

Universal- und kulturhistorische Studien –  
Studies in Universal and Cultural History

Michael Gehler  
Robert Rollinger *Editors*

# Empires to be remembered

Ancient Worlds through Modern Times



Springer VS

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Editors

# Empires to be remembered

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## Introduction

The contributions of this volume originate from an international conference held in Vienna, November 24–28, 2015, hosted by the Austrian Academy of Sciences. It is part of a larger project pursued by the editors of this volume dealing with a global and transdisciplinary approach toward the history of empires.<sup>1</sup> The conference was a follow-up of the conference in Hildesheim in 2010. Its intention has been twofold. On the one hand, it is aimed at shedding light on empires and empire-like formations that had been neglected at the conference in Hildesheim but that were regarded to represent interesting case studies for the development of a larger view on what “empire” means all through the epochs and world regions. On the other hand, it is intended to focus more specifically on one genuine aspect of empire history, whose importance has generally been overlooked but whose persistence was supposed to be one of the major results of the conference in Hildesheim. It is about the ongoing presence of empires, even after they came to an end in political terms. Empires survive even after they have gone. They become part of a discourse of memory that can be used for various purposes. Legitimization of subsequent empires or would-be empires is just one, but by far not the only one of them. Historiography and interest, orientation and education, framework and entertainment are just others. But what is important is the fact that empires are remembered for various reasons. Empires actually always survive somehow and thus become integral parts of larger restructuring and transformation processes.<sup>2</sup> As always, it has become evident during the Vienna conference that the available sources elucidate these processes of memorization in very different ways. For some empires they are very apparent and highly developed; in others they are much more difficult to trace. This said, although the aspect of remembrance is an important one for the contributions in this volume, it is much more present in some than in others.

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<sup>1</sup>In the meantime, five international meetings have been organized. The proceedings are either already published or will be forthcoming. See, apart from this volume, Gehler and Rollinger 2014a; Rollinger, Degen and Gehler 2020; Gehler, Rollinger, and Strobl 2022 (forthcoming); Nickel and Rollinger 2022 (forthcoming).

<sup>2</sup>See, e.g., the contributions of Hoffmann, Waters, Ruffing, Uluisik, and Rezakhani in this volume.

The conference was originally structured into eleven parts covering different regions, epochs, and approaches.<sup>3</sup> Although, unfortunately, some presentations could not be included in this volume, we nevertheless decided to structure the various contributions along this original outline, however with slight variations. The volume unites 20 papers that are focusing on the history of empire from the very beginning of history in the ancient Near East through the very present time. They encompass nearly all regions and continents of the world and thus develop a truly global perspective on the history of empire. The eleven parts are structured in different ways. Only some of them are truly geographical like Part III “Europe / Europa,” Part V “The Mediterranean and the Near East,” Part VIII “Southeast Asia”, and Part X “The Americas.” Others show a combination of geographical and chronological arrangements like Part VI “Central Asia before Islam” and Part VII “Iranian and Central Asian Formations of Empires in the Shadow of Mongol Rule.” Yet, others appear in a way which is more focused on certain subjects such as Part I “Theories of Empires: an ongoing debate,” Part II “Empires and Bureaucracies,” and Part XI “General Observations and Considerations,” or even a combination of geography, topic, and timeline, like Part IV “Early Medieval Steppe Empires in Europe”, and Part IX “Africa and Eurocentrism (before and beyond Empire).” The reason for this somehow motley mix of presentation, however, is not the editors’ inability to structure the various contributions in a more adequate way, but the colorful diversity of the phenomenon of empire by a perspective that takes global history at its word. Having said this, this trivial statement does not discharge the editors from their task to demonstrate the results of the conference in Vienna in a more general way and to apply them in a larger framework. This is part of the very first Part presented as a sort of summary on the state of the art concerning the “imperial turn” and the articles of this volume. This very last contribution is a much further developed and extended continuation of their general observations on the history of empires published in 2014.<sup>4</sup> It tries to adequately include the results of the papers of this volume and aims at generating a more nuanced and refined as well as an up-to-date perspective on the history of empires. It ends with a focused presentation of the basic results and some constructive thoughts for further research.

As always this volume would not have been possible without the help and assistance from many sides: We are grateful to Vera Machat and especially to Ulrike Rack from the Institute for Modern and Contemporary Historical Research (Austrian Academy of Sciences) for organizing the communication with the authors prior to the conference. We are very much indebted to both Astrid Rief and Hendrik Stanway from the Department of Ancient History and Ancient Near Eastern Studies of the University of Innsbruck for their invaluable help during the editing process of this volume. The conference as well as the production of this volume received rich funding from various sides. We are grateful to the

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<sup>3</sup>See [https://www.oeaw.ac.at/fileadmin/NEWS/2015/PDF/Einladung-Konferenz-Empires\\_24\\_28-11-2015\\_inz.pdf](https://www.oeaw.ac.at/fileadmin/NEWS/2015/PDF/Einladung-Konferenz-Empires_24_28-11-2015_inz.pdf)

<sup>4</sup>Gehler and Rollinger (2014b).

Austrian Academy of Sciences for hosting the conference and presenting a fantastic venue. We thank the City of Vienna, the University of Innsbruck, and Max Otte, Cologne, for their generosity without whose assistance neither the conference nor the publication of this volume would have been possible. Finally, we may express our hope that this volume and its contributions will find as many interested readers as possible, also in a global perspective, of course.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>The editorial work on this volume as well as the contribution Gehler/Rollinger has been finalized during my stay at the Getty Villa as Getty Guest Scholar for which I would like to express my gratitude (RR).

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**Part I**

**Theories of Empires: An Ongoing Debate**



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# Imperial Turn: Challenges, Problems and Questions

Michael Gehler and Robert Rollinger

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## 1 Reasons and Motivations for Newer and Younger Discourses on the Topic of Empire

Discussions on empires has significantly gained momentum since the late 1980s with Paul Kennedy's "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers".<sup>1</sup> It has experienced a noticeable boom both in public discourse and within scholarship, and it is present on many levels. It is encountered in feature articles, in the everyday political processing of world events, and in an abundance of scientific publications. The reasons for this astonishing development are widely varied, but they can be defined rather clearly. Essentially, several components can be named which carry the discussion and provide for both the increased scholarly interest and for the greater everyday political attention.

