


VARIOUS AUTHORS

***INTRODUCTION
TO THE STUDY
OF THE HISTORY
OF LANGUAGE***

ENRICHED EDITION
+

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**INTRODUCTION
TO THE STUDY
OF THE HISTORY
OF LANGUAGE**

**Willem Sijbrand Logeman, Benjamin Ide
Wheeler, Herbert A. Strong**

Introduction to the study of the history of language

Enriched edition.

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PREFACE

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In the following pages an attempt has been made to enable students to grasp the main points of the contents of one of the most important philological works which have been published during the last ten or twenty years—Paul's 'Principien der Sprachgeschichte[1].'

With this object in view, that work has been here, with more or less freedom, as the subject seemed to demand, rewritten. Though a translation of Professor Paul[2]'s book has been published by one of the authors, it has been felt that the existence of that translation did not render a work like the present superfluous, nor should a student whose interest has been awakened by the reading of these pages consider he can dispense with studying what Paul has written in his great work.

It may be best to state in how far this and Professor Paul's book are alike, as well as in what points they differ.

We have closely followed Paul in his division of the subject. Our chapters correspond in number, order, and subject with those of Paul. The views set forth in our pages are in the main those of Paul; the arguments are mostly his, even in the very few cases (such as the question of the consistency and nature of the laws of sound-change) where the authors might feel inclined to differ from Paul's views. Also the order in which the various points in each chapter are discussed has been generally preserved.

On the other hand, we have altered much, as we hope, in the interest of our readers. Professor Paul wrote for Germans

in the first place, and secondly for such students as were able to read books like his in the original, *i.e.* for those who not only knew German enough to feel all the weight and import of his German examples, but who also, like most German students, could be assumed to possess a sufficiently intelligent interest in the history of the German language to appreciate quotations of its older forms (a point which Englishmen have unfortunately too much neglected), and who, thirdly, might be expected to be sufficiently familiar with at least some of the other languages from which he drew his quotations.

Now though, in deference to a generally expressed opinion, a second edition of the translation of Paul's work is now in the press, in which all these examples have been translated, this Englishing of the illustrations will, we think, be found to be of use in but few cases.¹ It is, in fact, almost invariably not so much the mere word or sentence chosen as an illustration, as the peculiar form, its peculiar connotation, its peculiar construction, which is of importance. All these almost invariably disappear or differ in the translation, unless such translation be accompanied by such discussion and explanation as will bring out the meaning *as an illustration of the point in question*. It is self-evident that such additions in a translation could not be thought of.

Moreover, Professor Paul very frequently follows the German manner of exposition: first giving us the statement of abstract principle, and then illustrative examples. Though the authors are very far from wishing to say that no English student could or would follow this style of reasoning, they

believe that it is generally preferable to lead English students from the concrete to the abstract.

All these considerations have led to the following deviations from Professor Paul's work[19].

Everything has been illustrated from English wherever possible, and much also from French; examples from other foreign languages have, as a rule, been admitted only when they illustrated something new, and even then an attempt has generally been made to add such translations (literal and idiomatic) as would enable the reader to appreciate the force of the illustration, even without further knowledge of the language from which it was taken.

The order of the argument has sometimes been inverted.

Where what was said seemed sufficient to explain the nature and bearings of the subject of a chapter, some minor points have sometimes been omitted. They have not been omitted because they were thought unimportant, but generally because they could not be so well illustrated from English, and it was felt desirable to economise space for a full discussion of everything of which English *does* furnish illustrations. It will consequently be found that some of our chapters differ much more than others from the corresponding ones in Professor Paul's book. But even where, from the nature of the case, we had to follow Paul closely, we have always aimed at supplying further English examples or at explaining fully the illustrations from other tongues.

A word should, perhaps, be said as to the joint authorship. In all cases what the one wrote has been read by the other, and Mr. Logeman wishes more especially to

acknowledge in this matter his obligations to Professor Strong for many a correction of sentences where his style might have betrayed the foreigner. Professor Benjamin Ide Wheeler^[3] has perused the greater part of the work, and supplied many apt illustrations. Several important passages are from his pen. The authors at the same time have to acknowledge their gratitude to Mr. R. H. Case, B.A., who has patiently read the whole work. It was of immense advantage to them to have the benefit of the observations of a highly cultured mind, well versed in English and its literature, but new to a subject like this, such as Mr. Case brought to the work. Many improvements were thus made in various places where he could show the need of fuller explanation or of a different way of expressing the matter.

