Contributions to Political Science

Brian Williams

Anarchism and Social Revolution

An Anarchist Politics of the Transitionary State

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To Renee, for keeping me company at this moment of mankind's middle age.

Preface

This Book's Purpose

Transformative Goals

How can societies maximize freedom and equality (or equal liberty, more tersely) in the context of the modern sovereign state system? This is the central research question motivating this book. This question, perhaps because it is so basic, has been obscured, it seems, by a welter of intriguing but more-or-less desultory queries regarding various aspects of our individual and political lives. However, the current historical moment calls for revisiting the basic question, and refreshing our shared sense of purpose and direction. The malaise and morbid symptoms of the current historical moment reflect our failure thus far to do so.

As this book's title suggests, its argument focuses on the topic of *anarchism* – the social movement which aims to maximize equal liberty – as well as *social revolution* which, it will be argued, is needed to advance the cause of equal liberty beyond the current state of affairs. The sub-title of the book was inspired by John Clark's recognition, in his book *Between Earth and Empire*, of the "need for an anarchist politics of the transitional state" – something I seek to provide with this book. Like Murray Bookchin's book *The Ecology of Freedom*, which he describes as having an "unabashed messianic character," this book is highly ambitious. Specifically, this book contributes to transformative change in four domains:

1. *Anarchist philosophy* – this book's new perspective on anarchism has the potential to enhance anarchism's popularity, rendering it suitable as a new cultural paradigm by clarifying its often murky relationship with mainstream political participation, and more adequately addressing concerns about bad anarchy.
2. *Cultural paradigm shift* – the book advances a new paradigm – libertarian social democracy – with a vision and level of ambition proportional to the demands of the current historical moment. Such bold ideas are needed to overcome the

current crises of neoliberalism and liberal democracy, and to continue the historical march toward equal liberty.
3. *US politics* – the book presents a rigorous argument for social revolution in the United States, which will be needed to fully address its own contemporary policy problems and to catalyze a broader paradigm shift, potentially reviving the view of the United States as a city upon a hill (to borrow Winthrop's phrase).
4. *Interdisciplinarity* – as a byproduct of these goals, the book also promotes a new interdisciplinarity between anarchism and comparative politics conducive to breakthroughs in both fields: a new normative sense of direction for political scientists beyond liberal democracy, and an enhanced anarchist understanding about how institutional choices can affect anarchist progress.

A New Perspective on Anarchism

A key development in this book's argument was learning about prefigurative principle and its centrality to anarchism. As some readers may be aware, the prefigurative principle (as applied to anarchism) emphasizes the need to incorporate the anarchist goal of non-domination into everyday praxis and life, thereby increasingly realizing the anarchist goal of freedom and equality (or equal liberty) in the here-and-now, rather than waiting for one big revolutionary event in the by-and-by.

One of the basic implications of prefigurative strategy is a more-or-less strict prohibition on the use of state power as an instrument for anarchist progress. Thus, learning about prefigurative anarchism brought into relief how the gradualist perspective presented in this book contrasted with the traditional anarchist view that states are more-or-less incapable of facilitating a transition to a free and equal society. Indeed, even liberal democratic states may help to stabilize upper-class rule, and thus make equal liberty more difficult to achieve.

There are two central arguments made in this book that go against conventional anarchist thinking, but also connect anarchism to comparative politics (as explained in Chap. 1). First, state-based institutions can potentially be more conducive to equal liberty maximization than the decentralized or non-state counterfactual. Second, some (state-based) political institutions are more conducive to anarchist progress than others. This book's argument assumes that state-based political institutions can be used consciously (i.e., through direct involvement) to promote equal liberty (understood as anarchism's central aim), but only after a successful social revolution in the political, economic, and cultural realms (where needed to maximize equal liberty).

Revolution in the United States

In addition to its contribution to political philosophy, this book also seeks to promote actual change in the real world. In other words, this book engages with both theory (Part I) and praxis (Part II). With regard to the latter objective, the book focuses primarily on the United States, for a few reasons. First, as the most powerful country in the world, transformative change within the United States is essential not only to its own domestic policy reforms, but also broader changes at the international level. Also, as a lifelong US citizen, I am in a better position to analyze social affairs in the United States.

Over the course of this book's development, conditions in the United States have become increasingly ripe for its revolutionary argument: a long list of deeply rooted policy problems, the failure of the two-party system to adequately address the major issues, popular support for transformative change, and crises associated with the contemporary neoliberal and liberal democratic paradigms. While the broader objectives advocated in this book – anarchism and social revolution – may strike some as too radical, it will be argued that the current historical moment calls for transformative changes of this magnitude, rather than reformist politics-as-usual.

