



Walzer and War

Reading *Just and Unjust Wars* Today

Edited by
Graham Parsons
Mark A. Wilson

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Walzer and War

“One mark of a classic work is its persistent power to reward engagement with fresh insight. *Walzer and War* shows that Michael Walzer’s *Just and Unjust Wars* has just such power to generate important new lines of thought about the ethics of war. Walzer revived ‘just war’ thinking; now this book revives him.”

—Nigel Biggar, *Regius Professor of Moral and Pastoral Theology at the University of Oxford, and author of In Defence of War*

“There couldn’t be a better time to honor and reaffirm the importance of Michael Walzer’s groundbreaking and magisterial *Just and Unjust Wars*. These essays by leading scholars elucidate Walzer’s original insight, that war must be fought justly and that just war theory is not a niche discipline in either history, law, or philosophy. Walzer needs to be read and reread, critically, but never ever abandoned. This is a most fitting companion for keeping *Just and Unjust Wars* relevant and alive.”

—Nancy Sherman, *University Professor, Georgetown University and author of Afterwar*

“This is an excellent collection of interesting essays rethinking and reevaluating Walzer’s highly influential work. Especially illuminating are the discussions of Walzer’s assumptions, and the authors make admirable progress in understanding and confronting the moral dilemmas of going to war and conducting it.”

—Virginia Held, *Distinguished Professor Emerita, The Graduate Center, City University of New York, and author of How Terrorism Is Wrong: Morality and Political Violence*

Graham Parsons · Mark A. Wilson
Editors

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For our students

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This volume grew out of a unique collaboration between our two institutions—West Point and Villanova University. For five consecutive years, between 2013 and 2018, we organized a joint conference on the ethics of war and peace. First drafts of the essays collected in this volume were presented at the 2017 conference which celebrated the 40th anniversary of the publication of *Just and Unjust Wars* by bringing this distinguished group of scholars together to reflect on it. This book could not have been possible without the help of those who made this conference a reality. The editors would like to thank Joe Mazzocchi, Gary Bridges, Terron Johnson, Caroline Pagan, Kris Fox, Scott Parsons, Josh Carlisle, Harry Jones, Mark Doorley, and Peggy Elder, as well as the Department of English and Philosophy at West Point and the Ethics Program at Villanova.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Graham Parsons and Mark A. Wilson

WHY WALZER, STILL

It is indisputable that *Just and Unjust Wars* has impacted the world to an extent rarely achieved by a single-volume, philosophical monograph. Its publication in 1977 is routinely described as a pivotal moment in the study of international relations and the conduct of war. During the 1950s and 1960s the influence of just war theory—the view that war ought to be guided by moral principles—had reached its nadir. The policy-making establishment in the United States generally rejected foundational moral commitments and instead embraced realism and the primacy of brute national interest. By and large, just war thinking remained alive only in theology programs and debates in Catholic social thought. While other works share responsibility for the reversal of fortunes of realism and just war theory during the last decades of the twentieth century, *Just*

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and Unjust Wars deserves the lion's share of the credit. Almost single-handedly, Michael Walzer resuscitated just war theory and produced a widespread disavowal of realism in academia and policy-making circles. As David Luban testifies in the first chapter of this volume, "[In 1977], the need was urgent to set aside the emotions and anger that were tearing the country apart and reflect on Vietnam from a broader, more dispassionate, more philosophical, moral point of view. But before Walzer, I think few of us had any idea how to start." Through Walzer's singular influence, just war theory became the dominant framework for discussions of war within military, academic, and public arenas, as well as in international law. Any student, teacher, or researcher engaged in issues such as the ethics and law of war, terrorism, international relations, political sovereignty, humanitarian intervention, or insurgency is an inheritor of the discussions begun by *Just and Unjust Wars*.

