

Phaenomenologica 230

Nikos Soueltzis

# Protention in Husserl's Phenomenology

 Springer

# Protention in Husserl's Phenomenology

# PHAENOMENOLOGICA

SERIES FOUNDED BY H. L. VAN BREDA AND PUBLISHED  
UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE HUSSERL-ARCHIVES

---

230

NIKOS SOUELTZIS

PROTENTION IN HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

---

## Editorial Board:

Directors: Julia Jansen (Husserl Archives, Leuven, Belgium), Stefano Micali (Husserl Archives, Leuven, Belgium). Members: R. Bernet (Husserl-Archives, Leuven, Belgium), R. Breuer (Husserl Archives, Leuven, Belgium), H. Leonardy (Centre d'études phénoménologiques, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium), D. Lories (CEP/ISP/Collège Désiré Mercier, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium), U. Melle (Husserl-Archives, Leuven, Belgium), J. Taminaux (Centre d'études phénoménologiques, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium), R. Visker (Catholic University Leuven, Leuven, Belgium)

## Advisory Board:


R. Bernasconi (Memphis State University, Memphis, USA), D. Carr (Emory University, Atlanta, USA), E. S. Casey (State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, USA), R. Cobb-Stevens (Boston College, Chestnut Hill, USA), J. F. Courtine (Archives-Husserl, Paris, France), F. Dastur (Université de Paris, Paris, France), K. Düsing (Husserl-Archiv, Köln, Germany), J. Hart (Indiana University, Bloomington, USA), K. Held (Bergische Universität, Wuppertal, Germany), K. E. Kaehler (Husserl-Archiv, Köln, Germany), D. Lohmar (Husserl-Archiv, Köln, Germany), W. R. McKenna (Miami University, Oxford, USA), J. N. Mohanty (Temple University, Philadelphia, USA), E. W. Orth (Universität Trier, Trier, Germany), C. Sini (Università degli Studi di Milano, Milan, Italy), R. Sokolowski (Catholic University of America, Washington, DC, USA), B. Waldenfels (Ruhr-Universität, Bochum, Germany)

More information about this series at <http://www.springer.com/series/6409>

Nikos Soueltzis

# Protention in Husserl's Phenomenology

 Springer

Nikos Soueltzis   
Department of Philosophy and Social Studies  
University of Crete  
Rethymno, Greece

ISSN 0079-1350

ISSN 2215-0331 (electronic)

Phaenomenologica

ISBN 978-3-030-69520-0

ISBN 978-3-030-69521-7 (eBook)

<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69521-7>

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG  
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

*To Pavlos Kontos*

# Acknowledgments

The book at hand is a partially reworked version of the doctoral dissertation I defended in 2017 at the University of Patras. It would have never reached its present form had it not been for the immediate or indirect contribution of a number of people to whom I am deeply indebted. Even though most of them are not mentioned in the text, this book is for me first and foremost a reminder of the role each of them played in its completion.

Above all, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Pavlos Kontos. His close and instructive supervision throughout the years I was preparing my dissertation shaped decisively my way of working. However, my debt to him goes beyond the confines of our cooperation during the years of developing my dissertation. His courses on phenomenology, never lacking in enthusiasm and rigor, set the ground for my encounter with Husserl's writings, revealing their depth but also the discipline and dedication they require to become accessible. It did not take long to realize that it is with the same exemplary discipline and dedication that he works with his students. I consider myself fortunate to have been one of them.

I wish to extend my thanks to the members of the examining committee, starting with Prof. Alexander Schnell, who patiently went through my dissertation and assisted me with his accurate observations. He helped me clarify what I have done, and which relevant tasks are still ahead.

I am wholeheartedly grateful to Prof. Panos Theodorou for his long-lasting assistance in relation to issues revolving around Husserl's phenomenology but also with respect to other aspects of my academic (and non-academic) life. Our discussions always help me to be aware of my point of view on the matters at hand.

I am also grateful to professors John Drummond, Burt Hopkins, James Mensch and Stefano Micali for reading and commenting on my dissertation. Their comments led me to consider more closely aspects of my research that I would have otherwise neglected. The questions they raised were crucial for orienting and refining my research ever since as they were all charged with dilemmas bearing significant philosophical implications. Prof. Burt Hopkins was also kind enough to comment on an abridged version of my dissertation I presented at the forty-eighth Husserl Circle annual meeting and for that I am particularly thankful. His remarks

are always intellectually challenging. I am also grateful to the participants of the forty-eighth Husserl Circle annual meeting for their helpful comments and especially to Neal DeRoo for pressing on key points of my presentation.

Special thanks are due to Carlos Anaya for his constructive criticism on the manuscript.

