

Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 5

James G. Hart *Author*

Rodney K. B. Parker *Editor*

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# Hedwig Conrad-Martius' Ontological Phenomenology



Springer

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Volume 5

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James G. Hart · Rodney K. B. Parker

# Hedwig Conrad-Martius' Ontological Phenomenology

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# Preface

*And this: this escapes from me and dissolves  
in the air and in the aura of the grove,  
leaves me softly and becomes mine no longer [...] <sup>1</sup>  
rises incessantly away from me.*

—Rainer Maria Rilke, *Narcissus [III]* (1913)

This is the first published version of my doctoral dissertation, *Hedwig Conrad-Martius' Ontological Phenomenology*, submitted to the University of Chicago Divinity School in 1972, though I began writing it circa 1969. To paraphrase Christian Dupont, fifty years is a long interval—long enough for new scholarship on the figures and concepts addressed by this study to emerge, and for my own thought to evolve and mature.<sup>2</sup> For practical reasons, I decided not to attempt to update the content of this investigation into the philosophy of Conrad-Martius, even though some highly relevant literature has been produced in the intervening period. In this edition, I have attended to grammatical mistakes, typos, and, I hope, improved the sentences that struck me now as impenetrable. On a few occasions, I have noted some of my later writings that touch on, or are a reconsideration of, topics here discussed.

Now for a bit of history. My mentor at Catholic University, Thomas Prufer (1929–1993), was a friend of Hedwig Conrad-Martius. The Prufers spent summers in Munich where Conrad-Martius had taught and where Tom attended her lectures as a student.<sup>3</sup> For several of us, Prufer was a great figure in the phenomenological movement, but unfortunately unknown. Robert Sokolowski (b. 1934), who was his colleague, would confirm this view. He worked rather invisibly through lectures, discussions, primarily with friends and colleagues, etc. However, his very small book, *Recapitulations*,<sup>4</sup> which appeared about the time of his death, is pure gold.

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<sup>1</sup>Rilke 1996, p. 61.

<sup>2</sup>Dupont 2014, p. vii. Dupont's dissertation was submitted to the University of Notre Dame in 1997 and was first published in 2014.

<sup>3</sup>His dissertation, *Sein und Wort nach Thomas von Aquin* (Prufer 1959), was written under Alois Dempf and Helmut Kuhn.

<sup>4</sup>Prufer 1993.

When I received a Kent/Danforth fellowship to write my dissertation, having grown somewhat weary from my preoccupation with merely existential-hermeneutical questions while at the University of Chicago Divinity School, I had a longing to think about the themes of my major professor, Mircea Eliade (1907–1986), in terms of ontological-cosmological categories. Eliade famously wrote and lectured about myth and the holy, and mythic time and space. Learning of Conrad-Martius through discussions with Tom Prufer and his review of her *Die Geistseele des Menschen*,<sup>5</sup> I discussed the matter with him and was encouraged to go to Munich and write on Conrad-Martius with my philosophical-theological issues in mind. By then (circa 1967) she had passed on (she died in 1966), but through Tom and his Austrian wife, Franziska, who also was a friend of Conrad-Martius, I got to have a sense of Conrad-Martius as a person. They also enabled that I meet two of her friends: Gisela Kaldenbach (b. 1921), a psychiatrist, and Gerda Walther (1897–1977), a philosopher and fellow student of Husserl. The meetings with Kaldenbach were further helpful in terms of acquiring a sense of Conrad-Martius as a person. The meeting with Walther was interesting but not immediately helpful for obtaining any information about Conrad-Martius. I met Walther at a parapsychological conference and her attention was absorbed by the issues and personalities comprising that setting.

My primary debt of gratitude for help with research was to Eberhard Avé-Lallemant (1926–2015), Conrad-Martius' student, assistant, and close friend. He and his wife, Ursula (1913–2004), were always very welcoming to me, and Avé-Lallemant was a generous resource for my labors. His immense learning provided me with straight paths to answers to my many questions. (His edition of the three volumes of Conrad-Martius' *Schriften zur Philosophie* is itself a treasure.) He introduced to me the unpublished manuscript for her foundational *Metaphysik des Irdischen*, written during the Third Reich. Avé-Lallemant also showed to me how important the *Metaphysische Gespräche* were. Of course, the *Erscheinungslehre* and *Realontologie* provide the basic eidetic phenomenological basis for her cosmology. All these early works, along with her Christian faith in the transcendent sources and *telos* of creation, provide a kind of poetic-eidetic climate for her development of the "trans-physical entelechial potencies" and the "aeonic world-periphery." These conclusions of this ontological-phenomenological-cosmological philosophy, what I take to be one of the, perhaps most, robust *Naturphilosophien* of the twentieth century, were spurred also by Rudolf Bultmann's (1884–1976) project of demythologization, which for her deprived nature of transcendent depths/potencies that the New Heaven and New Earth would actualize.

Aspects of Conrad-Martius' thought have interesting symmetry with Gaston Bachelard (1884–1962), particularly in the effort to establish a connection between, on the one hand, the eidetic-poetical presentation of nature and the contemporary natural-scientific presentation. This linking of the poetic (eidetic) imagination with a conception of the deepest understanding of nature and the cosmos occasioned Mircea Eliade to claim to me, one time in a conversation, that Bachelard was the

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<sup>5</sup>Prufer 1963.



most important contemporary philosopher. Eliade, incidentally, was a well-known Romanian novelist besides being a philosopher and historian of religion. He himself knew nothing of Conrad-Martius and the phenomenology he probably knew was “existential” (perhaps mostly Jaspersian) and not “ontological.”

My dissertation was officially directed (i.e., read) and kindly encouraged by the well-known philosophically minded theologian, Langdon Gilkey (1919–2004); the thoughtful, kind, and then young, philosophical theologian, David Tracy (b. 1939), was also a helpful reader. I was honored to have Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005) at my public defense. He knew Conrad-Martius’ good friend Jean Hering (1890–1966) personally and was pleased that there was a dissertation written on Conrad-Martius. I think I misunderstood the gist of his comments and recall being quite dissatisfied with my answers to his kind but probing questions.

One might wonder why, after fifty years, one might choose to unearth this work. There are a few reasons. First, to date, this dissertation remains the only book length treatment of Conrad-Martius’ thought in the English-speaking world. In German, the situation is not much better: aside from the dissertations of her students, the only monograph devoted to commenting on Conrad-Martius’ work in her native tongue is Alexandra Pfeiffer’s excellent study, *Hedwig Conrad-Martius. Eine phänomenologische Sicht auf Natur und Welt*.<sup>6</sup> This is perhaps the reason why an electronic version of my 1972 dissertation which has emerged on the internet has been read and cited by numerous researchers writing in English. It seems appropriate in light of this to publish an authoritative version of the text so that the future generation can learn from and expand upon this introduction to Conrad-Martius’ thought.

