CHARLES DOWNER HAZEN



THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY


CHARLES
DOWNER
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ENRICHED EDITION
THE LONG
NINETEENTH
CENTURY

Charles Downer Hazen

The Long Nineteenth Century

Enriched edition. History of Europe (1789-1918)

Introduction, Studies and Commentaries by Darren Fox

EAN 8596547004929

Edited and published by DigiCat, 2022

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Introduction

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This is the story of a continent repeatedly remade by the collision between revolutionary upheaval and the restless search for order. Spanning the years from 1789 to 1918, Charles Downer Hazen’s The Long Nineteenth Century follows Europe as it transforms from the world of monarchies and estates to mass politics and modern states. The period begins with the French Revolution and ends with the First World War, framing a narrative of institution-building, ideological conflict, industrial growth, and imperial reach. Hazen guides readers through these pressures without reducing them to a single cause, emphasizing how ideas, interests, and unforeseen events continually reshaped the European landscape.

First published in the early twentieth century, this work is a broad survey of European history that blends narrative and analysis. Hazen, an American historian, anchors his account firmly in the European continent while keeping an eye on global entanglements created by trade, empire, and war. The chosen frame, often called the long nineteenth century, runs from the outbreak of the French Revolution to the conclusion of the First World War. Within that arc, the book traces how political institutions, social structures, and ideas evolved in relation to one another, offering readers a sustained panorama without relying on specialized jargon or narrow case studies.

Readers encounter a clear chronological progression, yet the book also pauses at decisive junctures to unpack the forces that made change possible or resistance durable. Hazen writes in a measured, explanatory voice that privileges clarity over ornament, guiding rather than dazzling, and aiming for coherence across a crowded stage. The tone remains steady even as the subject matter moves from revolution to reform, from diplomatic conference to factory floor. The result is a narrative history that invites sustained attention: the chapters build cumulatively, the transitions are explicit, and the interpretive signposts are unobtrusive, allowing the magnitude of the century’s transformations to emerge incrementally.

At the thematic core stand tensions between authority and liberty, tradition and innovation, and the rival claims of empire and nation. Hazen tracks how liberal, conservative, and socialist programs struggled to define citizenship and representation, while industrialization created new classes, new cities, and new forms of collective action. He follows the recalibration of the European balance of power, attentive to how diplomacy, armaments, and public opinion interacted. Colonial expansion appears not as a sideshow but as a constitutive arena of competition and ideology. Throughout, the book asks how ideas about rights, sovereignty, and progress collided with the stubborn realities of institutions, resources, and geography.

In adopting the long nineteenth century as a frame, the book emphasizes continuity amid disruption, inviting readers to see revolutions and wars not as isolated flashes but as episodes in larger patterns. The extended arc makes

it possible to follow how early experiments in governance and economy set conditions for later crises and reforms. Hazen’s pacing favors synthesis over digression, connecting developments across regions without losing sight of local particularities when they matter to the continental picture. This approach yields a series of vistas rather than microhistories, enabling a comparative perspective that clarifies both convergence and divergence within Europe’s varied political cultures.

Although firmly rooted in its period, the narrative speaks directly to contemporary concerns. Questions that animate today’s public life—national self-determination, the limits of supranational cooperation, economic inequality, the power of media, and the management of rapid technological change—are shown emerging in recognizable form. By tracing how institutions adapted unevenly to mass participation and industrial scale, the book illuminates recurring dilemmas of legitimacy and capacity. It also sharpens awareness of how international order depends on perceptions as much as capabilities, and how miscalculation can widen local disputes into continental crises, offering perspective without reducing complexity to simplistic lessons.

Approached as both a narrative and an interpretive guide, The Long Nineteenth Century offers a coherent map through a tumultuous landscape, neither sensationalizing upheaval nor downplaying endurance. Readers come away with a sturdy framework for understanding how modern Europe took shape and why its institutions, ideas, and conflicts continue to influence global affairs. The book

endures because it reveals the interconnectedness of politics, society, economy, and culture across more than a century of accelerated change. By clarifying continuities and tipping points, Hazen provides a durable vantage from which to read the present against the past, with nuance and historical humility.

