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Realism, Value, and Transcendental Arguments between Neopragmatism and Analytic Philosophy

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Chapter 3 appeared in *Cognitio* 8:2 (2007); it was presented in a conference on Robert B. Brandom's philosophy at the University of Pecs, Hungary (April 2005).

Chapter 4 appeared in Sami Pihlström (ed.), *Pragmatism and Objectivity: Essays Sparked by the Work of Nicholas Rescher* (Routledge, 2017); a brief version was presented in the International Conference on Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science at the University of Helsinki (August 2015).

Chapter 5 appeared in Dirk-Martin Grube and Rob Sinclair (eds.), *Pragmatism, Metaphysics, and Culture: Reflections on the Philosophy of Joseph Margolis* (Nordic Studies in Pragmatism 2, Nordic Pragmatism Network, www.nordprag.org, 2015); in one of its versions, it was presented in a conference honoring Joseph Margolis's 90th birthday at Temple University, Philadelphia, USA (May 2014), while it also partly draws on discussions at the conference in honor of Professor Margolis I was involved in organizing at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies in May 2013, in collaboration with Arto Haapala and Henrik Rydenfelt.

Chapter 6 was originally written for a collection of essays examining and honoring Christopher Hookway's contributions to pragmatism: Robert Talisse, Paniel Reyes Cardénas, and Daniel Herbert (eds.), *Pragmatic Reason: Christopher Hookway and the American Philosophical Tradition* (Routledge, 2023).

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Knowles, at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway (May 2009).

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Chapter 9 appeared in *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy* 4:2 (2012); it was also presented in a conference on "Cambridge Pragmatism" organized by Huw Price at Trinity College, University of Cambridge, UK (June 2012).

As the book chapters are based on articles originally written for various occasions – conferences, journals, and edited collections – I am grateful to all the above-mentioned individuals and institutions that enabled those original contexts of presentation and/or publication. For the inclusion of this collection in the series, Vienna Circle Institute Library, I am deeply grateful to Professor Friedrich Stadler and all the series co-editors; thanks are also due to two anonymous reviewers for helpful critical comments and Zarah Weiss at the University of Vienna as well as the efficient Springer staff for help in the editing process.

Even though this book does not strictly speaking represent detailed scholarship on the Vienna Circle, in its own way it contributes, I hope, to the on-going reassessment of the relations between the traditions of analytic philosophy (which was partially established by the Viennese thinkers in the 1920–1930s) and pragmatism (which was initiated in the United States in the late nineteenth century) – as explained in the "Introduction" (Chap. 1) and Chap. 2 in more detail. By having a chance to place this volume in Professor Stadler's impressive book series, I also hope in my modest way to contribute to the continuation of the close philosophical relations between Vienna and Helsinki. (I sometimes feel that, for a Finnish philosopher, visiting Vienna is always like going to a second home, because it was from Vienna that Eino Kaila brought logical empiricism to Finland and thus initiated what later became known as the Finnish tradition in twentieth-century philosophy.)

While the original versions of many of the chapters (that is, Chaps. 3, 5, 8, and 9) have appeared in open access outlets, I am grateful for the permissions to use copyrighted material to the following copyright holders of the original publications of the other chapters: Springer (Chap. 2), Taylor & Francis (Routledge) (Chap. 4), and Philosophy Documentation Center (Chap. 7).

The original versions of these chapters were written in the course of more than 15 years, during which I have worked at various institutions, particularly the University of Jyväskylä, the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, and the Faculty of Theology at the University of Helsinki. I would like to extend my thanks to a great number of colleagues and friends (not to be specifically listed here) whose comments at various stages of this project have had an important impact on the development of my views. I would never have even begun the work on the topics of

these essays had I not studied at the Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, under the guidance of Professor Ilkka Niiniluoto in the early and mid-1990s, and I see my reflections on pragmatism and realism continuing the dialogue I have engaged in with him since those early days. In fact, many of the essays still explore issues I first started to work on in my doctoral dissertation (1996) supervised by Niiniluoto. In this sense, Niiniluoto is clearly the most significant philosopher behind what I have written on pragmatism and realism, even though in the chapters of this book I only rarely explicitly address his version of scientific realism.