It may perhaps cause some surprise that we have omitted the introduction, and, unless a word in explanation of this fact were added, this omission might seem to imply but slight courtesy to Professor Paul, or respect for his emphatic statement that he considers this introduction by no means useless, nay, an integral and important part of his book.

We do not at all share the opinion of some critics of Professor Paul's work, to whom he almost indignantly refers as having said that this introduction has no bearing upon the chapters which follow. But we do consider that the book in this our present form can be profitably studied without it, and especially that his introduction is of so general a nature that there would be no advantage whatever in recasting it; and that it can be equally well studied, and should be studied, either in the original or in the translation of Paul's

own book—a work of such importance that, as we would once more insist, we do not wish our book to supersede it, but rather that our pages should cause the reader to ‘ask for more’ and peruse the original work.

The authors feel, of course, quite certain that their work is not final: they are but too keenly aware that they may have overlooked important illustrations which might be drawn from English, and are quite prepared to discover that here and there they may have added sins of commission to such errors of omission. They will heartily welcome all criticism and all indications of such imperfections, and if ever the demands for the work may necessitate a second edition, they hope that it will be found that they—in the words of a well-known author of a well-known book—have spent their time since the publication of the First Edition in trying to find out those things which they ought to have put in and did not put in, and those things which they did put in and ought not to have put in.

H. A. S[4].

W. S. L.

B. I. W.

September 1, 1890.

CHAPTER I. ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE.

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It is the province of the Science of Language to explain, as far as possible, the processes of the development of Language from its earliest to its latest stage. The observations made on these processes would naturally be registered in different *historical grammars* of different definite languages; these grammars would follow the different steps in the development of each single language from its earliest traditional origin to its most recent phase. Wider and more general observations on the processes of this development would naturally be expressed in a *comparative grammar*, whose task would be to examine and compare the relations between cognate families of speech, the common origin of which is lost: but it would in this case be necessary to insist that the comparisons instituted should only be between languages in the same stage of development; or that the same stage of development, in each of the languages selected for comparison, should be taken for the purpose.

It is the task of *Descriptive Grammar* to ascertain and record the grammatical forms and the conditions generally of a given linguistic community at a given time; to register, in fact, all the utterances of any individual belonging to such community which might fall from him without exposing him to the suspicion of being a foreigner. It will naturally register

its observations in abstractions, such as paradigms and rules. Now, if we compare the abstractions made at any given period of a language with those made at another time, we find that the results are different, and we say that the language has *changed* in certain respects: nay, we may even be able to detect a certain regularity in these changes; as, for instance, if we note that in English every *th* in the third person singular present indicative of a verb is now replaced by *s*: but we gather by such comparisons no information as to the true nature and origin of these changes. Cause and effect do not and cannot exist between mere abstractions: they exist only between real objects and facts. It is only when we begin to take account of the psychical and bodily organisms on which language depends, and to seek for relations of cause and effect in connection with these, that we are on safe ground.

The true object of the Science of Language, as distinguished from Descriptive and Comparative Grammar, is the entirety of the utterances of all individuals that speak; and the relations of these utterances to each other. A full history of the development of language would demand an exact knowledge of all the groups of sound ever uttered or heard, and of all the ideas awakened by such sound-groups and symbolised by them. The impossibility of attaining to any such knowledge is obvious; it is, however, possible for us to get a general idea of the play of the forces at work in the vast and complex series of processes involved in the development of language. A part only of these operating forces is cognisable by our senses. Speaking and hearing are two of the processes which can be apprehended; and,

again, the ideas, or pictures, called up by language, and those which, though unspoken, pass through our consciousness, are to some extent capable of cognition. But one of the greatest triumphs of modern psychology is the proof, due to its agency, of the unconscious activity of the human mind. All that has once been present to our consciousness remains as a working factor in unconsciousness. Power consciously acquired by exercise in consciousness may be translated into power operating and manifesting itself unconsciously. The mind forms from the groups of ideas with which it is stored, psychological groups, such as sound-groups, sequences of sounds, sequences of ideas, and syntactical combinations. Strong and weak verbs, derivatives from the same root, words fulfilling identical functions, such as the different parts of speech, associate themselves into groups; and again the plurals of nouns, their different cases, their different inflections, and even entire clauses of similar construction or similar cadence, group themselves in the same way. These groups arise naturally, automatically, and unconsciously, and must not be confused with the categories consciously drawn up by grammarians; though the two, of course, must frequently coincide.

