

***MADHAVA***



***THE SARVA-  
DARSANA-  
SAMGRAHA***

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DARSANA-  
SAMGRAHA***

**Madhava**

# **The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha**

**Or, Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy**

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PREFACE.

THE SARVA-DARŚANA-SAṄGRAHA.

THE PROLOGUE.

CHAPTER I.

THE CHÁRVÁKA SYSTEM.

CHAPTER II.

THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM.

CHAPTER III.

THE ÁRHATA SYSTEM.

CHAPTER IV.

THE RÁMÁNUJA SYSTEM.

CHAPTER V.

THE SYSTEM OF PURNA-PRAJNA.

CHAPTER VI.

THE PÁŚUPATA SYSTEM OF NAKULÍŚA.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ŚAIVA-DARŚANA.

THE ŚAIVA-DARŚANA.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PRATYABHIJNA-DARSANA, OR RECOGNITIVE SYSTEM.

CHAPTER IX.

THE RASEŚVARA-DARŚANA OR MERCURIAL SYSTEM.

CHAPTER X.

THE VAIŚESHKA OR AULÚKYA DARŚANA.

CHAPTER XI.

THE AKSHAPÁDA (OR NYÁYA) DARŚANA.

CHAPTER XII.

THE JAIMINI-DARŚANA.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE PÁNINI-DARŚANA.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE SÁNKHYA-DARŚANA.

CHAPTER XV.

THE PATANJALI-DARSÁNA.

APPENDIX.

ON THE UPÁDHI (cf. supra, pp. 7, 8, 174, 194).

THE END.

TRÜBNER'S ORIENTAL SERIES.

THE INDIAN EMPIRE: ITS PEOPLE, HISTORY, AND PRODUCTS.

ESSAYS ON THE SACRED LANGUAGE, WRITINGS, AND  
RELIGION OF THE PARSIS.

TEXTS FROM THE BUDDHIST CANON

THE HISTORY OF INDIAN LITERATURE.

A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF THE EAST  
INDIES.

THE BIRTH OF THE WAR-GOD.

A CLASSICAL DICTIONARY OF HINDU MYTHOLOGY AND  
RELIGION, GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY, AND LITERATURE.

SELECTIONS FROM THE KORAN.

MODERN INDIA AND THE INDIANS,

METRICAL TRANSLATIONS FROM SANSKRIT WRITERS.

THE GULISTAN;

MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS RELATING TO INDIAN SUBJECTS.

THE LIFE OR LEGEND OF GAUDAMA,

CHINESE BUDDHISM.

LINGUISTIC AND ORIENTAL ESSAYS.  
BUDDHIST BIRTH STORIES; or, Jataka Tales.  
A TALMUDIC MISCELLANY;  
THE CLASSICAL POETRY OF THE JAPANESE.  
THE HISTORY OF ESARHADDON (Son of Sennacherib),  
THE MESNEVI  
EASTERN PROVERBS AND EMBLEMS  
INDIAN POETRY;  
THE MIND OF MENCIAUS;  
THE RELIGIONS OF INDIA.  
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.  
A MANUAL OF HINDU PANTHEISM. VEDÂNTASÂRA.  
TSUNI—||GOAM  
A COMPREHENSIVE COMMENTARY TO THE QURAN.  
THE BHAGAVAD-GÎTÂ.  
THE QUATRAINS OF OMAR KHAYYAM.  
THE QUATRAINS OF OMAR KHAYYAM.  
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS AND ANCIENT  
INDIAN METAPHYSICS.  
A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF THE EGYPTIAN AND  
MESOPOTAMIAN RELIGIONS.  
YUSUF AND ZULAIKHA.  
LINGUISTIC ESSAYS.  
TIBETAN TALES DERIVED FROM INDIAN SOURCES.  
UDÂNAVARGA.  
A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF AFRICA.  
OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF RELIGION TO THE SPREAD  
OF THE UNIVERSAL RELIGIONS.  
A HISTORY OF BURMA.  
RELIGION IN CHINA.

THE LIFE OF THE BUDDHA AND THE EARLY HISTORY OF HIS ORDER.

THE SANKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA.

BUDDHIST RECORDS OF THE WESTERN WORLD,

THE ORDINANCES OF MANU.

