



A **CPS** HANDBOOK

**Handbook for**  
**Process Safety in**  
**Laboratories and**  
**Pilot Plants**

**A Risk-based Approach**

**WILEY**



# **Handbook for Process Safety in Laboratories and Pilot Plants**

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**A Risk-based Approach**

Center for Chemical Process Safety  
American Institute of Chemical Engineers  
New York, NY



**WILEY**

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## Table of Contents

<b>List of Figures .....</b>	<b>x</b>
<b>List of Tables.....</b>	<b>xi</b>
<b>Abbreviations and Acronyms .....</b>	<b>xii</b>
<b>Glossary.....</b>	<b>xv</b>
<b>Acknowledgments .....</b>	<b>xxii</b>
<b>Dedication.....</b>	<b>xxiv</b>
<b>Online Materials Accompanying this Handbook.....</b>	<b>xxv</b>
<b>Preface .....</b>	<b>xxvii</b>
<b>Part 1 – Introduction and Overview .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1 Purpose and Scope .....</b>	<b>3</b>
1.1 Purpose .....	3
1.2 Scope of Book and Target Audience.....	4
1.3 Terms for Laboratories and Pilot Plants.....	5
1.4 Distinctions between Laboratories and Pilot Plants .....	7
1.5 Organization of This Handbook .....	8
<b>2 Managing Risk to Prevent Incidents.....</b>	<b>13</b>
2.1 Some LAPP Characteristics .....	13
2.2 Safety in Laboratories and Pilot Plants.....	24
2.3 Where to Start with a Risk-based Approach in the LAPP .....	25
2.4 Gain Leadership Support to Implement Risk Based Process Safety.....	29
2.5 Laboratory Safety Management System Considerations.....	29
2.6 Resources for Risk Based Process Safety Management System .....	31
<b>3 Leaks and Spills in the LAPP .....</b>	<b>35</b>
3.1 Leaks of Hazardous Materials .....	35
3.2 Spills of Hazardous Materials .....	38
<b>Part 2 – Committing to Process Safety .....</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>4 LAPP Risk Management Concepts .....</b>	<b>41</b>
4.1 Occupational Safety and Process Safety .....	41
4.2 Hierarchy of Controls.....	41
4.3 Inherently Safer Design (ISD).....	42
4.4 Basic Risk Concepts.....	44

4.5	A Risk Management Program .....	47
4.6	Anatomy of an Incident .....	48
4.7	Preventive and Mitigative Safeguards .....	49
4.8	Applying a Risk-Based Approach in a LAPP .....	51
<b>5</b>	<b>Process Safety Culture in the LAPP .....</b>	<b>55</b>
5.1	RBPS Element 1: Process Safety Culture .....	55
5.2	Leaders' Responsibilities for Positive Safety Culture .....	58
5.3	Resources and Examples for Process Safety Culture .....	59
<b>6</b>	<b>Standards for the LAPP .....</b>	<b>63</b>
6.1	RBPS Element 2: Compliance with Standards .....	63
6.2	Risk Management Focus .....	65
6.3	Different Codes and Standards When Scaling Up from Laboratory to Pilot Plant.....	65
6.4	Jurisdictional Requirements.....	67
6.5	Resources for Compliance with Standards .....	67
<b>7</b>	<b>Process Safety Competency and Training in the LAPP .....</b>	<b>69</b>
7.1	RBPS Element 3: Process Safety Competency .....	69
7.2	RBPS Element 12: Training and Performance Assurance .....	72
<b>8</b>	<b>Workforce Involvement and Stakeholder Outreach in the LAPP .....</b>	<b>79</b>
8.1	RBPS Element 4: Workforce Involvement .....	79
8.2	RBPS Element 5: Stakeholder Outreach .....	82
<b>Part 3</b>	<b>- Understanding Hazards and Risks .....</b>	<b>83</b>
<b>9</b>	<b>Process Safety Knowledge Management in the LAPP .....</b>	<b>85</b>
9.1	RBPS Element 6: Process Knowledge Management .....	85
9.2	Overview of Information and Data Needs .....	86
9.3	Sources of Information and Data.....	89
9.4	Process Safety Information during Scale-up.....	92
<b>10</b>	<b>Types of Hazards .....</b>	<b>95</b>
10.1	Reactive Chemistry Hazards .....	95
10.2	Toxicity Hazards .....	115
10.3	Flammability and Combustibility Hazards .....	121
10.4	Temperature Hazards.....	137
10.5	Overpressure Hazards.....	140
10.6	Other Common LAPP Hazards .....	142