Among the pragmatist philosophers discussed in this volume, the late Professor Joseph Margolis stands out as the one who has had the most significant influence on the progress of my work over the years – and it might be mentioned that I first met Joe Margolis thanks to Ilkka Niiniluoto, who asked me to help with some practical arrangements of Joe's visit when he was awarded an honorary doctorate by the University of Helsinki in 1994. I have been extremely fortunate to have had a chance to meet over the years, and to some extent get to know, many of the other main characters of the chapters, too, including world-leading thinkers like Hilary Putnam, Robert Brandom, Nicholas Rescher, Christopher Hookway, Morton White, and (of course) Georg Henrik von Wright, but Margolis is the one with whom I developed, I suppose, something like a philosophical friendship. Joe Margolis, whom I saw over the decades regularly at conferences, visited Finland for the last time in 2018 on the occasion of the 3rd European Pragmatism Conference, and in 2021 he sadly passed away at the age of 97.

The main figures of the book chapters as well as the persons acknowledged above are, unfortunately, predominantly male philosophers, but my deepest thanks go to three admirable women: Professor Sari Kivistö as well as my daughters Meeri Pihlström and Katri Pihlström.

Helsinki, February 2023 Sami Pihlström

Contents

Chapter 1
Introduction

This volume collects together a selection of my articles examining, both historically and systematically, the interfaces of analytic (including late analytic or "post-analytic") philosophy and pragmatism (especially what is today called "neopragmatism"). These essays have not been incorporated in any of my previous books, although their general themes, particularly the relations between pragmatism, realism, and transcendental philosophy, as well as the valuational basis of pragmatist ontology, have been discussed in some of my earlier work (starting in the mid-1990s). In fact, I often feel that I am continuing to write the same book all over again throughout my entire academic life, returning to the same fundamental issues concerning, for instance, the relation between realism and pragmatism. These are questions that concern very basic features of our humanity and the world we find ourselves living in. Is the world objectively "out there" independently of our conceptual and epistemic perspectives? Or are we in some sense (and if so, in what sense exactly) "constructing" or "constituting" reality? How, moreover, are the ways the world is ("facts") related to the ways the world ought to be ("values")? There is, I think, a sense in which it would be hubristic to claim to have been able to settle such philosophical problems – even temporarily. Questions of realism, idealism, and fact and value need constant philosophical attention and cannot just be left unexamined by those seriously in the business of philosophy.

Instead of attempting to summarize my current views on these topics in terms of any final or fully worked-out position, I believe this volume shows how I have tried to reflect on such problems over the past 15 years or more in changing contexts but with the same overall aims and goals. The specific topics of the chapters range from general questions concerning pragmatism and realism in metaphysics and epistemology to issues in ethics and metaphilosophy, including the re-evaluation of the legacy of transcendental philosophy and transcendental arguments in the framework of pragmatism. While the chapters can be read individually as case studies of particular (neo)pragmatist philosophers' ideas, they also manifest (I hope) sufficient

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unity to be presented as a whole in this volume. In this introduction, I will draw particular attention to the substantial connections between the chapters.

One of the general lines of thought running through all the essays is the idea – centrally present in the pragmatist tradition – that our relation to the world we live in and seek to represent and get to know (and always know better) through our practices of conceptualization and inquiry is *irreducibly valuational*. There is no way of even approaching, let alone resolving, the philosophical issue of realism without drawing due attention to the ways in which human values are inextricably entangled with even the most purely "factual" projects of inquiry we engage in. This entanglement of the factual and the normative is, as explicitly argued in Chap. 7 but implicitly suggested in all the other chapters as well, *both pragmatic* (that is, practice-embedded and practice-involving) *and transcendental* (thus operating at the level of the necessary conditions for the possibility of our representing and cognizing the world in general). Therefore, we need to carefully examine the complex relations of realism, value, and transcendental arguments, and I have chosen to do so at the intersection of pragmatism and analytic philosophy. Obviously, these are not the only philosophical approaches that would be relevant to the topics I am exploring – for example, phenomenologists have had and continue to have a great deal to say about realism and idealism as well as the transcendental method – but the focus of this volume is based on the traditions my own reflections on these matters primarily emerge from. With a basically analytic training and a relatively long experience in pragmatism scholarship, I find it natural to study critically the ways in which different recent and contemporary pragmatists have tried to resolve the realism issue and how they may have employed transcendental arguments in their thought.