Synopsis

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The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Europe from 1789 to 1918 by Charles Downer Hazen offers a compact, chronological survey of the continent's political transformations and their social undercurrents. It opens with the French Revolution, presenting the collapse of the old regime, the remaking of sovereignty, and the mobilization of citizens in war and politics. Hazen follows how revolutionary ideals and institutions, extended by Napoleonic domination, reshaped law, administration, and the map of Europe. He stresses both innovation and resistance: new principles of citizenship confronted entrenched hierarchies, while neighboring states absorbed, adapted, or sought to roll back French changes.

Restoration and settlement after 1815 form the book's next movement. Hazen describes the Congress of Vienna's attempt to stabilize Europe by balancing power, restoring dynasties, and creating mechanisms for collective consultation. He notes the prominence of conservative statesmen and police measures, yet also the persistence of constitutional agitation. The revolutions of 1830 and the emergence of a new Belgian state signal the limits of repression, as do measured reforms in Britain. Throughout, the narrative emphasizes the continuing friction between order and liberty, showing how rulers sought to contain the revolutionary legacy while populations pressed for representation, rights, and national recognition.

The middle chapters follow the continent into the upheavals of 1848. Hazen recounts how liberal, national, and social demands converged in a wave of revolutions spanning Central and Western Europe. Provisional regimes and assemblies briefly advanced constitutions and reforms before encountering counterrevolution, division, and military force. The aftermath, as presented here, is not only reaction but recalibration: governments strengthened administrative and military capacity, while reformers rethought strategy. The book underscores the emergence of pragmatic statecraft, in which rulers and movements pursued change through calculated alliances, legal innovation, and controlled modernization rather than insurrectionary shock, altering the balance between ideals and power.

Against this backdrop, Hazen treats the mid-century wars as turning points. The Crimean conflict weakens established concert arrangements, and Italian unification proceeds through calculated diplomacy and limited wars led by Piedmont-Sardinia, with popular energies enlisted to complete consolidation. In the German lands, Prussia's ascendancy yields a new continental center of gravity, as wars of 1866 and 1870-1871 recast the map and crown a German Empire. The narrative links these outcomes to administrative reform, military innovation, and the management of nationalist aspirations. Bismarck's diplomacy then seeks to preserve gains by constructing a flexible continental balance, managing rivalries without immediate general war.

Parallel to political realignment, Hazen surveys the accelerating industrial and social changes that reconfigure

European life. Expanding factories, railways, and cities create new classes, interests, and tensions, while education and print culture widen participation in public affairs. Ideological currents - liberalism, conservatism, socialism, and nationalism - compete for allegiance and shape party systems and reform programs. The book notes the spread of suffrage and social legislation in several states, alongside anxieties about order and identity. Overseas expansion intensifies great-power rivalries, and the Eastern Question persists, as multinational empires confront the rise of new nationalities, particularly in the Balkans, where diplomacy and conflict repeatedly intersect.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the narrative turns to diplomacy's shifting architecture. Hazen outlines the intricate alliance system designed to localize disputes and deter confrontation, then shows how it hardens into opposed groups as policies change and mistrust grows. Naval competition, colonial friction, and repeated crises - among them incidents in Morocco and the Balkans - deepen suspicion. Domestic politics and mass opinion bear upon decision-making, complicating calculations of risk. Mobilization plans and military timetables narrow the room for negotiation. Without reducing causes to a single factor, the book traces how cumulative pressures erode the concert's flexibility and increase systemic volatility.

The concluding sections address the First World War as culmination and rupture. Hazen sketches the war's opening, the broad contours of fighting on multiple fronts, and the demands of total mobilization on states and societies. He emphasizes strains that transform politics and economies,

while keeping focus on the international framework within which strategies unfold. By 1918, armistice and the collapse of several empires close the period the book surveys. The study's arc links revolution, nation-building, industrial change, and imperial rivalry to a continental crisis, offering a coherent frame for understanding modern Europe's emergence without foreclosing the debates that follow.

