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Selected Topics in Migration Studies

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Contents

Introduction

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This book is a collection of papers about migration. More specifically, each piece focuses on a specific aspect of international migration at a given time. We do not pretend the coverage is complete or exhaustive, because it is not. But it is multifaceted, and this is important. That is, the papers cover a wide range of topics dealing with multiple aspects of international migration that have taken place at various locales around the globe, usually during the past two or three decades. Thus, the notable advantage of the approach here is that it provides a basis for discerning broad features of international migration, and their change during the period examined, including the general policy auspices under which such patterns have occurred. This then provides a basis for judging whether and why such tendencies appear to be changing. Examining only a single country, or only a single aspect of migration, would not offer the possibility of such insight.

What then are the important patterns that emerge, and what do they consist of? The old idea that "demography is destiny" still crops up, though now in nuanced analyses (Morland 2019, Schurman 2022). Although armchair analysts may fret that birth and death rates determine a country's economic and/or geopolitical situations, high birth rates or aging populations rarely are the main drivers of countries' well-being. They rarely determine overall socioeconomic standing for the simple reason that other factors generally intervene to compensate for their effects. Thus, for example, high nineteenth century European birth rates were often offset to a considerable degree by out-migration, thus easing negative pressures on national food supplies.

The globalization of migration has emerged as the major trend of recent decades (de Haas et al., 2020). Despite enormous refugee flows caused by such geopolitical traumas as the Syrian civil war or the invasion of Ukraine, the overall levels of migration have grown only slowly. Amid that slow growth, however, the number of origin countries has increased. The scope of intercontinental movements has also grown, leading to greater diversity in of migrants in the more developed countries (Brown et al., 2019). The direction of dominant migration flows has changed across the 20th century, most notably in that post-war Europe attracted settlers rather than sending them. Another migration trend emerges in the rise of non-Western destinations in the Gulf and industrialized parts of East and Southeast Asia. As these countries transition from sending countries to immigrant-receiving countries, their populations can also become more ethnically diverse. These trends have raised questions of security and fierce political debates about belonging. With fertility rates falling or stabilized at or below replacement level in virtually all high-income countries, immigrants constitute a higher proportion of their national populations, especially among young adults.

Although most developed countries generally encourage skilled migration, they try to restrict less-skilled migrants (Beine et al., 2016). Boucher and Gest (2018) argue that labor migration worldwide is becoming more transactional, that is, a "market model," in ways reminiscent of the guestworker programs of the mid-20th century. In more than half of the countries they studied, most migration flows consisted of temporary migrants whose presence prioritizes the state's hiring flexibility over any long-term investment in immigration. This temporary approach to migration may appease domestic nativist factions.

This trend leads to what appears to be a divergence in migration patterns. On the one hand, the globalization of migration has coincided with greater liberalization of migration and rising acknowledgement of human rights. On the other hand, increasing restrictions on immigrants have in many cases criminalized some of their movement. This divergence, or "liberal paradox" (Hollifield et al. 2014: 8), centers on how states can ensure both enough labor for economic growth and enough control to appease their citizens. Ruhs (2013) argues for an

inherent tradeoff in the quantity of migrant workers admitted by more developed nations and the quality of the rights that those nations bestow. Still, political scientists debate the degree to which states truly control the number and type of immigrants and the gap between immigration policy and its enforcement (Hollifield et al. 2014). The gap may reflect bureaucratic exigencies or perhaps a deliberate choice to try to satisfy multiple constituencies at once by placating public opposition to immigration with restrictive laws and then enforcing them only weakly (Boswell, 2007). This gap is yawning in the United States, where a vast border with Mexico, longtime agricultural migration, and willingness to overlook hiring laws resulted in millions of unauthorized immigrants (Martin, 2014).

Thus, today's "demographic destinies" appear increasingly to involve temporary labor migration as well as more refugees. To a considerable degree, and more so than at any time since the end of World War II, countries face the reality of having to deal with increasing numbers of migrants on the move. To have some chance of coping fruitfully with this phenomenon, it is thus important that we define carefully what we mean by the term migration. In its broadest sense, it means movement from one place to another. Clearly, the kind of place matters, with an essential starting point involving making a distinction between movement made within countries from movement made between countries. The former we call internal and the latter external migration. Thus, internal migration generally means movement from one governmentally defined place to another such place <u>within</u> a country. Thus, we often talk about movement between states (within a given country) or between cities (within a given country), or from one county to another (within a given state), and so forth. For external migration, however, we mean movement <u>between</u> countries.

Furthermore, movements between countries can also involve various kinds of temporal characteristics. Perhaps most fundamentally, movement can be permanent or temporary, by which we mean officially it can involve long-term change (since nothing is truly permanent) or short-term change. Also, if the movement involves arriving at destination under the official auspices of the receiving country, we call it <u>legal migration</u>, and if it does not, we call it <u>non-legal</u> (or irregular, unauthorized, or undocumented) <u>migration</u>. Temporary legal migration involves multiple forms as well, such as refugees, asylees, tourists, temporary legal workers, etc.). Each of these various kinds of migrants is important because the nature of migrant movements into a country determine the migrant's official membership with the receiving society, and thus the initial kind of "societal membership" under which the migrant can live his or her life. Clearly, unauthorized migrants face the harshest and most difficult societal categorization (one involving the fewest and most precarious opportunities for achieving success) in their new homelands.

Finally, it is important to realize that the latter category of migrant (who we have just used the phrase unauthorized to describe) consists of two kinds of migrants – those who have come under their own volition and those who have been forced to change their home country by dint of natural disaster, societal/economic collapse in their origin country, or extreme political or wartime danger in there. In short, migrants must also be distinguished by whether they seek new destinations voluntarily or forcibly. To a certain extent, those in the latter category can theoretically be accommodated in new countries as refugees, asylees, or victims of trafficking. However, in certain instances, especially recently, their numbers have been so large that, as a practical matter, it has seemingly been virtually impossible for many destination countries even to process them, let alone accommodate them as newcomer members of new destination societies. The United Nations formally defines refugees as people who have fled their homeland because of war or violence and have a well-founded fear of persecution based on their race, religion, nationality, political beliefs, sexual orientation, or membership in a social group. But despite the formal definition, refugees whose initial move was involuntary may become labor migrants, and some of the theories of labor migration may well apply to them (Bates, 2002; FitzGerald and Arar, 2018).

Many of the countries of the world over the past few decades, as the papers in this volume suggest, have developed various strategies and auspices for incorporating migrants into their societies and economies. A notable example involves the formulation and adoption of policies facilitating the entry and legality of workers, although frequently only on a temporary basis (Wassink and Massey 2022; Bean et al. 2014). But obtaining full and complete membership

in their new societies has thus far largely eluded such migrants. And taking the next step toward broader migrant integration is likely to prove challenging because of recent substantial growth in forced migration streams around the world stemming from weather and economic disasters associated with climate change and geopolitical conflicts.

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Part 1: Africa

African Island Migration

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Definition

African Island migration concerns the islands off the east coast of Africa in the western Indian Ocean: Madagascar and the Comoros, the Mascarene Islands of Mauritius and Réunion, and Seychelles.

