



ANNIE HELOISE ABEL

**THE AMERICAN
INDIANS AS
SLAVEHOLDERS AND
SECESSIONISTS**

Annie Heloise Abel

The American Indians as Slaveholders and Secessionists

Enriched edition.

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Introduction

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Balancing the paradox of oppressed nations practicing oppression, *The American Indians as Slaveholders and Secessionists* traces how certain Native polities, pressured by removal, treaty obligations, and strategic necessity, adopted slavery and aligned with a breakaway Southern nation, revealing a Civil War landscape where sovereignty, survival, and moral compromise collided; set in Indian Territory and the border South, the study follows diplomatic overtures, treaty-making, and intra-tribal debates that placed Native leaders at the intersection of imperial designs and autonomy, showing that decisions taken under duress could entangle communities in the machinery of bondage and rebellion, and that the era's conflict ran through Native country as decisively as through any Southern state.

Annie Heloise Abel's volume is a scholarly monograph in U.S. history, composed in the early twentieth century and steeped in documentary research. Its setting is Indian Territory and adjacent border regions during the opening phases of the American Civil War, when Confederate commissioners courted Native nations and federal authority faltered. Abel organizes the narrative around diplomacy, law, and policy rather than battlefield spectacle, piecing together official records, treaty materials, and contemporary testimony to reconstruct how secession reverberated beyond state lines. The result is a study that reads as both political history and borderlands history, attentive to jurisdiction, allegiance, and the vocabulary of sovereignty.

Without presuming a single Native viewpoint, the book examines how different nations and factions weighed choices in 1861 as Confederate envoys offered recognition

and protection in exchange for alliance. Abel's chapters move deliberately from background on removal-era institutions, including the presence of chattel slavery in some communities, to the negotiations that followed the collapse of federal garrisons. The reading experience is archival and exacting: argument builds through documents, chronology, and legal detail rather than through dramatic set pieces. The voice is judicious, the tone controlled, and the style measured, inviting readers to inhabit complexity and to track evidence as positions harden and agreements take shape.

Themes of sovereignty under pressure, complicity and survival, and the entanglement of Indigenous politics with the Confederate project structure the work. Abel foregrounds how policy environments created incentives that could compress moral horizons, how internal debates within Native nations mirrored the larger crisis, and how slavery operated as both an economic system and a diplomatic hinge. Federal neglect and Confederate opportunism emerge as contextual forces, but agency remains central: leaders chose among constrained options, often with profound costs. The book thereby illuminates a Civil War that was never only sectional, but also territorial and interethnic, governed by treaties, kinship, commerce, and calculated risk.

Abel writes as an early twentieth-century historian, prioritizing official correspondence, legislative texts, and the voices of diplomats and chiefs preserved in the archive. Her prose is spare and documentary, and her analysis proceeds by assembling a chain of verifiable claims rather than by speculative reconstruction. Readers will encounter terminology and framing characteristic of her era, yet the study strives to situate Native decision-making within specific institutional constraints rather than in stereotype. The method's strength is clarity about who said what, when, and under what authority; its limitation, which later

scholarship has supplemented, is less attention to everyday experience beyond the documentary reach of state and national actors.

For contemporary readers, the book matters because it expands the Civil War's map and moral accounting. It clarifies that the history of slavery and secession reached into Native country, and that questions of citizenship, treaty rights, and racial hierarchy were negotiated across multiple sovereignties. The narrative offers context for ongoing conversations about Indigenous self-determination, the legacies of removal, and the intertwined histories of Native and Black communities in what is now Oklahoma and the broader South. By recovering the diplomatic texture of the moment, Abel equips readers to approach present debates with historical depth, recognizing overlapping systems of power and responsibility.

