



# Challenging a Fictitious Neutrality

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*Edited by*  
Luce Irigaray

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# Challenging a Fictitious Neutrality

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Heidegger in Question

palgrave  
macmillan

*Editor*

Luce Irigaray

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# Acknowledgments

I am deeply grateful to Emma Reed Jones, David Farrell Krell and Mahon O'Brien for having entrusted to my care their reflections on how to challenge a fictitious neutrality from their reading of Heidegger. The thought of Heidegger is really difficult to approach and to collaborate on such a topic was not an easy task, all the more so since it concerns the heart of his thinking: the status of *Dasein*. What is more, the matter was also to detect what in his way of thinking has allowed Heidegger to commit political mistakes. From that task most have shrunk back either by simply rejecting Heidegger's work as a whole or by remaining under its spell and unable to distance themselves from it. Our want was thus to combine our respect for a thinker who cannot be ignored with an accurate attention to the aspects of his thought that must be criticized and overcome. Besides these aspects often correspond to a sort of caricatural emergence of the background which underlies almost all our tradition and even our own way of thinking. Questioning Heidegger amounts to questioning a metaphysical tradition to which we are heirs and which Heidegger himself tried to leave, providing us with some elements which are helpful in achieving a task that he was unable to accomplish in his own time. I hope that our contributions will represent a further stage towards the completion of such an undertaking.

**vi      Acknowledgments**

I am grateful to Emma, David and Mahon too for having devoted time to reread the English version of my own texts.

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## Notes on Contributors

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# Introduction: Heidegger as an Exemplary Case

Luce Irigaray

To perceive the meaning of Heidegger's thought, it is suitable to situate it in the context of our philosophical tradition, which, moreover, represents his main concern. Three aspects of the western way of conceiving of philosophy are particularly important to approach his work: the question of origin, the elaboration of the world and the definition and status of each of the elements which compose the world as a whole, and the situation of human being in the world.

It is surprising that western philosophy does not acknowledge our origin as the result of a conjunction between two different living beings. There is thus an original denial of reality, and of truth, in our way of thinking. From the beginning, the background of our reasoning, our evaluation of truth, our logos and conception of logic is founded on a construction, mainly by man, that does not take the real into account. All is reduced to one and only, presumably universal, subjectivity, one and only world, one and only discourse. A sort of basic contradiction between our origin as living and what ought to correspond to our spiritual and truly

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human being underlies what we say, what we think, even what we are. In order to enter the cultural universe, we ought to give ourselves up as living and become a man-made product dependent on means and rules of production which do not amount to our real identity. From the beginning, we ought to leave our natural belonging and its potential for growing and moving, for building a world, for expressing itself and thinking, as well as for entering into relation in order to submit it to norms, which are in large part extraneous to it and are imposed on us from an outside, that constrain us to surmount, and finally forget, the original being which is our own. Then we wander as artificial beings in an artificial world and with an artificial language waiting for the revelation of our own truth, our own energy and becoming from something or someone external to ourselves: our parents, our masters, our God, our environment, our past culture and so on. Instead of remaining rooted in a genesis which amounts to a dynamic process, which we must assume and make blossom as a specific living fruit, we ought to accept becoming a sort of fabricated product, put in the neuter as such, and thrown into a world to which we ought to be open in order to receive from it the/our truth, even if it is historically provisional. No doubt we ought to make this truth more authentic. But is it not from a mode of being which prevents us from doing that?

We could wonder whether 'Being'—the English translation of the German *Sein*—does not represent a sort of projection or substitute regarding our unrecognized origin as a conjunction between two different living beings. The appropriation by only one of this origin, which arises from two, has at least two effects: the necessity of putting 'Being' in a fictitious neuter which makes it difficult to interpret its meaning and its quite magical character and potential due to the fact that it conceals a difference and capitalizes an energy which does not belong to one alone. In reality, 'Being' concentrates in itself various meanings and questions, which makes it incomprehensible, all the more so since the initial capital letter removes, from this word, the dynamic potential of a verb, which exists with '*Sein*' and could exist in 'being' but not in 'Being'. Is not the reader of the English translation of Heidegger confronted with a general substantivization of the verb '*Sein*'—to be—which thwarts the Heidegger's will to surmount past metaphysics? The impact of Being on any being, in particular on our being as human, is also to reduce it to a made product

instead of leaving it to its living destiny. As such, our presence could correspond to the fullness of our being even if it is partial as human and calls for being united with the other(s), in particular the other(s) different from itself by nature—its *heteros*, as the early Greek would say. Then to be present does not entail being also absent, as Heidegger maintains, but to be a particular being, a living and sexuate being which needs to be conjoined with its other in order to ensure the motion of its becoming towards its accomplishment.

