


DAVID HANNAY



**A SHORT HISTORY
OF THE ROYAL NAVY,
1217 TO 1688**

David Hannay

A Short History of the Royal Navy, 1217 to 1688

Enriched edition.

Introduction, Studies and Commentaries by Noah Knightley

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Introduction

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At its core, *A Short History of the Royal Navy, 1217 to 1688* traces the protracted effort to turn disparate seafaring enterprise—part coastal defense, part commerce, part private adventure—into a coherent instrument of English state power, showing how policy, technology, administration, and geography combined to move the realm from improvised fleets to a more permanent naval posture, and how, along the way, the competing claims of local interests and central command, of profit and protection, and of tradition and innovation repeatedly collided, producing, through friction rather than design, the habits and institutions that would define the Royal Navy's early character.

This is a work of narrative history by David Hannay, surveying the development of England's sea power across the North Sea, Channel, and Atlantic littorals between the early thirteenth and late seventeenth centuries. Composed around the turn of the twentieth century, it reflects a concise, synthesis-driven approach typical of British naval historiography of that period. Hannay writes for the informed general reader and the student alike, assembling a chronological account that privileges policy, organization, and strategy. The setting is both institutional and maritime: courts, councils, and dockyards are considered alongside coasts, harbors, rivers, and the open sea.

The book's premise is straightforward: to show how a medieval monarchy that requisitioned merchant hulls and relied on ad hoc levies gradually assembled the resources, rules, and habits of a standing navy. Hannay guides readers through this process with a measured, unfussy voice, attentive to sequence without losing sight of causes. He explains technical matters—ships, armament, and administration—without pedantry, and keeps the narrative moving with careful transitions rather than dramatic set pieces. The tone is judicious and quietly argumentative, inviting readers to observe patterns in decision-making and continuity in practice while noting the pressures that forced adaptation.

Several themes shape the story that unfolds across these centuries. The first is the relationship between maritime commerce and naval protection, in which merchants, crown, and coastal communities continually negotiate costs and authority. A second concerns technology and organization: the evolution of hulls, gunnery, victualling, and dockyard management as parts of a single administrative fabric. A third is strategic geography, where straits, estuaries, and wind patterns constrain and enable policy. Finally, Hannay returns to the tension between private venture and public command, showing how licensing, privateering, and royal fleets intersect, and how control at sea becomes a measure of governance.

In contemporary terms, this history matters because it traces how a polity learns to convert maritime exposure into maritime advantage. Readers will recognize enduring questions about procurement, readiness, and civil oversight;

the costs of deterrence compared with the costs of war; and the ways commercial globalization depends on credible seapower. Hannay's emphasis on administration and finance sheds light on the institutional preconditions of capability, a subject as current as today's debates over fleets, budgets, and shipbuilding. The book thus offers not nostalgia but a framework for thinking about risk, resilience, and the alignment of national aims with naval means.

Part of the pleasure of reading Hannay lies in his economy. Chapters progress with clear signposts, keeping periods and policy shifts distinct without fragmenting the narrative. He balances the sweep of long change with succinct portraits of decision points, anchoring developments in budgets, building programs, and the shifting demands of defense and diplomacy. While the book does not linger on personal anecdote, it gathers essential materials from record and prior scholarship into a coherent line, making a complex subject intelligible. The result is a study accessible to newcomers and still useful to experienced readers seeking a compact orientation.

As a survey from 1217 to 1688, the volume follows England's passage from episodic sea power toward a more permanent naval posture at the threshold of a new constitutional settlement. It invites reflection on how institutions accrete, how practices harden into doctrine, and how maritime choices shape a nation's place in the world. For readers today—whether approaching naval history for the first time or revisiting its foundations—Hannay offers clarity, proportion, and a durable set of questions. This

introduction to the Royal Navy's formative centuries remains a concise guide to the uses and limits of sea power.