<b>11 Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA) in the LAPP .....</b>	<b>153</b>
11.1 RBPS Element 7: Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis .....	153
11.2 HIRA Team Members.....	156
11.3 HIRA Approaches Used in LAPPs.....	156
11.4 Qualitative versus Quantitative Analysis of Risks in LAPPs.....	165
11.5 ACS Hazard Analysis Tools .....	168
11.6 Evaluating the Effort Level for HIRAs .....	168
11.7 Determining the Extent of the HIRAs.....	169
<b>Part 4 – Managing Risk: Engineered Controls .....</b>	<b>171</b>
<b>12 Spill and Leak Protection.....</b>	<b>173</b>
12.1 Containment.....	173
12.2 Flexible hose and tubing .....	173
<b>13 Fire and Over-Temperature Protection .....</b>	<b>175</b>
13.1 Fire Prevention .....	175
13.2 Fire Mitigation.....	183
13.3 Over-Temperature Protection .....	185
<b>14 Overpressure Prevention and Protection .....</b>	<b>191</b>
14.1 Pressure Protection for Equipment .....	191
14.2 Pressure and Vacuum Relief for Atmospheric Pressure Vessels.....	196
14.3 Process Conditions/Situations to Consider in Pressure Relief Device Design .....	197
14.4 Blast Containment Cells and Pressure Relief for Building Areas .....	198
14.5 Venting Location and Downstream Treatment of Material Vented .....	201
<b>15 Ventilation Controls.....</b>	<b>203</b>
15.1 Ventilation Systems.....	203
15.2 Laboratory Chemical Fume Hoods .....	205
15.3 Pilot Plant Ventilation .....	207
15.4 Permanent Total Enclosures for Containment in the LAPP .....	207
<b>16 Automated Shut-down Systems .....</b>	<b>209</b>
16.1 Selection and Design Based on Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis .....	209
16.2 Basic Control Systems and Safety Shut-down Systems.....	209
16.3 Independent Automated Safety Shut-down Systems.....	210
16.4 Fail-Safe Design Considerations.....	212
16.5 Important Design Features for Control Systems.....	212
16.6 Control of Changes and Maintenance for Engineered Safeguards.....	214
16.7 Additional References.....	215

<b>17</b>	<b>Engineered Controls for Common Hazards .....</b>	<b>217</b>
17.1	Cryogenic Fluids and Compressed Gases .....	217
17.2	Cryogenic Fluids and Compressed Gas Cylinders .....	218
17.3	Glass Equipment .....	228
17.4	Gloveboxes .....	228
	<b>Part 5 – Managing Risk: Administrative Controls.....</b>	<b>235</b>
<b>18</b>	<b>Administrative Fire and Explosion Safeguards .....</b>	<b>237</b>
18.1	Standards and Guidance for Fire Prevention .....	237
18.2	Ignition Source Control: Procedures.....	237
18.3	Manual Fire Suppression.....	238
<b>19</b>	<b>Administrative Safeguards for Hazards in LAPPs.....</b>	<b>239</b>
19.1	Good Practices for Compressed Gas and Cryogenic Cylinders .....	239
19.2	Regulations and Standards for Compressed Gases and Cryogenic Fluids .....	239
19.3	Procedures and Best Practices for Compressed Gases .....	241
19.4	Good Practices for Storage, Movement, and Use of Cryogenic Fluids .....	248
19.5	Good Practices For Handling Glass.....	251
19.6	Administrative Controls for Reactive Hazards.....	251
	<b>Part 6 – Managing Risk: RBPS Management Systems .....</b>	<b>253</b>
<b>20</b>	<b>Operating Procedures and Conduct of Operations in the LAPP .....</b>	<b>255</b>
20.1	RBPS Element 8: LAPP Operating Procedures.....	255
20.2	RBPS Element 15: Conduct of Operations .....	260
<b>21</b>	<b>Safe Work Practices and Contractor Management in the LAPP .....</b>	<b>263</b>
21.1	RBPS Element 9: Safe Work Practices .....	263
21.2	RBPS Element 11: Contractor Management .....	266
<b>22</b>	<b>Asset Integrity and Reliability in the LAPP.....</b>	<b>269</b>
22.1	RBPS Element 10: Asset Integrity and Reliability .....	269
22.2	A Management Approach for Assuring Asset Integrity and Reliability .....	270
22.3	Examples of Asset Integrity and Reliability Management System Failures.....	271
22.4	Glass Equipment—Asset Integrity and Reliability Challenge for LAPPs .....	274
<b>23</b>	<b>Management of Change (MOC) and Operational Readiness in the LAPP .....</b>	<b>277</b>
23.1	RBPS Element 13: Management of Change .....	277
23.2	RBPS Element 14: Operational Readiness.....	281

