




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A black and white photograph of Edward Heath, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, smiling and waving his right hand. He is wearing a dark suit, a white shirt, and a patterned tie. The background shows a brick wall and a doorway with the number '10' visible.

Policies and Politics Under Prime Minister Edward Heath

Edited by
Andrew S. Roe-Crines
Timothy Heppell

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Edward Heath, as the new Prime Minister, arriving at No 10 Downing Street for the first time, after going to Buckingham Place to see the Queen. June 1970.

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March 2020

Andrew S. Roe-Crines
Timothy Heppell

Praise for *Policies and Politics Under Prime Minister
Edward Heath*

“This exciting and innovative new collection examines Edward Heath and his impact on the leadership of the Conservative Party. The book benefits substantially from contributions by a wide range of experts on the ideology, leadership, membership and support base of the Conservative Party. We learn much about Heath’s importance and significance as a major player in British politics through outstandingly thorough archival research and rigorous analysis by leading political scientists. This is essential reading for anyone with an interest in party politics.”

—Jon Tonge, *Professor of Politics, University of Liverpool, UK*

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CHAPTER 1

The Heath Premiership: Existing Academic Perspectives

Andrew S. Roe-Crines and Timothy Heppell

In post-war British politics, there have been four periods of Labour Party governance: 1945–1951 under the leadership of Clement Attlee; 1964–1970 under the leadership of Harold Wilson; 1974–1979 under the leadership of Wilson again and then James Callaghan; and the 1997–2010 period under the leadership of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. There have also been four periods of Conservative governance, and three of those periods have lasted a decade or more: 1951–1964 under the leadership of Winston Churchill; Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan and Alec Douglas-Home; 1979–1997 under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher and John Major; and the period since 2010 under the leadership of David Cameron, Theresa May and Boris Johnson. The fourth period of Conservative governance was the 1970–1974 premiership led by Edward Heath and it

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holds an unwarranted distinction—it is the only post-war premiership to be removed by the voters at the first opportunity.

All of the aforementioned eras involved some form of re-election for the governing party. The Attlee premiership that entered office in 1945 (majority 146) did secure re-election in 1950 (majority six) before losing office in 1951; the Wilson premiership of 1964 (majority four) secured re-election in 1966 (majority 99) before being defeated in 1970; and the second Wilson era entered office as a minority premiership in March 1974 and secured a small majority (of three) at the General Election of October 1974. The Blair era would involve three successive election victories and majorities of 179 (in 1997), 167 (in 2001) and 66 (in 2005). The three long-serving eras of Conservative governance saw the party securing stronger parliamentary performances when seeking their first re-election. They re-entered office in 1951 with a parliamentary majority of 17 and their majority increased to 59 in 1955 (and increased again to 100 in 1959). The victory that the Conservatives secured at the General Election of 1979, with a majority of 44, was followed by three further victories—in 1983 with a majority of 144; in 1987 with a majority of 102; and then a majority of 21 in 1992. Their return to office in 2010 as a coalition with the Liberal Democrats was followed by three further General Elections in the next decade, all of which resulted in the Conservatives holding onto power—in 2015, they secured a majority of 12 under Cameron; in 2017, they failed to secure a majority but held onto office as a minority premiership (under May); and finally, they held a majority of 80 under the leadership of Johnson in late 2019 (see Cowley and Kavanagh 2018; Cutts et al. 2020).

What must have been distressing for Heath personally was the performance of the Conservatives while he was their party leader, relative to their performances before and after his party leadership tenure. As Table 1.1 demonstrates, he led the Conservatives into four successive General Elections between March 1966 and October 1974 and he led them to three defeats alongside one victory at the General Election of June 1970. The four General Elections prior to him being leader of the Conservative Party (1951–1964) involved them winning three out of four, and the four General Elections after he was leader of the Conservative Party involved them winning all four (1979–1992). The 1951–1959 era saw the Conservative vote base oscillate between 13.1 and 13.7 million. Between 1979 and 1992, their vote base peaked at 14.0 million (in 1992) and was at its lowest in 1983 at 13.0 million, when ironically they secured