One advantage of focusing on transformative change is that it shifts the reader's attention away from politics-as-usual in the United States, and toward the larger historical context. Contemporary US politics seem characterized by a combination of right-wing distortions (lies, half-truths, spin, etc.) and threats to our basic rights, as well as a liberal preoccupation with reformism and attempts to counter those distortions and threats, thus allowing the right wing to control the agenda. As Hacker and Pierson observed during the Trump presidency, "Almost everything we read today is about [president Trump] and his outrages." This book transcends this depressing and futile situation, refocusing our attention on the bigger picture and charting a path toward real solutions to today's social problems.

Argument Characteristics

Primarily a Work in Political Philosophy

Overall, this book could more accurately be characterized as a work in political philosophy than a work in political theory. By *political philosophy* I mean, basically, rigorous normative argumentation regarding social affairs. In a similar vein, Leo Strauss, in his 1957 article "What is Political Philosophy?," described political philosophy as the pursuit of knowledge about the good life and good society. By contrast, *political theory* is sometimes understood as exegesis, or the development and application of methodological approaches to the interpretation of canonical texts (see, for example, Chapter 4 of John Gunnell's 1979 book *Political Theory: Tradition and Interpretation*). Of course, these two approaches are not mutually

exclusive: political philosophy often involves the interpretation of canonical texts, and authors focusing on the interpretation of canonical texts often seek to advance their own normative arguments.

In line with political theory's emphasis on interpretation, this book's argument aims to build upon existing works from several fields, especially anarchist philosophy and political science. In that sense, the argument reflects what Raekstad and Gradin refer to as *rational reconstruction*, according to which they "take an ongoing body of ideas and practices as our point of departure" and then aim to "make sense of the large, and at times complicated literature" on the topic. However, while I have sought to incorporate and build on the relevant existing theory, my own argument has remained "behind the wheel" of this book throughout its evolution (consistent with the practice of political philosophy, as described above).

Rationalist and Constructivist Methodologies

Just as one can find aspects of both political theory and political philosophy in this book's argument, so too can one find elements of both rationalist and constructivist methodologies. *Rationalism*, or rational choice theory, is positivist in nature. At the individual level, it emphasizes the goal of utility maximization (via cost/benefit analyses), processes of strategic interaction, as well as collective action problems. This book reflects a rationalist outlook in its recognition of collective action problems arising over public goods provision as well as revolutionary strategy.

In contrast to the rationalist emphasis on individual self-interest and strategic interaction, *constructivism* focuses primarily on the power of ideas as well as the historical dialectical process unfolding at the structural level. While rationalist methods (including rational choice theory) focus on individual's self-interests and remain normatively neutral, constructivist methodology, as I understand it, involves analyzing as well as promoting historical progress. From the perspective of libertarian social democracy – the central idea advanced in this book – history tends toward equal liberty maximization, although such developments depend crucially on individual choices.

A Weakly Deterministic Philosophy of History

As will be discussed further in the introductory chapter, the philosophy of history underpinning this book's methodology can be described as *weakly deterministic*. That term is adopted from Fukuyama's 1992 book *The End of History and the Last Man*, where it was used to emphasize the importance of both structural or macro-level developments [constructivism], as well as individual choice and agency [rationalism] in shaping the actual course of history.

With regard to modern historical developments, one can identify dialectical processes (thesis-antithesis-synthesis) roughly corresponding to this book's argument in the three primary realms of social life. In the political realm, this is reflected in the historical progression from the modern sovereign state, to classical anarchism, to the democratic transitionary state. In the economic realm, this is reflected in the progression from capitalism, to socialism, to the libertarian mixed economy. In the cultural realm, this is reflected in the transition from absolutism, to classical liberalism, to libertarian social democracy.

In *The Ecology of Freedom*, Bookchin emphasizes that the goal of philosopher Georg Hegel's dialectics is to comprehend "the whole" or totality, rather than the methodological process of thesis-antithesis-synthesis itself. According to this book's argument, historical developments within each of the three aforementioned realms converge into the larger social system which I will refer to as libertarian social democracy. That is, libertarian social democracy is the paradigmatic idea which subsumes more specific developments in the political, economic, and cultural realms. I also make use of the Hegelian term *summum bonum* a few times in the book, in reference to equal liberty maximization as a historical destination and teleological end-point.

Referencing and Citation Style

Many publications were reviewed over the course of this book's development, and it relies heavily on substantiating quotes and references from a variety of sources. There are a few advantages to this approach. First, conducting an extensive literature review allows one to "stand on the shoulders of giants" (Isaac Newton's expression) and, relatedly, to avoid "reinventing the wheel" with regard to the ideas expressed. Second, conducting a thorough literature review mitigates the challenge of presenting a radical argument while still being viewed as an adult in the room, by raising awareness of potential pitfalls, nuance, and counterarguments. A third benefit is more diffuse: a thorough literature review is more likely to alert readers to useful sources on topics of interest, facilitating stronger contributions to theory building.