Synopsis

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David Hannay's *A Short History of the Royal Navy, 1217 to 1688* surveys how England's sea power emerged from medieval expedients into a standing instrument of state. Beginning in the thirteenth century, he traces the Crown's intermittent command over maritime communities and the hiring of merchant shipping for war. The book balances operational episodes with institutional change, showing how finance, law, and administration shaped what fleets could accomplish. Hannay's narrative follows the interplay of coastal defense, commerce protection, and cross-Channel rivalry, establishing the sea as both frontier and lifeline. The result is a chronological account attentive to continuity as much as transformation.

Early chapters reconstruct the medieval framework: the service owed by the Cinque Ports, the appointment of regional admirals, and the practice of assembling temporary fleets for specific campaigns. Hannay explains the limitations of feudal levies and impressed mariners, noting how logistics and discipline constrained operations. He situates maritime warfare within Anglo-French conflict and the wider trades of the North Sea and Atlantic, where convoying and raiding coexisted. As ship types adapted to oceanic conditions and gunpowder entered naval use, strategy still relied on seasonal musters and hired tonnage. The period's achievements and setbacks expose the

difficulty of sustaining naval force without permanent structures.

With the Tudors, the narrative turns to deliberate state-building at sea. Hannay underscores the shift from episodic levies to a nucleus of royal ships, the growth of purpose-built dockyards, and the development of central offices to manage victualling, pay, and stores. Under Henry VIII, broadside artillery and heavier sailing craft became characteristic, and the Crown invested in skilled shipwrights and coastal fortifications. Administrative innovation, including boards and specialized clerks, brought regularity to accounts and procurement, even as costs rose. Hannay shows how these changes created a professional cadre and institutional memory, giving England the beginnings of a permanent navy able to mobilize more quickly.

Elizabethan chapters set naval policy amid great-power rivalry and global ventures. Hannay presents the partnership and tension between state fleets and private enterprise, as licensed raiding and long-distance voyages intersected with defense. He reads the famous confrontation with Spain as a test of organization, sea-keeping, and gunnery rather than a triumph of chance, emphasizing sustained readiness and logistics over isolated heroics. The crown navigated chronic fiscal strain while preserving a core of ships and dockyard capacity. Technical refinements in hull form and ordnance complemented improved seamanship, and the sea increasingly served as a theater where commerce, religion, and geopolitics converged.

Under the early Stuarts, Hannay highlights the strains of peacetime economies and contested finance. Efforts to

maintain readiness with limited revenue produced legal and political friction, notably over maritime taxation and obligations. Campaigns exposed weaknesses in supply and command while also advancing standard practices in rank, rating, and drill. Expanding colonial and commercial interests widened the fleet's duties from home waters to distant stations. The narrative connects administrative setbacks to broader constitutional crisis, showing a service caught between necessity and means. By mid-century, the need for clearer authority, discipline, and sustainable funding had become a central question.

The mid-seventeenth century marks a decisive professional turn. Hannay recounts how Parliament built a capable fleet with regular pay, audited stores, and commanders tasked with continuous operations. Prolonged conflict with the Dutch drove the articulation of standing squadrons, fighting instructions that favored the line of battle, and codified articles of discipline. After the Restoration, reforms consolidated gains: the Admiralty and Navy Board regularized processes, dockyards expanded capacity, and administrative oversight—associated with figures such as Samuel Pepys—tightened accountability. Hard-fought campaigns yielded tactical learning and exposed vulnerabilities, especially in finance and maintenance, pushing the service toward more systematic planning.

In the final chapters, Hannay situates the navy within the later Stuart state, where alliances, credit, and taxation underwrote ambitious programs. Anglo-Dutch rivalry continued alongside shifting continental alignments, and the

fleet operated as both diplomatic leverage and shield for trade. By 1688, the navy's institutions, doctrines, and logistics gave it national significance beyond any single admiral or expedition, and its stance mattered in domestic politics. Hannay closes by linking centuries of experimentation to an enduring framework for sea power. The study's broader resonance lies in showing how administration, resources, and seamanship together forged the foundation of the modern Royal Navy.

