Suping Lu

Japanese Atrocities in Nanjing

The Nanjing Massacre and Post-Massacre Social Conditions Recorded in German Diplomatic Documents

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

Self-portrait of the author

Suping Lu

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The Nanjing Massacre and Post-Massacre Social Conditions Recorded in German Diplomatic Documents

Edited and Translated with an Introduction by Suping Lu

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Preface

I first went to Berlin on a research tour in 2008, with the intention to enlarge my primary source repertoire and increase its diversity of source origin. At the time, I had retrieved abundant English source materials from both American and British national archives, the Library of Congress, Harvard, Yale, Columbia, UC-Berkeley, the Historical Society of Disciples of Christ, and archives of other church organizations. I had also collected numerous Chinese language primary sources from the National Library of China in Beijing, the Second Historical Archives of China in Nanjing, the Memorial Museum of Nanjing Massacre, and the collections of the Nanjing Massacre related archival documents published in the 1980s. I obtained Japanese language primary sources via the Inter-Library Loan system. The most valuable part of the Japanese sources is undoubtedly Japanese soldiers' wartime field diaries, which had been published largely in Tokyo in the 1990s.

In the summer of 2016, I made my second trip to Berlin to obtain more sources for the sections concerning Germans of the book, *The 1937-1938 Nanjing Atrocities*, published by Springer in January 2020. This trip generated a substantial number of the diplomatic dispatches German diplomatic officials sent from Nanjing largely in the early months of 1938. However, for *The 1937-1938 Nanjing Atrocities*, I could only use a tiny fraction of the German diplomatic documents I had collected. These sources are too valuable to remain unpublished. They should be made accessible for the students, researchers and scholars who are interested in the topic.

With the intention of publishing a collection of the German diplomatic documents, I made another trip to Berlin in the fall of 2017, hoping to conduct an exhaustive search of related documents in both the German Federal Archives and German Foreign Ministry Archives. This research trip yielded a lot more material, though not as much as I had anticipated.

The collections of American, British and German diplomatic documents, concerning the Nanjing Massacre and post-massacre social conditions are especially significant because immediately after the massacre period in early 1938, only American, British, and German diplomatic officials were allowed to return to Nanjing to reopen their respective embassies. The reports these diplomats dispatched from Nanjing in the early months of 1938 are important primary sources with historical and research values.

In the late 1990s, Japanese scholars Tokushi Kasahara (笠原十九司) and Yutaka Yoshida (吉田裕) made an effort to search, collect, translate into Japanese, and publish the German diplomatic documents concerning the Nanjing Massacre. Their book, *資料:ドイツ外交官の見た南京事件 (Source Material: The Nanjing Incident Witnessed by German Diplomats)*, translated into Japanese by Yūji Ishida (石田勇), appeared in print in 2001 in Tokyo. In addition to the fact that the Japanese

collection can hardly benefit the researchers and scholars in the English-speaking world, it contains only a limited number of the documents dispatched by the German diplomats from Nanjing.

During the first decade of the 21st century, Chinese researchers made another effort to collect, translate into Chinese, and publish German diplomatic records concerning the Nanjing Massacre. Taking the Japanese version as the basis, they first translated the Japanese version into Chinese, and published the documents, together with other source materials, in 2006. Another batch of documents newly collected from Germany were translated into Chinese from German and published in 2010. These Chinese version documents, while more complete than their Japanese counterpart, are not collected into one single volume, with inadequate arrangement and scholarly treatment, in addition that they can hardly be accessed by the readers in the English-speaking world.

Except for a small number of excerpts of the related German diplomatic documents were translated into English in the book, *Good Man of Nanking: Diaries of John Rabe*, edited by Erwin Wickert and translated by John Woods, the majority of the Nanjing Massacre related German diplomatic documents have not yet been translated into English and remained unpublished until now.

In comparison to the American and British diplomatic documents, however, the German diplomatic archival materials indicate that the German officials were more actively involved in collecting information, drafted more detailed atrocity and conditions reports, and the content of some of the reports and documents reveal unique information that American and British counterparts do not have.

Due to the fact that these documents were drafted by the officials of Germany, which was a close ally of Japan, their Japanese atrocity reports are significantly reliable and valuable. It would not be an overstatement that the publication of this volume of German diplomatic documents would be an invaluable addition to the research literature on the Nanjing Massacre, and benefit the researchers and scholars in the field.

These German diplomatic documents are compiled, edited, and published in three languages, namely, German version, *Japanische Greueltaten in Nanking: Das Nanjing Massaker in deutschen diplomatischen Dokumenten*; English version, *Japanese Atrocities in Nanjing: The Nanjing Massacre and Post-Massacre Social Conditions Recorded in German Diplomatic Documents*; and Chinese version, *日军南京暴行：德国外交文件中记载的南京大屠杀与劫后社会状况*. The Chinese version will be published by the Nanjing Publishing House (南京出版社) in December 2021, and the German version will be published soon thereafter by the German press Springer Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

The publication of the German diplomatic documents would make a perfect trilogy, together with *A Mission under Duress: The Nanjing Massacre and Post-Massacre Social Conditions Documented by American Diplomats* (2010) and *A Dark Page in History: The Nanjing Massacre and Post-Massacre Social Conditions Recorded in British Diplomatic Dispatches, Admiralty Documents, and U.S. Naval Intelligence Reports* (2012 & 2019).

Meanwhile, I would like to take this opportunity to extend my sincere appreciation to the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Research Council for the research grants which made the publication of this volume possible. I'd also like to thank my daughter, Dr. Diana Lu, who worked diligently to review and edit the English manuscript, Professor Priscilla Hayden-Roy for reviewing and providing suggestions for both English and German versions of the Introduction, and Dr. Gerhard Keiper of the German Foreign Ministry Archives, who searched and located documents for me during the pandemic lockdown when it was impossible to make another trip to Berlin.

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December 2021

Content

About the Author

Suping Lu is a professor at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. He is the author of *The 1937-1938 Nanjing Atrocities* (2019) and *They Were in Nanjing: The Nanjing Massacre Witnessed by American and British Nationals* (2004), and editor of *A Dark Page in History: The Nanjing Massacre and Post-Massacre Social Conditions Recorded in British Diplomatic Dispatches*, *Admiralty Documents and U.S. Naval Intelligence Reports* (2012, 2019), *A Mission under Duress: The Nanjing Massacre and Post-Massacre Social Conditions Documented by American Diplomats* (2010) and *Terror in Minnie Vautrin's Nanjing: Diaries and Correspondence, 1937-38* (2008). From 1999 to 2021, he also published 8 books on similar topics in Chinese in Beijing and Nanjing, China; and he will soon publish in Germany the book *Japanische Greueltaten in Nanking: Das Nanjing Massaker in deutschen diplomatischen Dokumenten* in German.

Because of his research contributions and advocating awareness of the Nanjing Massacre in the English speaking world, he was awarded the Special Contribution Award by the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Museum in 2014.

Introduction

Suping Lu

I

Early German Presence in China

As early as the early 17th century, individual German missionaries went to China, with the mission of sharing not just the gospel, but also Western technologies with the Chinese. Early representative figures are Johann Schreck and Johann Adam Schall von Bell. Both were recruited to China by the Italian priest Matteo Ricci (利瑪竇, 1552-1610), who had founded the Jesuit mission in China. Led by Ricci's assistant Nicolas Trigault (金尼閣, 1577-1628), they arrived in Macau in July 1619, along with several other European missionaries. Schreck went to Beijing in 1623, undertaking astronomical work and revision of the Chinese calendar for the Ming court. Schall von Bell continued Schreck's work after the latter passed away in 1630. He served both the Ming and Qing courts and became a trusted counsellor for Emperor Shunzhi (順治), an important position in court.