Despite the large number of publications reviewed, given the broad nature of this book's central topics (anarchism and social revolution) and the vast amount of relevant scholarship on those and more specific subsumed topics, some relevant works will not be reviewed in time for this book's publication. Consequently, some worthy publications will remain unengaged, and some important theoretical nuance possibly overlooked.

With regard to the many references included, scholarly publications (books and peer-reviewed journal articles) are cited parenthetically within the text followed by a full works cited section at the end of each chapter. Brackets are occasionally added within parenthetical citations to indicate the original publication year of an older work, and within quotes to distinguish my own words from those drawn directly

from the source. All online sources (op-eds, news briefs, reports, and some articles) are fully cited in footnotes rather than the list of works cited (Chap. 6 especially relies on many online sources). Most of the online sources cited are either politically neutral mainstream news sources such as the British Broadcasting Corporation and the Pew Research Center, or news updates from left-of-center sources such as *Democracy Now*. There are also some references to conservative online sources such as the *New York Post*, although these are fewer in number.

Roadmap

Part I of this book presents a vision of anarchism and is separated into four chapters. Chapter 1 sketches out a historical context, provides an overview of the book's argument, and describes the potential interdisciplinarity between anarchism and comparative politics. That is followed by chapters focusing on anarchism in the political (Chap. 2), economic (Chap. 3), and cultural realms (Chap. 4). Part II focuses on social revolution, especially in the United States. Chapter 5 lays out an elite-class theoretic alternative to the pluralist paradigm, thus providing a foundation for Chaps. 6, 7, and 8. Chapter 6 aims to demonstrate the moral justification for revolutionary (as opposed to reformist) change. Chapter 7 discusses revolutionary objectives in the political, economic, and cultural realms. Chapter 8 presents an argument for revolutionary as opposed to a reformist or hybrid strategy. The concluding chapter summarizes key aspects of the book's argument and contribution.

Acknowledgments

This book has taken several years to complete. I began developing it in the late 2016 while a post-doctoral researcher at the University of West Florida in Pensacola. The book expands on two articles which themselves developed over the course of several years. Those articles, which I began while a doctoral student at the University of California, Riverside, focused separately on the topics of social revolution and anarchism, and were eventually published in the journal *Theory in Action* in 2016 and 2018, respectively.

Along the way, there have been several individuals whose help, whether direct or indirect, contributed to the gradual development of this book and should therefore be acknowledged. While an undergraduate at California State University in San Marcos (CSUSM) in 2006, visiting professor Anthony O'Halloran introduced me to the Good Friday Agreement in his class on the politics of Northern Ireland, and thus sparked my interest in comparative politics and, more specifically, the fascinatingly paradoxical idea that proportional representation (and a multi-party system) can help to promote legislative consensus building. Meanwhile, Dr. Cyrus Masroori, professor of political science at CSUSM, introduced me to anarchist philosophy by

assigning Mikhail Bakunin's *God and the State* in one of his political theory courses I'd taken.

At the University of California in Riverside (UCR), where I eventually acquired my PhD in political science in 2014, Professor John Laursen provided useful comments on one of my aforementioned *Theory in Action* articles titled "States as Instruments of Anarchism," and assigned it as a reading in his graduate seminar on anarchism during the Spring 2016 semester. I also appreciate insightful feedback on an early version of that paper from my acquaintances Matthew Snyder and Brian Kim while attending UCR. Thanks are also owed to another acquaintance Dan Mages for allowing me to present an early version of my article on social revolution in his class at Golden West Community College in Huntington Beach California in 2014. I also appreciate the opportunity to present the early version of that article at the James C. Young Colloquium, organized by the Student Association of Graduate Anthropologists (SAGA) at UCR, in March of 2014.

I should also acknowledge the assistance of philosophy professor Nicholas Power at the University of West Florida, where I worked as a postdoctoral research associate during the 2016–17 academic year. Professor Power provided useful comments on the anarchism manuscript shortly before it was accepted for publication in *Theory in Action*. I also wish to thank John Asimakopoulos, editor of *Theory in Action*, who accepted my two aforementioned studies for publication, and for providing an opportunity to guest-edit a special issue of that journal on anarchism and democracy, published in January of 2020, further enhancing my understanding of the topics.