The composition of the world as a whole is also a crucial question in the work of Heidegger, as it is from the beginning of western philosophy. But he, as is the case with most philosophers, little wonders about the origin of this whole. What is the principle which governs the formation of such a whole? What is the status of the elements which compose this whole? How does the relation of interdependence between the whole and the elements function? And such a relation between the elements themselves? Is the whole governed by a One under the authority of which the elements are organized in a hierarchical way or is it the result of a link between the elements themselves? What sort of bond connects the elements which compose the whole? Have we to deal with a parataxis, a synopsis, a conjunction, a syntax? What logic governs the way elements relate to/with one another? Is it sameness or difference which acts as the most decisive assumption? And how is it assessed? In relation to a One which dominates the whole or according to the way in which the various elements can relate to/with one another? Is difference a comparative evaluation of each in relation to a sort of ideal or model to which it comes more or less close or does difference correspond to the specificity of the origin and identity of each element? Could not the former alternative be appropriate to man-made products and the latter to living beings the accomplishment of which results from their blossoming by themselves and not from some closeness to a cultural ideal? Is difference not estimated in the first case according to a logic of sameness and in the second case according to the real and specific being of each element in its singularity? Could it be possible to put all of them together and link them with one another in the same whole?

Another crucial question concerns the way each element moves as well as that of the whole. It seems that both the composition of the whole and

its motion can result either from an external intervention—more natural or more divine or human—or from a motion which starts above all from elements themselves. But how can a whole be formed by elements which are at once living and fabricated on the one hand, and, on the other hand, how can a whole be composed by living elements which do not stop evolving and the relationships of which cannot be defined once and for all? Did our tradition, as is the case with Heidegger himself, not favour the constitution of the whole to the detriment of the development of living beings? Is this not due to the fact that man can mastery, if only in imagination, a whole but not the way of evolving of both living beings and their relationships? Hence the necessity of reducing the living to ‘things’ corresponding to a certain form—which needs the privilege of appearing and the contribution of the logos. Indeed, if I maintain that what can unite the ensemble of the living is air, how could man compose and control such a whole? And if the desire of each element and its longing for the other(s) is that which causes, at least in part, the motion, how could the motion of the whole be determined from an outside? Does the respect for the growth and the motion of the living not require that their beings and their relationships remain evolving, and that the whole is thus kept always open and dependent on the blossoming of life itself? Does that sort of whole exist in our philosophical tradition? Does it exist in the thinking of Heidegger? Does he not speak of a constant tension between the world into which we are thrown and our *Da-sein*? What is the cause of this tension? What is at stake in his call for a search for ‘authenticity’ in the relationships between the world and the *Da-sein*? Is it a question of the adaptation of our *Da-sein* to the world through the logos or of the transformation of the whole of the world because of the nature, or the ‘essence’, of the being which underlies this *Da-sein*? What is the determining factor? Can this wavering explain the arising of the power of technique and the cybernetic in which Heidegger so much concerned himself?

If we are thrown into the world, according to the word of Heidegger, this entails that we do not come into the world as begotten living beings among others, sharing with them at least our living belonging, and thus not completely extraneous to the environment in which we were born. We already communicate with it through air, the light and warmth of the

sun, but also through the fruits of the earth. The world into which we come is, from the beginning, familiar to us and even intimate with us. And we are open to it, even without our willing and knowing it, on pain of death. Coming into the world means entering into communion with elements of this world. Thus how can Heidegger maintain that we are merely thrown into the world? Does that not amount to ignoring the living background of our being—which will also act on our consciousness regardless of where we are aware or not aware of it?

