Numanities - Arts and Humanities in Progress 14

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In Between Communication Theories Through One Hundred Questions

Springer

Numanities - Arts and Humanities in Progress

Volume 14

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ISSN 2510-442X ISSN 2510-4438 (electronic)
Numanities - Arts and Humanities in Progress
ISBN 978-3-030-41105-3 ISBN 978-3-030-41106-0 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41106-0

This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

This book is a dialogical explication of topics in communication, including theoretical positions and matters of various media, by two philosophers, both of whom live on opposite sides of the Atlantic Ocean, each asking 50 questions of the other person. Two times 50 makes 100, an exact figure that captures the exchange of views about communication between two people with very different experiences and perspectives on scientific research and the political environment. The use of the word, "about", is of special significance, since we talk of communication in order to explore the space between various communication theories, rather than develop a theory of our own. So, when we use the number, "100", we mean the inexhaustible ways in which we can talk about communication by engaging other theorists, methods, and topics in our dialogical explorations—with a constant adherence to the fact that communication is "about something".

The book's genesis lies in the shared experience of teaching a Masters programme, "Communication of creative society". It was in an auditorium some years ago at Vilnius Gediminas Technical University (VGTU), when Algis and I first met and engaged in a dialogue. Algis had been invited to teach in an intensive study programme on communication, and it was one sunny day in late autumn 2015 in VGTU's Laboratory of Creative Industries that Tomas challenged Algis's ideas on communication, and in front of a student body that was being less than cooperative. Shortly before Algis returned to the USA, we agreed to continue the discussions online by posing and answering a series of questions, laying the foundation for the dialogue recorded in this book.

We would like to thank the following people who have helped bring this book to fruition. Among them are VGTU's rector, Alfonsas Daniūnas, who has always been an enthusiastic supporter of the Faculty of Creative Industries (FCI) and its activities. Likewise, Vice-Rector Antanas Čenys is a keen patron of the social sciences and humanities. Dean of FCI, Živilė Sederevičiūtė-Pačiauskienė, has always been a tireless supporter and was instrumental in bringing Algis into our Masters study programme. Algis's visits were made possible by the generosity of the Lithuanian Ministry of Education, Science and Sport. We also wish to thank the editor in chief

of the Springer book series “Numanities” Dario Martinelli for organizing the reviewing process of this book. Finally, we would like to thank Ron Ringer for his careful editing of this monograph.

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Introduction

There are theoretical ventures which, while significant, were and are challenged and either discarded or become partial treasury of a tradition. Given this setting, we shall not offer one more theory or metatheory, but resume the dialogical tradition which forms a "theory of communication" reaching to the very writings of the dialogues of Plato, and numerous subsequent writings, including such significant medieval figures as St. Thomas. Thus, by now, the debates, analyses, and descriptions of dialogue and its variations cover one of the major theoretical trends of this century. At times, these trends are confused—intertwined with various systems of dialectics. Martin Buber, Michail Bakhtin, and more recently various schools of phenomenology, articulated by Waldenfels (1971), Renate von Heydebrand and Günther (1969), ending with postmoderns such as Arneson (2007), Dascal (1985), Waller and Marcos (2005), point to dialogue as an essential ground of all other ventures. Indeed, there are writers who attempt to posit dialogue as a fundamental theoretical–methodological problematic. Given this plethora engagements with dialogue, our venture is one theoretical mode of dialogical thinking, without reducing it to some specific interpretation, such as may be offered by "lingualisms", inclusive of hermeneutics, semiotics, and even postmodern notions of discursive practices, or to sociological theses that posit the primacy of society over the individual, or even to the claims that individuals possess some inherent drive to form communication with other individuals. These are notable theoretical constructions that founded numerous, even antagonistic ideological, economic, and even militaristic confrontations. In other words, they have created various theoretical and ideological "others" who, supposedly, were innocent of the truth of their lives. Yet what could not, and indeed in principle cannot be excluded even by ideologies and theories, is the presence of the dialogical other as a condition for reflection upon one's own positionality. This means that the limits of understanding and awareness, regardless of whatever theoretical and ideological ilk these may possess, are not offered within a given position. They require reflection from a different, an alternate domain that, even if not completely understood, indeed, even if rejected, compels its recognition. This suggests that dialogical thinking is granted even in cases of transcultural, transnational, trans-ideological, and even

trans-disciplinary engagements. Radically speaking, "the other" is affirmed even in its negation. Thus, the very efforts to deal with dialogue as a theory, in contrast to other types of theories, are already dialogical by virtue of the recognition of other theories. Dialogical awareness, it seems, cannot be limited to other theories and their presumed grounds, such as social, cultural, material, historical, biological, and even mythical. It comprises a domain that articulates itself in its practice. Any discussion of a given topic, including that of communication, compels us to recognize the essential and inevitable affirmation of the other as a dialogical partner at whatever level the other is encountered. Indeed, the very encounter already grants our recognition of the "sense of the other" that is not absolutely alien, that is different and yet not radically transcendent from some sense of ourselves, regardless of how this "ourselves" is culturally designated.