Second, at the time I wrote the present work I felt that, in spite of my own enthusiasm for the extraordinary originality, phenomenological insightfulness, and speculative power of Conrad-Martius—traits that were recognized among the circle of early students that surrounded Husserl, some of whom were to become well-known—there would be little interest in the thought of a rather obscure female German philosopher within the wider philosophical community. Over the past fifty years, interest in both marginal historical figures and women has grown in academic philosophy. This change in attitudes has improved our picture of the history of philosophy and has forced us to rethink the canon and confront the (often philosophically unacceptable) reasons why certain individuals and groups have been excluded. I hope that Conrad-Martius might become part of this important dialogue.

For me, reading this resurrected corpus is very much like looking in the mirror and seeing what is formed by another hand. And in a sense, it was. In re-reading it, I am reminded that Conrad-Martius is a rather permanent habitus and part of my basic philosophical grid, especially my reading of Husserl and how basic the notion “of entelechy” is for him.

Finally, I want to express my thanks to Rodney Parker for the initiative of resurrecting this old body of work, and his assistant, Emily Meier, who transcribed the original 1972 typescript of my dissertation. Rodney has been a necessary condition for this publication; I regard the publication of this work to be the result

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<sup>6</sup>Pfeiffer 2005.

of collaboration with him. Improvements concerning historical facts and figures, notably in §1 regarding Conrad-Martius' student years as well as in notes throughout the text, should be credited to his research. The addition of the English translation of the opening sections from Conrad-Martius' *Metaphysics of the Earthly* as an Appendix should also be mentioned here. Without his generous investment of time and thought in preparing the original typescript of Conrad-Martius' manuscript, his general editorial and translation assistance, and his help in writing this Preface, the present publication would not have been possible.

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James G. Hart

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# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	1
1.1	The Place of Conrad-Martius in German Philosophy	1
1.2	Conrad-Martius and Cosmology	4
	References	6
<b>2</b>	<b>The Method of the Realontology</b>	9
2.1	The Excess of the Appearing	9
2.2	The Eidetic Reduction and Ideation	18
2.3	The Essence of Essence	25
2.4	Ideation and the Kosmos Noétos	30
2.5	Excursus: Essence Analysis and the Openness of Experience	38
2.6	Transcendental and Ontological Phenomenology	40
2.7	The Realontology as a Philosophy of Nature	47
	References	54
<b>3</b>	<b>The Foundations of the Realontology</b>	57
3.1	The Being of Objects and the Being of Meaning	57
3.2	Real Being	64
3.3	The Ontological Dynamic	69
3.4	Passing Time	71
3.5	The Modes of Nature	78
3.6	Hyletic Substance	83
3.7	Pneumatic Substance	87
3.8	The Realontology of Space	94
	References	107
<b>4</b>	<b>The Self-formation of Nature</b>	109
4.1	Wholism, Preformism, and Entelechy	109
4.2	Excursus (1): Morphology, Essence-Analysis, and Evolution	119

4.3	Excursus (2): Genetics and the Trans-Physical Potencies . . . . .	122
4.4	Causality and Potency . . . . .	126
4.5	The New Physics and Aether . . . . .	135
4.6	Apeiric Time and Space . . . . .	150
4.7	The Basic Structures of Nature's Self-formation . . . . .	157
4.8	The Natural Formation of the Spirit-Soul of Man . . . . .	163
4.9	Overview of the Basic Categories . . . . .	168
	References . . . . .	171
<b>5</b>	<b>The Aeonic World-Periphery . . . . .</b>	<b>173</b>
5.1	The Foundation of the Discontinuous Motion of Time . . . . .	173
5.2	Aeonic Space-Time . . . . .	179
5.3	The Cosmology of History . . . . .	187
	References . . . . .	201
<b>6</b>	<b>The Realontology and Realmythology . . . . .</b>	<b>203</b>
6.1	Review of the Critical Pauses . . . . .	203
6.2	Conrad-Martius and Demythologizing . . . . .	205
6.3	The Contemporary Theological Problematic . . . . .	208
	References . . . . .	214
<b>7</b>	<b>Phenomenology and the Unearthing of Heaven . . . . .</b>	<b>217</b>
7.1	Heaven and Earth as Categories of Worldly Experience . . . . .	217
7.2	Heaven and Earth as Categories of "Praxis" . . . . .	221
7.3	Heaven and Earth as Regions of World-Space . . . . .	224
	References . . . . .	232
<b>8</b>	<b>Conclusion . . . . .</b>	<b>235</b>
8.1	The Realontological Foundation of the Heavenly Region . . . . .	235
	References . . . . .	241
	<b>Appendix: Excerpt from Hedwig Conrad-Martius' <i>Metaphysics</i></b>	
	<b><i>of the Earthly</i> . . . . .</b>	<b>243</b>
	<b>Author Index . . . . .</b>	<b>265</b>
	<b>Subject Index . . . . .</b>	<b>269</b>

# Chapter 1

## Introduction



### 1.1 The Place of Conrad-Martius in German Philosophy

Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888–1966), although little-known in the English-speaking world today, was considered by many during her lifetime as the “first lady” of German philosophy. This was not because she was the wife of a famous German philosopher (her husband, Theodor Conrad, published little during his lifetime,<sup>1</sup> and moved away from professional philosophy altogether, though he was one of the founders of the Göttingen Circle of phenomenologists), but because she was one of the first women to obtain a Ph.D. in and to lecture on philosophy at a German university. She is chiefly known as one of the early phenomenologists—along with Max Scheler, Jean Hering, Roman Ingarden, Martin Heidegger, and others—who took up long-buried metaphysical issues. The most proper setting in which to place Conrad-Martius is the so-called Göttingen Circle, the group that she joined in the winter semester of 1910/11 when, at the encouragement of Moritz Geiger, she left the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich to study with Edmund Husserl.

Conrad-Martius’ route to Göttingen was a circuitous one. She was raised in Rostock, the middle daughter of the physician Friedrich Wilhelm August Martius and Martha (née Leonhard). Because there was no *Gymnasium* for girls in the whole of Northern Germany at the time, Conrad-Martius moved to Berlin at the age of fifteen to attend the *Gymnasialkurse* for girls being offered by Helene Lange. After four years she obtained her *Abitur*, and in the winter semester of 1907/08 she enrolled in the faculty of philosophy at the University of Rostock. There she studied philosophy for this first time with Franz Bruno Erhardt, who introduced Conrad-Martius to the work of Spinoza, which struck her like a bolt of lightning.<sup>2</sup> After three semesters

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<sup>1</sup> Shortly before his death, Conrad’s *Zur Wesenslehre des psychischen Lebens und Erlebens* (Conrad 1968) was published.