Detailed Description

Islands are particularly distinctive sites of migration. They are geographically separated from their neighbors by water, which constrains movements of populations and grants island migrations a special character. Moving into and out of an island generally requires more effort than crossing a land border, and in the contemporary world, movements by sea and air are more easily controlled by the state. Island populations are often more aware of their identities than groups on the mainland, partly because of the difficulties faced in settling the island and partly because of the controlled character of contact with neighbors. However, islands require contact with the outside world: all but the very largest of islands are unlikely to be self-sufficient, and they rely on trading partners for foodstuffs, manufactured goods, labor, and capital.

Historical Migrations

All the islands of the southwestern Indian Ocean have been settled by immigrants in a relatively recent past. Madagascar was the last of the world's great land masses to have been colonized by humans, during one of the world's great historical migrations. The Austronesian-speaking peoples of Southeast Asia began moving out of their ancestral homeland in Taiwan more than 5,000 years ago, and their descendants today are found across a wide swathe of the globe, from Easter Island in the southeast Pacific, through Polynesia and Indonesia to, in the western Indian Ocean, Madagascar itself. These migrations finally ended with the settlement of New Zealand in the fourteenth century. However, while there are indications of a human presence in Madagascar as early as the late third millennium BC, there is no reliable evidence of the existence of a settled human population prior to the fifth century AD, and linguistic and genetic evidence suggests that Austronesian settlers arrived later still, almost certainly via the East African coast. Regardless of the dates of their arrival, however, geneticists, linguists, and anthropologists all agree that the contemporary Malagasy are descended from African and Austronesian immigrants (Adelaar 2012; Cox et al. 2012).

The same migratory movements probably led to the settlement of the Comoro Islands, to the northwest of Madagascar, but once again, evidence is lacking: the earliest reliably dated archaeological site in the archipelago is late first millennium. However, the historical record and the physical evidence from the nearby African coast confirms that Arab seafarers were navigating in the region some 2,000 years ago, and by the time Islam reached the area toward the ninth century, it is clear that the Comoros were already inhabited. Genetic analysis suggests that the bulk of the population has its roots in East Africa, but that both Arab men and Austronesian women contributed to the Comorian melting pot. The populations of

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both Madagascar and the Comoros were subsequently augmented by substantial movements of slaves from the East African mainland: the Comoro Islands were a notorious slave-trading center, while in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, large-scale slave raids on the African coast by Betsimisaraka and Sakalava slavers from Madagascar saw the forced migration of large numbers of East Africans to the latter island, whence many were sold onward to the Mascarenes.

Further east the smaller creole island states of Mauritius, Réunion, and Seychelles, uninhabited when first visited by Europeans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were populated by large-scale migrations during the colonial era. Plantation colonies were established on the islands, initially under French control, later, following the Napoleonic Wars and (with the exception of Réunion, which was returned to the French) under British control. In the early period large numbers of Africans were imported as slaves to work on the plantations, and they rapidly came to constitute a majority of the population and develop (much as in the Caribbean) a creole society. Although slaves were brought from all parts of the African continent, it seems likely that the majority were from East Africa and a substantial number were Malagasy. Malagasy immigrants were present in sufficient numbers in both Mauritius and Réunion to maintain their own language and culture until well into the second half of the nineteenth century; they were eventually assimilated to the general creole population, and while they lost their language in the process, creole culture in both states owes much to Malagasy origins (Larson 2009).

Following abolition, initially of the slave trade, later of slavery itself, the colonists were forced to turn elsewhere for their labor force. The French administration in Réunion was the first to recruit laborers under the indenture system and began shipping contract laborers from their ports in India, particularly Pondicherry, in 1826; however, it was the British government who recruited the greatest number of indentured laborers, and it is estimated that nearly half a million indentured laborers arrived in Mauritius from India between 1834 and 1913, with several thousand more arriving from Madagascar, China, and parts of East Africa (Addison and Hazareesingh 1993; Carter 1995). Although indentured laborers were in theory accorded a degree of legal protection and a free passage home at the end of their indenture, the conditions under which they lived and worked differed little from slavery; nevertheless, few opted for a return, and these mass migrations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have shaped contemporary demographics in the creole islands: Mauritians of Indian origin today constitute some 67 % of the population, while people of mixed African and European descent represent close to 30 %. Franco-Mauritians and Sino-Mauritians make up the remainder. In Réunion the proportions are more equitable: the three principal groups – of mixed African and European origin, of European origin, and of Indian origin – probably each account for approximately a third of the population; Réunion similarly has a small community of Chinese origin (Leguen 1979). In Seychelles – too small and remote for the development of a successful plantation economy – there are few of Indian descent and the population is largely of mixed European and African origin.

Internal Mobilities

From the high-income island of Réunion (a French department(s) and an EU Outermost Region) to the resource-poor and overpopulated Comoros, contemporary migrations have left their mark on all the islands although the political, economic, and demographic diversity of these islands provide for significant differences in the character and magnitude of migratory flows across the region. In the creole islands internal migrations are of minor significance – employment prospects draw individuals to the urban areas, while facility of movement allows those employed in towns to move out: in Mauritius, for example, infrastructure improvements have prompted a slight net outward migration from urban areas to rural areas over the past two decades. There are minor movements between the islands of Seychelles, generally for profession reasons; there is also a small net out-migration from the Mauritian island of Rodrigues,

although this has decreased significantly since the 1990s as the island's economy and infrastructure improves (Govt. of Mauritius 2000).

In Madagascar, internal migrations are more significant and are largely responsible for the growth in urban populations, particularly outside the capital, Antananarivo: while the capital's share of the population has remained constant at about 9 % of the total population over the past 20 years, regional urban centers have been growing proportionately more rapidly for several decades, currently at a rate 2 % in excess of that of the national population growth rate. One in three Malagasy households now lives in an urban area (Freeman et al. 2010; World Bank 2011). Despite this relative shift in growth, Antananarivo continues to attract more than 100,000 internal migrants annually: urbanization in Madagascar is almost entirely due to internal migratory flows, which are facilitated by the cultural and linguistic homogeneity of the island and underpinned by the strong attachment that Malagasy feel toward their ancestral lands and their ancestral tombs. This tends to discourage international migration; it also allows migrants to maintain strong links with their homes. Although in many cases poverty is certainly a factor encouraging rural–urban migration – migrants are drawn to urban areas by economic opportunities and better infrastructure, particularly in health and education – internal migrations in Madagascar are also often made possible by the wealth and support of a home that funds the movement to the city. Many rural dwellers move to the cities in order to sell agricultural produce from their home regions, and many are successful. It is not without significance that the majority of urban dwellers in Madagascar are landowners: all but the very poorest possess their house and a small garden where they grow rice – a culturally significant foodstuff in Madagascar. Kin groups are particularly important in shaping migrant networks, and the importance of the ancestors in Malagasy society means that an individual may belong to several large and cohesive descent groups who can provide support, extending a welcome to new arrivals in the city. In a similar vein, regional and ethnic associations also provide valuable support to migrants in urban areas. The migratory process is therefore a dynamic relationship linking urban and rural economies: produce from rural areas permits movement to the cities and provides both for regular physical return and for remittances to the rural areas, thus in turn sustaining the rural economy and encouraging further rural–urban migration (Nawrotzki et al. 2012).

Internal migrations are important on an interisland level in the Comoro Islands; the bulk of outward migrations are from the island of Ndzuani where the economy is exiguous, land shortages are acute, erosion is severe, and the population density (574/km^2 at the 2003 census) is twice that of Ngazidja and more than three times that of Mwali. Ndzuani is the poorest of the islands and, unlike Ngazidja, has no significant diaspora on whom to rely for remittances.