Most of the eight chapters collected here are primarily "person-centered" rather than thematic, examining both past historical figures of pragmatism and analytic philosophy (e.g., Ludwig Wittgenstein, Hilary Putnam, Joseph Margolis, Georg Henrik von Wright) and important living philosophers who continue to make a strong contribution to these interpenetrating traditions (e.g., Robert Brandom, Nicholas Rescher, Christopher Hookway). In addition, some highly significant thinkers (e.g., Morton White, Philip Kitcher, Ruth Anna Putnam) who do not get a chapter of their own in this volume are more briefly discussed in critical comparison to the main figures of the essays. I hope this book could also challenge some received views of who exactly belong to the "canons" of analytic philosophy and pragmatism, though clearly I am focusing on widely acknowledged major thinkers whose contributions are generally agreed to be of lasting relevance. In their different ways, all the philosophers to be considered have raised fundamental issues concerning the relations between realism, pragmatism, and value. They have also explored these issues at a level that may be called "transcendental", even though most of them have not explicitly described themselves as representatives of the transcendental tradition initiated by Immanuel Kant. By reading, or re-reading, some of their arguments as broadly speaking transcendental, I also hope to show that the scope of

transcendental reflection is wider than those narrowly restricting transcendental philosophy to a carefully defined argumentative strategy would admit.

Obviously, no exhaustiveness of any kind is claimed in this book: I am unable to provide any comprehensive overviews of these important thinkers' complex views and arguments (let alone the pragmatist and analytic traditions more broadly), and I inevitably have to be highly selective in drawing the reader's attention to some key issues – particularly realism, in relation to idealism and/or constructivism as well as transcendental arguments – that I find central in their thought as well as vital for the further development of pragmatism (and for the dialogue between pragmatism and analytic philosophy) today. Nor is this book exhaustive in the sense of covering all or most of the thinkers whose philosophy would be relevant to my overall topic. Among the leading neopragmatists, the most striking omission is, presumably, Richard Rorty. However, I have criticized Rorty's brand of neopragmatism (from the perspective of my own Kantian-inspired pragmatism) in several other writings, most recently in my book, *Pragmatist Truth in the Post-Truth Age: Sincerity, Normativity, and Humanism* (Pihlström 2021), and accordingly I have not felt it necessary to include any chapter on Rorty here. Yet, I suppose that the towering presence of Rorty's radical neopragmatist figure is in any event implicit in any discussion of (neo)pragmatism today. Even so, it seems to me that the philosophers I will discuss all differ from Rorty in at least one significant respect: they still believe in the reality of genuine philosophical problems – such as the ones on realism and value, for instance – and they believe in the power of constructive philosophical thought, argumentation, and theorization as a means of getting a grip of such problems. With the possible exception of Wittgenstein (though this is debatable), the philosophers to be commented upon in the chapters below are (or were) in the business of establishing philosophical views, positions, or theories based upon philosophical analysis and argument. They are (or were) not "end of philosophy" thinkers, and none of them believed that philosophy could, let alone should, be replaced some other activity – in contrast to Rorty's suggestion that philosophy, or what remains from it after the collapse of "systematic philosophy", is eventually reducible to "cultural politics".[1]

I am, furthermore, fully aware of the deplorable lack of any gender balance – or any other kind of balance – in the selection of representative pragmatist or

