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Overcoming the Retributive Nature of the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict



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We would like to dedicate this book to our beloved friend and mentor Thomas L. Saaty (1926–2017) for his untiring efforts, enthusiasm, and encouragement during the project that culminated with this book.

Preface

Overcoming the Retribute Nature of the Israeli Palestinian Conflict reflects a determined effort to address a seemingly irresolvable conflict. While we do not claim to have all the answers on how to untie a seeming Gordian knot stretching over an interminable period of time, we do have concrete recommendations on how to significantly move the ball forward. Our recommendations, presented in detail, are not based on a pipe dream, reflecting half-baked ideas, but rather the results of an extraordinary set of meetings in Pittsburgh, PA, USA, and Spain, over the course of more than a decade.

We are not the first to participate in such an undertaking. However, what distinguishes our effort, distinct from those that came before us, is that our work is predicated on a mathematical, hierarchical model called the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). It is the application of a prioritization-based approach rather than the traditional, zero-sum game model that enables us to state with a fair degree of confidence: implementation of the AHP suggestions will make a remarkably significant contribution to solving the conflict.

There is, of course, an important caveat of which we are well aware: at the end of the day, peace is made by leaders who convene, sometimes for an extended period of time, occasionally with great anger and distrust. The maxim that peace is made among enemies, not friends, is as true regarding this conflict as any other. More than that, we do not—under any circumstances—assert that the AHP comes instead of decision makers, carrying historical, political, religious, and personal baggage. But we do believe the AHP, as discussed at length in this book, gives decision makers tools unlike any other existing model.

The book¹ reflects our distinct disciplines, experiences, and backgrounds. Parts of the book are mathematical in focus; other parts are more conversational. The sum

¹This book contains excerpts from papers or book chapters previously published in the process of developing the AHP proposed solution, and during the project conducted that yielded the results presented in the book. The following papers and book have been used in the preparation of this book:

total is an accurate barometer of our efforts these past years. For a reader whose orientation is mathematical models and numerical analysis, sections of the book will be familiar and highly relatable. For a reader whose focus is history-law-politics, other sections will be more comprehensible.

This approach is deliberate both because it reflects our own academic disciplines and because it is the most accurate manifestation of our approach to the conflict. To create a way forward for decision makers, traditional methods are not effective and therefore a creative mechanism fills the void. It is in that spirit that we have dedicated years to this project and the reason we have written this book.

The book is intended for a wide range of audiences; while, admittedly, some of the text may be challenging for those not steeped in mathematics, the discussion and explanation are intended to facilitate sufficient understanding to appreciate the applicability of what we propose. We took this into consideration when deciding both how to write the book and how to frame the discussion. We recommend the reader keep a sharp focus on the true objective of this project: to give decision makers tools for their toolbox they otherwise do not have. It is clear that numerous tools are missing from that elusive toolbox; adoption of what to discuss will significantly enrich the possibilities.

While we do not claim to step into the shoes of decision makers, we do note that the proposed resolutions that are at the core of this book reflect the collective wisdom of individuals who are, truly, subject matter experts. While we cannot disclose their identity, the reader will have to take our word that the Israelis and Palestinians we convened over the course of many years, in multiple locations in the world, under an absolute guarantee of anonymity, brought significant knowledge to the discussion.

There was mutual respect among the participants, some who knew each other from previous engagements. For some, the AHP presented a significant challenge; ultimately, all understood its benefit and value. Needless to say, arguments were part and parcel of the gatherings; sometimes, the arguments were loud and vociferous. That should come as no surprise to anyone who has spent time in the region.

However, while occasionally voices were raised and tempers flared, all participants were fully committed to the undertaking. There was, whether directly or tacitly acknowledged, an understanding that the AHP's uniqueness deserved their attention and merited their time and effort. This book, in its distinct voices, seeks to bring that

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level of commitment to reader and decision maker alike. If the book makes even a sliver of a contribution to resolution of the conflict, no one would be happier than us.

