Phenomenology

AN INTRODUCTION

Second Edition

Stephan Käufer & Anthony Chemero

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An Introduction

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Introduction

Phenomenology is a loosely grouped philosophical tradition that began with Edmund Husserl in the 1890s and is still practiced today, though some of its current instantiations no longer use the name. The tradition is old enough to have a history, and it includes claims that seem odd, quaint, or outdated. And yet it is recent enough that even the work of its founders is alive with ideas that still challenge us and hold great promise. Arguably philosophers are only now beginning to fully appreciate the core insights of phenomenology, as we learn to construct rigorous analyses of perception and cognition in a phenomenological framework.

This book covers what we believe an interested reader ought to know about phenomenology, its history, its most important authors and works, and its influence on branches of current philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. We discuss the history of phenomenology through the work of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, their arguments against scientific psychology, and their critical examination of Gestalt psychology. As part of this history, we also include extended discussions of Gurwitsch, Sartre, and the history of psychology. We go on to discuss contemporary developments in critical phenomenology of gender and race, ecological psychology, critiques of cognitivist approaches to artificial intelligence, and embodied cognitive science. This mix of topics and level of detail make this a good textbook for undergraduates studying philosophy, psychology, or cognitive science, and a good starting point for graduate students and academics who are new to phenomenology.

What you will not find in this book

Here is one way to explain our focus and distinguish it from strains of phenomenology that we will not pursue in this book. One prominent concern of phenomenology has been to provide an account of the structures that make a shared, objective world intelligible. This account focuses on perception and cognition, and recognizes that bodies and skills are fundamental in making up this intelligibility. We consider this to be the central, most important, and most productive strain of phenomenology, and this book is intended to give a clear introduction to it.

Another strain of phenomenology, which we can only explore briefly in this book, is concerned to give a description of subjective experiences, especially of experiences that are unusual and hard to explain. So, for example, phenomenology might provide an analysis of what it is like to experience religious faith, overpowering sentiments such as love or anxiety, aesthetic highs, inescapable ambiguities and paradoxes, and so forth. This is an important task, and quite often it intermingles with the first task. In Heidegger's work, in particular, an understanding of anxiety and contingency is part and parcel of his explanation of the intelligibility of the world. In general, Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty were broad and innovative thinkers and their writings touch on art, religion, politics, aesthetics, and morality. Existentialism is largely an offshoot of phenomenology, and so is much critical theory in literary studies. Consequently, phenomenology has influenced many different fields, too many to cover in a single book. Browse the faculty pages of a university website, and you may find a large number of people in literature departments, film and theater studies, theology, art, and political science who identify their work as "phenomenology." We do not deny the importance of this

phenomenology in these various fields. But a single book cannot presume to cover all this material. Our choice of topics and authors is motivated primarily by our conviction that contemporary work on embodied cognitive science is a particularly clear and relevant continuation of the most central concerns that Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty were pursuing.

A further preliminary distinction might be helpful. As is well known, English-speaking philosophy has for over half a century perceived a division between so-called “analytic” and “continental” approaches. Some philosophers on either side of the divide want to identify phenomenology with the “continental” approach, either to acclaim or to disparage the entire tradition wholesale. Those who prefer a “continental” approach would probably choose a sequence of authors that leads from Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to Sartre, Derrida, and Levinas, and perhaps more current authors such as Badiou. That is a fine sequence of authors to study, and such overviews are available in many other books. But that is not our approach. We do not think the distinction is helpful or accurate at all, even aside from the obvious incongruity that “continental” is a geographic term while “analytic” is a stylistic or methodological one. Much analytic philosophy is done on the continent, and much good work in English-language philosophy consists of using analytic methods to explain the work of European philosophers. That is what we aim to do in this book. The goal of all philosophy, we think, is to give as clear an account as possible of the best available view on the big questions that motivate philosophy in the first place. We think that Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty articulate hard-won insights into the nature of the human ability to make sense of the world. Their writing is sometimes obscure, because they address very fundamental questions, make unexpected proposals that fly

in the face of centuries of philosophical tradition, and often invent new language to render their ideas. Our job is to use what scholars have learned over the past decades to try to make it easier for today's students to appreciate the insights of phenomenology.

