

Robert J. Stokes
Charlotte Gill *Editors*

Innovations in Community-Based Crime Prevention

Case Studies and Lessons Learned

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 Springer

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ISBN 978-3-030-43634-6

ISBN 978-3-030-43635-3 (eBook)

<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43635-3>

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This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

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Chapter 1

In Support of Innovative Partnerships for Crime Prevention: The Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation Program



Robert J. Stokes and Charlotte Gill

Introduction

This book presents a series of cases of communities across the United States partnering with public agencies and civil society organizations to positively impact the safety of their residents. This work has been pursued in some of the most troubled communities in the country: neighborhoods that have long suffered from extreme economic, social, and civic decline. These areas are characterized by high levels of unemployment, property abandonment, disorderly public environments, active illegal drug markets, underperforming schools, and violent crime.

While the work chronicled here is focused on the activities of the federally funded and administered Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation (BCJI) program, in many sites, community work long predates the more recent efforts of this program. For some sites, organized crime prevention activities have been pursued for decades prior to this program. These recent efforts, pursued under the BCJI program, have occurred during a rather difficult era in the annals of American policing. Stocks of mutual trust between police and the communities where policing services tend to be most active, while historically fraught, have been further depleted over the past decade. A series of nationally publicized police shootings – often accompanied by ubiquitous digital images provided by cell phone, police dashcam, or police body camera footage – has exacerbated historical tensions between the police and communities of color. These incidents, in addition to the controversial and drawn-out legal cases that have followed them (serially followed by an endless 24/7 media cycle), have led each side, the police and community advocates, to close ranks and

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R. J. Stokes, C. Gill (eds.), *Innovations in Community-Based Crime Prevention*,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43635-3_1

become less inclined to seek common ground. Indeed, those who casually follow the national news in the United States over the last decade would be inclined to believe that the relationship between the police and residents of disadvantaged, minority neighborhoods is fundamentally broken (Sharkey 2018).

The cases in this book, utilizing on-the-ground observations from a blend of urban planning, social work, economics, and criminology scholars, in addition to their practitioner partners, suggest an alternative view. Even during these difficult times, police and community advocates have continued to work together to address long-standing issues of crime and violence. While seldom perfectly pursued, as attested in the myriad case details presented in this book, these good faith collaborations provide a necessary glimmer of hope in support of community-empowered, legitimate, and effective public safety services.

This past decade, while difficult, has not been all bad news. Crime in many cities, including the country's largest two, New York and Los Angeles, have continued to creep down to levels not seen for more than a half-century. Advances in technology and data systems have led to improvements in policing deployment strategies and electronic surveillance capabilities in both public and private spaces, while also having a democratizing effect of the availability of criminal justice information for citizens, civil society advocates, the media, and researchers.

Good news aside, many larger cities like Chicago, Philadelphia, and Baltimore have witnessed tremendous spikes in murders and shootings over the last decade after a sustained period of decline. Crime has also become a growing problem in many smaller cities and, increasingly, suburbs and rural areas across the United States. The economic decline, depopulation, and municipal fiscal stress experienced by many large cities during the 1970–1990s have reached smaller cities and have led to increases in crime and violence in places where they had not been seen before. Smaller cities and rural areas have also endured the terrible ravages of increased levels of opioid addiction, facilitated by the easy access of powerful prescription pain medications and the synthetic opioid, fentanyl. This new set of problems have vexed smaller places, which lack the resources or established set of program providers, be they public or nonprofit, to address them. It is within this context that the Obama Administration pursued an effort to provide federal support for community-based crime reduction and prevention partnerships in distressed communities.

The BCJI Program

The BCJI program emerged at the end of President Obama's first term (2012) as part of a suite of three federal programs known as the Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative (NRI). This three-pronged initiative sought to link federal support to improvements in affordable housing through the US Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Choice Neighborhoods, the Department of Justice's (DOJ) BCJI program, along with the Promise Zone program, which sought to decrease poverty through investments in education, training, and targeted incentives

for private development in designated areas. While the BCJI program represented a new type of federal anti-crime program, it shares much in common with other programs that have come before it, many with similar theories as to the causes of crime, such as community and problem oriented policing, as well as a clear set of prescriptions toward its reduction and prevention. Prior to the decline in urban industrial and manufacturing areas and central city population losses brought on by suburbanization in the 1960s, the US Federal government had a very limited role in local crime policy. This changed with the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, a wide-reaching federal law that emerged within a context of growing urban, civil unrest; fast-growing rates of crime and violence; and the concomitant reduction in the local tax base due to industrial and population decline.

Out of the Safe Streets Act came a set of new federal resources and organizational capacities to help local governments address crime more effectively. These included the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), to be located within the Department of Justice (DOJ). The OJP was designed to provide the organizational structure to support local criminal justice agencies through grants, data, and technical support. The Act also created a national resource for criminal justice data collection and analysis, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, as well as supporting scientific research to study the efficacy of justice policies and practices through the creation of the National Institute of Justice. Support for community-based crime prevention and community capacity building were also key focus areas, through the Community Capacity Development Office and Office of Weed and Seed Strategies, respectively. Lastly, the Act created two additional sections to support improvements in local police training, operations, communications, and computer equipment: the Division of Applied Law Enforcement Technology and the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program.

Around the same time, community-oriented policing approaches rose up out of a crisis of legitimacy in American policing, whereby the civil unrest and rising crime of the late 1960s and 1970s eroded communities' trust in the police and fostered the view that they were out of touch with the needs of neighborhood residents. As crime grew and resources shrank, local policing organizations sought efficiencies in police services. These included designing centralized crime reporting and dispatch systems that linked patrol officers, often in cars, by radio to crime events in real time. Policing commanders became more focused on response times and clearing (or solving) crimes after they occurred, thus deprioritizing the preventative nature of police patrols.

