

Analecta Husserliana

The Yearbook of
Phenomenological Research

Volume CXXV



Posthumanism and Phenomenology

The Focus on the Modern
Condition of Boredom, Solitude,
Loneliness and Isolation

Edited by

Calley A. Hornbuckle

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 Springer

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Volume CXXV

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Calley A. Hornbuckle
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William S. Smith
Editors


Posthumanism and Phenomenology


The Focus on the Modern Condition
of Boredom, Solitude, Loneliness
and Isolation

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Part I
Boredom, Temporality, Transhumanity

The Treatment of Boredom in Heidegger and Insomnia in Levinas



Jadwiga S. Smith

Abstract Historical temporality of the concept of boredom is counter to Heidegger’s treatment of boredom as essential to his philosophical investigation of temporality/time but without the grounding of boredom in historical or cultural milieu or, for that matter, in psychology or neuroscience. A mood (*Stimmung*) of boredom does not have a direct intentional object of its own, but it can accompany emotional and/or cognitive experiences by giving them a certain coloring or tonality. Heidegger’s final statements are about contemporary man avoiding or suppressing profound boredom out of concealment and lack of courage to face the question of oppression “in this fundamental attunement.” Levinas, on the other hand, sees insomnia as “primordial opening” to the understanding of “impossibility of hiding in oneself” (Levinas E (1993) *God, death, and time*. Edited by Jacques Roland. Stanford University Press, Stanford, p 209).

Thus, Heidegger’s investigation of boredom parallels Levinas’s investigation of insomnia as revealing particular states of awareness and consciousness. But, unlike the Being held captive in a particular mood of boredom in Heidegger’s metaphysics and the pessimistic evaluation of profiting from the experience of profound boredom, Levinas’s insomnia reveals “the Other *within* the *Same* who does not alienate the Same but who awakens him” (Levinas E (1993) *God, death, and time*. Edited by Jacques Roland. Stanford University Press, Stanford, p 209).

Keywords Heidegger · Levinas · Boredom · Insomnia · Awakening · Consciousness · Mood · Attunement · The Other · The Being

Two publications on the subject of boredom, one solely devoted to it, were published in the United States in 1995: Martin Heidegger’s *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (Die Gruudbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt—Endlichkeit—Einsamkeit* submitted by Heidegger in 1975 and published by

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Klostermann in 1983), and Patricia Meyer Spacks's *Boredom: The Literary History of a State of Mind*. Spacks has not a single reference to Heidegger's treatment of boredom and its utmost importance to his explication of the fundamentals of metaphysics. Of course, she was simply unaware of his work at the time of the preparation of her book on boredom. The reason I mention Spacks's book is to underscore the fact that, though Heidegger mentions the importance of the subject of boredom to "contemporary man," he is not interested in investigating any historical context of cultural implications of boredom. For Heidegger, "profound boredom" (*tiefe Langeweile*) is his philosophical investigation of Dasein, in which boredom emerges as the crucial attunement/emotional tonality to which Dasein is already predisposed. For Spacks, however, boredom is a historically late concept:

an eighteenth-century belief in personal theological obligation giving way to nineteenth-century fatalism and twentieth-century location of responsibility outside the self. It explores the ways of subjectivity and the operation of social theory. The story begins in eighteenth-century England because the concept of boredom begins there. And the narrative comes to a stop if not an end in the present moment, when comic strips and advertisements as well as novels and sociological or psychological treatises...attribute to boredom enormous and essentially unalterable power. (Spacks 1995, ix)

She attributes the emergence of the idea of boredom as related to the development of the eighteenth-century interpretation of leisure: "It was born in the same era of the ideas of 'leisure' and the pursuit of happiness, and its social and literary functions have charted the development of civilization's discontents" (Spacks 1995, x). Spacks speaks directly of the invention of boredom as a "fabrication" in eighteenth-century England:

It has haunted Western society ever since its eighteenth-century invention. Its twentieth-century magnification absorbs ever more material for the imaginative writer, in a paradoxical relation that has intensified since the English fabricated the notion. (Spacks 1995, 272)

Spacks traces the evolving attitudes toward boredom through the lens of literature and pays particular attention to the gender and class distinctions as crucial to the ever-changing ethical and aesthetic views of boredom.