Table 1.1 The electoral record of the conservative party (1945–2019)

<i>Election</i>	<i>Elected Conservatives</i>	<i>Percentage share of vote</i>	<i>Total votes received</i>	<i>Government and majority</i>	
1945	213	39.8	9,577,667	Labour	146
1950	299	43.5	12,502,567	Labour	5
1951	321	48.0	13,717,538	Conservative	17
1955	345	49.7	13,311,936	Conservative	59
1959	365	49.4	13,749,830	Conservative	100
1964	304	43.4	12,001,396	Labour	4
Heath era					
1966	253	41.9	11,418,433	Labour	97
1970	330	46.4	13,145,123	Conservative	31
1974 F	297	37.9	11,872,180	Labour	Minority
1974 O	277	35.8	10,464,817	Labour	3
1979	339	43.9	13,697,923	Conservative	44
1983	397	42.4	13,012,315	Conservative	144
1987	376	42.3	13,763,066	Conservative	101
1992	336	41.9	14,092,891	Conservative	21
1997	165	30.7	9,602,957	Labour	179
2001	166	31.8	8,357,622	Labour	167
2005	198	32.4	8,772,473	Labour	66
2010	307	36.1	10,726,555	Conservative- Lib	Dem Coalition
2015	330	36.9	11,334,226	Conservative	12
2017	317	42.4	13,636,684	Conservative	Minority
2019	365	43.6	13,966,565	Conservative	80

Source: Adapted from Cowley and Kavanagh (2018) and Cutts et al. (2020)

a landslide parliamentary majority of 144 caused by the nature of the fragmentation of the Labour (27%) and Social Democratic Party (SDP)/Liberal Alliance vote (25%) (Butler and Kavanagh 1984). When the Conservatives lost power at the General Election of 1964, their vote fell to 12.0 million (down by 1.7 million from the 13.7 million secured five years earlier), but that decline did occur at the end of a 13-year period in office. Their vote base when losing office in 1964 (at 12.0 million) was larger than the vote base that the Conservatives secured in February 1974 after only three and half years in office—11.8 million—and the vote share in 1964 was significantly larger (at 43.4%) than the vote share in February 1974 (at 37.9%). That the electorate was sceptical of the merits of the Heath premiership was confirmed by their performance in the second

General Election of 1974, when their vote share fell further (to 35.8%) at a vote base of 10.4 million (Butler and Kavanagh 1974, 1975). Between the General Elections of 1970 and October 1974, the Conservatives lost 2.7 million votes and they experienced a vote share reduction of 10.6 percent. That was the Heath effect and, much to his chagrin, the Thatcher effect was just as pronounced but in the opposite direction. Between the October 1974 and May 1979 General Elections, the Conservatives gained 3.2 million votes and increased their vote share by 7.9% (Butler and Kavanagh 1980). That the Heath era seems a failed era for the Conservatives—the so-called self-proclaimed party of government—is evident from the fact that the General Election victory of 2019 was their 8th General Election victory out of 11 General Elections since his era.

The re-election of the Johnson premiership, in what became known as the Brexit General Election of 2019, has ensured that the United Kingdom will leave the European Union. That the year of exiting will occur on the 50th anniversary of the General Election of 1970 and the beginning of the Heath premiership carries a certain irony. That is because the greatest policy achievement, and thereby governmental legacy of the Heath premiership, was securing entry into what was then known as the European Community¹ (Kitzinger 1973; Lord 1993; see also Crowson 2007; Wall 2013). This provides the rationale for political historians to reassess the Heath premiership. If the most significant legacy of that era is now being reversed, as voters reject the benefits of integration within Europe, then does that impact upon how we interpret the Heath premiership? Or to put it another way, do we need to reassess the validity of the two rival perspectives that exist vis-à-vis the Heath premiership, that is, the critical perspective and the contingencies or circumstances-based perspective?.