Phenomenology now

A broad range of researchers in philosophy and psychology departments are empirically and conceptually investigating affordances, or the role of our bodies in perception and cognition, or action as a condition for maintaining a sense of the self. We claim that such work is not merely *influenced* by phenomenology, something that most of these people would readily accede to whether they have read Heidegger or not. We think that they are *doing* phenomenology, insofar as they are pursuing the basic ideas and insights this tradition was founded on. Still, some readers may be surprised that ecological psychology and embodied cognitive science belong among the proper successors of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. This is understandable, because the chain of influence that leads from Heidegger to, say, Gibson, dynamical systems theory, or enactivism is not clear or well known. It is easier and more common to point out more obvious threads, such as that Merleau-Ponty and Sartre were friends and collaborators for a while, and that Sartre was a giant in post-war French philosophy, from which Levinas, Derrida, and Deleuze emerged as important figures.

We hope that the narrative of this book vindicates our claim in detail, but here are two quick reminders that should make it plausible from the start. Merleau-Ponty's work is obviously indebted to Husserl, and even more deeply to Heidegger. The third big source of his thought is his sustained critical examination of Gestalt psychology. This

also had a major impact on Gibson, who was Kurt Koffka's colleague at Smith College for several years in the 1930s, just as Gibson was beginning to develop the first ideas of ecological psychology. Beyond this parallel influence of Gestalt psychology on Merleau-Ponty and Gibson, there was possibly a direct influence of the former on the latter. Though Gibson himself would deny it, some of his students recall that later he would often compare his work to Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception*, to the point of trying to ward off prospective graduate students by telling them they should read this impenetrable book first, and only come back when they had understood it.

More crucial than a common ancestry in Gestalt psychology is the work of Hubert Dreyfus, who brought the views of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty into current philosophy and cognitive science. In the 1960s and 1970s Dreyfus used his unusually insightful understanding of Heidegger's work to formulate sharp criticisms of the then burgeoning research projects in artificial intelligence. The following three decades of artificial intelligence research tell the history of the many ways in which Dreyfus' original critique transformed the field's understanding of human intelligence. It has led to many attempts to explain intelligent behavior in terms of the coupling of agent, body, and environment.

Why study phenomenology?

The simplest reason why you should study phenomenology is because everyone should. Even a fairly superficial study of Husserl, Heidegger, or Merleau-Ponty and those influenced by them can have a profound positive impact on your understanding of a host of issues relating to perception, cognition, and the general meaningfulness of human lives. Phenomenological approaches to a broad

spectrum of issues are interesting, accurate, and promising. Any serious study of philosophy or psychology ought to include at least some exposure to phenomenology.

At the more ponderous end of the spectrum, phenomenology is an ontology of human existence. Heidegger is most explicit about this, but Merleau-Ponty and Gibson also think of their work in these terms. So their work may lead you to think that people in general, and you specifically, are a different kind of entity than you might have thought. In particular, you might think that you experience the world by passively and reflectively cognizing objects; the phenomenologist, however, argues that you experience it through competent, unreflective action. At the more lively end, the authors and theories we discuss here provide a host of thought-provoking examples to make you question some basic assumptions about what we perceive. We do not see the shapes and sizes of objects, but the possible actions they afford us, invitations to act shaped by our own bodily capabilities. Such examples make reading about phenomenology both rewarding and entertaining.

If phenomenology is an important and influential school of thought, this is because the main phenomenologists think and write with remarkable insight and creativity. So another good reason to study phenomenology is to become familiar with Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty as authors. Though their writing can sometimes be unclear and frustrating, it is ultimately exhilarating.

Overview

This book proceeds in roughly chronological order and most chapters cover one main figure or movement. The chapters stand on their own, so if you are short on time or more interested in some topics than others, you can pick

and choose. However, the overall narrative is richer than a collection of individual portraits.

We have aimed to make this book easy to read without sacrificing accuracy or detail. We avoid jargon. While we use and define key technical terms proffered by the various authors, we think their insights are independent of any particular way of expressing them. In fact, you can only appreciate that phenomenology is alive and ongoing insofar as you can recognize that the same approach and the same basic views animate the different styles of the authors you will encounter in this book. We provide a glossary of key technical terms at the end of each chapter for reference.