Reformers pushing for a return to a community policing model became ascendant in the 1990s. Rather than impacting crime, community policing and problem-solving focused on the broader role of the police in maintaining order, reducing fear, and service provision (Skogan and Frydl 2004; Weisburd and Braga 2006; Gill et al. 2014; Weisburd and Majmundar 2018). The 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act created the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) within the DOJ. The COPS Office has provided over \$14 billion in funding to a majority of police agencies around the United States to implement community policing and to federally subsidize the hiring of additional community

policing officers (Scheider et al. 2009). The development of community policing offered opportunities for innovation and the re-establishment of relationships with the community (Morabito 2010; Scheider et al. 2009). Further leveraging relationships between police and communities, programs like Weed and Seed, the Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI), and Project Safe Neighborhoods, paired researchers, police departments, and communities in data-driven problem-solving efforts that capitalized on new research showing that the physical and social characteristics of places were relevant to crime prevention (Weisburd 2012, 2015; Rojek et al. 2015; Weisburd et al. 2016). These programs can be seen as precursors to the Bureau of Justice Assistance's Smart Suite (now called the "Innovations Suite") of grant programs, including BCJI, which also supported action-focused research partnerships.

In the following section, we will lay out what social researchers refer to as the *theory of action* of the BCJI program. The program request for proposals (RFP) document offered a clear theory of action framework for a set of preferred program interventions that had shown prior evidence of efficacy.

The BCJI Theory of Action

Community Empowerment

The opening paragraph of the first BCJI grant RFP expresses the ultimate goal of the BCJI program: creating healthy, vibrant communities.

Healthy, vibrant communities are places that provide the opportunities, resources, and an environment that children, youth, and adults need to maximize their life outcomes, including high-quality schools and cradle-to-career educational programs; high-quality and affordable housing; thriving commercial establishments; access to quality health care and health services; art and cultural amenities; parks and other recreational spaces; and the safety to take advantage of these opportunities (US BJA 2012).

The BCJI program was based on a set of foundational programmatic principals that have emerged through urban-based scholarship over the past century. While the scale of BCJI places varied across the program, it seldom exceeded the size of one neighborhood (with a mean of about 5000 people, the size of one typical census tract). Second, the programming was to be informed by the comprehensive nature of crime. This meant that an effective crime plan would need to account for various policy areas that are typically managed by different agencies and organizations across both geographic and policy scales. Thus, effective place-based, comprehensive crime prevention efforts would require a governance organization, one that could act as a problem-solving and response-coordinating node for too-often siloed efforts across government and nongovernmental agencies. Third, BCJI sought crime prevention and policing decisions to be informed by data and competent analysis of both secondary data such as crime, code violations, and land use indicators and

primary data that was to be collected by a designated research partner. These research and data collection methods often involved community satisfaction and fear of crime surveys, focus groups, interviews, and systematic observations of public spaces.

A Focus on Place: From Social Disorganization to Crime Hot Spots

The idea that place matters in the formation of criminal opportunity has a long history in the research on crime (Park 1915; Shaw and McKay 1942; Weisburd et al. 2016). The programmatic emphasis of the BCJI grant program was strongly influenced by the long-standing neighborhood-based research in criminology and urban studies (Shaw and McKay 1942; Jacobs 1961; Wilson and Kelling 1982; Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Newman 1995; Taylor 2001; Kubrin and Weitzer 2003; Sampson 2011), which suggests that communities with higher levels of community organization are more likely to succeed in tamping down the myriad threats to public order and safety that economically declining communities too often face. Indeed, the relative ability for a community to solve its collective problems varies greatly across places. The idea that a neighborhood can bring together existing resources as well as effectively marshal outside political support to garner additional resources has been a key area of research among social scientists. Researchers have noted that communities in the deepest need also tend to score low on their ability to manage their own social and civic affairs. Early place-based theories of criminality suggested that areas that were more socially “disorganized” tended to produce, over time, more juvenile delinquents than communities that were more organized (Shaw and McKay 1942). Social disorganization theory suggested that areas that were economically troubled, with high levels of housing turnover, low homeownership rates, and a surfeit of young people, would have a harder time collectively organizing to express and enforce community norms.

The ideas expressed in social disorganization have been updated through the years to include important variants of social processes and scale. For example, a number of studies conducted over the past three decades in the United States and internationally show that crime rates vary substantially across communities (e.g., Weisburd et al. 2012; Weisburd 2015). Crime typically concentrates at a small proportion (around 3–6%) of “micro” places as small as a single street block or even addresses, which are known as “hot spots.” Numerous evaluations have demonstrated that deterrence-based and problem-oriented policing interventions at hot spots are effective at controlling crime (see Braga et al. 2014). However, Weisburd et al. (2012) found that indicators of social disorganization also vary across micro places, suggesting crime prevention responses should be rooted in informal social control and collective efficacy-building programming.