<b>24</b>	<b>Emergency Management in the LAPP .....</b>	<b>283</b>
24.1	RBPS Element 16: Emergency Management.....	283
24.2	Emergency Planning .....	283
24.3	Implementing an Emergency Management Plan .....	284
24.4	Emergency Equipment .....	285
24.5	Training and Drills .....	285
24.6	Deficiencies in Emergency Planning and Response in LAPP Cases .....	286
24.7	Controlling Unattended Experimental Work and Working Alone in LAPPs .....	288
	<b>Part 7 – Learning from Experience .....</b>	<b>291</b>
<b>25</b>	<b>Investigating Incidents .....</b>	<b>293</b>
25.1	Incident Terminology.....	293
25.2	RBPS Element 17: Incident Investigation.....	294
25.3	Steps of an Incident Investigation .....	295
25.4	Ensure Lessons Are Learned and Remembered .....	298
25.5	Learn from Experience of Others.....	298
<b>26</b>	<b>Metrics, Auditing, and Management Review in the LAPP .....</b>	<b>299</b>
26.1	RBPS Element 18: Measurement and Metrics .....	299
26.2	RBPS Element 19: Auditing.....	300
26.3	RBPS Element 20: Management Review and Continuous Improvement .....	302
	<b>Part 8 – Conclusion.....</b>	<b>305</b>
	<b>References .....</b>	<b>307</b>
<b>Appendix A</b>	<b>Cases .....</b>	<b>323</b>
<b>Appendix B</b>	<b>Examples.....</b>	<b>453</b>
<b>Appendix C</b>	<b>Control Banding Strategies.....</b>	<b>501</b>
<b>Appendix D</b>	<b>Glass Equipment Design .....</b>	<b>517</b>
	<b>Index.....</b>	<b>525</b>

**List of Figures**

Figure 1-1 Format for Case Summaries in Chapter .....	11
Figure 2-1 Laboratory Explosion and Fire Damage .....	23
Figure 2-2 Laboratory Fire and Water Damage .....	23
Figure 2-3 Laboratory Hood Fire Damage .....	24
Figure 2-4 Stages in the Risk-Based Journey to Process Safety Excellence .....	28
Figure 4-1 A Qualitative Risk Matrix .....	47
Figure 4-2 The “Swiss Cheese” Model .....	49
Figure 4-3 Bow Tie Diagram .....	50
Figure 10-1 Fire Triangle .....	121
Figure 10-2 Analysis of Heat Production and Removal for Exothermic Process .....	139
Figure 10-3 A Cryogenic Fluid Storage Dewar and Components .....	144
Figure 10-4 Damage Following the Explosion of a Liquid Nitrogen Dewar .....	145
Figure 11-1 The Steps in a Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA) .....	154
Figure 13-1 Manual Restart after Alarm Shutdown .....	188
Figure 14-1 Typical Pressure Relief Valve .....	193
Figure 14-2 Rupture Disk .....	194
Figure 14-3 Failed Rupture Disk in Holder from Supplier .....	195
Figure 14-4 Cross Section View of Typical Pressure Vacuum Protection Devices .....	197
Figure 14-5 Blast cell in a small standalone building .....	199
Figure 14-6 Barricade around a high pressure unit .....	199
Figure 17-1 Components and Markings on Compressed Gas Cylinders .....	219
Figure 17-2 Covered and Segregated Storage Areas for Compressed Gas Cylinders .....	221
Figure 17-3 Storage Examples for Gas Cylinders .....	223
Figure 17-4 Multiple cylinder hot box .....	224
Figure 17-5 Compressed Gas Cylinder Connection Design .....	225
Figure 17-6 Inert Gas Glovebox .....	229
Figure 17-7 Anaerobic Chamber for Biological Research .....	232
Figure 19-1 A CO <sub>2</sub> cylinder fell, sheared its valve and went through the roof .....	241
Figure 19-2 Poor Location of Supply Station for Gas Cylinders .....	242
Figure 19-3 Compressed Gas Supply Stations on Exterior of Lab Building .....	243
Figure 19-4 Utility Service Corridor with Compressed Gas Cylinder Storage .....	244
Figure 19-5 Individual Gas Cabinet Bank for Compressed Gas Supply .....	244
Figure 19-6 Walk-in or Floor-Mounted Ventilation Hood .....	245
Figure 19-7 Compressed Gas Cylinders with Fire Barrier and Chain Restraints .....	245
Figure 19-8 Liquid Nitrogen Storage Vessel Located Outside Lab Building .....	249
Figure 23-1 Review Stages in an MOC Program .....	281