A decisive role is played by current political situations as well as by contemporary history backgrounds. These are diverse and change the view both of the present and of history. Key events that may be indicated are the end of the Cold War in Europe (1989–1990) and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact,<sup>2</sup> which were subsequently followed

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<sup>1</sup>Kennedy (1987).

<sup>2</sup>Mastny and Byrne (2005, p. 682f).

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by the implosion of the Soviet Union (1991).<sup>3</sup> The supposed ascent of the USA out of the Cold War as the sole remaining superpower (1991-2001) and NATO's Eastern enlargement (1999-2004)<sup>4</sup> starting from the end of the 1990s were formative events which, however, were immediately accompanied by supposed "crisis symptoms". These symptoms were thought of in "imperial" categories, with the term "imperial overstretch" being introduced as a central instrument of analysis.

These overreaches and overstrains of the remaining world power, the USA, in conflicts in Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, and elsewhere in the Middle East with the Third Gulf War from 2003 onwards, which manifested themselves above all else during the administration of American president George W. Bush (in office 2000 to 2008),<sup>5</sup> the leap in quality of the European Union from a customs- and free trade-based union to a currency union (2002) and its enlargement by ten new member states and then three more, primarily in the central, eastern, and southeastern part of the continent (2004, 2007, and 2013),<sup>6</sup> and the return of the Russian position as a great power in the last decade under Vladimir Putin<sup>7</sup> have all been sufficient causes and motivations to begin an intense treatment of empires and research into the formation of empires, the positions of hegemonic power, and the signs of the decay of empires as the subject matter of increased studies within the areas of political science and historical analysis.

In addition to the "structures", the gaze has been increasingly directed at the protagonists of the events. The fact that within that context it was above all else men (and only recently also women) who would make history, was still evaluated in the German-language historiography of the 1980s and 1990s as anachronistic and absurd, while in the contemporaneous process of the history of the present, there was the impression that this was indeed the case. Dominant political figures of global events such as Mikhail Gorbachev, Ronald Reagan, and then later the aforementioned Bush junior seemed to substantially determine and shape world history, but this was also true for their "opponents" and "challengers" who resisted the demands of imperial orders and aggressively called them into question. These included Ayatollah Khomeini and Saddam Hussein as well as Osama bin Laden.

On another level, central political figures and decision-makers became responsible for the expansion of associations of states, such as the President of the European Commission Jacques Delors,<sup>8</sup> Germany's Chancellor Helmut Kohl,<sup>9</sup> or the French State President

<sup>3</sup>Rühl (1992, p. 533ff.), Lozo (2014).

<sup>4</sup>Sloan (2005, pp. 89ff., 145ff., 181ff.), Staack (2018, pp. 15ff., 22ff).

<sup>5</sup>Ferguson (2004, pp. 169ff., 200ff.), Schwabe (2006), Schröder (2014).

<sup>6</sup>Gehler (2018b), Patel (2018), Schmale (2018).

<sup>7</sup>Mueller (2012, p. 226ff., 2014), Nolte (2017, p. 369ff).

<sup>8</sup>Ludlow (2015, p. 173ff).

<sup>9</sup>Schwarz (2012, pp. 619–716).

François Mitterrand<sup>10</sup> for the European Union, while others became responsible for their dissolution, such as Slobodan Milošević for Yugoslavia.<sup>11</sup> Empires and superpowers seemed to be present like never before. It was possible to observe their ascent to global players. At the same time, it was evident that the claim to power that accompanied this development was called into question, and thus the danger of an erosion or even a collapse of these empires was put forward as a demanding question to be addressed.<sup>12</sup> It became also evident that empires constantly have to take into account challenges and dangers, especially on the peripheries. On both sides of the events, there were apparently political leaders who pulled the strings and who were made responsible for the rapid succession of development in world history.

The debate about “empire” served as background for all of these patterns of explanations,<sup>13</sup> the ascent of which was observed with interest, but the condition of which was at the same time considered to be fragile and the future of which was deemed to be “open”. This addresses the current daily political events that turn out to be an important motivating force for the discussion of empires, hegemonic and world powers. Thus a relationship of causality exists between the recent, intensified preoccupation with empires and the debate that has begun since the end of the Cold War in the face of the supposedly sole remaining world power of the USA (1991-2001).<sup>14</sup> Since the twenty-first century and as a result of the re-establishment and formation of new trade blocs and economies as well as the rise of regional powers such as the BRIC states Brazil, India, China, or EU Europe, this discussion has taken on dynamics. Established orders appear to dissolve, and the view into the future is accompanied by uncertainties and imponderables. These uncertainties led to an increased interest in historical imperial forerunners, with the duration, success, and failure of hegemonic and world powers being rediscovered as leading questions.

These components of contemporary history also had an effect upon the formulation of questions by the guild of historians, where new orientations and tendencies were in the offing. Thus in the historiographies, a certain weariness set in with those topics that in recent decades had been accompanied by an intense focusing first of all upon societal history (“structural history”) and then upon the history of everyday life (the history “from below”). To be recognized in parallel to this was a trend of fading away from the postmodern tendencies which, under the leading term of “anything goes”, underwent a paradigm shift which interestingly enough was first played out in US historiography. In the vacuum that then came about as a result of this, *new diplomatic and political history* as well as neo-realistic approaches spread that concerned both the study of history and political

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<sup>10</sup> Schabert (2002), Bozo (2005), Lappenküper (2011).

<sup>11</sup> Sundhaussen (1993, 2012).

<sup>12</sup> Parsons (2010, p. 423ff).

<sup>13</sup> Osterhammel (2004, p. 157ff., 2006a, p. 4ff, b, p. 56ff.).

<sup>14</sup> Schröder (2018, p. 404ff).

science. The history of policy and the history of events, *res gestae*, war, and international relations experienced a renaissance in the research and gained significantly in popularity. It may not be overlooked within this context that there was a large and lengthy scholarly culture of writings on the history of empires and on universal history with regard to the great powers,<sup>15</sup> the empires, and their chief participants, if one thinks of Leopold von Ranke (*Weltgeschichte*)<sup>16</sup> in the nineteenth century or Paul Kennedy (*The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*)<sup>17</sup> in the twentieth century, and thus these traditions and the corresponding models may be carried on.