Historical Context

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Charles Downer Hazen’s survey situates Europe between 1789 and 1918, a period he frames as a “long nineteenth century” defined by political revolution, industrial change, and international rivalry. Writing in the immediate aftermath of World War I, the American historian draws on a tradition that centers states, diplomacy, and public institutions—monarchies and ministries, parliaments and courts, standing armies and foreign offices. The setting stretches from Paris to Petersburg, London to Vienna, encompassing empires and emerging nation-states. The narrative follows how legal codes, constitutions, bureaucracies, and fiscal systems expanded alongside literacy, print culture, and universities, creating a continental public sphere that shaped—and was shaped by—power.

At its outset stands the French Revolution, which broke the institutional monopoly of the ancien régime and recast sovereignty in national terms. The Estates-General convened in 1789 became the National Assembly; the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen articulated civil equality; feudal dues were abolished. Church property was nationalized and the Civil Constitution of the Clergy redrew confessional relations with the state. War with European monarchies internationalized the upheaval. The execution of Louis XVI and the mobilization of citizens under the levée en masse signaled a new politics of mass participation that would ripple across the continent.

From 1799 Napoleon Bonaparte reshaped continental institutions through conquest and reform. The Napoleonic Code standardized civil law, while administrative centralization and meritocratic promotion altered state service. His reorganization of German lands and the Confederation of the Rhine weakened the Holy Roman Empire, which dissolved in 1806. Britain’s naval supremacy and the failure of the Continental System, followed by campaigns in Spain and Russia, culminated in his defeat. The Congress of Vienna (1814–1815), guided by figures like Metternich and Castlereagh, restored dynasties, drew frontiers, and established a balance of power and the Concert of Europe intended to manage disputes and revolution.

The restoration order met a transforming economy. Industrialization began in Britain and spread to Belgium, France, and the German states, propelled by coal, steam power, mechanized textiles, and railways. Cities grew rapidly; new middle and working classes pressed for rights and representation. Liberalism promoted constitutionalism and free trade; conservatism defended monarchy and church; socialism and anarchism critiqued property and hierarchy. Political crises reflected these pressures: the July Revolution of 1830 toppled the Bourbon line in France and created independent Belgium, while the continent-wide revolutions of 1848 demanded constitutions, national self-determination, and social reform, exposing both reformist aspirations and limits.

Nationalism reconfigured the map. In Italy, Piedmont-Sardinia under Cavour leveraged diplomacy and war against

Austria (1859), while Garibaldi’s volunteers advanced in the south; plebiscites and the fall of the Papal States culminated in unification, completed with Rome in 1870. In Germany, Bismarck orchestrated wars against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870–1871), proclaiming the empire at Versailles in 1871 under Prussian leadership. The Habsburg Monarchy became the Dual Monarchy in 1867. The Ottoman Empire receded as Greece, Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria gained autonomy or independence, with the 1878 Congress of Berlin revising borders and great-power guarantees.

Imperial expansion overseas intensified European rivalries and linked domestic politics to global power. The Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 set rules for the partition of Africa; the Congo Free State emerged under Leopold II. Britain occupied Egypt in 1882 to secure the Suez Canal; France consolidated Algeria and advanced in West Africa; Germany and Italy claimed colonies. The “Great Game” defined Anglo-Russian competition in Central Asia. Industrial capacity supported steel navies and long-distance logistics, while social and scientific rhetoric justified empire. Imperial crises, investment networks, and migration flows brought distant frontiers into European strategic calculations and public debate.