**List of Tables**

Table 1-1 Framework for this Handbook .....	9
Table 1-2 The CCPS Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) Management System .....	10
Table 2-1 Fatal Incidents in LAPPs Resulting from Fires and Explosions .....	16
Table 2-2 Fatal Incidents in LAPPs Resulting from Exposure to Toxic Chemicals .....	18
Table 2-3 Fatal Incidents in LAPPs Resulting from Exposure to Biological Agents .....	19
Table 2-4 Fatal Incidents in LAPPs Resulting from Other Causes .....	20
Table 2-5 Fire Losses in Laboratory Buildings .....	21
Table 2-6 Comparison of LAPP Activities to the RBPS Elements .....	26
Table 2-7 Leader Accountabilities for Process Safety .....	32
Table 4-1 Description of Inherently Safer Design Strategies .....	43
Table 4-2 Argonne NL WPC Process Compared to the CCPS RBPS Model .....	53
Table 5-1 Incident Warning Signs to Detect Drift from Safety Management Systems .....	57
Table 7-1 Training for Select RBPS Elements .....	74
Table 8-1 US DOE Berkeley Lab Safety Culture .....	80
Table 9-1 Technical Information for Each Phase .....	88
Table 9-2 Control Banding Strategies .....	92
Table 10-1 Oxidizing Chemicals .....	101
Table 10-2 Pyrophoric Substances .....	106
Table 10-3 Decomposition Energies .....	108
Table 10-4 Toxicity Values for Selected Chemicals Commonly in Use in Industry .....	120
Table 10-5 Standards and Guidance for Specific Gases .....	131
Table 10-6 Classes of Hazardous Compressed and Liquefied Gases .....	146
Table 10-7 Guidance on Storage and Cleaning of Laboratory Glassware .....	150
Table 11-1 Hazard Analysis: High Temperature in Laboratory Reactor .....	158
Table 11-2 Reactive Chemical Hazards Questions for a Chemical Synthesis Process .....	160
Table 11-3 Hazards Analysis Methodologies Used in LAPPs .....	169
Table 13-1 NFPA Standards for Fire and Explosion Control .....	175
Table 13-2 Laboratory Cold Storage Unit Types .....	180
Table 17-1 Cryogenic Fluids and Typical Temperatures for Storage .....	220
Table 18-1 Standards for Explosions and Combustible Dusts .....	237
Table 19-1 Estimated Compressed Gas Delivery System Purging Cycles .....	248
Table 20-1 Skill, Rule, Knowledge Based Approach .....	257
Table 20-2 Procedural Statements to Address Deviations .....	259
Table 20-3 Checklist with Validation Steps (excerpt) .....	259
Table 25-1 Incident Investigation Steps .....	296

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACC	American Chemical Council
ACGIH	American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
ACH	Air Changes per Hour
ACS	American Chemical Society
AIChE	American Institute of Chemical Engineers
API	American Petroleum Institute
APIs	Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients
ASTM	American Society of Testing and Materials
CB	Control Banding
CCPS	Center for Chemical Process Safety
CFM	Cubic feet per minute
COO	Conduct of Operations
CPI	Chemical Process Industry
CSL	Chemical Safety Level
DOE	Department of Energy (US)
DOT	Department of Transportation (US)
EG	Exposure Guidelines
EHS	Environmental, Health, and (Occupational) Safety
ERPG	Emergency Response Planning Guideline
HEPA	High Efficiency Particulate Air [filter]
HHECB	Health Hazard Evaluation Control Band
HIRA	Hazards Identification and Risk Analysis
IDLH	Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health
IPL	Independent Protection Layer
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
LAPP	Laboratories and Pilot Plants
LC	Lethal Concentration
LFL	Lower Flammability Limit
LOPA	Layer of Protection Analysis
NASA	National Aeronautic and Space Administration (US)
NFPA	National Fire Protection Agency (US)
NIOSH	National Institute for Occupational Safety & Health (US)
NIST	National Institute of Science and Technology (US)
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (US)
OD	Operational Discipline

OEL	Occupational Exposure Limits (US OSHA)
P&ID	Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
PEL	Possible Exposure Limits (US OSHA)
PHA	Process Hazard Analysis
PI	Principal Investigator
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PTE	Permanent Total Enclosure
R&D	Research and Development
RBPS	CCPS Risk Based Process Safety
SDS	Safety Data Sheet
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
STEL	Short-Term Exposure Limit
TAM	Thermal Activity Monitor
TLV	Threshold Limit Value (for toxicity)
TWA	Time-Weighted Average
UFL	Upper Flammability Limit
US OSHA	US Occupational Safety and Health Administration
WPC	Work, Planning, and Control



## Glossary

This Glossary contains Process Safety terms unique to this CCPS publication. The CCPS Process Safety terms in this publication are current at the time of issue. For other CCPS Process Safety terms and updates to these terms, please refer to the CCPS Process Safety Glossary [1].