In the light of the various methodologies in currency, ranging from qualitative to quantitative, from neo-positivistic, to culturally relativistic, we maintain (despite the postmodern claims that anything essential is dead) that any subject matter requires an articulation of its own access. This is to say, it would be not only inadvertent, but also arbitrary to "apply" our favourite method, dogma, or theory on all phenomena. Since this procedure would be another variant of negation and thus affirmation of the presence of other methods and dogmas, it would be already within the domain of dialogue. Hence, to access the dialogical requires its own "way". The latter could only be reached through the steps of testing the limits of various methods and theories regardless of how much these may be established and promoted. One of the most prevalent views of communicative dialogue is composed of the triad of sender-message-receiver, with a variant inherent in the term "message". The latter may be regarded as a channel, and the channel, as is the case with Marshall McLuhan, may be the message. The empirical study of this triad must be quantitative, regardless at what level the study may be undertaken. One may count the frequency of specific sounds; one may measure the decibels and the reactions they evoke; one may measure the physiological channels transmitting light waves emitted by a sequence of marks on a page; one may measure the waves emitted by satellite technology, etc. The utility of such studies is obvious. Yet, this model and the empirical method leave some aspects of communication untouched. First, the message is more complex and can be at variance with the channel. Messages are understandable to the extent that they efface themselves in order to signify, point to, delimit some "object". Second, the latter may be cultural, physical, psychological, mythical, science-fictional, etc.; yet in all cases, it is required as a dialogical focus. In the case of this essay, the focus is dialogue and the other, and specifically the other as different, either racially, ethnically, or culturally. Third, despite the disagreements that may occur concerning the delimitation of the subject matter, the latter is a required condition for the continuity of communicative dialogical engagement. If the common subject matter is lost, the question will arise: are we talking about the same thing? In this sense, our text is a dialogical procedure focused on questions which allow us to maintain a specific topic within its recognizable limits—whether such topic is a theory, medium, death, a myth, or a body in action.

The other theoretical side, the rational-logical, with its a priori structures, has been shown to be limited to the extent that the connection between such structures and the world of experience is not implied by them. The rational structures, such as logic or mathematics, must be applied from some situated and dialogical position. The latter may be articulated as a point of interest, a hermeneutical setting, or available on the basis of tacit prejudgments. In all the cases, the reason is mediated and hence cannot take priority as the sole arbiter of human encounters. Especially, in such cases as race or the culture of others, there are no a priori structures which would be obvious to all concerned parties. Moreover, cultural others may have a different logic that could reveal our culture's limits of rationality. Even within one's own culture's rationality, there arise ambivalences whenever human action is introduced: the latter constantly defies strict rules and indeed reveals its own and the contingency of presumed fixed logics. These considerations suggest that the requirements to understand dialogue and the other are more complex and can only be unfolded dialogically. While this may appear to be circular, theoretically speaking some principles that delimit a region cannot be denied without denying the very region through which such principles appear. This is to say, the dialogical understanding is a principle which is involved in the very explication of dialogue, and, as mentioned above, involved in the acceptance–rejection of the other. In this sense, any method, any theoretical controversy, any question of the racial or cultural other, are dialogical. What is required, then, is to delimit the dialogical morphology and to show what types of dialogue attempt to negate the other, even though the other never leaves the dialogical setting, and what are the dialogical modalities that in principle affirm the other. It is important to note that even the modes of denial are revelatory of the elevation of the other's importance, and, in cases of race, even an over importance of the dialogical other.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that dialogical world is intersubjective and is one major way of resolving the protracted controversy between the proponents of the priority of individual over society and those who claim the supremacy of society. In the first instance, society is regarded as a sum of separate and indeed solipsistic individuals having solely antagonistic relationships, while in the second, the individual is a conjunction of social events wherein society (at times interpreted in the form of institutions) is the defining dimension. Meanwhile, the composition of dialogue has to be understood as prior to and foundation of both individualism and collectivism.

First, in dialogue, the other is not present as an object, a given entity, a mind inhabiting a body, but as a co-presence engaged in a common venture. One speaks with someone about something, some topic, concern, subject matter, prior to regarding the other as a subject or an object. The commonality, here, is a subject matter in which we are engaged, which we confront, dispute, or agree upon. There is granted an orientation towards something with an orientation of a Self to the Other.

Second, the notion of sender-message-receiver must be modified away from a sequence of activity–passivity, where the sender acts, while the receiver accepts the message. Rather, it is a complex process of the establishment of both sender and

receiver in a way that they both are contemporaneously active–passive as a mutual articulation and interrogation of a subject matter. Each partner founds the dialogue and in turn is founded by it. There is neither the priority of the individual, as the ultimate foundation, nor of the dialogical WE as the more encompassing. They are mutual and can be compared to a melody: each note is an individual and without it there would be no melody, but the melody also allows a note to have it's say as position in the melody. Change in either one is mutually change in the other. It is a founded–founding relationship.

Third, the dialogical partner is not merely the currently co-present other, but the others whose orientations towards the world, their perceptions of a topic, a subject matter, are equally co-present. The books I read, the conversations I had with others —perhaps long forgotten—comprise an extension of my perceptions and constitute a poly-centric and poly-logical field. I perceive with the perceptions of the others, perceptions that contest, extend, and modify my own regard of a given subject matter. The same is true of my current dialogical partner; he too is founding of and founded by a poly-centric field, and in our dialogue, we mutually involve our poly-centric awareness and hence extend our poly-centric participation. This also constitutes the basis for transcendence of one's own limitations and resultantly for openness and freedom. Without the other, and without our being co-present in a poly-centric field, we would lack the transcending movement. Indeed, we would be placed in a narrow position while thinking that such a position is all-encompassing and universal.