These groups must obviously be in a constant state of change, some growing weaker from the fact that they are strengthened by no fresh impulse, and some being strengthened and, it may be, changed by the accession of new ideas which ally themselves therewith. It must not be overlooked also that, as each person's mind is differently constituted, the groups of his linguistic ideas will take a

development peculiar to himself; even though the sources whence the groups take their rise should be identical, yet the elements which go to form the groups will be introduced differently and with different intensity in the case of each individual.

The action of our physical organs, unaided, would be unable to bring about the development of language. The word, when once spoken, disappears and leaves no traces; psychological activity, and this alone, connects the pictures of the past with the present. It must, therefore, be the task of the historian of language to give as complete an account as possible of the psychical organisms on which the production of language depends; and the psychical organism of language in each individual is the aggregate of more or less conscious recollections of words, nay, even of entire phrases, and of their connections with certain ideas, which is lodged in his mind. It is the business of the historian of language to watch and examine these organisms as closely as possible: to describe the elements of which they are composed, and their connection with each other. A state or condition of a language at a particular period could only be described by one possessed of a full knowledge of the psychical conditions at a particular time of all the members of any linguistic community. The more fully such observations as those referred to above are carried out, and the greater the number of individuals thus examined, the more nearly shall we be in a condition to give an accurate description of a state of language. Without a rigidly scrupulous examination such as we have described, it would be impossible to say how much in the language of

any individual is common to all or most individuals speaking the same language, and how much is to be set down to individual peculiarity. In every case it will be found that the standard of the language governs to some extent the language of every individual; but in the case of each individual there are likewise elements which do not conform to the standard or normal language, and which are, in fact, individual peculiarities.

In any case, the observation of a psychical organism of language is difficult. It cannot, like the physical side of language, *i.e.* the sounds actually produced and even the mode of their production, be directly observed; for it lies unseen in the mind, and is only known by its effects.

Of the physical phenomena of linguistic activity, the acoustic are those which lend themselves most readily to our observation. We can make the same individual repeat sounds practically identical as often as we please; and we can note these with more or less accuracy in proportion as our own sense of hearing is exact and developed. But as the transitions between the different sounds are so infinitely small, it follows that it must be a matter of extreme difficulty for the listener to decide whether the sounds are indeed precisely the same in colour, pitch, etc.; while, again, if it be desired to reproduce any sound, the process has to be carried out by orally repeating it and striving to reproduce it by an appeal to another's sense of hearing.

We register the sounds of a language by mastering and registering the movements of the organs of speech that produce them. Alphabetical symbols are at best but very imperfect pictures of sound-groups: they are used

inconsistently in most cases: and in any case even the most perfect phonetic alphabet cannot give a true and exact picture of the countless sounds in speech—sounds which require to be constantly denoted anew in every language. We can only succeed at all in registering such sounds, when we are able to closely observe the sounds uttered by living individuals. But when we cannot do this, we must always think of the sounds which the writing is intended to represent; and the power so to do demands some acquaintance with phonetics, and with the relation between writing and language. Thus a certain special training is necessary before we can hope to be able to gain any real knowledge of even the physical manifestations of linguistic activity.

The psychical factors in linguistic activity lie, like everything else psychical, unseen in the mind, and can therefore only be scrutinised by means of examinations made upon our own minds. In the process of watching other individuals we can never perceive any other than physical results, and thus it happens that in order to acquaint ourselves with the psychical organisms of language in others, we have to watch as closely as possible the processes in our own minds, and then to classify the phenomena which we observe in the case of others by the analogy of what we observe in our own. As we both think and speak in the mother-tongue, our classifications by analogy will be easier when we have to deal with fellow-countrymen; so too, for obvious reasons, with the living subject rather than with what has been committed to writing in the past.