THE LIFE AND WORKS OF ALEXANDER CSOMA DE KOROS,

MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS RELATING TO INDO-CHINA.

THE SATAKAS OF BHARTRIHARI.

ANCIENT PROVERBS AND MAXIMS FROM BURMESE SOURCES;

MASNAVI I MA' NAVI

MANAVA-DHARMA-CASTRA: THE CODE OF MANU.

LEAVES FROM MY CHINESE SCRAP-BOOK.

LINGUISTIC AND ORIENTAL ESSAYS.

MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS RELATING TO INDO-CHINA.

FOLK-TALES OF KASHMIR.

MEDIÆVAL RESEARCHES FROM EASTERN ASIATIC SOURCES.

ALBERUNI'S INDIA

THE LIFE OF HIUEN TSIANG.

A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF OCEANIA.

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[Table of Contents](#)

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## **PREFACE.**

[Table of Contents](#)

I well remember the interest excited among the learned Hindus of Calcutta by the publication of the Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha of Mádharma Áchárya in the Bibliotheca Indica in 1858. It was originally edited by Paṇḍit Ísvarachandra Vidyáságara, but a subsequent edition, with no important alterations, was published in 1872 by Paṇḍit Táránátha Tarkaváchaspati. The work had been used by Wilson in his "Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus" (first published in the Asiatic Researches, vol. xvi., Calcutta, 1828); but it does not appear to have been ever much known in India. MS. copies of it are very scarce; and those found in the North of India, as far as I have had an opportunity of examining them, seem to be all derived from one copy, brought originally from the South, and therefore written in the Telugu character. Certain mistakes are found in all alike, and probably arose from some illegible readings in the old Telugu original. I have noticed the same thing in the Nágarí copies of Mádharma's Commentary on the Black Yajur Veda, which are current in the North of India.

As I was at that time the Oriental Secretary of the Bengal Asiatic Society, I was naturally attracted to the book; and I subsequently read it with my friend Paṇḍit Maheśachandra Nyáyaratna, the present Principal of the Sanskrit College at



Calcutta. I always hoped to translate it into English; but I was continually prevented by other engagements while I remained in India. Soon after my return to England, I tried to carry out my intention; but I found that several chapters, to which I had not paid the same attention as to the rest, were too difficult to be translated in England, where I could no longer enjoy the advantage of reference to my old friends the Paṇḍits of the Sanskrit College. In despair I laid my translation aside for years, until I happened to learn that my friend, Mr. A. E. Gough, at that time a Professor in the Sanskrit College at Benares, was thinking of translating the book. I at once proposed to him that we should do it together, and he kindly consented to my proposal; and we accordingly each undertook certain chapters of the work. He had the advantage of the help of some of the Paṇḍits of Benares, especially of Paṇḍit Ráma Miśra, the assistant Professor of Sáṅkhya, who was himself a Rámánuja; and I trust that, though we have doubtless left some things unexplained or explained wrongly, we may have been able to throw light on many of the dark sayings with which the original abounds. Our translations were originally published at intervals in the Benares Paṇḍit between 1874 and 1878; but they have been carefully revised for their present republication.

The work itself is an interesting specimen of Hindu critical ability. The author successively passes in review the sixteen philosophical systems current in the fourteenth century in the South of India, and gives what appeared to him to be their most important tenets, and the principal arguments by which their followers endeavoured to

maintain them; and he often displays some quaint humour as he throws himself for the time into the position of their advocate, and holds, as it were, a temporary brief in behalf of opinions entirely at variance with his own.[1] We may sometimes differ from him in his judgment of the relative importance of their doctrines, but it is always interesting to see the point of view of an acute native critic. In the course of his sketches he frequently explains at some length obscure details in the different systems; and I can hardly imagine a better guide for the European reader who wishes to study any one of these Darśanas in its native authorities. In one or two cases (as notably in the Bauddha, and perhaps in the Jaina system) he could only draw his materials second-hand from the discussions in the works of Brahmanical controversialists; but in the great majority he quotes directly from the works of their founders or leading exponents, and he is continually following in their track even where he does not quote their exact words.[2]

The systems are arranged from the Vedánta point of view,—our author having been elected, in A.D. 1331, the head of the Smárta order in the Maṭh of Śringeri in the Mysore territory, founded by Śaṃkara Áchárya, the great Vedántist teacher of the eighth century, through whose efforts the Vedánta became what it is at present—the acknowledged view of Hindu orthodoxy. The systems form a gradually ascending scale,—the first, the Chárváka and Bauddha, being the lowest as the furthest removed from the Vedánta, and the last, the Sáñkhya and Yoga, being the highest as approaching most nearly to it.

