JOSEPH RICKABY



MORAL PHILOSOPHY: ETHICS, DEONTOLOGY AND NATURAL LAW

Joseph Rickaby

Moral Philosophy: Ethics, Deontology and Natural Law

Enriched edition.

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p. 31. Aristotle calls the end [Greek: *to telos*]; the means, [Greek: ta pros to telos] (St. Thomas, *ea quae sunt ad*

finem); the circumstances, [Greek: ta ein ois hae praxis].

Observe, both end and means are willed *directly*, but the circumstances *indirectly*.

The end is *intended*, [Greek: boulaeton]; the means are *chosen*, [Greek: proaireton]; the circumstances are simply *permitted*, [Greek: anekton], rightly or wrongly. The *intention* of the end is called by English philosophers the *motive*; while the choice of means they call the *intention*, an unfortunate terminology.

p. 42, §. 3. "As the wax takes all shapes, and yet is wax still at the bottom; the [Greek: spokeimenon] still is wax; so the soul transported in so many several passions of joy, fear, hope, sorrow, anger, and the rest, has for its general groundwork of all this, Love." (Henry More, quoted in Carey's Dante, *Purgatorio*, c. xviii.) Hence, says Carey, Love does not figure in Collins's *Ode on the Passions*.

p. 43. For *daring* read *recklessness*.

p. 44. Plato is a thorough Stoic when he says (*Phaedo* 83) that every pleasure and pain comes with a nail to pin down the soul to the body and make it corporeal. His Stoicism appears in his denunciation of the drama (*Republic*, x. 604).

p. 47, §. 8. The first chapter of Mill's *Autobiography*, pp. 48-53, 133-149, supplies an instance.

p. 49, §. I, 1. 2, for *physical* read *psychical*.

P. 52. §. 5. This *serving*, in [Greek: douleuein], St. Ignatius calls "inordinate attachment," the modern form of idolatry. Cf. Romans vi. 16-22.

p. 79. For *spoiled* read *spoilt*.

p. 84, foot. For *ways* read *way*.

p. 85, 1. 6 from foot. Substitute: ([Greek: b]) *to restrain the said appetite in its irascible part from shrinking from danger*.

p. 94, middle. For *others* read *other*.

p. 95. For *Daring* read *Recklessness*.

p. 103, middle. Substitute, *"neither evening star nor morning star is so wonderful."*

p. 106, §. 6. Aristotle speaks of "corrective," not of "commutative" justice. On the Aristotelian division of justice see Political and Moral Essays (P. M. E.), pp. 285-6.

p. 111, §. 4. The *static* equivalent of the *dynamic* idea, of orderly development is that the eternal harmonies and fitnesses of things, by observance or neglect whereof a man comes to be in or out of harmony with himself, with his fellows, with God.

p. 133. To the *Readings* add Plato *Laws*, ix, 875, A, B, C, D.

p. 151. Rewrite the Note thus: *The author has seen reason somewhat to modify this view, as appears by the Appendix. See P.M.E.* pp. 185-9: *Fowler's Progressive Morality, or Fowler and Wilson's Principles of Morals*, pp. 227-248.

p. 181, 1. ii from top. Add, *This is "the law of our nature, that function is primary, and pleasure only attendant" (Stewart, Notes on Nicomathean Ethics,* II. 418).

p. 218, lines 13-16 from top, cancel the sentence, *To this query*, etc., and substitute: *The reply is, that God is never willing that man should do an inordinate act; but suicide is an inordinate act, as has been shown; capital punishment is not* (c. viii. s. viii. n. 7, p. 349).

p. 237. For *The Month for March,* 1883, read *P.M.E.*, pp. 215-233.

p. 251. To the *Reading* add P.M.E., pp. 267-283.

p. 297, l.6 from foot. After *simply evil* add: *Hobbes allows that human reason lays down certain good rules, "laws of nature" which however it cannot get kept*. For Hobbes and Rousseau see further *P.M.E.*, pp. 81-90.

p. 319, middle. Cancel the words: *but the sum total of civil power is a constant quantity, the same for all States*.