Overcoming the Retribute Nature of the Israeli Palestinian Conflict is structured as follows. Chapter 1 describes the goals and objectives of the project on which this book is based. Chapter 2 lays out the origins, the evolution, and attempts at resolving the conflict. Chapter 3 summarizes the theory of the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) used to model the group decision methodology employed in the analysis of the conflict. Chapter 4 describes how conflicts of a retributive nature can be studied with the AHP. These conflicts involve benefits, costs, perceived benefits, and perceived costs of concessions (trade-offs) made by the parties. The main trade-off mechanism is introduced and illustrated with a basic negotiation case. Chapter 5 describes the hierarchies of benefits, costs, perceived benefits, and perceived costs needed to evaluate concessions (trade-offs) from the parties. Chapter 6 gives a description of the lessons learned in the process of using the AHP up to that point in time in the project. Chapter 7 uses judgments elicited from the participants in the project to evaluate concessions and build the core of a fair and equitable agreement. Chapter 8 develops each of the principles into actionable steps for implementation. Chapter 9 shows in detail how the Palestinian refugee problem could be solved. Chapter 10 describes what is needed to succeed in the implementation of the agreement by drawing from actual situations learned after the Oslo Accords were implemented. Finally, Chap. 11 looks ahead. This is the most difficult chapter due to recent developments as of the time of the finishing of the writing of this book in the spring of 2021.

The agreement developed in this book did not include Gaza as part of the discussions. However, one of the principles (#2) states "...Israel must respect the territorial integrity of the West Bank and Gaza by allowing free and safe passage between the two areas" So, albeit indirectly, the participants considered the inclusion of Gaza as part of the agreement. We were not concerned with which political party was in power as long as compromise and cooperation are part of the agenda.

Just because the future looks grim now it does not mean there is no path forward in which all parties involved can cooperate to find a fair and equitable solution. The results of this book show that only through cooperation an acceptable solution to both parties is attainable. Extreme positions only lead to radical solutions in which only one party will win, and the zero-sum paradigm will take hold. As we have seen, that is ultimately not a solution and is best defined as "lose-lose."

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Chapter 1

Laying the Groundwork



This book introduces a process to address the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. It does so in two ways that are different from past efforts. The first is by formally structuring the conflict, and the second is the way discussions are conducted and conclusions drawn. The effort is to create an objective, rather than subjective, model for resolving the conflict. As aspirational as that sounds, if not improbable as it may be, we believe that we have developed a workable model that is applicable to the conflict. We are confident because we have seen it in action; the model enables decision makers to engage in negotiations dramatically different from the traditional “zero-sum game” approach that has largely defined Israeli–Palestinian negotiations.

That has been the case over the years whether the parties negotiated with or without third parties having a seat at the table. While exceptions exist—the Oslo Peace Process is the obvious example—the reality is that as these lines are written, to suggest peace is in the offing would be an extraordinary exaggeration. While, perhaps, the contemporary stalemate is perceived by current Israeli and Palestinian leadership as beneficial to their specific, narrow tactical calculations, that truculence does not portend well for the years to come. This is despite the fact that there is little, if any, clamoring for resolving the conflict among Israelis and Palestinians. It is as if leadership and public alike have come to accept the status quo as tolerable, if not permanent.

Nevertheless, the model we discuss in this book—reflecting our active engagement in small group settings with Israelis and Palestinians—provides a path forward for resolving the conflict. Our approach provides negotiators with a unique pathway to consider the thorny issues and corresponding concessions underlying the deliberations, together with their implementation. The approach has been successfully applied in both South Africa (Saaty, 1988) and in Northern Ireland (Alexander & Saaty, 1977a, 1977b). The outcomes of this process added valuable dimension to the discussions and resolutions of those conflicts. That is what we set out to do in this book. That is our primary purpose and what drives this undertaking.

This is not a history book in the traditional sense, nor a book about politics and international relations. We do not argue which side is right, which side has suffered

more, which side has history in its corner, which side is more effective in the contemporary global arena, which side has more justified claims, or which side is the winner and which side is the loser. Those issues we leave to others for that is neither our purpose nor intent. Similarly, we do not engage in conversation regarding the broader Middle East. We eschew examination of Palestinian relations with the Arab world, Turkey, and Iran; similarly, we do not analyze Israeli relations with the broader Middle East, including the peace agreement with the Emirates and what may follow in its footsteps. In that vein, we avoid discussion of broader geopolitics and trigger points in the Middle East, whether it is Iran's nascent nuclear capabilities, ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Syria, or the complicated roles of the USA and Russia in the region.