The sixteen systems here discussed attracted to their study the noblest minds in India throughout the mediæval period of its history. Hiouen Tshang says of the schools in his day: "Les écoles philosophiques sont constamment en lutte, et le bruit de leurs discussions passionnées s'élève comme les flots de la mer. Les hérétiques des diverses sectes s'attachent à des maîtres particuliers, et, par des voies différentes, marchent tous au même but." We can still catch some faint echo of the din as we read the mediæval literature. Thus, for instance, when King Harsha wanders among the Vindhya forests, he finds "seated on the rocks and reclining under the trees Árhata begging monks, Śvetapadas, Mahápásupatas, Páñḍarabhikshus, Bhágavatas, Varṇins, Keśaluñchanas, Lokáyatikas, Kápilas, Káñádas, Aupanishadas, Ísvarakárinis, Dharmasástrins, Pauráñikas, Sáptatantavas, Śábdas, Páñcharátrikas, &c., all listening to their own accepted tenets and zealously defending them." [3] Many of these sects will occupy us in the ensuing pages; many of them also are found in Mádhava's poem on the controversial triumphs of Śaṃkara Áchárya, and in the spurious prose work on the same subject, ascribed to Anantánandagiri. Well may some old poet have put into the mouth of Yudhishṭhira the lines which one so often hears from the lips of modern paṇḍits—

Vedá vibhinnáḥ smṛitayo vibhinná,  
Násau munir yasya mataṃ na bhinnam,  
Dharmasya tattvaṃ nihitaṃ guháyaṃ,  
Mahájano yena gataḥ sa pantháḥ.[4]

And may we not also say with Clement of Alexandria,

μῖα̃ς τοῖνυν οὐ̃σης τῆς ἀληθείας, τὸ γὰρ ψεῦδος μυρίας  
ἐκτροπὰς ἔχει, καθάπερ αἱ βάρκχαι τὰ τοῦ Πενθέως  
διαφορήσασαι

μέλη αἱ τῆς φιλοσοφίας τῆς τε βαρβάρου τῆς τε  
Ἑλληνικῆς αἰρέσεις, ἐκάστη ὅπερ ἔλαχεν, ὡς πᾶσαν αὐχεῖ  
τὴν ἀλήθειαν, φωτὸς δ', οἶμαι, ἀνατολῆ̃ πάντα φωτίζεται.

E. B. C.

## Footnote

### [Table of Contents](#)

[1] The most remarkable instance of this philosophical equanimity is that of Vāchaspati Mīśra, who wrote standard treatises on each of the six systems except the Vaiśeshika, adopting, of course, the peculiar point of view of each, and excluding for the time every alien tenet.

[2] An index of the names of authors and works quoted is given in Dr. Hall's Bibliographical Catalogue, pp. 162-164, and also in Professor Aufrecht's Bodleian Catalogue, p. 247.

[3] Śrīharsha-charita, p. 204 (Calcutta ed.)

[4] Found in the Mahābh. iii. 17402, with some variations. I give them as I have heard them from Paṇḍit Rāmanārāyaṇa Vidyāratna.

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# THE SARVA-DARŚANA-SAṄGRAHA.

### [Table of Contents](#)

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## THE PROLOGUE.

### [Table of Contents](#)

1. I worship Śiva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of supreme felicity; by whom the earth and the

rest were produced, in *him* only has this all a maker.

2. Daily I follow my Guru Sarvajña-Vishṇu, who knows all the Ágamas, the son of Śárṅgapáni, who has gone to the further shore of the seas of all the systems, and has contented the hearts of all mankind by the proper meaning of the term Soul.

3. The synopsis of all the systems is made by the venerable Mádhava mighty in power, the Kaustubha-jewel of the milk-ocean of the fortunate Sáyaṇa.

4. Having thoroughly searched the Śástras of former teachers, very hard to be crossed, the fortunate Sáyaṇa-Mádhava[5] the lord has expounded them for the delight of the good. Let the virtuous listen with a mind from which all envy has been far banished; who finds not delight in a garland strung of various flowers?