Nearer to completion of the manuscript, I received valuable suggestions from Markus Lundström and Leonard Williams as well, for which I am grateful. Finally, I wish to thank the three anonymous reviewers for useful comments and suggestions, as well as Lorraine Klimowich and Rahul Srinivasan at Springer for helping me through the editorial process. Without the help of those individuals, this book would not have achieved the level of quality that it has. Finally, it should also be mentioned that I bear full responsibility for any imperfections – author misrepresentations, theoretical oversights, holes in the argument, factual inaccuracies, etc. – found in the following chapters.

Cortland, NY, USA Brian Williams

Contents

About the Author

Brian Williams is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at SUNY Cortland where he teaches classes in political research methods, comparative politics, and international relations. His recent empirical research has analyzed direct democracy and voter turnout, the electoral connection between voters and representatives, as well as governing coalition agreements. His work in political philosophy examines the interrelationship between anarchism and democracy. His work has been published in *The Social Science Journal*, *Representation*, *Political Science Research and Methods*, *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, and *Theory in Action*.

Part I
Anarchism

Chapter 1
The Arc of History

1.1 Introduction

In this introductory chapter, I provide a historical context for the book's argument, focusing on the rise of the modern sovereign state and capitalism, the spread of liberal democracy, perspectives on modernity, and a brief discussion about contemporary systemic crises and opportunities for a paradigm shift. I then introduce the argument at the heart of this book, libertarian social democracy, emphasizing its contrasts with traditional (prefigurative) anarchism, as well as its essential distinctions from political liberalism and Marxism. That is followed by an overview of the philosophy of history underpinning this book's argument, and a discussion of the potential benefits of a new interdisciplinarity between anarchism and comparative politics as a byproduct of libertarian social democracy.

1.2 Historical Context

Rise of the Modern Sovereign State

Before the Modern Era

The modern era, as I use the term here, follows the late Middle Ages, a transition which took place around the seventeenth century (using the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which marked the end of the Reformation and formally recognized the principle of state sovereignty, as a fulcrum between the two eras). The prevailing definition of the sovereign state was provided by German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920), who described it as a political association with a monopoly on the

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legitimate use of physical force within some clearly demarcated territory.[1] Many contemporary nation-states do not fully exhibit the main attributes of the modern state as Weber defined it (Morris, 2020). Weber's definition of the sovereign state is thus better understood as an ideal type that national political associations more-or-less closely approximate today. In their review of pre-modern political associations, Graeber and Wengrow (2021) identify three dimensions of state power: (i) sovereignty (the monopoly on the use of violence), (ii) knowledge (public administration or bureaucracy), and (iii) charisma (political competition).

Ancient kingdoms and state-like entities have been found in various parts of the world, such as Athens, Greece (Bookchin, 2005, p. 165). In the Middle East, the Giza pyramids, built during the Fourth Dynasty of the Old Kingdom of Ancient Egypt (2600–2500 BC) are indicative of some sort of state (Graeber & Wengrow, 2021, p. 403). In the case of the Old Kingdom of Ancient Egypt, sovereignty and bureaucracy had been established over a large territory (ibid, p. 507). The Hebrew monarchies also constituted an early type of state (Bookchin, 2005, p. 165). In Mesopotamia (modern-day Iraq), king burials (evidence of monarchy) were found in the early dynastic city-state of Ur (3800–500 BC), although "the rulers of ancient Mesopotamian city-states made no direct claims to sovereignty" (Graeber & Wengrow, 2021, p. 507). Evidence of a state-like entity has also been found in Sumeria, southern Mesopotamia (Bookchin, 2005, p. 165).

Turning to Asia, king burials have also been found in the late Shang Dynasty in China (roughly 1200–1000 BC) (Graeber & Wengrow, 2021, p. 399). Another early political association with sovereign state characteristics was Eastern Zhou Dynasty in China from 770 to 256 BCE (Fukuyama, 2011). State-like entities also existed in Southeast Asia over 2000 years ago (Diamond, 1997, p. 278). King burials were also found in the Kerma polity in Nubia near the Nile River (2500–1500 BC) (Graeber & Wengrow, 2021, p. 399). In West Africa, evidence of state-like associations from over 1000 years ago has been found (Diamond, 1997, p. 278). Meanwhile, in the Americas, signs of early states have been discovered in Mesoamerica (present-day Mexico to Nicaragua) dating to around 300 BCE, and in the Andes region from over 2000 years ago (Diamond, 1997, p. 278).