Thus, the stress on the historical temporality of the concept of boredom is counter to Heidegger's treatment of boredom as essential to his philosophical investigation of temporality/time but without the grounding of boredom in history/culture or, for that matter, in psychology of neuroscience. I am introducing Heidegger's "profound boredom" and Emmanuel Levinas's "insomnia" in the context of Patricia Meyer Spacks's book on boredom in order to stress the fact that as boredom has emerged as an ever-growing subject of interpretation—from philosophy to popular culture—so has insomnia become a preoccupation not only of psychiatrists but also of TV psychologists, popular movies and then also of... philosophy. At the same time, closer to the end of his investigation of the attunement of boredom, Heidegger asks a penetrating question: "Has man in the end become boring himself?" (Heidegger 1995, 161). But he does not want to over-emphasize his answer as focused on modern history, despite his use of the term "world history":

we did not pose this question to those who run around in public and give themselves credit for their achievements, those servants of culture who ape their own inventions; we did not ask where these people stand in the course of world history, or how far they have come hitherto and what is to be the outcome in this respect. We did not ask *where* man stands, but *how* things stand concerning man, concerning Da-sein in men. (Heidegger 1995, 161)

On the other hand, Levinas's progress toward the reinterpretation of Heidegger's *Dasein* as continuous presence and engagement of Being rather than the precariousness of disclosure and concealment is a way of dealing with the present, the embodied present, which leads Levinas to embracing both "transcendence" (engendered as common, everyday events) as well as transcendence (Infinity), a creating a uniquely human expression—and thus the infinite interrelated to the sensible.

Levinas, unlike Heidegger, recognizes the rationality of the self, sensibility, and transcendence. Hence, insomnia is not just a physiological/psychological event but an awakening of consciousness because the activities and moods of the self originate and end with the consciousness of self. The awakening of consciousness is, then, connected to the bodily requirement of sleep, and, in reverse, sleeping is an act of escaping consciousness. The states of being awakened, asleep, fatigued, indolent, or being in a state of insomnia allow the clearest illumination of the gap between self and I. In contrast, Heidegger's focus on anxiety—though later expanded with attunements/moods of boredom, joy, awe—seems to be suspended from immediate bodily connections by his emphasis on *Dasein*'s framed relationship to time.

Both philosophers stress the role of awakening, though Levinas refers to it much more directly as connected to sleep. Heidegger speaks of being awakened to the attunement of boredom, but one can also add another kind of awakening, though not as directly renewed, that is consciousness being awakened from boredom into the state of reconnectedness with beings of the world, no longer in limbo, no longer being left empty as was the case in the midst of boredom. Levinas's insomnia, however, stresses not just openness to the world but vigilance for-the-other; it is a primary ethical meta-category (as discussed in *Of God Who Comes to Mind*). Insomnia is the uselessness of a responsibility that introduces God; Levinas calls "relationships-to-God, the original insomnia of thinking" (Levinas 1986, 120).

Both Heidegger in his treatment of the attunement of boredom and Levinas in his treatment of insomnia speak of the condition of being overtaken by these moods and their revelatory impact on Being. Heidegger speaks of the "extremity of the moment of vision" as prompted by the third kind of boredom he calls "profound boredom," and Levinas in his "In Praise of Insomnia," published in 1976, comments on:

a journey on which we pass through the notion of a witnessing that was not referred to an experience, a bearing witness in which the infinite in relation with the finite, disquiets or awakens the finite, which is equivalent to the psyche *qua* inspiration and which was understood concretely in the sense of an ethical intrigue. (Levinas 1993, 206)

Thus, these awakenings for both thinkers are revelatory as to the apprehension of consciousness, and they both consider time as a fundamental point of reference in their respective treatment of boredom and insomnia. Levinas interprets:

this breaking open of the experience of witnessing, this expiation of the forms by the Other, as the *diachrony* of time. This is a time that would lend itself [*se donnerait*] to our understanding to a reference *to-God* itself [*l'a-Dieu* meme]—before being interpreted as pure deficiency or as a synonym of the perishable or the non-eternal. That is, what gives itself to be understood as that which is diametrically opposed to the traditional idea of God. It is as if, within temporality, there were produced a relationship with a “term” or end (but is it properly speaking a *term*?) that is third to being and to nothingness—an *excluded* middle or third, and in this way, alone, a God who would not be thought in an onto-theo-logical manner. (Levinas 1993, 207)

Thus, time for Levinas is not an enemy, so to speak, or does not have to be interpreted as a “deficiency,” as a “synonym of the perishable or not eternal.” But, for Heidegger, boredom reveals the temporality of design as oppressed by “a peculiar indication of its shortness”; the “while” in German translation of boredom as *Langeweile* or “long while”:

That the while becomes long means that the horizon of whiling—which at and for the most part shows itself to us, if at all, as that of a present, and even then more as what is now and today—*expands itself into the entire expanse of the temporality of Dasein*. This *lengthening of the while* manifests the while of Dasein in its indeterminacy that is never absolutely determinable. This indeterminacy takes Dasein captive, yet in such a way that in the whole expansive and expanded expanse it can grasp nothing except the mere fact that it remains *entranced* by and toward this expanse. The lengthening of the while is the *expansion of the temporal horizon* whose expansion does not bring Dasein, liberation, or unburden it, but precisely the converse in *oppressing* it with its expanse. In this expanse of time it oppresses Dasein and thus includes in itself a peculiar indication of its *shortness*. (Heidegger 1995, 152–53)

This oppressive nature of temporality of Dasein is responsible for emerging of the attunement/mood of profound boredom. Heidegger summarizes his definition of profound boredom as “the entrancement of temporal horizon”:

entrancement which lets the moment of vision belonging to temporality vanish. In thus letting it vanish, boredom impels entranced Dasein into the moment of vision as the properly authentic possibility of its existence, an existence only possible in the midst of beings as a whole, and within the horizon of entrancement, their telling refusal of themselves as a whole. (Heidegger 1995, 153)

Heidegger’s vocabulary in relation to temporality and boredom (“perishable,” “oppressed,” “refusal”) reveals an ultimate sense of inadequacy of exploring the attunement of boredom to its core. He admits just that:

Yet even this definition, which has arisen from a more penetrating interpretation, does not tell us much if it is taken as an assertion in which something is supposed to be established, instead of as a *more incisive directive for interpretation*, i.e., one more laden with questions, namely for an interpretation which unexpectedly has left itself behind and brought the design it has interpreted to the verge of the attunement to be interpreted, yet has never directly transposed it into this attunement itself. (Heidegger 1995, 153–54)

This definition is based mostly on the third form of boredom and thus cannot claim to be universal; it is nonetheless this third form which is more essential because it is “more profound, and thus more essential.”

The first and second form of boredom do not strike one as necessarily paralleling Levinas's thoughts, but they are necessary to the presentation of the third form of boredom, the understanding of profound boredom. This profound boredom has some crucial points of connection with the ideas of awakeness in Levinas. This first form is illustrated by Heidegger as "passing the time as a driving away of boredom that drives time on" at a railway station:

We are sitting, for example, in the tasteless station of some lonely minor railway. It is four hours since the next train arrives. The district is uninspiring. We do have a book in our rucksack, though—shall we read? No. Or think through a problem, some question? We are unable to. We read the timetables or study the table, giving the various distances from this station to other places we are not otherwise acquainted with at all. We look at the clock—only a quarter of an hour has gone by. Then we go out onto the local road. We walk up and down, just to have something to do. But it is no use. Then we count the trees along the road, look at our watch again—exactly five minutes since we last looked at it. Fed up with walking back and forth, we sit down on a stone, draw all kinds of figures in the sand, and in so doing, catch ourselves looking at our watch yet again—half an hour—and so on. (Heidegger 1995, 93)

The futility of various diversions we try to occupy ourselves with leaves us in "limbo by time as it drags" (Heidegger 1995, 99), or to say it more precisely: "The dragging of time as it were refuses the station the possibility of offering us anything. It forces it to leave us empty" (Heidegger 1995, 105). Things then, when bound to time, can leave us empty: "Things can leave us empty only along with that being held in limbo that proceeds from time" (Heidegger 1995, 105).

The second form of boredom acknowledges not the objective length of time, as associated with the waiting at the station, but with the depth of boredom, with more profound boredom. Heidegger distinguishes between being bored by something and being bored with something. Passing time during a boring evening—being bored *with* the evening—is "*simultaneously, what we are bored with here is passing the time. In this boring situation, boredom and passing the time become intertwined*" (Heidegger 1995, 113). So, nothing particularly is boring (unlike the station and all the fruitless activities to counteract our boredom) during our boring evening. Instead, "we have *something indeterminate that bores us*" (Heidegger 1995, 114), the "I know not what," which does not create any unease resulting in a search for some form of occupation, but rather accepts the "indeterminate unknown" (Heidegger 1995, 116). The time seems to stand still, and we seem to slip away from ourselves, quite satisfied (Heidegger 1995, 118). But are we really, asks Heidegger, and his answer is twofold: first, as a result of abandoning ourselves to what we interpret as an absence of boredom (*obstructive casualness* captures, ensnaring this passing of time); and second, leaving ourselves behind, our proper self—an emptiness can form a sense of dissatisfaction with all that "chattering." The time does not drag then, but "whiles [*weilt*] and endures," and manifests itself as "more originary being held in limbo" (Heidegger 1995, 122). Time stands still but, Heidegger warns, that we do not make time vanish. Instead, the present stretches as a result of that casual abandoning of self, with the sensation of the past and future being cut off. This is "*being held in limbo to time in its standing, and is thus the sought-after*