## Footnote

### [Table of Contents](#)

[5] Dr. A. C. Burnell, in his preface to his edition of the Vaṃśa-Bráhmaṇa, has solved the riddle of the relation of Mádhava and Sáyaṇa. Sáyaṇa is a pure Draviḍian name given to a child who is born after all the elder children have died. Mádhava elsewhere calls Sáyaṇa his "younger brother," as an allegorical description of his body, himself being the eternal soul. His use of the term Sáyaṇa-Mádhavaḥ here (not the dual) seems to prove that the two names represent the same person. The body seems meant by the Sáyaṇa of the third śloka. Máyaṇa was the father of Mádhava, and the true reading may be *śríman-máyaṇa*.

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# CHAPTER I.

## THE CHÁRVÁKA SYSTEM.

### Table of Contents

[We have said in our preliminary invocation "salutation to Śiva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of supreme felicity,"] but how can we attribute to the Divine Being the giving of supreme felicity, when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Chárváka, the crest-gem of the atheistical school, the follower of the doctrine of Bṛihaspati? The efforts of Chárváka are indeed hard to be eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current refrain—

While life is yours, live joyously;  
None can escape Death's searching eye:  
When once this frame of ours they burn,  
How shall it e'er again return?

The mass of men, in accordance with the Śástras of policy and enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the only ends of man, and denying the existence of any object belonging to a future world, are found to follow only the doctrine of Chárváka. Hence another name for that school is Lokáyata,—a name well accordant with the thing signified.

[6]

In this school the four elements, earth, &c., are the original principles; from these alone, when transformed into the body, intelligence is produced, just as the inebriating power is developed from the mixing of certain ingredients;

[7] and when these are destroyed, intelligence at once perishes also. They quote the Śruti for this [Bṛihad Āraṇy. Up. ii. 4, 12], "Springing forth from these elements, itself solid knowledge, it is destroyed when they are destroyed,— after death no intelligence remains." [8] Therefore the soul is only the body distinguished by the attribute of intelligence, since there is no evidence for any soul distinct from the body, as such cannot be proved, since this school holds that perception is the only source of knowledge and does not allow inference, &c.

The only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual pleasures. Nor may you say that such cannot be called the end of man as they are always mixed with some kind of pain, because it is our wisdom to enjoy the pure pleasure as far as we can, and to avoid the pain which inevitably accompanies it; just as the man who desires fish takes the fish with their scales and bones, and having taken as many as he wants, desists; or just as the man who desires rice, takes the rice, straw and all, and having taken as much as he wants, desists. It is not therefore for us, through a fear of pain, to reject the pleasure which our nature instinctively recognises as congenial. Men do not refrain from sowing rice, because forsooth there are wild animals to devour it; nor do they refuse to set the cooking-pots on the fire, because forsooth there are beggars to pester us for a share of the contents. If any one were so timid as to forsake a visible pleasure, he would indeed be foolish like a beast, as has been said by the poet—

The pleasure which arises to men from contact  
with sensible objects,

Is to be relinquished as accompanied by pain,—  
such is the reasoning of fools;  
The berries of paddy, rich with the finest white  
grains,  
What man, seeking his true interest, would  
fling away because covered with husk and  
dust?[9]

If you object that, if there be no such thing as happiness in a future world, then how should men of experienced wisdom engage in the agnihotra and other sacrifices, which can only be performed with great expenditure of money and bodily fatigue, your objection cannot be accepted as any proof to the contrary, since the agnihotra, &c., are only useful as means of livelihood, for the Veda is tainted by the three faults of untruth, self-contradiction, and tautology;[10] then again the impostors who call themselves Vaidic pundits are mutually destructive, as the authority of the jñána-káṇḍa is overthrown by those who maintain that of the karma-káṇḍa, while those who maintain the authority of the jñána-káṇḍa reject that of the karma-káṇḍa; and lastly, the three Vedas themselves are only the incoherent rhapsodies of knaves, and to this effect runs the popular saying—

The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing oneself with ashes,—

Bṛihaspati says, these are but means of livelihood for those who have no manliness nor sense.

