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From 'Japan Problem' to 'China Threat'?

Rising Powers in US Economic Discourse

Nicola Nymalm

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Stockholm Nicola Nymalm
2020

Contents

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Nicola Nymalm, PhD is an Assistant Professor in War Studies at the Swedish Defence University and an Associate Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) and the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA). Her research interests include relations between 'established' and 'emerging' powers, critical approaches to international relations, international political economy, security/military studies and US-China relations. Her previous work has appeared in journals such as *International Political Sociology*, *International Studies Review*, *Journal of International Relations and Development* and *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*.

List of Figures

PART I

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

'We are not in a trade war with China, that war was lost many years ago by the foolish, or incompetent, people who represented the US. Now we have a Trade Deficit of $500 Billion a year, with Intellectual Property Theft of another $300 Billion. We cannot let this continue!' Thus tweeted US President Donald J. Trump on 4 April 2018 (Trump 2018). In January that year, Trump had slapped 30 per cent tariffs on foreign imports of solar panels, of which China was the biggest source, in what is now considered the 'first strike' in a US-Chinese 'trade war' (Aleem 2018) that continued throughout 2019. Trump has claimed many times to be the first US president to stand up to 'unfair' trading practices by China, and for US workers who have been losing their jobs to 'unfair' competition (Cox 2019). Part of this can certainly be attributed to the hyperbole common to Trump's characterizations of his achievements as president and more generally, but he and his administration are not the only ones to talk about a new phase in US-Chinese relations, and not only when it comes to trade and economic policies. Several comments and publications across the political divides have proclaimed not only a tougher approach but even the 'end of engagement' (The *Economist* 2018a; Campbell and Sullivan 2019) and a beginning of confrontation and conflict: 'We're at the end of one moment and the beginning of another' (Moyer 2019, quoting Orville Schell). This 'new moment' has even been called a 'New Cold War' (e.g. Landler and Perlez 2018). What seems to be largely forgotten, however, is that while a growing consensus is visible in Washington that changing

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the economic approach to China in particular is overdue, accusations against the USA's most important trading partner and economic competitor of forced technology transfers, unfair trading practices resulting in US job losses, limited access for foreign firms and regulatory favouritism for locals (cf. Zakaria 2019) are nothing new, but date back to before China began its economic ascent.

'I believe that if trade is not fair for all, then trade is free in name only. I will not stand by and let American businesses fail, because of unfair trading practices abroad. I will not stand by and let American workers lose their jobs, because other nations do not play by the rules' (Reagan 1985). This statement by President Ronald Reagan in 1985 was made at the height of a growing trade deficit and tensions over economic policy with Japan, which was the biggest economic competitor and deficit trading partner of the USA at the time. It is not only the allegations and widespread rhetoric that the main economic competitor is not playing fair and is responsible for US economic problems, or that this competitor is a rapidly growing East Asian economy that present parallels with the discourse on China today. Japan was also depicted as having the potential to replace the USA as new 'No. 1' (Vogel 1979), and as inaugurating a new type of mercantilist international order. In other words, this was the last time that there was a debate about a 'rising power' challenging the USA not only on its economic position, but as a global hegemon. Surprisingly, the Japan case seems to have been largely forgotten when it comes to 'great power competition' (cf. Nymalm 2019b), both in Washington and in academic circles (notable exceptions aside). Nonetheless, as a relatively recent example, 'the rise of Japan' as the main (East Asian) economic competitor of the USA is important for learning about both the relationship between 'established' and 'rising' powers and the political and academic discourse on the 'rise' itself.[1]

This book examines the parallels in the US-Japanese and US-Chinese economic relationships by focusing on the role of identity in economic discourses. Identity has been largely neglected in research on US-Chinese economic relations. This also seems surprising, as an identity discourse—according to which China is expected to change and 'converge' (e.g. Moyer 2019, quoting Orville Schell and Jianying Zha) first economically and then politically, to become more like the USA—has been a widely debated constant of US economic policy that was also prominent in the case of Japan. The 'disappointment' about the outcome so far is now

[1] For a critical take on 'rising powers' see Zarakol (2019).

clearly demonstrated in the Trump administration's openly more confrontational approach.