And yet, in some fields there is great skepticism about the value or relevance of the book today. Particularly in philosophy, many scholars acknowledge the impact of the book and are grateful for the defeat of realism yet view the book mainly as the representative of a misguided, even poor, approach to the ethics of war. As a colleague said to one of us in an attempt to dismiss the importance of engaging with the book today, "Walzer's been refuted." Over the last twenty-five years or so, a school of thought has emerged that has built itself around a rejection of a central tenet of Walzer's theory—the moral equality of combatants—and some of its associated commitments. Known as "revisionist" just war theorists, these scholars have tried to develop a systematic ethics of war that is purged of a Walzerian attachment to the moral equality of combatants.¹ In this way, there is an anti-Walzerian spirit built into the identity of this movement; *Just and Unjust Wars* is precisely what they are committed to "revising." It is in light of such views that a defense of the present volume seems necessary.

We admit that *Just and Unjust Wars* has flaws. One of us even thinks the theory it expounds is fundamentally incoherent.² Moreover, we acknowledge that the revisionist attack on the moral equality of combatants is powerful and has produced valuable reassessments of just war theory. Nevertheless, we think reengaging with *Just and Unjust Wars* remains highly valuable, indeed, urgently necessary.

First, as a methodological matter, revisiting canonical philosophical texts is a central feature of good scholarship. Too many scholars view such activity as merely the job of niche thinkers who study the history

of philosophy or ideas. Their view seems to be that conversations can quickly evolve so as to make some works irrelevant and, therefore, there is little danger in ignoring them. Our view, however, is that works that are currently not central to conversations are often still highly relevant and that there is in fact great danger in allowing partisans of on-going debates to decide who is worthy of attention. Often, the sense that a work is no longer relevant is an illusion that is easily revealed by open-minded engagement with it. But, more fundamentally, we fear that the hard rejection of works such as Walzer's is symptomatic of a tendency among scholars to approach works merely in search of a reason to ignore them. It is disturbingly common for scholars to read a work simply in search of a flaw significant enough to justify rejecting it entirely. As one of our mentors once described it, these readers are merely looking to find "where to put the knife."³ This approach not only undermines potentially valuable dialogue between scholars and prevents the discovery of important insights, but it also leads to a radical ahistoricism that fails to appreciate the true complexity and robustness of the connections between thinkers and movements. No work is flawless, even the most important examples of human thought. One can accept that *Just and Unjust Wars* is imperfect and yet still find it immensely valuable.

Second, regardless of any methodological disputes, we think that it is simply untrue that *Just and Unjust Wars* does not have much to offer today. On the contrary, the book remains deeply edifying to contemporary readers and scholars. This is so for several reasons.

1. *Just and Unjust Wars* surveys an astonishingly wide variety of topics and debates. It is so much more than a defense of the moral equality of combatants. Indeed, it is hard to think of another book published since 1977 that contains and defends an innovative theoretical framework for evaluating the resort to and the conduct of war while engaging with such a range of types of wars, moral problems peculiar to war, and rich discussions of real-world cases. Whether or not one rejects some portion of Walzer's account, the book attains a level of comprehensiveness that remains extraordinary even after all these years. This is supported by the fact that the essays contained below tackle such a wide variety of topics.
2. Walzer's style rewards reconsideration more than most philosophical works. There is a certain irony here. The very features of the book

that so frustrate analytic philosophers are simultaneously the features that help make it worth revisiting. Walzer is willing to openly express uncertainty, to be vague, to make generalized claims about history and human nature, even to be contradictory. Such authenticity, imprecision, boldness, and openness to paradox is a major reason that some contemporary philosophers are so ready to dismiss him. However, it is this way of approaching his subject that makes the book unusually lasting. While it can be frustrating to try to pin him down, Walzer's work is nevertheless extremely rich. There is always something new to discover in it. It invites readers to engage in the conversation and to continue the inquiry. The novel readings of him offered in the chapters below confirm that the book is still an invaluable resource for new insights.