Some of the early German missionaries had long sojourns in China, acquired Chinese names, and never returned to their homeland. Up to the 1770s, those German missionaries who died and were buried in Beijing include Schreck (鄧玉函, 1576-1630), Schall von Bell (湯若望, 1591-1666), Gaspard Castner (龐嘉宾, 1665-1709), Bernard-Kilian Stumpf (紀理安, 1655-1720), Ignaz Kogler (戴進賢, 1680-1746), Florian Bahr (魏繼晋, 1706-1771), and Antonie Gogeisl (鮑友管, 1701-1771).

Sino-German trading activities can be traced back to 1752 when the first German merchant ship arrived in Guangzhou under the auspices of the Royal Prussian Asian Trading Company of Emden. During the first few decades of the 19th century, however, Sino-German trade mainly took the overland route through Siberia. After Russia imposed transit taxes in 1836, the trade preferred the maritime route, which proved to be more profitable.[1]

After the Second Opium War, when Great Britain, the United States, Russia, and France benefited from China's defeat and obtained trading privileges through unequal treaties with China, Prussia dispatched Friedrich Albrecht zu Eulenburg (1815-1881) on a diplomatic mission known as the Eulenburg Expedition and authorized him to negotiate commercial treaties with China. The treaty signed on September 2, 1861, in Tianjin signified the establishment of official Sino-Prussia relations. The Tianjin Treaty of 1861 granted Prussia and the other 26 northern German states the right to trade and have consular jurisdiction at the treaty ports. Ten years later in 1871, the unified German Empire inherited the treaty along with its privileges.[2]

S. Lu, *Japanese Atrocities in Nanjing*,
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In the following decades, Sino-German trade expanded rapidly. In 1889, Germans established the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank (德華銀行) in Shanghai, the first non-British foreign banking facility in China. By 1895-96, Germany became the second largest importer to China, while having the second largest shipping capacity after Great Britain in transporting commodities to China. The number of German firms established in China also stood second to that of Great Britain.[3]

From 1894 to 1895, China and Japan fought the First Sino-Japanese War, better known to the Chinese as the Sino-Japanese Jiawu War (中日甲午戰爭) over control of Korea. The Chinese were defeated in both naval campaigns and land battles. As a result, China was forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki (馬關條約), which stipulated the cessation to Japan of Taiwan, the Penghu Islands (澎湖列島), and the Liaodong Peninsula (遼東半島), as well as payment of 200 million taels of silver as war indemnity. However, under the intervention of Russia, France, and Germany, the Liaodong Peninsula was returned to China.[4] For its role in the intervention, the Qing Government allowed Germany to establish concessions in Hankou and Tianjin upon the latter's demand.[5]

Sino-German Relations after 1897

Sino-German relations headed down a bumpy road in 1897 when two German Catholic missionaries, Richard Henle (韓理加略, 1863-1897) and Franz Xaver Nies (能方濟, 1859-1897), were murdered in their sleep at a village in Juye, Shandong Province (山東巨野), in the night of November 1. A third missionary, Georg Maria Stenz (薛田資, 1869-1928), survived the attack unharmed. Two weeks after the murder, the German fleet rushed to the coastal area of Shandong and seized Jiaozhou Bay (膠州灣), which was also China's key naval base. The Germans presented six demands to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, including removal of the Shandong governor and various monetary compensations. The negotiation went on for four months until March 6, 1898, when the Lease Agreement of Jiaozhou Bay (Pachtvertrag zwischen China und dem Deutschen Reich, 膠澳租借條約) was signed. By this treaty, China leased Jiaozhou Bay to Germany for 99 years, allowed the Germans to build two railway lines within Shandong Province, and granted German merchants permission to open mines within the distance of about 10 miles on both sides of the two railway lines, thereby acknowledging the German sphere of influence over the entire Shandong Province.[6] Thus, the German Government took advantage of this incident as an excuse to coerce the Qing Government to advance its interest extensively in China.

Since the British launched the Opium War in 1840, foreign powers attempted repeatedly to force the Qing Government with gunboats and cannons to sign treaties, which enabled them to establish their respective sphere of influence inside China. The situation, along with the increasing Christian presence, aroused strong animosity toward Westerners and missionaries among peasants, particularly in Shandong and Hebei provinces in North China.[7] These peasants formed themselves into a martial art organization known as the Boxers. In 1900, they besieged diplomatic compounds and attacked foreign diplomats in Beijing, including the German Minister to China Clemens von Ketteler (1853-1900), who was killed on June 20.

In response, Germany, Britain, France, Russia, Japan, the United States, Italy, and Austria-Hungary dispatched troops jointly to form the Eight-Nation Alliance Expedition Forces (八國聯軍) to China. German Field Marshal Alfred von Waldersee (1832-1904) arrived in China on September 26, 1900, to assume the command of the allied forces. After the Boxer Rebellion was suppressed, on September 7, 1901, China was forced to sign the treaty commonly known as the Boxer Protocol (辛丑條約) with the afore-mentioned countries plus Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In addition to allowing these powers to station troops near Beijing and Tianjin, China was to pay an indemnity of 450 million taels of silver, of which, 20%, or about 90.07 million taels, went to Germany.[8]

After the Boxer Rebellion, the Russian expeditionary troops, instead of withdrawing back home, went to occupy China's northeastern region, known to Westerners as Manchuria.[9] To avenge Russia's role in the Liaodong intervention, as well as to remove the obstacle to its own expansion into Northeast China, Japan launched war against Russia in both Korea and Northeast China in February 1904. The Russo-Japanese War lasted more than a year and ended with a Japanese victory over Russia. According to the Russo-Japanese Treaty signed on September 5, 1905, Russia recognized Japan's primacy in Korea and surrendered to Japan its rights in the southern part of Northeast China, including the Liaodong Peninsula, and ceded the southern part of Sakhalin Island (庫頁島).[10] Japan finally expanded into Northeast China.

In the decade after the Boxer Rebellion, Sino-German relations became less tense, and gradually improved to some extent, for the Qing Government relied on German technologies while Germany faced diplomatic isolation in Asia after the Anglo-Japanese alliance was formed in 1902 and the Russia-France-British entente came into being in 1907. Consequently, more German firms opened business in China. For instance, Siemens opened its representative office in Beijing in 1904, the first in China, though the company had done business in China since 1872. By 1913, nearly 300 German firms operated in China. In 1911, the Qing Dynasty was overthrown. The German Government offered RM 6 million to the new Republic of China in 1912 and renounced its legal right to further railway construction in Shandong.[11]

The First World War

After the war started in 1914, Germany intended to return Jiaozhou Bay to China, fearing that it would fall into the hands of Japan, which had long coveted that region. Japan threatened the Chinese Government not to accept it. While the Western powers were fully occupied in WWI in Europe, Japan seized the opportunity to expand its sphere of influence into Shandong, as well as avenging German's role in the Liaodong intervention. On August 15, 1914, the Japanese issued an ultimatum to the German Government, demanding that the latter surrender Jiaozhou Bay to Japan within a month without condition or compensation. Germany gave no response. The Japanese declared war on Germany on August 23 and captured Qingdao on November 7. Thus, Japan succeeded in expanding into Shandong.[12] To legalize its occupation of Jiaozhou Bay and advance further interests in China, Japan presented a 21-point demand to the Chinese Government in secret on

January 18, 1915. Japan demanded extension of the lease, legalization of newly captured Jiaozhou, rights to construct railways, and that the Chinese Government hire Japanese advisors in political, financial and military affairs, and buy Japanese ammunitions, among others. (pp. 768-770)

Before officially entering WWI, in May 1916 China signed contracts with the French and British to send laborers to the western front in Europe to help with the shortage of manpower there. Altogether, China dispatched 140,000 laborers to Europe, about 100,000 to the British troops and 40,000 to the French, chiefly doing logistic works, such as transporting ammunitions and equipment, building trenches, moving the wounded, and burying the dead. On February 17, 1917, the French cargo-passenger ship SS *Athos* was torpedoed by a German u-boat in the Mediterranean, killing 543 Chinese laborers on board. China severed diplomatic tie with Germany on March 14 and declared war on Germany on August 14, deporting German diplomats, detaining German and Austrian-Hungary ships at the Chinese harbors, taking back German concessions in Hankou and Tianjin, and expelling German firms. The number of German firms operating in China dropped to 2 in 1919.