Historical Context

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In *A Short History of the Royal Navy, 1217 to 1688*, David Hannay surveys the English, later British, naval institution from its medieval origins to the Glorious Revolution. The setting spans the Channel, North Sea, and Atlantic approaches, where maritime security shaped royal power and commerce. Beginning with the Battle of Sandwich in 1217, when English ships under Hubert de Burgh broke a French relief fleet, the narrative follows the shift from ad hoc levies and port obligations to a recognizably permanent navy. Hannay situates fleets, dockyards, and offices—Cinque Ports, the Lord High Admiral, and the Navy Board—within broader dynastic, fiscal, and legal change.

Medieval English sea power depended on requisitioned merchant cogs, mariner communities of the Cinque Ports, and temporary royal ships. Under Edward III, naval campaigning became central to the Hundred Years' War: victories at Sluys (1340) and Winchelsea (1350) secured sea lanes, while defeat at La Rochelle (1372) exposed vulnerabilities. Admiralty jurisdictions, victualling arrangements, and convoy practices evolved alongside the wool trade and conflict with the Hanseatic League. Yet there was no continuous standing fleet; kings mobilized when threats loomed. Hannay reads these episodes as the formative school in which English rulers learned the cost and necessity of controlling the Channel.

The fifteenth century's dynastic turmoil weakened central maritime direction, encouraging piracy and privateering. With peace under the early Tudors, policy shifted. Henry VII fostered a modest standing force, invested in shipbuilding, and in 1495 created England's first dry dock at Portsmouth, anchoring royal oversight of maintenance. These measures, though limited, prefigured later expansion. Fiscal prudence, reliance on customs revenue, and cautious diplomacy framed his approach. Hannay treats this reign as a hinge between medieval expedients and systematic administration, establishing the base from which his successors—supported by improved dockyards and ordnance supply—could assert naval power more regularly in European waters.

Henry VIII transformed naval capacity. He founded royal dockyards at Woolwich (1512) and Deptford (1513), created the Navy Board in 1546 to manage stores and finance, and sponsored heavily armed sailing ships, including the *Mary Rose*. Continuous shipbuilding, specialized crews, and gun-deck innovations moved tactics toward the broadside. Under Elizabeth I, John Hawkins' reforms improved provisioning and hull design, and conflict with Spain elevated seafaring as national defense. The 1588 Armada campaign and subsequent operations consolidated a sea-keeping strategy centered on mobile gunnery and private enterprise. Hannay uses these decades to chart the emergence of a fleet with permanent institutions.

Under the early Stuarts, strategic aims shifted from Elizabethan private war to state-directed force. James VI and I sought peace, but piracy suppression and North Sea

protection required ships. Charles I pursued ambitious building, epitomized by the great ship *Sovereign of the Seas* (1637), financed partly by the contentious ship money levies. These fiscal measures, and disputes over control of the fleet, foreshadowed civil conflict. When the Civil Wars began in 1642, the fleet largely sided with Parliament under the Earl of Warwick, securing the Thames approaches and logistics. Hannay underscores how sea control shaped political outcomes as much as battlefield victories.

The Commonwealth and Protectorate made the navy a disciplined battle fleet and commercial instrument. The Navigation Act of 1651 challenged Dutch carrying trade, provoking the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652–1654). Generals at Sea—Robert Blake, George Monck, and Richard Deane—led campaigns that professionalized command. Fighting instructions emphasized ordered lines of battle and concentrated gunnery, setting patterns for later doctrine. Dockyard administration and victualling tightened, and Mediterranean expeditions protected merchants from Barbary corsairs. Hannay presents this period as the crucible of modern naval warfare, where tactical standardization and sustained funding linked maritime strategy to national economic policy.