3. Walzer's method in *Just and Unjust Wars* deserves reconsideration in light of the methods adopted by some of his harshest critics. Walzer's book aims to provide practical guidance for political and military leaders as well as combatants caught up in the messy real-world of domestic politics, international diplomacy, bureaucratic constraints, military regimentation, and combat. The book seeks true practical wisdom. As Walzer describes the research he undertook for *Just and Unjust Wars* in the Postscript to the Fifth Edition:

the greater part by far of my reading was not in theory at all but in military history, both academic and popular, and then in the memoir literature produced by soldiers of different ranks (preferably the lower ranks: junior officers and foot soldiers, who make the toughest moral decisions on the battlefield); and then in wartime journalism and commentary (especially about Vietnam, the immediate occasion of my own writing). Finally I read many of the novels and poems that deal with the experience of fighting and with the company of soldiers. The nontheoretical genres, and the books and articles they include, seemed to me the critically necessary material for my project.... I wanted the moral arguments of my own book to ring true to their authors—and to the men and women about whom they were writing.⁴

In the main, Walzer's critics in the revisionist school don't share this immediate practical focus. Instead, they seek to map out the abstract, universal moral rules of intergroup conflict, or what some call the "deep morality" of war. To be sure, these critics believe

that there is, or can be, important practical import to insights about ultimate moral principles. However, this practical import is often of secondary concern to them. Indeed, in some of the major revisionist studies it can be hard to tell what, if any, changes to the practice of war and war-making they are calling for. Rather than talking to real-world decision-makers, these studies seem to be talking to those in the abstract, logical space inhabited by (some) philosophers. For those of us who have worried that these studies have lost their bearings,⁵ there is good reason to return to *Just and Unjust Wars*. While we might disagree with the content of his advice at times, we can appreciate the advantages of his practical focus and learn from it.

4. Last, in recent years new threats have emerged to justice-based approaches to war and international affairs, whether Walzerian or revisionist, which should give common cause to everyone concerned with making international affairs more ethical. Whatever differences exist between Walzer and the revisionists, or between Walzer and the peacebuilders,⁶ these seem to be insignificant when compared to the differences between them and the xenophobic, race-based nationalists that are resurgent around the world today. All those who look at war through an ethical lens ought to join forces to resist this common enemy. Even if we find fault in *Just and Unjust Wars*, we ought still to be proud allies of its call to humanize war and international politics.

CONTRIBUTIONS

Each of the essays in this volume makes a singular contribution to the discourse on the ethics of war, highlighting the most lasting and salient impacts of *Just and Unjust Wars*. Honoring Walzer's methodological complexity, the contributors reflect an interdisciplinary approach, drawing from fields of just war theory, international law, cultural criticism, and military leadership. Some of the contributors have been engaged in the critical appraisal of the book for decades. Others are scholars looking at the work through new lenses. Still others are veterans of war and policy-making who bring the benefit of practical experience to the discussion. This is not merely a celebration of Walzer (though there is much to celebrate), but a collection of essays that to varying degrees reconsider, repurpose, and confront *Just and Unjust Wars* with the aim of advancing contemporary scholarship.

The essays are divided into two parts. Part I, “A Good War,” examines issues surrounding Walzer’s treatment of the *jus ad bellum*, the portion of just war theory concerned with how to justify entering war and how to frame debates thereon. Part II, “A Good Fight,” focuses on the conduct of war and the means through which wars are fought, understood traditionally as the *jus in bello*.

The opening essay by David Luban, “Prefaces and Postscripts,” situates *Just and Unjust Wars* within the context of its composition in the 1970s amid the Vietnam war protests. As Walzer notes in the Preface to the First Edition, “I did not begin by thinking about war in general, but about particular wars, above all the American intervention in Vietnam. Nor did I begin as a philosopher, but as a political activist and a partisan.”⁷ Part of Luban’s aim is to recognize that reading *Just and Unjust Wars* today demands attention to its historical situatedness, though not because the concepts are antiquated—they are, as Luban notes, timeless—but rather because Walzer’s methodology is deeply committed to the concrete experiences of war. As Luban notes, Walzer’s suspicion of philosophical abstraction is driven by a desire to “ring true” to the men and women who participate in war; consequently, Walzer rejects the sort of hypothetical “toy cases” offered by contemporary revisionists and instead employs a narrative, historically located style of casuistry, one that is highlighted by the topical discussions in the Prefaces to the second through fifth editions.