What then happens to our *Dasein*? First, we must wonder whether we have to understand the word as a substantive or a verb. Do we correspond to a *Dasein* or are we the ones who are being there and facing a 'there is'? Are we thrown into the world as a *Dasein* or are we beings which are capable of situating ourselves in front of the world—*Da-sein*—and of both adapting ourselves to the world and questioning and modifying it? As is often the case concerning the work of Heidegger both alternatives seem to be possible, in particular according to the English translation. Indeed, when it is a question of 'Sein', the English version often leans towards reducing the verb to a substantive—thereby making being a product of the world more than an agent of its production. Anyhow, even as a potential actor in our *Da-sein*, we must wonder about the part of ourselves which remains still present and active given that we have been deprived of our living origin and our living way of entering into the world. Of what and in what then can our *Da-sein* consist? Is it not reduced to a sort of abstract device functioning according to the determinations of a historical epoch? Is there a living subjectivity, or even any subjectivity, in the connection between our *Da-sein* and the world? Are we not confronted with and even assimilated to a sort of computing mechanism which connects our personal software with the hard disc of the world with a certain, but unequal, reciprocity with regard to the capability of leaving an imprint on the other? It is thus understandable that Heidegger takes such an interest in the essence of technique, that he is so puzzled about the question of the sexuation of *Dasein* or *Da-sein*, and that he maintains that the thing about which we have yet to think in his/our times is the status of subjectivity. However, his perplexity regarding the sexuation of *Dasein* or *Da-sein* looks more clever than the fashionable artless and arrogant way of affirming the importance of sexuality without

first wondering about what a sexuate identity and a sexuate subjectivity mean. Heidegger remains more prudent notably about the possible manner of giving up the traditional way of conceiving of our subjectivity.

Could Heidegger have succeeded in opening our past metaphysical horizon a little by substituting a questioning *Da-sein* for a subjectivity which confines itself to being the holder of negativity? Or are we faced with the same sort of subjectivity which amounts to mere mental mechanism and not to our whole being? Furthermore, the thinking of Heidegger could be weaker than that of Hegel because he fails to attach the same importance to the negative and leaves an undecidable truth—and even being—on hold, in particular through Being. Hegel is more rigorous concerning the issue of the subjective practice that he proposes. He suggests to what can lead the unfolding of the dialectical process, entrusting to us the care of pursuing it. Heidegger leaves us as much lost on the path as we were thrown originally into the world—and we no longer have the negative at our disposal. Could his merit be to have paid a greater attention to language itself, and to have more understood the necessity of modifying it in order to exceed our past logic and return to a more embodied subjectivity? However, his failure, as that of almost all the past philosophers, is to have not sufficiently considered syntax itself to be a key to interpreting and changing our logical economy. There is no doubt that he broaches the question, for example in his dialogue with a Japanese master. But he contents himself with the way of expressing the motion of natural phenomena without yet wondering how to express the dynamism of our living being and how it can share with a different dynamism. What would the reaction of Heidegger have been when discovering that a specific syntax corresponds to each sex—as the analyses and interpretation of many discourses produced by mixed representative samples prove? Could he remain unconcerned about the difference of syntactic structures between the discourses produced by girls or boys, women or men?

The aspect of his thought from which the four contributors to *Challenging a Fictitious Neutrality* question Heidegger is the neutrality, even the neutered character, of our being in the world, our *Dasein*. Indeed, this point can bear witness to his way of considering three determining factors in the history of philosophy: the problem of origin, the way of structuring of the world, and the situation of human being in

relation to the world. The status of *Dasein* is thus a key issue to approach Heidegger's thought and the one which is likely to unveil how Heidegger attempts to overcome past metaphysics towards another way of thinking. Given what is at stake, it has seemed suitable to invite as contributors two men and two women who, each in their own way, have already meditated on the work of Heidegger, notably on the possible link between his theoretical positions and his lack of discernment regarding some political choices.