We make a committed effort to “drown” out all external noise not specifically germane to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, narrowly defined. There is, however, an important caveat: the historical role played primarily, albeit not exclusively, by the USA to bring the parties together. We will examine that and other foreign involvements in various peace processes—such as the Oslo Peace Process—given their relevance to our narrow focus, but avoid broader discussion regarding foreign engagement, if not intervention, in the Middle East. That is in accordance with our very specific and narrow focus.

What does interest us is presenting to the reader an alternative mechanism to resolve what is widely understood to be an all but intractable conflict between two parties fighting over a small piece of land. The means we suggest are distinct from traditional approaches; they reflect an effort to engage in the conflict from an objective, rather than subjective, perspective. While the reader may look asunder at the notion of such an approach—after all much of the conflict is about emotion—we truly believe that our alternative model deserves an audience who is at the core of this undertaking. Understandably, an alternative model may raise eyebrows and be greeted with skepticism and doubt. We understand that and welcome the challenge of convincing the reader of the viability and validity of a fresh approach distinct from traditional orthodoxies.

At the center of the approach used is the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). We explain it in more detail in Chap. 3. Here is a summary of what the AHP is about. It is a scientific approach used to determine the relative importance of a set of activities or criteria. The novel aspect and major distinction of this approach is that it structures any complex, multi-person, multi-criteria, and multi-period problem hierarchically. Hierarchies are used to decompose the problem from the general to the particular. For example, the top level could be the goal, the next level could comprise the criteria to reach the goal, and the third level contains the alternative courses of action to be compared according to the criteria. Using a method for scaling the weights of the elements in each level of the hierarchy with respect to an element (e.g., a criterion or property they share) of the next higher level, comparisons of the activities in pairs can be elicited from decision makers. Each comparison indicates the strength with which one element dominates another with respect to a given criterion. Structurally, the hierarchy is broken down into a series of comparisons. For example, given a criterion and two alternatives, which alternative is more important according to that

criterion and by how much? The answer to this question is a judgment translated into a numerical value using Table 3.1.

This scaling formulation yields a unique vector of priority weights for each level of the hierarchy (always with respect to the criteria in the level above), which in turn results in a single composite vector of weights for the entire hierarchy. This vector measures the relative priority of all entities at the lowest level that enables the accomplishment of the highest objective of the hierarchy. These relative priority weights can provide guidelines for the allocation of resources among the entities at the lower levels of the hierarchy. When hierarchies are designed to reflect likely environmental scenarios, corporate objectives, current and proposed product/market alternatives, and various marketing strategy options, the AHP can provide a framework and methodology for the determination of several key corporate and marketing decisions.

While we focus on a unique approach, we are not oblivious to the human complexity, if not tragedy, of the conflict. Perhaps to the uninitiated, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict should be readily solvable. If Ireland and England could reach an agreement over the future of Northern Ireland, albeit a rocky agreement, then why is this conflict still unresolved? In the same vein, if South Africans were able to come together and undo institutionalized apartheid and replace a white minority government with a black majority government, then why should Israelis and Palestinians not convene around a table—whether brought together by a third party or not—and resolve, once and for all, the issues that prevent a just settlement for all concerned? While efforts have been made over the years, some meeting with success (e.g., the Oslo Accords, see U.S. Dept. of State, 1993), none has been sufficiently effective to enable the parties to jump over the final hurdle to reach the all-elusive finish line.

There is an endless litany of reasons for this ultimate failure for that is the only way to assess the on-the-ground reality. Truth be told, except for extremists on both sides, or those comfortable with the status quo, akin to a “permanent low-grade fever,” the current situation reflects a stalemate whereby neither side is satisfied. Fifty-three years after the 1967 Six Day War, when Israel defeated Jordan, Egypt, and Syria gaining significant land including the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip (from Egypt), the Golan Heights (from Syria), and the West Bank and East Jerusalem (from Jordan), the permanent status of the West Bank-Gaza Strip is as uncertain today as it was on the morning of June 10, 1967, when Palestinians in both areas woke up to a new reality: living under an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Military Government.

As Israel has never annexed the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, neither is subject to Israeli sovereignty but, rather, both live under a military government. While the Oslo Peace Accords and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and subsequent Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip changed the relationship between Palestinians and Israel, that impact is ultimately limited, for a Palestinian state exercising sovereignty over land and people has yet to be created. In other words, while the Oslo Accords were a significant step forward as the PA exercises some jurisdiction over the Palestinian population, it is not—and must not be—understood to be akin to an independent state.