After 1871, continental peace rested on shifting alliance systems. Bismarck constructed ties—the Three Emperors’ League, the Dual Alliance with Austria-Hungary, the Triple Alliance, and the Reinsurance Treaty—to isolate France and contain conflict. After 1890, Wilhelm II abandoned key arrangements; France and Russia formed an alliance (1894),

Britain reached the Entente Cordiale (1904) with France and the Anglo-Russian Convention (1907), creating the Triple Entente. Crises multiplied: the Moroccan disputes (1905–1906, 1911), the Bosnian annexation (1908), and the Balkan Wars (1912–1913). In 1914, the Sarajevo assassination and rapid mobilizations turned a regional confrontation into a general European war.

World War I mobilized entire societies: mass conscription, centralized procurement, censorship, and industrialized firepower produced unprecedented casualties. Western Front trench warfare contrasted with more fluid Eastern campaigns; naval blockades bit into economies. In 1917 the United States entered the war, while revolutions in Russia led to the Brest-Litovsk treaty. The Central Powers' 1918 offensives failed; the armistice of November 11 ended fighting. Four empires—the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman—collapsed, and new states emerged in Central and Eastern Europe. Hazen's work, composed in this moment, assesses the century's institutions and rivalries as prelude and warns through narrative of their consequences.

The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Europe from 1789 to 1918

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Preface

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To all thoughtful persons the European War has brought home with overwhelming power the importance of a knowledge of modern European history. For without such knowledge no one can understand, or begin to understand, the significance of the forces that have made it, the vastness of the issues involved, the nature of what is indisputably one of the gravest crises, if not the very gravest, in the history of mankind. The destinies of every nation in this world and the conditions of life of every individual will inevitably be changed, and may be profoundly changed, by the outcome of this gigantic and portentous conflict. No citizen of a free country who takes his citizenship seriously, who considers himself responsible, to the full extent of his personal influence, for the character and conduct of his government, can, without the crudest self-stultification, admit that he knows nothing and cares nothing about the history of Europe.

If he cares for his own national inheritance and tradition, for its characteristic and fundamental policies and principles, then he will care most emphatically about what happens in Europe. Nothing that happens there is really foreign to us, for the fortunes of Europe and America are inextricably intertwined.

This, in my opinion the most outstanding fact in the modern world, was exemplified in the eighteenth century in

the person of Lafayette, an American patriot and a French patriot, a hero of two revolutions.

In Lafayette's library hung appropriately side by side two momentous documents, the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, two utterances that have had memorable consequences in the world because multitudes of men have been willing to give their lives that these principles might prevail and multitudes have given their lives that they should not prevail.

Fundamentally this struggle for liberty has been the warp and woof of modern European history and the vicissitudes of the struggle are, in the deepest sense, what I have attempted to set forth in this volume.

Complicated, exceedingly, has been the history of this conflict, and many other elements have entered into the problem and solution. These I have given their due place, but I have also endeavored to keep them in just subordination to the central theme.

As furnishing the background for the story, I have described in the opening chapters the chief features of the eighteenth century, the Old Regime in Europe and in France. That regime was boldly challenged and roughly handled by the French Revolution. I have endeavored to indicate the spirit and meaning of that revolution as well as to describe its stirring events and personalities.. That revolution clashed with Europe and started a European revolution, which has had its ups and downs, its victories and defeats, its varying issues in the different countries. The contest assumed the character of world warfare under Napoleon, who said of

himself that he was "the Revolution"and that he had "killed the Revolution." Neither statement was correct; yet each possessed an element of truth. This essential duality of the Napoleonic system, Old Regime and New Regime commingled in impossible union, I have sought to make clear.

Napoleon partially conquered the New Regime, and those who conquered Napoleon and sent him to St. Helena were anxious to conquer it still more. They for a while succeeded, but in the end the new spirit which was abroad in the world was too strong for them and they and their works were severely battered by the widespread revolutions of 1848. To those who are content to look at the surface, the revolutions of that year seemed ephemeral; to those who look beneath they appear anything but ephemeral.

This ebb and flow has been the rhythm of European history since the close of the eighteenth century. The new has indisputably progressed, but it has progressed unequally in the different countries, as was natural and inevitable, since those countries are very dissimilar in character, in stages of development, and in mental outlook. This all-absorbing conflict has not yet ended.