<sup>2</sup> Conrad-Martius 2015, p. 57.

in Rostock and one in Freiburg, Conrad-Martius transferred to the University of Munich, knowing nothing of phenomenology.

During her first semester in Munich, Conrad-Martius enrolled in courses with Ernst von Aster and Aloys Fischer (both former students of Theodor Lipps), as well as Scheler. Lipps had recently retired from teaching, and so Conrad-Martius never attended his lectures during her time in Munich, nor did she attend the lectures of Alexander Pfänder (though he would later act as the promoter for her dissertation). In the summer of 1910 Conrad-Martius took a course taught by Geiger,<sup>3</sup> and became involved in the *Akademischer Verein für Psychologie*, otherwise known as the Munich Circle of phenomenologists. Impressed by her philosophical acumen, at the end of the summer semester Geiger sent Martius to do her doctorate with Husserl in Göttingen. In his letter of recommendation to Husserl, Geiger writes that Conrad-Martius is “the sharpest philosophically thinking woman I have ever met,”<sup>4</sup> and in a coinciding letter to Adolf Reinach, Geiger calls her “our most gifted Munich philosopher.”<sup>5</sup>

Conrad-Martius spent four semesters in Göttingen studying with Husserl and Reinach.<sup>6</sup> She became a central figure in the *Göttinger Philosophischen Gesellschaft*, otherwise known as the Göttingen Circle. The entire Göttingen Circle was convinced that Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* had ushered in a new era in philosophy.<sup>7</sup> They found, and this came to special formulation most famously in Reinach and Scheler, in the material a priori, in the regional ontologies that Husserl opened up in his *Logical Investigations* and lectures, a promised land over against the preceding generations of epistemological stalemates. But then many of them found Husserl’s subsequent transcendental turn to be a curious forfeiting of his original, revolutionary position.<sup>8</sup> Whatever the attitude towards the transcendental idealism of Husserl, the members of the Göttingen Circle, particularly the students who had first studied in Munich, were committed to essence-analysis and regional ontology. Among the philosophers who were the earliest to be drawn to Husserl and who belonged to the first generation of phenomenologists to come to Göttingen from Munich were Johannes Daubert,

<sup>3</sup>In her 1958 acceptance speech, Conrad-Martius recalls that this course was on David Hume (Conrad-Martius 2015, p. 57). However, her official enrollment documents from the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich indicate that the seminar was on Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*.

<sup>4</sup>Husserl 1994, p. 103. It is perhaps worth noting here that Conrad-Martius was one of five women in the Munich Circle in the summer of 1910. The others were Margarete Calinich, Frau Dieltrich, Frau Dr. Ortner, and Katharine Tischendorf (see the *Semester-Bericht des Akademischen Vereins für Psychologie. München. Sommer-Semester 1910* in the Nachlass of Maximilian Beck at the Bavarian State Library, Ana 354 D.II.1).

<sup>5</sup>“Ich möchte Dir nur unsere begabteste Münchner Philosophin, Fräulein Martius, empfehlen, die jetzt nach Göttingen kommt” (Conrad-Martiusiana D.I.2.vi—Brief von Moritz Geiger an Adolf Reinach, 28.IX.1910).

<sup>6</sup>For the list of courses by Husserl and Reinach that she attended, see the footnote at Conrad-Martius 2015, p. 52. Noteworthy is Conrad-Martius’ participation in Husserl’s winter semester 1910/11 lecture course on *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (Husserl 2006), which I have translated to English.

<sup>7</sup>References throughout will be to the *Husserliana* editions of this text; Husserl 1975, 1984a, b.

<sup>8</sup>We shall discuss Conrad-Martius’ attitude towards Husserl in the next chapter. For a historical account of the phenomenological movement see Spiegelberg 1994.

Geiger, Reinach and Theodor Conrad. The membership of the Göttingen Circle during Conrad-Martius' tenure included Hans Lipps, whose works on language and hermeneutics have placed him in the middle of contemporary discussions; Alexandre Koyré, whose studies on motion and Zeno's paradox, as well as on Jakob Böhme, Descartes, and the history and philosophy of science were important for Conrad-Martius<sup>9</sup>; Dietrich von Hildebrand, whose writings on ethics and religious subjects are well-known in the United States; Jean Hering, a life-long friend of Koyré and Conrad-Martius, and a well-known scholar of Protestant theology at the University of Strasbourg, whose *Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee*<sup>10</sup> was always part of Conrad-Martius' own phenomenological equipment.<sup>11</sup>

For the younger members of the circle, Reinach (after Husserl) was a leading mind and mentor. Reinach, a *Dozent* under Husserl who had come to work with him after completing his dissertation under Theodor Lipps in Munich, was respected by Husserl and admired by his students. After Reinach's death in the First World War, the younger members published his *Gesammelte Schriften* with an "Introduction" by Conrad-Martius.<sup>12</sup> Reinach's own interests were reflected in the later work of his students: incorporating the fundamental ideas and attitudes of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* for an essence-analysis of the "regions" of nature, society, psychology, logic and language, ethics, and religion. The Munich and Göttingen Circles, following Husserl's earliest intentions, regarded themselves as regional co-workers in selected areas, together moving towards a promised land of essences. This was certainly true of Conrad-Martius. Another important influence on the members of the Göttingen Circle was Scheler, who gave private lectures to the group between 1910 and 1914.

In 1912, Conrad-Martius entered an anonymous essay competition put on by the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Göttingen and was awarded first prize for her work *Die erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus* in June of that year.<sup>13</sup> The attention she drew as a result was not all positive, as many of Husserl's colleagues did not think it appropriate for women to study philosophy. Husserl was willing to accept the work for a doctorate at Göttingen, however, the all-male faculty blocked her from obtaining her degree by declaring that her *Abitur* from Berlin was not acceptable for earning a doctorate in Göttingen because it did not include competence in the Greek classics. She quickly returned to Munich where she submitted her *Preisschrift* as her dissertation with Pfänder acting as promoter. In July she was awarded her doctorate *summa cum laude* and one month later, on 20 August 1912, married Theodor Conrad. The couple moved to Bergzabern, where they purchased an orchard. From the First World War until the late 1920s, a number of

<sup>9</sup>See especially, *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe* (Koyré 1957).

<sup>10</sup>Hering 1921.

<sup>11</sup>Edith Stein arrived in Göttingen only after Conrad-Martius had departed, but the two women became close friends. For insight into their relationship, see Stein's *Briefe an Hedwig Conrad-Martius* (Stein 1960). This volume contains an interesting discussion by Conrad-Martius concerning Judaism and phenomenology. See Stein 1960, pp. 61–82.

<sup>12</sup>Reinach 1921, pp. 5–37.