THE CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE HEATH PREMIERSHIP

The critique of the Heath premiership is multifaceted. The dominant critique is the view expressed by those on the free market or economically liberal wing of the Conservative Party (who would later become defined

¹The European Communities were comprised of three entities: the European Economic Community, European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). It was the first of these that was most prominent—often referred to as the ‘Common Market’—and the main focus of the UK application to join. However, for the sake of consistency and to avoid confusion, we will refer to it as the European Community (or EC) throughout this book.

as the Thatcherite dries). They argue that the policy review process that was conducted in the opposition era under Heath (between 1965 and 1970), and which informed the construction of their 1970 manifesto, had established what an incoming Conservative administration for the 1970s (and beyond) should be seeking to achieve.² That programme appeared to be a challenge to the consensus politics of the post-war era (Kavanagh and Morris 1994; Dutton 1997).

Heath wanted to modernise the British economy. His strategy for promoting economic growth involved reducing state intervention in the economy,³ making the case for lowering both taxation and public expenditure, advancing competition and promoting efficiency. Initiating this plan for economic modernisation required entry into the European Economic Community and trade union reform, increasing selectivity in terms of the allocation of welfare entitlements and the rejection of formal prices and incomes policies (Kavanagh 1996: 366). Furthermore, his commitment to this new approach seemed to be clear from the language used in the Conservative Party manifesto of 1970, as Heath argued that:

I want to see a fresh approach to the taking of decisions. The Government should seek the best advice and listen carefully to it. It should not rush into decisions, it should use up to date techniques for assessing the situation, it should be deliberate and thorough ... *once a decision is made, once a policy is established, the Prime Minister and his colleagues should have the courage to stick to it* ... courage and intellectual honesty are essential qualities in politics, and in the interests of our country it is high time we saw them again. (Quoted in Campbell 1993: 271)

²In an overt piece of pre-election campaigning, Prime Minister Harold Wilson contributed to the impression of Heath as a hard-faced economically liberal and socially authoritarian Conservative. Naming Heath as ‘Selsdon Man’—after the Selsdon Park Hotel where the Conservatives held a policy review session in January 1970—Wilson argued that Heath had ‘an atavistic desire to reverse the course of 25 years of social revolution; what they are planning is a wanton, calculated and deliberate return to greater inequality’ (Campbell 1993: 265).

³This commitment to reducing intervention in the economy was reinforced by the rhetoric of John Davies, President of the Board of Trade, in November 1970. He said that the Heath premiership was determined to make ‘industry stand on its own two feet or go to the wall’ and that the ‘consequence of treating the whole country as lame ducks was national decadence’ (HC Debates, Vol. 805, Col. 1211–8, 4th November 1970).

That commitment seemed to be reaffirmed in the speech that Heath gave to the Conservative Party Annual Conference of late 1970, just a few months after entering Downing Street after the General Election of June that year. Dubbed the ‘quiet revolution’ speech, Heath argued that:

This then is the task to which your Government is dedicated: to give to all our people both freedom and responsibility. That is the challenge and from it will come opportunity. Opportunity to take our destiny, the destiny of the nation, once again in our own hands. *If we are to achieve this task we will have to embark on a change so radical, a revolution so quiet and yet so total, that it will go far beyond the programme for a Parliament to which we are committed and on which we have already embarked; far beyond this decade and way into the 1980s.* For it is the task of building something of style, of substance, and worth; something so important to the life and the future of this country of ours. We can only hope to begin now what future Conservative Governments will continue and complete. We are laying the foundations, but they are the foundations for a generation. (Heath 1970)

The rhetoric used appeared to be long term and left little room for ambiguity. After an initial attempt to begin the process of implementing their agenda, the evidence that it could work was not immediately forthcoming. Not only was inflation increasing, but what was more problematic was the increases in unemployment, which hit the one million mark in the winter of 1971–1972, a figure that Heath feared was politically unacceptable (i.e. re-election would not be possible at this level) (Kavanagh 1996: 373). As a consequence, Heath engaged in a process of policy reappraisal that he thought represented pragmatic adjustments, but his right-wing critics thought smacked of betrayal (Bruce-Gardyne 1974; Holmes 1982, 1997). The belief in a hands-off approach to industry and to not bail-out failing companies was backtracked on as they intervened to nationalise Rolls Royce and then rescued Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. They were forced to accept that their attempt at trade union reform, via the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, had failed—their new approach proved to be inoperable after the Trade Union Congress decided that they would expel any trade union that registered under the act. Having previously committed to cuts in public expenditure they did the exact opposite in 1972. They attempted to boost output and stimulate growth by reflationary methods, in what became known as the ‘Barber Boom’, after the Chancellor, Anthony Barber, which in itself was said to be the cause of the inflationary pressures that developed thereafter. They also contravened

their initial claims by intervening to impose an incomes policy (Bruce-Gardyne 1974; Holmes 1982, 1997). However, what did remain consistent was their focus in securing entry into the European Economic Community (Lord 1993).