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## 2      **Something Other than a Nation-State? Factors of Integration and Legitimation for Empires**

One essential aspect in the recent debates surrounding the phenomenon of empires is represented by the strategies of interpretation and legitimation<sup>18</sup> that have been pursued within this context. Along those lines, the question is raised as to whether empires substantiate their historicity differently than nations and nation-states do in order to foster their integration (internal) by rulers and the elite and to secure their legitimation (both internal and external).<sup>19</sup> While extensive historical research is available on nation-states, the question is raised as to whether we can already take knowledge about empires for granted to a sufficient degree in a manner that is not only specific to one era but also crosses over a plurality of them, that is, in a way that is extensive and covers world history, in order to effect a systematic comparative analysis at the same levels.

It may not be overlooked that there is a special pressure of expectations that challenges empires, because in the way that they view themselves, they are called upon not only for peacemaking, but also for ensuring wellbeing, which goes hand in hand with their mission and, as a rule, is defined as a central goal of the state.<sup>20</sup> These tendencies are already completely prominent with ancient empires and can also be observed with modern empires

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<sup>15</sup> Concerning the European Powers in Modern European History see the contribution of Suppan in this volume.

<sup>16</sup> Ranke (1881–1888/1938).

<sup>17</sup> Kennedy (1987, pp. 438ff., 447ff., 458ff., 471ff., 488ff., 514ff.); 2nd edition 1991, 3rd edition 2003.

<sup>18</sup> For the legitimation of empires by tradition cf. the contributions of Paul, Hoffmann, and Harding in this volume. But cf. also the contributions of Fräsch, Hoo and Wiesehöfer, and Rezakhani.

<sup>19</sup> Of course, there is much more than the simple dichotomy between ‘nation-state’ and ‘empire’, although its juxtaposition is useful for historical analysis. Cf. also in general Scheidel (2013). See, however, also the contributions of Fräsch, Pöhl, Connah, Sonderegger, Harding, and Hoo and Wiesehöfer in this volume, all of them developing nuanced conceptions on what ‘empire’ is supposed to be.

<sup>20</sup> Münkler (2005, p. 127ff).

such as the USA. They follow a guiding principle and profess possessing the “true” view of things in the world as well as being solely and exclusively in the position to guarantee growth and prosperity and to create law and order.<sup>21</sup> The dichotomy between “truth” and “lies”, which can be translated as the comparison between a legitimate and an illegitimate claim to power, plays a substantial role in the legitimation of power in Near Eastern empires,<sup>22</sup> but it can also be observed with its essential features with most of the empires of the subsequent eras.

With the clarification of such problems, it is worthwhile to establish precise criteria and, within that context, to not just ask which criteria are to be regarded as necessary and which are to be considered superfluous for an attempt at a definition.<sup>23</sup> For an empire, the nation-state argument of a firmly outlined territory *firstly* does not apply with regard to integration and legitimation. The means that are elementary for a nation with a united front of calling upon the “holiness of the borders” as well as the emphasis on the indivisibility of the state’s territory as a whole also do not apply. This does not have to mean that empires did not have, at least in some contested areas,<sup>24</sup> linearly fixed borders, but, and this is the important point, this is not a general phenomenon.<sup>25</sup>

*Secondly*, the continuity of rulers—be it dynasties, family units, or oligarchies of political elites—appears to be of significance with regard to both integration and legitimation,<sup>26</sup> which does not, however, exclude “charismatic rule” (Max Weber) or the personalization of imperial policy.<sup>27</sup> An analogue situation, although in a somewhat diluted form, is also found in the model of the nation-state. *Thirdly*, as a result of the (long-term) strategy that initially was not present, with an empire neither having a revolutionary founding act (in the form of a sort of birth certificate) nor a creation event (myth), fixed to a very specific day and single occurrence that is wrapped in legend seem to be compulsorily necessary as the fabric for integration and legitimation, as can be found all

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<sup>21</sup> Maier (2006, p. 26f).

<sup>22</sup> Pongratz-Leisten (2002).

<sup>23</sup> Concerning definitions and notions of the empire discourse see the contributions of Suppan, Frasch, and Rezakhani in this volume.

<sup>24</sup> Cf., e.g., Richardson (2020) for the Neo-Assyrian Empire and its border with Babylonia in the trans-Tigris area. For empires and wall-building cf. the various contributions in Nickel and Rollinger (2022).

<sup>25</sup> Cf. the contributions of Paul, Hoffmann, Dybaś, Pohl, Ziemann, Kurella, and Rezakhani in this volume. See also Hämäläinen (2008, 2013) and his concept of a ‘kinetic empire’ as exemplified by the highly mobile Comanches.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. the contributions of Hoffmann, Externbrink, Waters, Kurella, and Rezakhani in this volume.

<sup>27</sup> For a comparative analysis of different case studies where this continuity could not be established, see now the various contributions in Rollinger et al. (2022). Concerning the specific conceptions as related to a given ruler’s appearance and ability see Lanfranchi and Rollinger (2016).

too frequently with nation-building and the founding of states. Again, this does not have to mean that the ‘birth’ of empires is not related, at least from retrospective, with founding ‘heroes’ and conqueror kings,<sup>28</sup> although in many of these cases these “empires” appear to have been short-termed.<sup>29</sup>

We have thus arrived at the limits and the possibilities of the term “empire”. Forming “one world” (as Hans-Heinrich Nolte put it<sup>30</sup>)—that is, first just bringing one such construct together and then also keeping it together—means the highest degree of the fulfillment of the requirements for integration and legitimation. What follows from this?

*Firstly*, peacekeeping, the guarantee of security, and promises of welfare enjoy an important role<sup>31</sup> which, as a result of their size and diversity, requires far greater expenditures and far more energy of empires than it does of nation-states,<sup>32</sup> at least seen through the lens of their ongoing expansion agenda combined with the claim to rule the “world”.<sup>33</sup> In contrast to the latter, they have to find a much greater degree of both willingness to negotiate and capability to mediate within, since the target public is characterized specifically by its heterogeneity. On the other hand, this public is only to be viewed to a very restricted degree as “the people”. It is rather the elite who is to be considered as the essential contact zone of imperial communication and, on their part, take over (or should take over) crucial services of mediation and transfer.<sup>34</sup> In addition, these communication services in an empire play a more significant and greater role within than it is the case toward the outside. But the “rest of the world” does not remain out of consideration, since empires endeavor to attain an inner consolidation which, in the end, causes external acceptance and inviolability.