Different types of associations and societies pre-dating the modern sovereign state include bands, families, clans, tribal federations, villages, and municipalities (Bookchin, 2005, p. 71). According to Bookchin, "the dissolution of organic societies into hierarchical, class, and political societies occurred unevenly and erratically, shifting back and forth over long periods of time" (p. 70). For instance, "Until the emergence of nation-states in England, France, and Spain between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, Europe was comparatively free of the despotisms and bureaucracies that coated the social life of North Africa, the Near East, and Asia" (p. 336). At the time of the Spanish conquest in the fifteenth century, "The general consensus

[1] Anticipating Weber's definition, protestant philosopher Johannes Althusius ([1614] 1995, pp. 69–71) described sovereignty as, "the right of a major state or power as contrasted with the right that is attributed to a city or a province," adding that, "This power of the realm, or of the associated bodies, is always one power and never many."

is that there were only two unambiguous 'states' in the Americas […] the Aztecs and the Inca" (Graeber & Wengrow, 2021, p. 370).

According to Karl Marx, the modern political state emerged with the end of feudalism (Markell, 2003, p. 129). Feudalism was the primary social structure in Western Europe until the French Revolution in 1792 (Magone, 2019, p. 33) and in Russia until the end of the nineteenth century (Piketty, 2020, p. 63). Feudal structures can be roughly divided into three social strata or "estates" (as they were called in France). The first estate consisted of the clergy (*oratores*) including religious and intellectual elites. The second estate consisted of the nobility (*bellatores*), a privileged social class of knights, lords, and/or landed gentry. The third estate consisted of the commoners (*laboratores*) such as peasants, serfs, artisans, and eventually the bourgeoisie as an intermediate class. Atop this hierarchy sat a monarch or emperor. In the Middle Ages, most monarchs had to share power with the nobility in a decentralized system. By contrast, following the Norman invasion in 1066, all lords were vassals of the English monarchy who owned all the land (Magone, 2019, p. 33). Premodern ternary arrangements were also found in many non-European societies (e.g., China and Japan) and religious associations (Hindu as well as Shi'a and Sunni Muslim) (Piketty, 2020, pp. 51–2).

Emergence of the Modern Sovereign State System

Early forms of state power such as the Roman Empire, Abbasid Caliphate, and the Persian and Chinese empires can be distinguished from the modern State which "arguably gestated in the Italian city-states of the late Middle Ages" (Laursen, 2021, p. 55). The rise of the European nation-state in the late Middle Ages coincided with the decline of the universalistic Catholic Church. This process was hastened by the Renaissance and scientific revolution, which drove a wedge between the Church and the political world when it was discovered that the Earth rotates around the sun (Magone, 2019, p. 34). The decline of the papacy was also hastened by the Reformation, led by such individuals as Martin Luther (1483–1546) in Germany. Foreshadowing the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, the 1555 Augsburg Peace declared that each state of the German Empire could accept either Lutheranism or Catholicism, based on the principle *cuius regio, eius religio* – each region, the respective religion (Magone, 2019, p. 34).

The transition from the late Middle Ages to the early modern era involved the triumph of the sovereign state over other types of political association such as the universalistic Church, the city-state, the Hanseatic League in northern Germany (Spruyt, 1994), and stateless indigenous communities (Scott, 2009). The modern sovereign state began to develop in Western Europe in the late fifteenth century (Prichard, 2016, p. 130), continuing through the seventeenth century (Spruyt, 1994), and into the nineteenth century with the unification of Italy in 1861 and Germany in 1871. From the sixteenth through the end of the twentieth century, the number of states in Europe had consolidated from 500 to 25 (Bale, 2017, p. 6).

Focusing on fiscal capabilities, Piketty (2020, pp. 368–9) observes that the first "great leap forward" in the development of the modern state occurred between 1500 and 1800 among the leading states of Europe, which increased their tax revenues from 1% to 8% of national income. That process coincided with the rise of Euro-American slavery, "ownership societies" at home, and colonial empires abroad. The second leap forward took place between 1910 and 1980, when the rich countries as a group increased tax revenues from eight to between 30% and 50% of national income. Blending political, economic, and cultural features, Laursen (2021, pp. 69–79) identifies six iterations of states over the past 500 years: dynastic state, commercial oligarchy, national state, one-party state, social-democratic state, and the present-day neoliberal state.

The European sovereign state model was eventually exported to the western hemisphere, most of Africa, as well as many countries in the Middle East and Asia via colonization (Herbst, 2000; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). The subsequent waves of decolonization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries transferred sovereignty to those newly independent states, consolidating the modern state system. The sovereign state is now the predominant type of political association around the world.