Notes on the second edition

For the second edition, we have revised, reorganized, and expanded substantially. A list of the most important changes follows.

Chapter 2 "The Rise of Experimental Psychology" is a new chapter, collecting material that was spread across several chapters in the first edition, and with an additional section on the structuralism–functionalism debate in psychology. In its current form, it is better in keeping with the chronological structure employed in most of the rest of the book.

Chapter 3 "Edmund Husserl and Transcendental Phenomenology" has a new section on Husserl's writings on the body (section 3.5), the purpose of which is to draw closer connections between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.

Chapter 5 "Gestalt Psychology" collects material that was distributed across several chapters in the first edition.

Chapter 6 "Aron Gurwitsch: Merging Gestalt Psychology and Phenomenology" is entirely new. Gurwitsch is a key

figure in the history of phenomenology, and was a major influence on Merleau-Ponty.

Chapter 7 “Jean-Paul Sartre: Phenomenological Existentialism” is significantly expanded from the first edition. It now includes in-depth discussion of three more of Sartre’s major works, *The Transcendence of the Ego, The Imagination*, and *The Imaginary*.

Chapter 9 “Critical Phenomenology” is new to this edition. It collects and expands upon the discussions of the phenomenology of gender and race from the first edition, and includes new discussions of Frantz Fanon and trans phenomenology.

Chapter 12 “Enactivism and the Embodied Mind” is also new to this edition. It includes an expanded version of the basic discussion of enactivism from the first edition. It also includes new sections on 4E cognitive science and enactivist approaches to social cognition and language.

All citations give the date of the first edition listed in the references. Where English translations of foreign works are listed, they are the source of our quotations. Where no English translations are listed, the translations are our own.

1
Immanuel Kant: Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Background

Husserl thinks phenomenology is a new beginning in philosophy, a budding new science. At the same time he acknowledges the deep influence of the philosophical tradition. For most of his career he thinks of his work as "transcendental phenomenology," thus locating it within Kant's broad philosophical project. Heidegger similarly thinks he is making a new start, reawakening questions whose meaning, he claims, has been lost since antiquity. But he, too, knows that his work owes much to the tradition. Much of the first part of his most important book, *Being and Time*, has its origins in his earlier lectures on Aristotle. And in a lecture course in 1927 – the year *Being and Time* was published – he describes his deep involvement in Kant's work: "When, a few years ago, I studied the *Critique of Pure Reason* again and read it against the background of Husserl's phenomenology, it was as if the scales fell from my eyes, and Kant became for me an essential confirmation of the correctness of the path on which I was seeking" (Heidegger 1927/1928, p. 431). Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* is no less ambitious than the books of his two predecessors, although he is more modest in characterizing its revolutionary nature. He cites and refers to a vast literature of

nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy and psychology and develops his ideas in an active dialog with his contemporaries. At several points he, too, singles out the importance of Kant's transcendental framework.

It would be an endless exercise to attempt to explicate all the historical influences that shaped phenomenology. But we think it is important to spend a few pages reviewing central concepts from Kant's critical philosophy, because many of Kant's ideas have a very direct influence on Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. While, for the most part, these authors toil within Kant's overall framework, they are not Kantians in a strict sense. Kant comes in for some trenchant criticism. Heidegger sharply rejects Kant's focus on cognition through representations, and Merleau-Ponty similarly condemns Kant for ignoring the importance of the body and the indeterminateness of things in our experience. Gibson rails stridently against Kant's distinction between concepts and intuitions. Still, some of Kant's key arguments have clear successors in the work of the phenomenologists, and a quick overview of these arguments will prove helpful. For readers with some background in the history of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophy, most of this will be familiar.