Apart from that, I would like to thank Prof. Dieter Lohmar and Prof. Jagna Brudzinska for their hospitality at the Husserl Archives in Cologne in 2014. I am indebted to Prof. Lohmar for his insightful comments on a paper I presented at the ongoing *Phänomenologische Werkstatt* that he directs. My visit to Cologne was crucial in forming my way of reading Husserl's texts. During my stay there, I had the chance to meet and discuss with other Husserl researchers some of which still honor me with their friendship. Apart from their academic input, they contributed immensely to making my stay in Cologne enjoyable. Among them I wish to expressly thank Celia Cabrera, Marco Cavallaro, Tomas da Costa, Ricardo Mendoza-Canales, Axel Rivera, Andrea Scanziani and Honghe Wang.

These past years I was fortunate to be surrounded by people who, in one way or another, made it easier for me to productively focus on my research. For that I am particularly grateful to Evi Grammati, for our pleasant and vivid discussions; to Costas Picolos, for our close and demanding cooperation; and to Fotini Vassiliou, for her priceless readiness to help with whatever issues come up. I am no less thankful to Giannis Alysandratos, Giorgos Sagriotis, Stasinos Stavrianeas and Vasia Vergouli, who have all, in their own way, stood by me on a personal and academic level.

Last but not least, I owe my heartfelt gratitude to my parents, Aris and Maria, and to my sister, Anthi, for supporting and encouraging me in every step and in every respect. Their understanding has always kept me going.

Athens, Greece  
December 17, 2018

Nikos Soueltzis

# Introduction

This book is about protention, an overlooked topic, so to say, of Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness. Why overlooked? For one thing, Husserl has devoted to it a relatively small number of pages both in his published and unpublished writings. Likewise, the rich literature commenting and focusing on various aspects of time-consciousness—with some notable exceptions to be discussed in detail—has little to say about protention. Husserl scholars seem to have low expectations for what protention has to offer and tacitly treat it as a mere addendum to an analysis that had been already definitely shaped thanks to the discovery and description of retention.

It is the task of the present study to pay to protention the attention it deserves. It will prove that attaining a closer insight into protention—i.e., into the primal mode of how the future emerges in our consciousness—reveals various complexities of our time-consciousness that otherwise would have remained unnoticed (e.g., the variety of modes of fulfillment and their distinct functions at this primal level of consciousness). Most importantly still, protention brings to the surface the essential intertwinement between our awareness of time and other strata of human experience. We only need to shift our focus from protention's formal functioning to its materiality and we are already faced with a whole new field of investigation. We will be then in a position to touch on the multiple thin threads of protention that weave our future horizon and on their affective texture which makes itself most notably felt when they are disappointed. Our study aspires to shed light on overlooked aspects of Husserl's work and explores the peculiar intricacies of the relation between protention and affectivity. Only a phenomenological analysis of protention, so we will argue, can reveal the role of temporality within our affective life as well as affection's importance for time-consciousness.

The project to examine our consciousness of time is steadily accompanied by the feeling, so to say, that its own point of departure is unsafe. We always *know* what we are talking about when we are talking about time. Yet even the most trivial and randomly formulated expression of doubt about such knowledge is enough to shatter

our certainty.<sup>1</sup> *Feeling* this uncertainty, i.e., *experiencing* in a peculiar manner our knowledge of what time is *as* uncertainty, is fused with our everyday life as that vague fabric our life's appearance consists in.<sup>2</sup> Our everyday projects, worldviews, mutual interactions, etc., bear witness to the inextricability of this "feeling." Committing oneself to projects in their inescapable fragility as well as orienting oneself in the intersubjective nexus by determining the horizons of indeterminateness in various fields and levels—from the most basic perceptual to the highest ones (through promise, narration, history, etc.)—are signs of our implicit "experience" of this uncertainty: they are determinate stances toward temporality itself motivated by this experience. This same uncertainty is what calls for a soothing remedy in theoretical as well as in practical terms and serves as the common source of our theoretical and scientific concern with time as well as of our blind trust in the regularity of clock hands.

A most remarkable aspect of our pre-thematic awareness of our insufficient familiarity with time is the *aporia* regarding the *primal* mode in which we experience our uncertainty about time. Being pre-thematically aware of it may take on different forms and this can be brought to our attention once our time-consciousness has been thematized. It is through the latter thematization that our uncertainty reveals its formal versatility: it has been always lurking in every moment of unspoken certainty, bending and shaping—unnoticed yet omnipresent—our experience of the world. Before time itself becomes an explicit problem, the problematic status of time's "becoming a problem," of its unambiguous recognition as an object of our knowledge, has already contaminated our lives to such an extent that we find no corner of it which would be unable to bear swiftly and with hardly any resistance the question of time. It shares an incontestable kinship with every area of questioning.