Pre-modern states and quasi-states "were not as invasive of community life at the base of society as is the modern state, with its mass media, highly sophisticated surveillance systems, and its authority to supervise almost every aspect of personal life" (Bookchin, 2005, p. 165). With the gradual consolidation of state power, aided by technological advancements, it is now very difficult to find spaces of refuge from state power (Scott, 2009). As Gelderloos (2016, p. 174) notes, "[modern states] are now global and cannot be fled in the proper sense." According to Diamond (1997, p. 278), "The political, economic, and social institutions most familiar to us today are those of states, which now rule all of the world's land area except for Antarctica." In a similar vein, Pettit (2014, p. 117) asserts that "there is no effectively stateless zone left on earth […] You are condemned to life in a polity as a matter of historical necessity." Autonomous zones established within state boundaries, such as the *Zone a défendre* (ZAD) in France,[2] the *Exarchia* in Greece,[3] the territory held by the

[2] Willsher, K. (2017, December 28). *End of la ZAD? France's 'utopian' anti-airport community faces bitter last stand*. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/dec/28/end-of-la-zad-frances-utopian-anti-airport-community-faces-bitter-last-stand

[3] Crabapple, M. (2020, January 20). *The Attack on Exarchia, An Anarchist Refuge in Athens*. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-attack-on-exarchia-an-anarchist-refuge-in-athens

Kurdish *Yekineyen Parastina Gel* (YPG) militia in Northern Syria,[4] or the Capital Hill Autonomous Zone in Seattle,[5] tend to be disrupted by the state.[6]

Emergence of State Capitalism

Capitalism and Trade Before the Industrial Revolution

In the economic realm, the rise of modern sovereign states roughly coincided with the emergence of capitalist economic systems. Many pre-state societies relied on the principle of *usufruct* – the sharing of resources – in contrast to early-modern ideas such as communal property, reciprocity, and mutual aid (Bookchin, 2005, p. 117). Many mutual aid organizations would eventually be replaced by state welfare systems, as Kropotkin explains in *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution*.[7] Some early Eurasian cities (3500–1600 BCE) such as Uruk and Harappa engaged in trade relations, as did Aboriginal Californians (Graeber & Wengrow, 2021, pp. 142–3). However, such practices should not be confused with capitalism, which involves "constant reinvestment, turning one's wealth into an engine for creating ever more wealth" (ibid, p. 178).

Piketty (2020, p. 971) describes capitalism as "the extension of proprietarianism [a political ideology based on the absolute defense of private property] to the age of large scale industry, international finance, and more recently to the digital economy." According to Piketty (2020, p. 369), "the development of the centralized [European] state coincided with the transformation of ternary [feudal] societies into ownership societies, accompanied by the rise of proprietarian [capitalist] ideology and based on strict separation of regalian powers [the state] from property rights."

According to Price (2013, p. 69), the first stage of capitalism ("primitive accumulation") began as early as the fourteenth century and reached its high point in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. Nascent signs of capitalism are found in the Hanseatic League of northern Europe in the late-twelfth century (Spruyt, 1994, pp. 120–1), and in the dynamic urban centers of the Netherlands and northern

[4] British Broadcasting Corporation. (2019, October 10). *Turkey Syria offensive: Heavy fighting on second day of assault.* https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49998035

[5] British Broadcasting Corporation. (2020, June 22). *Seattle to end police-free protest zone after shootings.* https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53146258

[6] Autonomous zones such as that in Rojava may also be tolerated by the central government at least for a certain period (Clark, 2019, p. 130). As another exception, in 2012, collective ownership of the Christiania neighborhood in Denmark was achieved in a deal with the City of Copenhagen (Nielsen, 2020, p. 146).

Also, the autonomous zone of the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico has been sustained since 1994 at a relatively large scale (Raekstad & Gradin, 2020, p. 84).

[7] Kropotkin, P. (1902). *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution*. The Anarchist Library. Retrieved Aug. 10, 2021, from https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/petr-kropotkin-mutual-aid-a-factor-of-evolution

city-states of Italy in the late Middle Ages (Magone, 2019, p. 34). Also noteworthy, England's Act of Union with Scotland in 1707 introduced "new principles of free market capitalism across the country" (ibid, p. 37).

Even with the rise of liberal (laissez-faire) capitalism, a minimal state was commonly viewed as essential to economic development, especially for the clarification and protection of property rights. For instance, John Locke felt that the government and the state were justified by the need to protect private property (paraphrased by Reagan, 2021, p. 75). Even in the nineteenth century at "the height of [capitalism's] well-being as a system, [when] it relied mainly on market forces" (Price, 2013, p. 69), the state played an important role in establishing property rights. For example, although there was little government regulation of the railways in Britain following "Railway Mania" in the 1840s, Acts of Parliament set up new railway companies and charters recognized private ownership.[8] Given this close relationship between capitalism and the state, I will refer to the modern sovereign state and capitalist economic systems jointly as *state capitalism*.[9]