After the Restoration, the navy remained central to state power. The Second (1665–1667) and Third (1672–1674) Anglo-Dutch Wars refined fleet tactics and exposed administrative strains, notably during the Dutch raid on the Medway in 1667. Samuel Pepys, as Clerk of the Acts, advanced reforms in pay, discipline, and shipbuilding standards, while James, Duke of York, directed operational

and regulatory changes. Parliament authorized the 1677 'Thirty Ships' program, strengthening the line of battle. By 1688, England possessed a permanent, professionally managed fleet whose allegiance and employment were matters of high politics. Hannay closes on this threshold of constitutional and maritime transformation.

Published in 1895, Hannay's history reflects late Victorian preoccupations with sea power and institutional efficiency. Appearing after Alfred Thayer Mahan's influential 1890 study, and alongside the Navy Records Society's archival publications, it marshals documentary evidence to trace continuity from medieval levies to a standing navy. The book's emphasis on administration, finance, and disciplined tactics speaks to an era shaped by the Naval Defence Act of 1889 and imperial commitments. Without anachronism, Hannay evaluates earlier choices in organization and policy, implicitly measuring them against contemporary standards, and offering a critical yet admiring account of how England became a maritime state.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1217 TO 1688

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PREFACE

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IT has been my endeavour in this book to give a popular, but clear and not inaccurate, account of the growth, and services, of the Royal Navy. I have not attempted a general maritime history of England. This, which would include the rise and extension of commerce, discovery, much scientific matter and much legislation, would be the life-work of a Gibbon or a Hume. Such a task would be far beyond my powers, even if circumstances, which need not be specified, did not refuse me command of the time needed for so great an undertaking.

I am not unconscious that a landsman deals with sea affairs at a certain risk. He has, in Southey's phrase, to walk among sea-terms "as a cat does in a china pantry." He is liable to discover, from the criticism of a sailor, that he has made a fleet sail within two points of the wind—a disaster which it was once my lot to undergo. Perhaps only long professional experience will save a writer from such errors. If, as is only too probable, there are some in this book, I can but beg for the favourable consideration of the friendly reader.

The present volume ends at that dividing line in our history, the Revolution of 1688. Another will give the history of the great struggle with France and her dependent allies, which began in 1689, and ended only when the time of great naval wars was over—for at any rate the larger part of a century, if not for ever. The main subject of the present volume, apart from the formation of the naval service, is the

less known, but not less important, and assuredly not less arduous, struggle with Holland.

I have made it the rule to adopt the accepted spelling of names—to write Monk, not Monck; Raleigh, not Ralegh; Hawkins, not Hawkyns. Matthew Arnold once gave it as his reason for not adopting a reformed system of spelling classical names, that he would not pass his life in a wilderness of pedantry in order that his children might attain to an orthographical Canaan. That Hawkins used a "y" where we use "i" in his name, as in other words, therein following the custom of his time, does not seem to me to be any reason for departing from the practice of the language as it is to-day.

DAVID HANNAY.

INTRODUCTION

THE MEDIÆVAL NAVY

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AUTHORITIES.—Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas has made an exhaustive collection of all the evidence as to the history of the Royal Navy in the Middle Ages, in the only two volumes published of his *History of the Royal Navy from the Earliest Times to the Wars of the French Revolution*. It is the basis of this Introduction. Captain Burrows' *Cinque Ports*[\[1\]](#), in the Historical Towns Series, supplements Sir H. Nicolas.

A glance at a globe turned so as to bring the British Isles directly under the eye will at once reveal the most effective of all the material causes which have made them the seat of the great naval power among nations. It is the unrivalled advantage of their position[19]. They lie between the Old World and the New, with free access to the great ocean, surrounded by seas, which, though stormy, are not unmanageable. Their coasts are never blocked by ice. No long intervals of calm varied by mere puffs of wind reduce sailing ships to immobility, and limit their size by imposing on them the necessity of relying on the oar. Steam has freed maritime war and commerce from dependence on the wind, but the naval power of England was created during the ages of the sailing ship. Steam, too, has only made the benefit of free access to the ocean if possible more valuable. It is commonly said that an island is peculiarly fitted to be the seat of a naval power, and no doubt freedom from the perpetual risk of invasion by land is a material advantage. Immunity from that danger has saved us from the necessity for expending our resources on armies, which crippled Holland, exhausted Spain, and has hampered France. But it must be remembered that the great maritime powers of antiquity and the Middle Ages were on the mainland round the Mediterranean, not on the islands. Again, it is clear that if, in the place of Ireland, there lay to the immediate west of us any great bulk of territory too strong to be conquered, too alien to be absorbed, our insular position would not have saved us from being much confined, if not wholly shut in. But to the west of us lies the Atlantic Ocean, the beginning of the road which leads to wealth and empire all over the

world. No power can block our way thither while we exercise even equal strength on water.