WWI ended on November 11, 1918, and soon after the Paris Peace Conference opened on January 18, 1919, to set the terms for the defeated. At the peace conference, Chinese delegate Gu Weijun (顧維鈞) demanded that German-leased territories and interests in Shandong be returned to China. However, his demands were ignored, and instead the Western powers decided that the German-leased territory at Jiaozhou Bay, Qingdao City, the Qingdao-Ji'nan railroad, and mines were to be transferred to Japan. When the news reached Beijing, students took to the streets in protest on May 4, triggering a historic upsurge known as the May Fourth Movement. Because of the demonstrations Chinese representatives refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles at the signing ceremony on June 28, 1919. The Shandong lease issue remained unresolved until February 4, 1922, when the Treaty of Shandong was signed at the Washington Conference in the United States. The former German-leased regions were eventually returned to China.[13] Even after that, however, a large number of Japanese businesses, merchants, and citizens remained, significantly influencing social and economic activities there.

German Military Advisory Mission in China

A few months after the May Fourth Movement, China issued a decree on September 15, 1919, to stop treating Germany as an enemy state. Sino-German relations gradually improved and German firms returned to China. On May 20, 1921, China and Germany reached an agreement in Beijing to restore peaceful relations between the two countries, including normalization of diplomatic relations.

In the following decade, however, the political situation dramatically changed. Since the 1911 Revolution, which overthrew the Qing Dynasty, the country had been in a fragmented state, with different regions under the control of local warlords. The internationally recognized national government in Beijing known as Beiyang Government (北洋政府) was controlled by a succession of powerful warlord cliques, who kept fighting one another for control of the regions or the central government. Meanwhile, there was a southern government in Guangzhou headed by Sun Yat-sen

(孫中山, 1866-1925) and his successor Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石, 1887-1975), and it was supported by the Soviet Union.

Commanded by Chiang Kai-sheh, the National Revolutionary Army (國民革命軍) of Kuomintang or the Chinese National Party (國民黨), which formed the Southern Government jointly with a small fraction of the Communist elements, launched in July1926 the military campaign known as the Northern Expedition (北閥戰争) against the Beiyang Government and regional warlords, with the purpose of reunifying China. By April 1927, the Northern Expedition swept through the areas south of the Yangtze, reaching Wuhan, Nanchang, Shanghai, and Nanjing.

After capturing Shanghai, Chiang decisively purged the Communists and antagonized the left faction of the Kuomintang, causing the party to split into the leftist Wuhan Government headed by Wang Jingwei (汪精衛, 1883-1944) and the rightist Nanjing Government headed by Chiang, as well straining relations with the Soviet Union, their primary source of military aid.[14] At the same time, the Japanese dispatched 2,000 troops to Shandong at the approach of the Northern Expedition, ostensibly to protect Japanese citizens and businesses, but their true intention was to keep the Northern Expedition from reaching Northeast China, where vast Japanese economic interests were. The Northern Expedition was temporarily disrupted and did not resume until April 1928. As soon as the Northern Expedition resumed marching northward, the Japanese Government sent a 25,000 strong force to Shandong and occupied the provincial capital Ji'nan. They clashed with the Chinese troops, resulting in the bloody massacre known as the "Ji'nan Incident (濟南慘案)."[15] The Northern Expedition, however, eventually overcame all obstacles and reached Beijing, and the Beiyang Government leader Zhang Zuolin (張作霖, 1875-1928) fled to Fengtian (奉天), present-day Shenyang (瀋陽).

As early as the summer of 1926, Chiang attempted to recruit German military advisors to seek an alternative to Soviet aid, as well as out of admiration of German technologies and industries, military weaponry and equipment, and military education and training. After several unsuccessful attempts, in March 1927, the Chinese approached a retired German colonel Max Bauer (1869-1929) who accepted the invitation. He arrived in Shanghai in December and had the opportunity to present his ideas in person to Chiang Kai-shek, who was impressed by Bauer's military and industrial planning, and the latter was offered the position of Chiang's advisor. "Although Bauer's most tangible service to Chiang lie in the military-economic realm for which he had been engaged, the belief that he was putting his technical and organizational skills to use for causes compatible with the political outlook of Chiang and his faction made his service uniquely valuable." He convinced Chiang "that he could mobilize German industry and recruit German experts for the multifarious tasks involved in Chinese 'reconstruction'."[16]

Accompanied by Chinese officials, Max Bauer returned to Germany in March 1928 to recruit German military officers for the advisory mission and returned to China in November the same year with a group of 25 German advisors. (p. 55) Thus, the German Advisory Mission was officially in place and functioned in China for about a decade until July 1938.

Bauer's service was cut short during the campaign Chiang fought against the Guangxi faction (蔣桂戰爭), when he was infected with smallpox in April on the Wuhan front and died on May 6, 1929, in Shanghai. (p. 61) He was succeeded by Colonel Hermann Kriebel (1876-1941) who served as acting chief advisor from 1929 to 1930, Lieutenant General Georg Wetzell (1869-1947) as advisor-general from 1930 to 1934, General Hans von Seeckt (1866-1936) from 1934 to 1935, and General Alexander von Falkenhausen (1878-1966) from 1935 to 1938.

German military advisors played significant roles and provided advice to Chiang's government and armed forces in such areas as economics, aviation, armament industry, railroad development, military education and training, military equipment, and acquisition of arms, industrial equipment and technologies in Europe. By 1934, the German Military Advisory Mission had reached a total of 61 members. (p. 124) They advocated reorganizing Chinese armed forces with German standards, including establishing a new military command and communications protocols. They staffed the Central Military Academy with German instructors, developed strategies and trained Chiang's troops, and were directly involved in the military actions against the regional warlords and the Communist Red Army from late 1920s to mid-1930s. (p. 110) Most significantly, they helped establish a central army trained in German methods, of which a model division known as the Instruction Corps (教導隊) was the cornerstone for training other troops. (p. 59) They planned to train 300,000 Chinese troops (18 divisions), and by the time the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, 80% of the troops had gone through training. Of those troops, Chiang's crack divisions, the Central Instruction Corps (中央教導隊), the 36th, 87th, and 88th Divisions were not only trained by German military advisors but also fully equipped with German weapons and equipment.[17]

On August 20, 1935, General Alexander von Falkenhausen, who had recently assumed the post of advisor-general, presented to Chiang his recommendations concerning the strategies and preparations against potential Japanese invasions in North China and the Lower Yangtze Valley. (p. 319) When war broke out in July 1937, Falkenhausen went to the Hebei front, Lieutenant General Alfred Streccius (1874-1944) went to Shandong, and Major General Hermann Starke (1881-1963) went to Shanxi to help with the battlefield tactics of the Chinese troops. (p. 329) After hostilities began in the Shanghai area in August 1937, Falkenhausen went to the front, disregarding the prohibition from the German Government. It was reported that 71 person-times of German advisors were imbedded among the Chinese troops at the Shanghai front. (p. 391) During the Taierzhuang Campaign (台兒莊戰役) in March-April 1938, Falkenhausen was also at the front, helping with battlefield tactics against the Japanese. (pp. 393-394)

When Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1936, Germany's Far East policy shifted toward cooperation with Japan. Pressed by the Japanese, the German Government recalled the Military Advisory Mission in China in May and June 1938. Falkenhausen was initially defiant about the recall order and would personally honor his contract, for most of the advisors were contracted to either 1939 or 1940. However, urged by Joachim von Ribbentrop (1893-1948), the German Foreign Minister, after assuring Chiang Kai-shek that their knowledge of the Chinese military would never be used to aid the Japanese,[18] Falkenhausen left

Hankou on July 5, 1938, and returned to Germany via Hong Kong. Thus, the German Advisory Mission was brought to an end.[19]

Japanese Encroachment in China in the 1930s

While Sino-German relations improved steadily and became close in the two decades following the First World War, Sino-Japanese relations became increasingly tense.