Social Capital and Collective Efficacy

The theory of social disorganization informed more refined articulations of community-based theories such as social capital theory. Social capital is defined by the frequency and quality of positive social interactions exhibited among neighbors, which suggests that in communities with strong formal (civic associations, clubs, etc.) and informal sociability (speaking and sharing information with neighbors) communities can better marshal internal and external resources to deal with common problems. This theory was later adapted to form a theory of collective action, called collective efficacy, where researchers became interested in how social ties among neighbors impacted informal actions taken to address public problems (Sampson et al. 1997). While social capital theory was divorced from action (although it was theorized as being connected), collective efficacy researchers would ask people whether they thought their neighbors would get involved in common collective behavioral problems. Like social disorganization, in many national and local studies, neighborhoods with the most problems like poverty and substandard and vacant housing also tend, not surprisingly, to score low on scales of social capital and collective efficacy. The connection to crime theory was forwarded by Sampson and Raudenbush (1999), who tested the notion that holding other variables equal, communities with higher collective efficacy would have lower crime rates. They showed that even in equally poor neighborhoods, the quality of their civic capacity mattered. Thus, the strengthening of civic capacity was one of the core goals of the BCJI program.

Community Trust in the Police

Trust is an important element in community-based efforts to reduce crime and disorder. Citizens need to trust that the police will treat them fairly. The police need to trust that the communities they patrol will cooperate in, at times, very dangerous and difficult circumstances. A lack of trust from either side of this equation leads to a breakdown in communication and invariably leads to less effective policing practices and higher crime. Unfortunately, due to the relationship between economic and social disadvantage, crime, and disorder, poor communities also tend to need and get greater levels of policing services. This extra need for police resources in disadvantaged communities does not always translate into positive experiences with the police as police are known to change their tactics in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Smith (1986) found black suspects were more likely to be handled coercively in black neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods. In Kane's (2002) study of police misconduct in New York City, he found that areas characterized by high rates of poverty and disadvantage also had the highest rates of police misconduct.

There is a well-articulated link between trust in the police and effective policing services (e.g., Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler 2004). Communities that exhibit high

degrees of police mistrust are less likely to report crime, to serve as witnesses, or to cooperate in legitimate investigations. Thus, known violent criminals are left on the street to continue engaging in criminal activity. This evolves into a culture of mistrust where young children are told not to trust or respect the police, and the police assume that everyone in a community distrusts and dislikes them. This has a corrosive effect above and beyond simple everyday citizen/police interactions and becomes part of a bigger problem where mistrust is not the result of bad interactions between citizens and police, but instead becomes the cause of bad interactions. On the other hand, community policing efforts aim to strengthen police-community relationships and enhance legitimacy (Weisburd and Majmundar 2018), and higher levels of perceived police legitimacy and trust have been found to protect against crime at both the individual and neighborhood level (Mazerolle et al. 2013; Higginson and Mazerolle 2014; Tyler et al. 2015; Tyler 2017; Nagin and Telep 2017). Thus, trust is seen as a necessary, if not sufficient, condition of effective police-community partnerships directed at crime control. The BCJI program directly sought to build trust between the police and community groups.

Disorder Abatement

The well-known “broken windows” hypothesis, based on an elaboration of a social psychological field experiment by Zimbardo, proposes that social and physical disorder, including trash, broken windows, graffiti, vacant lots, groups loitering in public spaces, public drinking, and aggressive begging, can lead to more serious crimes (Kelling and Wilson 1982). Disorder is thought to diminish public order and increase fear among residents. This fear, in turn, is theorized to undermine collective action and generate more (and more serious) disorder and crime (Kelling and Wilson 1982; Skogan 1990; McGarrell et al. 1997; Hinkle and Weisburd 2008; Yang 2010; Weisburd et al. 2015a, b).

The causal link between disorder and serious crime, however, has been questioned by some researchers (see Sampson and Raudenbush 1999; Harcourt 2001) as either being nonexistent, spurious, or conditioned on cultural and reputational factors, rather than on objective measures of disorder (see Wilcox et al. 2018). That is, disorder occurs in lockstep with serious crime, or serious crime can be predictive of increasing levels of disorder, not the other way around. Recently, broken windows theory-informed policing has been assailed by criminal justice reformers as racist and unfair to the poor. Its tactics of stopping, questioning and frisking, or running warrant checks on low-level offenders have been seen as contributing to the mass imprisonment problem in the United States as well as declining levels of trust between minority communities and the police (Sharkey 2018; Southall 2019).

While the role of the police in affecting broken windows enforcement is controversial, less so is the usual role that is played by civic groups, code enforcement officers, and environmental sustainability groups who have been active over the past decade in cleaning and greening vacant properties that were previously seen as free

dumping sites. Recent research has pointed to the crime and violence reduction impacts of such cleanup efforts (Branas et al. 2011). An effort to focus on reducing place-based physical disorder – such as community cleanups, vacant lot remediation, and tree and flower planting campaigns – rather than people-based social disorder, is a key aspect of the BCJI program.

A Focus on Youth Engagement Programming

The importance of the positive socialization of children is clear in the sociological literature, especially how socialization and engagement of youth can act as a preventive barrier to crime and violence. In communities with limited private family resources – that is, a concentration of economically disadvantaged families – public and civil society organizations and programs are needed to fill the gap toward this end. Historically, these have included academic (homework clubs, tutoring), sports, arts, and performance-based enrichment programs (basketball, dance, arts, and crafts); adult and peer mentoring programs (Scouts, Big Brother/Big Sister); and psychological interventions related to stress or trauma. The relative availability and quality of such programs in a community, whether delivered in school, in public recreation centers, or through volunteer or civil society groups, can go a long way toward offering young people much needed social and psychological resources to grow into productive adults. Much of the programming derived through BCJI sought to bolster local community capacity to engage youth in planning and program delivery, while also seeking active partnerships with schools, sports and recreation as well as youth arts-focused organizations.