Industrial Revolution and Manchester Capitalism

During the early-modern stages of capitalist development, some European states, such as England (beginning in the early seventeenth century), passed enclosure laws, which clarified property rights over parcels of land previously held in common, pressuring many peasants to migrate to emergent urban centers where the industrial revolution was taking shape. Supporters of the Enclosure Acts and industrialization argued such developments were essential for meeting the needs of the burgeoning populations of Western Europe.[10] Indeed, early modern tools such as the wheel, kiln, smelter, and loom "provided an increasing abundance of food, clothing, shelter, tools, and transportation" (Bookchin, 2005, p. 131). During the first industrial revolution, "[s]ubsistence agriculture and crafts gave way to mass production of standardized goods" (Guriev & Treisman, 2022, pp. 171–2). For example, in seventeenth century England, agriculture declined from 80% to 60% of the national

[8] Wikipedia. (n.d.). *Economic History of the United Kingdom*. Retrieved August 28, 2022, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_history_of_the_United_Kingdom#Railways

[9] The term "state capitalism" has also been used (e.g., by Peter Kropotkin) to describe situations where the state controls the economy and accumulates wealth from the surplus value of labor, similar to a private enterprise (Price, 2013, p. 113).

[10] Christina Croft. (2013, March 28). *The Enclosures & the Agricultural Revolution* [Video]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hl-HznLeQs0. Other signs of early modernization could be found in France after the French Revolution (in the early 1800s), as property rights over land in the Forests of Orleans were clarified, and, with regards to drainage systems in Normandy, property rights concerning rights of way, compensation for damages, and eminent domain were clarified as well (Rosenthal, 1992). In Germany, the aristocracy began the process of enclosure in the early 1500s, making it illegal for peasants to log wood or fish from certain lands, thus forming part of the context for The Peasants War of 1525. Wikipedia. (n.d.). *German Peasants' War: Patricians*. Retrieved August 14, 2021, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Peasants%27_War

economy, rural workers became more dependent on commercial markets, and merchant shipping (exports and imports) increased (Lawson, 2019, p. 100).

England's industrial revolution would fully emerge in the mid-late eighteenth century, fueled by new technologies such as power looms and mechanical spinners in the textile industry, and steam-powered machinery (Frieden et al., 2019, p. 12). Coinciding with the industrial revolution, Boix (2019, p. 111) identifies three factors ushering in the period of "Manchester capitalism": specialization (splitting the process of production), mechanization (automating as many of those tasks as possible), and the factory plant (clustering productive functions into a single space). During Manchester capitalism, skilled craftsmen (who made entire products by hand) were replaced by less skilled employees who specialized in specific actions in the chain of production (Boix, 2019, p. 5). For example, after British handloom weavers had doubled in number between the late 1780s (following the invention of the spinning mule) and the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, this sector of workers was devastated by the introduction of the power loom in the early nineteenth century (ibid, p. 33). Writing in the nineteenth century, Karl Marx distinguished proletariat (urban working class forced to sell their labor) from the bourgeoisie (owners of means of production) and predicted an emergent socialist challenge to capitalism.

Globalization 1.0: From Mercantilism to Free Trade (Nineteenth Century)

Prior to the rise of liberal capitalism in the West, early modern states relied more heavily on mercantilist forms of wealth accumulation such as monopolies – either government-owned (e.g., the Spanish Crown's colonial gold mines in Latin America) or government-sanctioned (e.g., the Dutch East India Company) – as well as different forms of protectionism. For example, England's Navigation Act of 1651 mandated that all goods imported from Holland be transported in ships from England or the country where the goods were originally produced, undercutting Dutch shipping (since few imports from Holland were produced there) (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 48). As another example, farmers in colonial Virginia could only sell their tobacco to England (reducing demand and therefore price), and Virginians could only buy manufactured goods from England (reducing supply and thus raising prices) (Frieden et al., 2019, p. 6). Another well-known example of protectionism is the British Corn Law tariffs on imported grains (eventually overturned in 1846).

The rise of capitalism in the West occurred both in theory (notably, the classical liberal ideas of Locke, Smith, and Ricardo) and in practice (i.e., the industrial revolution and period of free trade which emerged during the Pax Britannica, 1815–1914[11]). The first period of liberal globalization was characterized by the gold

[11] Frieden, Lake, and Schultz (2019, p. 13) describe the rise of free trade during that time as follows: "After Britain, the world's most important economy, discarded mercantilism [in the 1840s], many of the nation's customers and suppliers followed suit. In 1860, France joined Great Britain in a sweeping commercial treaty that freed trade between them and subsequently drew most of the

standard, as well as increases in international trade, investment, and migration.[12] This period of globalization would come to an end with the onset of World War I. The "Thirty Years Crisis" (World Wars I and II, and the inter-war period) were characterized by protectionism, beginning with the industrialized countries and spreading to the developing world (Frieden et al., 2019, p. 446).