For many years migrants from Ndzuani have therefore settled in Mwali, taking up agricultural land and creating immigrant villages; they have also been drawn to Ngazidja, seat of the national government and where many work either in the civil service or in private enterprise; and they continue to travel to Mayotte, today (and despite Comorian claims over the island) a French département. All three of these movements have caused problems in the past. The influx of large numbers of immigrants to Mwali has occasionally caused tension, particularly over land, while in Ngazidja, migrants from Ndzuani are accused of being disproportionately represented in the civil service. These conflicts are exacerbated by sporadic outbreaks of secessionist sentiment on Ndzuani itself. In 1997, chronic political and economic instability at a national level finally prompted local leaders on Ndzuani to declare independence and seek recolonization by France; political reconciliation was achieved with the promulgation of the 2002 constitution, which devolved significant powers to the islands, but there are still regular expressions of separatist sentiment and, on a more social level, a general recognition and acceptance of strong and distinct island identities within the Comorian nation that often characterizes interisland migrants as being socially and culturally different.

Mayotte

Migrations to Mayotte are particularly problematic and are inscribed within a long-term circulation of individuals and families in the archipelago. In a 1974 referendum Mayotte voted against Comorian independence, and when the territory declared independence from France the following year, Mayotte expressed a desire to remain French. French support for Mayotte's self-determination, contrary to UN resolutions on decolonization and Comorian claims over the island, culminated in the full incorporation of the island into France as a département in 2011; and although the island is significantly less developed than other French départements, it is significantly more prosperous than the other islands of the group. For two decades following independence, there was a freedom of movement between the islands, but in 1995 France imposed visa requirements on Comorian passport holders wishing to travel to Mayotte. However, Comorians from Ndzuani, in particular, continue to enter Mayotte in large numbers, traveling in small, overloaded, and often unseaworthy boats: these boats frequently sink and the loss of life is high (Causes Communes 2012).

Many of those who travel to Mayotte do so to visit family and friends but others are seeking work. In Mayotte the undocumented are regularly exploited in the labor market; denied access to housing, education, and health services; and frequently denounced to French immigration. Those apprehended by immigration officials are held in overcrowded and insalubrious conditions in unfurnished cells in a detention center in Pamandzi that has repeatedly attracted condemnation from human rights organizations before being deported to Ndzuani: currently more than 20,000 individuals are deported annually from Mayotte – in 2011 this represented almost 15 % of the population of the island. Amnesty International has described the conditions in the detention center as "inhuman and degrading"; but the legal issues surrounding movements from the other islands to Mayotte are particularly difficult to resolve since from a Comorian point of view these are internal migrations. Furthermore, the nature of interisland mobilities and attendant kin-links, particularly between Ndzuani and Mayotte, is such that it is often difficult to determine with any precision who belongs where: many may have origins on the other islands but have been residents of Mayotte for decades.

Regional Flows

Intraregional migrations tend to follow patterns established in the colonial period. Mauritius and Seychelles are reasonably prosperous middle-income economies and migratory flows to the other islands are limited, although there are some 3,300 Mauritian residents in Réunion; likewise a relatively small number of migrants from Réunion to the other islands tend to be professionals. Intraregional migrations to Mauritius and Seychelles are also limited. Seychelles is a small state, difficult to get to, and with limited prospects for immigrants; and while French is widely spoken in both Mauritius and Seychelles, English is the official language, thus also discouraging potential immigrants from the other islands. Both countries are less attractive than Réunion which, as a French département, is a high-income economy member of the EU; even if less prosperous than metropolitan France, the socioeconomic benefits of France, a shared colonial history and a common language, and the facilitating role of Réunion for onward migration to Europe are strong drawcards. More than three quarters of Réunion's immigrant population come from neighboring islands: nevertheless, at 1.8 % of the population, there are proportionally far fewer immigrants in Réunion than in metropolitan France, where the figure is more than 8 %. There are, according to official figures, 6,400 Malagasy and 1,500 Comorians in Réunion. However, the latter are a particularly visible minority since their numbers are increased by a significant number of French citizens of Comorian origin, many of whom are from Mayotte: there may be as many as 30,000 Comorians in Réunion, almost all of whom, as citizens, are legally resident (INSEE 2010; Marie and Rallu 2012). However, identifiable both by their dress and by their practices as both Comorian and Muslim, they are frequently subject to

discrimination, exploitation, and abuse. They frequently find it difficult to obtain employment and housing and many live in insalubrious conditions in the poorer urban areas of the island.

Comorians are also present in Madagascar. French colonial policy encouraged the emigration of Comorians to Madagascar rather than East Africa to palliate labor shortages on the big island. However, rather than seeking work as agricultural laborers, the majority settled in the urban areas. A sizeable Comorian community was established in Mahajanga, on the northwest coast, and by 1960, Mahajanga counted some 23,000 Comorian inhabitants, almost 40 % of the town's population. Muslim Comorians (the majority of Malagasy are Christian), often prosperous and, following independence, foreign, were not always viewed favorably by their Malagasy neighbors and strained relationships reached breaking point in December 1976 when, following a dispute between two families, intercommunal rioting broke out and over a three-day period some 2000 Comorians were massacred. More than 17,000 individuals of Comorian origin were subsequently repatriated to the Comoros, the largest forced migration in the region in recent history. Although largely reintegrated, many of those repatriated had been born in Madagascar and retain a distinct identity in the Comoros where they are known as Sabenas (from the airline whose aircraft repatriated them) or Zanatany (Malagasy, "children of the land") (Etudes Océan Indien 2007).

Forced migration was also responsible for the depopulation of the Chagos Islands, detached from Mauritius in the late colonial period to constitute the British Indian Ocean Territory. The colony was leased to the United States for military purposes, on the understanding that there was no local population, and between 1965 and 1973 some 2,000 Chagossians were forcibly removed, the majority to Mauritius (Evers and Kooy 2011). Compensation was derisory and many lived in extreme poverty in the urban fringes: unemployment was high, mental health problems were widespread, and there were several suicides. Following many years of legal battles, the Chagossians obtained some compensation and British passports, and they now have right of abode in the United Kingdom: a sizeable community now live in the United Kingdom, particularly in Crawley, Sussex (Jeffery 2011). Others continue to live in Mauritius, and there is also a small community in Seychelles. In 2000 the community won a judgment in the British High Court that their eviction from the islands was illegal, paving the way for the Chagossians to return; but in 2004 this right was effectively blocked by a British Order in Council. After several further decisions the community is now pursuing the case at the European Court of Human Rights.