Before full advantage could be taken of our position, three conditions had to be fulfilled. These islands had to become the seat of an organised State, and to cease from being merely the field in which hostile races were fighting for the mastery. The weapon of sea-power, which is the seaworthy and sea-keeping ship, had to be created. The New World had to be opened to the enterprise of the Old, and the globe to be explored. Ages passed before these conditions were fulfilled.

The maritime history of the country divides itself into three periods. First, there are the ages during which the people was being formed and the weapon forged. This may be said to extend from the first beginnings to the accession of the House of Tudor. At that date, when, be it noted, the Portuguese were exploring the sea route round Africa to the east, and Columbus was leading Spain to America, there was still much to be done in the work of consolidation within, and in the perfecting of the ship; but a vessel had been made which could sail the world round, and in the British Isles it had come to this, that England was predominant, and that for her fellow-islanders the choice was between conquest at her hands, or union on honourable terms. The second period stretches from the accession of the House of Tudor to the close of the seventeenth century, when superiority of power at sea had been fully won. The third, beginning with the Revolution, lasts until our own time. It includes the two hundred years or so during which England, having now united to herself, or conquered, all

rivals within these islands, has exercised the power she had won.

A complete history of the maritime power of England would be a vast subject, for it must include the whole story of the growth of her commerce, and her commercial or fiscal legislation. The object of this book is more modest. It is merely to describe in the main lines, and without professing to enter into detail, the growth and action of the Royal Navy—the armed force by which England has protected her commerce, has made her strength felt in the strife of nations, and has first secured, and then defended, her dominions beyond the sea.

The first of the three periods just spoken of may be passed over rapidly. In the earlier ages there was neither the organised State which could wield a navy, nor the ships for it to use. From the days of Julius Cæsar to those of William of Normandy, no invader found effectual resistance for long on water when he was about invading this country. Our own Teutonic fathers, who were raiding on the coast long before they began their permanent settlements, the generals of the Roman emperors who had rebellions to suppress, the "hornets," as Simeon of Durham called them, who swarmed out of Scandinavia, and the Conqueror himself, landed as they pleased, with rare and doubtful exceptions. There was no State so rich and so fully organised as to be able to maintain a permanent navy. How fully this was the case was shown in the fateful year 1066. Harold was undisputed king in England. The House of Godwin was familiar with the use of ships, and possessed not a few. Yet within a few months England was twice

invaded from over sea. Harold must have known that the most effectual of all ways of protecting his crown was by preventing the landing of an enemy. But he was compelled to disband his land and sea forces on the Nativity of St. Mary, for want of provisions. No organisation capable of meeting the cost of a permanent navy existed. The ships, too, were but large open boats, seaworthy enough, and even capable of making long voyages, but, when full of fighting men, they could not be stored with provisions, and they could not give cover to their crews. So there could be no blockade, no long months of watching spent at sea, without which a navy can never be used except as a mere means of transport. Hence for centuries it is always the same story. The invader runs into an estuary, or on to an open beach, and marches inland, seizing horses. A battle on land decides whether he is or is not to succeed in his purpose, whether of mere plunder or settlement. The Conqueror himself made so little use of his ships, except to cross the Channel, that he could not prevent the Danish king from hanging on the eastern coast for months.

