


DAVID HUME



**DAVID HUME:
THE COLLECTED
WORKS**

David Hume

David Hume: The Collected Works

Enriched edition.

Introduction, Studies and Commentaries by Lucas Alder

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Introduction

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This collection gathers three landmark works by David Hume that together present a sustained investigation into human understanding and morals. It brings into one place *A Treatise of Human Nature*, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, and *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, allowing readers to follow Hume's philosophical project across its most influential formulations. The aim is not to survey every genre Hume practiced, but to present the core texts in which he develops his account of how we think, believe, act, and judge. As a set, these works show the unity and range of Hume's contribution to the modern philosophical canon.

The texts represented here are philosophical prose works: a large-scale treatise and two enquiries. They are not novels, poems, diaries, or letters, but sustained arguments written in clear, carefully structured essays of varying scope. The *Treatise* offers a comprehensive architecture of topics, while the *Enquiries* present streamlined restatements and refinements for a broader audience. Together they exemplify philosophical analysis attentive to everyday experience, informed by observation rather than speculation. The writing is neither theatrical nor epistolary; its genre is philosophical investigation directed to the reader's judgment through definitions, distinctions, and illustrative examples.

A Treatise of Human Nature appeared in three books between 1739 and 1740. It presents a systematic approach to understanding the mind, the passions, and morals. The *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* was published in 1748, and the *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* followed in 1751. These later works revisit and recast

significant portions of the Treatise, offering clearer pathways through complex issues. The chronology shows a philosopher returning to his themes with renewed clarity and pedagogical care, shaping the same central project in different formats so that readers can engage either with the full architecture or the distilled presentations.

Across these works, Hume undertakes a naturalistic study of human life, modeled on careful attention to experience. He asks what we can know, how beliefs arise, why we rely on certain forms of reasoning, and how moral approval and disapproval take shape. The approach is empirical in spirit, seeking principles that explain common patterns of thought and action without invoking claims beyond what observation and reflection can support. The project is unified by skepticism moderated by practicality: Hume tests the limits of reason while acknowledging the force of habit, sentiment, and social life in stabilizing everyday judgment.

The Treatise sets out with an ambitious plan to examine human nature in its principal domains. It explores the workings of the understanding, the dynamics of the passions, and the foundations of morals, aiming to build from basic elements of mental life to the complexities of belief and conduct. Its architecture invites readers to see connections across topics that are often treated separately. By placing cognition, emotion, and ethics within a single explanatory framework grounded in experience, the Treatise articulates a comprehensive vision of philosophy as a study continuous with common life and informed by careful analysis.

The Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding concentrates on questions about belief, evidence, and the reach and limits of our reasoning about the world. It considers how we form expectations, how we handle testimony, and how we weigh different kinds of evidence in ordinary and scientific contexts. The work's measured prose

and strategic use of examples aim to make intricate issues accessible without loss of rigor. Where the Treatise builds an extensive system, the Enquiry offers a guided path through key arguments, sharpening their presentation while retaining the underlying commitment to an experience-based account of knowledge.

The Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals turns to ethics with a focus on what grounds our approvals of character and action. It examines the role of sentiment in moral judgment and considers how social utility, sympathy, and virtue intersect in ordinary life. The text does not rely on abstract metaphysical systems; instead, it proposes that moral distinctions emerge from traits and practices that are intelligible within human experience. In doing so, the Enquiry offers a humane, observational approach to ethics, attentive to the variety of characters and situations that prompt praise, blame, esteem, and criticism.

Stylistically, these works are marked by lucidity, restraint, and carefully staged argument. Hume's prose moves from clear definitions to illustrative cases, often drawing on familiar scenes to illuminate philosophical points. The tone is poised rather than polemical, and the pacing allows readers to weigh premises before reaching conclusions. Recurring devices include attention to ordinary language, an eye for how customs shape expectation, and an insistence that theoretical claims answer to experience. The Enquiries refine this style, compressing and clarifying while preserving the hallmark balance of analytical precision and accessible exposition.