International Migration

Inward immigration to the Comoros is negligible, with the exception of return migrations of Comorians born elsewhere. The events of Majunga were a more brutal echo of the expulsion of a number of Zanzibaris of Comorian origin following the Zanzibar revolution in 1964. Prior to the French annexation of Madagascar (and the subsequent incorporation of the Comoros into the colony of Madagascar), the Comoros, and particularly the island of Ngazidja, had maintained strong links with East Africa, where Zanzibar was an economic and cultural center of some importance. A small Comorian community was present in Zanzibar at the beginning of the eighteenth century, but emigration from Ngazidja to Zanzibar increased rapidly following the French occupation of the former island in 1886. Enjoying the advantages of French citizenship, the small but influential Comorian community of Zanzibar enjoyed the respect both of the French government and of the British colonial administration and were generally employed in the civil service or served as religious leaders. Although many took up Zanzibari nationality in the run up to independence, they maintained their identity as a community and generally aligned themselves (with varying degrees of success) with the Arab communities and the ruling classes. One month after independence, the sultan of Zanzibar was deposed in a bloody coup that was followed by anti-Arab pogroms that saw widespread killings (the number of deaths remains obscure today) and the mass expulsion of Zanzibaris of Arab origin. Some Comorians, also perceived as foreigners due both to their French citizenship and, for many, their Arab origins, were expelled or forced to flee, and although their

number was small, the experience has marked the collective memory of the Comorian community in Zanzibar.

Comorian emigrants are found elsewhere in East Africa – there are communities in mainland Tanzania, Kenya, and Mozambique and individuals of Comorian origin in South Africa – and beyond. Ngazidja has long been a supplier of migrants, partly due to the lack of economic development of the island and partly due to the existence of an onerous customary marriage ritual, known as the *âda*, which forces individuals overseas to seek the capital with which to discharge their social obligations. For much of the late and postcolonial period, the preferred destination was France and there are sizeable Comorian communities in Paris, Dunkerque, and, above all, Marseille; and while the initial migrants are usually men, they are often later joined by spouse and children. Many of these Comorians are *sans-papiers*, undocumented migrants, and many more are French citizens and it is therefore hard to be precise about numbers – it is thought that 80 % of Comorians in France are French citizens, but that of the remainder 80 % are undocumented. Official French government statistics give a figure of 18,700 Comorian citizens in France and 25,800 Comorian-born, categories that presumably largely overlap, but these figures grossly understate the size of the population and it is thought that there are upwards of 100,000 Comorians in the country, of whom a majority live in Marseille (Vivier 1996). The Comorian community is one of the largest and most visible of immigrant communities and is frequently singled out for criticism, most notably in September 2011 when the French minister of the interior, Claude Guéant, claimed that the Comorian community was responsible for much violence in the city. Certainly the community, and particularly the younger, French-born, suffers from the discrimination and social disadvantage that touch many immigrant communities; but they are also well organized: there are several dozen Comorian migrant associations in France and social cohesion is strong.

Although much of the savings accumulated during a sojourn in France is destined for costs associated with the *âda* and its rituals, the social cohesion that is both at the heart of these rituals and is reinforced by them maintains immigrant links with the homeland. Most first-generation immigrants intend to retire to the Comoros (hence participation in the ritual), and the social investments prompt economic investments as the diaspora finance local development projects and send remittances to families at home. Remittances are crucial to the Comorian economy, perhaps accounting for as much as 20 % of GDP (da Cruz et al. 2004; Thierry and Axus 2007). Once again, exact figures are difficult to obtain since up to 75 % of funds are remitted in cash, but estimates range upward from €50 million annually. Criticism therefore that 75 % of these funds are spent on consumption items (implicitly the *âda*) should be tempered by the fact that without the *âda* the remaining 25 % would undoubtedly be very much smaller. Recently, Comorian migrants have moved beyond the traditional destination of France to the United Kingdom and Nordic countries, North America, and even Australia. These latter destinations also attract Mauritians, partly for linguistic reasons, and a small but significant group of Mauritians emigrated to Australia around the time of Mauritian independence in 1968 – the largest population, some 9,000, live in the Melbourne area.

Although there are small communities of Indian and Chinese origin in Madagascar – both groups generally run businesses, the former in the urban areas of the west coast, the latter on the east coast – migratory flows to and from Madagascar and Réunion are also largely orientated toward France. More than 100,000 Réunionnais live in metropolitan France; but the lure of the tropics is strong and there are some 80,000 metropolitan French natives living in Réunion, where they are known as *zorey*. The French also constitute the largest immigrant group in Madagascar, numbering perhaps 30,000, and the Malagasy community in France is also sizeable, numbering perhaps 50,000. It is thus one of the larger sub-Saharan African groups in France but is significantly less visible – at least in the French imagination – than similar sized communities from West Africa. This is largely due to their profile. Many Malagasy migrate to France for study rather than as laborers and they are also better integrated into French society, partly no doubt, by virtue of the fact that Malagasy are Christian (albeit largely Protestant)

and partly because many are phenotypically Asian rather than African and thus less likely to be subject to the sorts of prejudices suffered by West Africans or Comorians.

Malagasy emigrate elsewhere – to other European destinations and North America – but one destination is egregious: some 7,000 Malagasy women work as domestic laborers in Lebanon. Maltreatment of domestic migrants in Lebanon is chronic, and in 2009, in response to complaints and a rising number of suspicious deaths and suicides, the Malagasy government imposed a partial ban on labor migration to Lebanon, preventing new departures but allowing those in possession of Lebanese work permits to return. In 2010, 17 Malagasy maids died in Lebanon, and at the end of the year, the ban was upgraded to prohibit all labor migration to Lebanon; the following year, in response to more than 600 requests for help from Malagasy in Lebanon, 86 domestic workers were repatriated (Human Rights Watch 2010). Nevertheless, Malagasy continue to emigrate as domestic workers and there are small numbers in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan.

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Southern African Migration

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Introduction

Southern Africa is at the southernmost part of the African continent, and it is characterized by internal and international labor migration whose history goes way back to the seventeenth century. Internal migration is the movement of people within national borders of a country, while international migration occurs when people move across international borders. This entry will state very briefly about internal migration; but its focus is on contemporary international migration. Most recent studies of migration focus on international migration because of the increasing awareness of its importance in national and international development issues. Southern Africa experienced considerable forced migration from South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, Angola, and Zimbabwe between the 1950s and 1990s due to violent civil wars. The major destinations in the region for refugees were Botswana, Malawi, and Zambia. While several economic, social and political, environmental, and demographic factors have influenced internal and international migration in Southern Africa, these movements have in turn influenced national and international development in these areas. Meanwhile, migration has had considerable effects on the incidence and spread of communicable diseases, such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, and other sexually transmitted infections and noncommunicable diseases, such as hypertension and obesity (Levitt et al. 1993; Collinson et al. 2006; Ansell and Van Blerk 2011).

Data Availability

So much has been written about the limited data on migration, especially international migration (Byerlee 1974; Black 2003) that it is needless getting into that here. Studies in genetic anthropology indicate that the history of internal and international migrations in Southern Africa is ancient and may be traced back to several centuries before the birth of Jesus Christ. However, social scientists have been more occupied with investigating movements that occurred in modern history and contemporary times. There are indications from studies in African genome that the modern human migration in Africa originated in Southern Africa, especially Namibia and Angola, with pastoral occupation being the major motive for these movements (Tishkoff et al. 2009). However, several unexplained factors, such as cattle herding and tsetse fly-induced sleeping sickness in prehistoric times, have raised questions about the link between current and ancient geographical locations of Khoikhoi people of South-West Africa and their northern "cousins" in Botswana and Zambia (Boonzaier et al. 2000). Oral history and DNA were used in 1987 and 1988 by Spurdle and Jenkins (1996), with a sample of 49 unrelated Lembas, to explain the existence of people with non-African ancestry in the continent. These methods helped to identify the cultural origins and history of the Lemba ethnic people who live in Zimbabwe and claim that their ancestral parents were Jews who migrated from the Middle East to Southern Africa to trade in gold and other items. According to Spurdle and Jenkins (1996), the ancestors of the Lemba settled in Yemen and traded initially with East Africans. But a hostile invasion of their land, with devastating results, forced them to migrate to Africa with a part of the ethnic group settling in East Africa, while another part proceeded to Southern Africa. It was observed

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that the Lemba people practice circumcision in a manner similar to the Jews. They also observe dietary laws similar to those of the Jews. The authors concluded that the Lemba was more likely a descendant of Middle Eastern Jews than Arabs at about seventh century B.C.