Luban (following Walzer) is not concerned with reading *Just and Unjust Wars* in a vacuum. He is, rather, intent to explore the tensions that Walzer’s method creates, specifically regarding how human rights, understood individually or collectively, ground Walzer’s thinking. Luban invites us to wonder why Walzer says relatively little about human rights, particularly in light of the explosion of human rights discourse in the ’70s, and what this might mean within our current climate, where the very concept of human rights seems under assault by populist and authoritarian nationalism.

In a similar vein, Margaret Moore’s “Territory, Self-Determination, and Defensive Rights” presses foundational questions about the relationship between individual and collective rights, but is concerned specifically with how these rights buttress claims for political sovereignty, territorial integrity, and by extension defensive war. In sympathy with (but distinct from) Walzer’s claim in *Just and Unjust Wars* that “the land follows the people,”⁸ Moore advances a theory of collective self-determination as the most compelling basis on which to rest claims for defensive rights. Moore

finds fault with many contemporary accounts that seek to ground defensive war as either an extension of individual human rights of self-defense or within considerations of justice. Moore argues that those committed to the former view are forced, among other things, to deny that invasions of territory *per se* (e.g., bloodless invasions) justify defensive engagement, as no individual rights have been compromised. On the other hand, a view predicated on conceptions of justice—whereby a state’s entitlement to defense derives from its promotion of justice vis-à-vis its citizens—runs afoul of our basic intuitions that even unjust states have some basic rights to territorial defense. To think otherwise would imply that just states, say the United States in the aftermath of the Second World War, could legitimately assume the territory of an unjust state, such as Germany. A justice account also struggles to explain how to afford territorial rights to unjust states or states whose territories were acquired through colonialism or genocide.

Moore’s alternative is to see defensive rights to territory as attached not to individuals or to states (just or unjust) but rather to the rights of peoples to collective self-determination. Understood in this way, defense of territory is logically independent of the state. As Moore notes, her theory of collective self-determination has potentially profound implications for, among other things, how we might justify humanitarian interventions and civil wars, which is to say, the types of wars that have proliferated in the last forty years.

“Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention,” by Jennifer Welsh, combines a richly historicized examination of *Just and Unjust Wars* with a consideration of developments in international relations on the topic of humanitarian interventions. Contrary to popular belief, Welsh argues, the priority given to national sovereignty, and therefore nonintervention, is of relatively recent vintage: it originates in the work of modern theorists such as Emer de Vattel and culminates in the UN Charter. As Welsh describes it, the evolution of Walzer’s thinking on the topic of humanitarian intervention might be seen to reflect an inversion of history. In the First Edition of *Just and Unjust Wars*, Walzer offers a rather restrictive set of exceptions to respect for sovereignty, and then gradually—but only partially—loosens these restrictions through his subsequent amendments in the Prefaces to the Third through the Fifth Editions.

Most noteworthy for Welsh is the fact that Walzer only partially revises his approach to intervention. While he acknowledges the pressing and expanding concerns for atrocity crimes and the need for capable bodies to

respond, he also consistently measures this need against concerns about sufficiency, understood in terms of motivation, political legitimacy, and utility. Coupling an analysis of Walzer with the “Responsibility to Protect” articulated by the 2005 United Nations World Summit Outcome, Welsh observes that Walzer’s “principled pragmatism” offers an important heuristic for examining questions of intervention in the post-Cold War era. While the instances of potentially justified intervention multiply over time, so too do the concerns about mixed motivations and whether multilateralism really mitigates such concerns. Welsh foregrounds Walzer’s work as part of an exigent need to balance sins of commission and omission, interventionism and isolationism, as we reckon with conceptions of a shared responsibility to serve refugees and victims of brutality.

