



Nonviolent Resistance and Democratic Consolidation

Daniel Lambach · Markus Bayer ·
Felix S. Bethke · Matteo Dressler ·
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PREFACE

This project, like so many others, is the product of a chance observation. Markus Bayer, while writing his doctoral dissertation on nonviolent movements, noticed that much of the literature he was reading was in agreement that nonviolence is not only a useful strategy for achieving a movement's goals but also lays the groundwork for long-term societal peace. However, empirical research concentrated heavily on short-term outcomes while mostly neglecting long-term impact. And thus, the idea for this research project was born.

We are indebted to a great many persons and institutions who have made the research that went into this monograph possible. The University of Duisburg-Essen (UDE), where Daniel Lambach and Markus Bayer were situated at the time, provided seed funding in 2013 through its Main Research Area Transformation of Contemporary Societies, which allowed us to commission Felix Bethke to conduct the first exploratory tests. Results from these tests were very encouraging and enabled the submission of a fully fledged grant proposal to the German Research Foundation (DFG), which was funded under grant number LA 1847/9-1.

The project was conducted at UDE from April 2015 to March 2019, chiefly involving Markus Bayer, Felix Bethke, and Daniel Lambach. Mathieu Rousselin also briefly worked in the project as cover for parental leave, conducting a case study of Mali as an example of unsuccessful democratic consolidation after nonviolent resistance. At UDE, we received support from the team of the Chair of International Relations and Development

Policy, especially Professor Tobias Debiel, Inge Fischer, and Julia Nachtigall, and from the Institute for Development and Peace. The Institute of Political Science provided office space and further administrative support. We are also greatly indebted to our research assistants Cemal Öztürk, Lena Pohl, Katrin Grätz, Leah Ngaba, and Ibrahim Alhadjiui, who assisted in preparing the grant proposal, helped to organize field trips, wrote minutes of our team meetings, coded data, and also completed the arduous task of transcribing the many hours of interviews that Markus collected during fieldwork.

The Berghof Foundation was involved in the project from its inception. Véronique Dudouet had supported the initial grant proposal and contributed to the research project throughout the entire process, including during her research fellowship at the United States Institute of Peace, where discussions on the project findings influenced her contributions to this book. Katrin Planta conducted the very first case study on El Salvador before going on maternity leave; her tasks were taken up by Matteo Dressler, who did all of the remaining work, contributing to the project even after he moved from the Berghof Foundation to the Flemish Peace Institute in Brussels.

Markus Bayer conducted field research in Namibia between November 2015 and March 2016 in cooperation with the Namibian Institute for Democracy and the Institute for Public Policy Research. In Namibia, Henning Melber, Naita Hishoono, and Dennis Zaire were not only competent experts but also helpful advisors and opened some closed doors and established important contacts. Field research in Benin was conducted between June and November 2016 through contacts first established via the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES). We thank Wim Deckers and Toni Kaatz-Dubberke from the GIZ Program for Decentralization and Communal Development and Simon Asoba and Dr. Kalus-Peter Treiydte from FES. The final field research phase in Cape Verde took place between February and May 2017. There, Markus worked with Emiliano Moreno and Omarú Djaló Abreu, who acted as translators and go-betweens and were instrumental in making this visit a success. Peter Meyns, Aristides Lima, and André Corsino Tolentino kindly shared their immense knowledge and their helpful contacts. The desk studies on Chile, El Salvador, and Paraguay benefited from expert reviews by Alberto Martín Álvarez, Claudio Fuentes, and Magdalena López, and interviews in Chile and

Paraguay were conducted by Josefina Abarzúa Varela, Camilo Jose Caballero Ocariz, and Edith Arrúa. Aaron Griffiths provided proofreading services.

We presented interim results of our research at various conferences and thank audiences, participants and discussants in these events for their feedback. We are also grateful to the International Center for Nonviolent Conflict for giving us the opportunity to present some of our results in an entry to the Minds of the Movement blog. Also, we'd like to thank Aries Arugay, Janet Cherry, Christopher Clapham, Anita Gohdes, Carrie Manning, Henning Melber, Peter Meyns, Jonathan Pinckney, Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, Johannes Vüllers, Nils Weidmann, and Stephen Zunes for comments on various pieces of writing and for advice regarding the case studies.