On June 4, 1928, while travelling by train from Beijing to Shenyang, Zhang Zuolin was killed at Huanggutun (皇姑屯) near Shenyang by a bomb placed on the railroad tracks by the Japanese Guandong Army (関東軍). His son, Zhang Xueliang (張學良, 1901-2001), enraged by his father's assassination, announced his allegiance and loyalty to the Nanjing government, thus bringing the war lord era to an end and reunifying the country under the National Government in Nanjing,[20] quite opposite to the goal of the Japanese assassination.

Three years later on September 18, 1931, the Guandong Army blew up a section of railroad tracks at Liutiaohu (柳條湖), a Shenyang suburb, and alleged that it was sabotage committed by Chinese soldiers. Under this pretext, the Guandong Army launched sudden attacks at the Chinese barracks at Beidaying (北大營) near Shenyang, swiftly captured the city of Shenyang the following day, and completed the conquest of the whole Northeast China in a few months.[21] The September 18 Incident of 1931, known to Westerners as the Mukden Incident, serves as a turning point in Sino-Japanese relations: the beginning of confrontation.

In January 1932, a street riot between Chinese loafers and Japanese monks in Shanghai quickly escalated, evolving into a hostile diplomatic incident. Though Shanghai's mayor unconditionally accepted Japanese conditions, Japanese marines attacked Zhabei (閘北), an urban district of Shanghai, on January 28. The Chinese 19th Route Army responded with strong resistance.[22] After both sides rushed in reenforcements, the war continued for months until the League of Nations intervened, and a peace treaty was reached on May 5, 1932. According to the treaty, the Chinese could only deploy police force known as the Peace Preservation Corps (保安隊) inside Shanghai but could not station regular military troops there.[23]

To further consolidate their control over Northeast China, the Japanese abducted Pu Yi (溥儀, 1906-1967), the dethroned last emperor of the Qing Dynasty from Tianjin on November 10, 1931. As soon as the Japanese brought the whole Northeast China under their control, they set up the puppet regime for the region known as Manzhouguo (滿洲國), which literally means Manchu State, independent from China. Pu Yi was sworn in as the puppet head of Manzhouguo on March 9, 1932.[24]

Once the Japanese turned Northeast China into their colony of Manzhouguo under direct control of the Guandong Army, they planned its westward expansion. This time, the target was Rehe Province (熱河省) immediately west of the Manzhouguo boarder. Japanese troops attacked and captured Chengde (承德), the capital of Rehe Province, on March 4, 1933, without even bothering to come up with a

pretext.[25] Because Chinese troops launched counterattacks against the Japanese invasion, the Japanese attempted to cut the Chinese supply line south of the Great Wall, which resulted in fierce fighting along the Great Wall. After capturing a series of passes along the Great Wall, Japanese troops occupied 22 counties in eastern Hebei Province. The result of this conflict was the "Tanggu Truce (塘沽協定)," which, signed on May 31, 1933, recognized not only Manzhouguo but also Japanese occupation of Rehe Province, in addition to the establishment of a demilitarized zone south of the Great Wall in Hebei Province. (p. 59)

Two years later, the Japanese took advantage of the assassination of two pro-Japanese newspaper editors, which took place on May 2, 1935, in Tianjin, to force Chinese authorities to reach the "He-Umezu Agreement (何梅協定)." The agreement prohibited the deployment of Chinese military troops and activities of anti-Japanese organizations in Hebei Province, in addition to the removal of anti-Japanese officials from important provincial positions. (pp. 102-114)

Another incident took place in 1935 in Chaha'er Province (察哈爾省), northwest of Beijing. Four Guandong Army officers travelled in Chaha'er Province without the proper permit required by Chinese authorities. On June 5, 1935, they were detained in the town of Zhangbei (張北) by the Chinese 29th Army, but soon they were released with the warning that a proper permit should be obtained for future travel. The Guandong Army seized this routine case as the opportunity to force the Chinese to sign the "Qin-Doihara Agreement (秦土協定)" on June 27, 1935, to expel Chinese troops and other anti-Japanese organizations from Chaha'er Province.[26]

With the momentum of the "He-Umezu Agreement" and "Qin-Doihara Agreement," the Japanese installed an autonomous local government, the East Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Council (冀東防共自治委員會), on November 25, 1935, (pp. 192-196) and promoted the independent Inner Mongolian Government, which was inaugurated in June 1936.[27] As a result, a large portion of North China was under direct or indirect control of the Japanese.

The continuous Japanese encroachment in Northeast and North China aroused intense anti-Japanese sentiments among the Chinese populace who were fed up and could stand no more the repeated Japanese encroachments and the conciliatory approaches adopted by the Chinese National Government. The student demonstration known as the "December 9 Movement (一二九運動)" in 1935 and the "December 12 Xi'an Incident (雙十二西安事變)" in 1936 best demonstrated those sentiments. However, more incidents were yet to come.

On the night of July 7, 1937, while conducting a military exercise near Lugou Bridge (盧溝橋), known to Westerners as Marco Polo Bridge, southwest of Beijing, the Japanese alleged that a soldier was found missing. Suspecting that he had been abducted by the Chinese into Wanping (宛平), a small walled city nearby, the Japanese demanded to conduct a search inside the small city. The Chinese denied the allegation and refused to comply. Early the next morning, the Japanese launched attacks at Wanping, in spite of the fact that by that time, the missing soldier, who had lost his way for 20 minutes, was already found. The Chinese fought back. Thus, the "Lugou Bridge Incident" served as the prelude to the all-out war between China

and Japan, known as the Second Sino-Japanese War to the West and the War against Japan (抗日戰争) to the Chinese.

II

German diplomatic presence in China

As early as 1852, Hamburg opened a consulate in Shanghai. When Prussia and China reached the Friendship, Trade and Shipping Treaty (Freundschafts-, Handels- und Schifffahrtsvertrag zwischen Preußen und China 中德通商條約) on September 2, 1861, in Tianjin, the Qing Court refused to grant permission for the Prussian envoy to reside in Beijing, citing the unrest at the time. However, Prussian consuls could reside in the treaty port cities, enjoying the same privileges that the consuls of other nations had.[28] The top Prussian consuls and German consul generals resided in Shanghai until 1875 when Germany opened its legation in Beijing and the rank of envoy was upgraded to minister. The first German Minister in Beijing was Max von Brandt (1835-1920). Prussia had consulates in Shantou, Xiamen, and Fuzhou in 1864, while Germany opened consulates in Guangzhou (1871), Tianjin (1881), Beihai (1886), Hankou (1888), Ji'nan (1902) and Chongqing (1904).