With the beginning of the thirteenth century there came a great change. The conflict of races was over, State and people were formed in England. On the throne there was a man nearly as able as he was wicked, and he had every motive to make use of his ships to forestall invasions. With King John begins, strictly speaking, the naval history of this country. His predecessors since the Conqueror were masters of both sides of the Channel, and had no need of their fleets except for transport. They might take English ships and seamen with them on their expeditions as far as Syria.

Under their powerful rule commerce had increased, and a seafaring class had been formed. But John is the first king of England who effectually used his navy to stop invasion. By 1213 his Continental dominions had been torn from him. Philip Augustus, King of the French, was preparing an invasion, and John well knew that an invader would find friends among his vassals. Being richer and better armed, if not wiser, than Harold, he struck first. A fleet of English ships, under the command of John's half-brother, William Longsword, Earl of Salisbury, crossed to Damme, where the ships of the French king were collected, and burned them. The scheme of invasion broke down completely for that time. John's reign ended in anarchy. His rebellious barons brought in a son of the French king, and set him up as sovereign. But the death of the wicked king removed the one valid excuse for the rebellion. The country rallied round his infant son and against the invader. Within four years the ships of England were again used with decisive effect to crush an invasion.

In 1217 Prince Louis and his allies, the barons, had been defeated at the battle of Lincoln, and, being now hemmed in between their enemies and the sea, were in urgent need of reinforcements from abroad. Stores and men were collected for them in Normandy. Eighty ships, besides smaller vessels, are said to have been brought together at Calais, under the command of Eustace the Monk[2]. This man was one of the many mercenary fighters of the time, and had once been in the employment of King John. With this force he put to sea, running before a southerly wind. His intention was to round the North Foreland, and carry his convoy up the Thames to

London, which was still held for the barons. If he had succeeded, he might have greatly prolonged the Civil War, but, happily for England, neither the man nor the means to avert the disaster were wanting. Hubert de Burgh^[3], the King's Justiciary and Governor of Dover Castle, was at his post. He appealed to the men of the Cinque Ports, not in vain. "If these people land," he said, "England is lost; let us therefore boldly meet them, for God is with us, and they are excommunicate." Hubert de Burgh saw that the one effectual way of preventing Eustace from doing harm on shore was to beat him at sea before he could land. The man who reasoned like this had grasped the true principle of the defence of England. Sixteen large ships and some smaller vessels were lying in Dover harbour. They were at once got out by the shipmen and fishermen of the town, worthy ancestors of the men who, centuries later, volunteered to fill up the crews of Blake, when he was threatened by Tromp in these very waters. The knights, squires, and men-at-arms of Hubert de Burgh's following made up the fighting crews. Training the yards of the one great square sail which the vessels of that time carried on their single mast, fore and aft, the English squadron kept its luff (the word is used by Matthew Paris), and, standing out to the east, placed itself on the track of the Monk, and between him and Calais.

As Eustace saw the Dover ships apparently standing over to Calais, he came to the not wholly unnatural conclusion that their plan was to plunder the town in his absence. He laughed, for he knew that he had left it well protected. But the intention of Hubert de Burgh was incomparably more courageous and more effective. He had begun, as every

(the text notes it was carried at the foremast or mizzen to indicate certain leaders).

79 Refers to Michiel (Michael) de Ruyter, the leading Dutch admiral of the 17th century, who commanded Dutch naval forces in several Anglo-Dutch Wars and was active in major actions described here (notably 1667 and 1673).

80 A senior official at the Chatham Dockyard; the Pett family were prominent 17th-century English shipwrights and dockyard administrators, and 'Commissioner Pett' (Peter Pett in the record) was later criticised for his conduct during the Dutch raid on the Medway.

81 A 16th-century riverside fort on the River Medway near Rochester, Kent, built to defend the naval dockyards and anchorage; it was involved in the 1667 Dutch attack on the Medway.

82 The name of a contemporary popular air (tune) mentioned as being played by trumpeters; in this context it was used by sailors as a mocking or triumphal flourish after defeating an enemy.

83 Corsair crews operating from the North African 'Barbary States' (notably Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli and Salé) who raided Mediterranean and Atlantic shipping and enslaved captives during the 16th–18th centuries; European navies frequently mounted expeditions against them.

