

***HENRY
SIDGWICK***

A black and white close-up photograph of a man's face, showing his hair and glasses. The man has dark, wavy hair and is wearing glasses. The image is cropped to focus on the top and right side of his head.

***THE METHODS
OF ETHICS***

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INTUITIONISM

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4. The *existence* of apparent cognitions of right conduct, intuitively obtained, as distinct from their validity, will scarcely be questioned; and to establish their validity it is not needful to prove their 'originality.'

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5. Both particular and universal intuitions are found in our common moral thought: but it is for the latter that ultimate validity is ordinarily claimed by intuitional moralists. We must try, by reflecting on Common Sense, how far we can state these Moral Axioms with clearness and precision.

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2. Virtues as commonly recognised, are manifested primarily in volitions to produce particular right effects—which must at least be thought by the agent to be not wrong—: but for the completeness of some virtues the presence of certain emotions seems necessary.

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4. nor can we state any clear, absolute, universally-admitted axioms for determining the duties of the Affections:

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