Hence it follows that there is no other hell than mundane pain produced by purely mundane causes, as thorns, &c.;



the only Supreme is the earthly monarch whose existence is proved by all the world's eyesight; and the only Liberation is the dissolution of the body. By holding the doctrine that the soul is identical with the body, such phrases as "I am thin," "I am black," &c., are at once intelligible, as the attributes of thinness, &c., and self-consciousness will reside in the same subject [the body]; like and the use of the phrase "my body" is metaphorical "the head of Ráhu" [Ráhu being really *all head*].

All this has been thus summed up—

In this school there are four elements, earth,  
water, fire, and air;  
And from these four elements alone is  
intelligence produced,—  
Just like the intoxicating power from kiṇwa, &c.,  
mixed together;  
Since in "I am fat," "I am lean," these  
attributes[11] abide in the same subject,  
And since fatness, &c., reside only in the body,  
[12] it alone is the soul and no other,  
And such phrases as "my body" are only  
significant metaphorically.

"Be it so," says the opponent; "your wish would be gained if inference, &c., had no force of proof; but then they have this force; else, if they had not, then how, on perceiving smoke, should the thoughts of the intelligent immediately proceed to fire; or why, on hearing another say, 'There are fruits on the bank of the river,' do those who desire fruit proceed at once to the shore?"

All this, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy.

Those who maintain the authority of inference accept the *sign* or middle term as the causer of knowledge, which middle term must be found in the minor and be itself invariably connected with the major.[13] Now this invariable connection must be a relation destitute of any condition accepted or disputed;[14] and this connection does not possess its power of causing inference by virtue of its *existence*, as the eye, &c., are the cause of perception, but by virtue of its being *known*. What then is the means of this connection's being known?

We will first show that it is not *perception*. Now perception is held to be of two kinds, external and internal [*i.e.*, as produced by the external senses, or by the inner sense, mind]. The former is not the required means; for although it is possible that the actual contact of the senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the particular object thus brought in contact, yet as there can never be such contact in the case of the past or the future, the universal proposition[15] which was to embrace the invariable connection of the middle and major terms in every case becomes impossible to be known. Nor may you maintain that this knowledge of the universal proposition has the general class as its object, because if so, there might arise a doubt as to the existence of the invariable connection in this particular case[16] [as, for instance, in this particular smoke as implying fire].

Nor is internal perception the means, since you cannot establish that the mind has any power to act independently

towards an external object, since all allow that it is dependent on the external senses, as has been said by one of the logicians, "The eye, &c., have their objects as described; but mind externally is dependent on the others."

Nor can *inference* be the means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since in the case of this inference we should also require another inference to establish it, and so on, and hence would arise the fallacy of an *ad infinitum* retrogression.

Nor can *testimony* be the means thereof, since we may either allege in reply, in accordance with the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of Kaṇāda, that this is included in the topic of inference; or else we may hold that this fresh proof of testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier that stopped the progress of inference, since it depends itself on the recognition of a *sign* in the form of the language used in the child's presence by the old man;[\[17\]](#) and, moreover, there is no more reason for our believing on another's word that smoke and fire are invariably connected, than for our receiving the *ipse dixit* of Manu, &c. [which, of course, we Chárvákas reject].

And again, if testimony were to be accepted as the only means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, then in the case of a man to whom the fact of the invariable connection between the middle and major terms had not been pointed out by another person, there could be no inference of one thing [as fire] on seeing another thing [as smoke]; hence, on your own showing, the whole topic of inference for oneself[\[18\]](#) would have to end in mere idle words.

Then again *comparison*,[\[19\]](#) &c., must be utterly rejected as the means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since it is impossible that they can produce the knowledge of the unconditioned connection [*i.e.*, the universal proposition], because their end is to produce the knowledge of quite another connection, viz., the relation of a name to something so named.