Detroit Capitalism and the Keynesian Consensus (Twentieth Century)

The establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions after World War II facilitated a reemergence of free trade among the advanced Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) economies of North America, Western Europe, Japan, and Australasia, while many countries in the developing world turned toward a more protectionist form of socialism or import substitution industrialization (ISI).[13] Some countries from the global South succeeded in developing their own domestic manufacturing industries that way.[14] However, only a small share of world exports went from developing to developed countries, and those were mostly primary rather than manufactured goods. Most exports remained among the OECD countries (Boix, 2019, p. 109).

The mid-twentieth century period of "Detroit capitalism" – named after the Ford factory established there in the early-twentieth century – was characterized by "efficiently run assembly lines and spotless factories," balanced power relations between corporate management and union bosses, good pay and benefits for employees, patterns of class voting (with working classes voting left, and middle classes voting right), and 30 years of egalitarian income growth (Boix, 2019, p. 91). This period reflected a compromise between socialists, on the one hand, who accepted political pluralism, competitive elections, and a regulated market economy, and liberals and conservatives, on the other hand, who agreed to a system of embedded capitalism characterized by a mixed economy, a stabilizing regulatory framework, and a welfare state with universal insurance against unemployment, sickness, and old age.

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rest of Europe in this direction. As the German states moved toward unification in 1871, they created a free-trade area among themselves and then opened trade with the rest of the world. Many New World governments also reduced trade barriers, as did the remaining colonial possessions of the free-trading European powers."

[12] According to Frieden, Lake, and Schultz (2019, p. 378), "For the most part, before 1914 Europeans could move and work wherever they pleased (Asian immigration was much more heavily restricted). While international labor movements in recent years have been very large, they are proportionally smaller than those of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries."

[13] Some developing countries remained open to export-oriented development during that time, such as Chile under the Pinochet regime in the 1970s, and the "Asian Tiger" economies – South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore – beginning in the 1960s (Frieden et al., 2019, p. 448).

[14] By the 1970s, many developing countries pursuing ISI – e.g., India, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina – had become nearly self-sufficient in manufacturing products. For example, between 1950 and 1970, Brazil and Mexico had increased automobile production to about one million cars per year (Frieden et al., 2019, p. 447).

This compromise "eventually tempered the politics of the twentieth century" (Boix, 2019, p. 11).

Part of the post-war "Fordist" settlement was neo-corporatist systems of interest intermediation, according to which the major social partners – labor unions and business associations, organized into centralized peak associations – would participate in tripartite negotiations with government representatives over industrial relations issues such as wages and employment protection. "A central goal of corporatism is to avoid potentially damaging conflict between trade unions and employer associations" (Ansell & Torfing, 2021, p. 50). However, "[a]s the long period of postwar economic growth slowed, in part due to the exhaustion of the economic potential of Fordist technologies of mass production, the corporatist system eroded and only survived in modified form" (ibid, p. 51).

Globalization 2.0: The Neoliberal Era (1980-Present)

The information and communication revolution beginning in the 1970s affected the workforce of advanced OECD countries directly through job automation, and indirectly through the outsourcing of jobs (Boix, 2019). The sharp fall in transportation and communication costs made it unnecessary to integrate all jobs in a single plant, factory, or single corporation. As a result, "factoryless manufacturing" – where preproduction activities (such as design and engineering) are undertaken in the firm's home country, while goods are manufactured abroad – became more widespread. In the United States, factoryless manufacturing could be found in the apparel sector as early as the 1950s, consumer goods (e.g., toys) in the 1970s, and semiconductors and finished goods (e.g., electronics) in the early-2000s. In Japan and Germany about one-quarter of all firms had offshored their production by the mid-2000s, and in Germany close to 60% of large companies had done so (Boix, 2019, pp. 111–4). Across advanced industrial economies, it is estimated that about one-third of all employment losses over the past few decades are due to trade and job outsourcing (ibid, p. 15).

Coinciding with this increase in outsourcing, "manufacturing lost ground to services and – most importantly – to creating and processing information" (Guriev & Treisman, 2022, p. 172). The new service sector economies include low-skill jobs such as janitors and food preparation and higher-skills positions (requiring "deep knowledge and original thinking") such as consultants, architects, engineers, doctors, academics, artists, designers, entertainers, athletes, and journalists. By 2015, the share of workers in high-skill service sector jobs in Western Europe ranged from 26% in Portugal to 54% in Luxembourg (ibid). In the United States, high-skilled occupations increased from almost 28 percent of total employment in 1980 to 39% in 2010 (Boix, 2019, p. 14).

Liberal market ideas also began to seep into the public sector, affecting the norms of public administration. Notably, there was a transition from the Weberian-style classical public administration to a more market-oriented New Public Management model, thus changing the public sector from public authority to "service provider"