Approached on its own terms, *The American Indians as Slaveholders and Secessionists* offers a demanding but lucid account of how a continental war reordered allegiances on the periphery of the states. It neither absolves nor indicts by fiat; it asks readers to follow evidence, to weigh motives alongside structures, and to view Native politics as consequential to the national crisis. As an introduction to a complex chapter of Civil War history, it rewards patient reading, opens avenues for further inquiry, and provides a durable framework for thinking about sovereignty, slavery, and secession where histories meet and boundaries blur.

Synopsis

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Annie Heloise Abel's *The American Indians as Slaveholders and Secessionists* is an early twentieth-century historical study that investigates the political and social dynamics linking several Native nations of the Indian Territory to slavery and to the secession crisis. Concentrating chiefly on the peoples often grouped as the Five Tribes, Abel reconstructs how regional economics, legal developments, and diplomatic entanglements positioned these nations at the crossroads of U.S. sectional conflict. She organizes the narrative around archives and official papers, treating the subject as a neglected chapter in Civil War-era statecraft. The result is a tightly focused account of how Indigenous sovereignty interacted with U.S. and Confederate ambitions.

Abel first situates Indigenous enslavement in a long antebellum arc, distinguishing earlier captive practices from the later adoption of racialized chattel slavery. She traces how proximity to the American South, missionary influences, commercial agriculture, and codified tribal laws shaped institutions of bondage in different communities. Without flattening differences, she emphasizes how planter elites and intermarried networks helped integrate slaveholding into governance and social order. The book surveys labor regimes, legal protections for property, and manumission constraints, showing that the institution's contours varied by nation yet converged around Southern market incentives and political alliances that increasingly tied Indian Territory to the slave economy.

Turning to federal-tribal relations, Abel highlights the consequences of nineteenth-century removals and the treaty system that reorganized Native polities west of the

Mississippi. She details the Indian Office's administrative machinery, annuity payments, and the ambiguous guardianship that mediated sovereignty while binding Indigenous nations to U.S. oversight. As sectional tensions sharpened, economic routes, border-state politics, and migration patterns linked Indian Territory more tightly to Southern commercial circuits. Abel underscores how debates over jurisdiction, citizenship, and the legal status of people of African descent foreshadowed later alignments, revealing a political landscape in which internal governance was inseparable from external diplomatic pressure.

With secession unfolding, Abel narrates the Confederacy's concerted diplomacy to recruit alliances in the West. Commissioners—most notably in missions designed to consolidate treaties—courted Native leaders with promises to recognize territorial rights, assume financial obligations previously managed by the United States, and respect tribal self-government. Drawing on treaty texts and correspondence, she outlines how these negotiations advanced rapidly in 1861, producing formal agreements with several nations. Abel treats these developments as an extension of statecraft rather than a foregone ideological convergence, stressing material calculations, regional security concerns, and the leverage Indigenous governments held at a moment when both Union and Confederacy competed for their allegiance.

The study then examines the divisions within and among Native nations as leaders weighed neutrality, Union loyalty, or Confederate alliance. Abel reconstructs council debates, memorials, and policy shifts, emphasizing how geography, trade dependencies, and recent civil conflicts within tribes influenced calculations. The presence of enslaved and free Black communities, missionary advocacy, and the positions of influential families further complicated decision-making. Rather than depicting a monolithic stance, Abel shows layered factionalism in which strategic pragmatism mingled

with constitutional arguments about sovereignty and treaty continuity. Her analysis illuminates why some constituencies saw alignment as protection, while others feared coercion, instability, or the erosion of internal authority.

Abel also tracks the immediate ramifications of these political choices for governance and security in the Territory. She describes how new treaties prompted rapid institution-building, military organization, and administrative reorganizations that strained existing civil structures. Using official reports and private letters, she outlines the challenges of provisioning, enforcement of treaty terms, and the volatility created by shifting battle lines nearby. The portrait is one of fragile arrangements vulnerable to external military pressures and internal rivalries, with legal innovations and proclamations continuously tested by wartime realities that exceeded the capacity of any single authority to control.