As a whole, the collection demonstrates a distinctive partnership between skepticism and constructive explanation. Hume identifies limits to what reason can demonstrate, yet he also accounts for why we rely on patterns of inference and evaluation in everyday life. This dual movement—testing pretensions to certainty while explaining stable practices—has shaped debates in

epistemology and the philosophy of science. The works invite readers to reconsider the grounds of belief without abandoning practical confidence, offering a framework that continues to inform discussions about evidence, probability, justification, and the conduct of inquiry.

The ethical reflections in these texts have been equally significant. By emphasizing the roles of sentiment, character, and social benefit, Hume helped reorient moral philosophy toward the study of human dispositions and practices. His analyses foreground how moral judgment arises within shared life, connecting virtue to traits that promote mutual advantage and esteem. This approach has influenced later discussions of virtue, motivation, and the interplay between feeling and reason in ethics. It also helped encourage empirical study of moral psychology, inviting philosophers and others to observe how people actually evaluate actions and character.

This collection allows several paths through Hume's thought. One may begin with the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* and the *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* for concise treatments, then turn to the broader architecture of the *Treatise* for depth and context. Alternatively, readers may start with the *Treatise* to appreciate the project's full scope before observing how it was later refined. Whichever path is chosen, the juxtaposition clarifies continuities and developments. The works retain their integrity while illuminating one another, enabling careful comparison of arguments, emphases, and examples across different expository scales.

Taken together, these writings display a philosopher intent on explaining, without overreaching, how human beings think and evaluate. Their lasting significance lies in the invitation to practice philosophy in close contact with experience, to value clarity over system for its own sake, and to test theories against the ordinary conduct of life. By assembling these texts, the collection presents a coherent

portrait of Hume's central contributions and makes available, in a single place, the materials for a sustained engagement with questions that continue to matter to inquiry, ethics, and the understanding of ourselves.

Author Biography

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David Hume (1711-1776) was a central figure of the Scottish Enlightenment and one of modern philosophy's most influential empiricists and skeptics. He sought to place the study of mind, morals, and society on an experimental footing, modeled on the observational successes of natural science. His major philosophical writings include *A Treatise of Human Nature*, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, and *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*. Across these works he explored the sources and limits of knowledge, the nature of causation, personal identity, and the foundations of ethics, helping to reshape early modern debates about reason, sentiment, religion, and custom.

Hume grew up in Edinburgh and pursued advanced study there at a young age, absorbing the classical curriculum and the sweeping impact of Newtonian science on intellectual life. He engaged deeply with earlier British empiricists, especially John Locke and George Berkeley, while also drawing on ancient skeptical traditions. From early on he conceived a science of man that would investigate human understanding and the passions with the same attention to experience that physics applied to nature. This program shaped both the structure and method of his mature philosophy, prioritizing observation, psychological explanation, and careful analysis of everyday cognitive practices.

In the 1730s Hume wrote *A Treatise of Human Nature*, published in three books in 1739-1740. Composed when he was in his twenties, the *Treatise* proposed to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects. It offered a bold theory of ideas and impressions, an analysis

of causal inference grounded in habit, a skeptical challenge to demonstrative certainty about matters of fact, and a provocative account of the self as a bundle of perceptions. Although the *Treatise* received a cool reception on publication, it established the framework for Hume's lifelong themes and prompted him to present a clearer, more accessible restatement.

An *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748) recast key parts of the *Treatise* in a more concise and approachable style. It developed Hume's empiricist copy principle, clarified the difference between relations of ideas and matters of fact, and explained causal reasoning as expectation formed by custom. The *Enquiry* also articulated his mitigated skepticism, recommending epistemic modesty without abandoning everyday belief. Its famous discussion *Of Miracles* argued that no testimony could reasonably outweigh the uniform experience supporting laws of nature unless the falsehood of that testimony would be even more miraculous, a stance that became a touchstone in debates over religion and evidence.

An *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (1751) presented Hume's mature ethical theory. He held that moral distinctions arise chiefly from sentiment rather than reason, and that virtues are grounded in their usefulness or agreeableness to oneself and others. The work treats justice as an artificial virtue sustained by social conventions, and emphasizes sympathy as the psychological mechanism connecting individuals. It offers nuanced discussions of benevolence, practical deliberation, and the evaluation of character. By highlighting everyday moral experience instead of abstract duty, the *Enquiry* helped reorient moral philosophy toward empirical psychology and the study of human motivation, and influenced later sentimentalist and utilitarian currents.