The 2017 US National Security Strategy (NSS), for example, labels China (along with Russia) a 'revisionist power' that wants 'to shape a world antithetical to US values and interests' (White House 2017, 25). It also takes stock of and signals a departure from previous US policies that 'helped expand the liberal economic trading system to countries that did not share our values, *in the hopes that these states would liberalize their economic and political practices* and provide commensurate benefits to the United States'. Instead, the NSS continues, 'these countries distorted and undermined key economic institutions *without undertaking significant reform of their economies or politics*' (White House 2017, 17, emphasis added).

While China is not directly named in this latter context in the NSS, US Vice-President Mike Pence was more outspoken in his speech at the Hudson Institute in October 2018, which was quickly interpreted as reflecting the Trump administration's 'reset' that merges 'hawkishness, economic nationalism and values based advocacy […]' (Rogin 2018) when it comes to its relations with China:

'After the fall of the Soviet Union, we assumed that a free China was inevitable. Heady with optimism at the turn of the 21st Century, America agreed to give Beijing open access to our economy, and we brought China into the World Trade Organization. *Previous administrations made this choice in the hope that freedom in China would expand in all of its forms — not just economically, but politically,* with a newfound respect for classical liberal principles, private property, personal liberty, religious freedom — the entire family of human rights. *But that hope has gone unfulfilled.*' (The White House 2018, emphasis added)

In April 2019 the acting US Defence Secretary, Patrick Shanahan, stated that China was an economic threat, and both he and President Trump have been quoted as seeing the modernization of China as 'the biggest threat America faces' (Dedaj 2019). Trump has even called China 'a threat to the world' (Rappeport 2019).[2]

What many now call 'the China reckoning' (e.g. Campbell and Ratner 2018) is not just a view within the Trump administration, but widely shared across political divides in the US Congress and beyond, especially

[2] At the same time emphasizing his good and 'very amazing' relationship with Chinese President Xi Jinping (ibid.).

when it comes to US economic grievances (Bush and Hass 2019). A line of publications and commentaries concludes that 'we' have to realize that things did not evolve as expected, that China did not behave as anticipated and, most importantly, that 'China did not become more like us' (e.g. Browne 2017). Meanwhile, others are still warning against making China an enemy (Fravel et al. 2019), while public opinion is growing increasingly negative (Silver et al. 2019).

What these assessments have in common is that they revolve around the widely held assumption among US political elites about the interconnectedness of economic and political orders. In other words, and as expressed in the NSS and Pence's speech, political liberalization was widely expected to follow on from liberal economic reform, and this line of thought has been a constant of US economic policy on China (and other countries), for instance, when it came to China's contested accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). What makes any questioning of this principle and line of thinking significant is how intertwined it is with US identity not only as the global role model for economic and political development, but also as the quintessential great power, including the number one economy. Indeed, and as with Japan in the 1980s (see below), since the manifestation of China's rapid economic growth there has been a prolific debate not only over China overtaking the USA economically in the future, but also on a more comprehensive 'global power shift' from the USA to China and consequently from West to East (e.g. Dunne et al. 2013, 5). This debate is coupled with questions about, diagnoses of or prognoses for a decline or crisis of the USA, 'the West' and/or the 'liberal world order' in general (Cox 2012; Ikenberry 2013; Kupchan 2014; Schweller and Pu 2011). China is debated as offering alternative 'models' of global governance and capitalism, dubbed the 'Beijing Consensus', and 'authoritarian', 'illiberal' or 'state' capitalism (Etzioni 2011; see also Friedman and McCormick 2000; Gat 2007; Halper 2010; Rachman 2008; Wooldridge 2012). Meanwhile, China's rise is described as a historic occurrence without precedent that should already be considered 'the big story of our age' along 'the rise and fall of Rome, the Ottoman Empire, the British Raj or the Soviet Union' (Leonard 2008, 5).

Despite these ascriptions of 'uniqueness', there are striking parallels in that in the 1970s and 1980s Japan was hailed as an 'economic superpower' that had 'miraculously emerged' (Dower 2001, 314, 316) as the new 'number one' (Vogel 1979) and as a technological power that culminated in the image of a 'Superhuman Japan' (Thorsten 2012). In the