[1] On Rorty's famous distinction between systematic and edifying philosophy, see the final chapters of Rorty 1979. On his views on "philosophy as cultural politics", see his later essays in Rorty 2007. I am of course aware that these brief remarks entirely fail to do justice to Rorty's complex position, and by no means do I wish to downgrade his seminal importance in the re-emergence of pragmatism as a major tradition in contemporary philosophy, as well as pragmatism scholarship as a flourishing field in the history of philosophy. Any criticism of Rorty's neopragmatism as exaggerated – or as ultimately running the risk of losing the normative power of argument (cf. again Pihlström 2021) – must occur in the context of acknowledging Rorty's highly significant role in shaping the field, indeed at the intersection of pragmatism and analytic philosophy, over the past decades.

quasi-pragmatist philosophers to be commented upon.[2] The philosophers whose views on realism, pragmatism, value, and related matters I am entering into dialogue with in these chapters are (or were) almost exclusively multiply privileged white Western men (and so, of course, am I), reflecting the broader "canon" of both analytic philosophy and pragmatism that remains strongly male, white, and elitist. The inclusion of a section on Ruth Anna Putnam's pragmatist views on the fact-value entanglement in Chap. 7 is far from sufficient in maintaining anything close to a proper gender balance, but I do think that her ideas on fact and value make a lasting, albeit neglected, contribution to neopragmatism.

The canon of pragmatist philosophers this book presupposes is thus problematic in many ways. More generally, however, it is, I suppose, also a positive thing that traditions such as pragmatism and even analytic philosophy *have* something like a canon, because that is by itself an indication of a certain kind of history-consciousness of these traditions.[3] Let us consider analytic philosophy, in particular, in this respect. One might imagine that some analytic philosophers could deny there being any canon: philosophy, they may argue, is primarily about *problems* and *methods*, not about persons or classical texts, and even Aristotle would qualify as an "analytic philosopher". Accordingly, the very fact that we can so much as consider and problematize the canon of the analytic tradition – for example, by bringing it into dialogue with pragmatism, as I am hoping to do here – is a strong indication of the fact that history is taken seriously, which traditionally has hardly been a chief virtue of analytic philosophy. What I would, thus, like to emphasize is the way in which the canon of a philosophical tradition can be challenged by emphasizing not only non-canonized or forgotten philosophers but also the relations between the canonized (and non-canonized) figures of the tradition with figures primarily associated with other traditions. Therefore, an attempt to enter into dialogues with, for example, some historical analytic philosophers in a way that puts them into imagined conversations with, say, pragmatists is a way of both challenging and critically renewing our understanding of the canon(s) of our tradition(s).

A related issue is the "re-canonization" of some thinkers within more than one tradition. Perhaps a philosopher like Edmund Husserl does not belong to the canon of analytic philosophy because he is so centrally in (or even *the* central figure of) another canon, that of phenomenology? Possibly, one major figure can be – at least in a major role – only in one such canon. However, the discussions of philosophers like Hilary Putnam in this book might be seen as challenging this view: Putnam is as clearly a leading philosopher in the analytic tradition as he is in the pragmatist one. Similarly, Wittgenstein can be regarded as not only an analytic philosopher of

[2] For a moment, I considered the possibility of including an early essay of mine, a critical discussion of Susan Haack's views on pragmatism from 1998, in this collection, but I decided against this because that article is a very old piece in comparison to the ones collected here, and in many ways outdated (See Pihlström 1998c).

[3] These brief remarks on "canons" were inspired by a panel discussion I participated in at an online conference on the history of analytic philosophy organized by the University of Tilburg, The Netherlands, in December 2020.

language but also as a Kantian transcendental philosopher. In order to appreciate this, we need to place him in the context of these two traditions and their developing histories; moreover, what I am proposing to do here (in Chap. 9) is to view him as a (kind of) pragmatist, too. There is, at least, a way of seeing Wittgenstein as a figure at the margins of the pragmatist tradition, and certainly many (post-)analytic philosophers who have made important contributions to developing (neo)pragmatism have also been crucially inspired by Wittgenstein – most obviously Rorty and Putnam. Other examples could include Charles S. Peirce, who with his foundational insights in logic and probability theory, among many other things, was undeniably an analytic philosopher in addition to being a founder of pragmatism, analogously to the ways in which both W.V. Quine and Putnam later were both key analytic philosophers and pragmatists (of some kind). This relation between analytic philosophy and pragmatism can even be raised (and to a certain extent is raised in Chap. 2 below) in the case of Rudolf Carnap: it was in the context of and in response to Carnap's "pragmatism" (instead of the historical tradition of American pragmatism) that Quine in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1951) claimed to espouse a "more thorough" pragmatism.[4]