During his tenure in Beijing from 1875 to 1893, Brandt largely handled issues concerning Sino-German trade. He attempted to make revisions for the Tianjin Treaty, and eventually signed the Supplementary Convention between Germany and China on March 30, 1880, which allowed the Germans to possess the shipping facilities at Wusong, in addition to using other ports open to foreign trade. (pp. 6-7)

After the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War, German envoys in both Beijing and Tokyo played decisive roles in pressing the Japanese Government to return the Liaodong Peninsula to China. For their part in the Liaodong intervention, the Germans acquired their desired concessions in Hankou and Tianjin. Negotiations for the Hankou concession were carried out by the German Consul-General in Shanghai, Oskar Wilhelm Stübel (1846-1921). The Convention for the Concession at Hankou was concluded on October 3, 1895. Meanwhile, German minister in Beijing Gustav Adolf Schenck zu Schweinsberg (1843-1909) negotiated for the concession at Tianjin with the Chinese Foreign Office. The agreement was signed on October 30, 1895, by German Consul Albert von Seckendorff (1849-1921) and Sheng Xuanhuai (盛宣懷，1844-1916) and Li Minchen (李岷琛，1838-1913). The establishment of concessions in Hankou and Tianjin, in addition to the Supplementary Treaty of 1880, signified Germany's fully entry into China to compete with other powers and enjoy equally the privileges and most favored nation status. (pp. 8-13)

In the late 19th century, repeated foreign aggressions, numerous unequal treaties, and the influx of missionaries since the 1840s aroused intense anti-foreign sentiments among the grassroots Chinese populace across the country. Zhang Fengzhen (張鳳楨), author of *The Diplomatic Relations between China and Germany since 1898*, provided her analysis and interpretation of some of the reasons behind such sentiments:

> As the aggression of the Western Powers increased first in opening China and later in taking China's former dependencies, the anti-foreign feeling was increased with equal rapidity. The "anti-foreignism" was closely connected with the spread of Christian missions, especially those of the Catholics, who besides enjoying the right of consular jurisdiction in the treaty ports, carried their rights into the interior of China in violation of the treaty and claimed jurisdiction over their native (Chinese) converts, which jurisdiction properly belonged to the Chinese Government. Because of the constant demands of the respective foreign powers for the dismissal or reprimand of local officials, the local Chinese authorities began to allow the missionaries to interfere in the local jurisdiction in favor of the Chinese Christians regardless of the nature of the individual cases, so as to please the foreign missionaries. As a result, justice was not properly administered to the injured parties and therefore hatred against missionaries grew with these injustices whenever the non-Christian Chinese suffered. (p. 16)

The Chinese populace blamed the social injustice and sufferings they sustained on the foreigners, in particular, missionaries, and the local officials who failed to maintain justice or offer them protection. Peasants organized themselves into anti-Qing Government and anti-foreign groups such as the Elder Brother Society (哥老會), the Big Sword Society (大刀會), the White Lotus Society (白蓮教), and the Boxers, to name a few. Since 1870, these groups had repeatedly attacked Western missionaries, including two German Catholic priests slain on November 1, 1897, in Shandong Province. The anti-foreign movement culminated in the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 in Beijing, which claimed the life of Clemens von Ketteler, the German top diplomat in China.

A vicious cycle was thus triggered. The repeated foreign aggressions, numerous unequal treaties, and the influx of missionaries resulted in hostile feeling s among the Chinese people, as well as their violent resistance. This in turn gave Western powers excuses to force the Chinese Government to sign another round of treaties and offer further concessions. The slayings of the afore-mentioned two German missionaries led to the Jiaozhou Lease Agreement negotiated and signed by the German Minister in Beijing Edmund Friedrich Gustav von Heyking (1850-1915) with Li Hongzhang (李鴻章, 1823-1901) and Weng Tonghe (翁同龢, 1830-1904) on March 6, 1898. The Boxer Rebellion resulted in the Boxer Protocol of 1901, of which the German signatory was Ketteler's successor, Alfons Mumm von Schwarzenstein (1859-1924).

After the Boxer Protocol, Sino-German relations gradually got back on track. Following the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, Germany recognized the newly founded Republic of China on October 6, 1913. However, the First World War dealt Sino-German relations a heavy blow. On August 14, 1917, China declared war on Germany and severed diplomatic tie, expelling German diplomats, closing German Legation in Beijing and all the consulates in the cities across China, and taking back German concessions in Hankou and Tianjin.

After the war, in July 1920, Herbert von Borch (1876-1961) was dispatched to China as the German Government representative in Beijing, attempting to restore Sino-German relations. After several rounds of negotiation, on May 20, 1921, Chinese Foreign Minister Yan Huiqing (顏惠慶, 1877-1950) and Borch signed the

Agreement Regarding the Restoration of the State of Peace between Germany and China (Deutsch-Chinesische Vereinbarungen über die Wiederherstellung des Friedenszustandes, 中德協約) in Beijing.

The agreement stipulates that both countries agreed to re-establish diplomatic and commercial relations, and that "such relations should be based on principles of complete equality and absolute reciprocity in accordance with the rules of international law." Meanwhile "Germany hereby consents to the abrogation of consular jurisdiction in China." Concerning the lease of Jiaozhou Bay and Shandong issues, the "German Government points out that, owing to the events of the war and the Treaty of Versailles, Germany has been obliged to renounce all her rights, titles and privileges acquired by virtue of the Treaty concluded between Germany and China on March 6th, 1898, and by virtue of all other Acts concerning the province of Shantung, and whereas she is thus deprived of the possibility of restoring them to China." As to China's opposition to and refusal to sign the Treaty of Versailles because it handed Jiaozhou Bay and Shandong over to Japan, the "German Government would not, however, raise any objection should China, apart from the provisions of Articles 128 to 134 of the Treaty, avail herself of certain other rights which she derives from the Treaty, and which she may consider of importance to herself, either in their present form or, should the Treaty be revised, in their modified form."[29] In addition, Germany agreed to pay war indemnity to China:

> The passage in the German Declaration in which Germany declares herself prepared to reimburse China for expenditure in connection with the various internment camps is to be understood to mean that Germany is prepared to make this payment over and above the payments to be made for reparations in accordance with the principles laid down in the Treaty of Versailles.
>
> In order to satisfy the Chinese demands for reparations, the German Government undertakes to pay 4 million dollars in cash and the rest in debentures of the Tientsin-Pukow-Hukuang Railway. This payment, the total amount of which has yet to be fixed by mutual agreement, shall amount to half the proceeds of the sale of German property in China already liquidated and half the value of property sequestrated. (pp. 286-287)

The significance of this agreement is that it was the first equal treaty China had ever reached with a Western power. The treaty set the precedent for the Chinese Government in negotiations to reclaim foreign concessions in different cities across the county in the following decades. Germany's abrogation of its rights associated with the Lease of Jiaozhou Bay Treaty of 1898 and its respect for Chinese attitudes toward the Treaty of Versailles provided the Chinese with solid ground in reclaiming Jiaozhou Bay and other Shandong interests from Japan a year later. In addition, it was the first and only time China ever obtained a war indemnity from a foreign power; it had always been the other way round.

Sino-German relations in the 1920s and 1930s became smooth and increasingly close, largely due to Sino-German trade, China's interest in German technologies and armament, German investments in China, and the German Military Advisory Mission in China.

Though Nanjing became China's national capital after the Northern Expedition in 1927, most Western countries kept their legations and top diplomats in Beijing and did not move their diplomatic missions to Nanjing until 1935. Oskar Paul Trautmann (1877-1950) assumed the position of German Minister Plenipotentiary to China on October 2, 1931. He served in that capacity until the German diplomatic mission was upgraded to embassy on May 18, 1935, and moved to Nanjing, with offices located at 15 and 19 Yihe Road (頤和路), and the top diplomat's rank was upgraded to ambassador. Trautmann served in China until June 1938. Thus, he was both the last German Minister in Beijing and the first German Ambassador in Nanjing.

During Trautmann's tenure in China, Sino-German relations further improved particularly in trade, import of German armament, environment for German firms to operate, and roles played by German military advisors. However, as Sino-Japanese relations became volatile, Germany's East Asia policy was neither consistent nor balanced, posing a challenge to his work. Trautmann preferred a balanced approach and attempted to promote good relations with China. Meantime, he was an avid lover of contemporary Chinese art and served on the board of the Sino-German Cultural and Business Association. But the German Ambassador was to go down in modern China's history as a prominent figure through the active role he played as a mediator for a peaceful solution to the Sino-Japanese hostilities in 1937.