<sup>13</sup>Conrad-Martius 1913, 1920. The work is thus often referred to as the "*Preisschrift*."

the Conrads' former Göttingen classmates gathered sporadically in Bergzabern. The so-called Bergzabern Circle included Hering, Koyré, Hans Lipps, Edith Stein and Alfred von Sybel, and they devoted themselves to continuing the phenomenology of the Göttingen Circle, as well as discussing religious and political issues. Their aim was twofold: on the one hand, they wanted to create an informal institute in honor of Reinach, on the other, they wanted to create a counter movement in phenomenology to the work of Martin Heidegger.

In addition to the phenomenological movement, a full picture of Conrad-Martius' place in German philosophy must make mention of her kinship with the romantic *Naturphilosophie*. She closely studied the writings of Jakob Böhme, Franz von Baader and Friedrich W. J. Schelling. The common theme in these thinkers (and reappearing in the work of Ernst Bloch) of the category of potency and possibility as a real ontological state of affairs [*Sachverhalt*] was developed also in Conrad-Martius' writings. Goethe's theory of morphology and *Urphänomen* was thought by her to have close affinities with phenomenology understood as *Wesenslehre*. And the debate between Newton and Goethe over the philosophical meaning of nature, especially the argument focused in the meaning of colors, is revived in Conrad-Martius with her own phenomenology of colors,<sup>14</sup> and her protest against post-Cartesian cosmologies and the mathematization of nature. Finally, one must say that Conrad-Martius belongs to the classical tradition of philosophy. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and Immanuel Kant are present as friend or foe in her treatment of practically any problem. We will have abundant occasion to note this in our presentation. Conrad-Martius taught at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich from 1949 until shortly before her death, although she was only awarded an honorary professorship in 1955. She was never able to complete her unifying *opus magnum* (originally conceived in 1939), *Metaphysik des Irdischen*, because of persistent poor health and financial difficulties.<sup>15</sup>

## 1.2 Conrad-Martius and Cosmology

This work is a general introduction to Conrad-Martius' thought. Its major interest is in Conrad-Martius' attempt to give traditional Christian cosmological notions an ontological-cosmological foundation. A reviewer of Conrad-Martius' *Der Raum*<sup>16</sup> grasped what we take to be the essential contribution she makes to contemporary theology:

What in our picture of the world closes us off from the holy is the deep penetration in our soul of the theory of a homogeneous, continuous space. In the footsteps, as it were, of the

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<sup>14</sup>See Conrad-Martius 1929.

<sup>15</sup>I have had access to this manuscript and others through the kindness of Eberhard Avé-Lallemant, Conrad-Martius' "Mitarbeiter" in her last years and the editor of her three volume *Schriften zur Philosophie* (Conrad-Martius 1963, 1964, 1965).

<sup>16</sup>Conrad-Martius 1958.



interpretation of religion by Mircea Eliade, Hedwig Conrad-Martius attempts here to unmask the modern purely quantitative, mathematical-technical approach to the concept of space.<sup>17</sup>

Conrad-Martius had been busy with this task since 1921, and not only in terms of the question of space, but the entire realm of cosmology. As we shall see, and as the quote above indicates, Conrad-Martius never hesitated to point out the horizontal interests and presuppositions of the natural science interpretation of nature. Her own cards were always on the table. Her horizon was a Christian cosmological understanding of the cosmos. Whether this is a hopeless case of “Christian Philosophy” can only be judged with reference to particular arguments and speculative moves. For Conrad-Martius herself, being a Christian meant having the *possibility* of *seeing* better, that is, grace had a healing effect on our broken nature.<sup>18</sup> Being a first-generation phenomenologist who was also a Christian involved for her the situation (the peculiarity of which she was acutely aware) of placing facts against facts and essences against essences in the attempt to disclose the eidetic structure of the cosmos.<sup>19</sup> This admission and dilemma reveals the heart of Conrad-Martius’ approach to cosmology. We must elaborate it at the outset, for it, as the existential issue for her, is the “meta-methodological” question.<sup>20</sup> One can speak of the essence of the world as it is immediately given to us on the level of felt-meaning, an essence-intuition in which we participate with the totality of our existence.

Out of this experienced essence the tragic dimension breaks forth. Objectively considered and without false sentimentality, we live in a “valley of tears.”<sup>21</sup> But we can also speak of the essence of this world in a “metaphysical sense” that is not so accessible as the other, but which can be grasped with its own kind of exactness. Here we have a factually physical experience and essence over against a factually metaphysical experience and essence. This latter is the presentation of the world “at its foundations.” Here structures of the *actually* experienced world show themselves to be that without which the factual tragic-physical world would be unintelligible. For Conrad-Martius the world can *ultimately* be neither tragic nor unintelligible. The present actual world is a scarred descendent of its original possibilities and constituting potentialities. Ultimate tragedy and meaninglessness are never entertained as possibilities.

A cosmology that is not capable of treating this double-feature of the world, its really factual and factually possible features, misses its goal. In the resurrection of Christ, we have, believes Conrad-Martius, the most fundamental evidence that there

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<sup>17</sup>Pohl 1961, p. 839.

<sup>18</sup>See, e.g., Conrad-Martius 1965, p. 276. This is a statement showing a strong Thomist influence. See also Conrad-Martius 1963, p. 427. For Conrad-Martius, the clear vision arising from faith is dependent on charity and purity of soul—not widespread characteristics among Christians or anyone else.

<sup>19</sup>What essences and facts mean here will be discussed in the next chapter.

<sup>20</sup>The source is *Künftige Kosmologie* (Conrad-Martius 1964, pp. 380–382), a short essay in honor of Theodor Haecker (1879–1945), written at the time of the original manuscript of *Metaphysik des Irdischen*.

<sup>21</sup>If one did not experience the tragic essence, Conrad-Martius would probably say she was “essence-blind.”

is a more profound and more splendid form of the cosmos. Here is *empirie* over against what is otherwise only a metaphysical possibility. Here is bodily fact of this world over against bodily fact of that world. In this miracle, the proper essence of the world is radiated through the human dimension as well as the entire inorganic and organic cosmos.<sup>22</sup> These are considerations of Conrad-Martius as explicitly Christian. They are profoundly operative in her over-arching speculations. Ultimately only an examination of the actual content of her philosophical arguments can decide whether this Christian cosmology is only crypto-theology, i.e., in fact, bad philosophy and bad theology. We do not believe such a judgment is warranted. But that can only be evident in the light of Conrad-Martius' own work.

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<sup>22</sup>Conrad-Martius 1964, p. 382.