Sally Scholz’s “War, Collective Responsibility, and Contemporary Challenges to Democracy” shifts the discussion from broader considerations of what “just war” means to normative questions about how individual citizens are to participate in debates prior to, during, or after wars. Scholz suggests that notions of citizen-action and collective responsibility are only implicit in *Just and Unjust Wars*, despite the origins of the work within Walzer’s own activism. With an extended analysis of notions of collective responsibility, she asks how we should understand a citizen’s moral obligation and potential culpability as they pertain to wars waged by one’s state. Can citizens of the United States, for instance, be held morally accountable for any unjust war pursued under the auspices of their interests? How does the relationship between policy elites and common citizens complicate this analysis?

Using Walzer’s discussion of J. Glenn Gray’s claim that moral responsibility for war should be proportionate to the degree of freedom in democracy, Scholz defends a moral obligation for both policy elites and individual citizens to “collectivize intentionally,” to work toward informed, deliberate, and sustained debates about the justification for wars. Moreover, Scholz argues that the failures of democratic citizens to collectivize intentionally, even while complicated by increasingly manicured media sources and the rise of a narrow nationalism, may make them morally liable.

Lisa Cahill’s essay, “Peacebuilding and Counterinsurgency” concludes Part I by examining questions of moral dilemma, tragedy, and the intersection of just war theory and pacifism. As Luban observes in the first chapter, Walzer is “orthodox” only by his current legacy, not by reference to his engagement with the prominent figures in just war theory.

The voices of Augustine, Aquinas, and other pre-modern authors are quite muted in *Just and Unjust Wars*. From this vantage, Cahill notes that Walzer's sense of the moral dilemmas of war is, in important ways, more acute and demanding than his historical precursors.

Cahill's more substantive and ambitious claim is that there is little daylight between just war theory and pacifism within contemporary discussions of counter-insurgency and peacebuilding. Reminiscent of the dialogues between Reinhold Niebuhr and Martin Luther King Jr., Cahill argues that the ethics of war and pacifism are not different in kind, but rather informed by the same commitment to peace. If accepted, this claim means, minimally, that the sort of ambivalence found in Walzer on the tragedy of war positions his view much closer to pacifism than realism. Maximally, it means that the guiding principles of current strategies of counter-insurgency might in fact be better fulfilled through nonviolent means. Simply put, Cahill bids us to question the tradition of just war thinking, and Walzer's place in it, at least regarding the extent that war can ever be fully and simply justified.

In Part II, the focus of the volume shifts from considerations about when and how to conceive of justified reasons for wars and their ends, to the means by which wars are fought. Drawing on his extensive experience, not least as Commanding General of the Multinational Security Transition Command in Iraq, Lieutenant General (Retired) James Dubik foregrounds what might be considered the practical failures of the orthodox approach to the ethics of war. In "Fighting Versus Waging War," Dubik probes the disconnect between the obligations of individual combatants in war, especially common soldiers, and the military leadership in war who are charged with devising strategy and holistic mission goals.

Dubik introduces a distinction between fighting a war—on the part of regular service members—and the strategic decisions involved in waging war—on the part of senior civil and military leaders. The elision between fighting and waging wars, which Dubik takes to be part and parcel of the orthodox and Walzerian views, has resulted in a failure to articulate explicit ethical guidelines for responsible leadership at the strategic levels. In *Just and Unjust Wars*, Walzer acknowledges that senior military leadership (e.g., generals) might have different responsibilities than rank-and-file soldiers, but his discussion of this is brief and seems to Dubik to at least partially collapse the difference. The results of this are, according to Dubik, potentially devastating. The failures of the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, where debates about particular actions in war were divorced

from strategic goals, testify to the need to distinguish fighting war and waging war. Dubik offers a novel set of principles designed to structure discourse in light of a more differentiated understanding of *jus in bello* that respects the divide between strategy and tactics.