1980s, this debate became a central feature and trigger of the discourse on the 'Rise of Japan' as a possible challenger to a liberal world order with the USA as its major proponent. What became known as the 'Japan Problem' (cf. Van Wolferen 1986) until the mid-1990s—and at that time led to a severe crisis in the US-Japanese relationship—bears significant resemblance to the discourse on the 'Rise of China' and a possible 'China threat' since the mid- to late 1990s. A 'rising Japan' was depicted as a threat not only to US economic pre-eminence, but also subsequently to the entire liberal world order and its hegemon. Japan was attributed with promoting a 'Pax Nipponica/Japonica', which was understood as a mercantilist order (Van Wolferen 1986; Vogel 1986; Leaver 1989; Morris 2011, 24 f.). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the US public considered Japan's economy to be a greater threat than the Soviet Union's military, and most thought that Japan was already a bigger economic power than the USA (Gilpin 1989, 331; Hummel and Menzel 2001, 62; Mastanduno 1991, 74).[3] Chalmers Johnson argued in 1989 that the USA should recognize that Japan had 'replaced the USSR as America's most important foreign policy problem' (quoted in Mastanduno 1991, 77).[4]

In both cases, with Japan in the past and China more recently, the USA engaged in a domestic debate on its growing bilateral trade deficit and indebtedness vis-à-vis its main economic competitor (Destler 1998, 103). One of the main lines of argument amounts to reproaching Japan and China for their 'unfair practices' in the form of 'dumping' their cheap exports in the USA while maintaining closed markets at home (Curtis 2000; Evenett 2010; Ge 2013; cf. Keidel 2011; Otte and Grimes 1993, 121). This provides them with a competitive advantage through a distortion of the 'level playing field' (e.g. Nanto 1992, 1). Ironically, candidate Trump's campaign rhetoric regarding Japan in 2016

[3] In 2008, most Americans believed that China had already surpassed the USA as the world's leading economic power (Saad 2008), and in 2018 Americans were most concerned about China's growing economy (Wike and Devlin 2018). In 2019, China was increasingly perceived as overall threat (Silver et al. 2019). In 2019, China remains the second largest economy in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), but surpasses the USA when GDP is converted to purchasing power parity (Silver 2019).

[4] This kind of assessment was already being made by observers in the early and mid-1980s. See Kennedy (1988, 600). Apparently, a negative view of Japan among the general public was far less significant than among prominent governmental, academic and media commentators (Morris 2011, 32f.), a slight similarity with public views versus those of the political establishment on China (Hass 2019).

was still in line with Japan's critics of the 1980s (Soble and Bradsher 2016). One of them, Robert Lighthizer, vice US Trade Representative (USTR) under Reagan, became Trump's USTR. He is characterized as seeing China 'as an existential threat along the lines of how he viewed Japan in the 1980s' (Politi 2018; see also Miller 2018). Personnel continuities aside, as this book shows, chastising the most important trading partner for not playing fair, while portraying the USA as a victim, had been a persistent US political discourse long before the Trump administration came to power.

In his 2011 book *A Contest for Supremacy*, Aaron Friedberg wrote of the challenges to the USA's expectations of political liberalization in China, that 'for Americans the success of a mainland regime that blends authoritarian rule with market-driven economics is a puzzle and an affront. Such a combination is not supposed to be possible, at least in the long run' (Friedberg 2011, 43). In a 2017 article, however, he states that even 'if China were a liberal democracy with a full market economy, the prospect of it surpassing the United States, in terms of total GDP, would be disconcerting to many Americans' (Friedberg 2017, 97). He explains the latter by 'the impact of Beijing's trade and industrial policies on the future prospects of the US economy', because China is not a market economy (ibid., 98). In other words, in the end it is the material aspects of China's rise that matter most. What is missing from this account—and this is characteristic of most of the scholarship on US-Chinese economic relations—is how economic grievances and economic competition are not just about material factors and economic interests.[5] They are deeply intertwined with identity issues and identity politics.

1.1 Aims and Contributions of the Book

This book analyses the parallels in the discourses on 'the rise of Japan' and 'the rise of China' by advocating a view that goes beyond an understanding of 'the economy' as purely material capabilities and interests that is common in research on 'rising powers' and US-Chinese economic relations. It contends that US foreign economic policy on Japan and China goes beyond matters of trade and economic policy in a narrow sense and involves processes of the construction of collective and national identities in political and economic terms (cf. Nymalm 2013, 2019a). Past and

[5] Elsewhere, Friedberg writes about what he calls the role of ideology.