Mahon O'Brien begins his text by situating it in the context of the western tradition that he describes as 'myopic' and 'monadic' when sexuate difference is at stake. Then he approaches the question of the insistence of Heidegger on the neutral character of *Dasein* whatever his insights concerning its social constitution. After he dwells a little on the specific meaning of the word *Dasein*, its evolution in the Heidegger's work and its relation to human being, Mahon broaches the problem of what he calls a 'neutered *Dasein*', a *Dasein* which ought to be asexuate and disincarnate. This modality of *Dasein* would be necessary, according to Heidegger, to establish the fundamental ontology that he endeavours to introduce. But Mahon wonders, following Luce Irigaray, how it would be possible to erase the sexuate nature of *Dasein* given that sexuation determines all our behaviours in a specific way, which brings about the fact that the *Dasein* of one sex cannot be substituted for the *Dasein* of a different sex. Mahon then analyses how Derrida interprets Heidegger's silence on sexuality, which he first questions in a critical way (in 1982) but later (starting from 1983) defends as an 'original and powerful neutrality' which would correspond with an originally ontological 'asexual' or 'monosexual' level of being and would avoid falling back into the ontical binary opposition that sexuate difference is presumed to involve. The neutrality of *Dasein*, Heidegger maintains, is a manner of preserving the 'positivity and potency of the essence' as well as the transcendental a priori constitution of the being that we are and is designated as *Dasein*. After a detailed argument about the position of Derrida regarding the sexuation of *Dasein*, Mahon considers a text by Ann Van Leeuwen who tries to mediate between Irigaray and Heidegger through Derrida. In the last part of his chapter, Mahon questions the position of Heidegger on the worldlessness and historylessness of certain peoples, unable to reach a personal



or state *Dasein*, as is the case for animals and elements of the natural world as, for example, stones. Heidegger contrasts the being of animals and of certain peoples as limited to life, even to a cosmic life, with the being of humans, the essence of which is determined by temporality as historicity and a relation to death. Mahon finds in such an opposition further proof of the disincarnate, disembodied and asexuate character of the *Dasein*, the validity of which he contests.

David Farrell Krell first lingers on the fact that Heidegger considers 'neutrality' and 'sexlessness' as that which can preserve the transcendent power and potency of the essence of human kind. He alludes, in this connection, to the texts of Derrida about the topic of sexuality in Heidegger's work and the possible meaning of his insistence on the neutrality of *Dasein*. Next, David questions why the figure of Elis in Georg Trakl's poetry is interpreted by Heidegger as sexlessness, as 'not yet sexualized' and corresponding to a 'neutered' existence, the only one which would be capable of guaranteeing serenity and gentleness between the sexes. He wonders whether the 'absorption of maidenhood into boyhood' does not instead conform to the traditional canon of past metaphysics, which takes little account of the lovers and the sister in Trakl's work. In the later part of his text, David endeavours to develop the interest of Heidegger in the direction of what English grammar designates as 'neutral verbs' or verbs of being, which, according to him, are in the service of the feminines of « the clearing », « nature » and « truth », die *Lichtung*, *phusis* and *alètheia*'. He then underlines the fact that the motif of '*mana*', insistent in the so-called 'primitive' cultures, can have a relation to being, according to Heidegger himself. This leads David to meditate on Schelling's interest in the ancient Goddesses of Samothrace, like Demeter and Persephone, and gods who are *con-sen-tes*, who seem more able to pass on '*mana*' to us than disembodied spiritualities and 'neut(e)ralised philosophemes'. Such considerations encourage David to favour, along with Luce Irigaray, the discovery of a fleshly culture over the supposed innocence of children and Heidegger's 'fantasia of a unified and neut(e)ralised Geschlecht'. Indeed, could a fleshly culture not contribute more to the development of our whole being and the emergence of the new human being that it is incumbent on us to become? Finally, David wonders whether the god for whom we could still wait—'the only one who can

still save us', as Heidegger maintains in an Interview with *Der Spiegel*—must not be as much 'languishing' as 'plenipotent' as the ancient goddesses. Does divine plenipotency not arise from a 'poverty' and a 'longing' that deities are capable of sharing with the mortals?

In her chapter, Emma Jones explores the question of truth through the relation between *lethe* and *aletheia* in the post 1930 texts of Heidegger, with a particular focus on the role that 'unconcealment' plays in his conception of truth. She is above all concerned with the meaning of *lethe* as an 'original and originary obscurity'. Rather than dismissing the latter as a mysticism unsuitable for a philosopher, Emma wonders, as Heidegger himself does, whether truth does not require obscurity as part of its essence. And she does not hesitate to resort to a psychoanalytical perspective, namely Lacan's, to investigate what could 'remain hidden from Heidegger's view' in this obscurity. There is no doubt that this would have surprised, irritated and/or amused Heidegger, who kept away from psychoanalysis and about Lacan famously said 'Perhaps, he begins to think'. Before she appeals to a psychoanalytical reading, Emma makes a detour via the critique of Giorgio Agamben on the use of *lethe* in Heidegger's phenomenology, given the opposition that he notes between the 'closedness of animal life' and the 'openness' of *Dasein* which 'can and has led to totalitarian, and indeed genocidal, consequences' because of 'the negation of the actuality of nature and the reduction of animality and even living itself to a mere closedness or concealment'. Without neglecting the warning of Agamben, Emma tries to practice a more balanced interpretation of the relation between *lethe* and *aletheia* through a psychoanalytical reading of key texts of Heidegger. She comments on the fact that if Heidegger attempts to deepen his way of conceiving of nature through a return to the Greek *physis*, he does not consider what *lethe/aletheia* could mean in terms of 'relationality, sexuate difference and sexuality'. Thus 'Heidegger's thinking is ultimately lacking a critical limit, that of sexuate difference'. Now sexuate difference—a concept that Emma inherited from Luce Irigaray—could perhaps unveil something of the obscurity or mystery of *lethe*—and also save women from being categorized alongside animals in the Heideggerian dichotomy human/animal. According to Emma, what prevents Heidegger from approaching the question of human relationality and experiences which have to do with