Throughout, Abel frames the subject as a crucial window onto the entanglement of race, law, and diplomacy in the Civil War era. By foregrounding Indigenous agency alongside constraint, she complicates narratives that marginalize Native polities or treat their choices as mere echoes of Southern policy. The book's enduring resonance lies in its archival synthesis and its insistence that sovereignty, slavery, and secession cannot be disentangled in Indian Territory's history. Without overclaiming outcomes, Abel's study invites readers to reconsider the boundaries of the American conflict and to situate Indigenous nations at the center of its diplomatic and legal transformations.

Historical Context

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Annie Heloise Abel's *The American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist* (1915) examines the Five Tribes—Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Muscogee (Creek), and Seminole—in the nineteenth-century Indian Territory, a region administered through federal treaties and the Office of Indian Affairs. Abel situates these nations within the plantation South's economic orbit and the United States' treaty system, emphasizing how sovereignty, lawmaking, and diplomacy shaped daily life. Her study focuses on the decades before and during the Civil War, when chattel slavery existed inside several Native polities and when leaders weighed alliances with the Union or Confederacy. The book's documentary method foregrounds official correspondence, treaties, and legislative records.

In the 1830s, federal policy forcibly relocated Southeastern Native nations to lands west of the Mississippi. The Indian Removal Act of 1830 enabled treaties such as Dancing Rabbit Creek (Choctaw, 1830), Pontotoc Creek (Chickasaw, 1832), Cusseta (Creek, 1832), Payne's Landing (Seminole, 1832), and New Echota (Cherokee, 1835). Removal, culminating for the Cherokee in the 1838-1839 Trail of Tears, reshaped communities and institutions in Indian Territory. There, tribal governments reconstituted themselves with written constitutions, courts, and schools often staffed by missionaries. Agricultural adaptation accelerated, and some elites developed plantation-style enterprises. In this setting, enslavement of African Americans expanded, regulated by tribal statutes and judiciary procedures.

By the 1840s and 1850s, several of the Five Tribes codified slavery and restricted the rights of free Blacks, paralleling Southern slave codes. Cherokee laws addressed runaways and manumission; Choctaw and Chickasaw statutes made the condition of children follow that of the mother and barred intermarriage with people of African ancestry. Enslaved laborers worked in cotton and stock raising along river bottoms and road corridors linking Indian Territory to Arkansas and Texas markets. Slaveholding remained concentrated among mixed-ancestry and acculturated elites, while many Native households held no slaves. Missionaries, traders, and intermarried whites contributed to the diffusion of plantation practices and proslavery ideology.

The secession crisis of 1860–1861 disrupted federal protection in Indian Territory, as U.S. troops withdrew from frontier forts. Confederate agent Albert Pike negotiated treaties in 1861 with several Native governments, promising annuities, representation, and protection of existing institutions. The Choctaw and Chickasaw aligned early with the Confederacy; the Cherokee under Principal Chief John Ross moved from neutrality to a Confederate treaty in October 1861, while a strong Unionist faction persisted. Muscogee (Creek) leader Opothleyahola guided thousands of refugees toward Kansas rather than join the rebellion. Seminole communities also divided, with John Jumper leading a Confederate regiment and others resisting.

Civil War fighting in Indian Territory combined conventional campaigns with internecine conflict. Union Indian Home Guard regiments formed in Kansas fought against Confederate-allied units raised among the tribes. Battles and raids uprooted settlements and devastated crops and livestock. Cherokee brigadier general Stand Watie led cavalry raids and became the last Confederate general to surrender, on June 23, 1865. Enslaved people sought refuge at Union posts such as Fort Gibson, yet the

Emancipation Proclamation did not apply to tribal jurisdictions. As a result, lawful abolition within these nations came only through postwar diplomacy, not wartime proclamation, leaving profound humanitarian consequences.