In “Reflections on ‘Supreme Emergency,’” Jeremy Waldron explores one of the most contentious of Walzer’s claims. Walzer acknowledges that the prohibition against intentionally targeting noncombatants is meant to be absolute. And yet, in *Just and Unjust Wars*, Walzer famously (or infamously) defends the indiscriminate bombings of German cities by the British in the Second World War from 1939–1942. Under these extreme circumstances, Walzer claims, Churchill, and the British people faced the “ultimate threat to everything decent...an ideology and a practice of domination so murderous, so degrading...that the consequences of its final victory were literally beyond calculation, immeasurably awful.”⁹ In the presence of a catastrophic and imminent threat to an entire community, Walzer argues, the principle of noncombatant immunity may be suspended. But suspended for whom and in what sense?

Waldron provides a nuanced exploration of the possible ways to understand supreme emergencies, detailing a range of arguments for viewing it as a legal doctrine, a moral analysis, a communitarian political proposition, or a discourse on the role morality of politicians. While observing that there are reasons to embrace each of these interpretations, Waldron concludes that none of them is satisfactory. The supreme emergency is best understood, Waldron avers, not as a doctrine for the conduct of war but as a meditation on the possible limits of regulating war.

Through the lens of the Law of Armed Conflict and *jus in bello*, Henry Shue’s “Keeping Exceptions Exceptional in War,” explores the concept of moral exceptions within war and the role of rules in setting boundaries for justified action. There is a temptation, Shue notes, for philosophers (particularly revisionists) to seek increasingly subtle and theoretically precise rules that have built-in exceptions. Shue considers, by example, the rule to never target noncombatants. Theoretically, we should be inclined to favor a more complex rule, for instance, never target noncombatants unless they are morally liable for the conduct of an unjust war. While the adoption of the complex rule is desirable in principle, Shue argues that it is unsustainable and morally perilous in practice.

Faithful to Walzer’s “principled pragmatism,” as Welsh describes it, Shue posits that the rules of combat must be crafted with sensitivity to the psychological and epistemological constraints experienced by actual

combatants. Exceptionless rules are, to oversimplify Shue's point, feasible rules, even though they may prove inferior in purely notional accounts. Combatants in war act in extraordinary circumstances and attempts to idealize the rules of war fail to appreciate the limitations of human conduct *in extremis*.

In "Autonomy, Obedience, and Manifest Illegality," Judith Lichtenberg examines the exceedingly complicated and tenuous relationship between a combatant's obligation to obey orders and the obligation to heed the dictates of one's conscience and potentially the laws of war. On the one hand, Lichtenberg observes, combatants are required to subordinate their wills to superior commands. On the other hand, they are bound by duty and law to refuse illegal orders. This tension raises fundamental questions about the nature of moral responsibility for those who fight wars.

Through an examination of Walzer's discussion of the My Lai massacre, Lichtenberg defends his "particularist" approach to this tension, one that balances the idea that soldiers are never merely cogs in a military machine—they never relinquish their autonomy altogether—with the Cimmerian reality that in combat freedom and responsibility are mitigated by ignorance and duress. Any judgment of specific crimes of war, then, must attend to the particularities of circumstance and weigh the prospects of autonomy against the diminished capacities for free action.

In the final essay, "Walzer's Soldiers: Gender and the Rights Of Combatants," Graham Parsons problematizes one of the core assumptions of both international law and Walzer's understanding of the *jus in bello*—the idea that all combatants are *prima facie* legitimate targets and that no fundamental moral harm or tragedy occurs when they are killed in battle. As discussed by Waldron, Shue, and Lichtenberg in this volume, the principle of discrimination prohibits the targeting of noncombatants. Conversely, the principle gives a broad license to kill combatants.