Governance Toward Problem-Solving: The Comprehensive Community Model

Current urban problems require innovative solutions that are focused on organizational flexibility, cross-sectoral partnerships, and programmatic experimentation (Bogason and Musso 2006). While urban problems are hardly new, the strategies to solve them have continued to evolve away from purely state-centered solutions. Governance, rather than government, has become the focus of local policymakers, citizens, and nonprofit organizations. Governance networks have arisen to develop coordinated solutions to policy problems such as urban redevelopment; environmental management; low-income housing; and, in the case of the BCJI program, crime, violence, and disorder prevention.

Research focused on public safety and security governance has noted an erosion in both the public monopoly in policing and broader social control policy formation (Johnston 2001; Wood 2006). In this perspective, public police are but one

institutional actor among many who seek to assure a public safety outcome. Within police bureaucracies themselves, this phenomenon gets played out through policing innovations such as community and problem-solving partnerships, where police seek to develop a more diverse set of information networks and problem-solving mentalities (Goldstein 1990). And outside of formal policing organizations, “policing,” or the efforts to institutionalize formal social control mechanisms, has been pursued by other public regulatory agencies, such as code enforcement, as well as from private community-based nonprofit groups, who have made crime prevention and social control part of their operational efforts (Johnston and Shearing 2003). Poorly coordinated, fragmented public services – including policing services – can afford greater opportunity for criminal activity. Thus, effective community-based crime interventions need to account for a variety of factors while being integrated and comprehensive (Sampson 2011).

The BCJI program asserted that a place-based orientation was an important aspect of crime programming, but so was the existence of locally legitimate, community civic institutions which are key to negotiating shared values. These organizations also work as an intermediary to local political leadership and public bureaucracies, as well as providing a network that connects to other resources that extend beyond the community itself (Sullivan 1998; Sharkey et al. 2017; Sharkey 2018). Skogan’s (1987) work on the role of community organizations and public safety points to the dual role that community organizations play in crime prevention. First, they work on the more basic community-level social, economic, and physical drivers of crime, whether it be infill housing development, zoning changes, code enforcement, or youth engagement programming, while also being focused on directly working with the criminal justice agencies on information sharing, trust building, patrol planning, prisoner reentry, and citizen surveillance programs such as block watches. Acosta and Chavis (2007) suggest four key connections between a community development ethos and crime reduction:

Community development addresses the root causes of crime, improves the effectiveness of law enforcement, and enhances justice. The key components of community development that contribute to its ability to address crime are (1) relationship building; (2) development of institutional, structural, and economic assets; (3) engagement and collective action by citizens; and (4) sustainable and institutionalized change (p. 653).

The Use of Data in Making Informed Policy Choices

Having a designated research partner was a key element of the BCJI grant program. Grantees were required to have an identified partner, one who could assist in developing a data-informed plan, as well as be content experts to the community and police with regard to the probable efficacy of planned activities. As “embedded experts,” the research partner role was much more involved in the day-to-day decision-making process than would be normal for academic researchers, who are more likely to be there at the end of a program to perform a study on whether

planned activities had an impact on program goals. While many of the case chapters below do offer an assessment of crime or other outcomes, such as disorder or job training placements, most also pursue a description of the process of building a community based crime prevention program. Many of these chapters, most notably the concluding Chap. 11, on the technical assistance needs of the BCJI program, also offer additional insights into the role of the research partner, its prospects, and its limitations.

Case Studies

This book emerged from a set of discussions with a group of BCJI designated research partners and representatives from the federally contracted technical assistance provider for the BCJI program, the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC). The original set of grantees from 2012 included 15 sites, four of which are described in Chaps. 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this volume (Baltimore, MD; Dayton, OH; Philadelphia, PA; and Seattle, WA). This volume also includes two BCJI neighborhoods (Chaps. 6 and 7) from the 2013 grantee group (Cleveland, OH; Providence, RI), two (Chaps. 8 and 9) from 2015 (Berea, KY; St. Louis, MO), and one (Chap. 10) from 2017 (Tucson, AZ). The 11th and final chapter is written by the lead staff member for LISC's BCJI technical assistance program, an organization that has long advocated for building safety planning into the broader community development process.

These case chapters represent an array of place types, including one very large city with a population above 1 million (Philadelphia, PA); three large cities with populations between 500,000 and 1 million (Seattle, WA; Baltimore, MD; Tucson, AZ); two midsized cities with populations between 200,000 and 499,000 (Cleveland, OH; St. Louis, MO); two smaller cities with populations below 200,000 (Providence, RI; Dayton, OH); and three rural counties with a total population of less than 85,000 and no population centers over 10,000 residents (Berea, KY). These places also represent cities that are growing quickly (e.g., Seattle, WA; Tucson, AZ) and those in the throes of steep population declines (e.g., Baltimore, MD; Cleveland, OH; Dayton, OH; St. Louis, MO) that thus have stressed municipal resources in which to deal with growing problems of crime, violence, and drug addiction.