When considering, and perhaps reconsidering and revising, the canons of our philosophical traditions, we should have nothing against canons as such; they help us orientate in our thinking and research. But we should retain a fallibilist and self-critical understanding of them. We may at any time have good reasons to question our canonizations and canonization principles. Furthermore, philosophical canons can be claimed to play an interesting double role. They are in a sense thoroughly contingent: they could clearly be different from what they are, as we obviously could have included philosophers we in fact did not include in our canon. Thus, canons are potential objects of critique – always, continuously. At the same time, we need a canon – in some form at least – as a framework that makes critique possible. It is hardly possible to negotiate one's relation to a certain philosophical tradition without at least some kind of pre-understanding, based on a canon consisting of certain key thinkers and texts, of what that tradition is in the first place. Thus, historical canons can provide necessary pragmatic conditions for the possibility of

[4] Furthermore, we may ask whether Wittgensteinian thinkers like Rush Rhees, Peter Winch, D.Z. Phillips, and Raimond Gaita are "analytic philosophers" – simply due to their having been influenced by Wittgenstein, who certainly occupies a majestic place within the canon – or whether they perhaps in some ways come closer to what is (misleadingly) labeled Continental philosophy. How about a highly original Wittgensteinian-inspired figure like Stanley Cavell? Another example: regarding my attempts (both in this volume and elsewhere) to develop a quasi-Kantian "transcendental pragmatism", it would be important to take into consideration philosophers such as Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel, whose views are not discussed here (but cf. Pihlström 2003a on Apel's version of transcendental pragmatism), as well as, again at the intersection of the pragmatist and analytic traditions, C.I. Lewis, famous for his "pragmatic a priori" (cf. Chap. 2). Most of these important thinkers are difficult or even impossible to canonize into any single tradition. Furthermore, see the very interesting re-canonizations of some British analytic philosophers (especially Frank Ramsey but also, in his own way, Wittgenstein) as "Cambridge pragmatists" in Misak 2016a, b; Misak and Price 2017.

critique (including the critique of the canon itself) by manifesting a "paradigm", a general understanding of what is going on in the field and how its main discussions have historically emerged.

This brings us to a point familiar from Thomas Kuhn's famous analysis of scientific change: as Kuhn argued in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), scientific paradigms tend to make their history invisible. This is, we may suggest, to a certain degree true about, say, the analytic philosophy canon, too. We do not usually "make visible" the full and explicit reasons we include some people in the canon – that is, view them as having shaped the history of the tradition in ways we take to be crucial – and the reasons we exclude some others. Of course any attempt to employ Kuhnian notions here must be treated with extreme caution and must include qualifications: neither analytic philosophy nor pragmatism is a "normal science" in any obvious Kuhnian sense; nevertheless, their "paradigms" might to a certain degree be compared to the scientific paradigms Kuhn discussed, even though Kuhn's own examples were taken exclusively from the sciences. Perhaps most importantly, the canon as an element of the paradigm of analytic philosophy or pragmatism can be seen as playing the double role that Kuhnian paradigms play, too: we can view canons, as well as paradigms, as "transcendental", constitutive of the "world" the discipline studies, while seeing them at the same time contingent in the sense of being challenged or at least challengeable by that study itself. Our realization that a neglected figure *ought to* have been included in a certain canon is analogous to a Kuhnian anomaly that gradually leads to a crisis and eventually to a revolution. For example, the canon of analytic philosophy might be significantly enriched or even fundamentally transformed by the realization that a pragmatist thinker like John Dewey ought to be taken seriously among analytic philosophers.[5] Reconsiderations of philosophical canons are ways of creating novel philosophical dialogues between thinkers that are not habitually – in a "normal-scientific" way – set into dialogue with each other. In a sense, my attempts to discuss the topics of this book "dialogically" with the thinkers I have chosen to comment on is also such a reconsideration of their role as canonical figures of pragmatism and analytic philosophy.