Reconstruction treaties concluded in 1866 between the United States and the Five Tribes abolished slavery, imposed land cessions, and reoriented federal-tribal relations. The Cherokee treaty recognized the citizenship of Cherokee Freedmen and their descendants. Choctaw and Chickasaw agreements required emancipation and called for the admission of Freedmen to citizenship or provision for their removal and support, sparking prolonged disputes. The Creek and Seminole treaties likewise ended slavery and ceded territory for the relocation of other tribes and for rail corridors. New agencies, schools, and courts expanded federal oversight, embedding emancipation within a broader reconfiguration of sovereignty and resources.

Later nineteenth-century policy transformed Indian Territory again. The Dawes Act of 1887 initially exempted the Five Tribes, but a Dawes Commission (1893) negotiated allotment agreements, and the Curtis Act of 1898 dissolved tribal courts and mandated allotment regardless of consent. Rolls created for allotment enrolled citizens, including many Freedmen, on separate lists, shaping land tenure and political rights. Railroads, towns, and federal courts further integrated the region into U.S. governance, culminating in Oklahoma statehood in 1907. Disputes over the status and rights of Freedmen within tribal citizenship regimes persisted, a legacy directly tied to wartime alliances and 1866 treaties.

Published during the Progressive Era, Abel's study drew on treaty texts, congressional debates, War Department records, and Indian Office correspondence to reconstruct Native-Confederate relations. Trained in documentary history at the University of Chicago, she pursued a trilogy on the Civil War and Reconstruction in Indian Territory, with this

volume appearing in 1915. The work complicates simplified sectional narratives by showing Native nations as autonomous actors with contested politics and economic interests, including slaveholding. It also reflects its time's archival positivism and limitations, framing policy and elite decision-making more than community voices. Together, these choices both illuminate and constrain her historical critique.

The American Indians as Slaveholders and Secessionists

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
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PREFACE

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This volume is the first of a series of three dealing with the slaveholding Indians as secessionists, as participants in the Civil War, and as victims under reconstruction. The series deals with a phase of American Civil War history which has heretofore been almost entirely neglected or, where dealt with, either misunderstood or misinterpreted. Perhaps the third and last volume will to many people be the most interesting because it will show, in great detail, the enormous price that the unfortunate Indian had to pay for having allowed himself to become a secessionist and a soldier. Yet the suggestiveness of this first volume is considerably larger than would appear at first glance. It has been purposely given a sub-title, in order that the peculiar position of the Indian, in 1861, may be brought out in strong relief. He was enough inside the American Union to have something to say about secession and enough outside of it to be approached diplomatically. It is well to note, indeed, that Albert Pike negotiated the several Indian treaties that bound the Indian nations in an alliance with the seceded states, under the authority of the Confederate State Department, which was a decided advance upon United States practice—an innovation, in fact, that marked the tremendous importance that the Confederate government attached to the Indian friendship. It was something that stood out in marked contrast to the indifference manifested at the moment by the authorities at Washington; for, while they were neglecting the Indian even to an extent that amounted to actual dishonor, the Confederacy was offering him political integrity and political equality and was establishing over his country, not simply an empty wardship, but a bona fide protectorate.

Granting then that the negotiations of 1861 with the Indian nations constitute a phase of southern diplomatic history, it may be well to consider to what Indian participation in the Civil War amounted. It was a circumstance that was interesting rather than significant; and the majority will have to admit that it was a circumstance that could not possibly have materially affected the ultimate situation. It was the Indian country, rather than the Indian owner, that the Confederacy wanted to be sure of possessing; for Indian Territory occupied a position of strategic importance, from both the economic and the military point of view. The possession of it was absolutely necessary for the political and the institutional consolidation of the South. Texas might well think of going her own way and of forming an independent republic once again, when between her and Arkansas lay the immense reservations of the great tribes. They were slaveholding tribes, too, yet were supposed by the United States government to have no interest whatsoever in a sectional conflict that involved the very existence of the "peculiar institution." Thus the federal government left them to themselves at the critical moment and left them, moreover, at the mercy of the South, and then was indignant that they betrayed a sectional affiliation.