We are also grateful to Palgrave Macmillan for giving us the opportunity to publish this monograph with them. Anca Pusca, the Senior Editor for International Relations and Security Studies, has shown interest in this project for years. Katelyn Zingg, her editorial assistant, has made the publication process as smooth as possible.

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CONTENTS

1	Introduction	1
2	Theory	15
3	Statistical Analysis	41
4	Mechanisms	63
5	Inching Towards Theory	133
6	Conclusion	175
	Index	189

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 2.1	Horizontal and vertical relations of political regimes	21
Fig. 3.1	Kaplan-Meier survivor functions	49
Fig. 3.2	Peaceful turnovers of power for regimes without NVR	51
Fig. 3.3	Peaceful turnovers of power for regimes with NVR	51
Fig. 3.4	Average levels of democracy before and after transition	54
Fig. 4.1	Legislative constraints of the executive for regimes with and without NVR-induced transition	71
Fig. 4.2	Freedom of association and expression for regimes with and without NVR-induced transition	73
Fig. 4.3	Political environment for CSOs for regimes with and without NVR transition	75
Fig. 4.4	Probability of coups after transition	108
Fig. 4.5	Success rate of coups	109



CHAPTER 1

Introduction

A STORY OF THREE AFRICAN DEMOCRACIES

In 1989, the small West African country of Benin entered its 18th year of autocratic rule by the socialist single-party regime of President Mathieu Kérékou. The country had experienced a number of military coups in the 1960s and 1970s, including the one that brought Kérékou to power in 1972. Benin was then, as now, very poor—it has been on the United Nations' list of Least Developed Countries since the list was first published in 1971. According to World Bank data, Benin's literacy rate in 1992 (the closest year for which data was available) was just 27.2% of people aged 15 and above, compared to an average of 53.4% in sub-Saharan Africa. In short, Benin was just about the most unlikely place for democracy to emerge and take root.

But that is precisely what happened. Resistance to Kérékou's socialist one-party regime germinated in the mid-1980s, mainly among student groups and university teachers. With the economic situation deteriorating and wages being paid irregularly, more and more of the urban population joined the ranks of the opposition and pushed Kérékou to liberalize the political system. Restrictions on the press and trade unions were lifted in 1988, but protests continued unabated. The year 1989 saw huge nonviolent demonstrations and strikes. By December, Kérékou was left with no option but to announce the end of Marxism–Leninism as the state ideology and to call for the appointment of a National Conference. The

National Conference worked out a new constitution, installed a provisional government, set out a timetable for democratic elections and paved the way for Benin's '*renouveau démocratique*'—its democratic renewal.

Kérékou was voted out of office in 1991, but the first extraordinary event of Benin's nascent democracy took place in 1996. The Beninese voted out the first democratic government of Nicéphore Soglo in favour of Kérékou. Soglo's economic policies had been met with widespread disapproval and he alienated many voters when he tried to pass the 1994 budget via executive decree—a move that was blocked by the constitutional court. From 1996, regular and peaceful turnovers of power were to become a feature of Benin's democracy. The presidential elections in 2016 were the sixth of their kind and resulted in the fourth handover of power. Benin passed Samuel Huntington's famous 'two-turnover test', whereby democracies are seen as consolidated after the second electoral turnover, in 2006 when Kérékou had to leave office at the end of his two-term limit.

That constituted the second extraordinary event. Leading up to 2006, rumours had been spreading that Kérékou would seek a third term in office. But the constitutional consensus reached by the National Assembly had remained highly valued by the population, and people took to the streets under the slogan '*touche pas à ma constitution*'—'don't touch my constitution'. The same thing happened in 2016, when Kérékou's successor, Thomas Boni Yayi, also sought to circumvent the two-term limit. Again, citizens rushed to the defence of the constitution using the same slogans and banners as in 2006, with an even broader coalition this time.

Benin, this small, impoverished country with a chequered past of military rule and one-party autocracy now has an unbroken history of democracy that is about to celebrate its 30th anniversary. And it is not that this 30-year history has been easy. Far from it, democracy in Benin has been threatened time and again, but it has proven to be remarkably resilient in spite of weak state institutions and a fragmented party system, thanks mostly to the pro-democratic attitudes and activist stance of Beninese civil society.