Term	Definition
Acceptable Risk	The average rate of loss that is considered tolerable for a given activity.
Accident (See Incident)	An incident that results in a significant consequence involving: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• human impact,</li><li>• detrimental impact on the community or environment,</li><li>• property damage, material loss,</li><li>• disruption of a company's ability to continue doing business or achieve its business goals</li></ul>
Biosafety Level (BSL)	A biological risk management category used to identify the protective measures needed in a laboratory setting to protect workers, the environment, and the public.
Causal Factor	A major unplanned, unintended contributor to an incident (a negative event or undesirable condition), that if eliminated would have either prevented the occurrence of the incident, or reduced its severity or frequency.
Competent	Individual having the necessary ability, knowledge, or skill to do something successfully [2].
Consequence	The undesirable result of a loss event, usually measured in health and safety effects, environmental impacts, loss of property, and business interruption costs.
Exothermic	A physical or chemical change accompanied by the evolution of heat.
Exothermic Reaction	A reaction involving one or more chemicals resulting in one or more new chemical species and the evolution of heat.
Explosion	A release of energy that causes a pressure discontinuity or blast wave.
Explosion	The bursting or rupture of an enclosure or container due to the development of internal pressure from a deflagration.
Finding	A conclusion reached by an auditor or investigator based upon data collected and analyzed during an audit or investigation. Note: Findings can be positive or negative. Negative Findings describe a deficiency or gap between the current state and the expected state.
Fire	A combustion reaction accompanied by the evolution of heat, light, and flame.

Term	Definition
Fire Triangle	[A triangle diagram showing] the three basic conditions that are required for a fire to take place. These conditions are fuel, oxygen, and heat.
Flash Fire	A fire that spreads by means of a flame front rapidly through a diffuse fuel, such as a dust, gas, or the vapors of an ignitable liquid, without the production of damaging pressure.
Hazard	An inherent chemical or physical characteristic that has the potential for causing damage to people, property, or the environment.
Hazard Identification	Part of the Hazards Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA) method in which the material and energy hazards of the process, along with the siting and layout of the facility, are identified so that a risk analysis can be performed on potential incident scenarios.
Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA)	A collective term that encompasses all activities involved in identifying hazards and evaluating risk at facilities, throughout their life cycle, to make certain that risks to employees, the public, or the environment are consistently controlled within the organization's risk tolerance.
Health Hazard Exposure Control Band (HHECB)	A risk-based approach used to help manage inhalation risks when exposed to new substances that have little or no available hazards information.
Hierarchy of controls	A way of determining which actions will best control exposures [3].
Impact	A measure of the ultimate loss and harm of a loss event. Note: Impact may be expressed as the number of injuries and/or fatalities, the extent of the environmental damage, or the magnitude of the loss, such as property damage, material loss, production loss, market share loss, and recovery costs.
Incident (See Accident)	An event, or series of events, resulting in one or more undesirable consequences, such as harm to people, damage to the environment, or asset/business losses. Or An unusual, unplanned, or unexpected occurrence that either resulted in, or had the potential to result in harm to people, damage to the environment, asset/business losses, or loss of public trust or stakeholder confidence in a company's reputation.
Kilo-prep lab	A lab used in scale-up between laboratory and pilot plant, with typical batch sizes of 2–3 kg. Often used to produce sufficient product for initial testing.

Term	Definition
Laboratory	A facility where the containers used for reactions, transfers and other handling of chemicals are designed to be easily and safely manipulated by one person. A laboratory is a workplace where chemicals are used or synthesized on a nonproduction basis [4].
Laboratory And Pilot Plant (LAPP)	A LAPP includes all laboratories, pilot plants, and research facilities that stand-alone or are a part of a commercial manufacturing site, government establishment, or academic institution.
Loss of Containment (or Loss of Primary Containment)	An unplanned or uncontrolled release of material from [primary] containment, including non-toxic and non-flammable materials (e.g., steam, hot condensate, nitrogen, compressed CO <sub>2</sub> or compressed air).
Mitigative Safeguard	A [safeguard] designed to interrupt the chain of events after a loss event, given that there has been a loss of containment of a hazardous material or energy. Note: Specific to a hazards evaluation of an incident sequence, a mitigative [safeguard] is in between the loss of event (the loss of containment) and the scenario's impact, helping reduce the consequences of the incident scenario, and thus, helping reduce the scenario's risk.
Near-miss	An incident in which an adverse consequence could potentially have resulted if circumstances had been slightly different.
Observation	A conclusion reached by an auditor based upon data collected and analyzed during the audit. Observations can be positive or negative. Negative Observations may indicate opportunities for improvement.
Pilot Plant	An experimental assembly of equipment for exploring process variables or for producing semi-commercial quantities of materials [4].
Polariscope	A polariscope is composed of two polarized lenses and a light source mounted behind one lens. The glass item to be examined is placed between two lenses and viewed through the lens opposite the light source lens. Note: Polariscopes work based on the principle of stress induced birefringence, the phenomenon in which light passing through a homogenous material under stress exhibits two refractive indices.