structural moment of being bored with” (Heidegger 1995, 126). Heidegger underscores the importance of the second form of boredom because in it: “we are held more towards ourselves, somehow enticed back into the specific gravity of Dasein even though, indeed precisely because in doing so we leave our proper self standing and unfamiliar” (Heidegger 1995, 128).

Finally, in the third form of boredom, the individual relationship to boredom is lost. It’s no longer “I” or “we” acknowledging being bored, but, instead, we say, “It is boring for one” (Heidegger 1995, 134). One does not imply any connection to “name, standing, vocation, role, age and fate” (Heidegger 1995, 135); neither does it imply any generalizing or concrete distinction. Thus, we are not bored by any particular beings (first form), and we are not bored ourselves (second form). What the third form reveals is emptiness, being left empty, “relieved of our everyday personality,” making “everything of equally great and equally little worth” (Heidegger 1995, 137), ultimately resulting in all encompassing “*indifference* enveloping beings *as a whole*” (Heidegger 1995, 138).

At this point of his discussion of boredom, Heidegger questions the “impoverishment” which exposes the self to nakedness, indifference: “Beings as a whole refuse themselves tellingly, not to me as me, but to the Dasein in me wherever I know that ‘it is boring for one’” (Heidegger 1995, 143). Thus, the temporality of Dasein is revealed through the temporal character of profound boredom which is a form of temporal entrancement.

This temporal entrancement is broken in time “ruptured only through time itself” (Heidegger 1995, 151). This moment of vision, or “disclosedness for action,” is a moment of reconnection from Dasein with the temporality of past, present and future. It is a form of awakening in a Levinasian sense, an act of facing the world. For Heidegger, boredom has a revelatory value at the moment of its rupture, its disclosedness for action, but the magnitude of his investigation of boredom creates an oppressive sense of helplessness. Heidegger is aware of the danger of interpreting the third form as a form of despair. He objects to such a view as it would imply a leap into another attunement. Ultimately, Heidegger stresses that boredom “in the ordinary sense is disturbing, unpleasant and unbearable” and should be eliminated (Heidegger 1995, 158). However, one is to appreciate boredom and all other attunements because “[m]oods are something that awaken pleasure or displeasure in us, something to which we have to react accordingly” (Heidegger 1995, 159).

Heidegger’s endowment, his appreciation of moods, feelings as expressed in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* is quite striking because one is familiar with his earlier works and their emphasis on anxiety and temporality in the shadow of death. He sees boredom in the ordinary sense as a way of suppressing profound boredom and thus getting involved, or we could say awakened in the context of Levinas’s work, though in a superficial way, in the busy activity of Dasein.

Levinas, on the other hand, is immersed in the ethical relevance of his philosophical investigation of wakefulness. In his stress on the obligation of the self toward the Other, he perceives insomnia as a state of wakefulness, a heightened sense of awareness of the Other, resisting the mundane and impersonal. In *Of God Who Comes to Mind* (1986), Levinas interprets insomnia as extreme vigilance for-the-other. Thus, the moment of breaking out of boredom is “disclosedness” of the self, awakened to beings, reengaged with the world in a self-centered way. For Levinas, however, insomnia awakens consciousness, it is a form of responsibility that opens *L-dieu* (in later Levinas). Unlike the Being held captive in a particular mood of boredom in Heidegger’s metaphysics and the pessimistic evaluation of profiting from the experience of profound boredom, Levinas sees insomnia as revelatory: “the Other *within* the Same who does not alienate the Same but who awakens him” (Levinas 1993, 209).