It will, then, be plain that the observation of any given state of language is no easy matter, owing to the manifold and complex way in which groups of ideas associate themselves in the human mind, and owing to the incessant progress of hardly perceptible sound-change. It may easily be gathered that even the most full and perfect of ordinary grammars are quite unable to portray the manner in which different ideas and groups of ideas range and classify themselves. Our grammatical system can give but the most imperfect picture of the relationships existing between different ideas. Certain categories, for instance, are drawn up, and under one or other of these are ranged words under the name of certain parts of speech. As a matter of fact, a large proportion of words is capable of being used to fulfil the function of several parts of speech, and in no language is this more obvious than in English. Again, we are accustomed in grammar to meet—even in the case of the Indo-European group of languages—with the same grammatical term employed to express quite different functions, as when we speak of the Latin *future*, and call the English future in “*I shall*” or “*I will*” do by the same name. Again, we are accustomed, in the case of a language which has passed from the synthetic to the analytic stage, to employ the same categories, regardless of the fact that, in the analytical form of the language, new shades of meaning have found expression as they have also come into being. Again, we often define the meaning of words by their etymology, even though the ordinary speaker may have no knowledge whatever of that etymology, and a new and very different meaning may have attached itself to the word.

The comparison of different epochs in the life of any language will enable us to draw some inferences as to its condition in the past. Of course, in proportion as the foreign factors that have made their influence felt in the regular course of the language are fewer, the simpler and more satisfactory will be the comparison. It would be impossible to reconstruct the sounds of Anglo-Saxon, for instance, from Middle English only; as it would be necessary to remember that Norman, Danish, Celtic, and other influences had been busy with the language between its earlier and later stages.

We now proceed to ask what are the causes of change in language? And how do these causes operate? In the first place, they operate in most instances without the consciousness of the individual. There are, indeed, a few cases in which we may say that conscious intention on the part of the individual is operative, as where a botanist coins a name for some new variety, and forces it upon all the scientific men of his circle. But it must be repeated that changes are for the most part involuntary and unconscious. It is of the essence of the life of language to unconsciously select the forms and sounds which may best serve for conveying the meaning present in the speaker's mind. The material existing and forming the actual stock in trade of any language may very aptly be looked upon as the survival of the fittest; in this case, of the *material* fittest to survive. If we now proceed to consider the causes of change in language, we must remember that there is always in language a certain amount of freedom left to the individual, which is quite independent of ordinary linguistic development. As each speaker must have certain psychical

peculiarities, so must he express himself differently from every other speaker; and if the sound-producing organs of any given speaker have any peculiarities, he will exhibit corresponding peculiarities in the sounds which he utters by their agency. Again, there are circumstances which must not be overlooked, like the natural tendency to imitation; and the further circumstance that all attempts at imitation must necessarily be imperfect. Again, each individual is prone to modify the sounds which he utters, through carelessness and economy of effort or laziness. Besides all this, we must reckon the effects produced by such factors as climate, which, however gradual in their operation, must still ultimately leave some effects if only time enough is allowed. The result of these displacements, if only the tendency to displacement lasts long enough and operates in one direction, is a *displacement of usage*. The new usage starts from the individual, and, under favourable circumstances, succeeds in becoming permanent. There are, however, numerous other tendencies to displacement likewise constantly occurring which do not become permanent, because they are not consistent, and because they do not all run in the same direction.

It must, then, be the task of the historian of language to endeavour to settle the relationship between linguistic usage on the one hand, and individual linguistic activity on the other; and in order to arrive at any satisfactory conclusions on this point, it is necessary to classify, as far as we can, the different changes of usage which occur in the growth and development of language. It is, then, his business to trace the relationship between the different

classes which he has formed, and to remember that his province is to trace connections where ordinary grammar draws lines of demarcation, bearing in mind that the steps which lead from class to class are very gradual, and that the processes leading up to the smallest variation of usage are in very few cases due to a single cause, but are generally very complicated. The gradual development in the life of language in general may be best studied in individual languages, as when we compare the English of Chaucer's day with that of our own; and, again, in the relations of individual languages to each other, as when we compare Spanish, for instance, with Italian, and note the different paths taken by these sister-tongues in their development from Latin.

Sound-changes come about in the individual partly from the tendencies of his own organs of speech, as when [i:] becomes [a] and when one sound is habitually substituted for another, as in the case of the Russian *Feodor* for *Theodore*, or the similar substitution, frequent among children, *fing* for *thing*. They partly, too, depend upon the influences which each individual receives from others, as when an endeavour is made to substitute a significant for an unmeaning whole, in cases of popular etymology and the like. To this must be added the possibility of imperfect audition, and consequently of imperfect reproduction of sounds. These influences are mostly operative and easiest of observation at the time that language is being learnt, *i.e.* most commonly during the time of infancy. To watch such processes as a particular language is being learnt must

always be very instructive for the explanation of variations in the usages of language in general.