Term	Definition
Preventive safeguard	<p>A [safeguard] designed to interrupt the chain of events leading up to a loss event, given that an initiating event has occurred.</p> <p>Note: Specific to the hazards evaluation of an incident sequence, a preventive [safeguard] is in between the initiating event (the cause) and a loss event, helping reduce the frequency of the incident scenario, and thus, helping reduce the scenario's risk.</p>
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)	<p>An organized effort to identify and evaluate hazards associated with processes and operations to enable their control.</p> <p>This review normally involves the use of qualitative techniques to identify and assess the significance of hazards. Conclusions and appropriate recommendations are developed. Occasionally, quantitative methods are used to help prioritized risk reduction.</p>
Protection Layer	<p>A concept whereby a device, system, or human action is provided to reduce the likelihood and/or severity of a specific loss event.</p>
Qualitative Risk Analysis	<p>An analysis method based primarily on description and comparison using historical experience and engineering judgment, with little quantification of the hazards, consequences, likelihood, or level of risk.</p>
Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA)	<p>The systematic development of numerical estimates of the expected frequency and severity of potential incidents associated with a facility or operation based on engineering evaluation and mathematical techniques.</p>
Recommendation	<p>A proposed action intended to correct a deficiency that resulted in a Finding.</p>
Risk	<p>A measure of human injury, environmental damage, or economic loss in terms of both the incident likelihood and the magnitude of the injury or loss.</p> <p>Note: A simplified version of this relationship expresses risk as the product of the Frequency and the Consequence of an incident (i.e., Risk = Frequency times Consequence).</p>
Risk Analysis	<p>The estimation of scenario, process, facility and/or organizational risk by identifying potential incident scenarios, then evaluating and combining the expected frequency and impact of each scenario having a consequence of concern, then summing the scenario risks if necessary to obtain the total risk estimate for the level at which the risk analysis is being performed.</p>

Term	Definition
Risk Analysis	The estimation of scenario, process, facility, and/or organizational risk by identifying potential incident scenarios, then evaluating and combining the expected frequency and impact of each scenario having a consequence of concern, then summing the scenario risks to obtain the total risk estimate.
Risk Assessment	The process by which the results of a risk analysis (i.e., risk estimates) are used to make decisions, either through relative ranking of risk reduction strategies or through comparison with risk targets.
Risk Assessment	<p>The process by which the results of a risk analysis (i.e., risk estimates) are used to make decisions, either through relative ranking of risk reduction strategies or through comparison with risk targets.</p> <p>Note: The decision-making protocol may conclude:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The Risk is tolerable, no further action is needed</li> <li>2. Additional safeguards or protection layers should be considered</li> <li>3. The Risk is unacceptable, the activity as is should be discontinued</li> </ol>
Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS)	The Center for Chemical Process Safety's (CCPS) process safety management system approach that uses risk-based strategies and implementation tactics that are commensurate with the risk-based need for process safety activities, availability of resources, and existing process safety culture to design, correct, and improve process safety management activities.
Risk Management	The systematic application of management policies, procedures, and practices to the tasks of analyzing, assessing, and controlling risk in order to protect employees, the general public, the environment, and company assets, while avoiding business interruptions. Includes decisions to use suitable engineering and administrative controls for reducing risk.
Risk Management	The management systems, such as the those described in the CCPS RBPS program, that are integrated for use in managing operations, maintenance, and changes for the life of the process.