What all these places have in common is a history of serious crime problems, often linked to larger social and economic forces that have negatively impacted the private, parochial, and public institutions which are the basic requirements of safe, healthy places. In addition, flagging private, public, and civic resources have directly impacted the physical landscape of these places, influencing the growth in vacant and abandoned properties; unhealthy land uses, including concentrations in alcohol-serving establishments, a lack of healthy food options, and disorderly and dangerous public spaces; as well as a lack of access to employment and quality educational options of children. Places in decline also suffer from declining political influence as well as a decreased governance capacity to solve collective problems, rendering

solutions that much more difficult. Many of the cities included in this volume have also undergone, during or immediately prior to the BCJI process, a crisis in police-community relations, including rioting and civil unrest. This has been the case in Baltimore, MD; St. Louis, MO; and Cleveland, OH, all brought on by notable cases of police officers' use of deadly force against minority citizens.¹

The main motivation to compile this work was a desire to chronicle, with the necessary level of detail and nuance, the inner workings of a major federal community crime prevention program – one that has a relatively large enough set of cases to uncover both challenges and better (if not best) practices in the planning and implementation of a comprehensive crime reduction strategy. As the National Institute of Justice has contracted separately for a larger evaluation of the crime impacts of this broader program, our volume represents an effort to examine the difficult work undertaken on the ground to build these crime-focused partnerships and thus offers a venue for uncovering processes and outcomes beyond crime prevention outcomes. While many chapter authors do report on various crime outcomes, they also report the results of citizen surveys, focus groups, systematic observations of disorder, and in-depth interviews. In developing their chapters, authors were asked to consider the following set of themes:

- How can we best institutionalize sustainable police-community partnerships in times of distrust?
- Are there economies of scale and consistency-of-focus in the safety governance of small places?
- How can we empower community research capacities and find a role for research that matters to real people on the ground?
- What are some of the factors and conditions that predict the relative effectiveness and sustainability of crime-centered community partnerships?
- How does a comprehensive community planning process that is centered on crime reduction as a key policy outcome differ from other urban planning endeavors that more typically focus on redevelopment, transportation, and/or land use issues?
- How did policy innovation related to crime prevention and reduction programs work in real time and in real places?
- What was the specific role of the BCJI research partner (RP) in the effectiveness and sustainability of program efforts? How did the role of the RP ultimately vary from the initially prescribed role?

¹In St. Louis, civil unrest started in neighboring suburban Ferguson, MO, and was inflamed by the police shooting and subsequent legal processes surrounding the death of Michael Brown in 2014. In Baltimore, the death of Freddy Gray, which occurred in 2015 while Mr. Gray was in police custody, has led to a prolonged set of police-community problems for that city, while in Cleveland, 12-year-old Tamir Rice was shot in a city park while holding a BB gun in November of 2014 by a police officer responding to a radio call regarding a person with a gun.

While not every theme was addressed by each case, many of them come through in the authors' narratives, both directly and indirectly. The following and last section of this chapter offers a set of summaries of the case chapters in this volume.

Case Chapter Summaries

Chapter 2 presents an overview of the program process and selected outcomes of the Baltimore BCJI case. In the first cohort of 15 sites to receive BCJI funding, the McElderry Park neighborhood in Baltimore provides an interesting case of an innovative crime prevention partnership. The chapter authors, Seema Iyer (the lead research partner), Andrea Cantora, and Cheryle Knott – all at the University of Baltimore – chronicle a crime prevention partnership that emerged from the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice,² an office that serves as an institutional link between the Mayor's Office and the Baltimore Police Department. McElderry Park, a community of 4,000 located in the eastern end of the city, possessed a set of economic, social, and physical challenges. The area has a higher poverty rate than the citywide average, is home to a significant cluster of vacant and abandoned buildings, and has a crime rate that is almost double Baltimore city averages. The Baltimore BCJI award led to the development of a new community-based, umbrella organization known as the McElderry Park Revitalization Coalition (MPRC). The MPRC, which was composed of various established community interests in the neighborhood, became the lead advisory organization for the planning and implementation of the BCJI program.

The Baltimore authors detail a democratic planning and participatory budgeting process, facilitated by a university-based data collection and analysis unit – the Neighborhood Indicators Alliance – where residents voted on how to direct budgeted funds each year. The authors note that the outcomes of such a democratic process can conflict with one of the primary programmatic goals of the BCJI program, that is, to pursue programs having an empirically tested basis for their investment. The authors noted that the main, democratically determined, programmatic intervention in year 2 was a job training and placement program. The authors correctly noted that there was no evidence in the crime prevention literature to support such a program in a small localized area. Nonetheless, residents clearly came to the process with a view, no doubt influenced by their lived experience, that crime was caused by economic stress and joblessness, and finding people employment would reduce crime. They ran into the reality of the limits of recruiting a sizable enough population to participate in the program, especially one that was transitioning from

²Many cities around the country have added such an office over the past decade in an acknowledgement that policing services should not exist in a policy or operational silo from other crime and safety influencing public service areas, such as housing, zoning/code enforcement, sanitation, and recreation. While these offices have proliferated, their influence over policing practices, as evidenced in the Baltimore case, has remained a work in progress.

incarceration back to the community (which was a targeted population for the training), as well as the fairly common low completion and placement rate of the program participants. And finally, the realization that such a program would not have a direct or measurable impact on local crime in any reasonable bounding period ultimately led residents to jettison this program focus in year two. Thus, the main takeaway from the Baltimore case involved the realization of limits of a locally focused social programming directed toward crime reduction. Moreover, like many of the sites in this volume, the authors note an increased and sustained level of community energy and organizational capacity, which while not sufficient, is certainly a necessary precondition to larger community improvements.

Chapter 3 is focused on Dayton, OH, and was authored by Brian John of the Dayton Police Department (DPD); Amanda Arrington and Jan LePore-Jentelson of a local community-based organization, the East End Community Services (EECS); and the designated research partner, Richard Stock of the University of Dayton. Dayton is located in the Miami Valley region of southwest Ohio. It is a declining city of 140,000 that sits in the center of a formerly thriving industrial and agricultural region that has been hit hard by the last great recession. Declining population and unionized employment levels have had the effect of battering its job and tax base, leading to both personal and collective damage.

