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# Big Business and Dictatorships in Latin America

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## A Transnational History of Profits and Repression

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*Edited by*

VICTORIA BASUALDO  
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Palgrave Studies in Latin American  
Heterodox Economics

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Victoria Basualdo  
Hartmut Berghoff • Marcelo Bucheli  
Editors

# Big Business and Dictatorships in Latin America

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ISSN 2662-3943

ISSN 2662-3951 (electronic)

Palgrave Studies in Latin American Heterodox Economics

ISBN 978-3-030-43924-8

ISBN 978-3-030-43925-5 (eBook)

<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43925-5>

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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

## Praise for *Big Business and Dictatorships in Latin America*

“This volume combines a refreshingly interdisciplinary approach with the very best new Latin American scholarship to provide compelling insights on the vexed relationship between big business and dictators in Latin America. By shifting the focus away from the notorious behavior of some US corporations, the authors provide a more nuanced account, which is enlightened by comparisons made with other contexts, including the story of business and the Nazi regime in Germany.”

—Geoffrey Jones, *Isidor Straus Professor of Business History, Harvard Business School*

“This book spans Latin America, from Central America to Patagonia, with illuminating macro analyses and case studies of South America’s regional powers: Argentina, Brazil and Chile. It reveals how big business collaborated with their civil-military dictatorships and the dictatorships promoted their business interests. This book is required reading for scholars and students of Latin America’s recent past, Cold War and human rights struggles.”

—Peter Winn, *Professor of History, Tufts University*

“This *tour de force* exposes the political economy roots of the violent repressive civil-military dictatorships in Latin America during the 1960s-1980s. It presents evidence confirming ‘big capital’s’ role in shaping, legitimizing, and strengthening those regimes. It echoes the call for ‘never again’ in presenting the dire consequences of the development model: the torture, death, and disappearance of workers and their human rights allies.”

—Leigh A. Payne, *Professor of Sociology and Latin America, University of Oxford*

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# Crime and (No) Punishment: Business Corporations and Dictatorships

*Victoria Basualdo, Hartmut Berghoff,  
and Marcelo Bucheli*

This volume studies the relationship between big business and the Latin American dictatorial regimes during the Cold War. Between the 1950s and 1970s, many civilian governments in Latin America fell in quick succession and were replaced by military regimes often supported by the US government. These regimes were considered a bulwark against the advance of communism, which was viewed as a credible threat both by Latin American elites and by the United States, particularly after the triumph of

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V. Basualdo et al. (eds.), *Big Business and Dictatorships in Latin America*, Palgrave Studies in Latin American Heterodox Economics, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43925-5\\_1](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43925-5_1)

the Cuban Revolution and its subsequent popularity among significant segments of the Latin American working and middle classes. Contemporary studies viewed big business (both foreign multinationals and domestic firms) as the natural allies of the right-wing military regimes: segments of the military, which were concerned about “foreign infiltration” from international communism through labor activism, were able to find common ground with managers frustrated by union-led disruptions of their business operations and frightened by the growth of anti-business and obstructionist political organizations, not to mention violent ones (as well as the obvious potentially negative effect on their bottom line).<sup>1</sup> During that period, many analysts and casual observers found clear and unequivocal evidence of such business-military collusion in events such as the 1954 overthrow of Guatemala’s President Jacobo Arbenz following his conflict with the United Fruit Company, or the 1973 coup against Chile’s President Salvador Allende following clashes with foreign firms like the International Telegraph and Telephone Company (ITT) and the Chilean elite.<sup>2</sup> Further evidence of this collusion was also located in the subsequent adoption by the military regimes of Chile in the 1970s and Argentina in the 1980s of open-market policies that overwhelmingly benefited big business and foreign investors.

Despite the perceived importance of the role of the Latin American Cold War dictatorships in creating a business-friendly environment during the 1980s and 1990s, no single volume provides readers with a view of the relationship between big business and the authoritarian regimes on a continental scale. Country-focused studies published by some of this collection’s authors have made important contributions. This volume seeks to enrich this debate by bringing together case studies on Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Central America, plus chapters on particular industries, including infrastructure, defense, finance, and automobile manufacturing. The chapters of this volume go beyond the traditional view, which focuses on US corporations and the global agenda of the United States. To date, the literature has honed in overwhelmingly on

<sup>1</sup>Peter Evans, *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1979); Guillermo O’Donnell, *El Estado Burocrático Autoritario: 1966–1973* (Buenos Aires: Belgrano, 1982).