The Sino-Japanese Hostilities in Shanghai

By the end of July 1937, Japanese troops had attacked and captured Beijing, Tianjin and other cities in North China. Down south in the Shanghai area, tensions were quickly mounting as well. On August 9, two Japanese marines were alleged to have made a forced entry into the airfield at Hongqiao (虹橋) in a western suburb of Shanghai. While Chinese guards attempted to stop them, the Japanese shot a soldier of Peace Preservation Corps before the Chinese shot back and killed both marines.[30] The shooting clash at Hongqiao quickly escalated into a diplomatic crisis and then further to a military standoff. Though both the Chinese and Japanese agreed to seek a diplomatic solution after several rounds of negotiation, both sides rushed re-enforcements into Shanghai. War eventually broke out on August 13 in the urban area of the city.

The German trained and equipped Chinese 36th, 87th, and 88th Divisions fought ferociously against the 9,000 Japanese marines in densely populated urban areas until August 23, when the Japanese 3rd and 11th Divisions landed at the Yangtze River mouth north of Shanghai. The Chinese troops rushed northward to engage in counter-landing operations. The focus of the war shifted from urban areas to the rural country, while the Chinese were forced to be on the defensive. Confronting their better equipped and trained opponents supported by naval bombardments and aerial coverage, the Chinese soldiers fought stubbornly and persistently in spite of heavy casualties, defending their shrinking positions, village by village, street by street, and even house by house.

The war lasted nearly three months. Close to the end of October, the Chinese lost all their positions north of the Suzhou Creek (蘇州河) except the Continental

Godwin (四行倉庫), in which the so-call "Doomed Battalion," the 1st Battalion, the 524th Regiment of the Chinese 88th Division, held on to resist Japanese advance until October 31, in hopes of winning international sympathy from the Nine-Power Conference which would meet on November 3 in Brussels. There were no signs the hostilities would be settled with a peace agreement.

German Mediation Attempt

Under the circumstances, the Japanese attempted to negotiate a peace treaty with China through German mediation, hoping that a treaty would enable Japan to gain more territories and interests without a long-term war, in addition to making a peace gesture to the upcoming Brussels Nine-Power Conference. Japanese foreign minister Koki Hirota (広田弘毅, 1878-1948) on November 2, 1937, presented to German Ambassador to Japan, Herbert von Dirksen (1882-1955), a seven-point peace proposal, which was passed on to the Chinese through Oskar Trautmann on November 5:

> 1. Inner Mongolia shall be autonomous.
> 2. The demilitarized zone in North China shall be extended; while the Chinese Central Government still retains administrative power over North China, it shall not appoint any anti-Japanese officials or leaders there. If during the interval of negotiation, there should arise a new regime in North China, it shall be allowed to remain, although up to the present Japan has no intention of establishing such a regime.
> 3. The demilitarized zone in Shanghai shall likewise be extended, and the administrative power shall remain the same as before the war.
> 4. The prohibition of anti-Japanese activities shall follow the principles discussed between Ambassador Kawagoe and Foreign Minister Chang Chun in 1936.
> 5. China shall take effective measures against Communism.
> 6. China shall revise customs duties in a favorable way.
> 7. China shall fully respect the interests of foreign powers in China.[31]

At this junction, the Chinese Government, still anticipating that the Nine-Power Conference would pass a resolution to restrain Japan, did not find it necessary to consider the proposal. Meanwhile, Japanese new enforcements, the 10th Army landed at Hangzhou Bay, south of Shanghai on November 5. A few days later, the 16th Division landed near the Yangtze mouth north of Shanghai, threatening to encircle the Chinese troops and cutting their evacuation routes. Even if the Chinese had agreed to negotiate at this point, it was doubtful the Japanese military advance would have been suspended, since the decision to dispatch troops had already been made weeks earlier. The real intention of the peace proposal remained dubious.

The Chinese troops were forced to give up their positions in Shanghai and make a hasty and disorganized westward evacuation. After Shanghai fell on November 12, the Japanese moved swiftly, chasing the fleeing Chinese troops westward and capturing Suzhou on November 19. The Chinese Government then announced on November 20 that the national capital would be relocated from Nanjing to Chongqing in West China. The Chinese Foreign Ministry relocated first to Hankou in Central China. The American, British, German, Russian, and other embassies followed

the Foreign Ministry to Hankou in late November. Chiang Kai-shek remained in Nanjing until December 7, when the Japanese troops were almost at Nanjing's city gates.

The Nine-Power Conference, however, failed to pass any resolution to place restraint on Japan as the Chinese had expected. In late November, as Japanese troops were sweeping through the Lower Yangtze Valley toward Nanjing, the Chinese Government, feeling the need to negotiate the terms of the proposal with the Japanese, contacted Trautmann and asked him to make an inquiry through Ambassador Dirksen in Tokyo whether the Japanese were still willing to discuss the proposal. Foreign Minister Hirota responded affirmatively. Trautmann informed the Chinese right away and discussed the issue with Foreign Minister Wang Chonghui (王寵惠, 1881-1958) on November 29 before travelling from Hankou to Nanjing on December 2 with Vice Foreign Minister Xu Mo (徐謨, 1893-1956) by the Chinese customs' cruiser *Hai Hsing (海星)* to meet with Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang agreed to negotiate on the condition that the seven-point terms were regarded as the foundation of the negotiation with Germany as the mediator. (ibid)

The Chinese decision reached Tokyo on December 7 when Japanese troops were only a few miles away from Nanjing's city gates. The Japanese captured Nanjing days later on December 13, and as a result, the attitude of the Japanese changed. On December 22, Hirota informed Dirksen:

> At this time, when there has been a great change in the situation, it is not possible to make the conditions agreed on by the Chinese the basic conditions for a truce any longer. If the Chinese side will generally agree on the following terms, we shall be ready to go directly into negotiations. If the Chinese side should act contrary, we shall have to deal with the incident from a new standpoint, etc.
> Terms.
> 1. China shall abandon her pro-communist and anti-Japanese policies, and collaborate with both Japan and Manchukuo in an anti-communist policy.
> 2. Demilitarized areas shall be established in necessary regions, and special organs (wide-scale free government system) shall be set up in said areas.
> 3. A close economic treaty shall be concluded among the three nations, Japan, Manchukuo, and China.
> 4. China shall make necessary reparations to Japan.
> Then we demanded a reply by the end of the year, and also to dispatch a delegation either to Japan proper or to Shanghai for the purpose of truce negotiations based upon the above terms.
> Of course, we had a feeling that the reply may be prolonged until about the 10th of January. The details of the above basic terms our government had in preparation are as follows:
> Details.
> 1. China shall formally recognize the government of Manchukuo.
> 2. China shall abandon her anti-Japanese, and anti-Manchurian policies.
> 3. China shall establish special areas in North China and Inner Mongolia.
> …… …… ……
> 4. An anti-communist policy shall be established, and China shall cooperate with Japan and Manchukuo in the execution of the same policy.

5. Demilitarized areas shall be established in occupied territories of central China. China and Japan shall cooperate in the maintenance of peace and order in Shanghai and in its economic development.

6. Japan, Manchukuo, and China shall conclude necessary agreements on customs duties, trade, air defense, transportation, and communications in connection with the development of natural resources.

7. China shall pay indemnity to Japan. (There is opposition within our circles).

8. China shall recognize the stationing of Japanese troops for necessary terms in designated areas in North China, Inner Mongolia and Central China for the purpose of security.

9. Truce treaty shall not be negotiated until after the above agreement shall have been concluded.[32]

The Chinese Government declined these terms. The Japanese Government issued the well-known "Konoye Statement (近衛聲明)" on January 16, 1938, to completely end the negotiation attempt with the National Government of China.[33] Trautmann's mediation mission thus came to an end.