*Secondly*, empires that are defined in this way constantly have to be measured against the claims that they themselves have raised, as well as against the achievements that have succeeded with preceding empires, in order to not be regarded as “weak empires of the second and third order”<sup>35</sup> and to not fade away. This also includes the assertion and the

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<sup>28</sup>This can even be combined with the establishment of an era that signals the introduction of a new epoch, which, within one single king’s reign, was initialized for the first time in world history with Rim-Sin of Larsa (Charpin 2004), and in a much larger and much more effective way with the Seleucid era (for the enormous effects of this ‘invention’ on the conception of time and history, see now Kosmin (2018). However, it is very telling that for some of these eras, like the one of the Kushanas, modern scholarship is unable to connect its starting point with a specific event and thus to establish a firm chronology. See Rezakhani, in this volume.

<sup>29</sup>Rollinger, Degen and Gehler (2022), and for Alexander III (“the Great”) Bichler (2014).

<sup>30</sup>Nolte (2008a, b, pp. 9–10).

<sup>31</sup>See Neumann (2014), Paulus (2014), Ruffing (2014a), Rollinger (2014a, 2017).

<sup>32</sup>In the time of Augustus the Roman Empire spent about three fourth of its tax income for military matters: Woolf (2012). Already in 1936 over a third of Nazi Germany’s expenditure went towards rearmament and it was further increasing (Suppan 2020).

<sup>33</sup>Cf. Roger (2018).

<sup>34</sup>Cf. Rollinger (2016b) for the Achaemenid empire.

<sup>35</sup>Nolte (2008a, b, p. 5ff).

capability for accomplishment with respect to competing imperial power factors. The question is therefore raised, and not completely without good reason, whether two or three power constructs that exist simultaneously and that are in direct opposition with each other are still to be designated as “empires”.<sup>36</sup>

Can one empire exist next to another one? In other words, with regard to the competing Near Eastern empires of the Amarna period,<sup>37</sup> Urartu and Assyria<sup>38</sup>; the Achaemenid Empire<sup>39</sup> and the maritime alliance led by Athens; the Imperium Romanum<sup>40</sup> and the Parthian or Sasanian Empire<sup>41</sup>; Byzantium<sup>42</sup> and the Caliphate<sup>43</sup>; the Islamic empires of Central Asia,<sup>44</sup> the Ottoman Empire,<sup>45</sup> the Habsburg Empire,<sup>46</sup> and the Russian Tsar Empire,<sup>47</sup> along with their competitors in East and West: were they empires or rather hegemonic powers in their specific spheres of influence and neighborhood regions? This continues to be, as always, a question of criteria and perspectives which modern scholarship cultivates. It is also possible to speak of *global empires* (such as the British Empire<sup>48</sup>) and *regional hegemonic powers* (such as the Habsburg Empire), although the two categories need not be mutually exclusive: China is perceived to be a regional hegemonic power in East Asia,<sup>49</sup> while at the same time it is to be seen as a global economic and trade empire and therefore a growing military and political world power.<sup>50</sup> The change of one and the same power construct from one “state” to the other is to be ascertained: if the EEC and the EC were still regional powers with hegemonic traits in Western Europe during the Cold War, then the European Union of today on the entire continent is a global hegemonic power on the path toward being an economic, currency and trade world power with imperial or neo-imperial traits.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Cf. the contributions of Paul, Hoffmann, Dybaś, Externbrink, Waters, Ziemann, and Rezakhani in this volume.

<sup>37</sup> Paulus (2014).

<sup>38</sup> Salvini (2014), Radner (2014).

<sup>39</sup> Rollinger (2014a, 2017).

<sup>40</sup> Ruffing (2014a).

<sup>41</sup> Wiesehöfer (2014).

<sup>42</sup> Schneider (2014).

<sup>43</sup> Hämeen-Anttila (2014).

<sup>44</sup> Cf. the contributions of Paul, and Hoffmann in this volume.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. the contribution of Uluisik in this volume.

<sup>46</sup> Judson (2017).

<sup>47</sup> Nolte (2008a, b).

<sup>48</sup> Brendon (2008).

<sup>49</sup> Klein (2009, p. 345ff.), Gu (2014).

<sup>50</sup> Gu (2018, p. 435ff).

<sup>51</sup> Gehler (2016, 2018b, pp. 614–637, 632), also see Zielonka (2006), Kühnhardt (2008b).

*Thirdly*, an empire's sheer "size" is of particular relevance,<sup>52</sup> but *fourthly* also its "permanence" or, to put it better, its "infinity".<sup>53</sup> A guarantee of continuity and the care and maintaining of traditions are crucial for integration for "genuine empires".<sup>54</sup> Nations, on the other hand, are historical phenomena that are very young, relatively contestable, and prone to crises. Like their cities and internal regions and peripheries, though, empires are considerably older.

Starting from the idea that empires do not possess any firmly defined or precisely delimited territorial status, it is necessary to return to Nolte's argument on expansion<sup>55</sup>: empires are always in motion and develop dynamics which have to do with material accumulation or territorial adjustment, i.e. stabilization and adaptations of political power, and directly related to the steady "increase of the empire", exploitation of the available resources (men and kind), fluent socioeconomic developments and processes of social integration, as well as the permanent service of clientele relationships and the provision for the 'needs' of subjects, i.e. elites at first hand, but also non-elites. With such ambitious objectives and the never-ending challenges to be faced, the limits of feasibility and the time factor are constantly to be taken into account, to which we shall return below.

*Fifthly*, another relevant integration factor for empires is not only a central administration, but above all else a bureaucratic system that is based upon apparatuses.<sup>56</sup> This administration, in spite of a prominent bureaucracy, allows for a considerable degree of maneuvering room for domestic and foreign policy action and possibilities for development in order to possess the corresponding acceptance therein and to ensure loyalty.

The use and the instrumentalization of religion (in particular, monotheistic exclusive religions like Christianity and Islam, and dogmatic economic ideologies like communism and capitalism) for the integration and legitimation of empires appears to find less attention in the research against the background of an alleged secularized, agnostic spirit of the times. And yet the "holiness of rule" and the sacred aura of power as well as the divinity of empire and the aura and charisma of its leader were additional essential reasons that were given for its justification and its cohesion.

Eva Marlene Hausteiner<sup>57</sup> is to be agreed with that historicity was an important resource, if it did not even play a central role in the way an empire views itself or else the way the imperial elites view themselves.<sup>58</sup> With ideas of imperial history and rule, reference was made to claims such as exclusivity, uniqueness, originality, and

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<sup>52</sup> Although it is an important element indeed: Gießauf (2014).

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Rollinger (2014a, b, 2017).