In suggesting a model for resolving the conflict, we have, as our goal, a path leading to a two-state solution, the State of Israel and the State of Palestine. However, an important caveat is in order. The caveat, with which we have struggled during the years we have been working on this issue with Palestinians and Israelis, is a question that “hangs in the air” when engaging with Palestinians regarding the contours of a future state. There is, understandably, discomfort surrounding this question because it cuts to the core of whether a Palestinian state would encompass Palestinians living in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, or just the West Bank. A few years ago, one of us met with a senior Palestinian official and when this subject was broached, the response was direct, “leave us alone until we have our own house in order.” The reference left little doubt: only the Palestinians can resolve this matter. Fair enough. However, in proposing a road map for resolving the conflict, that is not an applicable approach.

We are aware of the bitter internecine conflict between Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip and those living in the West Bank. That has been made consistently clear to us during our work on this project. It has been articulated in different forums, discretely or otherwise, by Palestinians for years. We are not oblivious to the tension, in the past morphing into violent confrontation between the PA and Hamas which effectively rules the Gaza Strip. It is not an exaggeration to state that the PA exercises no control or influence over the lives of Palestinians residing in the Gaza Strip. This issue raises an important dilemma that demands resolution in how we present this book. We do not take this question lightly for we are aware of its tensions and controversies.

After careful consideration and reflecting our years-long engagement with Palestinians, we have decided that although our focus in this project on a two-state solution was centered around the West Bank and Israel, the solution that is proposed here is applicable to Gaza. One of the principles (#2) derived from this work states that the State of Palestine must allow its citizens to have free and safe passage to and from all sites within it. The proposed solution does not depend on which party is in power as long as that party seeks a fair and equitable solution to all parties involved. This is not made lightly but we rely heavily on what Palestinians with whom we have met have repeatedly emphasized. We understand and respect the discomfort, if not anger, this will elicit. Nevertheless, we believe this to be the correct approach. Furthermore, this decision—controversial and discomforting as it may be—reflects what we have learned over the years in engagement with Israelis and Palestinians with whom we met in an effort to develop a framework for resolution of the conflict.

We met in small groups in discrete settings with individuals we identified as deeply knowledgeable and fully versed in the intricate details of the conflict. Those individuals were not official representatives of either the State of Israel or the Palestinian Authority. We guaranteed participants absolute confidentiality regarding their involvement; we felt this was necessary to ensure frank, even heated, discussions that demanded candor and honesty. We exercised discretion if we felt a participant was unwilling to respect the terms of agreement to which each participant was duty bound.

As a result of our efforts, we authored a document that has been made available exclusively to decision makers on both sides. The document which is intended to serve as a road map has not been made available to the wider public. The road map reflects a “win-win” approach—the essence of prioritization—whereby both sides can walk away with a sense of achievement and accomplishment, rather than feeling the other side got the upper hand. This is intended to assuage concerns in the context of domestic consumption; after all, the selling of an agreement is no less important than its details. This is an issue we shall explore at some length in this book.

While the period from 1967 to the outbreak of the First Palestinian Intifada (December 1987–1993) was largely marked by passivity, if not begrudging acceptance of the IDF’s presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the subsequent three decades have been marked by significant violence and bloodshed, with a peak in the Second Intifada, 2001–2005 (Vox, 2018). The term passivity (1967–1987) may raise eyebrows in some quarters; some suggest a period of adjustment more accurately reflects the 20-year period; others theorize it took that long for the population to fully internalize the dramatic shift from living under Jordanian rule to living under a military government.

Perhaps for that reason, efforts to resolve the conflict were undertaken only in the aftermath of the Palestinian “uprising”—(1987–1993)—rather than in the previous twenty years. Whether those twenty years (1967–1987) were “wasted” is a matter of historical debate; what is clear is opportunities that may have existed to develop mechanisms for a just and lasting agreement between Israel and the Palestinians were not explored with any degree of seriousness. That is explained, in part, by a (in retrospect) tragic euphoria that characterized Israeli society from June 1967 to October 1973. That six-year period—from the Six-Day War to the Yom Kippur War—gave many Israelis a sense of invincibility, after the stunning victory over the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. It was in that period that Jewish settlements began to be built in the West Bank as the powerful sense—for the Israeli religious right—of a messianic return to the historic Land of the Bible.

