Vedat Yorucu Ozay Mehmet

Small Islands in Maritime Disputes: Greek Turkish Energy Geo-politics



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Vedat Yorucu Department of Economics Eastern Mediterranean University Gazimagusa, 99628, via Mersin 10, Turkey Ozay Mehmet Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Carleton University Ottawa, ON, Canada

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Preface

Building on our two previous monographs, ^{1,2} this new study will analyze small island maritime disputes, focusing on Greek-Turkish hydrocarbon geopolitics in Cyprus waters and the Aegean Sea. These waters contain a lot of small islands with their own specific characteristics. In small islands, the central challenge is sustainability or development of economic viability. The Greek-Turkish hydrocarbon geopolitics, centered on maritime boundary conflicts, surrounding small islands are also linked to recent discovery of hydrocarbons. Our monograph combines these two themes (small islands and hydrocarbons in disputed waters between Greeks and Turks) in a cross-disciplinary way utilizing international maritime law and political economy.

At the outset, we consider it is necessary to state that our study is analytical, written by two academics originating from Turkish Cyprus. Though personally affected by displacement and dispossession, we reject emotionalism and seek to be objective. The Turkish case in maritime boundary disputes over small Aegean islands or around the island of Cyprus is not as well known in the West as the Greek claims. This is in part due to the historical legacy going back to the Ottoman Empire, but it may also be due to the general climate of Islamophobia. With this caveat, we hope that our credentials as academic economists stand out. We strongly believe in rational behavior and have approached the Greek-Turkish maritime disputes from this perspective. Rationality theorem urges cooperative solution to disputes. We believe, sooner or later, Greeks and Turks will learn to appreciate the benefits of cooperation. In modern times, the grand example of Venizelos-Ataturk, enemies turned friends, stands as our dream.

Terminology

Small islands in the Aegean and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean are at the center of the Greek-Turkish maritime boundary disputes. Greek Islands, as the name implies, are part of Hellenic identity. For historical reasons, however, Aegean islands dispute is complicated by terminology and ideology. Each island, for example, has a Turkish name and Greek equivalent. In this study, we have typically used dual

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names, [Kardaş/Imea, Meis/Kastellerizo, etc.] to maintain neutrality. In the case of the ethnically divided Cyprus, there are a Greek-speaking South and a Turkish-speaking North. In this study, we have adopted Turkish and Greek Cyprus as our preferred terminology to reflect the fact that the dispute over sovereignty and hydrocarbons in Cyprus is part and parcel of the wider Greek-Turkish disputes. The Greek-Turkish geopolitics over boundaries and hydrocarbons have deep ethno-national emotionalism with competing national ideologies to be explored later. We believe it is important to state at the outset that we have tried to minimize emotionalism in our study. This is merely for clarity of disputes to be analyzed, without any political endorsement.

Our Major Theme

A major theme of our book is that the UN Conference of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982) has generated widespread disputes all over the world because it has granted small islands equivalent maritime rights as coastal states. Case after case, the courts, including the International Court of Justice, have rejected these equivalent island entitlements, delivering judgments more in accordance with proportionality of islands' area or their own characteristics. This is equitable, and, fortunately, UNCLOS also has provision for the equity principle. However, many states, including Greece, have ignored equity, resting their claims solely on maximalist entitlement of small islands. Internationally, courts and judges have had to be creative, inventing such formulae as 'half effect', and 'angle-bisector' and 'concave lines,' etc., to fill in the gaps in UNCLOS and deal with the peculiar geography of islands.

One major gap in UNCLOS is its inadequate consideration of the economic sustainability of small islands. Island economies, except for such notable cases as Singapore, are vulnerable and dependent upon aid or subsidy from outside. Briefly put, a body of international law such as UNCLOS needs to pay no less attention on the economics of maritime resources than on law. Needless to say, international maritime law should promote peaceful resolution of disputes over boundaries and resources. Conflict result must be equitable, fair, and just. For, equity is the soul of law, including customary maritime law; without equitable accommodation, law is dry bones, a lifeless body. Plato stated 'equity is a necessary element supplementary to the imperfect generalization of legal rules' https://www.ipl.org/essay/Importance-Of-Equity-In-Common-Law-F3E253RC486. Accessed on 25 Jan 2022.