1.1 Kant's critical philosophy

Kant is fond of astronomy. He thinks of it as an example of a discipline that struggled for a long time to produce theories and predictions with certainty, until Copernicus' revision of its foundation put it on what Kant calls "the secure path of a science." Kant likes to compare the main insight of his *Critique of Pure Reason* to this Copernican revolution. In the preface to the B edition (published in 1787), he writes:

> Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them *a priori* through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition. (Bxvi)

Copernicus enabled progress in astronomy by presupposing that the earth revolves around the sun, despite the intuitive evidence to the contrary. Kant sees himself as enabling progress in metaphysics. By metaphysics Kant means an account of non-empirical truths, that is, propositions that are necessarily true and whose truth we can establish without recourse to particular experiences of the world. He claims that we can only give such an account by presupposing, counter-intuitively, that objects conform to our *a priori* cognition of them, rather than the other way around. This claim is more readily expressed by saying that the structures of cognition *constitute* general features of objects or, as Kant himself puts it, that "we can cognize of things *a priori* only what we ourselves have put into them" (Bxviii). Besides constituting the objects of our experience, the same basic structures also constitute ourselves. So, although he is not consistently clear about this, Kant ends up with the view that subject and object are two interdependent poles in a single structure that constitutes the origin of meaningful experience. The task of philosophy is to analyze and spell out this underlying origin.

1.2 Intuitions and concepts

Cognition, says Kant, has two stems. On the one hand, we are receptive to sense data. Objects affect our sensory surfaces and give rise to a mostly unstructured "manifold"

of sense impressions that means nothing by itself, but is a necessary element of any experience of an object. Kant calls our capacity to be affected by objects our “sensibility,” and he calls this mental content “intuitions.” A book on the desk or a familiar face, for example, affect our sense surfaces and give us a manifold of visual or tactile sense data including colors, lines, lighting, smoothness, and so on. This manifold resembles what William James called a “blooming, buzzing confusion” in his *Principles of Psychology*. It is mostly unstructured, but not entirely, for the sense data present themselves in a temporal sequence and in a spatial arrangement. The spatial and temporal order may be vague at first, but at least we have a sense that the orange patch is distinct from the brown patch and both are distinct from myself, because we intuit them at different moments and as located in different places. Kant argues that all intuitions must come in some temporal sequence, and all intuitions of objects distinct from us – that is, objects in the world, as opposed to our own thoughts – must present themselves in some spatial arrangement. A rough intuition of space and time, then, underlies all our sense data.

On the other hand our mind also actively structures experiences. We do this by organizing mental content according to concepts. A concept is a rule for recognizing a given intuition or a set of already cognized objects as an instance of a general type. Kant calls our capacity for spontaneously ordering a manifold and recognizing it under a general type the “understanding.” The understanding organizes the orange and brown patches and lines given in intuition as edges of a compact, colored object on a smooth surface, and recognizes it as a book on a desk. Just as space and time underlie all intuition, the understanding has some basic concepts that are required for all active structuring of mental content. Kant thinks, for example,

that without basic notions of quantity (such as “one” or “many”), of negation, existence, or substance (a thing can persist as the same while some of its properties change), our understanding could never get off the ground. Kant produces a table of such basic concepts, which he calls the “categories.” The details of this table and Kant’s method for producing it may be challenged. But the overall point is well taken. A cognizer can certainly have experiences without *some* of our concepts. We can imagine a cognizer who lacks the concept of a book, of food, money, or whatever. But the categories are so fundamental to our cognition that without them no object-recognition, cognition, or experience is possible.

Obviously an unstructured manifold of intuitions is not yet an experience of anything. Less obviously, using concepts by themselves without applying them to intuitions also does not amount to an experience of anything. Cognition requires both stems. Kant puts this eloquently in a famous passage:

> Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. . . . The understanding is not capable of intuiting anything, and the senses are not capable of thinking anything. Only from their unification can cognition arise. (A51)

This two-stem feature of Kant’s theory of cognition is fairly radical. Most philosophers prior to Kant think that a sense impression of a book and the concept of a book are the same kind of mental content. Hume, for example, thinks that they differ only insofar as the sense impression is more vivid than the concept, which is an attenuated and modified copy of the original impression. Leibniz, by contrast, thinks that the concept is clearer and more distinct, while sense impressions are vague and imprecise instances of conceptually determined experience. Kant’s reasons for

claiming that intuitions and concepts cannot be reduced to one another derive mostly from his older argument about "incongruent counterparts," which are pairs of objects that are conceptually equivalent, but differ perceptually. Regardless, in his *Critique* he focuses much of his analysis on explaining how intuitions and concepts are brought together in consciousness to produce objective experience. And that is where his view becomes truly groundbreaking.