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Neumann (2014), and see the contributions of Paul, and Hoffmann in this volume.

<sup>55</sup> Nolte (2008a, b, p. 5ff).

<sup>56</sup> Cf. the contributions of Palme, Waters, Uluisik and Kurella in this volume.

<sup>57</sup> For this and what follows: Hausteiner (2015, pp. 15–33, especially, pp. 16–25).

<sup>58</sup> Cf., e.g., the focus of ancient Near Eastern empires and would-be empires of the second and first millennium BC on the precocious third millennium kings of Agade like Sargon and Naram-Sin; see Neumann (2014), Rollinger (2013), Richardson (2020), Van de Mierop (2020). For the idea of a succession of empires see Wiesehöfer (2003a), Rollinger (2011). See also Pongratz-Leisten (2018)

incomparability.<sup>59</sup> Yet the question is raised as to whether assertions and presumptions of that sort cannot also be established with nations, where their formation and development of identity likewise played a role. So what differentiates the imperial *raison d'être* from its national counterpart?

Hausteiner understands imperial self-reflection to be a stronger linking of history, the present, and future than it is the case with nations, above all else as far as the capability for the establishment of progress is concerned. This mainly involves the profile of the elites that carry on the imperial discourses as the agents. Hausteiner raises the question as to whether national discourses on ideas and legitimation are likewise correspondingly shaped, borne, and structured by national elites. Nation-states have to communicate “ideology” but have to do so substantially more broadly. Further comparative research has to be achieved here that will also have to focus on the “historiographers” of the empires, examining how and in which way they wrote their works, and above all else to what extent they differ from other historians and/or “historiographic” agents dealing with nations and their discourses.

Also to be placed within these contexts are the modern universities, the origins of which are closely linked with the birth of the nation-state. The scientific disciplines as they have been established especially in the nineteenth century did not originate out of nothing but were part of specific contemporary agendas, perceptions, and frameworks. This also relates to the general decision which epochs are supposed to be of major and of less importance in history. All this is not only about gaining and establishing knowledge but also about exploiting approaches and entrenching specific world views and perceptions.<sup>60</sup> Schools, other educational institutions, and curricula are a multiplier of this development and considerably affected by this.<sup>61</sup>

Hausteiner’s remarks suggest that empires were more artificial with respect to their historical foundation and historicity and therefore also rather a sort of more fabricated and thus more ‘unnatural’ than nations. Are nations a “natural form” and empires pure products of artifice? This appears to be a problematic assumption and it is more appropriate to use different construction models.<sup>62</sup>

The transfer of imperial power for example from Rome through the Frankish Empire to the Holy Roman Empire,<sup>63</sup> or from Rome to Byzantium<sup>64</sup> and on to Moscow<sup>65</sup> opens up

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for a sophisticated treatment of the categories of tradition, discourse and ideology in the ancient Near East. For the transformation of identities: Canepa (2018).

<sup>59</sup>With empires, these terms depend not upon the people, but rather upon other factors: mission, ruler/dynasty, God/religion, “location” (such as Assur, Babylon, and Rome).

<sup>60</sup>Wiesehöfer (2002, 2003b, 2010).

<sup>61</sup>Cf, e.g., Marchand (1996, 2010).

<sup>62</sup>Hausteiner (2015).

<sup>63</sup>Steinacher and Winckler (2014), Ruffing (2014a).

<sup>64</sup>Preiser-Kapeller (2018).

<sup>65</sup>Nolte (2017).

the question in this specific case as to what happened with competing claims of historicity of imperial rule and its legitimation.<sup>66</sup>

Furthermore, the question is raised regarding to what degree national and imperial legitimations of history can be connected or confounded, in that way becoming inseparable and causing something new to arise. The status of France as an *état nation* passed through its rank that had been elevated as a first empire (1794/1795–1815) followed by a second empire (1831–1858) and would thus be rather compatible with this.<sup>67</sup> From this backdrop, the special case of the empire of the Modern Era has to be addressed.

To sharpen the inquiry: can a selective dissociation between nation-states and empires, along with their histories that are told and their historicities that are imagined be maintained at all for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? Hausteiner takes this circumstance into account and points at the close linking of both imperial and nation-state historical references. Examples of this may be found: Italian Fascism (1922–1943/1945) was a product of a delayed formation of the nation-state (1861–1871) and the starting point for the “*Mare Nostrum*” empire, even if it was a short-lived one (1935–1945).<sup>68</sup> The “Third Reich” (1933–1945) also emerged from a delayed founding of a nation-state (1867–1871) and, along with the “Greater German Empire” (1939–1943), formed an aggressive short-term wartime and robber empire which, although it was larger in terms of area, was even shorter-lived than that of the Fascism of Italy.<sup>69</sup> Here we can observe that nation-states and empires interplay and overlap.

The discourses on the “American nation” and its “empire”, that were carried on by the imperial elite within the context of the rise of a world power after the First World War (1918–1941) and a superpower after the Second World War (1945–2001) did not exclude, but rather thoroughly allow for linking with each other with a certain decline after 9/11.

With the tracking down of imperial benchmarks, the question is raised as to whether these observations do not also imply a calling into question of an empire’s claim for exceptionality. Is the conscious renunciation of measuring against previous imperial examples therefore not also a strategy for negotiating deficits in integration and legitimation? At least, Hausteiner postulates that empires are supposed to be under greater pressure concerning the establishment of integration and the obligation for legitimation than constructs of rule that covered less territory and were more manageable, such as nations and their states. This is true, but what appears also to be correct is that dealing with the pressure for legitimation is expressed differently, depending upon the different agents involved in these processes.

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<sup>66</sup>For making use of a power vacuum as well as the establishments of ideals and claims of imperial rule cf. the contribution of Paul in this volume.

<sup>67</sup>See also in the ‘long’ history of Germany the ideas revolving around a First, Second, and Third ‘Empire’ (‘Reich’): Nolte (2008a, b). Cf. also Dybaś in this volume and the transformation processes in the course of Polish-Lithuanian history.

<sup>68</sup>See Moos (2022).

<sup>69</sup>See Suppan (2020).

In any case, the empires' need for self-explanation was tremendously and considerably greater than it was for nation-states and grew even further with increasing expansion—the European Union with its deficits in communicating integration and producing legitimation after the growth of crisis of the so-called “Eastern Enlargement” of 2004 and 2007 is a good example of this<sup>70</sup>—whereby the additional question is raised as to whether the historic capital for this ongoing process can still gain momentum in the future and is even at all sufficiently available for this sort of endeavor.