pp. 322-3. Cancel §. 7 for reasons alleged in *P.M.E.*, pp. 50-72. Substitute: *States are living organizations and grow, and their powers vary with the stage of their development*.

p. 323, § 8. For *This seems at variance with*, read *This brings us to consider*.

p. 338. To the *Readings* add *P.M.E.*, pp. 102-113.

p. 347, middle. Cancel from *one of these prerogatives* to the end of the sentence. Substitute: *of every polity even in the most infantine condition.*

* * * * *

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

PART I. ETHICS.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE OBJECT-MATTER AND PARTITION OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

1. Moral Philosophy is the science of human acts in their bearing on human happiness and human duty**[1q]**.

2. Those acts alone are properly called *human*, which a man is master of to do or not to do. A *human act*, then, is an act voluntary and free. A man is what his human acts make him**[2q]**.

3. A *voluntary* act is an act that proceeds from the will with a knowledge of the end to which the act tends.

4. A free act is an act which so proceeds from the will that under the same antecedent conditions it might have not proceeded.

An act may be more or less voluntary, and more or less free.

5. Moral Philosophy is divided into Ethics, Deontology**[1]**, and Natural Law. Ethics consider human acts in their bearing on human happiness; or, what is the same thing, in their agreement or disagreement with man's rational nature, and their making for or against his last end. Deontology is the study of moral obligation, or the fixing of what logicians call the comprehension of the idea *I ought*. Ethics deal with [Greek: to prepon], "the becoming"; Deontology with [Greek: to deon], "the obligatory". Deontology is the science of Duty, as such. Natural Law (antecedent to Positive Law, whether divine or human, civil or ecclesiastical, national or international) determines duties in detail,—the *extension* of the idea *I ought*,—and thus is the foundation of Casuistry**[2]**.

6. In the order of sciences, Ethics are antecedent to Natural Theology; Deontology, consequent upon it.

Readings.—St. Thos[3]., *in Eth*., I., lect. 1, init.; *ib*., 1a 2æ, q. 1, art. 1, in corp.; *ib*., q. 58, art. 1, in corp.

CHAPTER II.

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OF HAPPINESS.

SECTION I.—*Of Ends*.

1. Every human act is done for some end or purpose. The end is always regarded by the agent in the light of something good. If evil be done, it is done as leading to good, or as bound up with good, or as itself being good for the doer under the circumstances; no man ever does evil for sheer evil's sake. Yet evil may be the object of the will, not by itself, nor primarily, but in a secondary way, as bound up with the good that is willed in the first place.

2. Many things willed are neither good nor evil in themselves. There is no motive for doing them except in so far as they lead to some good beyond themselves, or to deliverance from some evil, which deliverance counts as a good. A thing is willed, then, either as being good in itself and an end by itself, or as leading to some good end. Once a thing not good and desirable by itself has been taken up by the will as leading to good, it may be taken up again and again without reference to its tendency. But such a thing was not originally taken up except in view of good to come

of it. We may will one thing as leading to another, and that to a third, and so on; thus one wills study for learning, learning for examination purposes, examination for a commission in the army, and the commission for glory. That end in which the will rests, willing it for itself without reference to anything beyond, is called the *last end*.

3. An end is either *objective* or *subjective*. The *objective end* is the thing wished for, as it exists distinct from the person who wishes it. The *subjective end* is the possession of the objective end. That possession is a fact of the wisher's own being. Thus *money* may be an objective end: the corresponding subjective end is *being wealthy*.

4. Is there one subjective last end to all the human acts of a given individual? Is there one supreme motive for all that this or that man deliberately does? At first sight it seems that there is not. The same individual will act now for glory, now for lucre, now for love. But all these different ends are reducible to one, *that it may be well with him and his*. And what is true of one man here, is true of all. All the human acts of all men are done for the one (subjective) last end just indicated. This end is called *happiness*.

5. Men place their happiness in most different things; some in eating and drinking, some in the heaping up of money, some in gambling, some in political power, some in the gratification of affection, some in reputation of one sort or another. But each one seeks his own speciality because he thinks that he shall be happy, that it will be well with him, when he has attained that. All men, then, do all things for happiness, though not all place their happiness in the same thing.