<sup>2</sup>Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); Lubna Qureshi, *Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009).

firms originating in the United States. In addition to examining US foreign investment and foreign policy in the region, the volume makes an unprecedented contribution by considering firms from Germany, France, Italy, and Canada, with a particular emphasis on the relationship between German foreign policy and the cooperation of German firms with the military dictatorships. In addition to analyzing the operations of multinational corporations, the volume also studies the role of the banking sector in financing authoritarian regimes and the local elites' accommodation of the military governments.

*Big Businesses and Dictatorships in Latin America* engages in dialogues with recent studies on these types of relationships in other parts of the world. Some recent studies, for example, have shown the complexity and variety of relationships between big business and the Nazi regime. After decades of attempting to silence, deny, and muffle this history, most large German corporations began to open their archives in the 1990s in response to high pressure from a critical public and often from international clients threatening to boycott these firms. Many, but not all, major German corporations have commissioned independent historians to analyze their history during the Nazi dictatorship, yielding an impressive array of high-quality scholarship that illuminates important and often disturbing aspects of this history.<sup>3</sup> None of this has happened in Latin America, where the general attitude of companies is still silence, denial, and closed archives. However, scholars now benefit from the large quantity of evidence and sources, some of which were generated during legal actions against firms involved in repression carried out during the dictatorships. The time that has elapsed since the fall of the Latin American military regimes, the freedom Latin American scholars have managed to achieve since then, and the opening and discovery of new archival sources provide optimal conditions for revisiting, through a variety of lenses, the complex ties between Latin

<sup>3</sup> Gerald D. Feldman, *Allianz and the German Insurance Business, 1933–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001); Harold James, *The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War against the Jews: The Expropriation of Jewish-Owned Property* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001); Peter Hayes, *From Cooperation to Complicity: Degussa in the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006). See also the chapters in Harold James and Jakob Tanner, eds., *Enterprise in the Period of Fascism in Europe* (Aldershot: Routledge, 2002); Francis R. Nicosia and Jonathan Huener, eds., *Business and Industry in Nazi Germany* (New York: Berghahn, 2004); and Hartmut Berghoff, Jürgen Kocka, and Dieter Ziegler, eds., *Business in the Age of Extremes: Essays in Modern German and Austrian Economic History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

American military governments and different types of businesses ranging from large domestic firms, family firms, foreign multinationals, and state-owned enterprises.

This project began with a workshop at the University of Göttingen in September 2016 about “Corporations and Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America,” where preliminary versions of some of the chapters were presented. It became clear at that academic event that the topic was as relevant as it was complex, with highly contentious dimensions and aspects. Therefore, this book is a product of a conscious attempt to make progress in this field by bringing together contributions from specialists in economic history, business history, labor history, and human rights and Transitional Justice, which are often completely separate realms or in disagreement with one another. To welcome contributions from different theoretical perspectives, scholarly traditions, and research trajectories developed in various geographical and institutional frameworks was a considerable challenge that took time and energy. We hope this collective effort, which is necessarily diverse and multifaceted, will help foster knowledge and debate about issues of relevance not only to global and regional history but also to current economic and social relations.

This volume dialogues with several scholarly communities. First, we reflect on the debates generated by studies on the relationship between the Nazi regime in Germany and the corporate sector and connect them to an important area of the world that was dominated by right-wing dictators (many of them more or less openly inspired by European fascism) in the 1970s and 1980s. Although history never exactly repeats itself and comparisons across different times and continents should be treated with great caution, there are some stunning parallels between the experience of Germany and Latin America as far as the relationship between the business community and right-wing dictatorships is concerned. In all cases, the dictatorships emerged in unstable democracies that were particularly unpopular with the corporate world.