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## Chapter 2

# The Method of the Realontology



### 2.1 The Excess of the Appearing

In this chapter, we wish to discuss the basic orientation and methodological commitments of Conrad-Martius. It was characteristic of the Munich and Göttingen Circles to spend little time or space on methodological and hermeneutical considerations. The chief reason was that the circles were founded on a work devoted to freeing philosophy from epistemological bogs: Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. This work was felt to be the presupposed context for their own work—a work thereby defined by its freedom to turn “*zu den Sachen selbst*,” to the things themselves.<sup>1</sup> Our discussion of Conrad-Martius' method will be limited to the bare essentials necessary for grasping her more central considerations.<sup>2</sup>

As we have already noted, Conrad-Martius completed what was to be her doctoral work, *Die erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus*, under Husserl at Göttingen in 1912. It reflects the *Logical Investigations* and presumably also the spade work for the first volume of Husserl's *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and*

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<sup>1</sup>At the beginning of the second volume of *Logical Investigations* one finds the famous statement: “Wir wollen auf ‘die Sachen selbst’ zurückgehen” (Husserl 1984a, p. 10).

<sup>2</sup>Avé-Lallemant's unpublished *Habilitationsschrift, Phänomenologie und Realität* (Avé-Lallemant 1971) discusses her method at length. The dissertations of Conrad-Martius' other students, Franz Georg Schmücker (1926–2018) and Wolfgang Behler (1927–2007) also detail her method and relationship to the phenomenological movement. See Schmücker's *Phänomenologie als Methode der Wesenserkenntnis* (Schmücker 1956) and Behler's *Realität und Ek-sistenz* (Behler 1956). In a letter to Herbert Spiegelberg from 1954, Conrad-Martius mentions two additional doctoral students: Lange, writing on “*Die Augustinische Zeit*,” and Schäfer, who was writing on “*Theaterphänomenologie*” in the Husserlian sense (Ana 387 E.II Briefe von H. Conrad-Martius 12.VIII. 1954). As a student of Pfänder, Spiegelberg's own writings, such as *Alexander Pfänders Phänomenologie* (Spiegelberg 1963), are important for understanding the Munich and Göttingen Circles. Finally, for a brief discussion that stays close to the Munich and Göttingen Circles and early Husserl, see Richard Schmitt's “Phenomenology” in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Schmitt 1967).

to a *Phenomenological Philosophy*,<sup>3</sup> but is not a mere repetition of their themes. In essence, the doctoral work is an explication of Husserl's remark in *Ideas I* that, "We [phenomenologists] are the genuine positivists."<sup>4</sup> It is phenomenology that attends fully to the given, i.e., to the *fully given*. The positivism of neo-Humeans such as Ernst Mach, Richard Avenarius, and Hans Cornelius brought a freshness into the idealist atmosphere. The insistence on the brute positivity of the given over against the a priori categorical or immanentist theories of knowledge was an important historical cause in the genesis of phenomenology. The "problem of the external world" was to be met by a careful study of what *actually* presented itself. This enabled Conrad-Martius to criticize neo-Humeanism on its own terms. We wish to note two decisive effects of this early bout with positivism: the seminal form of the thesis about the relationship between the way nature appears and the way it is—or correlatively—the possibility of a qualitative study of nature and, secondly, the basic Husserlian thesis of the "excessiveness" of a particular experience.<sup>5</sup> The first consideration will occupy us at various stages in the course of this work. We will come to see that the appearing of something, its ecstatic being othered by way of its power of disclosing itself, is inherent to its *realontological* structure. The second consideration has two internally related aspects, the noetic and the noematic. The excess on the side of noesis, i.e., consciousness' intentionality, is the excess of world as the horizon of the knowable and the already known and which horizon is pre-thematically operative in all of our experience.

Conrad-Martius drew ontological consequences from Husserl's early analysis of intentionality (in the *Logical Investigations*) in her *Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Aussenwelt*.<sup>6</sup> Here she shows how, "in a spiritual attitude" one sees more than he "properly" can see. Along with what is properly "seen" the world or milieu is present. This presence is not a matter of repeatedly new considerations, new acts or looking. In fact, it requires a peculiar and difficult act of experience to have only present "what falls under the senses." Furthermore, the analysis or the "spiritual attitude" discloses the spiritual being has an essential relationship to the world, that man is being-in-the-World.

But now one can ask—whether it is not the case that the specific spiritual relationship-to the external world—even when it is not a matter of any particular acts or actions—does not as such already include in a natural way something that goes beyond the circumstance or the pure being-present-to-itself of the "shut-down" (sensible) attitude. Indeed, we believe that in fact we must hold that spiritual being as such constitutes its being in a kind of transcendence—in the sense that no particular action or no performed "Salto mortale" is

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<sup>3</sup>Hereafter referred to as *Ideas I*.

<sup>4</sup>Husserl 1976, p. 45.

<sup>5</sup>See Husserl 1984b, p. 660. We also know that Conrad-Martius attended Husserl's *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* WS 1910/11 (Husserl 1973b, pp. 111–194).

<sup>6</sup>This work was originally intended to be an expansion of the *Preisschrift*. Pages 345–396 are a reworking of the 1912 text. However, this plan was changed, and the work continued, not according to the five divisions of the earlier work, but only in connection with its general themes, now treated from a new standpoint (see Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 396). I owe this illumination of the text to Avé-Lallemant. From here on we shall refer to this work as *Erscheinungslehre*.

necessary in order that the spiritual I be not only present-to-itself but also lives in a world other to itself. It belongs to the nature of the spiritual being that within it can be embraced an entire world. And in no case should it need a further dimension than its own in order to win unhampered comprehensiveness and development. And this regards not only specifically “spiritual” regions but also that of the real external world. The initial unlimited scope of the spiritual perspective [...] belongs to spirit as spirit and it can consequently rest in itself without artificial and troublesome attempts to surpass or jump outside of itself.<sup>7</sup>

As spirit man is being-in-the-World and the attempts to construct World out of either atomistic sense data or a “*salto mortale*” were completely absurd.<sup>8</sup>

We want to look more closely at this noetic-noematic theme of the excessiveness of any particular experience because these earliest analyses established basic patterns and methodological procedures for all of the later works. Although the noetic is not separable from the noematic one can separately describe the excessiveness on the side of the noema. In the critique of positivism and in the *Erscheinungslehre*, Conrad-Martius elaborated the thesis of the excessiveness of the noema, the *given*, in terms of the *given-along-with*, or the “surroundings.”<sup>9</sup> The given-along-with of the thing or the transcendence by this of its immediate boundaries must be considered an intrinsic aspect of what originally presents itself. Every experience (or experienced, i.e., noema) is always already “exceeding,” and this excess takes various forms. We want to look at the kinds of excessiveness found in experience. I see this cabinet before me; I have it in view. How do I “have” it? What is given to my senses is only one side of the cabinet which is directly turned towards me. That is, we have it in its three-dimensional extensiveness and have the *other side* of the table which is not given in vision, properly speaking, because of the abbreviated presentation of having it from a perspective.<sup>10</sup>