The author deems it of no slight advantage, in undertaking a work of this sort, that she is of British birth and antecedents and that her educational training, so largely American as it is, has been gained without respect to a particular locality. She belongs to no section of the Union, has lived, for longer or shorter periods in all sections, and has developed no local bias. It is her sincere wish that no charge of prejudice can, in ever so small a degree, be substantiated by the evidence, presented here or elsewhere.

Annie Heloise Abel.
Baltimore, September, 1914

I. THE GENERAL SITUATION IN THE INDIAN COUNTRY, 1830- 1860

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Veterans of the Confederate service who saw action along the Missouri-Arkansas frontier have frequently complained, in recent years, that military operations in and around Virginia during the War between the States receive historically so much attention that, as a consequence, the steady, stubborn fighting west of the Mississippi River is either totally ignored or, at best, cast into dim obscurity. There is much of truth in the criticism but it applies in fullest measure only when the Indians are taken into account; for no accredited history of the American Civil War that has yet appeared has adequately recognized certain rather interesting facts connected with that period of frontier development; viz., that Indians fought on both sides in the great sectional struggle, that they were moved to fight, not by instincts of savagery, but by identically the same motives and impulses as the white men, and that, in the final outcome, they suffered even more terribly than did the whites. Moreover, the Indians fought as solicited allies, some as nations, diplomatically approached. Treaties were made with them as with foreign powers and not in the farcical, fraudulent way that had been customary in times past. They promised alliance and were given in return political position—a fair exchange[1q]. The southern white man, embarrassed, conceded much, far more than he really believed in, more than he ever could or would have conceded, had he not himself been so fearfully hard pressed. His own predicament, the exigencies of the moment, made him give to the Indian a justice, the like of

which neither one of them had dared even to dream. It was quite otherwise with the northern white man, however; for he, self-confident and self-reliant, negotiated with the Indian in the traditional way, took base advantage of the straits in which he found him, asked him to help him fight his battles, and, in the selfsame moment, plotted to dispossess him of his lands, the very lands that had, less than five and twenty years before, been pledged as an Indian possession “as long as the grass should grow and the waters run.”

From what has just been said, it can be easily inferred that two distinct groups of Indians will have to be dealt with, a northern and a southern; but, for the present, it will be best to take them all together. Collectively, they occupied a vast extent of country in the so-called great American desert. Their situation was peculiar. Their participation in the war, in some capacity, was absolutely inevitable; but, preparatory to any right understanding of the reasons, geographical, institutional, political, financial, and military, that made it so, a rapid survey of conditions ante-dating the war must be considered.

It will be remembered that for some time prior to 1860 the policy¹ of the United States government had been to relieve the eastern states of their Indian inhabitants and that this it had done, since the first years of Andrew Jackson’s presidency, by a more or less compulsory removal to the country lying immediately west of Arkansas and Missouri. As a result, the situation there created was as follows: In the territory comprehended in the present state of Kansas, alongside of indigenous tribes, like the Kansa and the Osage,² had been placed various tribes or portions of tribes from the old Northwest³—the Shawnees and Munsees from Ohio,⁴ the Delawares, Kickapoos, Potawatomes, and Miamies from Indiana, the Ottawas and Chippewas from Michigan, the Wyandots from Ohio and Michigan, the Weas, Peorias, Kaskaskias, and Piankashaws from Illinois, and a


few New York Indians from Wisconsin. To the southward of all of those northern tribal immigrants and chiefly beyond the later Kansas boundary, or in the present state of Oklahoma, had been similarly placed the great⁵ tribes from the South⁶—the Creeks from Georgia and Alabama, the Cherokees from Tennessee and Georgia, the Seminoles from Florida, and the Choctaws and Chickasaws from Alabama and Mississippi.⁷ The population of the whole country thus colonized and, in a sense, reduced to the reservation system, amounted approximately to seventy-four thousand souls, less than seven thousand of whom were north of the Missouri-Compromise[2] line. The others were all south of it and, therefore, within a possible slave belt.