In Germany, most businessmen perceived the Weimar Republic (1918–1933) as the poisoned fruit of World War I. The military defeat and the Treaty of Versailles were generally seen as unfair and humiliating, burdening the republic with a painful legacy. The establishment of the Weimar Republic generated features that were diametrically opposed to business interests. These included an unprecedented rise of the labor movement and the temporary participation of the Social Democrats in government. German business was forced, for the first time in history, to

accept labor unions as legitimate representatives of their workers. In 1920, the principle of codetermination was introduced. All companies with more than 20 employees had to set up elected works councils whose task was to advocate for employees' interests vis-à-vis the management. Workers in Germany gained such rights for the first time; never before had there been so many strikes and lockouts. A second business-undermining feature of the Weimar Republic was that, in stark contrast to the German Empire of 1870–1918, it was characterized by economic instability and social unrest. The experience of hyperinflation, recurrent political turmoil, the emergence of an expansive welfare state, and higher levels of corporate and personal taxation added to the business class's disenchantment with democracy, which, in general, was a new historical experience for all Germans that seemed frail by itself. Thus, it comes as no surprise that for the middle classes, in general, and most members of the business community, in particular, the authoritarian monarchy of the German Empire looked like a land of milk and honey in retrospect.<sup>4</sup>

As a result, there was little loyalty to the republic but rather a great deal of disapproval and hostility toward it. However, this negative attitude did not translate into support for the NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers' Party, commonly referred to in English as the Nazi Party), which remained a chaotic splinter party on the lunatic fringe for a long time. Even after it had increased the number of seats it held in parliament from 12 (1928) to 107 (1930), the party disturbed most businessmen with its anti-capitalist manifesto. After all, it was a "National Socialist Party." Most businessmen wanted an authoritarian alternative to the republic that would put labor back on a short leash and ensure law and order as they understood it. The view that big business backed Hitler<sup>5</sup> has proved to be

<sup>4</sup>Eric D. Weitz, *Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2007) 129–168; Richard J. Evans, *The Coming of the Third Reich* (London: Penguin, 2003), 78–138.

<sup>5</sup>This view has been popular in the left political spectrum. It had become canonized at the 7th World Congress of the Communist Third International in 1935, when Georgi Dimitrov called fascism "the open, terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic, and most imperialist elements of finance capital." Georgi Dimitrov, "The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist International," Main Report delivered at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International—"The class character of fascism"; collected in *VII Congress of the Communist International: Abridged Stenographic Report of Proceedings* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1939). This thesis proved to be very influential until the 1980s. For Hitler, finance capital was "Jewish" and had to be destroyed. So the majority capitalists had no cause to support him. Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship:*

erroneous. Rather, in addition to the general crisis of the economy and the state, the support of large landowners and parts of the military was decisive. They were under the illusion they could instrumentalize Hitler to make up for lost ground, that is, to secure government subsidies for crisis-ridden agriculture and to restore the army, which had been drastically downsized by the Treaty of Versailles, to its former size and glory. The business community was primarily responsible for having weakened the republic, not for having given direct support to Hitler prior to 1933, although there was a minority of businesspeople who backed Hitler early on and saw Germany's savior in him.<sup>6</sup>

After Hitler became chancellor and acquired dictatorial powers, the business community eagerly looked for ways to come to terms with the new rulers and take advantage of the dictatorship. They joined the NSDAP in large numbers, and some prominent businessmen took up top positions in the new state. Kurt Schmitt from Allianz Insurance became the Reich Minister of Economics in 1933 but was already released from his duties in 1934. His successor became the internationally renowned banker Hjalmar Schacht, who also served the regime as the president of the central bank until 1938, when he was dropped like a hot potato because he insisted on a reasonably sound financial policy, which the regime regarded as dispensable since it intended for the subjugated countries to foot the bill.<sup>7</sup>

Overall, tactically motivated, opportunistic cooperation between regime and the entrepreneurial class prevailed. There was a convergence

*Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation*, 4th ed. (London: Arnold, 2000). The classic view of East German communists was that the NSDAP had been controlled by big business. See Eberhard Czichon, *Wer verhalf Hitler zur Macht? Zum Anteil der Deutschen Industrie an der Zerstörung der Weimarer Republik* (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1967). For a recent summary of the debates and further literature, see Jörg Osterloh, "Die Monopole und ihre Herren. Marxistische Interpretationen," in *Unternehmen im Nationalsozialismus. Zur Historisierung einer Forschungskonjunktur*, edited by Norbert Frei and Tim Schanetzky, 36–47 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2010).