unconscious processes is a sort of 'castration anxiety' resulting from a lack of limits that the existence and/or recognition of another subject could bring to him.

Luce Irigaray—by the way it is my name—uses another method to question the neutrality, or neutered status, of the Heideggerian *Da-sein*. Instead of facing the problem directly, she interrogates the background from which it arises. The traditional western way of constituting the world in which we are situated as human beings does not allow for a *Dasein* other than as neutral and asexuate. A serious consideration for the crucial determination of our being that sexuation represents calls for a new foundation of our culture and not merely some adjustments to our sexual practices. The matter concerns the definition and status of subjectivity itself. But how can we escape our subjection to the totality of a world of which we are both agents and patients? Resorting to self-affection and hetero-affection could provide us with a means of leaving the vicious circle in which we are trapped. This means passing from a world in which forms are defined by sight and representation to a world in which individuation is first shaped by touch, which better corresponds with living beings and their necessity of at once dwelling in themselves, developing and communicating or communing with one another. The flesh born from touch needs a frame to be appropriated in order to receive qualities and welcome the other without fragmenting, dispersing, even vanishing. Sexuation can act as a structuring which assembles and differentiates each flesh so that it could evolve while preserving what is its own. Then, the truth which is unveiled to us, including our own truth, springs from our relating to/with the other and keeps the irreducible part of obscurity that a natural difference involves. From the obscure background of our being rooted in nature, two clearings—*lichtung*—can be opened that are yet to be explored: one corresponding to the self appearing and moving of every living being, and the other to desire and our touching one another as a specifically human clearing which calls for being thought and shared. Thus the matter is not one of cleansing our being in the world—our *Da-sein*—of living determinations, among others the sexuate ones. Instead working out our subjectivity from our natural belonging seems to answer our feeling nostalgic for a pre-metaphysical Greek way of perceiving in order to overcome its neutral and disembodied metaphysical status

towards a post metaphysical era of being and thinking in which flesh itself reaches a transcendental determination through the assumption of the negative of a subjective sexuante difference.

Heidegger remains torn apart between the Greek pre-metaphysical way of thinking and a post-metaphysical way of thinking which he was in search of (cf. notably *Héraclite*, a seminar held by Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink in 1966–1967, Chapitre VI). But has he not denied the relation to life which could provide him with the means of passing from the former to the latter? Indeed, what is at stake is how to transform the immediacy of a living perception of the real into a perception which reaches transcendence without abolishing the living nature of both the one who perceives and what is perceived. This requires us to assume a negative which serves life instead of a cultural construction which removes from life—our own life but also that of what or whom we perceive.

The way of perceiving of the Greek philosopher corresponds to an immediacy which does not involve a negative. Inside the metaphysical horizon, the negative is used by subjectivity for, supposedly, ensuring a transcendental dimension of perception, notably through overcoming a natural immediacy. But this is to the detriment of life itself and ends in exhausting the living being, and even the subjectivity which exercises the negative, and little by little gives up its power to a *Gestell* at the service of mere technique. The task which is incumbent on a post-metaphysical thinker is to recover a relation to life and so make our subjectivity lively again without for all that neglecting the negative that it needs to think. This is possible by leaving a logic based on sameness for a logic which resorts to difference. But difference, and the negative that it involves, henceforth does not relate and apply only to the predicates but to the subjectivity which produces the discourse and establishes the identity and truth of each being.