Other data sources include censuses, random sample survey, and continuous recording systems especially at international border posts and airports. Official statistics on remittances are generally obtained from banks, post offices, and money transfer agencies. These sources have been widely used to estimate volumes, rates and patterns of migration as well as explain their determinants (Kok et al. 2006; Collinson et al. 2007; United Nations 2009a, b; World Bank 2011). Though little effort has been made to improve the collection of international migration data in Africa, Southern Africa has been fortunate to have over 12 years of continuous investigation of attitudes and behavior of internal and international migrants and nonmigrant citizens by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP). SAMP surveys are mostly cross-sectional and cover several subjects including brain drain, brain circulation, remittance, diaspora, xenophobia, and health (see SAMP website www.queensu.ca/samp/sampresource). Several other researchers have done individual studies on the subject, and in 1978–1982, the government of Botswana conducted a National Migration Survey which remains one of few such exercises in the region. A notable finding from an individual researcher is the contribution of Ghanaian immigrants to economic development in Southern Africa where the professionals worked in the educational, legal, and administrative sectors. As many of the men were accompanied by their wives, the women brought along skills which they applied in commerce and service sectors and acquired considerable wealth (Van Dijk 2003). These women also invested in the importation and sale of clothing obtained mainly from Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. The variety of data sources has occasionally raised questions about the consistency of variable definitions and measurements (Frayne and Pendleton 2001; Posel and Casale 2003; Campbell 2010).

Internal Migration

The most documented of internal migration in the region is the Great Trek, a mass movement of Dutch settlers (or Boers) from the Cape Province in the western part of South Africa to areas which later became the province of Orange Free State, Natal, and Transvaal. Calvinist Dutch began settling in South Africa in the seventeenth century having moved from Europe to escape persecution at the hands of conservative followers of John Calvin. The Great Trek was motivated by a mix of economic, political, and religious factors. But central to these was a determination by the Dutch settlers to attain independence from British rule as it was perceived to be oppressive (Templin 1968). The blacks in South Africa were restricted in their ability to move to the cities. Movement from rural to urban areas was predominantly of the circular type and families were not permitted to stay with male workers in the cities. The situation was similar in Namibia and Zimbabwe. Black Namibians were confined in undeveloped communal farmlands with controlled movement to the town, mines, and commercial farms (Frayne and Pendleton 2001). Before independence in 1980, black people in Zimbabwe were restrained from undertaking rural to urban migration because of economic and political factors. Rural–urban migration increased after 1980 resulting in dramatic increase in urban population growth rates. For example, the growth rate of Harare rose from 3 % before 1980 to 6.2 % by 1990 largely due to internal migration (Potts 2010). Historically most labor migrants in Southern Africa (internal and international) were men, though within short distances, women dominated (Crush 2000; Crush et al. 2005; Posel and Casale 2003). Botswana is among the few exceptions where females were dominant among internal migrants (Gwebu 1987).

Immigration and Emigration

Southern African countries have a common economic goal (within the Southern African Customs Union) which is to attain maximum economic development. This and other factors, including national security and social development, contributed to the formation of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which has recently been determined to facilitate international migration for development in the region. However, the level of cooperation on international migration in the region has been fraught with several challenges emanating from the markedly differential economic status of the countries. While South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia have made significant economic progress, several others have not done so well. This difference has been a major obstacle to the implementation of the protocol on free movement of persons within the region, settling instead for the protocol on the facilitation of movement persons in the region (United Nations 2011). The patterns of immigration and emigration in Southern Africa center on South Africa, a country that has historically been the economic hub of the region. The history of emigration in the region goes back to the nineteenth century when South Africa began recruiting foreign labor to work in the gold mines. The recruiting agency of the South African Chamber of Mines is The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA).

The intention of the South African government was not to recruit foreigners to work in the gold mines permanently, but to restrict their stay and lifestyle by excluding families, keeping them in hostels and ensuring that they were repatriated periodically. For instance, the contracts of miners from Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland were for 6–9 months, while Malawians were granted 2 years, partly due to the travel risk associated with long distance from South Africa (Lucas 1987). Although most migrants to South Africa were men who sought employment in the mines and farms, women also migrated to South Africa primarily to work in the informal domestic sector. Most of the migrants were unskilled. The motivation for cross-border migration was primarily economic with the aim of increasing household incomes at home. Migrant remittances assisted much in this direction although there are conflicting views on the level of assistance. Table 1 indicates that the peak of mine labor recruitment in South Africa varied between countries of origin. The sudden stop in recruitment of Malawians was largely due to a conflict between the South African and Malawian governments over HIV testing of applicants. Botswana received tens of thousands of refugees from South Africa in 1976–1978 as they passed through to seek asylum in Zambia and Tanzania. At the same time, Zimbabwean refugees increased in Botswana by over threefold to 25,300. Many resided in the country with thousands receiving Botswana citizenship (Campbell 2003).

The stock of immigrants in Southern Africa reached 2.2 million people in 2010 – with an average annual increase of 7.3 % between 2005 and then. South Africa hosts the majority of these migrants (1.9 million) (see Fig. 1). The high sex ratios in Table 2 indicate the persistence of male dominance among international migrants in the region. But with increasing education and personal liberation of women, these ratios are falling due to the growing feminization of international migrants in the continent. Since 1990, migration within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and from the rest of Africa to SADC has increased dramatically. The direction of movement is highly influenced by the marked economic differentials in the region, with South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia being the dominant destinations. The number of persons migrating from Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia to the commercial farms of Zimbabwe declined considerably since the land transfer program in Zimbabwe. Immigration in Zimbabwe began in the nineteenth century with Europeans and South Africans entering in the twentieth century (Mlambo 2010). Later in the century, an exodus of blacks and whites occurred in response to the liberation struggle. But the greater exodus occurred in the twenty-first century following the country's economic recession which began in the late 1990s. The number of Zimbabweans migrating to work or to look for work in Botswana and South Africa has increased dramatically. Opportunities for Zimbabweans to work legally in other countries are limited but that has not prevented many from migrating (Crush et al. 2010).