<sup>6</sup> Henry Ashby Turner, "Big Business and the Rise of Hitler," *American Historical Review* 75, no. 1 (1969): 56–70; idem, *German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1987); Reinhard Vogelsang, *Der Freundeskreis Himmler* (Göttingen: Muster-Schmidt Verlag, 1972). For a biographical case study, see Hartmut Berghoff and Cornelia Rauh, *The Respectable Career of Fritz K: The Making and Remaking of a Provincial Nazi Leader* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2015).

<sup>7</sup> Adam J. Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* (London: Penguin, 2006), 99–134 and 285–325; and Richard J. Evans, *The Third Reich in Power 1933–1939* (London: Penguin, 2005) 351–377.

but no identity of interests. Businessmen who were directly involved in the rearmament drive were closer to the regime and benefited more from it than those in the consumer-goods industry. For the most part, they frowned upon severing international connections and implementing capital controls or import quotas. The rearmament boom, however, gave many companies lucrative orders. Full employment and rising profits were highly welcomed. Nevertheless, they saw corporations bow to the primacy of politics and sometimes helplessly watched as state-owned or party-affiliated companies took precedence even over the most powerful private businesses. The most famous cases are Volkswagen and the steel and weapons conglomerate Reichswerke Hermann Göring. Volkswagen was founded with capital that had been stolen from the trade unions because private industry refused to build a car that Hitler wanted them to sell below production costs.<sup>8</sup> The state-owned Reichswerke used taxpayers' money to hasten the exploitation of poor domestic iron ore, which private companies did not want to touch because this raw material was too expensive to process and sell at a profit. There was almost an open confrontation between the steel barons of the Ruhr and the government, but the regime needed both private corporations run by traditional elites preoccupied with profits and state-owned enterprises run by political fanatics without any regard for commercial considerations.<sup>9</sup> Volkswagen and Reichswerke were notorious for their exploitation of forced laborers.<sup>10</sup>

Parts of the private corporate sector also became highly complicit with the regime when it came to "Aryanization," that is, the robbery of Jewish property, or the exploitation of occupied territories, but in these instances, too, the party typically had greater leverage than individual companies when conflicts arose. Complete agreement with Hitler's ideological goals was rare but not absent. Overall, the cooperation of the old elites with the NSDAP never became a happy alliance.

<sup>8</sup> Hans Mommsen and Manfred Grieger, *Das Volkswagenwerk und seine Arbeiter im Dritten Reich* (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1996).

<sup>9</sup> Gerhard Thomas Mollin, *Montankonzerne und "Drittes Reich": Der Gegensatz zwischen Monopolindustrie und Befehlswirtschaft in der deutschen Rüstung und Expansion 1936–1944* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988); and Richard J. Overy, *War and Economy in the Third Reich* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995), 93–174.

<sup>10</sup> Manfred Grieger, "Extermination and Work under the Nazi System of Forced Labor," in *Forced Labor: The Germans, the Forced Laborers, and the War*, edited by Volkhard Knigge, Rikola-Gunnar Lüttgenau, and Jens-Christian Wagner (Weimar: Stiftung Gedenkstätten Buchenwald und Mittelbau-Dora, 2010), 208–220.

Another important difference between the Nazi dictatorship and Latin American ones in the 1970s and 1980s was the role of the military. The *Reichswehr*, the German armed forces, set great hopes on Hitler and welcomed the stripping away of the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles but never managed to get into the driver's seat. The regime initially left the military forces under the illusion that they could have a say in strategic political issues, but by 1938 Hitler made it clear that the army was to be a subordinate institution. Several conservative generals were either murdered or fired.<sup>11</sup> National Socialists did not want to serve anyone—not the military or the business class. Above all, they pursued their own ideological, racial, and kleptocratic agenda regardless of the consequences.