It is, accordingly, with these caveats that I propose to explore some relatively strongly canonized figures standing at the crossroads of pragmatism and analytic philosophy. Interpreting them as central philosophers for *both* traditions may have an effect on how we view those traditions themselves.

Furthermore, acknowledging that all philosophical traditions (like, again, Kuhnian paradigms) emerge and develop in some particular cultural and historical contexts, never in an imagined ahistorical vacuum, we might pause for a moment to reflect on the *geographical* dimensions of the traditions this book surveys. Pragmatism has often been described as the only originally American orientation in philosophy, and indeed the classical pragmatists Peirce, James, and Dewey, and many of their students and followers, were influential in the United States.

[5] Readers of Rorty's *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979) were generally surprised to see Rorty highlighting the importance of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey as the three most important philosophers of the twentieth century.

Pragmatism is also entangled with other currents of thought in America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including transcendentalism, "new realism", naturalism, and process philosophy. However, instead of emphasizing pragmatism as "American philosophy", I believe it is important to remind the philosophical community about the inherently cosmopolitan nature of pragmatism. The early pragmatists were cosmopolitan thinkers to begin with. James, in particular, was widely known in Europe and spent long periods in various European countries, and Dewey traveled all over the world, including Russia and China. More importantly, the classical pragmatists never claimed to be originally "American" thinkers but both explicitly and implicitly carried ideas from European philosophical traditions into their own thinking – which is, in a sense, a very "American" thing to do. While one very important source of insight for all the three major early pragmatists was British empiricism,[6] I will in the chapters of this volume repeatedly refer to the ways in which pragmatism continues the Kantian transcendental tradition. It would be an exaggeration to claim that either the classical pragmatists or the neopragmatists I will mostly focus on would have been Kantian transcendental philosophers in any straightforward sense, but I hope to be able to argue that in an important sense the pragmatists' (early and late) elaborations on the complex issue of realism vs. idealism and the fact-value entanglement, in particular, take place at what we may call a transcendental level of investigation. I realize, of course, that this claim is controversial within both pragmatism scholarship and historical scholarship on the transcendental tradition, but it is precisely for this reason that I hope my reflections on the pragmatists' distinctive versions of transcendental arguments might be of some relevance to research within both traditions.

Moreover, analytic philosophy, as we know, is not only philosophically but also geographically multifarious, given that its origins were both on the European continent – particularly in Vienna – and in the English-speaking world. In this sense, it perhaps slightly resembles pragmatism as a genuinely cosmopolitan philosophy. As the first main chapter below especially emphasizes, we should view the history of the pragmatist tradition after its classical origins as a continuous dialogue with European logical empiricism, and the post-WWII logical empiricism that was brought to America by emigrating philosophers (and by American philosophers who visited Vienna, most famously W.V. Quine).

Both analytic philosophy and pragmatism today are genuinely cosmopolitan philosophies actively discussed and researched not only in Europe and North America but virtually everywhere. While the selection of thinkers discussed in this book is, again, not at all representative regarding the variety of regional and cultural contexts of scholarship, as the philosophers I will focus on are mostly Americans and West-Europeans, we should keep in mind that non-American and non-European scholars are increasingly strongly present on the scene. Both analytic philosophy and

[6] Regarding the classical empiricists influences on the classical pragmatists, I am greatly indebted to my doctoral student Sami Kuitunen who is working on this topic (These influences are not discussed in this book).

pragmatism can be seen as orientations within "world philosophy" – whatever exactly this means. But this, on the other hand, should not make us overhastily conclude that their "European" core, such as the largely Kantian issues of realism vs. idealism and transcendental arguments, would be any less significant.[7] Different interpretations of what actually is the core of these traditions – representing a wide variety of cultural contexts of interpretation – are certainly welcome in the open, flexible, and pluralistic spirit of pragmatism.