Heidegger’s final comments about contemporary man avoiding or suppressing profound boredom out of concealment and lack of courage to face the question “what oppresses us in this fundamental attunement” (Heidegger 1995, 167). Levinas on the other hand sees insomnia as prior to intentionality: “primordial opening that is an impossibility of hiding; one that is an assignation, an impossibility of hiding in oneself” (Levinas 1993, 209). Insomnia is not just not being asleep. It is a category escaping categorization “on the basis of a determinant activity” in order to determine, to qualify the Other: “Insomnia is the tearing of [that] resting within the identical” (Levinas 1993, 209). Levinas finds in the act of awakening the “spirituality of the soul... ceaselessly woken up in its state, its *state of soul*” (Levinas 1993, 210). The formlessness of insomnia reminds one of the state of boredom because of its lack of intentionality and also because, according to Levinas, consciousness breaks out of insomnia, not unlike reaching a moment of vision out of profound boredom.

Levinas affirms the primacy of insomnia, stating consciousness is born out of insomnia and ultimately leading to the forgetting of the Other, to grasping the ever anew presence in the process of subjectivity from within. Levinas closes his essay/lecture on insomnia and its role in the emergence of consciousness with a statement that cognition is not the only mode of meaning. He states: “*It is necessary to put experience in question as the source of all meaning*” (Levinas 1993, 211). He questions “the resolution of all meaning to exhibition. Thus, the investigation of insomnia leads Levinas to a statement that emotion or anguish or the representation in phenomenological interpretation are not to be of central importance. He acknowledges the complexity of the treatment of representation in Heidegger, but he states: “In Heidegger, the question is much more complex, but we nevertheless still find in him that idea of monstration and manifestation, which remains the corollary of meaning.

“But we must at least recall the situation of the Cartesian idea of the infinite, in which the *cogito* bursts under the impact of something it cannot contain” (Levinas 1993, 212).

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Modulation to a New Key in *The Syntax of Time*: Peter Byrne Manchester and Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka’s Common Telos of the All



Randolph Dible

Thought builds on time... on many scales.

(Peter Manchester, Unpublished Introduction to The Syntax of Time)

Abstract This chapter explores foundational issues in the philosophy of time and space by comparing the phenomenological contributions of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka and Peter Byrne Manchester. Each of these two philosophers have revived an ancient paradigm for thinking about problems of continuity in the philosophy of space and time. Peter Byrne Manchester’s 2005 book, *The Syntax of Time: The Phenomenology of Time in Greek Physics and Speculative Logic from Iamblichus to Anaximander*—the second in the Brill series *Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism, and the Platonic Tradition*—traces Husserl’s phenomenology of inner time-consciousness back through Plotinus to Aristotle’s philosophy of time, and thereby reconnects its problematic to the most archaic origins of philosophy in the Presocratics. Through the philosophical reconstruction of an ancient worldview on the basis of an insight about the ordering principle of time as a logical syntax, Peter Manchester uncovers a neglected ancient doctrine called spherics (*sphairikē*, or *sphairikon logon*), which has deep implications not only for time but for all the dimensions of experience. He names his guiding figure the Sphere of the All, a formulation belonging to his ancient sources. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka’s phenomenology of life also recognizes a previously unnoticed syntax. For her, it is the intrinsic functioning of life, which she elaborates in her phenomenology of life as ontopoietic process. Her extensive account of life’s inner-workings yields a phenomenological cosmology of multiple spheres of being grounded in a “great vision of the All” (Tymieniecka 2000, 643), much like Manchester’s spherics. The convergence to similar frameworks arrived at independently by these two philosophers is

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a philosophical synchronicity due to the teleology at play in their phenomenological thought, common to multiple philosophical cosmologies, but what is more remarkable is the convergence of their specific functional systems and metrological terms. This convergence arises from the pursuit of an ancient and perennial cosmology rooted in a deep synthesis of order and measure. The ancient intuition that the language of God is the language of mathematics plays a special role in classical phenomenology, and the recovery of the doctrine of the spheres represents a new contribution to the synthetic and geometrical side of this intuition. By arriving at a synthesis of the most fundamental ontological units in these two systems, a new paradigm of speculative cosmology and transcendental logic emerges from the paradigm of the sphere.