The present study's topic is situated within the wider context of time-consciousness, which means that it presupposes the explicit examination of our awareness of time: a gesture that calls forth not only all that lies implicit in our awareness of this uncertainty (the means to its potential remedy in an appropriate analysis) but also the paradoxical forms it may take when it is indicated by

---

<sup>1</sup> In Book XI of the *Confessions*, Augustine realizes that he is not in a position to give a proper reply to anyone who asks him what time is, and this surprising realization should be regarded as a self-conscious theoretical familiarization with an already latently familiar uncertainty (cf. St. Augustine, 1912, 239). In this respect, even though one is inclined to agree with von Herrmann that the natural understanding of time does not reach the notion of a critical examination of its accomplishing knowledge of time, the fact that the starting point of critical examination is the intra-temporal should bear witness to this latent familiarity with our vague understanding of time (cf. von Herrmann, 1992, 59f.). Thus, although a distance is a necessary condition for critical examination, a certain connection of the latter with our natural understanding of time is always at play. In a similar vein, the fact that *speaking* about our not-knowing the essence of time unfolds in time does not in any way prevent this "not-knowing" from being somehow implied in my knowing that speaking about time occurs in time. However, instead of claiming that we *know* about our not-knowing the way we know about the duration of our speaking about it, we should appeal to a less explicit mode of relating to it.

<sup>2</sup> As Fink would phrase it, we experience our familiarity with time as insufficient (see Fink, 2008, 380).

experiences that themselves crumble the moment they bear this indication. No matter their form, they all perform the same function: they make us aware of our wavering and this influences directly how we subsequently grasp the problem of time. In order to reach a clear understanding of how our experience of this uncertainty partly orients our explicit awareness of time, we must seek its primordial mode in our already pre-philosophically thematized experience of time-consciousness. By means of this circularity, it is not only our time-*consciousness* that undergoes a cognitive ontification—i.e., it becomes thematized as an object of knowledge—but the pre-thematic awareness of our insufficient familiarity with time is also included in it as a stratum of this ontification: a mode of primal “certainty.” Whether we experience this primal certainty in a cognitive or in a purely affective manner is a matter of dispute the present study will only indirectly address.<sup>3</sup>

In virtue of this implicit unthematic experience and the problems that come to the surface once we pay heed to it, it comes as no surprise that almost every major philosophical theory eventually strives to tame it. Evidently, this “feeling” of uncertainty attains specific forms within different theoretical contexts. From the perspective of a philosophy that seeks to gain access to its own foundations, responding to this uncertainty initially amounts to a preliminary decision about the points of departure for examining it, viz., a decision that is necessarily burdened by a provisional naivety. Thus, a phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness, aiming at unearthing this universally functioning layer of consciousness,<sup>4</sup> necessarily starts from some provisionally accepted experiential givens. Every living-experience (*Erlebnis*) has *duration* and through this duration it relates to other living-experiences within a conscious experiential flow. What exactly this “through” means and how we can thematize the essential mode of interrelation among living-experiences is

---

<sup>3</sup>Fink (2008, 377) seems to pose a relevant question. What is at stake here is whether or not we can distinguish a motivation lying within our natural attitude and leading eventually to a transcendental-phenomenological account of our consciousness of time, regardless of the “nature” of this motivation. On the more general problem of the motivation of transcendental-phenomenological reduction, see Luft (2002, 79ff.). Luft, in these pages, discusses briefly two main theses (“freedom-thesis” and “paradox-thesis”) regarding the “how” and the possibility of the motivation of reduction. The first one asserts that we are free to perform the reduction, while the second questions freedom’s capacity to “break open” the horizon of our natural attitude, i.e., to “end” its expansibility (Luft 2002, 82).

<sup>4</sup>Time-consciousness is the first and universal synthetic structure of our experiential life, extending its reach up to the most complex higher-level constitutive achievements. No matter how “thin” and “indistinguishable” our consciousness’s synthetic life may be, we are always in a position to direct our gaze to its vague corners, even if by more refined performances of reductions. Equipping ourselves with the latter we stumble upon an additional task. One should examine whether employing the reductive method in phenomenology (not just the transcendental-phenomenological reduction) also presupposes a previous process of homogenizing the living experiences that undergo the relevant reductive “de-synthesis.” This may be particularly true for those experiences that are “weaker” than the ones that usually serve as starting points for various reductions (reductive instances). Such experiences may include our lived-bodily sensing or our instinctive life (see Montagova, 2013, 28). Below we shall discuss more extensively the idea of reduction that underlies this line of thought.