On Parsons's reading, this sanguine treatment of killing combatants reflects a deep-seated and deeply troubling paradigm where soldiers are males, males are naturally servants of the state's wars, and servants are disposable with minimal grievance or grieving. Parsons's provocative claim is that the very concept of discrimination, a bedrock feature of *jus in bello*, is structured by gendered norms of masculinity that solemnize self-sacrifice as a preeminent virtue. This masculinized vision of the warrior class, where honor entails a readiness to die in combat, has roots in the foundations of the just war tradition and continues to be reflected

by Walzer's theory. A properly ungendered account, Parsons suggests, would require us to dramatically reimagine the principle of discrimination and our understanding of combatants' liability to attack.

Taken together, these essays testify powerfully to the importance of *Just and Unjust Wars*, elucidate and augment Walzer's profound insights, and advance his conviction that personal, public, and policy debates on the ethics of war must continually balance a philosophical commitment to principle and logical coherence with a humanistic understanding of ambiguity that may even border on paradox. Walzer and the contributors to this volume remind us of Philip Marlowe's wisdom: be wary of the "austere simplicity of fiction" and more mindful of the "tangled woof of fact."¹⁰ *Just and Unjust Wars* can be "refuted" only when we think it presents an answer rather than a call to question.

NOTES

1. Some representative examples of this movement are Jeff McMahan, *Killing in War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Cecile Fabre, *Cosmopolitan War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Helen Frowe, *Defensive Killing* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Kai Draper, *War and Individual Rights: The Foundations of Just War Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); and Adil Haque, *Law and Morality at War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
2. Graham Parsons, "The Incoherence of Walzer's Just War Theory," *Social Theory and Practice* 38, no. 4 (October 2012): 663–88.
3. Credit for this line (and much more) belongs to the late Kant scholar, Arnulf Zweig.
4. *Just and Unjust Wars*, 5th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 336.
5. Some who have explicitly argued that directly action-guiding norms for war must depart from the principles of abstract moral theory include, Allen Buchanan, "A Richer *Jus Ad Bellum*," in *The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War*, eds. Helen Frowe and Seth Lazar (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 167–84; David Luban, "Just War Theory and the Law of War as Nonidentical Twins," *Ethics and International Affairs* 31, no. 4 (2017): 433–40; Henry Shue, "Keeping Exceptions Exceptional in War: Could any Revisionist Theory Guide Action?" Chapter 9 below; and Jeremy Waldron, "Civilians, Terrorism, and Deadly Serious Conventions," in *Torture, Terror, and Trade-Offs: Philosophy for the White House* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 80–110.

6. For a discussion of the peacebuilding movement, see Chapter 6, Lisa Cahill's "Peacebuilding and Counterinsurgency: Alternatives to the Moral Dilemma of War."
7. *Just and Unjust Wars*, xxiii.
8. *Ibid.*, 55.
9. *Ibid.*, 252.
10. Raymond Chandler, *The Big Sleep* (New York: Vintage Paperbacks, 1950), 157.

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CHAPTER 2

Prefaces and Postscripts: Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars* Today

David Luban

I

I must begin with a personal recollection. In 1977 I was teaching philosophy at Kent State University, my first job out of graduate school, and I visited Cambridge over winter break. In those days before Amazon and the Internet, visiting an academic center with a major bookstore was a pilgrimage of sacred status, and the Harvard Coop was my temple of choice, up there with the legendary bookstores of Hyde Park. At the Coop the first thing I saw on display was stacks of the newly-published *Just and Unjust Wars*. I was already a Walzer fan from reading *Obligations*,¹ so I made a beeline for the new book and, as the cliché goes, snapped it up and read it straight through when I got home. The next fall I taught a seminar on *Just and Unjust Wars*, and my students and I worked our way through it chapter by chapter over a full ten-week quarter.

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