In the lived perception, we go beyond the perspectival thing-as-seen. This lived perception of the full bodily reality is an intuition, i.e., it is not a result of an inference, nor of the compilation of shifts of attention, nor of an assembling of the aspectival presentations. Such a collection would never result in “the cabinet” as I have it in the primary intuitive seeing. The full reality, the other side and all the aspects are given, *given with*, the particular aspectival seeing. The bodily thing with all its aspects presents its fullness along with its aspects. Conrad-Martius named this total objective content of the self-presentation of something in the realm of intuitive vision the body-face [*Körpergesicht*]. Each bodily thing comes forth in its material substantiality into appearance and manifests itself. (To what extent objective, physical light, on the one

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<sup>7</sup>Conrad-Martius 1916, pp. 407–408 The term “shut down” here refers to an earlier analysis where Conrad-Martius attempted to give a kind of legitimacy to the pure or “typical” sense-datum experience where the person in absolute distancelessness from the given and in an attitude of passive relaxation immediately experiences the sense-data alone. Here the I is “loosened” from the world, i.e., “shut-down” and completely turned within. See Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 404. For the mature formulation of spirit’s being-in-the-world, see the following chapter.

<sup>8</sup>See Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 398.

<sup>9</sup>We could compare this with William James’ concept of the “fringe” (cf. James 1958, p. 71).

<sup>10</sup>We are drawing upon a synthesis of the earlier more elaborate discussions that are found in Conrad-Martius 1965, pp. 315–334.

hand, and the sense apparatus on the other, are conditions for this self-disclosure of a physical thing is another question.) We will discuss at length the meaning of material substantiality in a later chapter. Here let it suffice to note that we always already perceive the cabinet in its substantiality and reality. But this is not identical with the having of the other side of the thing. The body-face shows itself *in* the aspectual presentation. We see the full cabinet all around. It is not as if we were here involved in a cubist presentation of the cabinet, as if it turned its other side to us—this is impossible. Rather it is as if we had “spiritual” stalked-eyes [*Stielaugen*]<sup>11</sup>—Conrad-Martius is thinking of the antenna-like eyes of a snail—along with our normal ones. The side of the cabinet which is turned towards us and sensibly given is had as such only through *abstraction* from the full perceptual experience.<sup>11</sup>

This discussion is particularly interesting because it indicates how Conrad-Martius attempts to overcome the situatedness and perspectivity of our knowing through an example of perception. This claim that we *have* the other side of the cube, which might be criticized as a confusion of the *mitgemeint* with the *mitgegeben*, i.e., the intended and presumed with the perceived meaning, is open to the charge of “intellectualism” that Maurice Merleau-Ponty discusses.

There is a first order dogmatism, of which reflexive analysis rids us, and which consists in asserting that the object is in-itself, or absolutely, without wondering what it is. But there is another dogmatism which consists in affirming the presumptive meaning of the object, without wondering how it enters into our experience. Reflexive analysis puts forward, instead of the absolute existence of the object, the thought of an absolute object, and, through trying to dominate the object and think of it from no point of view, it destroys the object’s internal structure.<sup>12</sup>

Early phenomenology understood as a science or doctrine of essences is in danger of attempting to see its essential objects from no point of view. We shall return to this issue in later sections of this chapter.<sup>13</sup>

For Conrad-Martius the spiritual act of perception can, as it were, be “shut down.” This can be artificially done as in a “phenomenological experiment.”<sup>14</sup> But it of course can be more essentially accomplished through forms or blindness, whether

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<sup>11</sup>Conrad-Martius 1965, p. 318. Husserl compares the having of the backside of a thing (e.g., a cabinet) with the mediate intentionality (which he calls a kind of “appresentation”) of another person in the original perception of the body. The act is a making-present-along-with [*Mitgegenwärtigmachen*] (Husserl 1973a, p. 139). In another place he notes that the other side—as well as the other ego—is meant-along-with [*mitgemeint*] (Husserl 1973a, p. 85).

<sup>12</sup>Merleau-Ponty 1945, p. 236.

<sup>13</sup>On the other hand, Conrad-Martius’ critique of Merleau-Ponty would center on his reduction of the realm of essences to an existential attempt to deal with facticity. Surely the truth and import of his phenomenology (essence-analysis) of perception is more than that. Relevant texts showing Merleau-Ponty’s attitude towards “*Wesensschau*” are in Merleau-Ponty 1945, pp. ix–xi, 235–237, 452–454.

<sup>14</sup>Conrad-Martius often used the term “phenomenological experiment” to designate a free imaginative variation of the thing to be studied in order to grasp its properties. Thus, as we shall see, it is related to the “eidetic reduction” and “ideation.” In the immediate context, the “experiment” is to imagine what it is like to be completely shutdown, e.g., completely passive, sunken in ourselves, half-awake, with our eyes open, but merely gaping.

they be physical or spiritual. When the spiritual attitude is shut down, we see the thing only from one side, or not as a substantial thing, i.e., perhaps as a maze of color patches. We do not perceive the other side, or substantiality, or the field or perceptions, or the environment which, as unobjectively perceived, contributes to the having or the thing from *this* perspective. For Conrad-Martius positivism failed to see the artificiality and abstraction of the kind of perception they were considering as paradigmatic. More important is the consideration that the experimental shutting down of the spiritual attitude discloses the possibility of spiritual blindness in the realm of *essence-intuition*. When I stupidly stare at the cabinet, I do not have the cabinet *as* cabinet. I do not have its essential categorical meaning. In our normal dealings with and perceptions of the world we have objects in their essential categorical meanings, but not explicitly. I perceive the door, the pen, etc., but not explicitly *as* door or pen. If we did not have this implicit awareness of their essential meaning, if we did not implicitly have them *as...*, we could not assume the attitudes towards them that we in fact do. We could not use them properly, e.g., sit in the chair, open the door, write with the pen.<sup>15</sup> One can say: That which is from the standpoint of sense phenomena most immediately given to us is the most mediately given to our spiritual (understanding) perception. That which exceeds and lies beyond the sense-phenomenal dimension is precisely that which is the most immediately given to our understanding.<sup>16</sup>

For Conrad-Martius, Kant's discussion is hampered with "sensualist prejudices." In Kant's analysis, there is a blindness or intransparency of the sense data. One can grant that "*nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in sensu*," and yet argue that there is more than the sense data immediately given. A phenomenology of the appearing of things shows that sense data are transparently transcendent: the appearances lead over and beyond themselves to that which founds them. Merleau-Ponty, commenting on a basic position of Conrad-Martius, observes that the passage of sense data within our view or through our hands is comparable to a self-communicating language in which each meaning, as it were, originates out of the structures of the

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<sup>15</sup>Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 408ff; 1965, pp. 320–321. Cf. Heidegger 1963, p. 148ff. Conrad-Martius makes reference here to Jaspers 1946, p. 143. We shall have repeated occasion to note how the natural sciences have a kind of spiritual blindness which shuts out the full appearance of nature. The theme of idea-blindness is prevalent in phenomenological literature. Husserl wrote: "Idea-blindness is a kind of blindness of the soul: one becomes, through prejudices, incapable of bringing into the field of judgment what he has in the field of intuition" (Husserl 1976, p. 48). This is a crucial distinction. If idea-blindness *within the realm of essence intuition* was a general cultural possibility it is hard to see how phenomenology would have a case. Thus, phenomenology must hold that its analyses are potentially public and generally accessible. It must make the claim that those who non-pathologically hold explicit positions which work against the manifested essential realities experience "in the field of intuition" these essences in an implicit, unthematic way. Essence intuition will be discussed in the following section.