We saw above that metaphysics, for Kant, consists of non-empirical knowledge, which he also calls *a priori* knowledge, and that Kant is trying to explain how and to what extent such knowledge is possible. According to the two-stem view of cognition, Kant is committed to saying that metaphysical knowledge must consist of *a priori* intuitions and *a priori* concepts. Kant believes that there are such intuitions and concepts. In fact, they are precisely the important basic structures we just outlined – space and time for intuitions and the categories for concepts. This *a priori* mental content ultimately grounds all possible metaphysical knowledge.

Kant's argument that space, time, and the categories are *a priori* is fairly straightforward. All sense data are given as spatial and temporal (except for sense data that the mind gives to itself, which are only temporal). Since we need to have a representation of space and time in order to be given any sense data at all, we cannot derive our representation of space and time from what is given to us. Space and time are thus *a priori* intuitions. They cannot be *concepts*, because, as quoted above, Kant states explicitly that the understanding, that is, the faculty of concepts, "is not capable of intuiting anything."

Moreover, space and time display some crucial hallmarks of intuitions. For example, unlike concepts they are not general terms that have a lot of instances falling under

them. Different spaces or times are all parts of the same single space and time, not exemplars or instances of it. Kant's argument that the categories are *a priori* is similar. Since they are necessary preconditions for having any experience at all, we cannot derive them from experience. I cannot get my concepts of existence or unity from my visual and tactile experience of a book, because I must be able to conceive of single, existing things in order to have an experience of the book in the first place. But if the categories cannot be derived from experience, they are not empirical ("empirical" just means "derived from experience") and must be *a priori*.

If space, time, and the categories are not derived from experience, they must come from somewhere else. Kant thinks that they are innate in the human cognitive apparatus (and non-humans as well, if any of them are cognizers like us). Kant recognizes clearly that as subjective structures space, time, and the categories are specific to our experience. Space, he writes:

> is nothing other than the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible *for us*. . . . We can accordingly speak of space, extended beings, and so on, only from the human standpoint. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can acquire outer intuition . . . then the representation of space signifies nothing at all. (A26, emphasis added)

He makes analogous claims about time (A34–5). And Kant also acknowledges that there could be an altogether different kind of cognizer, whose mind would not require concepts at all. He envisions, for example, a "divine understanding, through whose representation the objects would themselves at the same time be given, or produced"

and notes that for such an understanding “the categories would have no significance at all” (B145).

Kant’s view that objects are intelligible to us only from the human standpoint is called his “transcendental idealism.” Idealism is the view that objects depend on our minds. Kant’s idealism is “transcendental,” because on his view this dependence only shows itself insofar as we consider the basic constitutive structures of the human standpoint. This is a specific, limited philosophical perspective that we only adopt when we are doing transcendental philosophy, that is, a philosophical analysis of the constitution of experience. For all ordinary and scientific purposes, we necessarily remain within the human standpoint, and must therefore be realists about objects. In fact the main lesson from transcendental philosophy is that the objects of experience have a lot of universal and necessary features that we can know about. Kant therefore pairs his transcendental idealism with a clear commitment to empirical realism. For example, he insists on:

> the reality (i.e., objective validity) of space in regard to everything that can come before us externally as an object, but at the same time the ideality of space in regard to things when they are considered in themselves through reason. (A28)

In this respect, Kant’s transcendental idealism differs from the views of Descartes or Berkeley, who doubted the reality of external objects from within the human standpoint.