To his critics on the free market/economically liberal wing of the Conservative Party, Heath had backed away from their agenda. Thatcher would speak of the ‘poisoned legacy of our U-turns’ which she said stemmed from the fact that Heath had ‘no firm principles’ (Thatcher 1995: 240). A similar view was expressed by Norman Tebbit, later a key ally of Thatcher, who described the abandonment of the free market agenda that they had agreed in opposition, as a ‘retreat into corporatism’ and a ‘climbdown’ that was characterised by a ‘mish-mash of ill-considered centralist and socialist hand to mouth devices with no intellectual nor political cohesion’ (Tebbit 1988: 105, 124). Bruce-Gardyne concluded that the U-turn led to a fatal combination of (a) a statutory incomes policy that created conflict with the trade unions and (b) an expansionary financial policy, which served to increase inflation (Bruce-Gardyne 1974; see also Holmes 1982, 1997). The right-wing critique, or betrayal thesis, would thereby ‘precipitate the birth of Thatcherism’ (Gamble 1988: 69).

However, the critique of the Heath premiership is not solely limited to the disappointment of economic liberals who berate him for abandoning their agenda due to his lack of ideological backbone. The U-turns provoked considerable disquiet within Conservative parliamentary ranks, and a clear critique would emerge of Heath as a party manager (see Critchley 1973; Norton 1978; Franklin et al. 1986). Parliamentary rebellion rates were significantly higher than in previous Conservative governments of the post-war era. The overall parliamentary rebellion rate was 18% across the 1970–1974 Parliament (including a 29% in the 1970–1971 parliamentary session), as compared to the following rebellion rates across the 1951–1964 period: 0.8% in the 1951–1955 Parliament, 1.4% in the 1955–1959 Parliament and 11.8% in the 1959–1964 Parliament (Norton 1978: 208). Despite being a former Chief Whip with experience of the challenges of ensuring discipline, Heath adopted an inflexible approach to party management. That reluctance to compromise and offer concessions flowed from his determination to secure his legislative objectives ‘unchanged’ and left little outlet for backbenchers to exert influence upon policy, thus fuelling dissent (Seldon and Sanklecha 2004: 55; see also Heppell and Hill 2015).

Alongside the critiques of Heath for his policy U-turns and his difficulties in terms of party management, it is important to identify the problems that his administration had in terms of demonstrating governing competence. In a damning verdict, Kavanagh identified how the Heath era was associated with a ‘record number of work days lost due to strikes, some of which severely dislocated life for millions of ordinary people’ as they suffered ‘states of emergency, double digit inflation, a three-day working week, blank television screens, lawlessness and vandalism’ (Kavanagh 1996: 360). In economic terms, Heath was left bemused as ‘inflation and unemployment continued to defy the textbook by rising together’ (Heath 1998: 343). These difficulties in terms of economic performance, which ran parallel to their failure to improve industrial relations (Moran 1977), contributed to the image of the decade as ‘disconnected, quarrelsome, unsteady, ineffective and self-defeating’ (Beer 1982: 1; see also Whitehead 1985; Fry 2005; Beckett 2009; Sandbrook 2010; Black and Pemberton 2013).

Ultimately, the cumulative effect of perceptions of leadership failure and ideological inconsistency, internal party disunity and governing incompetence was electoral rejection—their vote base collapsed from 13,145,123 to 11,872,180 between the General Elections of 1970 and 1974, and their vote share fell from 46.4 to 37.9% (Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky 1971; Butler and Kavanagh 1974). It is also the case that all accounts of the history of the Conservative Party make reference to some or all of the themes identified above (see, for example, Ramsden 1996, 1998; Evans and Taylor 1996; Blake 1998; Charmley 2007; Bale 2012; Heppell 2014).