Like many places throughout the United States over the past decade, Dayton has suffered from the ravages of an opioid addiction and overdose crisis. The authors, whose professional backgrounds speak clearly to the cross-sectoral nature of the BCJI program, examine a crime prevention partnership between the DPD, EECS, and the researcher that is focused primarily on opioid overdose and drug addiction prevention. Detailing an incredible spike in the level of narcotic abuse and overdose deaths in their target area, the authors point to an opioid access trajectory that began with the growth of under-regulated “pill mills,” or pain clinics where medical doctors prescribed and distributed copious amounts of pain medications, often without a required medical examination and often paid for in cash by addicted patients. After the Ohio legislature stepped in to regulate unscrupulous pain clinics, heroin – often laced with the powerful synthetic opioid, fentanyl – made its way into circulation, causing overdose deaths to skyrocket. The Dayton BCJI looked for innovative solutions to street level opioid addiction and adapted an intervention originally created to intervene with known criminals. By linking disparate data sets and utilizing innovative data analysis to support a “call-in” strategy of known addicts and their families, the Dayton BCJI team sought to reduce overdose deaths through counseling and training on the timely administration of Narcan, an overdose reversal drug. They also sought to connect and prevent more prosaic but demoralizing crime problems such as theft and prostitution that were found to be directly associated with the drug trade and drug users.

Chapter 4, authored by Philadelphia’s designated research partner, Robert J. Stokes, presents the case of the Mantua community in Philadelphia. Mantua is a long-struggling area of 6,000 residents, located just north of more thriving areas surrounding the University of Pennsylvania and Drexel University in West Philadelphia (aptly named University City). Mantua has, since the 1970s, been the

focus of intense economic decline, racial segregation, property abandonment, and crime – much of it violent and centered on a very active illegal, street drug market. As much of the rest of University City has become safer and more prosperous, Mantua has stood out as one of the last communities not to have gone through a prolonged gentrification phase. Mantua is notable as it received all three of the Obama Era neighborhood-based federal grant programs: Choice, BCJI, and the Promise Zone. This stacking of federal programs comes from an understanding that the problems facing disadvantaged neighborhoods are mutually reinforcing across policy areas such as housing, economy, schools, and crime. Moreover, in order to get the most troubled places turned around, stacked investments are more likely to bring enough resources to bear to reach a tipping point, whereas communities are more likely to sustain a trajectory of improvement than merely receiving a one-off grant program.

Mantua's deep needs have led to the neighborhood becoming the focus of intensive programming, within and outside the BCJI programming umbrella. These have been pursued by city agencies, local nonprofits, as well as Drexel University, whose campus is directly adjacent to the neighborhood. This larger effort is referred to as the *We Are Mantua!* community initiative. The Mantua chapter describes the community governance capacity improvements realized in the neighborhood. These include the restoration of a dormant civic association; the creation of a community development corporation focused on affordable housing, zoning, and commercial development; enhanced partnerships with local schools and city recreation department programming; a sustained partnership with police on problem-solving and a crime hot spot intervention; and the development of a block leadership program. This chapter also chronicles the difficulty in developing and fully implementing effective, discrete, crime prevention programming that requires multiple partners under short-term contracts, as well as working in a true partnership with policing organizations. This has been especially the case during these heightened times of conflict between police and disadvantaged communities. Evaluation elements include a pre- and post-block assessment that sought to isolate the impacts of a block leadership program on observed disorder; a comprehensive analysis of officially reported crimes, looking at both crime volume trends and crime distribution across identified hot spots; and interviews and focus group results from residents regarding perceived changes to the neighborhood related to BCJI programming.

Chapter 5 provides an overview of the Seattle, WA, BCJI program. Named *Rainier Beach: A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth* (ABSPY) by participating community members, ABSPY is a community-led, non-arrest, place-based, data-driven initiative to improve public safety and collective efficacy in five hot spots of youth violence in the Rainier Beach neighborhood. The broader goal of ABSPY was to rebrand Rainier Beach, a diverse and vibrant area that has been stereotyped as high-crime and low-opportunity, as a “beautiful, safe place.” ABSPY is both a community partnership and a problem-solving framework. A community task force, composed of people who lived and worked in the areas of five data-determined hot spots, was at the forefront of identifying place-based risk factors for youth crime and developing innovative, evidence-informed strategies. The implementation of

these strategies was stewarded by a core team composed of community organizations including the Rainier Beach Action Coalition, Rainier Vista Boys and Girls Club, and the Seattle Neighborhood Group; several city departments, including the Seattle Police Department; and research partners from the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy at George Mason University in Fairfax, VA. ABSPY's signature interventions include the Corner Greeters, who build relationships and collective efficacy in the community, spread positive messaging, and provide guardianship through "pop-up" events, information sharing, and neighborhood beautification; Safe Passage, in which neighborhood residents provide guardianship and encouragement to young people on their way to and from school; business outreach; and Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design.

In this chapter, authors Charlotte Gill – ABSPY's lead research partner – and City of Seattle research liaison Claudia Gross Shader draw on the success of ABSPY, which is now funded for continued operation and evaluation through the City's budget and has shown promising results for community perceptions of safety in Rainier Beach. The authors explore the factors that underpin a successful, sustainable "translational criminology" experience such as ABSPY, whereby compelling research and theory, motivated practitioners, and a supportive context came together to support the crime prevention effort. The authors describe specific examples of how successful research translation and implementation was achieved in Rainier Beach, which is particularly noteworthy given that ABSPY developed almost completely outside traditional bureaucratic criminal justice system and local government structures.