This circumstance is not without significance; for it is the colonized, or reservation, Indians⁸ exclusively that are to figure in these pages and, since this story is a chapter in the struggle between the North and the South, the proportion of southerners to northerners among the Indian immigrants must, in the very nature of things, have weight. The relative location of northern and southern tribes seems to have been determined with a very careful regard to the restrictions of the Missouri Compromise and the interdicted line of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes was pretty nearly the boundary between them.⁹ That it was so by accident may or may not be subject for conjecture. Fortunately for the disinterested motives of politicians but most unfortunately for the defenceless Indians, the Cherokee land obtruded itself just a little above the thirty-seventh parallel and formed a “Cherokee Strip” eagerly coveted by Kansans in later days. One objection, be it remembered, that had been offered to the original plan of removal was that, unless the slaveholding southern Indians were moved directly westward along parallel lines of latitude, northern rights under the Missouri Compromise would be encroached upon. Yet slavery was not conscientiously excluded from Kansas in

the days antecedent to its organization as a territory. Within the Indian country, and it was all Indian country then, slavery was allowed, at least on sufferance, both north and south of the interdicted line. It was even encouraged by many white men who made their homes or their living there, by interlopers, licensed traders, and missionaries;¹⁰ but it flourished as a legitimate institution only among the great tribes planted south of the line. With them it had been a familiar institution long before the time of their exile. In their native haunts they had had negro slaves as had had the whites and removal had made no difference to them in that particular. Since the beginning of the century refuge to fugitives and confusion of ownership had been occasions for frequent quarrel between them and the citizens of the Southern States. Later, when questions came up touching the status of slavery on strictly federal soil, the Indian country and the District of Columbia often found themselves listed together.¹¹ Moreover, after 1850, it became a matter of serious import whether or no the Fugitive Slave Law^[4] was operative within the Indian country; and, when influenced apparently by Jefferson Davis, Attorney-general Cushing gave as his opinion that it was, new controversies arose. Slaves belonging to the Indians were often enticed away by the abolitionists¹² and still more often were seized by southern men under pretense of their being fugitives.¹³ In cases of the latter sort, the Indian owners had little or no redress in the federal courts of law.¹⁴

In point of fact, during all the years between the various dates of Indian removal and the breaking out of the Civil War, the Indian country was constantly beset by difficulties. Some of the difficulties were incident to removal or to disturbances within the tribes but most of them were incident to changes and to political complications in the white man's country. Scarcely had the removal project been fairly launched and the first Indian emigrants started upon

their journey westward than events were in train for the overthrow of the whole scheme.



Map showing free Negro Settlements in the Creek country

When Calhoun mapped out the Indian country in his elaborate report of 1825, the selection of the trans-Missouri region might well have been regarded as judicious. Had the plan of general removal been adopted then, before sectional interests had wholly vitiated it, the United States government might have gained and, in a measure, would have richly deserved the credit of doing at least one thing for the protection and preservation of the aborigines from motives, not self-interested, but purely humanitarian. The moment was opportune. The territory of the United States was then limited by the confines of the Louisiana Purchase and its settlements by the great American desert. Traders only had penetrated to any considerable extent to the base of the Rockies; but experience already gained might have

taught that their presence was portentous and significant of the need of haste; that is, if Calhoun's selection were to continue judicious; for traders, as has been amply proved in both British and American history, have ever been but the advance agents of settlers.