When putting this book together, I have made no attempt to substantially revise the originally separately written articles into proper monograph chapters; they will have to stand by themselves as somewhat distinct and partly slightly overlapping contributions that do, however, firmly "belong together" in the sense of continuing basically the same exploration of the problem of realism and value in relation to pragmatism in changing contexts and with variable foci on individual philosophers. Only major and obvious overlaps among the essays have been omitted, and only some essential minor revisions and slight updates have been made, with the exception of one substantial addition, a new section discussing Ruth Anna Putnam's views on the fact-value entanglement in Chap. 7.[8] I like to think of these chapters as offering snapshots of how certain issues (especially realism, value, and transcendental arguments) at the interface of pragmatism and analytic philosophy have manifested themselves to this contingently placed author at the equally contingent time of their initial completion as self-standing articles. It would have been impossible, for the purposes of this book, to substantially revise the essays by taking into consideration major publications by (or on) the philosophers examined that have

[7] I do recognize that my treatment of pragmatism, for example, as a move within transcendental philosophy (in a broad sense) might seem like a Euro-centrist myopia. On the other hand, I cannot hide my own cultural background and the context I am working in. While I have been extremely fortunate to have had a chance to interact with, say, pragmatism scholars coming from Japan, China, and Latin American countries, my own approach remains heavily European in the sense of emphasizing the entanglement of "American pragmatism" with European classics like Kant and Wittgenstein.

[8] More generally, it would unfortunately have been beyond any reasonably sized undertaking to update the chapters in such a manner that all relevant recent scholarly discussions would have been taken into consideration. For example, regarding the basic debates on pragmatism and realism in ontology (see especially Chaps. 2 and 7), some of Hilary Putnam's latest works (including the collection Putnam 2016) would have to be dealt with; regarding pragmatism and Wittgenstein (see Chap. 9), Anna Boncompagni's (2016) comprehensive investigation would have to commented upon, especially when it comes to Wittgenstein's links to Ramsey regarding a pragmatist understanding of truth irreducible to any single traditional "theory" of truth (see also Boncompagni 2017), and also in relation to the development of "Cambridge pragmatism" more generally (cf. Misak and Price 2017); regarding the theme of values within pragmatism more widely (as at least implicitly invoked in many of the chapters), the work by Hugh McDonald on "meliorist theory of values" (see especially McDonald 2011) would have to be responded to; and regarding the complex historical (and systematic) relations between pragmatism and analytic philosophy generally, or pragmatism and logical empiricism specifically, there is plenty of scholarly discussion available (e.g., Calcaterra 2011; Pihlström, Stadler, and Weidtmann 2017; Rydenfelt 2023a, b).

appeared after the original completion and publication of the essays.[9] Nevertheless, the inquiry into realism and value, pragmatically and transcendentally conceived, runs through the essays and hopefully integrates everything into a coherent whole.

Let me briefly summarize the main contents of the chapters and thus sketch the way in which the overall argument of the book can be seen as unfolding despite the fact that the chapters are, inevitably, separate and self-contained.

After this introduction, Chap. 2 opens the volume by explaining why appreciating logical empiricism as a key background of later neopragmatism – exemplified by Hilary Putnam's version of pragmatic realism (labeled "internal realism" in the 1980s), in decisive ways indebted to Rudolf Carnap's logical empiricism – is important for the understanding of the entire pragmatist tradition. In a crucial sense, the historical lines of influence from classical pragmatism to neopragmatism extended through logical empiricism and thus early analytic philosophy. Therefore, while some pragmatists may still find pragmatism and analytic philosophy opposed to each other, these can also be seen, rather, as currents within a single heterogeneous philosophical tradition, admittedly characterized by many significant tensions, including (again) especially the issue of realism – to which most of the chapters of this volume are in a way or another devoted. Putnam's version of pragmatism-cum-logical-empiricism is also critically compared to the "holistic pragmatism" developed by his one-time Harvard colleague Morton White. Holistic pragmatism is very important for our purposes, because it makes explicit the entanglement of the factual and the normative, or fact and value, in pragmatist considerations of our relation to the world.[10]