This struggle for freedom has had many aspects. The spirit of nationalism, so prominent a feature of the nineteenth century, has in some cases been an expression of the desire for liberty; in other cases it has been the expression of the old familiar desire for national greatness and power, nothing more. I have attempted in my narrative to show the varying operation of this spirit in the different countries.

Again, where economic and social factors have been formative in national policy, I have described them, as for instance the conditions that prevailed in France before the Revolution, the free trade movement in England, the abolition of serfdom in Russia, the Zollverein[1] in Germany, the tariff policies, the labor legislation, and the various measures of social reform which have been a growing feature of the modern world.

In the treatment of the past century I have drawn freely upon my larger work, Europe Since 1815. The numerous illustrations which accompany the text have been selected with reference to their historical importance, and it is hoped that they will render the scenes and persons they portray more actual. I am greatly indebted to Dr. Ernest F. Henderson and his publishers, Messrs. G. P. Putnam's Sons, for permission to use several illustrations from Dr. Henderson's vivid and illuminating book Symbol and Satire in the French Revolution; and to Miss Louise Stetson Fuller of the Department of History of Smith College for the preparation of the Index.

C. D. H.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, January, 1917

PREFACE TO THE REVISED EDITION

This book appeared originally early in 1917. I have since then added an account of the Great War ending with the armistice of November, 1918. I have, however, allowed the earlier chapters to stand as they were written in spite of the obvious incongruity of some of the tenses employed in

them. This arrangement is provisional only; meanwhile no one is likely to be deceived or confused, the change in the situation of the world, rendering such formal alterations desirable, having occurred so recently.

C. D. H.

JUNE 6, 1919.

Chapter I
The Old Regime in Europe

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Anyone who seeks to understand the stirring period in which we are now living becomes quickly aware that he must first know the history of the French Revolution, a movement that inaugurated a new era, not only for France but for the world. The years from 1789 to 1815, the years of the Revolution and of Napoleon, effected one of the greatest and most difficult transitions of which history bears record, and to gain any proper sense of its significance one must have some glimpse of the background, some conception of what Europe was like in 1789. That background can only be sketched here in a few broad strokes, far from adequate to a satisfactory appreciation, but at least indicating the point of departure.

What was Europe in 1789? One thing, at least, it was not: it was not a unity**[1q]**. There were states of every size and shape and with every form of government. The States of the Church were theocratic; capricious and cruel despotism prevailed in Turkey; absolute monarchy in Russia, Austria, France, Prussia; constitutional monarchy in England; while there were various kinds of so-called republics federal republics in Holland and Switzerland, a republic whose head was an elective king in Poland, aristocratic republics in Venice and Genoa and in the free cities of the Holy Roman Empire.

Of these states the one that was to be the most persistent enemy of France and of French ideas throughout the period we are about to describe was England, a commercial and colonial empire of the first importance. This empire, of long, slow growth, had passed through many highly significant experiences during the eighteenth century. Indeed that century is one of the most momentous in English history, rendered forever memorable by three great series of events which in important respects transformed the national life of England and her international relations, giving them the character and tendency which have been theirs ever since. These three streams of tendency or lines of evolution out of which the modern power of Britain has emerged were: the acquisition of what are still the most valuable parts of her colonial empire, Canada and India; the establishment of the parliamentary system of government, that is, government of the nation by its representatives, not by its royal house, the undoubted supremacy of Parliament over the Crown; and the beginnings of what is called the Industrial Revolution, that is, of the modern factory system of production on a vast scale which during the course of the nineteenth century made England easily the chief industrial nation of the world.

The evolution of the parliamentary system of government had, of course, been long in progress but was immensely furthered by the advent of in 1714 a new royal dynasty, the House of Hanover**[2]**, the House of still at this hour the reigning family. The struggle between Crown and Parliament, which had been long proceeding and had become tense and violent in the seventeenth century in

of law; in imperial Russia such decrees could be used to make immediate legal decisions without a legislative process.