THE CONTINGENCIES OR CIRCUMSTANCES PERSPECTIVE OF THE HEATH PREMIERSHIP

Alongside the critique of the Heath premiership, there is the revisionist perspective. This is based primarily on identifying the difficult circumstances that the Heath premiership faced, with Seldon arguing that it is this contingencies perspective which ‘provides the fairest judgement’ (Seldon 1996: 19). In this context, Seldon asks political historians to acknowledge the constraints that Heath was forced to operate under.

The economic circumstances of the times would create challenges for any political party or prime minister, being as it was an era associated with

notions of economic decline and the ungovernability or overload thesis⁴ (see King 1975; Tomlinson 2000). Concerns about increases in inflation and unemployment predominated, and it is worth noting that both the preceding and successor Labour administrations would also struggle to overcome the same issues (see Ponting 1990; Coopey et al. 1993; Dorey 2006, 2019; O'Hara and Parr 2006 on the 1964–1970 era; and Holmes 1985; Harmon 1997; Hickson and Seldon 2004; Hickson 2005a and Shepherd 2013 on the 1974–1979 era). Linked to the difficulties in terms of economic performance was the perception of increasing trade union power. It is evident that the dysfunctional relationship between government and the trade unions was a contributing factor in the downfall of the Heath administration that is, the non-viability of the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, the 1972 Miners' Strike, the 1973–1974 Miners' Strike and the imposition of the three-day week leading to the 'Who Governs' General Election of February 1974 (see Seldon 1988; Taylor 1996; Butler and Kavanagh 1974; see also Moran 1977; Dorey 1995, Chap. 5; Phillips 2006, 2007). However, Taylor suggests that the problem was that the Trade Union movement was structurally and ideologically incapable of securing an agreement with the Heath premiership, or working with them to create the modern European social market economy that Heath envisaged (Taylor 1993: 218). Moreover, as Barnes and Reid (1980) observed, trade union power and influence had been a significant factor in the fall of three successive prime ministers, as either side of Heath, Wilson had been undermined by the failure of *In Place of Strife*, and Callaghan was undermined by the Winter of Discontent (Shepherd 2013; Dorey 2019). Furthermore, the constraints that Heath was operating under were not limited to those associated with the economy and industrial relations. He was also constrained by the escalating conflict within Northern Ireland, the suspension of the Stormont Parliament and the imposition of direct rule from Westminster (Arthur 1996; Smith 2007; McDaid 2013).

Political historians who adopt the contingencies or circumstances perspective on the Heath Premiership argue that, once the difficult operating environment is acknowledged, more nuanced arguments can emerge.

⁴The Heath premiership also coincided with destabilising international economic circumstances. The ending of the Bretton Wood system of fixed exchange rates intensified the uncertainty, and the weakened British economy of the early 1970s was ill prepared to deal with the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Arab states (October 1973), which 'led to the quadrupling of oil prices by OPEC countries' (Kavanagh 1996: 380).

First, given that the Heath premiership possessed a healthy parliamentary majority (at 31), they did manage to deliver—in a legislative sense—what they claimed were their main objectives when entering office, even if some of these were reversed by the successor Labour administrations of 1974–1979; for example, they did secure their primary objective of negotiating their entry into the European Economic Community and they gained parliamentary approval for this. They also delivered in legislative form in the following areas: reforming taxation, housing finance and industrial relations, and they also recognised health care, central and local government and they ended mandatory comprehensive education (Kavanagh 1996: 362). Second, if we acknowledge the difficult economic environment, then their policy changes should be seen as being pragmatically driven rather than the abandoning of principles. As such, the betrayal thesis perpetuated by the Thatcherite right vis-à-vis the U-turns is an ‘exaggeration’ (Seldon 1996: 13). Seldon argues that the significance of the Seldon agenda and the Conservative Party manifesto of 1970 was overstated because Heath was ‘never a believer in *laissez faire*, but was a traditional Tory who saw the state as an essential deliverer of economic and social policy’ (Seldon 1996: 14). As such some of the policies that they had advocated at the 1970 General Election, for example, the rejection of an incomes policy and tax and spending cuts, were driven by ‘*instrumentalism* and *opportunism*, not *ideology*’ (Seldon 1996: 14). Kavanagh endorses this scepticism, arguing that Heath was ‘consistent about ends, flexible about means: he was a pragmatist, concerned with pursuing the best means to achieving economic growth and greater personal freedom’ (Kavanagh 1996: 367).