Fourth, poly-centric poly-logue defies the traditional notions of temporal history; poly-logue constitutes a field of temporal depth wherein the "past" partners are not passive, but participate equally in articulating, challenging, and interrogating a specific issue, topic, or subject matter. Thus, it is quite normal to say, for example, that for the Egyptians humans were not categorized in terms of some presumed racial features, but in accordance with hierarchies of social positions and tasks. Of course, the focus of our poly-logue is the human, including the others, the Egyptians, who open and extend our perception by showing our own limitations and positions. Here, their perceptions contest actively our own perceptions of ourselves, our prejudices, and our limitations. At the poly-logical level, we are constantly decentred from our limitations even when we would reject the others perceptions of a given subject matter. Indeed, the very preoccupation with rejection, the efforts to demonstrate the inadequacy, the mistaken understanding, and downright error, shows the extraordinary credence and co-presence of the other.

Fifth, the poly-logical compresence of the other not only decenters mutually absolute positions, but also constitutes the initial awareness of human situatedness as well as a reflective self-identification each through the other. It could be argued that poly-logical field comprises the domain of inter-positional reflexivity such that one recognizes oneself only due to the difference from the other in modes of awareness of a subject matter. This is the transparency principle: I know myself to the extent that I reflect from the other, from the how she articulates a specific theme. I see myself through the different perceptions offered by the other that connect us by way of a common theme, task, subject matter, and allows us our recognition of our

own positions. Another aspect of this morphology must be mentioned in order to avoid misunderstandings inherent in the efforts to objectify the other. Even if we engage in a dialogue about the other, we shall find that she cannot be understood apart from her perceptions of something, of some concerns inherent in her world. We shall understand her only to the extent that she is engaged in some task or concern, and thus is an aspect of our own poly-centric field. After all, to discuss Virginia Wolf is to discuss her views about something and thus introduce her as our poly-logical partner. Even if we were so crude as to intrude into her "private feelings", we would still understand them as "feelings about something". She, as well as we, are comprehensible only with respect to the world we address, contest, and share in our different ways. An all-encompassing, undifferentiated, homogeneous thesis would not be recognizable, would not possess an identity, and would cease to be poly-logical; it would be a divine speaking without any co-presence of the other. It would be a denial of the other's existence as co-presence through difference. That such divine positions are assumed is obvious from numerous examples across cultures and even within specific cultural institutions. It behoves us, therefore, to point to such positions which, while dramatically paradoxical due to their emphasis on the other, attempt to abolish the other's existence.

We know that there are numerous institutions in cultures whose members know not only themselves, but can account for all others, including their way of life, thinking and even feeling. There are also grand proposals, such as scientific theories, theocratic or ideological prejudgments which purport to "explain" everything and specifically the other. Not all such theories need be explored; we must disclose their common principles that will inhere in such explanations. In turn, we shall not rank such theories with respect to their "higher" status in a given culture, not because we wish to insult the adherents of such theories, but due to the comparative nature that seeks essential commonalities. To speak in principle, all theories which posit inevitable causes for and outcomes of human actions and engage in homogenization deny human presence as a diversity. In the final analysis, there are the mechanical, universal laws, forces clashing in the cosmic night, childhood violations, historical market forces, and divine shamans that speak. Here one cannot claim a situated, responsible, poly-logical, contesting, limited but open human presence. In principle, this is an abolition of the subject in favour of an object as a product of causes, an engagement in mono-logical and all-encompassing claim which subsumes and silences the other. If the other speaks about something, her voice is already explained by the mono-logical position. More precisely speaking, there is no such a position, since it cannot be recognized due to its all-encompassing presumption. After all, any position will be encompassed by monologue which is "non-positional".

The situated, poly-logical individual, is replaced by an abstract set of factors: the human is subject to the force of institutions, such as mass media, that are deemed to be in a position to posit and manipulate the individual as an object and to determine her course. In brief, the other does not exist as a poly-logical other, but is an object without any situational perception and identity by virtue of poly-logical differentiation. What is of note is that speakers proclaim these theses—even if for a

moment—ex-cathedra, from a homogeneous position, without a reflective moment that such a position is an aspect of their own poly-logical differentiation from other positions. They claim to be unsituated, apart from, and untainted by the very institutions or factors which they posit as grounds for all explanations. This is their dramatic paradox: peoples are dominated by institutions, by causes, but our proclamations are from a position of unaffected privilege. We are the subject, and our discourse is homogeneously absolute. The other, here, does not exist as a speaking, dialogical subject. One specific result of this homogeneity is the tacit assumption that the other cannot be held responsible; she is innocent. Indeed, in some discourses, she may be defined as a victim, and even an innocent victim.