This draws attention to another form of overstretch. It is not the traditional one that is related to economic, political, and military exhaustion, but one that is related to discourse strategies that become more and more ineffective and futile. With the case study of the British Empire for “instrumentally analogizing appropriations of history”,<sup>71</sup> the question is likewise raised as to why it is that, at least in the last 1500 years, the Imperium Romanum repeatedly served as a benchmark for ‘empire’ and what can really be made of its capacity as a model and paradigmatic example.<sup>72</sup> Was it its particular mission, the “Pax Romana” as a paradigm for the “Pax Britannica” and in a second step for the “Pax Americana” in future times also for a “Pax Europea”, or was it just a highly welcome and well-known pretext for a super-power intending to control its “world” (as it is still a welcome excuse for modern historians to avoid embedding their conceptions of ‘empire’ in larger contexts)?

Specifically with focused and rather exclusive comparison between the Imperium Romanum and the British Empire, there is a methodological objection: Taken as they are, both are supposed to be unique and therefore absolutely exceptional representations of ‘empire’. But every empire is “unique” and this leads to the methodologically relevant question as to what it is comparable and what should be compared: the Imperium Romanum is still thought to stand for an expansion that was broadly self-contained but also thoroughly transcontinental,<sup>73</sup> while the British Empire represents a (truly) global reach with territory under rule and points of support distributed throughout the entire world.

It is enormously difficult and requires constant struggling to ascribe a single definition to empires that extends across several historical periods, and there is in fact far too much material in concentrated form that is complex in terms of history and reception history which can no longer be managed by a single researcher.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>70</sup> Gehler (2018b, pp. 473–493).

<sup>71</sup> Hausteiner (2015).

<sup>72</sup> Ruffing (2014a), Huhnholz (2014, pp. 277ff., 319ff., 339ff).

<sup>73</sup> However, it has to be said that this somehow traditional view of the Roman Empire is about to change considerably in the last decades, due to the importance of the empire's trading activities in the Indian Ocean and the enormous gains from these endeavors. It is important to note that the agents of these transcontinental and truly ‘global’ activities were by far not only ‘Romans’ but an ‘international’ community. See, e.g., Strauch (2012), Ruffing (2014b), De Romanis and Maiuro (2015), Cobb (2015, 2019), Seland (2016), Speidel (2016a, b, c), Andrade (2017), cf. also Speidel and Kolb (2017).

<sup>74</sup> See MacKenzie et al. (2016).

The factors of space (extent, pressure for expansion, size and range, and open borders), power (center, centralism, concentration, decline,<sup>75</sup> the relationship of the elite to underlings and of the center to the peripheries, and border areas, ideologies of universalism,<sup>76</sup> and competition or lack thereof), and time (duration, era, myth, and lasting effect) offer starting points for plenty of comparisons, which can only be truly achieved by trans-disciplinary collaboration.

Writing imperial history does not just mean a return to universal history, but rather an entangled and interconnected history with global perspectives which also implies a renaissance of the history of the great powers. Combined with the new, newer, and newest approaches in historical research including social and cultural sciences, but also different branches of science,<sup>77</sup> it will be enriched even further.

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### 3 Pre-Modern, Modern and Post-Modern Empires? Why Perspective Matters

Period-crossing comparisons of empire still tend to especially highlight the last 500 years of history, i.e. the time from the Late Middle Ages/Early Modern Era up to contemporary history.<sup>78</sup> This specific form of myopia claims a substantial differentiation between pre-modern, modern, and postmodern empires. Similar concepts attempt to operate with a division between pre-modern “tributary empires” and empires of the immediate present.<sup>79</sup> However, upon closer consideration, these differentiations admittedly turn out to be problematic, particularly since criteria for integration and legitimation as well as the corresponding structural differences appear to be much less substantial than generally assumed. Against this backdrop, it would in fact be possible to designate the Holy Roman Empire as a pre-modern empire, the United States of America as a modern one, and the European Union as a postmodern one.<sup>80</sup> But then this immediately raises the question as to the general classification of the ancient empires, as well as to the actual workability of this differentiation.<sup>81</sup> This implies the crucial problem of a purported structural borderline between pre-modern and modern epochs and the hard facts for this sort of an alleged and qualified differentiation. It is true that historical processes and developments constantly increase, become more and more dynamic, complex and

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<sup>75</sup> For the decline of empire cf. in general Gehler et al. (2022). See also the contributions of Ziemann, Paul, Kurella, and Demandt in this volume.

<sup>76</sup> In order to claim for a “*Monarchia universalis*”, cf. the contribution of Externbrink in this volume.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. Rollinger and Stadler (2019).

<sup>78</sup> Kennedy (1987), Münkler (2005), Maier (2006), Osterhammel (2006a, b).

<sup>79</sup> Bang and Bayly (2011), Boilley and Marès (2012).

<sup>80</sup> Gehler (2018b, pp. 614–637), also see Kühnhardt (2008a).

<sup>81</sup> See Bichler (2010).

interrelated in the last 500 years, but this somehow simplistic assessment would also justify cutting history in a pre- and post-Second World War narrative. Much to the contrary, it is the long-term developments and universals that bring to the fore historical phenomena, their adaptations and adoptions, the dynamics and changes involved, as well as the ups and downs of history.<sup>82</sup> More than often, the supposed hard frontier-line between pre-modern and modern history appears just to be an excuse and pretext to ignore the tremendous richness of much older and extra-European histories and epochs.<sup>83</sup>

Let us return to the striking problem regarding the differentiation of national and imperial strategies for integration and legitimation. An interesting and very informative perspective has been developed by Benedikt Stuchtey and his view of British history.<sup>84</sup> He deals with the question as to what the British nation was, and astonishingly referred to the British Empire that was thought to present an answer. The result of his argumentation is staggering as well. By referring to the empire a greater tendency towards a primacy of domestic policy emerges, and this appears more than true seen through the lens of the so-called Brexit. The British nation found answers with the empire and with imperialism, whereby nationalism could experience the challenge of globalization. Thus, at the latest in the Late Modern Era, the concept of nation and empire appear to go hand in hand. Two mixed forms manifested themselves as consequences of imperialism which served as a connecting medium: nationalized empires and imperial nationalism.