These changes in usage may of course be classified in various ways, but there is one important point which should be noted: the processes may either consist in the creation of what is new or in the disappearance of what is old; or, lastly, in the replacement of the old by the new in a single act, which is the process seen in sound-change. In the case of word-significations, the processes of change consist either in the disappearance of the old or in the appearance of the new. But these processes are in truth very gradual. A word may be perfectly intelligible with a certain meaning in one generation, and in another generation may be obsolete and not understood: but there will none the less have been an intervening generation, some members of which understood the meaning attached to the word or phrase by the former generation, while some only imperfectly understood it.

Again, we may classify changes in usage according to whether sounds or significations are affected. The sounds change without the signification being altered, as in the numerous words in Chaucer which as yet clearly retained their French pronunciation. Again, the signification is affected without any change affecting the sound, as in the case of metaphorical uses of a word, such as *a crane*, used alike for the bird and the lifting machine; etc. Thus it is that we arrive at the two classes of change: sound-change and change in signification; not that the two kinds are mutually exclusive—they may both occur together, as in our *owe*, from A.S. *âgan*[\[6\]](#), to possess. But the two kinds of change

are independent in their origin and their development; neither is caused by the other.

There is, however, an important class of cases in which Sound and Meaning develop simultaneously; these are the original creations of language; and we must suppose the entire development of language to rest upon this primitive combination. We must conceive the original utterances in language to have been the imitation of various natural cries and sounds, aided and interpreted by gesticulation. Then comes a stage in which the sound-groups already existing in language develop on the basis of this original creation. They develop in this way mainly by the influence of analogy, which is itself an imitative faculty and plays a larger part where sound and signification are united than in the department of pure sound. The principles of which we have spoken must be held applicable to all languages at all stages of their development. When once language had originated, it must have developed solely in the way we have indicated. The differences between early and later stages of language are merely differences of degree and not of kind.

It must also be noticed that we must not sharply separate the grammatical and the logical relations of language, as if they were in no way connected. Grammatical rules are simply convenient descriptions of the most ordinary and striking ways in which a language expresses itself at a particular time. But the groups of ideas in the mind of a speaker are constantly forming themselves anew, and finding expression in forms which do not tally with actual and received linguistic expression, and, as they

change, give rise to so-called irregularities of grammar. The philologist must therefore discard neither the linguistic processes which are described and registered by grammar, nor the psychical ones which manifest themselves in speaking and hearing, but are not represented in linguistic expression, and yet are always operative in the direction of change in Language.

CHAPTER II. ON THE DIFFERENTIATION OF LANGUAGE.

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The most elementary study of Comparative Philology teaches us that from a language which, in all essentials, may be considered one uniform tongue, there have frequently sprung several others; and that these, in their turn, have parted into new dialects or distinct languages. This process has been usually compared to that which we see operative in the growth and development of organic nature; and the relationship between various languages has often been expressed by the terms applicable to the human family. Latin, for instance, is called the *parent* of French, Spanish, Portuguese, and the other Romance dialects; English and Dutch are called *sister-tongues*, while the last-named pair may be called *cousins* of German.

The comparison implied by such use of these terms is in the main correct; but it would be more exact to illustrate the relationship between languages from the language of Botany: we might consider the language of each individual speaker as the parallel of the individual plant, and compare the various dialects, languages, and families of languages, to the varieties, species, and classes of the vegetable kingdom. Even then our simile is but partially applicable, and a careful consideration of how far it holds good, and where and when it becomes misleading, will be found instructive to a student of language.

phrase *conditus in nubem* meaning ‘hidden into a cloud’ (having passed into a cloud and hidden itself).

51 A Sanskrit technical term for an exocentric compound (literally ‘much-rice’ type), where the compound as a whole denotes something that possesses the described quality (e.g. ‘much-rice-king’ meaning ‘a king possessing much rice’), commonly discussed in Indic grammar.

52 An English feast-day name from Old English *hláfmæsse* (‘loaf-mass’), historically a harvest first-fruits or thanksgiving festival traditionally observed on or about August 1st.

53 An archaic English term meaning ‘seven nights’ (i.e. a week), historically used instead of ‘week’ in older English usage.

54 A French verb form written here as *j’aimerai* (modern orthography *j’aimerai* or *j’aimerai*) is the first-person singular future tense ‘I will love’; historically the modern future developed from a compound of the infinitive *aimer* + the auxiliary *ai* (from ‘have’).