Japanese Atrocities at Nanjing

While German mediation was in progress, Japanese troops advanced swiftly toward Nanjing along three routes without encountering significant resistance from the Chinese. Meanwhile, rampant atrocities were reported in the areas along the Lower Yangtze Valley, through which the Japanese troops travelled.

The Japanese troops reached Nanjing's city gates on December 9, surrounding the city on three sides. Iwane Matsui (松井石根, 1878-1948), commander-in-chief of the Japanese Central China Expeditionary Forces, issued an ultimatum to Tang Shengzhi (唐生智, 1889-1970), the commander-in-chief of the Chinese defending troops, demanding an unconditional surrender by noon the following day. The Chinese, however, did not respond. The Japanese launched the final assaults at 2:00 p.m. on December 10. Fierce fighting took place at several city gates in the southern and southeastern parts of the city before the Chinese defense collapsed at nightfall on December 12. Nanjing was brought under Japanese control on December 13, 1937.

What followed the fall of Nanjing went down in history known as the Nanjing Massacre, or the Rape of Nanking to Westerners. Five American and British journalists remained in Nanjing to cover the siege and anticipated fall of the city. They unexpectedly witnessed the early stage of the massacre. It was these Western correspondents, rather than the Chinese, who first broke the news of Japanese atrocities in the Chinese capital to the outside world and placed the event under the global spotlight. They reported that Japanese soldiers were turned loose, indulging themselves in such atrocities as mass executions of surrendered Chinese soldiers and civilians, rampant violation of women and girls, widespread burning, and wholesale looting.

The first of the atrocity reports, dispatched by Archibald Trojan Steele (1903-1992), appeared on the front page of *The Chicago Daily News* on December 15. Steele, the newspaper's China correspondent, reported:

> I have just boarded the gunboat *Oahu* with the first group of foreigners to leave the capital since the attack began. The last thing we saw as we left the city was a band of 300 Chinese being methodically executed before the wall near the waterfront, where already corpses were piled knee deep.
>
> It was a characteristic picture of the mad Nanking scene of the last few days.
>
> The story of Nanking's fall is a story of indescribable panic and confusion among the entrapped Chinese defenders, followed by a reign of terror by the conquering army that cost thousands of lives, many of them innocent ones.[34]

On December 17, Arthur von Briesen Menken (1903-1973) of the Paramount Newsreel reported in *The Chicago Daily Tribune*, "All Chinese males found with any signs of having served in the army were herded together and executed."[35] On the same day, the report dispatched by Charles Yates McDaniel (1906-1983) of the Associated Press appeared first in *The Seattle Daily Times* in diary form. In his December 15 and 16 entries, he wrote:

> **Dec. 15.**–…… Went with embassy servant to look for her mother. Found her body in ditch. Embassy office boy's brother also found dead. This afternoon saw some of the soldiers I helped disarm dragged from houses, shot and kicked into ditches. Tonight saw group of 500 civilians, disarmed soldiers, hands tied, marched from safety zone by Japanese carrying Chinese "big swords." None returns. ……
>
> **Dec. 16.**–Before departing for Shanghai, Japanese consul brought "no-entry" notices, which posted on embassy property. En route to the river, saw many more bodies in the streets. Passed a long line of Chinese, hands tied. …… My last remembrance of Nanking: Dead Chinese, dead Chinese, dead Chinese.[36]

Frank Tillman Durdin (1907-1998) of *The New York Times*, whose reports provided more detailed accounts along with analysis, recounted on December 18 in *The New York Times*:

> Thousands of prisoners were executed by the Japanese. Most of the Chinese soldiers who had been interned in the safety zone were shot en masse. The city was combed in a systematic house-to-house search for men having knapsack marks on their shoulders or other signs of having been soldiers. They were herded together and executed.
>
> Many were killed where they were found, including men innocent of any army connection and many wounded soldiers and civilians. I witnessed three mass executions of prisoners within a few hours Wednesday. In one slaughter a tank gun was turned on a group of more than 100 soldiers at a bomb shelter near the Ministry of Communications.
>
> A favorite method of execution was to herd groups of a dozen men at entrances of dugouts and to shoot them so the bodies toppled inside. Dirt then was shoveled in and the men buried. .....
>
> Civilian casualties also were heavy, amounting to thousands. The only hospital open was the American-managed University Hospital and its facilities were inadequate for even a fraction of those hurt.
>
> Nanking's streets were littered with dead. Sometimes bodies had to be moved before automobiles could pass.
>
> The capture of Hsiakwan Gate by the Japanese was accompanied by the mass killing of the defenders, who were piled up among the sandbags, forming a mound

> six feet high. Late Wednesday the Japanese had not removed the dead, and two days of heavy military traffic had been passing through, grinding over the remains of men, dogs and horses.
>
> The Japanese appear to want the horrors to remain as long as possible, to impress on the Chinese the terrible results of resisting Japan.[37]

The British correspondent, Leslie C. Smith of *Reuters*, reported in London's *The Times* on December 18, "anyone caught out of doors without good reason was promptly shot," and "the Japanese began a systematic searching out of anyone even remotely connected with the Chinese Army" and at "the Hsiakwan gate leading to the river the bodies of men and horses made a frightful mass 4 ft. deep, over which cars and lorries were passing in and out of the gate."[38]

There were a large number of Japanese correspondents embedded in the attacking Japanese troops. Some of them also left behind written records about the atrocities. Shinju Sato (佐藤振壽, 1913-2008) was the photography correspondent of *The Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbum (東京日日新聞)*, a major Japanese newspaper. He entered Nanjing with the Japanese 16th Division. In his memoir, "Following the Troops on Foot (従軍とは歩くこと)," which was published in 1993 in Tokyo, he described a mass execution he had witnessed on December 14, 1937, inside a military compound in the eastern part of Nanjing:

> Once inside the gate, I saw a military barracks building, and in front of the building was a square, in which over 100 people sat. With their hands bound behind their backs, they appeared to be captured wounded soldiers. In front of them, two big pits about five square meters in area and three meters deep had been dug.
>
> In front of the right pit, a Japanese soldier held a Chinese rifle. He made a Chinese soldier kneel down by the pit while he placed the rifle muzzle to the back of the Chinese soldier's head and pulled the trigger. As the rifle fired, the Chinese soldier fell forward, like an acrobatic performance, down to the bottom of the pit, becoming a corpse.
>
> In front of the left pit, a Japanese soldier, with his upper body naked, held a rifle fixed with the bayonet, calling out, "next," while he pulled up a sitting captive. He ordered the captive to walk toward the pit, shouted "ya!" and suddenly thrust the bayonet into the back of the Chinese soldier, who instantly fell into the pit.[39]

In addition to the five American and British journalists, there were 14 American missionaries and five German businessmen who chose to stay in the besieged Nanjing. John Heinrich Detlev Rabe (1882-1950) of the Siemens Nanjing branch office recorded in his December 16 diary entry:

> Almost all the houses of the German military advisors have been looted by Japanese soldiers. No Chinese even dares set foot outside his house! ……
>
> I've just heard that hundreds more disarmed Chinese soldiers have been led out of our Zone to be shot, including 50 of our police who are to be executed for letting soldiers in.
>
> The road to Hsiakwan is nothing but a field of corpses strewn with the remains of military equipment.[40]

His December 22 diary entry reveals that,

> While cleaning up the Zone, we find many bodies in the ponds, civilians who have been shot (30 in just one pond), most of them with their hands bound, some with stones tied to their necks.……
>
> I promised the Japanese to help them look for employees of the electricity works and told them to look, among other places, in Hsiakwan, where 54 electricity plant workers were housed. We now learn that about three or four days ago, 43 of them were tied up and led down to the riverbank and machine-gunned, ostensibly because they were the employees of an enterprise managed by the Chinese government. News of the execution was brought to me by one of the condemned workers, who fell unwounded into the river beneath the bodies of two of the victims and so was able to save himself. (pp. 86-87)