Following the *Enquiries*, Hume published essays on politics, commerce, and taste, and he later achieved

widespread public recognition as a historian. He also held posts in civil service and spent time in Parisian intellectual circles, where his wit and clarity were admired. Philosophically, he continued to refine his views, urging readers to judge him by the *Enquiries* rather than the early *Treatise*. While some contemporaries criticized his religious skepticism, many praised his literary style and psychological insight. Over time, his analyses of belief, habit, and moral sentiments shaped discussions across philosophy and the emerging social sciences.

In his later years, Hume remained an emblem of the Scottish Enlightenment's urbane, secular inquiry. He died in 1776, leaving a body of work that profoundly influenced successors. Immanuel Kant credited Hume with awakening him from dogmatic slumber, and later movements—utilitarianism, pragmatism, and logical empiricism—drew on Humean themes about experience, language, and evidence. His accounts of induction, causation, and moral psychology continue to inform contemporary philosophy, cognitive science, economics, and legal theory. The three books featured here remain gateways to his project: a careful, often disarming exploration of how human beings know, feel, and live together under the guidance of custom.

Historical Context

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David Hume's major philosophical writings emerged in the middle decades of the eighteenth century, when Britain and, especially, Scotland were central nodes of the European Enlightenment. The period after the 1707 Union joined Scottish political institutions to those of England, while Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Aberdeen became vibrant intellectual centers. The three works gathered here—*A Treatise of Human Nature*, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, and *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*—span roughly 1739 to 1751. They reflect an era shaped by confessional tensions, the consolidation of a commercial empire, and the authority of experimental science, all of which framed Hume's rethinking of knowledge, belief, and morality.

The Scottish Enlightenment provided Hume with a distinctive milieu: porous boundaries between philosophy, history, and political economy; accessible universities; and active learned clubs. Figures such as Francis Hutcheson and, slightly later, Adam Smith worked to replace scholastic systems with inquiries modeled on observation and experiment. This ethos—sometimes termed the science of man—encouraged analysis of human faculties, sentiments, and social conventions. Hume's texts belong to this movement, using case studies of common life, legal practices, and everyday reasoning to investigate the foundations of understanding and morals, rather than relying on innate ideas or abstract metaphysical systems.

Across Britain, the prestige of Isaac Newton's natural philosophy and the empirical turn introduced by John Locke and developed by George Berkeley reshaped the standards of argument. Newton's emphasis on experiment and

cautious inference influenced philosophical method well beyond physics. Hume's *Treatise* explicitly proposes bringing an experimental approach into moral subjects. The *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* compresses that program into a sharper investigation of ideas, causation, and the limits of reason. By insisting that claims be traceable to experience, Hume situated his work within a broader, cross-disciplinary confidence in observation and probabilistic reasoning.

Hume was born in 1711 near Edinburgh and studied at the University of Edinburgh in his youth. After a period of private study, he spent several years in France, including time at La Flèche, around 1734–1737. There he completed substantial portions of the *Treatise*. France offered inexpensive living costs, rich libraries, and contact with the Republic of Letters. The Jesuit college at La Flèche had a scholarly reputation dating back to Descartes. This Franco-Scottish context helped Hume absorb continental debates about skepticism and metaphysics while keeping his eye on the British empirical tradition he aimed to refine and challenge.

The *Treatise* appeared in two installments in 1739 and 1740. Its initial reception was muted, prompting Hume to issue a concise *Abstract* in 1740 to guide readers. The book's ambitious analyses of perception, belief, and morality—delivered in a dense style—tested the patience of a public more familiar with sermons, polite essays, and Newtonian popularizations. The chilly response did not end Hume's project. Instead, he reworked key portions into more accessible forms, resulting in the two *Enquiries*. The pattern reveals an Enlightenment practice: recalibrating learned argument to suit a widening, literate audience without surrendering rigor.