Term	Definition
Risk Matrix	<p>A [graphical approach to present the organization's] risk tolerance criteria, typically involving graduated scales of incident likelihood on the [ordinate] and incident consequences on the [abscissa]. Each cell in the [graph] (at intersecting values of incident likelihood and incident consequences) represents a particular risk level.</p> <p>Note: The <i>ordinate</i> refers to the (y) coordinate and the <i>abscissa</i> refers to the (x) coordinate of a standard two-dimensional graph.</p>
Risk Matrix	<p>A graphical presentation of the risk tolerance criteria, with the incident's likelihood plotted versus the incident's consequence.</p> <p>Note: Each intersecting cell represents the LAPP's tolerance criteria, ranging from acceptable risk to unacceptable risk. An example Risk Matrix is shown in Figure 4-1.</p>
Risk Reduction	Development, comparison, and selection of options to reduce risk to a target level, if needed, or as needed.
Risk Tolerance	The maximum level of risk of a particular technical process or activity that an individual or organization accepts to acquire the benefits of the process or activity.
Risk Tolerance Criteria	A predetermined measure of risk used to aid decisions about whether further efforts to reduce the risk are warranted.
Risk-based Approach	A quantitative risk assessment methodology used for building siting evaluation that takes into consideration numerical values for both the consequences and frequencies of explosion, fire, or toxic material release.
	The use of systematic methods to identify and control risks, ... initiated at the earliest stages of work proposal and remains in effect through all subsequent phases of work [5].
Root Cause	A fundamental, underlying, system-related reason why an incident occurred that identifies a correctable failure(s) in management systems. There is typically more than one root cause for every process safety incident.
Safeguard	Any device, system, or action that interrupts the chain of events following an initiating event or that mitigates the consequences.
Scenario	A detailed description of an unplanned event or incident sequence that results in a loss event and its associated impacts, including the success or failure of safeguards involved in the incident sequence.

Term	Definition
Toxic Hazard	A measure of the danger posed to living organisms by a toxic agent, determined not only by the toxicity of the agent itself, but also by the means by which it may be introduced into the subject organisms under prevailing conditions.
Toxicity	The quality, state, or degree to which a substance is poisonous and/or may chemically produce an injurious or deadly effect upon introduction into a living organism.
Worker	Any laboratory or pilot plant personnel who uses materials or procedures in their LAPP, including principle investigators, supervisors, students, lab technicians, pilot plant operators, staff, etc.,

## **Acknowledgments**

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## Dedication

CCPS Handbook for Process Safety in Laboratories and Pilot Plants

Is dedicated to

**Jerry Forest**



Jerry's focus and passion for Process Safety shines in his work and life. He is an indispensable contributor to CCPS's mission and he truly lives its tenets. His contributions on the leadership of the CCPS Planning Board have been and continue to be invaluable, as well.

Jerry's focus on practical applications shows through his activities. To Jerry, 'walk the line' is not a country song or movie, but a process safety initiative he led as Senior Director of Process Safety at Celanese and that he shared with the rest of the industry. Clear and concise communications are at the focus of this initiative. Eliminating errors by improving the conduct of operations is Jerry's belief—the operators must know with 100% certainty where energy will flow each time a processing unit change is made.

Jerry has been on many CCPS project committees, contributing his expertise to the CCPS body of knowledge. When the COVID-19 pandemic affected the process industry, Jerry was a key contributor on a CCPS panel on managing Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) during disruptive times. More recently, Jerry served as committee chair for the book *Introduction to Process Safety for Engineers, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition*. Jerry maintains his status as a CCPS Certified Process Safety Professional (CCPSC).

Jerry is a passionate believer in teaching and giving future engineers process safety knowledge. Currently, he teaches a course on process safety at the Louisiana State University, his Chemical Engineering alma mater.

CCPS is delighted to dedicate this book to Jerry in recognition for his past, present and continuing support of CCPS and the global process safety community.

*Anil Gokhale and Jennifer Bitz*

surface of a glass vessel wall). Rapid changes from hot to cold can be more harmful for brittle materials with surface defects because it generates tensile stresses on the rapidly cooled surface that may activate pre-existing micro-cracks and lead to wall failure as the cracks propagate.

Thicker glass is more prone to damage/failure as a result of rapid temperature changes because glass is such a poor thermal conductor. Jacketed glass vessels will often fail due to thermal stress at the junction of the two vessels (outer jacket and inner vessel). This is not where jacketed glass will fail due to pressure. Joint failures are due to several issues, and may be the single greatest source of containment failure in a glass system.

The Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) or safety review team should identify actions with laboratory glass equipment that could lead to thermal shock condition. This can be done by asking questions about the heating and cooling steps in the procedures. If these steps are done incorrectly or skipped entirely, thermal shock could result.

Connections to glass equipment involving materials with different thermal expansion coefficients can (and do) fail. When metal tubing or pipe is used for connections to glass equipment, differences in thermal expansion can induce stresses at the connection points. Thermal expansion of metal piping or tubing may be several times as much as that of borosilicate glass. As a result, lateral or perpendicular pipe and supports induce more shear and tensile stress on the glassware (already not good under stress), inducing cracks. Metal clamps and metal bolts used on glass joint connections will also expand more than the glass at a given temperature, effectively loosening connections, and thus allowing vapors to be released and bottom fittings to leak and drip. Heating and cooling of pressure joints need to be controlled, and the fittings tightened or loosened in stages to assure containment and to avoid over-stressing the glass at the connection. Polariscopes again could be used to detect such stress points in glass. This is difficult and unreliable even for the most experienced users.