6. Just as when one goes on a journey, he need not think of his destination at every step of his way, and yet all his steps are directed towards his destination: so men do not think of happiness in all they do, and yet all they do is referred to happiness. Tell a traveller that this is the wrong way to his destination, he will avoid it; convince a man that this act will not be well for him, will not further his happiness, and, while he keeps that conviction principally before his eyes, he will not do the act. But as a man who began to travel on business, may come to make travelling itself a business, and travel for the sake of going about; so in all cases there is a tendency to elevate into an end that which was, to start with, only valued as a means to an end. So the means of happiness, by being habitually pursued, come to be a part of happiness. Habit is a second nature, and we indulge a habit as we gratify nature. This tendency works itself to an evil extreme in cases where men are become the slaves of habit, and do a thing because they are got into the way of doing it, though they allow that it is a sad and sorry way, and leads them wide of true happiness. These instances show perversion of the normal operation of the will.

Readings.—St. Thos., 1a 2æ, q. 1, art. 4, in corp.; *ib*., q. 1, art. 6, 7; *ib*., q. 5, art. 8; Ar., *Eth*., I., vii., 4, 5.

SECTION II.—*Definition of Happiness*.

1. Though all men do all things, in the last resort, that it may be well with them and theirs, that is, for happiness

vaguely apprehended, yet when they come to specify what happiness is, answers so various are given and acted upon, that we might be tempted to conclude that each man is the measure of his own happiness, and that no standard of happiness for all can be defined. But it is not so. Man is not the measure of his own happiness, any more than of his own health. The diet that he takes to be healthy, may prove his poison; and where he looks for happiness, he may find the extreme of wretchedness and woe. For man must live up to his nature, to his bodily constitution, to be a healthy man; and to his whole nature, but especially to his mental and moral constitution, if he is to be a happy man. And nature, though it admits of individual peculiarities, is specifically the same for all. There will, then, be one definition of happiness for all men, specifically as such.

2. *Happiness is an act, not a state*. That is to say, the happiness of man does not lie in his having something done to him, nor in his being habitually able to do something, but in his actually doing something. "To be up and doing," that is happiness,—[Greek: en to zaen kai energein]. (Ar., *Eth.*, IX., ix., 5.) This is proved from the consideration that happiness is the crown and perfection of human nature; but the perfection of a thing lies in its ultimate act, or "second act," that is, in its not merely being able to act, but acting. But action is of two sorts. One proceeds from the agent to some outward matter, as cutting and burning. This action cannot be happiness, for it does not perfect the agent, but rather the patient. There is another sort of act immanent in the agent himself, as feeling, understanding, and willing: these perfect the agent. Happiness will be found to be one of

29 A pre-Socratic Greek sophist and philosopher (c. 490–420 BC) often associated with relativist views, famous for the saying sometimes rendered as “Man is the measure of all things.”

30 An ancient Greek philosopher (c. 341–270 BC) who founded Epicureanism, a school teaching that pleasure (understood as absence of pain) is the highest good and advocating simple, moderate living.

31 A Christian doctrinal statement emphasizing the Trinity and the two natures of Christ, composed in Latin in the late antique or early medieval period and traditionally (but likely incorrectly) attributed to Athanasius.

32 A phrase used here for the Positivist conception associated with Auguste Comte and his followers’ ‘Religion of Humanity,’ a 19th-century secular ritual veneration treating Humanity (or collective worthies) as an object of quasi-religious homage.

33 An allusion to Lord Byron’s narrative poem “The Prisoner of Chillon” (published 1816), which popularized the story of a captive at the Château de Chillon on Lake Geneva and the image of a prisoner adapting to confinement.

34 Thomas Cranmer (c. 1489–1556), Archbishop of Canterbury during the English Reformation, principal author of the Book of Common Prayer and a leading figure in the Edwardian liturgical reforms.