It is well-nigh impossible to resolve the conflict without addressing the question of the settlements; to suggest they have been front and center in the conflict is an enormous understatement. That was repeatedly made clear to us in all our meetings. While there is an understanding, spoken and unspoken, among the Palestinians that even were a Palestinian state to be established in the West Bank it is impossible—practically and politically—to remove all the settlements that have been built in the past few decades. To sharpen the point: since 1967, the right–left divide in Israel has focused on one question: the future of the settlements and the end of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. A caveat is in order: the phrases “end of the settlements” and “Israeli occupation” are rejected by the Israeli right who favor (as we shall discuss) annexation of parts (if not all) of the West Bank and refuse to use the term “occupation” when referring to the relationship between Israel and the West Bank. As we shall come to see, nuances and terminology are of extraordinary importance in our analysis.

In exploring Israeli–Palestinian negotiations, our primary focus is to present to the reader a model that we believe can chart a way forward. That model enabled the

crafting of the road map document to which we will refer frequently throughout this book. While we will reference the “road map” document we have created, we will not share it in full in accordance with terms of participation in the discussions we conducted. We are convinced of its relevance and saliency as we have applied it elsewhere. Simply put, we know it works. To understand it will require the reader to engage in a willingness to think outside the box in analyzing negotiations through a mathematical model. Readers uncomfortable with mathematical modeling need not be concerned as the explanations will be “user friendly.” The word “model” is used deliberately, signaling to the reader that our approach is predicated on a systemic, systematic approach enabling prioritization of desired goals. That is very different from the traditional negotiating model. In undertaking this project, we were hopeful the parties could examine this historical conflict from a different perspective, using an approach whereby each side “wins,” rather than the more traditional, “zero-sum game” mechanism whereby the gains of one side are the losses of the other.

Nevertheless, to strive for cogency and coherence we offer below our definitions. However, it is more complicated than that. As an example: for some, the mere term “Palestinians” is a red herring as they reject, from the outset, the very notion that the term is viable, denying the essence of a Palestinian people. For others, Israel’s right to exist is an abomination and they are consistent in their determined efforts to reject that the State of Israel is legitimate.

The same controversy applies to the territory captured by Israel in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War; what for some is “occupied” is for others “liberated” and what for some is the “West Bank” is for others “Judea and Samaria” and “Greater Israel.” For those relying on the Hebrew Bible the entire discussion is moot for this is the Land of Israel and no contemporary examination is relevant to what the Divine ordained. For others, the existence of Jewish settlements on land captured in the Six-Day War is THE primary roadblock to resolving the conflict; absent an Israeli decision to withdraw, peace will be forever elusive.

This is akin to the terminological dispute, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. The semantic discussion is important; in some cases it is, unfortunately, *casus belli*. That is one of the tragic realities when considering this most complex conflict. For the purposes of this book, we suggest the following definitions, taking into consideration objections will be raised in some quarters regarding some of the definitions:

- West Bank: the area between pre-1967 Six-Day War Israel and the Jordan River; the “border” between the West Bank and Israel is commonly referred to as the Green Line though there is no official border.
- Gaza Strip: as commonly denoted on agreed upon maps.
- Palestinian Authority: as defined in the Oslo Peace Accords, while there is no Palestinian state as recognized by commonly accepted international law, the PA has state-like functions, albeit is not defined as a State. Jewish settlements: cities in the West Bank built by the Israeli government after 1967, exclusively populated by Jews.
- Areas A, B, and C: areas in the West Bank demarcated by the Oslo Peace Accords.

We will ascribe the pushback to “reasonable minds can reasonably disagree.”

In the next chapter, we discuss the origins, evolution, and attempts to resolve the conflict without being too detailed and/or exhaustive. Thus, we only describe the main events that took place in the conflict that led to the current situation when we try to use our approach.