<sup>16</sup>Conrad-Martius 1965, p. 319. This whole discussion finds illuminating parallels (and, of course, differences) in William James' placing of the "thickness of experience" (James 1958, pp. 250–251, 261, 280) against a "vicious intellectualism," and Alfred North Whitehead's exposure of "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness" through the distinctions of "causal efficacy" and "presentational immediacy" (Whitehead 1978, pp. 198–204).



signs themselves and that enables us to say in the exact sense of the words: Our senses question the things and the things answer. Then, he notes, quoting Conrad-Martius: “The sensible appearance *is* that which announces. It expresses as such what it itself is not.”<sup>17</sup> As in the perception of the expression of joy, the lines in the face are not the object of our consideration—they are only the medium of expression for that which is transparent in them—so it is not the sensible modes of appearance of a thing, but the thing which we consider.<sup>18</sup> Because the sensible appearance is that which announces, it itself cannot speak, and therefore it cannot be at hand when there is not something present expressing itself in the appearance. It is the appearance which makes this “something” known and, correspondingly, it is this “something” which founds the presence and being of the appearance.<sup>19</sup>

This is a central thesis for Conrad-Martius’ entire realontology. It is the initial “step” in overcoming the Galilean (primary and secondary qualities) view of things as well as Arthur Eddington’s “two-tables” view of nature.<sup>20</sup> It founds the entire later program to undertake an essence analysis of nature not only as it appears to us in our everydayness but also in relation to the appearances of nature which are mediated through the technological and experimental conditions of contemporary science. Here is founded in part the thesis that nature’s appearance cannot be essentially at odds with any of its modes of appearing. The full presentation of the thesis is the goal of both the *Erscheinungslehre* as well as the *Realontologie*.<sup>21</sup> To follow it in detail would require a work of its own. We must discuss, however, the formal lines of the analysis. This discussion continues our examination of the “excess of the appearing” for it will outline how the material manifestation of things mediates their material bodiliness which, in turn, founds the manifestations. When we shut down artificially the spiritual attitude towards the world, so that our spiritual roundabout vision [*Stielaugen*] is made inoperative and the, e.g., cabinet, is no longer a cabinet but a fuzzy blur, the object becomes a meaningless face or stage prop, no longer a solid meaningful thing. It is only a face of an appearance. Therefore, it is something that is had only insofar as it is for me something that is able to be experienced or “noted” by the senses. (We can call that which is able to be experienced by the senses the “sensible.”) For the specifically sensible it is characteristic that it alone remains for me when I myself (as shut-down or comatose) do not reach beyond the sphere of my own personal being. Even in this passive, shut-down, withdrawn condition, the sensible appearance is the only thing of the external world which is present to me.<sup>22</sup>

The external world could, of course, intrude or force itself on me, or press itself against me, so that I would have to attend to it or take note of it. But that is not

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<sup>17</sup>Merleau-Ponty 1945, pp. 368–369. See Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 371 and Conrad-Martius 1965, p. 325.

<sup>18</sup>Conrad-Martius 1965, p. 333.

<sup>19</sup>Conrad-Martius 1923, p. 196.

<sup>20</sup>Eddington 1929, pp. ix–xvii.

<sup>21</sup>Conrad-Martius 1923.

<sup>22</sup>Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 409.

the sensible appearance or manifestation or the world.<sup>23</sup> The abiding and inevitable presentation of itself to me *from afar*, which is the appearing of the sensible world, cannot be identified with an oppressive force. A fantasy product or a memory can oppress me. But their existence is dependent on my attending to them. They sink away when I “take my mind off of them.” That, or course, may be exceedingly difficult or even impossible. But still the point remains that they are dependent on my attending to them for their existence.<sup>24</sup> However, the perceived sensible appearances—provided, or course, that I do not block their access or remove myself from their range—address themselves to me from out of themselves. They stand in-themselves and present themselves and are not dependent on my attending to them—because, in fact, in my shut-down attitude I am only minimally open to them.<sup>25</sup> The sensibly appearing is for me through announcing itself, and there would be no announcing were I not there to perceive it. Yet it announces itself from out of itself and not by reason of my grace. It announces itself from out of its own autonomous ground.<sup>26</sup>

One can object that a phantasized object is a sensibly appearing object, and that the later discovery, that it is only a phantasy, does not mean that it ceases to be a sensible appearance.<sup>27</sup> Conrad-Martius answers with a phenomenological experiment. When an imagined appearance becomes actually real before us, it is as if a veil were removed from the object. What was before behind the veil now comes forth. And here the sensible appearance must be said to be *qualitatively different*. It is *disclosed*. But in the realm of imagination the process of unveiling could be repeated indefinitely. That is, there could be an infinite number of “disclosures.” But this is not the case when there is a perceived realization of the previously imagined. Here there is total disclosure. There are no more veils. There is full *bodiliness*. This is an essential difference and here is something totally new.<sup>28</sup> The sensible appearing of the imagined object is not bodily. It is bound, hidden. It is only an “appearance” [*Schein*], i.e., a seeming

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<sup>23</sup>The sensibly appearing for Conrad-Martius refers properly to the regions of seeing and hearing. The other sense regions are analyzed by her, but this would take us too far afield.

<sup>24</sup>In the *Erscheinungslehre* as well as in the *Realontologie* there are lengthy studies of the imagined or dreamed objects [*Vorstellungen*] over against the perceived. It is an especially important weapon for the attack on the neo-Humeanism which still defended, in essence, Hume’s distinction between ideas and impressions.

<sup>25</sup>There is an important sense in which, however, the sensible things lie in wait for our attending to them. They are not illuminated until our “attending ray” illuminates them. This we shall discuss later in the context of Conrad-Martius’ phenomenology of light. Here the emphasis is that the sensible appearing, in contrast to the imagined *factum*, announces itself from out of itself, whereas the latter is totally rooted in my attending to it.