Yet an unavoidable reflexivity comes into play, and in principle. The very claim to innocence and victimization is a position, differentiated from other positions in a poly-logical field of claims and counterclaims, accusations, and excuses. The first moment of such a poly-logical interplay is the pointing out that those who posit the other as an object of explanation must either belong to the same explanation and hence cannot claim to be responsible subjects, or they are cynical. The second moment appears in all cases when the victimized proclaim their innocence and accuse the other as the victimizer. The victimized joyfully–sorrowfully exhibits the scars of being "crucified" and oppressed and, therefore, of having a universal moral authority by dint of their suffering, to judge all others. What is characteristic of these claims, as a third moment, is equally an abstract universal posture: the Germans did this to us, the Soviets have crucified us, the Japanese owe us an apology, Eurocentrism is a neo-colonial privileged invasion. The fourth, moment shows that the other, the colonizer, the oppressor, is not another at all, not a poly-logical partner, but a monstrous object, an anonymous blind force bereft of human features.

At any rate, the denial of the poly-logical other, in the other's very forceful presence, takes on a dual abstraction. The oppressor sees the other as a lesser being, and if this view is pushed to the limit, the other is denied human existence. The other belongs to a race that cannot be characterized as human; she is on a lower level of evolution and perforce is best suited for subservient tasks. Here, the oppressor, the colonizer, the racist denies his own positionality and poly-logical situatedness and regards the other from totalized position. The other may offer her deeds, achievements, trajectory of her life, but the racist, the colonizer, the possessor of a monologue has presumed the sole and true standards such that the other can never offer adequate evidence that she has a right to human existence. If her deeds, history, achievements, as correlations to the world are excluded, then she is left as a pure body, an entity that does not resemble anything human. But the ethnically or racially oppressed are equally exposed to the same logic. They must regard the oppressor in terms of decontextualized abstraction. The oppressor, the racist or the colonizer, is equally lacking in human characteristics. He lacks conscience, is a brutish barbarian and, as all lower creatures, a predator. Moreover, he is incapable of providing for his own needs; all his possessions stem from theft. All his deeds, his life's achievements, do not belong to him but to those he oppresses and exploits. He is a body bereft of significance, a greedy biochemical mechanism.

This too constitutes a non-poly-logical attitude and establishes an unsituated gaze towards the other. On both sides, the poly-logical transcendence and hence human situated and yet decentred freedom is abandoned.

Our text is an example of dialogical engagement with each other and with the "others" whose presence is equally respected and whose "voice" is taken into account while discussing the various topics and issues. The reader will notice that while answering each other's questions, we do not offer a "final explanation", but remain open to continuous dialogue with the honoured readers of this text. They too will find an opportunity to contest not only our answers, but even out questions—since neither of them are from some absolute "non-position" accessible only to us. It is in this spirit that our text has something to say to communication scholars, students and—most likely—to persons who are interested in our complex life-world and, indeed, numerous life-worlds.

We have organized the material in this book into two sections, which reflect our formula of 2×50 questions. Each section comprises seven chapters, some of which are guided by the logic imposed by the questions. Thus, the "talker" emerges in a horizontal sense, i.e. the answer to a question, but also at the vertical level, i.e. by chapters. Both questions and chapters articulate the interests and priorities of the question being posed. In this way, the respondent is provoked into reflecting on matters raised by the questioner with their deeper understanding of their own subject matter. However, this deeper understanding comes from the dialogues that include experiences of other thinkers focused on a similar topic, leading to a poly-logue and historical depth. Questions and answers were written in the respective native tongue (either English or Lithuanian) and translated by the native speaker. Hence, questions were posed in one language and answers were given in another. We might regard this as a double hermeneutic move, and one which should be considered as a good practice in communication. In general, hermeneutics is inseparable from dialogue, as well as from communication. In our book, the aim to understand emerges at different levels: by speaking about incommensurable communication theories, by discussing the possibility of metacommunication and intercommunication, by interpreting different experiences and environments, by seeking to exhaust a question with an answer, and by translating our respective answers to the questions. Here, we ask: is dialogical process away of understanding "better"? Translation serves a number of purposes: it conveys a different language, different experiences, and attitudes and seeks to communicate with another culture and another time. Even if two parts of the book have been written (and translated) synchronically, a certain diachrony remains due to differences in age, viewpoint, and ways of speaking. It is important to note here that diachrony is necessary in order to disturb and to provoke each others response to questions during the dialogue.

Philosophy, to be precise, phenomenology, is that which connects the book's authors, despite our different interpretations of communication, and it is this phenomenology, in its inter-subjective-dialogical mode which allows us to explore different theories, as well as to search for the diverse accesses to the "thingness" of worldly phenomena. Both of us agree that "in between" means the approach

between communication theories as well as the space between communication and dialogical phenomenology. This opens up two avenues to explore, the first being the school of phenomenology. The second engages in a conversation about different questions in communication and media, such as phenomenological methods and topics, e.g. thingness (a "return to the things"), communicative bodies, interaction between an individual and the environment, as well as attitudes towards death. The book, however, is not strictly a work on the phenomenology of communication, but rather an extended consideration of the branch of phenomenology, whose ideas are framed within a collection of conversations that took place in the post-phenomenological (as well as postmodern and post-industrial) times in which we find ourselves.