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Chapter 2

The Middle East Conflict: Origins, Evolution, and Attempts to Resolve



Introduction

When future Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion (born David Grün, he adopted the Hebrew name Ben-Gurion, after the Jewish leading figure Joseph ben Gurion of the Great Jewish Revolt against the Romans) arrived in Palestine in 1906, he ignored the fact that the land was populated by a non-Jewish majority. While the Land of Israel has powerful religious, historical, social, and cultural importance for Jews—religious and non-religious alike—the majority population in 1906 was Moslem. That is a fact. However, that fact does not diminish the 5000-year Biblical connection between the Land of Israel and the Jewish people. That, too, is a fact. These are not competing truths for both are true; these truths—while largely not in dispute—do not prevent an ongoing battle of the narrative. In many ways, that battle is at the root of the conflict; each side claims its historical superiority, each side stakes a claim that it “was here first,” and each side believes its claims to be the mantle of historical ascendancy.

The ties to the land are deep. For many people those ties define their existential existence, impacting the capability—and willingness—to have a rational discussion regarding how to resolve the conflict. Some, truth be told, have no interest in resolving the conflict; after all, resolution implies compromise, suggesting legitimacy of the other side’s claims. There are, obviously, other conflicts that demand the world’s attention, whether in the Middle East or elsewhere. The world, after all, is rife with tension points, wars, and battles. However, for a variety of reasons—without minimizing the importance of other conflicts—there is “something” about the Israel-Palestinian conflict that attracts international attention like no other. The conflict stirs passion, even among those whose knowledge is minimal at best; it has become an inherent part of US elections, unlike almost any other international conflict point. The reasons are varied, various, too disparate to count.

The conflict has been the source of endless soundbites, mantras, statements, position papers, white papers, debate, and heated discussion. It is as if “everyone”

has a position on the conflict; the list of experts is only as long as the list of “experts.” Events, seemingly unrelated to the conflict, are linked to it, oftentimes for no understandable reason. Perhaps that is because of the centrality of Jerusalem to all three monotheistic faiths; perhaps because of the extent of American financial support of Israel; perhaps because of lobbying efforts by various organizations resulting in political pressure, real or imagined; perhaps because of an effort to cast the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as the centerpiece of the Middle East. Whether for these, or other reasons, the conflict has for decades attracted an extraordinary amount of attention.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the efforts—regardless of their genuine-ness, good faith, and sincerity—the conflict is no closer to resolution than decades ago. What makes the undertaking to resolve so extraordinarily difficult is the lack of core understanding, or agreement, regarding the source of the conflict, much less a mutually desirable endpoint. The lack of consensus regarding the most desired and most achievable result is a reality that negotiators have confronted for years. Whether one is religious or not, it is all but impossible to ignore the role faith plays in the historical underpinning of the conflict.

For Jews, whether a person of faith or not, the connection to the land is rooted in archeology, history, and documented events. Aside from the Biblical narrative recounted in the Torah, archaeological evidence points to the existence of Israel as far back as 1213 BCE. It is irrelevant whether all that is written in the Hebrew Bible is historically “fool-proof”; what is important is the 5000-year yearning of Jews to return to the Land of Israel. The phrase “next year in Jerusalem,” which concludes the Passover Seder, resonates with Jews worldwide and represents the historical ties to the Land of Israel. None of this, however, undermines Palestinian claims to the land. Palestinian claims to the land are no less legitimate, and they demand being heard and addressed. Despite extremist views on both sides denying the very existence of a Palestinian people or denying the legitimacy of a State of Israel, both sides in this conflict deserve to have their claims respected.

The amorphism “land without a people, people without a land” has been used to describe the paradigm from the Jewish perspective; its meaning is clear regarding the deep connection between the Jewish people and the Land. It also ignores the fact that Muslims-Arabs-Palestinians were living on that land when Jews began settling it. The Jewish movement to the Land of Israel/Palestine beginning in the late 1880s and continuing through the 1930s was a direct reflection of Zionism as articulated by Theodore Herzl (Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2004). Herzl, a Viennese Jew, was profoundly impacted by the Dreyfus Trial, believing the anti-Semitism at the trial’s root signaled European Jews must leave (Britannica, 2010). That was amplified in the aftermath of the Kishinev Pogroms (The Harvard Gazette, 2009). In addition to Jews moving to/back to the Land of Israel—this is referred to as “Making Aliyah,” literally “moving up”—there were 10,000 Jews living in Palestine, the overwhelming religious, eking out, largely, a meager existence. For a broader discussion on this issue, please see (DellaPergola, 2003).

During the years that the Ottoman Empire (1516–1917) (Shaw & Yapp, 2021) ruled Palestine, relations between the minority Jewish community and the majority