Unfortunately for the cause of pure philanthropy, the United States government was exceedingly slow in adopting the plan of Indian removal; but its citizens were by no means equally slow in developing the spirit of territorial expansion. Their successful seizure of West Florida had fired their ambition and their cupidity. With Texas annexed and lower Oregon occupied, the selection of the trans-Missouri region had ceased to be judicious. How could the Indians expect to be secure in a country that was the natural highway to a magnificent country beyond, invitingly open to settlement! But this very pertinent and patent fact the officials at Washington singularly failed to realize and they went on calmly assuring the Indians that they should never be disturbed again, that the federal government would protect them in their rights and against all enemies, that no white man should be allowed to intrude upon them, that they should hold their lands undiminished forever, and that no state or territorial lines should ever again circumscribe them. Such promises were decidedly fatuous, dead letters long before the ink that recorded them had had time to dry. The Mexican War followed the annexation of Texas and its conquests necessitated a further use of the Indian highway. Soldiers that fought in that war saw the Indian land and straightway coveted it. Forty-niners saw it and coveted it also. Prospectors and adventurers of all sorts laid plans for exploiting it. It entered as a determining factor into Benton's great scheme for building a national road that should connect the Atlantic and Pacific shores and with the inception of that came a very sudden and a very real danger; for the same great scheme precipitated, although in an indirect sort of way, the agitation for the opening up of

Kansas and Nebraska to white settlement, which, of course, meant that the recent Indian colonists, in spite of all the solemn governmental guaranties that had been given to them, would have to be ousted, for would not the “sovereign” people of America demand it? Then, too, the Dred Scott decision, the result of a dishonorable political collusion as it was,¹⁵ militated indirectly against Indian interests. It is true that it was only in its extra-legal aspect that it did this but it did it none the less; for, if the authority of the federal government was not supreme in the territories and not supreme in any part of the country not yet organized into states, then the Indian landed property rights in the West that rested exclusively upon federal grant, under the Removal Act of 1830[1], were virtually nil. It is rather interesting to observe, in this connection, how inconsistent human nature is when political expediency is the thing at stake; for it happened that the same people and the same party, identically, that, in the second and third decades of the nineteenth century, had tried to convince the Indians, and against their better judgment too, that the red man would be forever unmolested in the western country because the federal government owned it absolutely and could give a title in perpetuity, argued, in the fourth and fifth decades, that the states were the sole proprietors, that they were, in fact, the joint owners of everything heretofore considered as national. Inferentially, therefore, Indians, like negroes, had no rights that white men were bound to respect.

The crucial point has now been reached in this discussion. From the date of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill[3], the sectional affiliation of the Indian country became a thing of more than passing moment. Whatever may have been John C. Calhoun’s ulterior and real motive in urging that the trans-Missouri region be closed to white settlement forever, whether he did, as some of his abolitionist enemies have

for judicial purposes to the western district of Arkansas, affecting jurisdiction and where Indians could be tried.

47 A term used in the text for a portion of Indian Territory administered in the 1850s-1860s; the Wichita Agency oversaw this area (often called the “Leased District”) near the present Oklahoma-Texas border and it was the locus of federal Indian agents and military concerns.

48 Shown in the document as an Indian agent; later references in the text identify him as Matthew Leeper, who served as U.S. agent for the Indians of the Leased District around 1860-1861.

49 Black Beaver was an Indigenous man who served as a United States interpreter for the Wichitas and led a mounted volunteer company (including Shawnees and Delawares); contemporary records indicate he also undertook service during the Mexican War and later brought claims against the U.S. for wartime services.

50 Fort Washita was a U.S. Army post established in the 1840s in what is now southeastern Oklahoma (then Indian Territory) near the Red River, used to protect frontier settlements and the nearby Indian nations.

51 Fort Leavenworth is a long-established U.S. Army post in present-day Leavenworth, Kansas (founded in 1827) that served as a regional military headquarters and staging point for troops in the 19th century.

52 ‘Ben. McCulloch’ refers to Benjamin McCulloch, a Texas ranger and Confederate general who commanded Confederate forces in parts of the Trans-Mississippi theater early in the Civil War and was active in frontier operations.