Again, this same absence of a condition,[\[20\]](#) which has been given as the definition of an invariable connection [*i.e.*, a universal proposition], can itself never be known; since it is impossible to establish that all conditions must be objects of perception; and therefore, although the absence of perceptible things may be itself perceptible, the absence of non-perceptible things must be itself non-perceptible; and thus, since we must here too have recourse to inference, &c., we cannot leap over the obstacle which has already been planted to bar them. Again, we must accept as the definition of the condition, "it is that which is reciprocal or equipollent in extension[\[21\]](#) with the major term though not constantly accompanying the middle." These three distinguishing clauses, "not constantly accompanying the middle term," "constantly accompanying the major term," and "being constantly accompanied by it" [*i.e.*, reciprocal], are needed in the full definition to stop respectively three such fallacious conditions, in the argument to prove the non-eternity of sound, as "being produced," "the nature of a jar," and "the not causing audition;"[\[22\]](#) wherefore the definition holds,—and again it is established by the śloka of the great Doctor beginning *samāsama*.[\[23\]](#)

But since the knowledge of the condition must here precede the knowledge of the condition's absence, it is only when there is the knowledge of the condition, that the knowledge of the universality of the proposition is possible, *i.e.*, a knowledge in the form of such a connection between the middle term and major term as is distinguished by the absence of any such condition; and on the other hand, the knowledge of the condition depends upon the knowledge of the invariable connection. Thus we fasten on our opponents as with adamantine glue the thunderbolt-like fallacy of reasoning in a circle. Hence by the impossibility of knowing the universality of a proposition it becomes impossible to establish inference, &c.[24]

The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke, &c., to the knowledge of fire, &c., can be accounted for by its being based on a former perception or by its being an error; and that in some cases this step is justified by the result, is accidental just like the coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms, drugs, &c.

From this it follows that fate, &c.,[25] do not exist, since these can only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you thus do not allow *adṛishṭa*, the various phenomena of the world become destitute of any cause.

But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things. Thus it has been said—

The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool  
the breeze of morn;  
By whom came this variety? from their own  
nature was it born.

And all this has been also said by Bṛihaspati—

There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any  
soul in another world,

Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders,  
&c., produce any real effect.

The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's  
three staves, and smearing one's self with  
ashes,

Were made by Nature as the livelihood of those  
destitute of knowledge and manliness.

If a beast slain in the Jyotishṭoma rite will itself  
go to heaven,

Why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer  
his own father?[\[26\]](#)

If the Śrāddha produces gratification to beings  
who are dead,

Then here, too, in the case of travellers when  
they start, it is needless to give provisions for  
the journey.

If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering  
the Śrāddha here,

Then why not give the food down below to  
those who are standing on the housetop?

While life remains let a man live happily, let  
him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt;

When once the body becomes ashes, how can  
it ever return again?

If he who departs from the body goes to  
another world,

How is it that he comes not back again, restless

for love of his kindred?  
Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that  
Brahmans have established here  
All these ceremonies for the dead,—there is no  
other fruit anywhere.  
The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons,  
knaves, and demons.  
All the well-known formulæ of the pandits,  
jarpharí, turpharí, &c.[27]  
And all the obscene rites for the queen  
commanded in the Aśwamedha,  
These were invented by buffoons, and so all  
the various kinds of presents to the priests,[28]  
While the eating of flesh was similarly  
commanded by night-prowling demons.

Hence in kindness to the mass of living beings must we  
fly for refuge to the doctrine of Chárváka. Such is the  
pleasant consummation.

E. B. C.

## Footnote

### [Table of Contents](#)

[6] "Śaṅkara, Bháskara, and other commentators name the Lokáyatikas, and these appear to be a branch of the Sect of Chárváka" (Colebrooke). Lokáyata may be etymologically analysed as "prevalent in the world" (*loka* and *áyata*). Laukáyatika occurs in Páṇini's ukthagaṇa.

[7] *Kiṇwa* is explained as "drug or seed used to produce fermentation in the manufacture of spirits from sugar, bassia, &c." Colebrooke quotes from Śaṅkara: "The faculty of thought results from a modification of the aggregate elements in like manner as sugar with a ferment and other ingredients becomes an

inebriating liquor; and as betel, areca, lime, and extract of catechu chewed together have an exhilarating property not found in those substances severally."

[8] Of course Śaṅkara, in his commentary, gives a very different interpretation, applying it to the cessation of individual existence when the knowledge of the Supreme is once attained. Cf. Śabara's Comm. Jaimini Sút., i. i. 5.

[9] I take *kaṇa* as here equal to the Bengali *kunṛ*. Cf. Atharva-V., xi. 3, 5. *Aśvāḥ kaṇá gávas taṇḍulá maśakás tusháh.*

[10] See Nyáya Sútras, ii. 57.