## Index

- academic, 30, 50, 53, 58, 64, 100, 102, 103, 118, 170, 258, 265, 282, 287, 301
- acetylene, 17, 131, 132, 133, 134, 451
- animal, 116, 369, 506
- asset integrity and reliability, 13, 63, 214, 247, 250, 269–76, 295
- audit, 300–302, 304, 498
- basic process control system, 209
- biological risk. *See* biosafety
- biosafety, 501–15
- Chemical Safety Level (CSL), 96, 503–4
- combustibility. *See* flammability
- competency, 69–72
- compliance with standards, 63–67, 67, 131, 142, 175, 203, 237, 239
- compressed gas, 130–36, 143–47, 218–28, 239–48, 370, 398, 451, 480, 485, 486, 487
- Conduct of Operations (COO), 260–62
- confined space, 264
- contractor management, 266–67
- control banding, 91–92, 501–15
- corrosion, 36, 98, 142, 217, 347
- cryogenic, 131, 142, 143–47, 218, 220, 231, 239–41, 248–51
- drill, emergency, 184, 285–86, 287, 338, 348
- emergency management, 283–90
- enterprise risk management. *See* ISO 31000
- exothermic reaction, 44, 76, 95, 97, 109, 114, 137–40, 160, 165, 212, 348, 352, 373, 376, 390, 448, 450
- experiment, unattended, 14, 184, 211, 288, 337, 358, 411
- fire. *See* flammability, *See* flammability
- fire hazard rating, 502–3
- fire prevention, 175–83, 237, 354
- flammability, 15, 16, 31, 56, 68, 71, 121–36, 166, 175, 182, 200, 480, 502, 515
- fume hood, 17, 64, 118, 205–7, 384
- glass, 147–51, 228, 251, 274–76, 488, 517–23
- glovebox, 21, 128, 228–34, 356, 359
- hazard, 45
- Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA), 70, 210, 283, 469, 481, 483, 498, 501
- hierarchy of controls, 50, 171, 235
- hot work permit, 264
- hydrogen, 16, 30, 81, 107, 122, 131, 132, 133, 134, 233, 272, 288, 334, 364, 371, 376, 396, 405, 442
- incident investigation, 293–98, 497
- incompatibility, 37, 96, 104, 220, 251
- Inherently Safer Design (ISD), 125, 355, 397
- ISO 31000, 52
- Lockout / Tagout (LOTO), 264, 437
- Management of Change (MOC), 206, 214, 277–81, 289
- management review, 58, 80, 302–4
- management system, 10, 29, 32, 54, 57, 304, 453
- metrics, 298–300
- NFPA 45, 6, 66, 129, 203, 240
- novelty, 168, 170, 501
- occupational safety, 41, 54, 59, 65, 80, 260, 296
- operating procedure, 63, 163, 233, 255–60, 295
- Operational Discipline (OD). *See* Conduct of Operations (COO)
- operational readiness, 281–82

- overpressure, 140–42, 164, 166, 189–201, 218, 231, 332, 372, 445, 449, 450, 494
- overpressure protection, 225, *See*
- oxygen, 17, 30, 125, 131, 132, 133, 136, 146, 217, 327, 439
- process knowledge management, 85–91, 498
- process safety culture, 55–61, 79, 82, 200, 296, 305
- process safety information, 92, 277
- reactive chemistry, 95–115, 140, 159, 161–65, 376, 473, 476–79
- regulation, 63, 94, 239, 304
- risk, 45, 47, 64, 65, 171, 235, 253
- Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS), 3, 9, 29, 31, 51, 65
- risk matrix, 45–47
- safe work practices, 263–65
- safety culture. *See* process safety culture
- scale-up, 58, 85, 92–94, 104, 137, 164, 331, 376, 393, 418, 465, 505
- silane, 17, 105, 131, 132, 133, 135
- spill, 38, 173, 299, 379, 475, 495
- stakeholder outreach, 82
- standards. *See* compliance with standards
- thermal expansion, 35, 141, 191, 250
- toxicity, 15, 18, 460, 91–92, 504
- training, 72–77, 255, 285–86, 456
- ventilation, 222, 227, 230, 245, 384, 464, 480
- work permit. *See* safe work practices
- workforce involvement, 56, 79–81