Chapter 6 details the BCJI program in the city of Cleveland, OH. The Mount Pleasant neighborhood was identified by the local planning group as particularly challenged, with high levels of poverty, racial segregation and property abandonment. The area was also known to have active criminal gangs that drove violent crime trends in the area.

Cleveland case authors Dan Flannery, Liuhong Yang, Mark Singer, and Michael Walker, note that Mt. Pleasant was chosen as a targeted BCJI intervention site through a data-informed process. Unlike many of the sites in this volume, there was not a need in Cleveland to create the organizational structure to build the partnership model required of BCJI. Cleveland already had an organization, created in 2006, called the Stand Together Against Neighborhood Crime Every Day (STANCE) program. The authors describe STANCE as an evidence-based partnership program that is managed by the larger Partnership for a Safer Cleveland. It is notable that many cities in the US, and a few in this volume, have created citywide, civil society organizations to assist in addressing crime problems. The STANCE program is focused specifically on working with police and community partners to assist in crime prevention, law enforcement interdiction, and the effective reentry of formerly incarcerated citizens back into their communities.

Chapter 7 is written by policing researchers Sean Varano and Stephanie Manzi of Roger Williams University, who describe Providence, Rhode Island's Olneyville neighborhood and its BCJI effort, known locally as the *Community and Police Alliance* (CaPA). A diverse community of just under 6,000 people, Olneyville has

long suffered from economic disadvantage, in part due to the collapse of the textile industry in the mid-twentieth century. With a large population of recent immigrants, Olneyville residents have a median income of about 60% of the citywide average. The neighborhood, like many chronicled in this volume, has become defined by a chronic vacant property problem, with a large number of vacant dwellings and empty lots due to weak demand for real estate. These extreme social and built environment disadvantages have contributed to making Olneyville one of the most crime-ridden areas in Providence, causing a further drag on the area's economic prospects. Despite these challenges, Olneyville has been able to sustain an active community development corporation, ONE Neighborhood Builders (ONB) which served as a key partner in the BCJI program.

A list of the programmatic interventions plied by CaPa include a set of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) efforts; focused deterrence of identified hot spots utilizing BCJI program budgets for police overtime; and an enhanced set of community engagement efforts with the police – including a more strategic problem-oriented policing partnership approach in the community – specifically to address the consistent issue of street prostitution. Considering the expertise of CaPa and the broader goals of the BCJI program to blend physical redevelopment and safety planning, the team centered some of their programming around mitigating the negative externalities of vacant structures and lots by redoubling their efforts to rebuild and revitalize abandoned structures and spaces. The authors also report on their research findings, which include the results of a geographic crime analysis; a pre- and post-community survey that sought to gauge changes in citizen attitudes toward the police, perceptions of community problems, collective efficacy, and other constructs; and key informant interviews. The authors offer a detailed set of pre- and post-metrics to assess the results of the BCJI intervention, which, due to the structural nature of the economic and physical environment problems in Olneyville, will require a sustained future effort to ameliorate.

Chapter 8 examines a unique case in this volume. Based out of Berea, KY, this case represents one of only a handful of BCJI sites focused on a completely rural area. Funded in 2015, Berea's BCJI effort intended to empower and mobilize local communities in three Southeastern Kentucky Promise Zone counties to develop evidence-informed approaches to reducing youth crime. The fiscal agent for the grant, Partners for Education at Berea College, provides programs, services, and funding for place-based, student-focused approaches to improving education in Appalachian Kentucky. In collaboration with researchers from the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy at George Mason University, they aimed to combine best practices in youth development and crime prevention to improve youth safety and security, recognizing the important relationship between safety, health, and academic success. The four-phase BCJI program began with community capacity building around problem-solving and youth engagement, followed by increasing supervision and structure for young people in the community through mentoring and recreational activities; positive youth development approaches including leadership and service learning; and environmental revitalization and economic development.

Unfortunately, due to a “course correction” in the goals of BCJI toward the end of Berea’s planning phase, most of the planned interventions developed by the community could not be implemented. However, in this chapter, author Jenna Meglen, the program coordinator, and research partner Charlotte Gill describe the valuable lessons they learned during the planning phase about how to apply community-led, data-driven, place-based crime prevention strategies in a rural area. In the absence of much guidance in the research literature about rural crime hot spots and relevant evidence-based approaches and significant challenges in obtaining crime data from more than 30 law enforcement agencies that serve the target communities, they developed innovative ways to combine quantitative and qualitative methods to identify hot spots. The authors also discuss the painstaking iterative approach to leveraging community buy-in and support that respected local cultural traditions of relationship building and storytelling. Finally, they highlight some of the challenges and pitfalls in trying to apply research and evidence-based strategies developed in urban settings to the rural environment.

Chapter 9 is an examination of the BCJI program in St. Louis, MO, and is written by research partners Lee Ann Slocum, Cherrell Green, and Thomas Baker from the University of Missouri at St. Louis. Programmatically led by the City of St. Louis’s Department of Health, this site engaged a local nonprofit, Urban Strategies, Inc., to facilitate community engagement.