As an interim conclusion, it may be stated that imperial strategies for legitimation had to be more flexible than their national counterparts. Within that context, democratic and liberal as well as moral concepts were not incompatible with the logic of imperial patterns of action and justification. Having clarified this, we may now shortly review some truisms concerning empire that are nevertheless important to be highlighted.<sup>85</sup>

The nation-state has a clearly defined territory available with a larger ethnic homogeneity (sometimes tending to ethnocentrism) and it has developed a much greater reliance on founding myths. Empires, on the other hand, have a territory that is, at least theoretically, capable of never-ending expansion, they possess flexible movable and open external borders, and they have multi-confessional, multi-religious and multiethnic structures (“a multinational empire”). Nations often come into existence out of territories that have been ceded after defeats and losses, while empires come into existence through gains and growth. They grow, they hurry from campaign/‘military operation’ to campaign/‘military operation’ (in secret and in public and generally sold as success and victory), and they cope with major defeats more easily, even if they just decide to ‘ignore’ them. Defeat is out of

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<sup>82</sup>Cf., e.g., Chew (2015, pp. 28–32). See also Frank and Gills (1993), Kardulias (1999), Gills (2003), Hodos (2017).

<sup>83</sup>The postulation of the existence of a “Middle Millennium (scil. 500 n.–1500 n. Chr.)” does also not help to solve this problem: Olstein (2015).

<sup>84</sup>Stuchtey (2012, p. 94ff).

<sup>85</sup>For what follows see also Gehler and Rollinger (2014a), as well as the various contributions in Gehler and Rollinger (2014b).

any empire's discourse whereas nation-states can even build up their identities on devastating losses.<sup>86</sup> Nations are partial worlds, empires are entire worlds; nations are younger, empires are older; nations have direct access to their inhabitants, empires have more direct access to the elite and less to their 'subjects' (those who are remote from rule). These structural, and not chronological, juxtapositions demonstrate the deficits of an alleged distinction between modern and pre-modern empires.

The arbitrariness of this chronological differentiation becomes especially apparent if empires are viewed as a whole including their structure, features, and characteristics. Within that context, the deficits of selection become immediately clear. It is highly problematic if historical analysis is mainly concentrated on forms of state of the so-called Modern Era without comprehensible arguments leaving previous periods nearly completely aside.<sup>87</sup> However, in many cases selection does not simply move along the lines of modern and pre-modern. If pre-modern empires nevertheless make it into the field of view, then in addition to the Imperium Romanum the attention is for the most part focused on ancient China without explicitly explaining why that is the case.<sup>88</sup> The objection may be made here that research into empires owes a substantial part of its terminology to the Imperium Romanum, but upon closer examination, this is only true in part, since individual terms such as those of the empire itself were provided by modern research with completely different connotations of meaning than it was the case for them in ancient contexts.<sup>89</sup> This fact demands critical reflection, and it is hard to explain why, apart from the Roman and Chinese empires, numerous other empires, contemporary and competing ones like the Parthian or Sasanian Empires are simply ignored as are former empires of the Near East and later empires in Central Asia, Africa,<sup>90</sup> and the Americas.

There is, however, another deficit related to this kind of approach and it is of a methodological nature. It concerns the question at heart which features and characteristics are to be considered to be fundamental in order to characterize a state as an "empire". Obviously, it is problematic to label certain states as "empires" from the very start in order to then define what an "empire" actually is by using an analysis of the structures of, in fact, those very states. The risk of circular reasoning is obvious. The fact that with a method of

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<sup>86</sup>For the enormous significance of the battle of Kosovo (1389) concerning the creation of a Serbian identity see Čirković (1999), Hafner (1999), Mihaljčić (1999), and in general Schmitt (2019). For the rich reception of the battle of Thermopylae (480 BCE) see Albertz (2006, pp. 250–260), Trundle (2018). For Hermann Göring's propagandistic radio address to the German soldiers encircled by the Red Army at Stalingrad referring to the ideal of Thermopylae and the Spartans' 'heroic stand' see Albertz (2006, pp. 293–308), and Rebenich (2002). For the complex reception history of the 'Persian Wars' narrative during the Roman Empire cf. now Rollinger (2019).

<sup>87</sup>Münkler (2005), Nolte (2008a, b).

<sup>88</sup>Scheidel (2009).

<sup>89</sup>Ruffing (2014a).

<sup>90</sup>Concerning the slavery issue and the question of stereotyping empire in Africa cf. the contribution of Sonderegger in this volume.

consideration that is restricted in that way, the larger historical background of the origin, the lines of development, the continuities, and the relations with power factors of third parties remain outside of regard is not surprising. This is the main reason why this volume takes a universal view on empires and avoids the distinction between pre-modern and modern representations of the phenomenon.

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## 4 Previous and Ongoing Attempts at Definition

Taking into consideration the results of this and the previous volume on empire, the following ‘universals’ in the history of empire may be highlighted.<sup>91</sup>

### 4.1 Development/Genesis

Empires do not come into existence. Rather, they develop themselves. This occurs without deliberate planning. When viewed in this way, neither a grand design nor a master plan exists for any empire, apart from the general idea to rule the world (see below). A formal act of founding such as with nation-states is alien to them or else it is hardly, if not never, common. Generally speaking what all empires have in common is unrestricted expansion, a *penetration* of the area to be ruled *in terms of power policy*, and an exertion of influence through trade, culture, and economy. *Power policy* has a wide range of meanings. It starts from claiming acceptance of an empire’s dominance, including the sheer demonstration that a specific region is simply within an empire’s reach, practically and theoretically, and goes as far as the establishment of direct rule. All this is part of dynamic processes that exhibit changes and transformations in a long-term perspective (without being planned as such from the very beginning). Therefore, *territorial expansion*, *belligerent conquest*, and *the application of military force*<sup>92</sup> are crucial instruments of power that are applied within this context. An essential role is played in this regard by deportations and the targeted deployments of larger groups of populations.

### 4.2 An Improvising and Dynamic Arrangement of the World and the Geographical Dimension

Empires are distinguished if they contribute lastingly and over a long period of time to the structuring of their larger power and network. They substantially arrange this “world of

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<sup>91</sup>For what follows see, besides the contributions in this volume, also Gehler and Rollinger (2014b). Cf., moreover, Rollinger et al. (2022).