Political conditions shaped the intellectual concerns of these works. The Hanoverian succession (from 1714) stabilized the constitutional order after 1688 but left Britain

anxious about legitimacy and authority. Scotland witnessed Jacobite risings in 1715 and 1745, events that dramatized tensions among loyalty, tradition, and improvement. Hume's discussions of custom, authority, and religious belief unfold against memories of civil conflict and fragile settlements. The *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, for example, interrogates testimony and evidence in an environment where factional narratives circulated widely and where statesmen and clergy alike appealed to providence, miracles, and historical precedent.

Expanding commerce and property relations also informed Hume's treatments of justice and convention. Eighteenth-century Scotland and England experienced growing markets, credit networks, and urbanization, trends often described as improvement. In the *Treatise* and the *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, Hume analyzes justice as an artificial virtue sustained by rules of property, transfer, and promise—rules that develop to stabilize cooperation under scarcity. This framework resonated with the legal and economic transformations of a commercial society, where enforceable contracts, reliable credit, and expectations of fair dealing became practical necessities as well as philosophical examples.

Religious controversy formed a persistent backdrop. The Church of Scotland grappled with disputes between so-called Moderates and Evangelicals over doctrine and discipline. Public debate about deism, toleration, and providence surged through sermons and pamphlets. Hume's section on miracles in the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* examined the standards for accepting extraordinary reports, arguing that evidence must be weighed against uniform experience. The discussion provoked extensive replies, notably George Campbell's *Dissertation on Miracles* (1762). Hume's failure to secure a university chair in Edinburgh in the mid-1740s reflected

clerical suspicion of his skepticism, further revealing the stakes of the period's religious politics.

In moral philosophy, Hume wrote amid disagreements between rationalist theorists, who grounded obligation in reason or divine command, and moral sense proponents like Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, who emphasized affection and approval. The *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* sides with sentiment by locating moral distinctions in feelings of approval and disapproval, while still giving a central role to social utility. This approach aligned with civic humanist and polite culture ideals that prized benevolence, sociability, and public spirit. It also engaged contemporary philanthropic movements that praised sympathy for suffering and improvement in manners.

Hume's emphasis on sympathy intersected with broadening literate and commercial publics. Periodicals, coffeehouses, and expanding book markets encouraged readers to imagine perspectives beyond their own. While Hume articulated sympathy as a psychological mechanism rather than a moral panacea, this conceptual focus mirrored cultural practices—correspondence, travel writing, and polite conversation—that trained individuals to align sentiments. In both the *Treatise* and the second *Enquiry*, moral evaluation depends on shared points of view, an idea intelligible to audiences accustomed to debating taste, politeness, and propriety in mixed company across Britain's increasingly interconnected cities.

War and empire were constant features of mid-eighteenth-century life. The War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) and, later, the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) reshaped trade routes, fiscal policy, and public credit. These conflicts stimulated discussions of risk, probability, and trust—topics Hume analyzed under the heading of belief, custom, and causal inference. The circulation of news and the variability of military outcomes offered vivid examples of how people update expectations. Hume's account of

inductive reasoning in the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* thus spoke to readers accustomed to wagering, insurance, and the uncertainties of a globalizing economy.

Hume's own public service linked his philosophy to diplomacy and statecraft. In the late 1740s he served as secretary to General James St Clair, traveling on missions to continental courts. The *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* appeared in 1748, in the midst of this international exposure. Contact with French and Austrian intellectual circles complemented Hume's earlier years in France and his immersion in the skeptical and historical erudition of figures like Pierre Bayle. The cross-border character of the Republic of Letters reinforced Hume's conviction that standards of evidence and argument should be portable beyond confessional or national frameworks.

The *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* selectively recast Book 1 of the *Treatise*, clarifying discussions of ideas, causation, and freedom. The *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* similarly reworked materials from Book 3. Hume pared back controversial metaphysical excursions and refined his style to reach a broader public. This strategic revision followed a common Enlightenment pattern: experimenting with genre to balance accessibility and depth. The shift from youthful *Treatise* to mature *Enquiries* underscores how changing readerships, publishers, and polemical climates could shape the presentation of philosophical systems without transforming their central concerns.