The St. Louis BCJI program, which included both a planning and implementation funding stream, focused on two adjacent neighborhoods just north of St. Louis’s central business district, Carr Square and Columbus Square. Together, these neighborhoods hold approximately 4,600 residents with a demographic profile that indicated a high level of poverty, joblessness, youthful population, and minority racial isolation. These neighborhoods also had a violent crime rate that was twice the citywide average. Like the case of Philadelphia, the Carr and Columbus Square neighborhoods are also the recipients of all three federal NRI grants: BCJI, the Choice Neighborhood, and the Promise Zone program. St. Louis, like many of the cities described in this volume, has suffered from extensive economic decline and population loss during the era of suburbanization and deindustrialization in the United States. The city of St. Louis has lost almost 65% of its population from its height (856,798 in 1950) to a recent estimate of just over 300,000. The authors also note that Carr Square represents one of the more infamous examples of urban policy failure in US history, as it was home to the Pruitt-Igoe public housing development. Built in the mid-1950s, its 33 towers held close to 3,000 units. Its decline was fast, as the towers were emptied and demolished in the early 1970s due to crime and eroding housing conditions. Five decades later, the mega site, located within a couple of miles of downtown St. Louis, remains an undeveloped, overgrown, open field.

As the St. Louis BCJI was established a few years after the other cases in this volume, the authors do not report on any measured program outcomes. Instead, they distinguish place-based interventions – including a CPTED intervention in identified hot spots and a public art program – with people-based programming, including employment training; psychological counseling to address post-traumatic stress syndrome from exposure to community violence; a restorative justice and conflict

resolution program; and an effort to improve trust between the police and citizens. The authors do a service to future planners of this program by exploring three main themes that are evident across many of the BCJI sites, which include (1) the unclear, evolving and conflicting role of the research partner; (2) the challenges to implementing programming with a high degree of fidelity given the low capacity limits of local contractors; and (3) the inability to jettison and replace planned, budgeted, but failing programming due to the delays in approvals required by federal and local governments.

Chapter 10 provides a review of the BCJI site in Tucson, AZ – a site that was, at the time of this writing, in the initial stages of its program plan. Authored by Mary Ellen Brown and Katie Cotter Stalker of Arizona State University, the chapter describes the target area, the Oracle/Miracle Mile section of Tucson. The target area is characterized by automobile dominated land use, with low density and copious amounts of abandoned property (14.6%). Once a thriving economic area, the 1.6 square mile community of 9,073 residents fell on hard times after the construction of Interstate 10, which valorized other areas of the Tucson region at the expense of places like Oracle/Miracle Mile. As property was abandoned, formerly attractive private-market dwellings, like the luxury high-rise Tucson House, were taken over by the city of Tucson to provide low-income housing.

The authors describe a community-based comprehensive planning and programming effort, subsidized by both a HUD Choice Neighborhoods grant and the BCJI³ program that has come to be known as *THRIVE in the 05*.⁴ Much of the chapter is dedicated to laying out the larger organizing framework of the BCJI effort in Tucson, which is defined by the principles of community-based participatory research. The authors organize the key aspects of the Tucson effort with the acronym ACTION, which stands for Assess, Connect, Transform In Our Neighborhood. Program goals are expressed through a sustained engagement process, in partnership with Tucson's city planning department, the Tucson Police Department, and local community-based groups. Collectively, *THRIVE in the 05* is aiming to improve community civic capacity, public safety, local culture, economic opportunity, and physical aspects of targeted neighborhoods. As this project is still in its early phases, the main lesson learned in this case is the need to be patient, flexible, and resident focused.

The eleventh and final chapter of this volume is authored by Matthew Perkins, who worked closely with all BCJI sites as the technical assistance point-of-contact for the program. Mr. Perkins, a senior program officer with Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) Safety and Justice unit, reviews the relevant history of US federal intervention in crime and community-based programs while also couching the BCJI program origin into this history. The author also discusses LISC, which is a national nonprofit community development financial institution (CDFI) created during the late 1970s by the Ford Foundation, in partnership with several capital

³Tucson received the DOJ funding under the new program articulation and name, the Innovations in Community Based Crime Reduction program, or CBCR. For the sake of consistency, it is referred to as BCJI here as this program emerged directly from the BCJI program.

⁴05 is a reference to the last two digits of the area's zip code (85705).

investment partners. CDFIs seek to provide capital and development expertise in neighborhoods that have witnessed substantial market failure in localizing real estate markets – places, that due to factors such as deindustrialization, suburban population flight, and/or mortgage redlining, have a stunted market for housing and commercial development. This market failure leads to widescale property abandonment, the demise of civic and community institutions, and attendant increased criminal opportunity. Since its creation, LISC has grown beyond its national offices in New York City to include over 30 regional offices located in cities across the United States.

The author offers an assessment of the challenges faced in providing technical assistance, especially early in a program's funding trajectory where grantees are likely to experiment with what works, while trying to make positive course corrections in an at-times balky collaboration process. He provides an overview of the four main pillars of the BCJI program through an examination of the experiences of key case sites. These include a focus on (1) data and analysis, (2) cross-sectoral partnerships, (3) community engagement, and (4) sustainability of programming.

The end of this chapter also provides challenging but hopeful ideas for places seeking to learn how to best build lasting community partnerships for innovative, data-informed, crime prevention programming. These include how police and community partners can best share responsibilities for problem identification, decision-making, and program implementation; how to disrupt crimes in the short term – while also working toward improving root cause conditions and processes that often predict future criminal activity; and how to make collaborative problem-solving part of a larger program to repair frayed police and community relationships. This final chapter also offers a framework for partnership: that is, how to best build a goal-oriented structure that can work effectively across the various actors, agencies, organizations, and cultures that have, thus far, been less than optimal in their independent responses to the problems at hand – to work together to be able to effectively and consistently innovate around the immediate and longer-term issues of crime, safety, and community development.

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