current debates, in their constitution of US economic policies on Japan and China, cannot be sufficiently understood without considering them in terms of identity constructions that rely on Self/Other articulations. This assessment originates in poststructuralist theories that understand every identity as non-essential and differential, and therefore in permanent need of a constitutive outside. Political discourse theory (PDT) is proposed as a framework for analysing the role of identity in foreign economic policy, while also addressing what even proponents of PDT have called its methodological deficit (cf. Howarth 2005, 316). The book proposes a method for the application of PDT to empirical research that draws on rhetorical political analysis (RPA; e.g. Finlayson 2007). For this purpose, US congressional debates on economic policies on Japan and China in 1985–2008 were analysed as examples of the official US elite public discourse. While the time frame of the empirical analysis does not extend to the presidency of Donald Trump, his attitudes to trade with Japan and China and those of his administration make it even more compelling. His withdrawal of the USA from the Transpacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), and the debates on renegotiating the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) into what became the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in October 2018, have led to criticisms in the USA that have similarities with the debates on US identity as a global leader and champion of free and fair trade analysed in this book. While the USA under Trump now questions the principles it has long advocated, because of the perceived loss of international standing resulting from the 'liberal policies' of the past, Trump also blames others beyond China, such as Mexico, Canada, the European Union and Japan, for problems in the USA. This again resonates with the debates analysed here. The analysis also shows that as hawkish as Trump's language and rhetoric and the Trump administration's approach to China have been, they did not emerge 'out of nowhere' but have clear precedents, and that the topics and issues raised and at times even Trump's way of expressing them have been a constant of the US political discourse since at least the 1980s. Discourses resonate more, and have greater potential to become dominant, when they can connect to and build on pre-existing ones (cf. Auteserre 2012, 207). Moreover, this kind of political rhetoric is not unique to the USA and is becoming more widespread especially among right-wing populist leaders globally. In this sense, the questions and focus on identity politics remain salient for academia and policymaking beyond the particular cases of US-Japanese and US-Chinese relations (cf. Nymalm 2019a), and tie into the emerging field of Global Political

Sociology (GPS) with its emphasis on the ineradicability of contingency and heterogeneity in the construction of global and local identities.

The analysis starts from the perspective that these discourses reflect challenges to concepts of political and economic order that are central to the USA's understanding of itself as 'the global motor for democracy and progress' (ZEIT- Stiftung 2010, 1), and therefore to 'the entailments of US-identity' (cf. Campbell 1994, 157). In particular, these entailments are thought to figure prominently in the concepts of American exceptionalism and the liberal theory of history (cf. Nymalm 2013). The latter is characterized by the idea that the introduction of a liberal market economy will inevitably be followed by political liberalization, and thus that free trade and free markets lead to democracy and peaceful relations (cf. Mandelbaum 2002, 6). This was notoriously captured by Francis Fukuyama in his notion of 'the end of history' after 1989, when Fukuyama also referred to Japan as an example of the success of economic and political liberalism (Fukuyama 1989). The special role that American exceptionalism assigns to the USA is to serve as a role model and promoter of this development (Krause 2008; McEvoy-Levy 2001, 23ff.; Nabers and Patman 2008). However, Japan and China have to different extents countered or been perceived as countering the envisaged 'universal path to progress', and thus as challenging not only the concepts themselves, but also US identity according to these concepts as a vanguard and role model for the functioning and prospects of the 'liberal world order' (Layne 2014; cf. Morris 2011, 2). In other words, the USA's self-attribution as *the* economic and political role model paves the way for the challenge or competition attributed to Japan in the past and China more recently. As they and their economic development do not 'fit' into the old paradigm, their relationship with the USA is at times characterized by Self/Other dynamics that clearly have antagonistic tendencies, driven by the aim of preserving US identity by externalizing the problem to an 'external Other' in the form of 'unfair' Japan and China (cf. Nymalm 2019a).

The starting point of this book is not to posit that the 'cases' of Japan and China are entirely similar. On the contrary, the similarities in the elite political discourses on Japan and China, the differences in the bilateral relationships with the USA notwithstanding, are one aspect that renders studying the whole issue worthwhile. In this sense, the objective of the book is not to do a 'cross-case comparison', but rather to take a broader historical view, by deciphering the meaning given and the approach taken to the economic rise of China by the USA, taking account of the past

articulation of and reaction to the economic rise of Japan. In both cases dealing with the major economic competitor bore tendencies of turning the issue of economic competition into an ideological struggle. By asking similar questions with regard to both cases (Lebow 2018, 9), the interest here lies in the possible similarities and differences—or the potential continuity and change (cf. Hansen 2006, 79)—in the logics that drive different discourses (cf. Doty 1993, 309), and in looking at 'how certain concepts have historically functioned within discourse' (Campbell 1998, 5; Flockhart 2013, 78f.).