something to be discussed later. Further, every living-experience has its own (partial) flow in which consciousness is (able to be) “carried away” toward what is given to it. Our consciousness is directed toward the constitutive products of objective temporal givenness. Yet we are also able to detach our phenomenological gaze from the constitutive momentum and direct it toward the temporal modes in which a living-experience manifests itself.<sup>5</sup> By being directed toward the temporal modes of givenness of a living-experience we are being led to an indubitable, yet phenomenologically provisional, discovery:<sup>6</sup> a “now” “follows” a “previous now” and all of these temporal terms are given to a consciousness whose continuity is constituted by those temporal modalities themselves.<sup>7</sup> This means that this “derivative” experience of sequences of “nows” points back to a primal transitivity. We are pre-thematically aware of our experiential life’s streaming, and it is in this pre-thematic awareness that the intuitive field in which each living-experience exhibits its

---

<sup>5</sup> Whether this “detachment,” properly effected as a reductive moment through phenomenological reflection, occurs, in its turn, by means of temporal modes or not is a parallel issue open for debate.

<sup>6</sup> “Provisional” does not mean “mistaken” or “misleading.” It only signifies the persistence of “naivety” even within the transcendental level of inquiry. With respect to the sequence of “nows” that is experienced as provisional, this can only mean that it is a “derivative,” so to speak, understanding of time, made possible through our primordial awareness of time (cf. Held, 2010, 92–93).

<sup>7</sup> It should be emphasized that this phenomenological discovery is articulated in the form of a judgment. As such it needs to be submitted to further phenomenological analysis. An index for this necessary additional reductive step is that the judgment form, in which our discovery is initially articulated, may appear to be imposed as a phenomenon whose origin lies in higher levels of experience that are essentially incompatible with our initial steps of reduction to inner time-consciousness. Needless to say, these initial reservations concerning the judgment-form echo Ricoeur’s concern to point out that our attempt to “bring the hyletic out of silence” may entail the danger of borrowing determinations from objective time as well as falling prey to the unacknowledged metaphorical character of the very terms we use to describe this deepest level of experience (see Ricoeur, 1988, 24ff.; also, cf. Theodorou, 2015, 238ff.). Ricoeur’s diagnosis implies that we are actually capable of experiencing this discrepancy, yet not in a manner that would allow us to reduce that experience back to a primary hyletic givenness. From a phenomenological point of view, this means that the source of legitimacy of his critique is to be found in another field of experience, one that is not bound by the lawfulness of hyletic givenness. The foregoing remarks show Ricoeur’s distance with respect to certain fundamental Husserlian positions. By contrast, if we follow those positions, we become aware that, since the goal of a further reduction would be to depart *from* the formulated judgment form *toward* the relevant underlying experiential ground, metaphor is also excluded, nevertheless without thereby qualifying the “literal” usage of the terms as phenomenologically appropriate. Regardless of the radicality of that reductive step which is necessary for securing the appropriateness and accuracy of our description, one should leave open the possibility that “metaphor” and “indication” as well as the relative experiences from which they originate play an essential role in our understanding of reduction itself and that it may pose a considerable resistance in our attempt to “disarm” them. By that we do not simply imply that metaphor directs the gaze that determines the “objects” of the transcendental field in an articulated phenomenological description, i.e., that it transfers “the ‘appearingly’ structured content from the sensory intuition field to linguistic understanding and communication,” but also that it delimits the terms in which we understand the reductive process itself (see Theodorou, 2015, 241). In any case, before one’s attention is turned to its function, it should be first explained how our mediate relation with what is “named” by the metaphor is articulated (cf. Bernet, 1985, LV).

duration manifests itself. We are always conscious of the various temporal modalities (being-present, being-just-past, being-imminent) in a primordial manner.

Living-experiences of duration are essentially characterized by a peculiar continuity that is established by an interconnection of its various present phases. What brings about this interconnection is a peculiar intentional structure which becomes thematized in the course of Husserl's investigation, namely, what he calls "longitudinal intentionality" (*Längsintentionalität*) (*Hua X*, 81 & 379).<sup>8</sup> Undoubtedly, similar kinds of interconnection are also experientially discernible within our natural attitude. Even in our scientifically informed or uninformed everyday lives, we try to comprehend—by means of our "scientific" common sense—temporal change by reflecting on various aspects of our experience of it. For instance, we seem to "know" that time is linear, be it during my lasting perception of an object or in the transition from yesterday to tomorrow, and that the different presents are but points that belong to this line. Husserl himself was, to some extent, initially drawn to this understanding, a fact that becomes obvious in the development of his time-diagrams. Yet we must be aware that in the case of a reflection carried out "naturally"—i.e., a reflection abiding by the positing of the world as real by being perceived as an event occurring in the world—a division of the various reflective layers has a merely relative value. What this division reveals is not characterized by the essential necessity that pertains to a reflection carried out *after* the performance of transcendental-phenomenological reduction.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, a phenomenological re-appropriation of this division within the transcendental attitude is made possible through a radical modification of our "naturally" performed reflection. The different reflective layers of the latter assume then an essentially indexical function vis-à-vis the transcendental field.