BETWEEN CRITIQUE AND CONTINGENCIES/CIRCUMSTANCES: THE HEATH PREMIERSHIP AND A TRANSITIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Having identified the two existing perspectives on the Heath premiership—the critical and the contingencies/circumstances perspectives—the aim of this book is to advance an alternative perspective. This perspective involves acknowledging the failures and difficulties that the Heath premiership experienced and thus accepting that there is validity to both existing perspectives. But rather than subscribing to one perspective or the other, it is credible to see the Heath premiership as a transitional

government. By that we mean that although the ability of the Heath premiership to pursue a new policy agenda was compromised by difficult circumstances—which creates the evidence of policy failure—their policy legacy and political impacts were more pronounced than might be initially assumed.

To help us in our reassessment of the Heath premiership, we shall structure the book around the dimensions of the statecraft model. The statecraft model is associated with the work of Jim Bulpitt (1986)⁵ and it represents a useful analytical framework⁶ for us when examining the only post-war government that failed to secure re-election.

Statecraft refers to the method(s) by which political parties attempt to win office (the politics of support) and then govern competently (the politics of power). When assessing its value to our understanding of Conservative Party politics, Hickson has argued that ‘statecraft should be viewed as an examination of how the Conservative Party has sought when in power to *insulate* itself from social, economic and international pressures’ and then ‘how it has sought to *manipulate* them in order to maintain some degree of governing competence’ (Hickson 2005b: 182). Statecraft has the following interconnected dimensions (which should be seen as cyclical ending in re-election if pursued effectively, with the determinant of effectiveness being relative to the Labour Party):

(1) *A Winning Electoral Strategy*

Whatever policy platform the leadership decides to construct, it has to be perceived as viable (i.e. achievable) so that it can secure a sufficient level of voter support to provide the basis for a parliamentary support. That process may involve compromises in order to maximise their potential vote base, but those compromises have to be tempered by the need to retain the support of their own activist base (Bulpitt 1986; Stevens 2002; Hickson 2005b; Taylor 2005; Buller and James 2012)

(2) *Evidence of Governing Competence*

Flowing from the policy platform that was (a) constructed in opposition and then (b) secured enough electoral support to win

⁵ For academic discussions on the strengths and limitations of the statecraft approach, see Stevens (2002: 119–150); Buller (1999: 691–712); and Buller (2000: 319–327).

⁶ Marsh has acknowledged that statecraft theory is a key approach through which to understand British government and politics (Marsh 2012: 48–49).

power, the (new) governing party now have to demonstrate that they can provide governing competence, especially in the sphere of economic management (Bulpitt 1986; Stevens 2002; Hickson 2005b; Taylor 2005; Buller and James 2012)

(3) *Political Argument Hegemony*

Linked to the above theme on governing competence, the governing party will use power to (a) *deflect blame* on any policy failings onto the predecessor government, and (b) by doing so, they will seek to *delegitimise* the views of their Labour opponents so as to establish that it would be a *risk* to return to a Labour government at the next General Election. Bulpitt defines this as gaining dominance of elite debate so as to ensure that as the governing party they can push their values and agenda up the political agenda, whilst simultaneously pushing down the political agenda the values and agenda of their (Labour) opponents (Bulpitt 1986; Stevens 2002; Hickson 2005b; Taylor 2005; Buller and James 2012).