Keywords Ancient philosophy · Cosmology · Mathesis universalis · Metrology · Paradigm · Phenomenology · Pythagoras · Spheres · Syntax · Synthesis

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, founder of the World Phenomenology Institute and *Analecta Husserliana*, and Peter Byrne Manchester, a professor of philosophy at Stony Brook University and founding member of the International Society for Neoplatonic Studies, have each in their own way sought to open up the horizons of the Husserlian phenomenology of time to the dimensions of eternity through making explicit its place in the broader context of its most ancient precedents in the philosophical speculation on time. Each thinker articulates a holistic vision of the way the total cosmos makes its mark in every ordered and measured part. Manchester frames time in an infinite sphere called the Sphere of the All, “an all-encompassing self-referential equality of an intentional kind—a disclosure space” (Manchester 2005, 53). Tymieniecka’s key concept of phenomenological disclosure is the traditional notion of the unity of apperception, but she extends this Kantian and Husserlian concept to include in its compass the fundamentally creative functions of life’s essential individualization (Tymieniecka 2000, 265–80). Tymieniecka’s modal thematization of life in its elementary operations presents in relief the place of life’s inner-workings within the big picture of the fullness, or ‘the All’ (*ta panta*), of possible fulfillments, and develops outward into a phenomenology of possible worlds (Tymieniecka 1974, 3–41). It could be said that what Tymieniecka’s modal realism of the phenomenology of life contributes is a visualization of individualization. Manchester’s phenomenology of time and Tymieniecka’s phenomenology of life will be shown to have sufficient structural and methodological convergences to frame a phenomenological place for an ancient paradigm called the doctrine of the spheres (*sphairikē*, or *sphairikon logon*).

The philosophical theory of manifolds (*Mannnigfaltigkeitslehre*) is at the core of both Kant and Husserl’s methodology, and this is the song that undergoes modulation to a new key in the phenomenological work of both Manchester and Tymieniecka. Tymieniecka’s cosmic architectonic presents a vision of the human position in the All “as the underlying unity of the life of the cosmos and human life” (Tymieniecka 2011, 5). The word “life” has a technical sense in Tymieniecka’s vocabulary. For

her, life is the unique phenomenon where the disclosure of being to itself occurs through an implicit ordering principle. But this also happens to be an intuitive insight that is implied in the common idea that life is a self-promoting and self-steering part of a total cosmic harmony. Tymieniecka's technical term for life is "ontopoiesis," and it includes the definition of the biological systems term "autopoiesis" within its scope, but the usual sense works as well.¹ Life is also the subject of Manchester's phenomenology of time, specifically the experience of time and the imagination of eternity by eternal life. Manchester's primary aim is to expose the reductive understanding of time as a point on a line by showing how time is, as the Pythagoreans intuited, the sphere itself.

Manchester's central motif of the placement of the aperture of phenomenological disclosure in the Sphere of the All can supply Tymieniecka's overall corpus—from the "multi-sphere model" of her earlier work (*Leibniz' Cosmological Synthesis*; Tymieniecka 1964; see also Tymieniecka 1965, and Tymieniecka 1966) to the later "geo-cosmic transcendental positioning" of *Analecta Husserliana* volumes 100–115—with a geometrical definition, and with that the beginning of a synthetic *mathesis universalis*. Manchester's allusions to "a lost continent in the history of philosophy" (Manchester 2005, 56) that he calls "the ancient 'spherics'" (54), and "the original phenomenology of the sphere" (53), indicate a lost work, and his choice of the Stoic formulation "Sphere of the All" gives important first clues to how the general spherics functions. The phenomenology of the sphere discerned in the meeting of the phenomenology of time and the phenomenology of life reveals through methodological and formal coincidences a well-defined clearing for future phenomenological development. The convergence of Manchester's and Tymieniecka's philosophies implied by the work of weaving together their structural and methodological coincidences hints at the possibility of developing a more explicitly convergent phenomenology of life and time, perhaps already discernible on the horizon.

Over many years of development, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's cosmic architectonic came to define a phenomenology whose method did not limit itself to the constitution of the given world, but included the human and cosmic creative dimension of the genesis of the world and its structures. The self-evidence of the given phenomenal world of the individual is a coherence superseded by an intercoherence of universal self-evidence at the level of the world order,² and finally at the ultimate level of transcendental logic. Her thesis takes the orderliness and universality of mathematical science as a model for both thought itself and Kant and Husserl's

¹Tymieniecka engages the autopoietic theory in *Analecta Husserliana* volumes 60, and 100, and other contributors to *Analecta Husserliana* have also compared ontopoiesis with autopoiesis, for instance Daniela Verducci and Elisa Tona. See also my own study on the topic of the calculus occluded by Maturana and Varela's theory, "Ontopoiesis, Autopoiesis, and a Calculus Intended for Self-Reference," forthcoming in *Analecta Husserliana*.

²World order: the constant, intrinsic pattern of organization, whose presence is arrived at conjecturally through "structurally rooted *indications* concerning the relations... to the world order" (Tymieniecka 1966, 21).