84 A secret and public agreement concluded in May 1670 between Charles II of England and Louis XIV of France, including clandestine provisions for Anglo-French cooperation against the Dutch and financial support (a pension) to Charles II.

85 Informal name for a mid-17th-century group of royal ministers whose initials (Clifford, Ashley, Buckingham, Arlington, Lauderdale) roughly form the word 'cabal'; the circle advised Charles II and the term later gained a pejorative sense.

86 The Downs is a sheltered anchorage in the southern North Sea off the east coast of Kent (England) that was used historically as a gathering and waiting point for fleets and merchant convoys.

87 Stadtholder was the title of the chief executive or military governor in the Dutch Republic, often held by members of the House of Orange who exercised political and military authority in the provinces.

88 'Breeming' (modern spelling 'breaming') refers to the practice of cleaning a ship's bottom by burning off seaweed, barnacles, and fouling before recoating with tar or pitch, a hazardous maintenance method used before coppering of hulls became common.

89 The Popish Plot (1678) was a widely believed but largely fabricated conspiracy alleging a Catholic plan to assassinate King Charles II of England, and it provoked anti-Catholic hysteria and political fallout in the late 1670s.

90 An extra allowance paid to captains in addition to wages and victualling; in this period it was a cash grant intended to defray officers' mess/table expenses and in practice significantly increased their effective pay.

91 Short for impressment, the practice of forcibly recruiting seamen into naval service (often by pressgangs); it was a common but controversial method of manning Royal Navy ships in the 17th century.

92 A hazardous sandbank and anchorage area off the Essex coast near Harwich (often called Gunfleet Sands); it was a navigational and strategic locality used for stationing squadrons in the period.

93 A contemporary epithet used for the Prince of Orange and his expedition in 1688; it appears as a name applied to his fleet or cause by supporters rather than as a formal ship name.

94 A royal household office responsible for the sovereign's wardrobe and personal clothing; it was a courtly appointment that could carry salary and influence and sometimes be held alongside naval or other posts.

95 A late 19th-century collection of poems by Rudyard Kipling portraying the language and experiences of British soldiers; it contains several of his best-known short poems and ballads.

96 Names of rival political factions in medieval Italy, broadly representing supporters of the Papacy (Guelphs) and supporters of the Holy Roman Emperor (Ghibellines); their conflict shaped Italian politics from roughly the 12th to 14th centuries.

97 A reference to the Sixteenth Dynasty of ancient Egypt; dynastic numbering for Egyptological periods can vary, and the precise dating and character of this dynasty are treated as uncertain by scholars.

98 Abbreviation for Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George, a British order of chivalry typically awarded for distinguished service in relation to foreign or Commonwealth affairs.

99 A traditional British bibliographic format: 'demy' combined with '8vo' (octavo) describes the physical size and folding format of a book and thus its general dimensions and market class rather than its content.

100 Another conventional book format (crown octavo) indicating a particular page size and binding class used in late 19th-early 20th century publishing; it denotes how sheets were folded and the resulting book dimensions.

101 A book format combining the older 'foolscap' paper size with the octavo folding (8vo); the term indicates a specific physical size historically used for certain editions and is less common in modern publishing terminology.

102 A stiff, durable cotton or linen cloth, often heavily sized or glazed, used for book bindings to give a firm cover; commonly used in library and cloth-bound editions in the period.

103 The 'Thirty-Nine Articles' are the historic doctrinal statements of the Church of England formulated during the English Reformation in the 16th century and long used as a foundational standard of Anglican doctrine.

104 A 'Regius' professorship is a royal (crown-established) university chair; the Regius Professorship of Hebrew at Oxford is a historic, senior academic post created among several royal chairs in the 16th century to oversee Hebrew scholarship.

105 A price in pre-decimal British currency meaning three shillings and sixpence (also written 3s. 6d.); this system of shillings and pence was used in Britain before decimalisation in 1971.