Our intention is therefore to conduct a dialogue that disturbs and interrupts assumed positions, something that Plato would have approved of, because for this Greek philosopher dialogue was integral to his own dialectics. Provocative questions around the chosen topic open up ever more and ingenious levels of challenge and response. In our earlier work, we moved towards this dialogue and in a different circle through collaboration (Mickunas and Stewart 1990; Mickūnas and Šliogeris 2009) and discussions (Kačerauskas and Vėželis 2016) with other authors on numerous occasions. Thus, we regard communication as the very dialogue into which both of us enter and explore possibilities first imagined at our first meeting on that autumnal day. The question remains: what do we mean by "in-between communication theories?" First, the phrase reflects the relationship between communication theories, including their contradictions and conjunctions. Next, it adopts a critical approach towards the phenomena of communication and media, as well as theorizing about them. Third, it is a philosophical search for the theoretic precedents of communication that can be found in the history of philosophy. Fourth, it is a phenomenological method wherein the phenomena have been "seen", disclosed, and described. Fifth, it moves from ground in that communication theories and media tendencies have been reviewed first. Sixth, it is also sceptical towards tendencies within communication and media to construct general theoretic schemes, resulting in a change from monologue to dialogue. All of this allows us to speak about intercommunicativity—moving in-between communication theories.

As previously mentioned, the poli-text is composed of two separate, but mutually intertwined narratives to explicate the many indefinite issues that comprise the complexity of communication. The latter is a modern notion, has postmodern variants and also the basic assumption that everything is communication—including the claim that there are "incommunicable" areas of human relationships. In this sense, the various major philosophies of Western tradition are interpreted in terms of this modern framework, warning us that the latter might not belong to other contexts or other traditions. The reader will notice one basic difference between the styles of the authors. Tomas tends to present numerous positions which adhere to their own distinct rhetorical styles, while Algis tends to make a specific case by argument. Although both stem from phenomenological philosophy, they emphasize its two distinct features: one, a description of the variety of phenomena that comprise communication (including a variety of theoretical constructs), and the

other, an articulation through variations of a specific invariant of an awareness, which provides for an identifiable principle. Hopefully, the difference in styles does not clash but complements each other.

Throughout our mutual, interrogative dialogue, we avoided the daunting issue not only of metacommunication, but also of the "transcendental" problematic of accessing the numerous theoretical, thematic, historical aspects of communication. The explication of such a thematic belongs to philosophy, and in this text, we agreed not to burden the reader with such issues. In brief, philosophers should not look for some definitive position, which the authors feel obliged to defend as a point of honour. If we do mention the names of philosophers and references to their texts, then we make no claim that such references state a principled position of a given philosopher. Rather, the quotations and references constitute the heuristic means to shift specific statements towards their interpretation as communication. This means that we do not explore any ontological or metaphysical principles of a given philosophy and then argue for or against them, but play with their language at the conversational level.

In this context, we do not face an issue of misinterpretation, because at the outset we admit that what we say about historical figures is read out of our own modern context, premised on a new discipline's self-interpretation. It should also be clear that such self-interpretation is diverse to the point that even the scholars within find it difficult to reach a common ground of communication. Clearly, this is a situation in which the modern Western creation of multi-discoursivity and diversity of academic disciplines finds itself. Accordingly, modern philosophy is not able to find a universal language so that every "universal" language fails to hold, ultimately dividing into "sub-discourses" and further "sub-discourses", leading to a cacophony of discourses. The same can be said of scientific disciplines: there is no one physics. Long ago, the latter fractured into "macro" and "micro" branches, just as chemistry or biology fractured into "bio-chemistry", "genetic biology", "organic evolution", "evolutionary chemistry" and so on. No exception can be granted to communication —it, too, belongs to our modern Western world. This is one compelling reason why we neither offered nor sought to articulate a single "unifying" theory.

Neither do we claim to have explored our entire Western civilization under the guise of communication, or any other civilization for that matter. Members of other civilizations might have no such concerns about communication, perhaps regarding our interpretation of their texts as disguised neo-colonialism. We mean no disrespect by omitting from our discourse any other civilization, but rather the opposite —respect for their right to decide how to understand any topic in terms of their own context. For the sake of argument, feminist "theory" as understood in Western civilization would appear to be totally irrelevant throughout the Middle East, as well as our understanding of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Such a theory does not "communicate" anything, just as political democracy is meaningless in their context. Indeed, all we can say is that for us the door for dialogue and poli-logue remains wide open.

We would like to discuss briefly the relationship between metacommunication, the philosophy of communication, and the practice of communication,