(4) *Effective Party Management*

This acknowledges the importance of internal cohesion in terms of how voters perceive the Conservative Party relative to their Labour opponents.⁷ Historians of the Conservative Party have often emphasised how, in the pre-Heath era, the Conservatives were known for their parliamentary unity in the division lobbies, their emphasis on loyalty to their leader and their rejection of ideological dogmatism in preference for political pragmatism or adaptability (Ball 1998; Blake 1998; Charmley 1996; Davies 1996; Evans and Taylor 1996; Gilmour and Garnett 1998; Ramsden 1995, 1996, 1998).

The aim of this book is to make the case for viewing the Heath premiership from a transitional perspective. To do this, we split the book into three parts. Part one of the book—entitled *from opposition to office*—is devoted to the first dimension of the statecraft model—the construction of a winning electoral strategy. It will offer an assessment on the key developments within the Conservatives in the opposition era of 1964–1970. In

⁷Writing in 1964, Richard Rose concluded that the Labour Party were a party of factions, involving stable, cohesive and organised groups that sought to advance specific policies and leaders. The Conservative Party, in contrast, were a party of non-aligned tendencies, based on fluctuating alignments amongst parliamentarians, but these were transient alignments that lacked the cohesiveness of the more factional Labour Party (Rose 1964: 33–46).

Chap. 2, Thomas McMeeking identifies how and why Heath won the Conservative Party leadership election of 1965, which was the first democratic leadership election in the history of the party. In Chap. 3, Mark Garnett examines how and why the Conservative Party's policy agenda was amended in the opposition era. In Chap. 4, Martin Farr analyses the General Election campaign of 1970, where the Conservatives secured what was seen to be at the time an unexpected victory.

For the second dimension of the statecraft model, governing competence, part two of the book—entitled *policy implementation*—re-examines the central policy objectives of the Heath premiership. Part two considers the coherence, contradictions, failings and impact of their policies. In Chap. 5, James Silverwood reconsiders the economic performance of the Heath premiership. In Chap. 6, Samuel Warner reappraises the record of the Heath premiership vis-à-vis industrial relations, via a case study analysis of the failure of the Industrial Relations Act of 1971. In Chap. 7, Ruth Davidson evaluates the approach of the Heath premiership towards social security reform. In Chap. 8, David Jeffery examines the significance of the local government reforms of the Heath premiership. Chapter 9 sees Catherine McGlynn and Shaun McDaid re-examine the difficulties that the Heath premiership experienced in relation to the politics of Northern Ireland. In our final policy-based chapter (Chap. 10), Peter Dorey examines the primary policy success of the Heath premiership—seeking and securing entry into the European Economic Community.

The third and fourth dimensions of the statecraft model—political argument hegemony and party management—are considered within part three of the book—entitled *political debates*. In this section on wider political debates, we consider the following. In Chap. 11, Philip Norton reconsiders how effective Heath was at managing relations within the Conservative Party in terms of the wider organisation and the parliamentary party. Chapter 12 sees Gillian Peele reconsider the difficulties caused by Enoch Powell and the politics of Powellism. Chapter 13 sees Timothy Heppell place the Heath era within the context of wider party politics by re-examining the developments of the Labour Party in opposition. Following on from this, Chap. 14 sees Chris Byrne, Nick Randall and Kevin Theakston offer a new leadership interpretation on the performance of Heath as prime minister.

Ultimately, an effective statecraft strategy will see the governing party being re-elected and, as such, Bulpitt sees his model as being cyclical, that is, the fifth and final dimension involves securing re-election and then

starting the cycle again. As such, in Chap. 15, Andrew Roe-Crines reassesses the fateful decision to call the General Election of February 1974. Then, in Chap. 16, Emily Stacey charts how and why, when in opposition, Heath was removed from the leadership of the Conservative Party. To broaden the debate out, in Chap. 17, Antony Mullen locates the Heath premiership within the context of consensus politics and how it has been interpreted (and exploited) by Thatcher and the post-1979 Conservative premierships.

By structuring the book around the statecraft model, this provides us with a new way of assessing the Heath premiership. In Chap. 18, Andrew Roe-Crines and Timothy Heppell argue the case for moving beyond the prevailing perspectives on the Heath premiership, that is, the critique or the contingencies/circumstances perspective, as they make the case for the Heath premiership being seen as a transitional era in British politics.

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