[11] *I.e.*, personality and fatness, &c.

[12] I read *dehe* for *dehaḥ*.

[13] Literally, "must be an attribute of the subject and have invariable concomitance (*vyápti*)."

[14] For the *sandigdha* and *niśchita upádhi* see Siddhánta Muktávali, p. 125. The former is accepted only by one party.

[15] Literally, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance (as of smoke by fire).

[16] The attributes of the class are not always found in every member,—thus idiots are men, though man is a rational animal; and again, this particular smoke might be a sign of a fire in some other place.

[17] See Sáhitya Darpaṇa (Ballantyne's trans. p. 16), and Siddhánta-M., p. 80.

[18] The properly logical, as distinguished from the rhetorical, argument.

[19] "*Upamána* or the knowledge of a similarity is the instrument in the production of an inference from similarity. This particular inference consists in the knowledge of the relation of a name to something so named." Ballantyne's Tarka Sangraha.

[20] The *upádhi* is the condition which must be supplied to restrict a too general middle term, as in the inference "the mountain has smoke because it has fire," if we add wet fuel as the condition of the fire, the middle term will be no longer too general. In the case of a true *vyápti*, there is, of course, no *upádhi*.



[21] 'Αντιστρέφει (Pr. Anal., ii. 25). We have here our A with distributed predicate.

[22] If we omitted the first clause, and only made the upādhi "that which constantly accompanies the major term and is constantly accompanied by it," then in the Naiyáyika argument "sound is non-eternal, because it has the nature of sound," "being produced" would serve as a Mímámsaka upādhi, to establish the *vyabhichára* fallacy, as it is reciprocal with "non-eternal;" but the omitted clause excludes it, as an upādhi must be consistent with *either* party's opinions, and, of course, the Naiyáyika maintains that "being produced" *always* accompanies the class of sound. Similarly, if we defined the upādhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term and constantly accompanied by the major," we might have as an upādhi "the nature of a jar," as this is never found with the middle term (the class or nature of sound only residing in sound, and that of a jar only in a jar), while, at the same time, wherever the class of jar is found there is also found non-eternity. Lastly, if we defined the upādhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term, and constantly accompanying the major," we might have as a Mímámsaka upādhi "the not causing audition," *i.e.*, the not being apprehended by the organs of hearing; but this is excluded, as non-eternity is not always found where this is, ether being inaudible and yet eternal.

[23] This refers to an obscure śloka of Udayanáchárya, "where a reciprocal and a non-reciprocal universal connection (*i.e.*, universal propositions which severally do and do not distribute their predicates) relate to the same argument (as *e.g.*, to prove the existence of smoke), there that non-reciprocating term of the second will be a fallacious middle, which is not invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal of the first." Thus "the mountain has smoke because it has fire" (here fire and smoke are non-reciprocating, as fire is not found invariably accompanied by smoke though smoke is by fire), or "because it has fire from wet fuel" (smoke and fire from wet fuel being reciprocal and always accompanying each other); the non-reciprocating term of the former (fire) will give a fallacious inference, because it is also, of course, not invariably accompanied by the special kind of fire, that produced from wet fuel. But this will not be the case where the non-reciprocating term *is* thus invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal, as "the mountain has fire because it has smoke;" here, though fire and smoke do not reciprocate, yet smoke will be a true middle, because it is invariably accompanied by heat, which is the reciprocal of fire. I wish to add here, once for all, that I own my explanation of this, as well as many another, difficulty in the Sarva-darśana-śaṅgraha to my old friend and teacher, Paṇḍit Maheśa Chandra Nyáyaratna, of the Calcutta Sanskrit College.

[24] Cf. Sextus Empiricus, P. Hyp. ii. In the chapter on the Buddhist system *infra*, we have an attempt to establish the authority of the universal proposition from the relation of cause and effect or genus and species.

[25] *Adṛishṭa*, *i.e.*, the merit and demerit in our actions which produce their effects in future births.

[26] This is an old Buddhist retort. See Burnouf, *Introd.*, p. 209.

[27] Rig-Veda, x. 106. For the Aśwamedha rites, see Wilson's Rig-Veda, Preface, vol. ii. p. xiii.

[28] Or this may mean "and all the various other things to be handled in the rites."