Table 1 Mine labor recruitment in South Africa, 1990–2000

Year	Botswana	Lesotho	Mozambique	Swaziland	Malawi
1920	2,112	10,439	77,921	3,449	354
1930	3,151	22,306	77,828	4,345	0
1940	14,427	52,044	74,883	7,152	8,037
1950	12,390	34,467	86,248	6,619	7,831
1960	21,404	48,842	101,733	6,623	21,934
1970	20,461	63,988	93,203	6,269	78,492
1980	17,753	96,308	39,636	5,050	13,569
1989	16,051	100,529	42,807	16,730	72
1990	14,609	99,707	44,590	17,757	–
1991	14,028	93,897	47,105	17,393	–
1992	12,781	93,519	50,651	16,273	–
1993	11,904	89,940	50,311	16,153	–
1994	11,099	89,237	56,197	15,892	–
1995	10,961	87,935	55,140	15,304	–
1996	10,477	81,357	55,741	14,371	–
1997	9,385	76,361	55,879	12,960	–
1998	7,752	60,450	51,913	10,336	–
1999	6,413	52,188	46,537	9,307	–
2000	6,494	58,224	57,034	9,360	–

Source: Crush et al. 2005

Fig. 1 Stock of migrants in Southern Africa, by destination, in 2000, 2005, and 2010 (in thousands)

Skilled emigration on a large scale in Southern African is a relatively recent phenomenon and it is associated with tertiary education and brain drain. The most attractive African country for skilled migrants is South Africa. A distant second is Botswana, followed by Namibia. While it is quite difficult to estimate skilled immigrants in Southern Africa, the proportion of skilled immigrants in South Africa seems to be inversely related to social distance from the source countries. Most of the skilled migrants are from

Table 2 Foreign-born population in Southern Africa (2007)[a]

Country	Male	Female	Sex ratio**
Botswana	17,995	11,562	156
Namibia	63,056	56,162	112
South Africa	1,206,287	648,274	186
Swaziland	17,049	14,694	116
Zambia	72,623	68,791	106

Source: UN (2009) Demographic Yearbook 2007

[a]Information is for countries with adequate immigration data. It excludes persons whose migration status was not known

Western Europe, followed by the rest of Africa and southern Africa (Mattes et al. 2000). About 33 % of African labor migrants employed in South Africa are skilled (McDonald et al. 2000). Skilled Namibians are more likely than the unskilled to migrate to South Africa. Greater skills among urban than rural populations largely explain why urban Namibians are more likely to migrate to South Africa than the rural folks. Among Zimbabweans, 20 % of male and 14 % of female visitors to South Africa had completed at least high school education. The four principal sources of skilled immigrants in Botswana are South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and the UK. Just as South Africa and Botswana have experienced brain gain, it seems that there is the risk of brain drain from these countries. Brain drain occurs when the skills that a government invested in emigrate to work and live elsewhere. Up to 1992, South Africa gained more skilled immigrants than it lost (Mattes and Richmond 2000; Mattes et al. 2000). But since 1994, the country has been experiencing a deficit in skilled human resource. Effectively, it has consistently lost than gained skilled persons through international migration. The situation is similar in Zimbabwe.

From the wealth of research-based information on Zimbabwe's brain drain, it may seem that the country has lost the most skills in the region. But Table 3 indicates that Zambia is relatively the biggest skill loser with 17 % of its professionals having emigrated. Still, it is evident that Zambia and Zimbabwe have experienced the most brain drain in the region. Having previously been considered a curse, brain drain is now acknowledged to be a national blessing because it has contributed directly to the positive effects of international migration, namely, the diaspora, remittance, and brain circulation. From being a net immigration country between 1921 and 1975, Zimbabwe has been characterized by emigration for political reasons during the second half of the 1970s and for economic reasons since 2000 (Crush and Tevera 2010). The health sector has been the most affected by skilled emigration in and from Southern Africa. According to Table 3, every country has lost over 10 % of its native-born physicians and a fair proportion of its nurses. From the health point of view, Zimbabwe has lost the most skilled workers with the majority having obtained employment in the UK and South Africa.

In view of the extent to which professionals felt obliged to leave their ancestral home countries, it appears that skilled emigration was underestimated. Between 1989 and 1997, about 233,000 South Africans emigrated to the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. But official statistics revealed that 82,811 people actually left during this period. Throughout the 1990s, there has been a steady decline in the number of immigrants. In 1993, there were 9800 immigrants and this declined to 4100 in 1997. Meanwhile, from 1994 to 1998, South Africa experienced net emigration of close to 4,000 annually. Forty-eight percent of the 342,947 emigrants who lived in OECD countries were highly skilled (OECD 2006). Their exit left serious social, economic, and political consequences in its wake. Unfortunately the loss of skills was not offset by a proactive, aggressive recruiting immigration policy. The implications of these trends are very clear. There will continue to be a shortage of skilled workers as well as an oversupply of unskilled labor. The negative implications will reverberate throughout the South African economy and impact on the country's global competitiveness given that skilled workers generally create jobs for unskilled workers and that the level of skills in the labor force is an attraction for foreign investment.

Table 3 Immigration and emigration statistics

	Botswana	Lesotho	Namibia	South	Swaziland	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Africa
Total population (2009)	2,000,000#	2,100,000	2,200,000	49,300,000	1,200,000	12,900,000	12,500,000	
No. of emigrants (2010)	63,000	427,500	16,500	878,100	163,300	185,800	1,253,100	
Emigrant as % of total pop[a]	3.2	20.5	0.7	1.7	13.3	1.4	9.9	
Skilled (tertiary) emigrant (%)	3.6	4.3	3.5	7.5	0.5	16.8	12.7	
Emigration of physicians (%)	11.4	33.3	45.0	21.1	28.5	56.9	51.1	
Emigration of nurses (%)	2.2	2.8	5.4	5.1	2.8	9.2	24.2	
Immigrant stock (2010)	114,800	6,300	138,900	1,862,900	40,400	233,100	372,300	
Immigrant as % of total pop	5.8	0.3	6.3	3.7	3.4	1.8	2.9	
Remittance inflow (US$ mil)[b]	141	490	17	834	99	59	500+	

Source: World Bank (2011) Migration and Remittances Factbook

[a] 2000

[b] 2008   # 2011 National Census figure   + over US$500 million

A clear gender dimension emerges; men are more likely to leave permanently than women (Dodson and Crush 2004).

Consequences of Immigration and Emigration

Until the 1990s, the informal sector was almost absent in South Africa's economy. Its growth owes much to the economic activities of contemporary immigrants especially from West and East Africa. The informal economic sector which has historically been a common feature of West and East African lifestyle hardly existed in South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia before 1990. Considering the high levels of unemployment in the cities, the informal sector is crucial for providing those not employed in the formal sector with a way out of poverty. Several migrants who fail to find work or are refused work permits in the country become self-employed, at times illicitly setting up barber, food, clothing shops, etc. Zimbabweans constitute the highest proportion of migrant street vendors. Mozambicans and, to a lesser extent, Batswana, Basotho, and Swazi are also quite active in promoting the informal sector in South Africa. Tevera and Zinyama (2002) observed that, among all visitors and migrants to South Africa, the highest proportion of men and women who buy and sell goods is from Zimbabwe. Basotho, Mozambican, and Namibian migrants also buy and sell goods in South Africa (Sechaba Consultants 2002). Zimbabwean males seem to be in South Africa as much to work or look for work as it is for commerce. But almost three quarters of migrant women are there for commercial purposes (Tevera and Zinyama 2002). Apart from personal development within the new diaspora, a common feature of this group is the remitting of money and goods to families in the ancestral home.