Reactions within Scotland quickly situated Hume within an ongoing debate about common sense and skepticism. Thomas Reid's *Inquiry into the Human Mind* (1764) criticized Hume's account of perception and causation, proposing that certain basic principles are known by common sense and need no proof. Reid and the Aberdeen Philosophical Society addressed the same educated audience that read the

Enquiries, attempting to secure everyday belief against radical doubt. Such exchanges illustrate how Scottish universities and clubs functioned as testing grounds where the limits of experimental philosophy in the human sciences were negotiated.

Hume's moral writings were also read alongside emerging political economy. Though the collection here does not include his essays, contemporaries increasingly discussed luxury, refinement, and commerce as engines of sociability. The Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, with its attention to utility, industry, and the stability of possession, resonated with these themes. Later British thinkers associated with utilitarianism found affinities in Hume's emphasis on general social advantage and impartial viewpoints. In this way, debates about public welfare, poor relief, and economic growth provided a living backdrop for Hume's analysis of the virtues.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, new scientific disciplines reframed Hume's legacy. Immanuel Kant famously credited Hume's challenge to causation with awakening him from dogmatic slumber, and post-Kantian philosophy continued to wrestle with Humean skepticism. In the twentieth century, logical empiricists highlighted Hume's treatment of meaning and verification, while philosophers of science debated his problem of induction. Psychologists and cognitive scientists later drew on Hume's accounts of habit and association. These receptions helped readers reinterpret the Enquiries and the Treatise as early, influential models of naturalistic inquiry into mind and morals.

Technological and cultural shifts have further influenced how Hume's texts are read. The eighteenth century's expanding print culture, postal networks, and improvements in transportation fostered communities of discussion that Hume both inhabited and analyzed. Early industrialization and the growth of financial instruments made probabilistic

reasoning and impersonal trust more salient. Against this background, the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding's account of evidence and testimony, and the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals' focus on conventions and utility, can be viewed as philosophical reflections on infrastructures—material and institutional—that were becoming characteristic of modern life. Finally, taken together, these works offer a coherent commentary on their age's aspirations and anxieties. They articulate an experimental approach to human understanding that responds to religious contention, political consolidation, and commercial expansion. Later readers—from common sense philosophers to Kant, from utilitarians to analytic philosophers—have repeatedly returned to them to reassess reason's scope, the authority of experience, and the sources of moral judgment, ensuring their continued reinterpretation as contexts and concerns change.

Synopsis (Selection)

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A Treatise of Human Nature

A comprehensive attempt to build a science of human nature, this work develops an empiricist psychology in which perceptions ground all thought and belief. It probes the limits of knowledge about causation, the self, and external objects, showing how habit and passion structure our inferences and motivations. The tone is systematic and rigorously skeptical, yet oriented to ordinary experience, establishing themes the other works refine and revisit.

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

This enquiry offers a streamlined account of how we form beliefs about the world, distinguishing demonstrative truths from factual claims that rest on experience. It explains causal reasoning as a product of custom and evidence, scrutinizes the reach of testimony, and advocates a modest, practical skepticism about what can be justified. Compared with the more expansive treatment elsewhere in this collection, its style is lucid and selective, crystallizing Hume's epistemological concerns.

An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals

Turning to ethics, this enquiry locates the foundations of moral judgment in human sentiments and the social contexts that shape them. It argues that virtues attract approval through their benefits to others and to ourselves, while analyzing justice, benevolence, and the role of

conventions in stabilizing society. The tone is humane and pragmatic, complementing the epistemological works by showing how feeling and shared interests guide conduct more reliably than abstract reason alone.

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emphasizing instead the patterns through which perceptions cohere. Personal identity becomes a matter of psychological continuity rather than a metaphysical substrate. This portrait is reflective and provisional, designed to match the complexity of lived mental life. It suggests that what we call the self is stitched together by organizing tendencies that render a flux of experiences intelligible without positing a further, hidden entity.