For reasons of space, the issue of the phenomenological reductions is not to be extensively addressed in the present context. We simply mean to stress that some methodological questions about the reduction in its connection with

---

<sup>8</sup>This issue will be addressed in §4.2. All references to Husserl's work drawn from the *Husserliana* series will be indicated with the official abbreviation *Hua*, followed by the Latin number of the volume and the Arabic number of the page. Reference to Husserl's work *Erfahrung und Urteil* will be made by using the abbreviation *EU*, followed by the Arabic number of the page. Unless otherwise noted, translations of Husserl's texts are ours. For those cases that we cite from an existing translation, we have used the available English translations, yet we have modified them in certain occasions, whenever we deemed that the existing translation does not provide us with the appropriate technical clarity required by our analysis. The reader can always consult the original passages which are also cited in the corresponding footnotes.

<sup>9</sup>On the possibility of reflection on our living-present, see Sakakibara (2010). Sakakibara claims that Husserl, in his later manuscripts, develops his theory of reflection based on the model of self-touching of the functioning Ego, what Husserl in his earlier texts on time-consciousness called "primal consciousness" (Sakakibara, 2010, 259). Regarding phenomenological reduction, it should be noted that by the time of the *Vorlesungen* Husserl had not yet developed his theory of transcendental-phenomenological reduction, even though he was already employing other kinds of reduction, such as the "Reduktion auf den reellen Bestand." On this kind of reduction as well as on the idea of reduction in Husserl's work in general, see Lohmar (2002b), Lohmar (2012a), Theodorou (2015, 17–66).

time-consciousness make a genuine part of our study (§2). This is the case all the more because of the scope of Husserl's analysis of time. Even though his analyses begin by the example of a perceived tone or melody—viz., of a temporal object (*Zeitobjekt*) which is characterized by a peculiar temporal extension—, they are by no means restricted to merely describing a single conscious living-experience of a tone by means of fuzzy formulations (see *Hua X*, 5). On the contrary, they aspire to an all-encompassing eidetic validity and thus refer to sense-perception in general and not merely to the temporal structure of hearing one tone.<sup>10</sup>

\*\*\*

The present study focuses on a quite unexamined part of Husserl's overall theory on time-consciousness: the question of *Protention*. The reason for this neglect has mainly been the unfortunate, until recently, lack of access to the manuscripts (mostly belonging to the *L-Manuskripte*) in which Husserl has undertaken most of his efforts to deal with the issue of protention. Thus, even though his theory of time-consciousness enjoys a certain fame, consciousness's primordial manner of relating to the future has not been adequately accounted for. Our aim is to study closely Husserl's conception of protentional consciousness and to trace both its uniqueness and its contribution to our overall awareness of time.

The text is divided into three main parts. The first part discusses more general issues relating to a phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness, while the other two parts follow the distinction between our primal awareness of the past and our primal awareness of the future. It may strike the reader as a surprise that there is no separate part of our study dedicated to our primal awareness of the present. The reason for this omission is rather simple, but significant. We consider in advance that our primal awareness of the present is always situated in the functional context of the other two temporal modalities. Even though this is true for each of the temporal modalities (they are always situated within their complex interrelation), the peculiarities of the present serve as the fundamental indications for grasping Husserl's shifts regarding the way that he perceives this primal intentional complex. It is through the changes that the conception of the present undergoes in his work that we are able to follow the bigger or finer transformations of this complex. To that extent, we deemed it more fitting for our analysis not to isolate it, keeping in mind that it is a constant point of reference for our descriptions.

Part I begins with some general remarks regarding Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness (§1), by sketchily going through the structure of our living-present, i.e., its primordial articulation in proto-impression (*Urimpression*),

---

<sup>10</sup>Cf. Held (1966, 15–16). The linguistic-discursive form in which Husserl's research is presented is but one of the instances in which a phenomenology of time-consciousness openly intersects with fundamental methodological issues of Husserlian phenomenology. It is well beyond the current project's scope to deal with those complexities inherent in Husserl's systematic work. Some of these complexities will be addressed in the course of the inquiry but only to the extent that they exhibit an essential relation to the main theme of protention, i.e., only insofar as a certain degree of clarification with respect to these complexities is indicated by the inner coherence of the inquiry as a necessary condition for achieving the current project's goals.

retention and protention, in Husserl's *Hua X*. To do so, however, certain preliminary clarifications are in order. On the one hand, we are faced with the essential question, what is given in time-consciousness and offers itself to phenomenological description? On the other hand, we have to be clear about questions of methodology, viz., about how one should carry out such a description. That analysis will lead us to consider phenomenological reduction in its direct relation to time-consciousness (§2). We will examine a specific conception of the reduction that chimes well with the analysis of time-consciousness, and in particular of protentional consciousness. Performing the reduction brings to light a supratemporal element, i.e., the ego-pole, and invites us to consider to what extent one can achieve a phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness by taking into account the relation of our primal awareness of time to our consciousness's egoic aspect.