Our book explores prospects of Greek–Turkish cooperation, going beyond previous studies (Aydin and Ifanitis 2004; Bahcheli 1990; Keridis and Triantaphylou 2001) applying the rational behavior framework of political economy. We do not believe maritime disputes should lead to conflict; instead, it should promote peaceful resolution of boundary disputes and conflicts over maritime resources, including hydrocarbons. We attach great importance to the role of the EU and the UN as third-party facilitators of peace and cooperation for shared wealth creation for future

generations of Turks and Greeks who must take the initiative themselves first to settle differences.

Gazimagusa, Turkey Ottawa, Canada Vedat Yorucu Ozay Mehmet

Notes

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Vedat Yorucu Ozay Mehmet

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Abbreviations

AGRI EU Agriculture and Innovation Network BBF Bi-zonal, Bi-communal Federalizm

bcm billion cubic meter

Bn Billion

BP British Petroleum Company
DEPA Greek State-Owned Oil Company

DESFA The Hellenic Gas Transmission System Operator

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
EMGF East Med Gas Forum

ENOSIS A Movement of Greek Societies (Unification with Greece)

EOKA Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (Greek Cypriot Paramilitary

Organization)

FIR Flight Information Region
GHG Greenhouse Gas emission
GNA Government National Accord

HELPE Hellenic Petroleum

IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IC International Corridor

ICJ International Court of Justice

IONIC Ionic Adriatic Pipeline

ITGI Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy

ITLOS International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

JDA Joint Development Areas

KRG Kurdistan Regional Government MBBtu Millions of British Thermal Unit

mcm Millions of Cubic Meter

Mn Million

MOU Memorandum of Understanding
Mtoe Million Ton of Equivalent

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

nm nautical miles

xvi Abbreviations

OXI It means 'no' in Greek languages

PKK Kurdistan Workers Party

PLO Palestine Liberation Organizations

PPC Public Power Corporation
SEC Southern Energy Corridor
SEEP South East Europe Pipeline
SGC Southern Gas Corridor

SIDS Small Island Developing States

TANAP Trans Anatolian Pipeline
TAP Trans Adriatic Pipeline
tcf trillion cubic feet
tcm Trillions of cubic meter

UNCLOS UN Convention on the Law of the Sea—1982

UNFICYP United Nations Force in Cyprus UNSC United Nations Security Council

VOLKAN Turkish Cypriot Struggle Movement established in 1963

WWI World War One WWII World War Two

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Chapter 1 The Economics of Sovereignty in Small Islands



1

Abstract This chapter explores the delicate inter-connections between law and economics, specifically as regards island entitlements under international maritime law, specifically the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS). It is observed that maritime law has been the domain of almost entirely legal experts. Yet, maritime boundary disputes are over resources, such as hydrocarbons, a vitally important economic subject. In Greek-Turkish maritime disputes in Cyprus and Aegean waters, hydrocarbons from exploration to monetizing and marketing are as much economic disputes as legal. Small islands lacking economic sustainability cannot be entitled to same rights as coastal states, a topic discussed in the next chapter.

1.1 Introduction

This Introductory chapter explores the delicate inter-connections between law and economics, specifically as regards island entitlements under international maritime law. This is an area in literature generally overlooked because maritime law has been the domain of almost entirely legal experts. Yet, maritime boundary disputes are over resources, such as hydrocarbons, a vitally important economic subject. In the case of Greek-Turkish maritime disputes in Cyprus waters, hydrocarbons are the central issue, from exploration to monetizing and marketing. The hydrocarbon issue must, of course, be seen in the context of the Cyprus Problem, a conflict over sovereignty which predates the hydrocarbon discovery with a long and bitter history of seven decades or more. The boundary disputes over the small Greek islands in the Aegean, are about overlapping continental shelves, but also over maritime resources including hydrocarbons.

We wrote this monograph from a conviction that the economics of maritime law have been ignored; as a result, lawyers and legal experts have dominated the field, to the alarming degree of causing needless international conflicts. Our monograph is a small contribution to remedy this serious neglect. We target the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the major body of international maritime law, 1982, codified in expectation that boundary maritime disputes should be settled peacefully