To add another divergence, it must be stressed that Hitler's seizure of power was an internal German affair, in which neither foreign secret services nor foreign governments or companies played any role. In contrast to Latin America, the United States was not actively involved in the overthrow of the republic. The United States had direct interests in the repayment of Germany's outstanding debts, and it was obvious that any Nazi-led government would refuse to honor these obligations. And the United States wanted to preserve free trade, which the Nazis promised to abandon. Thus, Washington had no reason to support a regime change in Germany.

Foreign capital also played no role in Hitler's seizure of power, in contrast to the Latin American dictatorships. As a rule, foreign companies in Germany were disadvantaged and intimidated, above all by capital controls and threats of confiscation. However, like German companies, they did develop structures of complicity in the interest of profits and the defense of property. Between 1933 and 1939, several hundred US companies made significant portions of their sales in Germany, some of them even until 1941. Around 1935, 26 of the largest American corporations had close business relations with the German dictatorship.<sup>12</sup> Although this was not illegal in the United States, in view of Hitler's treatment of Jews and political opponents and his blatant violations of international law, it was highly distressing and therefore kept a secret.

<sup>11</sup> Rolf-Dieter Müller, *Hitler's Wehrmacht, 1935–1945* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016); and Evans, *Power*, 642–645.

<sup>12</sup> Research Services of the German Parliament, *Report on the Alleged Cooperation of US-Corporation with the NS-Regime* (WD 1 – 134/07) (Berlin, 2007) (in German), 3.

There were prominent cases of companies that would later also cooperate with Latin American dictators. The largest car manufacturer in Germany was General Motors through its Opel subsidiary. Opel built the hardy three-ton truck “Blitz,” which became the mainstay of the German army. Opel almost doubled its staff in Germany in the 1930s and increased its sales to the Nazi state, which became its most important customer. Opel and GM managers had close contacts with leading Nazi functionaries. James D. Mooney, the president of GM overseas operations and a supporter of the isolationist and racist anti-New-Deal American Liberty League, met with Hitler several times, even after the invasion of Poland, and was treated as the Führer’s special guest. In 1938 Mooney was awarded the Grand Cross of the German Eagle Order, the highest party order for foreigners, for his service to the “Third Reich.” The first recipient of this new medal had been Mussolini in 1937. Twenty-two American citizens received the award between 1937 and 1940, among them also Thomas Watson, the chief executive of IBM, and Henry Ford. GM obscured Opel’s American ownership and control as the rank-and-file Nazis “condemned anything foreign-owned or foreign-made.”<sup>13</sup> Prominent German figures and Nazi functionaries were appointed to Opel’s board. During the war, Opel also produced essential components for warplanes with the help of forced laborers. At the same time, Opel’s American personnel were replaced by Germans handpicked by and loyal to GM.

Ford had opened a factory in Cologne in 1931 but never reached the same importance in Germany as GM did. Still, Ford became an important supplier for the army, providing it with about one-third of its trucks. In 1939, when Hitler’s preparations for war were escalating and more than obvious, Ford did not shy away from importing essential truck components from Dearborn to Cologne to meet the rising demands of the German army. Allied forces in the war made the bewildering discovery that they were driving the same brands of trucks as their enemy. Henry Ford, an outspoken anti-Semite, who was admired by Hitler, received the

<sup>13</sup>Edwin Black, “Hitler’s Carmaker: The Inside Story of How General Motors Helped Mobilize the Third Reich,” *Global Research*, Oct. 1 (2018). This article is one-sided in many ways. A more thorough but partly apologetic account is Henry Ashby Turner, *General Motors and the Nazis: The Struggle for Control of Opel, Europe’s Biggest Carmaker* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2005).