Part II is meant to offer a picture of retention or primary memory, i.e., the primal mode of experiencing past in the deepest level of time-consciousness (§3). One of retention's major features is its double intentional directedness: retention intends (a) the immanent temporal object by contributing to its constitution through "transversal intentionality," and (b) the past retentional phases, i.e., the past phases of consciousness itself through "longitudinal intentionality." The latter intentionality is responsible for the constitution of the unity of our flow of consciousness and is thus a primal form of self-awareness. It is on this basis that one should revisit the well-known debate concerning the levels of constitution. Without aspiring to an original contribution to the debate, we mean merely to address the following questions: Is it appropriate to refer to our pre-reflective awareness of experiences in this deepest level of constitution as an awareness of "internal objects"? And should we consider that what Husserl calls "absolute flow" is exhibiting itself in a radically different manner, i.e., is there a mode of self-appearance proper to the absolute flow? The eventual rejection of this model of constitution—viz., constitution as act-constitution, for being essentially inapplicable to the level of time-constitution—mirrors in the dismissal of the "apprehension/content" schema for describing the lowest level of our awareness of time. However, this dismissal should not amount to an overall rejection of the schema.

It is Part III that turns to protention itself. Husserl's gradual clarification of the role of protention in our time-consciousness goes hand in hand with his reworking of time-diagrams and leads to sweeping changes in his time theory (§4). The development of his thought on the topic brings to light the significance of protention's fulfillment in its double meaning, viz., both as particular and as general fulfillment. The former is tied to the constitution of particular temporal objects, while the latter brings about the primal awareness of the process of fulfillment, and thus of the temporal flow. A certain complication arises regarding Husserl's two accounts of temporal pre-reflective self-awareness, i.e., his initial account of retentional longitudinal intentionality and his later conception of "general fulfillment." A very important difference lies in the fact that self-awareness is now attributed to the fulfilling function peculiar to protentional consciousness and not to the retentional intending and modifying of the previous phases of primal appearing. We will suggest a way to reconcile both accounts by clarifying what protentional longitudinal intentionality

amounts to. In addition to this, protention will also be examined as a sort of empty constitution according to its modes of making-intuitive (*Veranschaulichung*): the “confirming” (*bewahrheitende*) and the “picturing” (*ausmalende*) or “clarifying” (*klärende*) making-intuitive—a distinction introduced by Husserl in his *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*. These modes as well as what Husserl names “mere filling” (*bloßes Füllsel*) will be extensively examined in their connection with general and particular fulfillment. Our findings make Husserl’s description of protention to appear much more nuanced and attractive than it is usually taken to be.

A key point of our approach is the claim that Husserl’s theory of protention reveals its richness once we move to the material analysis of protention, i.e., once we focus on its content (§5). First, we will discuss the senses in which protention appears as modification and the various protentional functions that are distinguished once one takes into account the peculiarities of protentional content. “Disappointment” and “phantasmatic self-affection” will be given special attention. The pertinent works by Lohmar, Ferrer, and Rodemeyer will serve as the main points of reference and also as the means for us to clarify and delimitate our own views and suggestions regarding protention’s typology.

To illustrate protention’s function in a palpable way, one must specify how different protentional functions operate and cooperate at the perceptual level. This will allow us to see that the specific qualitative determinations of the perceptual content correspond to the specific formal functions of protention. But since sense-perception brings us face to face with cases where protentions are disappointed, one important aspect remains to be discussed, i.e., how some cases of “disappointment” lead to a radical “corrective” transformation of our protentional horizons. In addressing the corrective transformation of protentional consciousness, we encounter the distinctively *affective* character of this primal experience, i.e., in irritation and surprise. Thus, it seems proper to consider the affective aspect of our consciousness by entertaining the idea that affective elements are essential components of our living-present’s primal temporalization (§6). Delimiting the affective structure of the living-present, we will investigate affection’s relation to protention on the model of the “affective relief,” viz., the unitary nexus of affectivity that maps the gradation of affective force on our living-present. The model of affective relief, largely overlooked in phenomenological research though it is, has the benefit of emphasizing the dynamic-affective unity of our living-present on a level where the affective prominences (*Abgehobenheiten*) have not yet acquired the meaning of object-presentation. It will be shown that affection and protention are closely connected at the level of affectivity and this is brought to our attention once we pay heed to affective propagation (*Fortpflanzung*).