1.3 The transcendental deduction

With this we have come to the crux of Kant’s critical philosophy, and also to the beginning of his most important and most difficult argument, the “transcendental deduction.” Obviously space, time, and the categories

constitute experience for us. We cannot have experience any other way. But why should we think that the forms of *our* sensibility and the basic concepts that *we* must rely on as a matter of the finitude of our minds are an appropriate fit for the way things really are? What rational justification can we have for taking our so-constituted experience to be objective? The purpose of Kant's transcendental deduction is to explain how these subjective conditions can constitute *objective* experience. Kant actually produces two versions of this long and complicated argument, one for each edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, accordingly known as the A-deduction and the B-deduction. They differ in the details, but have the same overall strategy. Like the table of categories (and much else in the *Critique*), some of the detailed claims Kant makes in the deduction can be challenged, and it is debatable whether the overall argument works. Scholars even debate what the structure of the deduction is, whether it consists of a single argument or two independent ones, what the premises are, and so on. However, all agree that the basic insights that drive the deduction are groundbreaking and define the development of post-Kantian philosophy for well over a century.

The deduction hinges on the notion of the unity of our consciousness. As is clear from the two-stem view, any cognition or experience of objects requires that the mind bring together given intuitions and concepts. This can only occur if the mind itself is unified. If one person has the sense data of the orange patch in her mind, while another has the concept of a book in hers, neither of the two perceives the book. All relevant mental content must be held and processed in the same, single mind. This much is obvious. Kant's genius lies in his realization that the requisite unity of consciousness is more complex and structured than others had realized, and he gives a stunningly subtle analysis of this complexity.

The unity of consciousness is not a passive state. The mind is not a receptacle, like a bowl in which we mix several ingredients to make a cake. Rather, Kant argues that the unity of consciousness is an active mental process of unifying. He calls this process *synthesis*, and he claims that the unity of consciousness that makes cognition possible is a *synthetic* unity. Synthesis is required even for the elementary task of intuiting a manifold of sense data. To have such a manifold, the mind needs to be aware of each element of the manifold, and it needs to be aware of them (or at least to represent them at a pre-cognitive level) as distinct from one another. To intuit an orange patch *and* a brown patch requires that I can represent the orange and the brown as well as their difference. The representation of their difference, and hence the representation of their "two-ness," or manifold, is more than the sum of two distinct representations. It requires the mind to apprehend one datum and keep it present, or reproduce it, while it apprehends the second. To further recognize these sense data as a book on a desk, or even just as a manifold of colored objects, the mind runs through this manifold of intuitions and organizes them according to a rule that constitutes the concept of that object. Kant therefore speaks of a "threefold synthesis" of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition. The A-deduction goes through this threefold synthesis in great detail. The B-deduction goes through it quickly and focuses on trying to spell out the important philosophical claims that follow from the recognition of this fundamental synthetic process.

The first consequence relates to the object side of the synthesis, and addresses the central question of the deduction. Since consciousness of anything is an achievement of synthesis, the structures implicit in this synthesis must be basic determinations of anything that we could encounter as an object of consciousness. That is to

say that the very notion of “object” has the structures that accrue to it in synthesis. Kant goes on to claim, more or less plausibly, that these structures are precisely the categories whose objectivity is in question, and that therefore the categories are objectively valid. Note that this conclusion is substantially stronger than the previously established claim that the categories are *a priori* concepts. One could think that concepts are *a priori*, that is, not derived from experience, and that we cannot help but use them in experiencing, but still doubt that they characterize intrinsic features of objects. This is what Hume thought about causation, for example. According to Hume, we cannot get the concept of causation from experience, so it is non-empirical, and we use it all the time in judging matters of fact. But we cannot rationally justify this use. One of Kant’s big goals in the *Critique* is to find a solution to Hume’s skepticism about the rational legitimacy of our *a priori* concepts. Kant therefore mentions Hume as one of his targets as he introduces the deduction (B128). In the deduction Kant concludes from the necessity of synthesis that we cannot even make sense of the notion of an object aside from categorical determinations. We cannot rationally entertain Hume’s skeptical worry about *objects*, because the fully understood notion of an object already answers the skepticism.

A second consequence has to do with self-consciousness. Just as a synthesis is required to represent a manifold, a synthesis is also a necessary condition for self-consciousness. In particular, Kant focuses on a kind of self-consciousness that he calls “apperception.” Apperception is my consciousness that a particular thought or cognition is mine. When I see the book on the table, I am conscious that *I* am perceiving it, or at least I can become conscious of this. In general, I can apperceive any act of my consciousness, for otherwise it would not count as an act of