intercommunication, and creative communication. It seems that all of these notions are contradictory, yet all of them play an important role because they circumnavigate the topics of communication and of media. Metacommunication is not only thinking and speaking about communication as defined by Craig and Muller (2007), but is also the practice that transforms and moves communication, i.e. contrary to the speculative metaphysical discourse. Furthermore, thinking about communication can be transferred into a higher level of thinking, or thinking about thinking which infers no end to the process. Metacommunication, like intercommunication, deals with interactions and coverings of different communication discourses, as well with the borders in-between. Metacommunication is revealing of everyday practices of communication and can be compared with the existential everydayness articulated by Heidegger (1996), such as idle talk, "the they", ambiguity that play a special role in the ontology of *Dasein*. Discussion in the margins is a case both of metacommunication and of intercommunication, since the loudness evinced by a thought is transferred between the lines. Here, the philosophy of communication is important, but not because communication science separated from philosophy less than a century ago (Peters 1999). We face many germs of communication and media discourses in the history of philosophy, such as Platonic discussions on advantages (remedy) and lack (poison) of writing (Plato 1997). Lastly, the precedents of the philosophical life are also important in discussions on communication. An example is Diogenes the Cynic who "forged" what we know as social values, which have been further shaped on the anvil of public communication by the hammer of the media. On the other hand, creative outstandingness disturbs the established ("coined") social attitudes. In general, disturbance of communication or silence (being intermediate) play a special role by transferring the knowledge, values, and traditions. Both of them are marginal (in-between): the creativity phenomena hazard that is not transferable while they have not been recognized as outstanding and the transfer of creative message hazards to "distort" the very message. On the other hand, creative practice does not only disturb the tradition of communication but also guarantees it while ensuring its dynamic development. As a result, metacommunication, intercommunication, the philosophy of communication, the practice of communication and creative communication flow in and out of each other, and in a paradoxical sense remain inseparable.

Here as elsewhere (Kačerauskas and Vėželis 2016), we explore questions on the genre of this book. Although the sources and usage practice of the notional "monograph" refers to integral (but not one) topic characteristic of this book, there are some doubts. Is a book consisting of dialogue a monograph? Does dialogue-ness spoil monograph-ness? Does the "mono" of monograph level the folds and delete the in-betweens. So, let it be "monograph", an ironic inscription in an unserious book that hopefully will find its place between many serious monographs on communication.

A note here on sources is instructive. We formed our sources into discreet groups, the first of which includes literature about the origin, notion, and understandings of communication (Peters 1999; Fiske 2010; Craig and Muller 2007; Baran and Davis 2012; DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach 1975; Flusser 2007; Faules and Alexander 1978;

Hovland 1948; Jansen 2002; Lozano 2013; Manovich 2001; Matterlart 1996; Park and Pooley 2008; Pilotta and Mickunas 2012; Schramm 1954). Literature in this group underpins discussions that emerge later in the book. The group comprises literature about philosophical (including phenomenological) perspectives towards communication (Heidegger 1959, 1989, 1996; Mickūnas and Stewart 1990; Buber 2000; Dewey 1927; Dilthey 1985; Feyerabend 1993; Derrida 1981, 1997; Kant 1999; Kuhn 1996; Lévinas 1979; Locke 1964; Plato 1888, 1980, 1990, 1997; Popper 1971; Ricœur 1984; Rousseau 1987; Sartre 1984; Schopenhauer 1969; Wittgenstein 1990a, b). This group is important not only because of the authors' interests and education background, but also because of the attempt to explore areas that lie between the communication theories. It is impossible to ignore the classical philosophical texts that mention communication by any other name, such as (Aristotle 1959, 1996, 2011; Augustine 2013; Berkeley 1982; Epicurus 1994; Gadamer 1989; Habermas 2001; Hume 2000; Husserl 1970; James 1975; Nietzsche 1974; Plato 1997). This third group is our attempt to find the precedents of communication and how it is reflected in the history of thinking at various stages in the development of Western society. The fourth group brings together those authors who criticize contemporary mediated society (Horkheimer and Adorno 1972; Marcuse 1991; Berger and Luckmann 1966; McLuhan 1964; Baudrillard 1989, 2016; Bauman 2007; Benjamin 1969; Bourdieu 1986; Debord 1994; Foucault 1971, 1972; Marx 1977). These writers are important because of their critical attitudes and attempts to reflect the role of the media. Our fifth group includes authors who develop ideas germane to creativity (Caves 2002; Florida 2002; Howkins 2009, 2013). This area of enquiry is important in terms of the creative aspects of communication and the deficit of creativity in contemporary mediated culture. The sixth major grouping consists of literature in cultural studies and in aesthetics (Anderson 1991; Bakhtin 1984a, b; Berger 2008; Carey 1989; Danto 1997; Grossberg et al. 1992; Huizinga 1970; Mitchell 1994; Müller 2004; Winckelmann 2006). Their work attests to the belief that the phenomena of communication cannot be separated from the cultural (aesthetic) environment. The seventh group consists of certain aspects of art, including media art (cinema, photography, and fiction) such as Antonioni 1970; Defoe 2008; Greenaway 1996; Trier 2013; Lachapelle 2009; Saint-Exupéry 1943; Thoreau 1960, which demonstrate an eclectic mix of sources that reach far beyond scientific literature and the literature itself.