55 *amaveram* is a Latin pluperfect (I had loved), traditionally analyzable as perfect stem *amav-* plus *eram* (‘I was’/‘I had’); it denotes an action completed before another past time.

56 *amabo* is the Latin first-person singular future of *amare*, meaning ‘I will love’; the text discusses how its ending was historically related to auxiliary or root forms rather than a simple present stem + suffix interpretation.

57 *fu-i* (appearing with a hyphen in the text) refers to the Latin perfect form *fui* (from *sum* ‘to be’), meaning ‘I was’ or

'I have been'; the author uses it to note historical connections between verb endings and auxiliary forms.

58 pherois is cited as a Greek optative form of the verb φέρω (phérō, 'to carry'), an example illustrating that what appears as separable elements (pher- + o + i + s) is historically not a synchronic compound in classical Greek.

59 Lethe (here 'Lethe's Lake') is from Greek mythology: the river (or waters) Lethe in the underworld whose drink causes forgetfulness or oblivion, often invoked in classical and Elizabethan poetry.

60 A sepoy was an Indian infantryman employed by European colonial powers (notably the British); the term is commonly associated with 18th-19th-century colonial armies and events such as the Indian Rebellion of 1857 (often called the Sepoy Mutiny).

61 Meerschaum is a soft white mineral (hydrated magnesium silicate) traditionally carved into tobacco pipes; the German word literally means 'sea-foam' and these pipes became popular in Europe from the 18th century onwards.

62 Æschylus is the Latinized form of Aeschylus, an ancient Greek tragedian (approximately c. 525-456 BCE) whose surviving plays are foundational works of classical Greek tragedy.

63 Prælectiones is a Latin title meaning 'lectures' or 'readings'; in the passage it refers to a published series of lectures by Mr. Keble, a form of academic or clerical address common in 19th-century Britain.

64 'Pigeon English' is a historical spelling of what is now more commonly written 'pidgin English' — a simplified contact language or lingua franca that arose for trade and

communication between speakers of different native tongues (e.g., varieties of Chinese Pidgin English).

65 'Attic κοινή' combines the Attic dialect name with the Greek κοινή (koinē, 'common'); it denotes the common or standardized form of Greek based on Attic usage that served as a Hellenistic koine from roughly the 4th to the 1st centuries BCE.

66 Paternoster Row was a historic London street long known (especially in the 18th–early 20th centuries) as the centre of the British book trade and publishers; E.C. denotes the Eastern Central postal district.

67 Longmans, Green & Co. is a major British publishing firm (founded in the 18th century); 'Messrs.' is an old plural honorific (gentlemen) sometimes used in publishers' imprints.

68 Abbreviation for 'Crown octavo', a common 19th-century book format/size (an octavo of the crown paper size), indicating the physical dimensions and typical binding of the volume.

69 Abbreviation for 'Foolscap octavo', another book format slightly different from 'crown octavo', used to describe the physical size of small volumes in 19th-century publishing.

70 Knight Commander of the Order of the Indian Empire, a British order of chivalry (established 1878) conferred for service related to British India.

71 Abbreviation of 'Baronet', a hereditary British title ranked below the peerage; used after a surname (e.g. 'Sir X, Bart.').

72 Viscount Bury is a noble title; K.C.M.G. denotes Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George, a British honour often awarded for diplomatic or colonial service.

73 Title of a late-19th-century travel book by Lady Brassey describing voyages aboard the yacht Sunbeam, a privately owned vessel notable for extended world cruises in that period.

74 Title of a satirical novel by Samuel Butler (first published 1872) — the invented place-name is a near-anagram of 'nowhere' and the book critiques Victorian society and technology.

75 An endowed series of lectures (from the Hibbert Trust) on religion, theology and related subjects, typically delivered publicly and often later published; established in the 19th century.

76 A prestigious lecture series founded in the late 19th century and delivered at Scottish universities on topics of natural theology and philosophy, many of which are later issued as books.

77 A named series of manuals of Catholic philosophy associated with Stonyhurst (a Jesuit college and its scholarly community), publishing instructional works by Catholic/Jesuit authors.

78 Refers to an expurgated edition of Shakespeare's works, following the approach of Thomas Bowdler in the early 19th century to remove or alter passages judged unsuitable for 'family' reading.

79 A Latin title meaning 'A Defence of My Life', it is the autobiographical defence by John Henry Newman of his