35 A canonist cited in the text as active around 1700 whose permissive opinion on duelling was explicitly condemned by Pope Benedict XIV in 1752; he is treated here as an early-18th-century authority in canon law.

36 An early Christian theologian and bishop of Hippo (c. 354–430 CE), author of influential works such as Confessions and The City of God; often cited in Western moral and theological writings on sin and conscience.

37 Refers to Queen Anne of Great Britain (1665–1714), who reigned 1702–1714; here the phrase is used as an intentionally absurd public assertion to illustrate a joke or 'lie in jest.'

38 Thucydides was a 5th-century BCE Athenian historian best known for The History of the Peloponnesian War; the parenthetical indicates book III, chapter 83 of that work.

39 A verse in the New Testament Epistle to the Ephesians (chapter 4, verse 25) which, in most English translations, exhorts readers to 'put away lying, and speak the truth every man with his neighbour.'

40 Thomas Cranmer (c. 1489–1556) was Archbishop of Canterbury during the English Reformation; the text refers to his historical taking of an oath to the Pope and to accounts (e.g. Strype) that he later acted with qualifications or reservations while aiding reform.

41 An ecumenical council of the Roman Catholic Church held 1512–1517 (commonly referred to as the Fifth Lateran Council); the 1515 session under Pope Leo X issued canons and pronouncements, here cited in connection with definitions of usury.

42 A Latin legal maxim meaning 'to one who consents, no injury is done'; used in law and moral argument to indicate that a person's voluntary consent may preclude a later complaint about the act.

43 A Latin formula from the Roman marriage rite meaning literally “Where you are Caius, I am Caia,” used to express the bride’s assent and her taking the husband’s name and place in the household.

44 A phrase denoting reciprocal fidelity and obligations between spouses; in older theological and legal contexts it emphasizes the idea of marriage as a two-way covenant of trust.

45 Latin for a dispensatory action; the text notes it corresponds to the Greek oikonomia and can mean an ‘economy’ or mitigated application of law, distinct from the later canonical sense of granting exceptions.

46 A reference to the New Testament, Acts chapter 17 verse 30, part of Paul’s speech at Athens about God ‘overlooking the times of this ignorance,’ often cited in theological discussions about providence and moral development.

47 A Latin legal phrase (short for a vinculo matrimonii) meaning “from the bond,” used to describe a divorce that dissolves the marriage bond and permits remarriage.

48 A Roman legal term meaning the property or assets of a household or family; in Roman law it designated goods held for the use and benefit of the family unit.

49 A legal concept by which an individual officeholder (e.g. a bishop or monarch) holds property and rights in continuity with the office, so the office is treated as a single corporate entity across successive holders.

50 Pinchbeck is a brass-like alloy developed in the 18th century (credited to clockmaker Christopher Pinchbeck) used as a cheaper imitation of gold for jewellery and fittings.

51 The Committee of Public Safety was the executive government body during the French Revolution that exercised emergency powers, especially during the Reign of Terror (circa 1793–1794).

52 Graphae paranomon (Greek for ‘prosecutions for unlawful proposals’) was an Athenian legal procedure used to challenge and punish motions or decrees deemed contrary to law or the constitution of the assembly.

53 'Victoria Dei gratia' is a Latin formula meaning 'Victoria, by the grace of God,' traditionally used on coinage and inscriptions to express that Queen Victoria's authority was held by divine favour.

54 Gog and Magog are names from biblical and later apocalyptic and legendary traditions used figuratively in political and literary discourse to denote opposing or monstrous forces; here they personify two opposing political idols.

55 'Roi fainéant' is a French term literally meaning 'do-nothing king,' historically applied to later Merovingian monarchs who retained the title while real power was exercised by their chiefs of palace.

56 Tel-el-Kebir refers to a battle in Egypt (fought on 13 September 1882) where British forces under Sir Garnet Wolseley defeated Egyptian nationalists, a frequently cited example in late 19th-century British political writing.

57 A transliteration of an ancient Greek maxim printed in the text; it echoes the preceding English rendering ‘‘let us not disturb the foundations of popular morality: they are better undisturbed.’’ The precise original Greek wording and