Other important, though not directly related sources, are worth mentioning. These include feminist (Butler 1990; Foss et al. 1999; Goffman 1979; Irigaray 1985), semiotic (Barthes 1977; Greimas 1987a, b) discourse, political studies including political communication (Huntington 1997; McChesney 1997, 2004; Mickūnas 2007; Mills 1957), advertising studies (Fowles 1996; Goffman 1979; Wernick 1991), and utopian (Campanella 2011; Huxley 2007; More 1972) discourses. Feminist discourses are important as an alternative way of thinking and as a communication school in feminist correspondence. Semiotic discourse has played an important role in the development of communication science and is one of two fundamental sources that helped to determine the embranchment of schools of

communication. It also seems inevitable that political studies influenced the rise and development of political communication. Moreover, from the very beginning, politics facilitated the emergence of communication as public speaking. It seems that comparing new literature on advertising orient towards one aspect of communication. However, the "laws" and tendencies of (self) advertising are valid not only in advertising, and not only in the media. Utopian ideas witness that communicative society, if we may call it so, is also utopian. On the other hand, its utopian character does not mean that it is less real. On the contrary, the utopias force the society to move towards certain directions and in this way make it real. All of these and other sources form the theoretical and practical environment in which we develop our ideas in-between communication, and not only theories. It should be stressed that this book is neither a review of mentioned (and unmentioned) literature, nor its interpretation. In many cases, these authors and their works remained in the margins of our dialogues. In the first part of Algis' answers they are not named but rather implied. It bears witness to contrary aims. On the one hand, we have aimed to develop an intensive communication discourse by engaging ourselves in the discussions and dialogues with other authors. On the other hand, we have tried not to let the ideas of other authors shade our conversation.

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Contents

Abbreviations

A. M.	Algis Mickūnas
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
EU	European Union
FCI	Faculty of Creative Industries
HCI	Human-Computer Interconnection
IGO	Intergovernmental Organizations
INGO	International Non-governmental Organizations
OECD	Organization for Economic Development
Q	Question
T. K.	Tomas Kačerauskas
TV	Television
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
U.S.A.	United States of America
VGTU	Vilnius Gediminas Technical University
Vol.	Volume

Part I
Immediate and Mediated Communication

Chapter 1
Is Everything Communication?

Question 1

T. K. In Latin *communicare* means to share or to turn into a common thing. How much does the etymology of notion allow an understanding of communication phenomenon, which does not mean the sharing of thoughts? How, then, do we define the notion and understanding of communication?

A. M. This question opens a broad field of discussion, belonging not only to communication but also to other disciplines, such as sociology, culture, and inter-disciplinary issues. But first, let us look at the term *communicare*, as sharing something in common, which requires us to understand the commonality. We do not share our thoughts since thoughts are about something, which is expressed simply in the question "what are you thinking about"? We can think about anything; a theme, a cucumber, a theory, galaxy, friend, love, inner feelings, ideal society, Platonic forms, and numerous other givens accessible to thinking, feeling, bodily gestures, all of them indicating the required "common something." It must also be obvious that such aspects as inner feelings cannot be deciphered without becoming a means by which we communicate. If one encounters a person who is sad, one will normally ask "why are you so sad?" with the expected answer: "because my friend is angry with me", or "I failed my chemistry course." Even these answers can become a means of communicating about something. One might ask "and why is your friend angry with you?" and receive the answer: "because I forgot to meet him in a bar last night." This means that communication, including feelings, is an indication of something or, as semiotic jargon has it, signifying something in such a way that the indicated or signified must have a general composition accessible to anyone. This also means that despite the modern metaphysical psychology of subjective or inner states, we also access such states by the very fact that they indicate something, and thus reveal themselves on the basis of what they indicate or signify, i.e. mean. At this level we should exercise care to not

T. Kačerauskas and A. Mickūnas, *In Between Communication Theories Through One Hundred Questions*, Numanities - Arts and Humanities in Progress 14, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41106-0_1

introduce factors that do not belong to a specific shared presence on which communication centres. For example, if we discuss mathematics and suddenly demand that to understand mathematics we must first discover where numbers are, such as in the brain, in the genes, in the unconscious, we inadvertently change the subject matter of discussion—from mathematics to biology, to genetics and other matter, and thus fail our communication about mathematics. Of course, it would be appropriate to point out that we have changed the subject matter of communication and have a different general theme requiring very different communicative access. Communication must accept the directly given theme on which the dialogical parties are focused.

The question also raises an issue of commonality or a requirement to make something common as a condition for communication. Indeed, the majority of theories and methods from Plato to empiricists have addressed this issue without offering a resolution. At the outset, in all theories and methods, the communicative event is possible. Plato argued for the presence of changeless forms, which allow for common features. Yet, as was noted his search for such forms, not found among changing phenomena was assumed before all and any argument; after all, to say that we are searching for something, which we do not yet know, is to assume that we already know. And this "already" is not accounted for. At the other end, the empiricists wanted to find the commonality, I, generalizing from particular phenomena to form general propositions, yet they failed to note that to generalize is to assume that there are present common features on the basis of which any generalization depends. And finally, Immanuel Kant proposed that the communicating commonality depends on a priori concepts present in all thinking subjects—although at the transcendental level. But if all phenomena are organized by the general a priori concepts, on which depend all communication, by what means do we address the topic of the a priori concepts?

Question 2

T. K. How can we understand communication? Is it to be understood as a comparatively new science separated from philosophy less than a century ago, and still unable to reflect on itself? And is it possible to understand communication only from the outside?