The book focuses on the articulations of US identity in terms of foreign economic policy on Japan and China, and on what the possible commonalities and/or differences between the Japanese and the Chinese case can reveal considering a dislocation of US identity.[6] The main focus lies on how and at what points the discourses on economic issues converged to articulate Japan and China not only as the main economic competitor, but also as antagonistic Others, and on what this tells us about US identity, as well as Self/Other relationships more generally. Discourse is understood in terms of meaning-structures as well as a horizon that constitutes our reality that we cannot get outside of. The focus is therefore on the elite public discourse on the rise of Japan and China as one part of the bigger picture of how a normal or 'hegemonic' perspective is challenged, or dislocated, by events that cannot be reconciled with it or integrated into it.

The focus on economic policy is highly relevant for three reasons. First, the whole 'rise debate' is mainly premised on the economic performance of Japan and China (cf. e.g. Khong 2014, 157, 162; Nabers 2010, 932), and especially on their growing share of global trade (Gilpin 1989, 329 f.; cf. e.g. Hilpert 2013).[7] Second, economic issues linked to trade policy are among the most prevalent and disputed in the respective bilateral relationships. Last but not least, economic performance in terms of the success of liberal democratic capitalism has been a central feature of the USA and its self-perception as the pre-eminent economic and political role model, with respect to China in particular since the 1990s.[8] When it comes to its 'great powerness' (cf. Agnew 2003), the USA's self-attribution as an

[6] For an emphasis on the importance of identity questions when dealing with the power shift discourse, see, for instance, Hagström and Jerdén (2014) and the other contributions in their special issue.

[7] On the problematic aspects of this premise in the Chinese case, see Pan (2014, 395ff.).

[8] In their study of the 'China threat' argument in the US print media, Yang and Liu (2012, 706) conclude that over their time period studied (1992–2006) the economic/trade threat

economic power plays an important role in the challenge or competition attributed to Japan and China.

Accordingly, one of the main contributions of this book lies in first problematizing and then proposing an alternative view to the dominant approaches in academic and policymaking circles, which overwhelmingly treat China's growing economy as *necessarily* leading to a Chinese challenge or threat to the global role of the USA, and thus is in danger of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. The book shows that growing economic capabilities do not speak for themselves. Instead, *who* is growing or rising is important, as well as *how* meaning is attributed to these increased capabilities. In other words, a 'Japan problem' or a 'China threat' does not naturally follow from economic growth rates. Instead, they are discursively produced through the meaning and significance attributed to economic factors according to the USA's perception of itself as 'number one' and a 'great power', and connected to a universalist view of how the world works in terms of development and progress (Nymalm 2019a). Here, the book advances poststructuralist criticisms of the ideational/material dichotomy from a discourse theoretical perspective and aligns itself with emerging approaches that build on PDT in International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE). Even though a lot of ink has been spilled over the importance of 'ideational vs. material factors', the crucial argument that poststructuralists eschew this commonly accepted dichotomy, and hence do not take sides in debates on which realm to privilege, still goes largely unheard (cf. Griffin 2018). In the words of Laclau and Mouffe:

> The main consequence of a break with the discursive/extra-discursive dichotomy is the abandonment of the *thought/reality opposition* […]. Rejection of the thought/reality dichotomy must go together with a rethinking and interpretation of the categories which have […] been considered exclusive of one or the other. (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 110, emphasis added)

In this book, the question of 'reality versus ideas'—in PDT terms, discourse—is problematized within the framework of PDT and RPA to deal with what Jaqueline Best and Matthew Patterson summarize as a legacy of

issue was the most persistent of three fields identified by them, the other two being military/strategic and political/ideological.