102 A heavy multi-thonged whip used historically in Russia as an instrument of corporal punishment; its use was known to cause severe injury and could be fatal in some cases.

103 A traditional Russian village community or commune in the 19th century that held and distributed land collectively and provided limited local self-government (also commonly called the obshchina).

104 A conflict between Great Britain and China (given here as 1840–1842) in which Britain used military force to protect its trade in opium; it ended in a decisive British victory that opened Chinese ports to foreign trade and weakened imperial control.

105 The peace settlement that ended the Opium War, obliging China to pay a large indemnity, cede Hong Kong to Britain, and open additional ports (beyond Canton) to British trade under fixed conditions.

106 Refers to Commodore Matthew C. Perry of the U.S. Navy, who led an American squadron to Japan in 1853–1854 and compelled the Tokugawa government to begin formal diplomatic and commercial relations with the United States.

107 Vyacheslav von Plehve was the Russian Minister of the Interior from 1902 to 1904, associated with harsh repression of liberals, police measures against minorities, and reactionary policies; he was assassinated in July 1904 by a bomb thrown under his carriage.

108 Nicholas II was the last Emperor (Czar) of Russia, ruling from 1894 until his abdication in 1917; in 1898 he proposed the international conference that led to the first Hague Peace Conference in 1899.

109 A dreadnought is a type of battleship first epitomized by the British HMS Dreadnought (launched 1906) whose design made earlier battleships largely obsolete; 'super-dreadnoughts' refers to later, larger and more heavily armed successors.

110 Established by the 1899 Hague Conference, the Permanent Court of Arbitration is an international forum that provides a roster of arbitrators and administrative rules for voluntary arbitration of disputes between states and other parties, rather than a permanent bench of sitting judges.

111 The Young Turks were a coalition of reformist Ottoman officers and intellectuals who led the 1908 revolution restoring the constitution and parliamentary life in the Ottoman Empire, a movement that subsequently influenced internal politics and nationalist tensions.

112 Peace agreement signed in August 1913 that ended the Second Balkan War and redrew borders among Balkan states; it left Serbia territorially limited and contributed to regional tensions before 1914.

113 A defensive coalition formed in 1882 between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy that obligated mutual aid in certain defensive wars and shaped pre-1914 European diplomacy.

114 Giovanni Giolitti, Italian prime minister at several points in the early 20th century, who in 1913–1914 refused to support Austria's proposed action against Serbia and guided Italy's initial neutrality in 1914.

115 Bernhard von Bülow, who served as Chancellor of the German Empire (around 1900–1909) and whose commentary is cited; he linked Ottoman decline to German policy and military legislation.

116 Franz Ferdinand, heir presumptive to the Austro-Hungarian throne, whose assassination in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, triggered the July–August 1914 crisis leading to World War I.

117 Capital of Bosnia where the 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand occurred; then part of Austria-Hungary and a focal point of Balkan tensions.

118 Province annexed by Austria-Hungary in 1908, a move that angered Serbia and Russia and contributed to Balkan instability before World War I.

119 Nationalist agitation and publications aimed at promoting Serbian influence and the unity of South Slavs, which Austria-Hungary blamed for fostering hostility and the Sarajevo murder.

120 Reference to international arbitration institutions established at The Hague (from 1899 and 1907 conferences), notably the Permanent Court of Arbitration, intended for peaceful settlement of disputes between states.

121 A pre-war diplomatic understanding among Great Britain, France, and Russia (early 1900s) that was not a formal alliance but fostered cooperation and mutual support in crises.

122 Title borne by the hereditary ruler of Egypt (Muhammad Ali dynasty) under nominal Ottoman suzerainty; in World War I Britain deposed the Khedive and proclaimed a protectorate, replacing him with a Sultan.

123 The German naval base and leased port in China (often spelled Tsingtao or Jiaozhou) seized by Japan in 1914 as part of Allied operations in the Far East.