Diasporas in Southern Africa

Between ancient and modern times, two categories of diaspora have been identified. These are the "classic" and "modern" diaspora. Classic diasporas are associated with the Jewish, African, Indian, and other diasporas which were formed several centuries ago, while modern diasporas were formed fairly recently from contemporary international migration (Cohen 1997). Examples of classic South African diasporas in the region are the Tswana in Botswana and Shona in Zimbabwe. The modern diasporas in the region were formed from contemporary migration from in and outside the region. The latter include Nigerian, Ghanaian, Somali, and Kenyan diasporas. Though the African Union recognizes that both groups should be encouraged to make significant contribution to economic and social development in the continent, the focus in Southern Africa is harnessing the potential of the modern diaspora for immediate and future socioeconomic development in the region. South Africa has taken the lead in this by organizing meetings for dialogue and cooperation as well as reaching out to the diaspora with provision of incentives. Diasporas in and out of Southern Africa have contributed much to the national economies at home through financial and social remittances. Financial remittances are monies and goods sent home by migrants, while social remittances include the ideas, identities, language, behavior, food, music, other arts, and social capital that are transferred from destination to origin countries (Levitt 1998). The altruistic relationship between African parents and their offspring explains much of the factors that influence migrant remittances. The South Africa diaspora is the highest remitter in the region, and it is estimated that Zimbabweans sent over US$500 million home in 2009 (IRIN 2012). Indeed, the nation of Zimbabwe would have collapsed without migrant remittances (Crush and Tevera 2010). Lesotho also receives a considerable amount of remittance, while Namibia is the lowest recipient (Table 3).

Migrant remittances contribute significantly to poverty reduction in the region. The bulk of all remittances received in Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, and Swaziland comes from South Africa. Though the region receives the lowest amount of international remittances in Africa, they

Table 4 Items remittance in Southern Africa is spent on, 2004 (in percentage)

	Botswana	Lesotho	Mozambique	Swaziland	Zimbabwe	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Food	87.5	89.3	69.9	83.4	75.7	81.9
School fees	42.9	56.0	49.1	54.9	54.6	52.3
Clothing	62.9	76.1	43.5	24.0	56.6	52.2
Transport fares	27.0	50.0	24.8	29.2	31.6	33.8
Seed	2.4	24.4	26.3	44.4	11.3	24.0
Fertilizer	1.1	18.5	1.3	34.2	9.4	15.2
Tractor	1.5	12.5	0.9	39.7	1.3	13.6
Savings	8.6	18.7	10.9	4.7	19.4	12.5
Cement	26.7	5.2	14.9	7.2	8.1	11.1
Funeral	18.9	16.3	5.5	5.0	9.1	10.8
Roofing	21.6	3.6	7.2	3.5	6.7	7.5
Bricks	20.3	4.5	5.0	2.7	6.7	6.9
Fuel	3.6	9.9	6.1	2.0	7.8	6.0
Labor	5.0	5.1	9.8	4.1	4.3	5.5
Cattle purchase	20.8	1.4	2.2	1.6	2.0	4.6
Repay loans	6.8	1.9	5.8	4.2	3.5	4.2

Other items excluded
Source: Pendleton et al. (2006) Migration, remittances. . . . . .. SAMP

contribute significantly to national development in several countries, especially Lesotho and Zimbabwe where the remittance is 29 % and about 40 % of GDP, respectively (World Bank 2011; Bhebhe 2012). Migration, remittances, and development have a long history in the region. Bilateral agreements between South Africa and several Southern African countries, including Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland, ensured that foreign miners put significant proportions of their earnings into the national economies (referred to as deferred payment). In 1984, 18,691 Batswana miners generated nearly R17 million ($2.6 million) in officially recorded remittances alone, which helped to grow Botswana's rural economies in particular. Remittances contribute substantially to several key areas within the Millennium Development Goals, especially mitigating hunger and enhancing children's education. Most of the remittances to and in the region are used for personal and household consumption (Table 4). Food is the primary item on which remittances are spent, followed by school fees, clothing, and transport fares. Apparently, Batswana (citizens of Botswana) do not require remittances for children's school fees as much as other nationals do, and this is partly because of the existence of government-induced public education system which is almost fee-free from primary to university levels (UNECA 2011). Meanwhile, the dominance of Botswana's expenditure on cattle purchase is due to the great value the nationals place in cattle rearing (cattle is a major export product in the country). Most migrants remit through unofficial channels, including taking money and goods home when they visit, using bus drivers and friends. High frequency of visitation makes personal remitting the most popular. Others use banks, post office, and money transfer agent such as Western Union.

Associated with diaspora and African development is ensuring that brain drain is moderated and encouraging brain circulation. Former President Mbeki of South Africa once pledged about US$71 million to encourage highly skilled citizens to stay in (or return to) the country (Campbell 2007). In an attempt to ease the effect of emigration of health workers in Lesotho, the Minister of Health and Social Welfare met with Basotho health professionals in the UK to discuss the plans that the Lesotho government had for those who returned. In order to attract skills back home, several governments are implementing

economic policies that would guarantee employment, investment, and internationally competitive income. The government of Malawi has introduced economic and investment policies since 2000. These have helped improve economic performance and attracted the attention of potential professional returnees. In collaboration with DFID, the government is offering incentives to discourage emigration of health professionals. Sadly, brain circulation (generally defined as return home of skilled emigrants), which has been successful in developed countries and in India and China, has not quite taken off in Southern Africa because the social, economic, and emotional investment risks are high and minimize its usefulness in the region and the rest of Africa (Wickramasekara 2002). It works best within developed nations' socioeconomic systems where the environment for setting up the networks required for profitable professional, academic, and commercial ventures are quite advanced and favor performance and competition. But it is not so in Africa where populations are transitional.

Human Rights

Much of the policies on international migration either affects or is influenced by the rights of people to move freely between countries. Though human trafficking has become increasingly important in human rights issues, irregular migration takes precedence because of its general and more transparent nature. Irregular migration is movement of people across cross-international borders without appropriate travel documents (i.e., passport and entry visa). It also applies to migrants who entered another country legally but stayed beyond the time permitted by their visitor of work permit. An alternative concept of irregular migration is undocumented migration. The two terms are widely preferred to the apparently derogatory one "illegal migration" because the concept "illegal" criminalizes the act of irregular border crossing. Due to the absence of effective border controls in many African countries, irregular migration did not seem to exist until the twentieth century. While irregular immigration occurred in Zambia and Zimbabwe during the peak of mining, none is comparable to the attraction of South Africa. Irregular movement to South Africa by men and women began in the 1920s. Women were more disadvantaged than men in getting jobs. Apart from domestic work and street hawking, some women got into more demeaning activities such as prostitution (Crush 2000, p. 17). A decline in recruitment of foreign mine workers occurred in the 1960s partly due to the negative post-independence attitudes in several Southern African countries toward apartheid South Africa. The governments of Zambia, Tanzania, and Malawi did not favor labor migration to South Africa; so Zambia and Tanzania withdrew its mine workers shortly after independence and Malawi did so in 1972 (Crush et al. 2005). The policies which restricted migration to South African mines fostered irregular migration to South Africa in pursuit of employment and higher living standards in South Africa's multi-sectoral economy.