'disembedding' economy and culture; that is, locating the economy on the 'reality side' and culture on the 'ideas side' of the presumed divide. Consequently, there is ' […] a lack of politics in cultural economy debates, a lack of economy in culturally inflected international/political theory and a lack of culture in international political economy' (Best and Patterson 2010, 3).[9]

Second, while the book sheds light on and traces identity/difference dynamics in a particular contemporary (US-China) and a historical case (US-Japan), it also connects to the more general question of how we—both conceptually and in practice—deal with crises or dislocations to our 'hegemonic' ways of making sense of the world in certain categories and concepts that are connected to who we think we are and what our relationship is to others. It seems that all too often this challenge is still met with what David Campbell has called a central feature of states and their foreign policies: the externalization of an internal problematic and its attribution to an external cause or 'enemy' in order to account for inner deficiencies, which usually leads to a discourse on the threatening 'adversarial' other (cf. Campbell 1998, 62). Much of the poststructuralist work on IR that focuses on identity and Self/Other relationships, and identity and (foreign) policy practice, has sought to expose how politics is often intertwined with this kind of 'outside' threat construction and with turning difference into otherness, as described by Campbell and Connolly among others (e.g. Nabers 2009; Herschinger 2012; Pan 2004; Turner 2013; Doty 1993; Weldes and Saco 1996). While important, this focus has at times left other theoretical and empirical aspects underexplored. Notable exceptions aside, there remains often what Hansen has called a main focus on 'the radical other' (Hansen 2006, 38; see also Herschinger 2011, 7); or, as Rumelili puts it, critical constructivists and poststructuralists have 'emphasized the ontological bases of the self/other relationships, but have not been attentive to the diversity of its behavioral manifestations' (Rumelili 2007, 33). In other words, although Campbell's *Writing Security* does not seek to extrapolate from its particular cases of US foreign policy that all identity construction looks like this (Hansen 2006, 39), it

[9] By 'culture', they refer to the so-called cultural turn in IR with its focus on identity and ideas. For instance, the 2019 *Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary International Political Economy* (still) fails to include or refer to these kinds of approaches. But see, for example, Sum and Jessop (2014) for their particular take on CPE.

does at times seem that this is nonetheless the conclusion that has been drawn (cf. also Rumelili and Todd 2018, 8).[10]

Relatedly, the IR scholars who rely on the work of Laclau have typically focused on what are termed his key concepts of discourse, hegemony and antagonism.[11] The latter in particular has led to some lack of clarity about whether antagonisms—the drawing of boundaries between 'us and them' by the construction of a 'radical Other' to constitute/sustain the Self—are an *inevitable* feature of identity construction *in general*.[12] In this book, this issue is linked to the context of previous research on the influence of American exceptionalism, the liberal theory of history and/or liberalism in a broader sense on US economic policy on Japan and China, and the question of whether a 'liberal lens' necessarily leads to hostile or confrontational attitudes to Japan and China. As Laclau himself pointed out, among others, ontologically speaking, antagonisms are *not* necessary: there are no natural or predetermined antagonisms (see Chap. 3). Moreover, in spite of the notion of discursive *hegemony*, discourses and identities are *never* really fully constituted, and thus always remain inherently unstable and vulnerable, and thus inherently dislocated. This to some extent seems to stand in contrast to the prevalent empirical (and theoretical) focus on attempts at fixation and closure, which has at times not only overlooked 'the complexities of the processes in which political identities are forged', but potentially also led to the belief that 'all identity has to be thought in the form us/them' (Norval 1997, 72).[13] For political analysis, this is 'potentially very damaging' as 'it tends to direct attention to the moment of exclusion, to the development of antagonisms, that is, to the relation to "the other" *at the expense of an analysis of those dimensions of identity which cannot be captured in the us/them form*' (ibid.). In this respect, Thomassen (2005, 2019) reminds us that there is yet another concept that should receive more attention in Laclau's theory—the notion of heterogeneity

[10] Discussions of to what extent these are 'ontological features' in Campbell's and also Connolly's work are not entirely clear and (implicitly) interpreted mostly in this way, see Berenskoetter and Nymalm, under review.

[11] A growing but still limited number, see overview on IR and IPE in Stengel and Nabers (2019).

[12] More broadly, also about whether the theory is about the articulation of meaning and identity as such, or in particular instances (Thomassen 2005, 293).

[13] This was in fact upheld by Chantal Mouffe at a public seminar in Stockholm in 2019, see: https://vimeo.com/364040324?fbclid=IwAR2dKF5jY12InB5kexRn90adfqj2ou6KM2ZkAHL8GL6klpSffIZ35BUVQEY (accessed 26 November 2019).