# **CHAPTER II.**

## **THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM.**

[Table of Contents](#)

At this point the Buddhists remark: As for what you (Chárvákas) laid down as to the difficulty of ascertaining invariable concomitance, your position is unacceptable, inasmuch as invariable concomitance is easily cognisable by means of identity and causality. It has accordingly been said

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"From the relation of cause and effect, or from identity as a determinant, results a law of invariable concomitance—not through the mere observation of the desired result in similar cases, nor through the non-observation of it in dissimilar cases."[\[29\]](#)

On the hypothesis (of the Naiyáyikas) that it is concomitance and non-concomitance (*e.g.*, A is where B is, A is not where B is not) that determine an invariable connection, the unconditional attendance of the major or the middle term would be unascertainable, it being impossible to exclude all doubt with regard to instances past and future, and present but unperceived. If one (a Naiyáyika) rejoin that uncertainty in regard to such instances is equally inevitable on our system, we reply: Say not so, for such a supposition as that an effect may be produced without any cause would destroy itself by putting a stop to activity of any kind; for such doubts alone are to be entertained, the entertainment of which does not implicate us in practical absurdity and the like, as it has been said, "Doubt terminates where there is a practical absurdity."[\[30\]](#)

1. By ascertainment of an effectuation, then, of that (*viz.*, of the designate of the middle) is ascertained the invariable concomitance (of the major); and the ascertainment of such effectuation may arise from the well-known series of five causes, in the perceptive cognition or non-cognition of cause and effect. That fire and smoke, for instance, stand in the relation of cause and effect is ascertained by five indications, *viz.*, (1.) That an effect is not cognised prior to its effectuation, that (2.) the cause being perceived (3.) the

effect is perceived, and that after the effect is cognised (4.) there is its non-cognition, (5.) when the (material) cause is no longer cognised.

2. In like manner an invariable concomitance is ascertained by the ascertainment of identity (*e.g.*, a sisu-tree is a tree, or wherever we observe the attributes of a sisu we observe also the attribute arboreity), an absurdity attaching to the contrary opinion, inasmuch as if a sisu-tree should lose its arboreity it would lose its own self. But, on the other hand, where there exists no absurdity, and where a (mere) concomitance is again and again observed, who can exclude all doubt of failure in the concomitance? An ascertainment of the identity of sisu and tree is competent in virtue of the reference to the same object (*i.e.*, predication),—This tree is a sisu. For reference to the same object (predication) is not competent where there is no difference whatever (*e.g.*, to say, "A jar is a jar," is no combination of diverse attributes in a common subject), because the two terms cannot, as being synonymous, be simultaneously employed; nor can reference to the same object take place where there is a reciprocal exclusion (of the two terms), inasmuch as we never find, for instance, horse and cow predicated the one of the other.

It has thus been evinced that an effect or a self-same supposes a cause or a self-same (as invariable concomitants).

If a man does not allow that inference is a form of evidence, *pramāṇa*, one may reply: You merely assert thus much, that inference is not a form of evidence: do you allege no proof of this, or do you allege any? The former

alternative is not allowable according to the maxim that bare assertion is no proof of the matter asserted. Nor is the latter alternative any better, for if while you assert that inference is no form of evidence, you produce some truncated argument (to prove, *i.e.*, infer, that it is none), you will be involved in an absurdity, just as if you asserted your own mother to be barren. Besides, when you affirm that the establishment of a form of evidence and of the corresponding fallacious evidence results from their homogeneity, you yourself admit induction by identity. Again, when you affirm that the dissentiency of others is known by the symbolism of words, you yourself allow induction by causality. When you deny the existence of any object on the ground of its not being perceived, you yourself admit an inference of which non-perception is the middle term. Conformably it has been said by Tathágata—

"The admission of a form of evidence in general results from its being present to the understanding of others.

"The existence of a form of evidence also follows from its negation by a certain person."

All this has been fully handled by great authorities; and we desist for fear of an undue enlargement of our treatise.

These same Bauddhas discuss the highest end of man from four standpoints. Celebrated under the designations of Mádhyamika, Yogáchára, Sautrántika, and Vaibhášhika, these Buddhists adopt respectively the doctrines of a universal void (nihilism), an external void (subjective idealism), the inferribility of external objects