53 The Chickasaw Legislature was the governing assembly of the Chickasaw Nation; in the cited May 25, 1861, session it adopted resolutions addressing the tribe's position regarding the dissolution of the U.S. government and relations with the Confederate States.

54 Boggy Depot was a prominent frontier trading post and settlement in the Choctaw Nation of Indian Territory (now southeastern Oklahoma) that served as a local administrative and communications center during the Civil War period.

55 This phrasing appears in the Chickasaw resolutions as a pejorative label: 'Black Republican' was a derogatory term used by many Southern and pro-slavery commentators for Abraham Lincoln and the Republican Party, not an official or formal title.

56 Stand Watie (1806–1871) was a Cherokee leader and militia commander who led a pro-Confederate faction, raised Cherokee regiments for the Confederacy, and became a Confederate brigadier general, notable for being among the last Confederate officers to surrender.

57 Pea Ridge (Battle of Pea Ridge, March 7–8, 1862) was a major Civil War engagement in northwestern Arkansas in which Union forces defeated Confederates, securing Federal control of Missouri and influencing operations in the Trans-Mississippi region.

58 Confederate Treasury notes were paper currency issued by the Confederate States of America to finance the Civil War; they suffered severe depreciation and widespread loss of value by the end of the conflict.

59 A clause in the Creek treaty reproduced here that declares Confederate laws for the return of fugitive slaves

and fugitives from labor will apply within the Creek Nation, making rendition obligations similar to those between U.S. states under Confederate authority.

60 The political entity of the Muscogee (Creek) people, who after removal in the 19th century lived in Indian Territory (generally present-day Oklahoma) and negotiated treaties with the United States and, in this context, with the Confederate States.

61 A judicial district created by the Choctaw and Chickasaw treaty to be part of the Confederate judicial system in that territory, with a semi-annual district court to sit at Boggy Depot for specified civil and criminal jurisdiction.

62 A named site used by the Choctaw Nation as a seat of government or national office in the 19th century Indian Territory; here it appears as the place where a copy of Albert Pike's letter was certified in 1873.

63 A type of conical expanding rifle bullet (commonly spelled Minié ball) developed in the mid-19th century that greatly increased the effective range and accuracy of rifled muskets and was widely used in the American Civil War era.

64 A 19th-century U.S. Indian Agency — a federal administrative post responsible for managing relations, annuities, and supplies for the Choctaw Nation in Indian Territory.

65 A small Native American tribe historically based in central Texas (and later parts of Indian Territory); in the Civil War era some Tonkawa groups aligned with the Confederacy and received Confederate provisions.

66 A Seminole leader who signed agreements with Confederate agents during the Civil War and was made an

honorary lieutenant-colonel by the Confederate Provisional Congress (January 1861) for his alliance with the Confederacy.

67 A term used in the text for a mounted Creek militia or policing force active in the Indian Territory during the Civil War era, responsible for enforcing orders and local security among Creek communities.

68 A named individual in the document who issued written orders to the Creek Light Horse; the name appears in contemporary U.S. Indian Office records and may represent a Creek leader or agent recorded in mid-19th-century correspondence (variant spellings may occur in other sources).

69 A Cherokee settlement and mission community in the Indian Territory (in present-day Oklahoma) that served as a political and social center for the Cherokee Nation and the residence of some Cherokee leaders in the 19th century.

70 Federal legislation (commonly called the Enrollment or Conscription Act) that established national draft procedures during the U.S. Civil War; the act prompted questions about whether Native Americans were subject to conscription and how agents should respond to enrolling officers.

71 Opothlehoiyla (commonly rendered Opothleyahola) was a Muscogee (Creek) leader who led a pro-Union faction of Creeks and other refugee Indians during 1861-1862, organizing resistance to Confederate recruitment and leading a winter exodus toward Kansas; spellings and exact dates vary among contemporary sources.

72 "Great Father" is the diplomatic term used by many Native American tribes in 19th-century correspondence and