Chapter 3 analyzes somewhat critically the approach to pragmatism adopted in the 1990s and early 2000s by one of the most widely discussed contemporary analytic neopragmatists, Robert Brandom (who was one of Rorty's most famous students), especially well known for his "inferentialist" semantics and his integration of Kantian, Hegelian, and pragmatist themes in the philosophy of language. While I generally endorse Brandom's antireductionist views on normativity – and find such antireductionism highly central to pragmatism generally, as explained in some of the other chapters as well – I do have some reservations concerning his interpretations of the classical pragmatists, at least as he articulated them around the turn of the millennium, and thus concerning his appropriation of the tradition of pragmatism as a whole. These critical points are discussed in dialogue with Putnam's criticism of Brandom. (Note, however, that this book contains very little in the way of substantial historical interpretation of the classical pragmatists, whose views are commented upon only to the extent that they are present in my readings of the works by the neopragmatists to be explored; historical truth about what Peirce, James, Dewey, or the other great old pragmatists really thought is not primarily pursued in this volume.)

[9] Occasionally, I do indicate some recent publications of my own which explore some of the themes of the chapters more extensively.

[10] In my *Pragmatist Truth in the Post-Truth Age* (Pihlström 2021), I also employ White's holistic pragmatism in my overall argument.

Chapter 4 focuses on yet another major "analytic pragmatist", Nicholas Rescher, whose numerous contributions to the problem of realism have over the decades significantly contributed to our understanding of that key debate in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science, also consistently emphasizing the relevance of value considerations for such debates. It is especially through a critical examination of Rescher's arguments for "objective" and realistic pragmatism in this chapter that a distinctively Kantian way of looking at the pragmatist tradition is also introduced to the discussions of this book – creating an implicit dialogue with the Brandomian approach explored in the previous chapter. A pragmatist investigation of the complex relations of realism and idealism requires, I argue, a Kantian-inspired transcendental argumentation strategy, which Rescher insightfully develops; yet, Chap. 4 explains why I nevertheless find his particular version of Kantian pragmatism and pragmatic realism (and idealism) wanting for various reasons.

Chapter 5 offers a somewhat parallel investigation of recent discussions of pragmatic realism and (quasi-Kantian, transcendental) idealism by taking a look at how Joseph Margolis – another very important (neo)pragmatist with a strong background in analytic philosophy who sadly passed away in June 2021 (at the considerably high age of 97) – elaborated on these fundamental issues by developing his distinctive version of pragmatism as historicist constructivism integrated with nonreductive naturalism. Margolis's account of the world as "languaged" and language as "worlded" is both interestingly similar to and different from, for example, Putnam's pragmatic realism (Chap. 2) and Rescher's combination of pragmatism and realism (Chap. 4). Analogously to both Putnam and Rescher (as well as, though in a different way, Brandom), the availability of a specifically Kantian (transcendental) version of pragmatism, or pragmatic realism, is a critical issue for Margolis's pragmatist constructivism, even though Margolis never embraced the Kantian transcendental vocabulary and retained a critical distance from Kantian construals of pragmatism. In its own way, Margolis's pragmatism also interestingly manifests the entanglement of factuality and normativity, and there would be much more work to be done in order to critically compare his contribution to that discussion with, say, Brandom's and White's. (This book can only suggest that such comparisons would be important; it is a task for others to complete them.)

Chapter 6 continues to explore the complicated relations between realism, pragmatism, and transcendental argumentation by bringing into the discussion yet another argumentative strategy, the "will to believe" idea we owe to William James. The focus of the chapter is the version of pragmatism and realism developed by Christopher Hookway through his appropriation of especially Peirce's but also to a certain degree James's pragmatisms. This investigation not only continues to emphasize the entanglement of realism, idealism, and pragmatism in a transcendental and value-laden context of inquiry focusing on our very ability to represent a mind- and concept-independent world but also shows how inescapably the voices of the pragmatist classics, especially Peirce and James, are present in the debates engaged in by leading contemporary pragmatism scholars such as Hookway. Importantly, Hookway is one of the very few recent pragmatists who have appreciated the significance of both transcendental and "will to believe" type of arguments