A. M. In a contemporary setting communication is regarded as an all-encompassing discipline. Whether we speak of globalization, politics, new technologies, economy or personality cults, we speak of systems of communication. For example, globalization is equivalent to information, regardless of the topic that might be involved. The Arab Spring was a revolution initiated by and expanded through informational technology—the internet and its various systems, mobile phones of every design, and contacts with the rest of the world by means of media outlets, communicating a request to pressure the governments involved for change. It is possible to include in communicative systems just about anything produced by the Western world today. But before entering this discussion it is advisable to point out that the pre-outstanding shift in communication toward the notion that any factor, inserted

into a system, communicates its message across the entire system. Of course, this view came from the study of languages. In this area, the major impact arose from research in the field of linguistics. The simple observation of speaking and listening is sufficient to point out that a word spoken in a sentence does not gain its sense from the relationship of the words within the sentence. The sentence is not the only aspect from which the dead, individual word receives its life; a more important aspect plays a dominant role, namely the system of the total given linguistic field carried by a tradition and present to the speaker and hearer. The total linguistic field is the condition for understanding. On the other hand, this means that any changes in individual components of the field will change the entire field. A famous example that resonated through the modern West was Friedrich Nietzsche's proclamation that, God is dead. This means that if we delete the word "God" nothing will remain the same, which transforms the meaning of terms such as moral, value, political, ritualistic. Simple pronouncements such as, "if there is no God everything is permitted", tell the story. The same holds for all modern factors, above all technology. Much has been said about technological transfer from the West to other parts of the world, such that an introduction of a specific technological means will change an entire communicative process of a given life world. Whether it is a tractor, cell phone or a computer, once introduced into a given life world the world can never be the same again. In the remote mountain villages of Peru or Guatemala, the people now possess seemingly innocent objects such as cell phones, but they no longer gather in traditional meeting places. Instead, they meet on cell phones and the old places are abandoned. In brief, even the social structures of space and time are transfigured.

The issues arise with communication science specifically when science assumes the modern prejudgment that all explanations must be "empirical." Hence, there is no need to engage in the old controversy that empiricism as a theory cannot be verified. While in principle this observation is correct, for communication science more important issues arise. First, the scientific method as evidenced in mathematics (especially statistics), tells us nothing about communication. Let us consider, "God is dead" and ask how it can illustrate the issue. Communication scientists ask a group to respond to a questionnaire, "is God dead or not" and then correlate the answers statistically, i.e. 83% say, no, 7% say, yes, and 10% say, no opinion. However, what do I know about the question and what does it communicate? To be precise, nothing at all. Another simple case might be where wave frequencies are monitored by studying communication between satellites and TV stations. The result is a statistical distribution of such frequencies rather than discussion of what messages these frequencies carry. This would be analogous to the statistical analysis of the distribution of alphabetical letters on a newspaper page: how many a, b, c…, u, v, y, z without telling what words and sentences are formed and what they say. Briefly stated, the fundamental dimension of communication is completely excluded, leading to the conclusion that for any daily and even scientific communication about something, such studies are irrelevant. Consider this: an understanding of certain pages of a journal article is not the sum of the letters on each page, but something more—it is an understanding of the meaning as a whole. So, the poor scientist would have to count how many a's, b's etc. are on each page and then pronounce, "I understand."

No ordinary person and no scientist would be so irrational as to make such a pronouncement. Thus, a philosophical argument must enter and demonstrate that there is a difference between the carrier of a message, and the message itself, such that the latter must mean something, signify states of affairs, disclose a theme, point to acts, and so on. In brief, to study the messenger is inadequate; one must also study the message. Enter philosophical arguments, used since the classical philosophical tradition and continued by phenomenology: it is possible to change the carrier without changing the message, such as using entirely different languages and yet offering the same message: "It is raining", "Lyja," "Es regnet," and so on. To count the letters and their distributions would not tell us anything about the message. Hence, there appears a communicative dimension that "means" something, which intends some objective presence as a referent of the message. Any argument against the message as meaning, introduces a meaningful message. This is a philosophical principle we call self-inclusion.

Question 3

T. K. John Fiske (2010) mentions two schools of communications, including process and the semiotic. However, we can and will, speak about hermeneutic, existential, phenomenological and other aspects. As a result, we face a multiplicity of understandings in what we mean by communication. Is this diversity a result of sciences' differentiation, or does it tell us about different sources united by our understanding of communication?

A. M. That there are various communication theories suggests that no single theory is adequate, since none asks a basic question: given two communication theories each proposing an inclusive explanation, what is the communicative process on the basis, of which there is a debate between two theories? Let us assume that each theory claims to be a metalanguage that encompasses and explains any and all communicative events, and that the proponents of each metalanguage propose to show that one of them is all-inclusive. The question is not answered—and philosophy must raise such a question, what language is used to articulate either metalanguage and is taken for granted as a condition for communication about the two metalanguages? If it is another metalanguage, then we confront an infinite regress. Concerning the possibility of hermeneutical theory the question arises how to solve the hermeneutical debate among the proponents of various hermeneutical positions: there is historical hermeneutics, philosophical hermeneutics, methodological hermeneutics, etc., each arguing for the primacy of its own position. Yet, all of them face a common issue since everything is linguistic interpretation and thus there are no extra-linguistic criteria to judge which theory of interpretation is true. This begs another question regarding necessity and contingency. If a given tradition comprises the necessary conditions for all understanding, then, given that there are other traditions with the same claim, the result is that all traditions are contingent. With respect to phenomenology it is essential to point out that for communication it is not another theory, but rather a way