   Several countries which did not permit their citizens to visit or work in South Africa suspended this policy when apartheid formally ended in 1994. The attraction to Zimbabwe, where almost a quarter of a million African migrants were employed in 1961, and Zambia had dwindled remarkable as their economies declined (Crush et al. 2005). Also, the lifting of apartheid occurred at a time of serious economic and political turmoil in most other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. These factors boosted irregular migration to South Africa. Initially, employment of irregular migrants was concentrated in the commercial farm sector and mostly in farms close to the borders of Zimbabwe and Mozambique (Crush 1999). But political changes in the 1990s enhanced opportunities for irregular employment in urban centers such as Johannesburg and Durban, and the social and environmental effects of this drew the most attention to the increasing inflow of irregular migrants to the country. Zimbabweans form the second largest group of irregular migrants in South Africa. Between 1994 and 1999, they grew much faster than the Mozambicans did (27.0 % annually), and from 2000 to 2004, they grew annually by 12 % (8.5 % points more than the

corresponding growth rate of Mozambicans). In the absence of reliable statistics on irregular migrants, the deportation figures give some idea of the trend of irregular migration. The total number of deportees from South Africa between 1994 and 1995 increased from 90,692 to 183,861 (an increase of over 100 %). It is acknowledged that this increase may be an effect of the governments' restriction of movements into the country and an intensified search for irregular migrants than increase in irregular immigration.

Zimbabwe's economy has struggled immensely since 1990. The decision by ZANU PF, the ruling party, in 2000 to redistribute highly productive white-owned farms to black nationals worsened the state of the country's economy (Bracking 2005; Moyo and Yeros 2005). Zimbabwe's poor rose markedly after the 2002 elections as a result of international discontent with the reelection of Robert Mugabe, the inability of blacks to maintain the commercial value of the land, and the political excesses of Mugabe. This forced scores of thousands of young Zimbabwean men and women to emigrate to South Africa and Botswana. Botswana has historically been a transit station for refugees and travelers who moved northward from South Africa to Zambia and Tanzania to escape violent conflict in their country. Between 1976 and 1978, about 10,000 refugees who escaped the apartheid regime of South Africa to seek asylum in Zambia and Tanzania went through Botswana whose government was exceptionally sympathetic to refugees. Botswana was also a popular destination of Zimbabwean refugees in the 1970s and remains so to irregular migrants from Zimbabwe. Deportation figures indicate that about 95 % of all deportees from Botswana are Zimbabweans. The average annual growth rate of irregular migrants in Botswana between 2000 and 2007 is 28.1 % (Campbell 2009). The surge in irregular migration to Botswana is largely due to geographical distance and cultural relationship between the two countries. The northeastern part of Botswana is dominated by the Bakalanga whose ancestry is in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Other contributors to irregular migration since the 1970s include: (1) the financial cost passport and visa may be too high for the poor, (2) poor education limits potential migrants' access to information about where and how to obtain international travel document, (3) mileage distance between the potential migrant's residence and the city (where travel documents are obtained) may be too far, (4) corruption of customs and immigration officers at border posts, and (5) close proximity of potential migrant's residence to the destination country.

Among the difficulties experienced by irregular migrants in Southern Africa is the abuse of their right to economic and social services. Much of this is due to negative opinion of nationals of the host country (i.e., the destination country) about irregular migration. Irregular migrants are usually stereotyped as criminals as well as being the perpetrators of unemployment and spread of sexually transmitted diseases in host countries. Irregular migration has therefore contributed to a rise in xenophobia in several countries in the region, especially Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa (SAMP 2001; Crush and Pendleton 2004). Table 5 indicates that Namibians and Batswana are less tolerant of irregular migrants than South Africans. Paradoxically, even nationals such as Mozambicans and Zambians who have been victimized by xenophobic reactions to their presence in major destinations like South Africa and Botswana are apparently also intolerant of irregular migrants (Crush 2000; Nyamnjoh 2002; Campbell 2003; Campbell and Oucho 2003; Crush and Pendleton 2004). Over half of Mozambicans and Zimbabweans would support a policy by their government if it denied legal protection to irregular migrants. Generally, there was overwhelming support for a policy which ensured that irregular migrants were never granted freedom of speech, voting right, and legal protection and giving policy the right to apprehend all irregular migrants as well as military presence along the country's borders. Some preferred the arrest of employers of irregular migrants, while nearly a third approved the use of electric fencing of national borders.

Notwithstanding these negative attitudes toward irregular migrants, the policies of governments should be guided by the United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Though irregular migrants have limited coverage within this Convention, it may be argued that, subject to correction of residence status, all migrants should be treated

Table 5 Nationals support of government policies to minimize irregular migration, by country of enumeration (%)

Support policy	South Africa	Namibia	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Swaziland
Police right to detain suspected irregular migrant	82.4	95.1	87.6	77.5	88.3	56.9
Foreigners to carry identification always	74.9	89.6	82.0	65.7	92.3	47.7
Increase tax to assist border patrol	20.6	49.9	37.7	14.6	35.7	11.4
Use army to patrol border	82.6	94.6	94.9	62.0	71.7	73.3
Allocate more money to border protection	61.1	80.7	68.5	39.8	61.0	51.4
Punish employers of irregular migrant	81.1	94.8	95.4	57.7	86.6	66.0
Turn on electric fence	60.4	79.8	62.7	47.5	22.9	33.7
No freedom of speech for irregular migrant	85.5	90.9	94.8	82.9	84.5	87.3
No voting right for irregular migrant	88.7	98.8	98.4	90.4	96.1	95.8
No legal protection of irregular migrant	62.1	64.7	59.9	50.4	57.3	46.2
No social service to irregular migrant	65.4	49.9	77.3	46.5	33.9	40.7

Source: SAMP (2001) Raw data from 2001 NIPS survey

as equals with nationals and should therefore be granted freedom of expression of religious and cultural beliefs and practices, social independence, medical care, education of children, and judicial rights in cases of detention and deportation (United Nations 1990, Article 1.1; Bosniak 1991).

Other contributors to irregular migration since the 1970s include: (1) the financial cost passport and visa may be too high for the poor; (2) poor education limits potential migrants' access to information about where and how to obtain international travel document; (3) Mileage distance between the potential migrants residence and the city (where travel documents are obtained) may be too far; (4) corruption of customs and immigration officers at border posts; (5) close proximity of potential migrant's residence to the destination country.

Irregular immigration contributes substantially to economic development of the nations throughout the world. Contrary to "stealing" jobs from nationals, these migrants actually save the host citizens much from the low wages they receive and their willingness to work in sectors which nationals do not favor. Moreover, they do not necessarily benefit from health and unemployment insurance. Lack of data makes it difficult to determine the financial benefit of irregular migration to African nations; but there is evidence that in the USA, they save the private sector millions of dollars annually due to wage depression (Huddle 1995).

An increasing area of concern to governments in the SADC region is the trafficking of women and children. Human trafficking involves deception of the victims and their parents about the eventual benefits of the transporting to the destination. Unlike people smuggling, the association between victims and traffickers does not end with the arrival at the destination. It continues and is often exploitive and violent (Orhant 2009, p. 4). In Africa, this occurs mainly between West and East Africa (the source) and South Africa where they are used mostly as prostitutes. Businesswomen in Malawi often work with long-distance truck drivers to recruit young women with promises of marriage, education, and jobs in South Africa. Trafficking of Asian women to South Africa involves trips through transit countries, such as Lesotho and Mozambique, to Johannesburg and Cape Town where they are forced to become commercial sex workers. Other sources of trafficked women include Eastern European countries from which women are flown to South Africa with false offers of employment as waitresses and domestic workers (Adepoju 2005).