What is more, the protentional dynamic of the subjective side of affection, i.e., of our consciousness’s readiness to be affected, will be also taken into account (§7). The focus will be on the element which seems to exhibit a peculiar protentional dynamic, namely “instincts.” A discussion of Husserl’s theory of instincts and the various distinctions introduced by it will be necessary in order to pinpoint some of the dimensions that are relevant to our investigation of the intertwinement between protention and instinctive striving. What has been said with respect to instincts and

protention will then be applied to the model of affective relief (§8). Our “readiness to be affected,” i.e., the subjective side of the relief, is partly structured by our instincts and their corresponding formations. What is needed is to point out how the subject side of the relief contributes to the unitary propagation of its affective force.

The most important philosophical contribution of the present study, so we think, consists in that it brings to light the richness of Husserl’s notion of protention and, most of all, its close relationship with affectivity.

## References

- Bernet, R. (1985). Einleitung des Herausgebers. In Edmund Husserl. *Texte zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917)*. Hamburg, Germany: Felix Meiner.
- Fink, E. (2008). *Phänomenologische Werkstatt Bd. 2. Bernauer Zeitmanuskripte, Cartesianische Meditationen und System der phänomenologischen Philosophie*. Freiburg/München, Germany: Karl Alber.
- Held, K. (1966). *Lebendige Gegenwart* (Phaenomenologica 23). Den Haag, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Held, K. (2010). Phenomenology of ‘authentic time’ in Husserl and Heidegger. In D. Lohmar & I. Yamaguchi (Eds.), *On Time – New contributions to the Husserlian phenomenology of time* (Phaenomenologica 197) (pp. 91–114). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.
- Lohmar, D. (2002b). Die Idee der Reduktion. Husserls Reduktionen – und ihr gemeinsamer, methodischer Sinn. In H. Hüni & P. Trawney (Hrsg.), *Die erscheinende Welt. Festschrift für Klaus Held* (pp. 751–771). Berlin, Germany: Duncker und Humboldt.
- Lohmar, D. (2012a). Zur Vorgeschichte der transzendentalen Reduktion in den *Logischen Untersuchungen*. Die unbekannte ‘Reduktion auf den reellen Bestand’. *Husserl Studies*, 28, 1–24. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.
- Luft, S. (2002). “Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie”. *Systematik und Methodologie der Phänomenologie in der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Husserl und Fink* (Phaenomenologica 166). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer.
- Montagova, K. S. (2013). *Transzendente Genesis des Bewusstseins und der Erkenntnis* (Phaenomenologica 210). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.
- Ricoeur, P. (1988). *Time and narrative* (Vol. 3, K. Blamey & D. Pellauer, Trans.). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Sakakibara, T. (2010). Reflection Upon the Living-Present and the Primal Consciousness in Husserl’s Phenomenology. In D. Lohmar & I. Yamaguchi (Eds.), *On time – New contributions to the Husserlian phenomenology of time* (Phaenomenologica 197) (pp. 251–271). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.
- St. Augustine. (1912). *Confessions II*, W. Watts (Trans.). London/New York: The Loeb Classical Library.
- Theodorou, P. (2015). *Husserl and Heidegger on reduction, primordiality and the categorial. Phenomenology beyond its initial divide* (Contributions to Phenomenology 83). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.
- von Herrmann, F.-W. (1992). *Augustinus und die phänomenologische Frage nach der Zeit*. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Vittorio Klostermann.

# Contents

## Part I Phenomenology of Time-Consciousness

<b>Preliminary Remarks</b> . . . . .	3
1 Absolute Givenness. . . . .	3
2 The Given in Time-Consciousness . . . . .	6
3 Introduction to the Phenomenological Analysis of Time-Consciousness . . . . .	9
4 The Environment of the Debate on the Perception of Time . . . . .	12
References. . . . .	15
<b>Phenomenological Reduction and Suspension of Objective Time</b> . . . . .	17
1 The Idea of Reduction. . . . .	19
2 The Supra-Temporal . . . . .	22
References. . . . .	26

## Part II Phenomenological Analysis of Retentional Consciousness

<b>Retention or Primary Memory</b> . . . . .	31
1 The Development of Time-Diagrams: Retentional Consciousness . . . . .	35
2 Double Intentionality of Retention and the Constitution of the Flow of Consciousness . . . . .	40
2.1 Excursus I: Self-Consciousness and Retention's Double Intentionality—the Debate . . . . .	43
3 Apprehension/Content Schema. . . . .	49
3.1 Excursus II: Merging as Process of Unification . . . . .	51
4 Near and Far Retention . . . . .	55
References. . . . .	59