<sup>26</sup>Although Conrad-Martius speaks in this connection of an autonomy of existence, it is always in the context of an eidetic analysis and is not a confrontation with the critical question. As we shall see, the *eidetic reduction* as well as her own version of the *transcendental reduction* is always presupposed in her discussions of the structures or that which shows itself as real. See Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 413ff and our later discussion of the reduction in the present chapter.

<sup>27</sup>Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 414.

<sup>28</sup>Conrad-Martius 1916, pp. 415–417. The notion of “bodiliness” as used here will be discussed in a later chapter when we consider “substance.” In Husserlian terms, one is no longer in the attitude of as-if it were so.

to appear. It can be compared with the way a mirror reflects the appearing. Into the mirroring goes all that comprises the face or aspect of the matter. But it is only an appearing.<sup>29</sup>

We must consider more closely the sense appearance as a self-presentation. This self-presentation is not just any sort but consists of a presentation *material*. We must strictly distinguish between the colored appearing or the color as appearing, on the one hand, and the *quale* color, on the other. The difference is that a *quale* color need not be a quality of something—it can merely be. Conrad-Martius gives as an example a “spectral color,” i.e., a color deriving from the spectrum. As a spectral color the *quale*, which presents itself is not a quality of something because the appearing here is nothing but color. Another example is a rainbow. In a loose analogy, which we shall study at length later, Conrad-Martius calls the constituting material of the appearing the “substance.” Thus, in a pure color appearance (as in a rainbow), the color *quale* is the specific substance of the constituted object (i.e., the color appearance). Because the sensible appearance here is constituted of a material, whose entire essence it is to present, the sensible appearing itself is pure presentation. However, as is immediately clear, not all presentation is *quale*. The presentation material discloses itself as also quality. We must now attend to this more typical material. Color and sound are in-themselves things that “address” or “announce.” As such they are “self-expressing,” and things that have the qualities of color or sound must themselves be “announcing” or “speaking” things. As announcing, the appearing is an “othering” or a “swelling.” But this othering or swelling remains fixed in its source. When a clock strikes, the gong presents itself in its outward directed motion *as a stroke of the clock*. Color is pure manifestation, a revelation; therefore, similarly, an othering which at the same time abides in-itself.<sup>30</sup> Other *qualia*, e.g., warmth, do not have this structure of othering which remains bound to its source. In the communication of warmth, the warmth does not remain bound to its source, but rather it is essentially bound with my feeling of it. In this sense, it is not even an othering as a process of the same’s othering itself because its being is now in the other, i.e., my feeling of the warmth. The essence-analysis of colors shows that it is a fundamental *category mistake* to treat the color as an affection of the eye, i.e., after the structure of the tactile sense. Once one has grasped the essence of color, i.e., once one has seen that it is essentially announcing (an othering which abides in its source), one cannot describe it after the model of tactile data.<sup>31</sup> Although color and sound as *quale* have objective being, i.e., are present to consciousness, and have a kind of remaining in-themselves and thus an

<sup>29</sup>Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 418ff. To work out fully the mode of givenness of the sensibly appearing one would have to compare the kinds of relationships tactile feelings, smells, tastes and the properly “sensibly appearing” (i.e., to our vision and hearing) have to the field of perception. Furthermore, one would have to consider the various levels of intimacy each of these have with respect to the I. The important distinguishing note of the felt-tactile datum, that it, as such, is not *objective expression*, but rather is bound to the perceiver’s sense of touch, would also have to be treated. See Conrad-Martius 1916, pp. 426–461.

<sup>30</sup>Though in both color and sound there is an othering which abides affixed to its source they can be essentially distinguished in the manner of announcing. See the following discussion.

<sup>31</sup>Conrad-Martius 1916, pp. 472–473.

enclosed structure, they do not stand in-themselves or come forth in-themselves. As we shall see at length later, every object has a definite objective mode of being, but not everything which has an objective mode of being is an object existing in-itself. Color and sound have objective being but do not stand in-themselves or come forth for-themselves. They present a material that is in- and for-itself. The thing that is presented through the sensible appearance is not some unknown *X* veiled by the appearances but is that which inhabits the appearances.<sup>32</sup>

An important distinction must be noted. Sound and color, as essentially divulging, have a profoundly different manner of divulging. In color, a material totality comes to presence. The total material being breaks out of itself and with itself. It is a total presentation of self. On the other hand, sound presents itself only as an expressing or divulging. For Conrad-Martius it is the merely divulging; it belongs to sound that that which is disclosed remains behind that which discloses it. In color that which is disclosed breaks forth out of itself with that which discloses it.<sup>33</sup> The thing in its unity of manifestations is not an unknown substrate, an *X*, which is best described by the underlying primary (i.e., quantitative) qualities. The appearing thing is that unique accent which is found in each of its manifested properties which express it. Merleau-Ponty wrote in this connection:

For example, the brittleness, hardness, transparency and crystal ring of a glass all translate a single manner of being. If a sick man sees the devil, he sees at the same time his smell, his flames and smoke, because the significant unity “devil” is precisely that acrid and fire-and-brimstone essence. There is a symbolism in the thing which links each sensible quality to the rest. Heat enters experience as a kind of vibration of the thing; with color on the other hand it is as if the thing is thrust outside itself, and it is a priori necessary that an extremely hot object should redden, for it is its excess of vibration which causes it to blaze forth.<sup>34</sup>

The realontology of Conrad-Martius attempts to show the harmony and disclosure power of the various aspects of the total phenomenon of nature. She thereby attempts to overcome the abyss which the natural sciences are supposed to uncover between what really is and what appears. Thus, heat’s presentation of itself involves the disclosure of the dimension referred to by kinetic theory which is accounted for chiefly in non-qualitative terms. And extremely warm objects, i.e., those objects which disclose an excessive disturbance, properly redden and blaze forth because color is the ecstatic othering of the thing and in its excessive disturbance (inflammation) it rages forth outside of itself. This is a phenomenon which is commonly described only in terms of an oxidation process which neglects totally the sensible appearances of the

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<sup>32</sup>Conrad-Martius 1916, p. 476. The rainbow presents an important exception in the realm of vision in that it has pure “spectral color”; pure color manifestation (*quale* color) is the “specific substance” of the appearing “object”—which is only a color appearance.

<sup>33</sup>See Conrad-Martius 1923, pp. 286–289. It is clear that Conrad-Martius is considering only the region of *natural things* in this discussion. If the region were *works of music* rather than the sound quality of things, important distinctions would have to be made.

<sup>34</sup>Merleau-Ponty 1945, pp. 368–369. As Merleau-Ponty suggests in a footnote, Conrad-Martius’ analyses in the *Realontology* are a contribution to the phenomenology of religion.