On January 21, 1938, Christian Jakob Kröger (1903-1993), German firm Carlowitz & Co. (禮和洋行) representative in Nanjing, provided his eyewitness account concerning Japanese atrocities in a letter to Lieutenant General Alfred Streccius, a German military advisor then in Hankou:

> In short, the days of horror came after the occupation. Nanjing was made available for wanton looting and over the course of two weeks the residents were subjected to all forms of atrocity. All refugee camps were searched, and although the civilian population did not fire a single shot at the Japanese, around 5,000 to 6,000 civilian men were taken out to be shot in Xiagwan. As soon as they entered the city, they shot anyone they saw, but during the plundering, they were even quicker with their bayonets. The number of these victims cannot be estimated, but it runs into the thousands, many of whom were massacred in the cruelest possible way. Likewise, the number of women and girls raped is incredibly high.
>
> All the houses were looted, nor were the Japanese soldiers stopped by foreign flags. The Embassy is compiling an accurate list, and your servant has already made a list of the things that were stolen from your house. In summary, 4 houses belonging to Hempel, Kiessling, Schmeling and Echert were burned down, 15 houses were badly ransacked, 24 were lightly looted, and approx. 14 were intact or showed only evidence of "initial looting". 13 cars were stolen. The Americans and British suffered even more damage. Several servants paid the price of their lives to be loyal to their masters. As far as I know, for Germans, a coolie was killed in Boddien's house.[41]

First-hand accounts of Japanese atrocities in Nanjing during the 1937-1938 winter were also given by the American missionaries who volunteered to stay behind and organize the International Committee for Nanjing Safety Zone to shelter and protect Chinese refugees, and by the American, British, and German diplomats, who returned to Nanjing to re-open their respective embassies in early January 1938. In addition, these accounts also found echo in Japanese soldiers' wartime diaries, which describe the atrocities from the perspectives of the perpetrators.

Concerning the mass executions and other killings committed by Japanese troops in and around Nanjing, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East stipulates in the judgment in 1948:

> Estimates made at a later date indicate that the total number of civilians and prisoners of war murdered in Nanking and its vicinity during the first six weeks of the Japanese occupation was over 200,000. That these estimates are not exaggerated is borne out by that fact that burial societies and other organizations counted more than 155,000 bodies which they buried. They also reported that most of those were bound with their hands tied behind their backs. These figures do not take into account those persons whose bodies were destroyed by burning or by throwing them into the Yangtze River or otherwise disposed of by the Japanese.[42]

III

The Ordeal of the German Embassy Nanjing Office

The Chinese Government announced on November 20, 1937, that the national capital would relocate from Nanjing to Chongqing, while several government agencies, including the Foreign Ministry, first moved to Hankou. Two days later, Trautmann led the main body of the German Embassy staff to sail for Hankou on the chartered British steamship *Kutwo (吉和輪)* on November 22, and the German military advisors headed by General Falkenhausen also evacuated to Hankou. Meanwhile, a German consular team officially known as the German Embassy Nanjing Office (Deutsche Botschaft Dienststelle Nanjing), consisting of Georg Friedrich Murad Rosen (1895-1961), Paul Hans Hermann Scharffenberg (1873-1938), and Alfred Mathias Peter Hürter (1904-1988), stayed behind in Nanjing to take care of the embassy business.

On December 8, 1937, when Japanese troops reached the suburbs of Nanjing, the remaining officials of the American, British, and German embassies decided to go with their respective nationals on board the American and British gunboats and merchant vessels anchored in the Yangtze above the Nanjing harbor. The British consul accommodated the German consular group first on a hulk with other Europeans and hundreds of Chinese refugees, and later moved them to the passenger ship SS *Whangpu* on December 11 for better accommodation. As the Japanese authorities urged to evacuate all the foreigners from Nanjing, Rosen and Hürter returned to the city on December 9, attempting to persuade the remaining five Germans and one Austrian to leave, but none of them were persuaded.[43]

However, their evacuating journey proved to be a dangerous ordeal. Shortly after lunch on December 11, Japanese artilleries shelled the British shipping concentration. Both merchant ships and gunboats of the convoy raced upstream at full speed to outrun the shells. The shelling pursued them for over an hour before they located safe anchorage about 15 miles above Nanjing in the evening. (p. 252)

December 12, however, turned out to be even more dangerous and nerve wracking. “In the morning hours, Japanese infantrymen from tugs and pontoons landed nearby, first killing some harmless civilians on land and on junks, as was their custom, and then cruised around our ship convoy so that they had plenty opportunities to convince themselves of the neutral and peaceful nature of our ship concentration.” (pp. 253-254)

Just as they felt their safety was assured after the Japanese cruised around the convoy, suddenly at 13:30 three Japanese bombers swooped in to drop nine bombs.

Though there was no direct hit on any ship, considerable damage was done to the SS *Whangpu*, due to air blast and splintering effect. As a result, all the foreign passengers on the SS *Whangpu* were transferred to the HMS *Scarab* and the HMS *Cricket*. As the German officials were being transported in a small tug to the HMS *Cricket* around 14:30, three Japanese planes appeared, dived and dropped six more bombs. However, the machine guns and revolver guns on both gunboats fired to keep the planes from diving low, and no damage was done.

The American Yangtze patrol gunboat USS *Panay* was not that fortunate. At about 13:40, Japanese planes attacked the American convoy, which consisted of the USS *Panay* and Standard-Vacuum Oil Company's tankers, several miles upstream from the British shipping concentration. The USS *Panay* was hit by more than 20 bombs and sank at 15:54. The two tankers were sunk and others damaged as well.[44]

The Japanese air strikes on the British convoy, however, were not over yet. At 16:10, the convoy sustained its third round of Japanese air-raid. The Japanese dropped four more bombs, but again, thanks to the effective anti-aircraft defense from the British gunboats, the air strike did not result in damage to the convoy.[45]

After getting assurance from the Japanese that there would be no more air-raids, the German diplomats went back aboard the SS *Whangpu* on the 14th, but, assuming that they could land at Nanjing in a few days, they soon returned to the HMS *Cricket* once again and stayed with her until the HMS *Bee* arrived from Wuhu on the 18th, when the latter took them to the Nanjing waters. The captain of the HMS *Bee* attempted to persuade the Japanese to allow

> the return of the British officials with us on the *Bee* and our own return to Nanjing. This was denied on the pretext that Chinese irregular soldiers were still at work. The real reason, however, is that the Japanese did not want to let us see how horribly the totally undisciplined Japanese troops had been rampaging among the civilian population of Nanjing. As a result, we and our British colleagues decided to join the 2nd convoy on the 20th, which arrived in Shanghai under the guidance of a Japanese destroyer without incident on the 21st. As we went past the port suburb of Nanjing Xiaguan, we were able to observe not only the considerable destruction but also several piles of corpses – the bodies were clad in civilian clothes. (pp. 256-257)

Reports dispatched by Georg Friedrich Murad Rosen (1895-1961)

Rosen and his staff arrived in Shanghai on the British steamer SS *Suiwo (瑞和)* and stayed in Shanghai until they were allowed to return to Nanjing. Around noon on January 9, 1938, the HMS *Cricket* arrived at the Xiaguan dock, with Georg Rosen, Paul Scharffenberg, Alfred Hürter and Chinese secretary Sun Jicheng (孫积誠, 1897-1992), along with the British consular group, on board. As soon as they returned, they did investigations on the German property losses and damage, as well Japanese atrocities toward the surrendered Chinese soldiers and civilians and sent their reports to the German Embassy in Hankou and Foreign Office in Berlin. From January to mid-June, most of the cables, reports and documents were drafted and dispatched by Rosen.