Only our sexuante belonging seems to be able to allow us to assume such undertaking. Sexuation corresponds to a real which determines every subjectivity, even without its willing and knowing, in its relating to/ with our self, the other(s) and the world. Assuming our sexuante specificity and difference asks us to take on a negative at the level of subjectivity, and even of being, itself. But this negative is that which allows us to keep or recover a relation to and with the natural world, including as a part of

ourselves. However, this relation reaches another sort of immediacy, which is now cultivated in a human manner and provides us with a transcendence in the way of relating which remains alive and sensitive thanks to the respect for the difference between living beings.

In fact, Heidegger did not realize that instead of taking a step backwards he had to take a step forwards, but not in a linear space or time. And instead of leaping, notably to regain a Greek way of relating to the real, he had to inhabit his own body and carry out a transformation of his sensitivity in order that he could perceive the transcendence of the sexually different other and share with her in a transcendental way. This gesture could let him cross the limits of the metaphysical horizon over to another horizon, another way of being and of thinking, which would have allowed him to experience how the Greek philosopher considered truth without in a way contenting himself with it. Perhaps to succeed in clearing such a path he needed to close, if only for a moment, his eyes and pay attention to what touch and being touched bring to him in order that he would become able to reach another way of relating to the other, all living beings, and the world. Could this happen through discovering a transcendental way of looking which could perceive, beyond the natural light and the one conveyed by representation and metaphysical theory which let above all the forms of beings appear, a light emanating or radiating from a flesh animated by life, an amorous desire or a carnal thinking likely to unveil being itself?



# The Destitution of Dasein

Mahon O'Brien

In recent work such as *To Be Born* and *Sharing the Fire* Luce Irigaray revisits some perennial themes associated with her vision for a new humanity. In particular, Irigaray continues to fasten on the myopic (we might say 'monadic') focus of the Western tradition when it comes to its failure to acknowledge sexuate difference. Irigaray has successfully diagnosed the patriarchally over-determined nature of that tradition masquerading behind a façade of objectivity and neutrality in ways that continue to open up interpretive and critical possibilities in terms of reading the canon today. Some issues that frequently exercise Irigaray are ones that a number of twentieth century phenomenologists addressed with more and less success, namely, questions concerning alterity/otherness, questions of intersubjectivity, the phenomenology of sociality, what have you. Heidegger, in particular, ploughed the rough field of some of these concerns in ways that would *appear*, prima facie, to proffer fertile soil for some of Irigaray's undertakings. And yet, Irigaray levels a powerful challenge against

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Heidegger's conception of Dasein and his point of entry into 'phenomenological ontology'. Thus, Heidegger, the thinker that Irigaray, arguably, engages with most positively in some of her recent work is charged not just with the 'exsanguination' of his conception of Dasein, as it were, but with having neutered Dasein in a way that is all too characteristic of the monadic tendencies of the Western tradition and its enduring suppression of sexual difference. Part of what we will examine in some depth in this section of the book then is a blindspot in Heidegger's account of Dasein which, for all of his insights concerning the social constitution of Dasein, leaves him open to some of the criticisms which Irigaray has successfully levelled against an entire tradition.<sup>1</sup>

## Dasein

In *Being and Time* Heidegger spends some time looking at the meaningfulness of being for that being that alone finds being meaningful—whose being is an "issue" for it. That being is picked out by the term Dasein. In ordinary German—the word 'Dasein' simply means 'existence' and its use in German philosophy predates Heidegger. In his *Beiträge*, Heidegger summarises the traditional way that the term was used in philosophy:

In metaphysics 'Da-sein' is the name for the manner and way in which beings are *actually* beings and means the same as being-extant—interpreted one definite step more originarily: as presence...running throughout the whole history of metaphysics is the not accidental custom of transferring the name for the mode of actuality of beings themselves and of meaning, with 'Dasein,' 'the Dasein' [existence], i.e., a completely actual and extant being itself. Thus Dasein is only the good German translation of *existentia*, as a being's coming forth and standing out by itself, presencing by itself (and a growing forgetting of *aletheia*).

Throughout [metaphysics] 'Dasein' means nothing else. And accordingly one could then speak of thingly, animal, human, temporal Dasein [as mere existence]. (Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy*, p. 209)

Heidegger uses the term Dasein in an unusual and quite extraordinary way, however. The word Dasein is a compound of 'da' (here or there) and