**Part III Phenomenological Analysis of Protentional Consciousness**

**Protention as Phenomenon** . . . . . 63

1 Reduction and Protentional Consciousness . . . . . 66

2 The Development of Time-Diagrams (II): Protention and Its Relation to ‘General’ and ‘Particular’ Fulfillment. . . . . 67

3 Protention as Empty Constitution . . . . . 71

4 Protention and Its Modes of Making-Intuitive . . . . . 75

    4.1 Clarifying or Picturing Making-Intuitive . . . . . 78

    4.2 Synthesis of Fulfillment in Picturing Making-Intuitive . . . . . 81

    4.3 Mere Filling . . . . . 85

    4.4 Modes of Making-Intuitive in Their Relation to ‘General’ and ‘Particular’ Fulfillment. . . . . 88

5 Protention and Its Double Intentionality . . . . . 95

References. . . . . 98

**Elements of a Material Analysis of Protention** . . . . . 101

1 Protentional Modification . . . . . 104

    1.1 Protention as a Distinct ‘Kind’ of Modification . . . . . 105

    1.2 Protention as ‘Content’-Modification . . . . . 108

2 What Does Protention Protend? . . . . . 110

3 The Phenomenon of Disappointment and the Role of Hyle Within the Protentional Continuum . . . . . 113

4 Hyletic Protentions of Expectation—A First Approach: Phantasmatic Self-Affection . . . . . 117

5 Ferrer’s Version of Protentional Typology . . . . . 122

6 Near and Far Protention . . . . . 130

7 Protentional Typology of Our Perceptual Field . . . . . 135

8 “Corrective” Transformation of Protentions. . . . . 143

References. . . . . 148

**Protention and Affectivity: The Affective Relief** . . . . . 151

References. . . . . 163

**Protention and Instincts** . . . . . 165

References. . . . . 174

**Experiential Elements of the Affective Relief and the Role of Protention** . . . . . 177

References. . . . . 182

**Conclusions** . . . . . 183

**Bibliography** . . . . . 187

**Index**. . . . . 195

# Abbreviations

( <i>Hua</i> volume, page)	Edmund Husserl: <i>Husserliana</i> , <i>Edmund Husserls Gesammelte Werke</i>
( <i>Hua Mat</i> volume, page)	Edmund Husserl: <i>Husserliana Materialien</i>
( <i>EU</i> , page)	Edmund Husserl 1954. <i>Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik</i> , redigiert und herausgegeben von Ludwig Landgrebe, Claassen, Hamburg

Unless otherwise noted, the translations of Husserl's texts are ours. The original passages are also cited in the corresponding footnotes.

**Part I**  
**Phenomenology of Time-Consciousness**



## 1 Absolute Givenness

It is well-known that Husserl dealt with the phenomenon of time throughout his life, beginning from his notorious lectures on time-consciousness held in Göttingen during the winter semester of 1905. The significance he attributed to this phenomenon for his entire phenomenological project can be easily recognized in that he explicitly acknowledged, in *Ideen I*, the necessity of a separate, special field of research for treating the issue of inner time-consciousness.<sup>1</sup> Admittedly this declaration is made rather late, but he had already gone through this special field in his *Vorlesungen* in a rather impressively detailed application and refinement of his early methodological tools, as they were developed in his *Logische Untersuchungen*.<sup>2</sup> The praising introductory reference to Augustine's XI book of *Confessions* already predisposes the reader about Husserl's general orientation. In that respect, the methodological exclusion of objective time, articulated in two parallel operations, comes as no surprise (Hua 1966a, 5; also, cf. Kortooms, 2002, 22f.). Similarly to Augustine, we encounter irresolvable difficulties once we try to clarify the way in which temporal objectivity, i.e., individual objectivity in general, is constituted within subjective time-consciousness. The same complexities are met when we undertake the task to

---

<sup>1</sup> "Eine eigene Besprechung erfordert die phänomenologische Zeit als allgemeine Eigentümlichkeit aller Erlebnisse" (Hua 1976, 180). In *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis* Husserl says: "Im ABC der Konstitution aller bewusstwerdenden Objektivität und der Subjektivität für sich selbst seiend liegt hier das A. Es besteht, wie wir sagen können, in einem universalen formalen Rahmen, in einer synthetisch konstituierten Form, an der alle anderen möglichen Synthesen Anteil haben müssen" (Hua 1966b, 125).

<sup>2</sup> In his *Ideen I*, Husserl reports in a footnote that he considered his struggling with the enigma of time-consciousness as being completed in 1905, when he communicated his results in the lectures he held at the University of Göttingen that same year. See Hua 1976, 182. Needless to say, his *Vorlesungen* were not actually Husserl's final word on the matter.