Eagle Order in 1938 on the occasion of his 75th birthday. The certificate was personally signed by Hitler.<sup>14</sup>

During the war, more and more forced laborers were dispatched to the Cologne factory. They accounted for about half of the staff in 1943. Toward the end of the war, Ford requested concentration camp inmates from the SS to keep production going. In 1944 the first inmates from the Buchenwald camp arrived in Cologne. Opel also used forced labor but refused to employ concentration camp inmates. In other words, there was a choice. After the war the parent companies in the United States claimed not to have made any profits from the German war economy and to have lost control of their subsidiaries between late 1941 and 1945, when the United States was at war with Germany. Ford had reduced its share in the German subsidiary to 52 percent in 1941 but kept the majority ever after. In May 1942, the Nazi regime put Ford Werke in “trusteeship” but did not nationalize it. It remained American property.<sup>15</sup>

Human rights violations were endemic at Ford, just as they were in large parts of German industry during the war. In the Ford factory worker-inmates toiled for twelve hours a day. They were given 200 grams of bread and coffee for breakfast, no lunch, and a dinner of spinach and three potatoes or soup made of turnip leaves. In late summer 1944, about eight million workers—that is, roughly a quarter of the workforce in Germany—were foreigners; the majority of these were forced laborers, who were compelled to work in Germany mostly under pitiful conditions.<sup>16</sup> In some cases companies set up production facilities close to concentration camps. Representatives of these companies were often directly involved in the

<sup>14</sup>Stephan Link, “Rethinking the Ford-Nazi Connection,” *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute* 49, no. 2 (2011): 135–50.

<sup>15</sup>Ken Silverstein, “Ford and the Führer,” *The Nation*, January 6 (2000); and Simon Reich, *The Fruits of Fascism: Postwar Prosperity in Historical Perspective* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1990), 107–145.

<sup>16</sup>Ulrich Herbert, *Hitler’s Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany under the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006); Mark Mazower, *Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe* (New York: Penguin Press, 2010), 294–318; Mark Spoerer, “Forced Labour in Nazi-Occupied Europe, 1939–1945,” in *Economies under Occupation: The Hegemony of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in World War II*, edited by Marcel Boldford and Tetsuji Okazaki, 73–85 (London: Routledge, 2015); idem, *Zwangsarbeit unter dem Hakenkreuz. Ausländische Zivilarbeiter, Kriegsgefangene und Häftlinge im Deutschen Reich und im besetzten Europa 1939–1945* (Stuttgart: DVA, 2001).

selection of workers; people deemed fit to work were thus allowed to live for the time being, while everyone else was sent to certain death.<sup>17</sup>

After the war, the majority of the implicated businessmen were not punished, or only relatively mildly.<sup>18</sup> Quite a few Nazi criminals fled to Latin America via the so-called ratlines where they found safe havens. In the Federal Republic, the economic elites experienced lenience as they were needed for the reconstruction and the integration of the Federal Republic into the Western camp against the backdrop of the emerging Cold War. A broad discussion of the role of the elites and National Socialism only began with the student movement in 1968. It peaked in the 1980s and 1990s when numerous large companies decided to open their archives to investigate their role in the dictatorship. This was often triggered by pressure from the public and international customers, some of whom threatened to boycott these firms. Another key factor was the fact that the generation change had now progressed so far that the companies could easily distance themselves from those responsible at the time. No one who had been complicit was in office anymore, and even the next generation that had been trained and supported by former perpetrators and collaborators found themselves retired. In most cases, discovering the dark period of the dictatorship no longer had immediate personal consequences. Most forced laborers received significant compensation from the companies only in the 1990s and 2000s, after decades of refusal. Class action suits in the United States and public opinion made them change their minds.

This historical review has touched on the key issues also crucial to the Latin American dictatorships, which hold this volume together. How did entrepreneurs stand in relation to democratic governments? Were they involved in regime changes, directly or indirectly? What was the role of foreign powers and capital? To what extent and why did businessmen form alliances with dictators? Were there shared interests or antagonisms? Did

<sup>17</sup>Hermann Kaienburg, ed., *Konzentrationslager und Deutsche Wirtschaft 1939–1945* (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1996).

<sup>18</sup>Norbert Frei, *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2002): Hartmut Berghoff, "Zwischen Verdrängung und Aufarbeitung. Die bundesdeutsche Gesellschaft und ihre nationalsozialistische Vergangenheit in den Fünfziger Jahren," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 49, no. 2 (1998): 96–114. A more general account with examples from other countries is Manfred Berg and Bernd Schäfer, eds, *Historical Justice in International Perspective: How Societies Are Trying to Right the Wrongs of the Past* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009).