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding keeps metaphysical ambitions modest while sustaining attention to the experiential basis of self-conception. The Enquiry focuses on how ideas derive from impressions and on how habits of thought shape our expectations about ourselves and the world. By prioritizing clarity and restraint, it presents the self less as a debated essence and more as a practical standpoint formed through regularities in experience. The emphasis falls on how belief and anticipation operate within personal life, reinforcing the idea that identity is tied to patterns discernible in memory and behavior rather than to an isolated core beyond experience.

An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals adds a social dimension by treating character as the locus of moral assessment. Here, the self appears through traits that draw approval or disapproval, understood via the sentiments and sympathies they evoke in observers. Identity is thus carried by recognizable dispositions and their effects on communal life. This approach brings the self into public view, where praise, blame, and education shape enduring habits. The focus on shared responses makes the moral self both personal and relational, highlighting how stability in character is sustained by practices that foster predictable and beneficial patterns of conduct.

Across the three works, the self emerges as a layered construct: psychologically patterned, experientially grounded, and socially expressed. Philosophical analysis discourages positing an invariant inner entity, yet everyday

life requires stable points of reference for memory, responsibility, and evaluation. Hume's account accommodates both insights by tracing identity to the continuity of perceptions, the reliability of habits, and the public recognition of character. The tension between flux and stability becomes productive rather than paralyzing, yielding a conception of self that is intelligible without metaphysical excess and robust enough to anchor moral discourse and practical commitments.

Question 5

How does Hume's method evolve from system-building to selective clarity across the collection?

A Treatise of Human Nature undertakes a comprehensive architecture of philosophy, encompassing understanding, passions, and morals within a single, interconnected project. The Treatise's scope produces depth and intricacy, inviting readers to track how analyses in one domain reverberate in another. Its method prizes explanatory reach and coherence, even when arguments lead to unsettling reflections about knowledge and identity. This ambitious structure illustrates Hume's commitment to a unified science of human nature. The breadth serves as both strength and challenge, revealing the benefits of system while exposing how complexity can obscure the practical bearings of key insights.

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding distills central themes into a clearer, more focused presentation that targets core epistemic issues. Rather than attempting an all-encompassing framework, it concentrates on the mechanisms of inference, the status of causal reasoning, the role of testimony, and the management of probability. Examples and distinctions are crafted to illuminate rather than to extend a system. This selective clarity does not alter the naturalistic orientation but sharpens it, emphasizing

what inquiry can responsibly claim. The method here privileges accessibility and argumentative precision, positioning key conclusions where they can guide investigation without burdensome theoretical scaffolding.

An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals continues the movement toward concision by presenting a streamlined account of moral judgment rooted in sentiment and social experience. The work relies on familiar cases and observable effects of character traits to clarify evaluative patterns. Its method aims at illumination rather than exhaustive derivation, providing a practical orientation to moral reflection. By keeping the focus on widely shared responses, it shows how ethics can be both reflective and grounded in everyday life. This approach complements the earlier system by translating its commitments into a format readily integrated with common moral discourse.

Viewed together, the texts reveal a trajectory from comprehensive system to targeted exposition. The Treatise demonstrates the power of a grand design; the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding extracts methodological essentials for knowledge; and the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals does the same for ethics. The evolution favors clarity, tractability, and public intelligibility without abandoning the original naturalistic commitments. Continuity is preserved in themes and conclusions, while changes in presentation reshape how readers engage the ideas. The collection thus models how philosophical projects can mature by refining scope, sharpening language, and reorienting arguments toward their most serviceable forms.

Memorable Quotes

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1q "But penetration is impossible: Mathematical points are of consequence equally impossible."

2q "Ideas always represent their objects or impressions;"

3q "It is absurd, therefore, to imagine the senses can ever distinguish betwixt ourselves and external objects."

4q "We have no perfect idea of any thing but of a perception."

5q "This we must prove by our experiments."

6q "Reason is the discovery of truth or falshood."

7q "The remedy, then, is not derived from nature, but from artifice;"

8q "I have already observed that the imagination passes with greater facility from little to great, than from great to little,"

9q "We may begin with considering a-new the nature and force of sympathy."

10q "All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect."

11q "Every idea is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment;"