<sup>92</sup>On military man power, cf. the contribution of Paul in this volume.

theirs” according to their ideas on order and their canon of values. Empires stand out through sheer size and “endless” breadth and thus break through the common dimensions of area that are typical to the times. Although this qualifies their achievements according to the standards of time, this is an important assessment, not least for reasons of comparability. Their external borders are not determined, but rather they are stretchable, dynamic, and fluid. Out of this “borderless” territorial extent grows a *trans-ethnic* and *trans-territorial claim to power* which can theoretically encompass the entire existing “world” in time.<sup>93</sup> “Empires” that have been conceived in this way have different faces as far as the use of their instruments of power is concerned. If early Near Eastern Empires are still constituted to a large extent as land empires, then at the latest with the Teispid-Achaemenid Empire, the rule of the sea also represented a substantial factor of power.<sup>94</sup> Above all else in the period following antiquity, a series of maritime empires came into existence, whereby in many cases it is difficult to strictly differentiate between a land empire and a sea empire.<sup>95</sup> Rather, some of these constructs can be described as “amphibious empires”.

### 4.3 Range

Even though the concept of the “continent” does not represent any *sui generis* size, but rather owes its existence to the creation of an idea on the ordering of the world that started out from Greek thinkers of the sixth and fifth centuries BCE,<sup>96</sup> the term has been most closely linked from the very beginning onward to the *range* of empires. Thus it was the aforementioned Greek thinkers such as Hecataeus, Aeschylus, and Herodotus who equated the area that was ruled by the Persian Empire with the range of Asia and called for a border between Europe and Asia that was apparently natural and sanctioned by the gods, one which was also conceived as a political border, at least ideally.<sup>97</sup> In spite of that, the range of empires is not restricted to one continent, but rather empires can extend across several of them. The Persian Empire already controlled parts of both Europe and Africa. A similar situation holds true for the Imperium Romanum as well as for numerous empires after antiquity.

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<sup>93</sup> Leitner (2011, pp. 23ff., 115ff.), Nolte (2017, p. 41ff.), cf. Bichler and Rollinger (2017).

<sup>94</sup> There are, however, antecedents of this development. See Schaudig (2008), Rollinger (2013, 2016a), Strootman et al. (2020).

<sup>95</sup> On early empires and especially on land and sea empires cf. the contribution of Demandt in this volume.

<sup>96</sup> See Schultz (1999), Cobet (1996), Demandt (1998).

<sup>97</sup> Bichler (2000, p. 15ff.), Bichler and Rollinger (2011, p. 27ff.).

#### 4.4 Heterogeneity

In addition, empires distinguish themselves through their *multiethnic* (multinational) composition and by exhibiting *multidenominational* (multi-confessional and multi-religious) contexts. The toleration of confessional and religious diversity is consequently an essential characteristic that is typical of numerous empires. If this requirement is disregarded, then empires get into crisis situations and phases of instability emerge. An analogous situation holds true for mastering the diverse, multinational challenges, especially as the *integration of heterogeneous ethnic groups* is concerned. With the successful managing of these “tasks”, a lasting empire is recognizable, although with the “Third Reich” or the Soviet Union negative examples can also be cited which perverted this requirement profile for empires and thus failed immediately or in the long run.

#### 4.5 Plurality of Forms of State

Within this context, the determination appears to be important that empires are not tied to certain forms of state, but rather a particular diversity of rules and different political system possibilities of development can be observed in this regard. Empires therefore develop and unfold independently of forms of rule and government, which can be different and which can alternate or change throughout their history. This is already demonstrated in fifth century BCE Greece, and therefore in that era in which our modern typology of forms of state came into existence. In a model text of these theoretically oriented conceptions, Herodotus, in his fictitious “Constitutional Debate” which is set in the Persian Empire, has a series of leading Persians discuss how they are to be ruled in the future (*Histories* 3,80–82).<sup>98</sup> Within that context, the pros and cons of monarchy, democracy, and aristocracy are debated. Even though at the end, monarchy wins out and Darius I ascends to the throne,<sup>99</sup> it was at least theoretically conceivable that a different form of state could also have been realized, since completely different conditions of constitution also existed within the Persian Empire under the rule (*archē*) of the Persians. Thus, for instance, according to Herodotus, the Persians under their commander Mardonius were successful to establish the first democracies in the Hellenic cities (*Histories* 6,43).

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<sup>98</sup>Bichler (2000, p. 281ff.), Bichler and Rollinger (2011, p. 93ff.), Sieberer (2017).

<sup>99</sup>Cf. now also Rollinger (2018).

## 4.6 Various Elites/Agents in Continuity

Empires are therefore not determined by a constitution<sup>100</sup> and they also do not necessarily rely upon a *single ruler* or several successive *charismatic leadership personalities*, but rather they may have a *continuous leadership class of ruling elite*. It is these leadership classes that are tied together by a common ideology and communicate on a variety of levels, both direct and indirect, with the central leadership. These elites represent a central factor of mobilization for every empire. In this way, empires possess the power and the means to raise large militaries (land and naval forces) in a short period of time and to use them operationally in targeted campaigns. They deploy these military potentials both against enemies abroad and with respect to competitors in the struggle for power and hegemony.<sup>101</sup>

## 4.7 The Ability to Wage War and the Military

For non-peaceful (that is, violent) extension and expansion, empires require corresponding capabilities to wage war, that is, to operate constantly with strong military structures that act with new, young and fresh forces, that are correspondingly capable of regeneration, and that are also able to handle setbacks well. With amphibious empires, the great advantage is added of having both land forces and naval forces available<sup>102</sup> (such as the Achaemenid Empire,<sup>103</sup> the Roman Empire,<sup>104</sup> the British Empire,<sup>105</sup> the Ottoman Empire,<sup>106</sup> and the United States of America<sup>107</sup>).

Empires in the Late Modern Era and in contemporary history furthermore draw attention to the transition from armies of the elite to armies of the masses and the escalation from cabinet wars (*Kabinettskriege*) to peoples' wars (*levée en masse*) up to wars of extermination. In spite of that, sight should not be lost of the fundamental common ground with the predecessors of antiquity.

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<sup>100</sup>Concerning constitutional questions and reforms of an empire, cf. the contribution of Dybaś in this volume.

<sup>101</sup>Cf. the contributions of Paul, Hoffmann, Externbrink, and Kurella in this volume.

<sup>102</sup>Strootman et al. (2020).

<sup>103</sup>Rollinger (2014a).

<sup>104</sup>Ruffing (2014a).

<sup>105</sup>Brendon (2008).

<sup>106</sup>Cf. the contribution of Uluisik in this volume.

<sup>107</sup>Maier (2006).