Compare this with Liberia and Guinea-Bissau, two other small West African countries. In 1989, Liberia too was poor and had a history of single-party dominance and military rule. But instead of a peaceful revolution, it experienced a violent insurrection by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor. The NPFL quickly attracted support from a disaffected populace while the Liberian state, weakened

through decades of autocratic misrule by President Samuel Doe and his predecessors, was unable to quash the rapidly growing insurgency. In July 1990, a decisive victory for the NPFL seemed at hand but a Nigerian-led military intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) prevented it from capturing the capital, Monrovia. Six years of stalemated conflict and a dozen failed peace agreements later, the Nigerian leadership and Taylor reached a compromise deal to introduce a caretaker government followed by presidential elections, which Taylor and the still fully armed NPFL would go on to win with a decisive majority.

But Taylor's accession to the presidency in 1997 did not bring peace. Taylor ran the country like a kleptocracy for the benefit of himself and his closest supporters. There was no reconciliation or reconstruction and society's wounds were left to fester. In 2000, militias mobilized against Taylor, whose government proved to be no more capable of counter-insurgency than its predecessor. By 2003, with the militias advancing on Monrovia, Taylor agreed to go into exile in Nigeria. This paved the way for a UN-supervised peace process, backed by a large contingent of peacekeepers, that led to democratic elections in 2005 and 2006. Democracy has held since then, even as each new election tests the stability of the new regime.

Estimates of casualty figures from the first Liberian war (1989–1996) vary between 150,000 and 250,000 people dying on and off the battlefield (Ellis 2006, pp. 312–316), with a smaller number in the second Liberian war (2000–2003). According to official statistics of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, during the mid-1990s there were up to 800,000 Liberian refugees in the neighbouring countries of Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Côte d'Ivoire, plus an estimated one million internally displaced persons. Given that the pre-war population was only about three million, these are staggering numbers. The Liberian economy was devastated and the country has needed massive injections of aid to finance the recovering state apparatus.

Guinea-Bissau, like Benin, had been run by a socialist regime that had come to power in a military coup. Under the leadership of João Bernardo Vieira, the Revolutionary Council governed through the only party, the *Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* (PAIGC), for 14 years. Faced with a worsening economic crisis and abandoning socialism, Vieira started to liberalize the regime in 1991, legalizing the activities of opposition parties. The first multiparty elections were held

in August 1994. Vieira narrowly won the presidential election and the PAIGC retained control of parliament.

But democratization did little to assuage social and economic grievances or to mediate elite power struggles. The post-transition Vieira government was tainted by corruption, patronage, and economic stagnation. Finally, in 1998, the army chief of staff Ansumane Mané deposed Vieira after a bloody 11-month civil war that necessitated the deployment of ECOWAS and UN peacekeepers. And even though Mané's military junta appointed a transitional government afterwards and Guinea-Bissau has had no fewer than five multiparty elections since then, it has never managed to attain even a semblance of political stability. There have been successful coup d'états in 2003, 2009, and 2012, plus an unsuccessful attempt in 2011. Vieira returned to power in the 2005 elections but was assassinated while in office during the 2009 coup. Politics in the country is characterized by political factions in government and the military engaging in all-out power struggles. Civil society, especially in rural areas, is weak and disenfranchised, preferring to keep its distance from the state (Forrest 2003).

Benin, Liberia, and Guinea-Bissau represent three different ways of democratizing a country. In Benin, democratic transition was forced upon the regime through large-scale nonviolent resistance. In Liberia, the government was toppled by armed insurrection, with democracy only coming about via a mediation process under heavy international pressure. In Guinea-Bissau, democracy, such as it was, was installed top-down by the incumbent authoritarian government. Comparing these three modes of transition shows that events leading up to and during transition will affect the long-term viability of democracy for years or even decades to come.

The first point is that transition without popular mobilization robs democracies of some of their lifeblood. In cases like Guinea-Bissau, citizens and civil society are mostly demobilized and have little leverage over the government. The political, military, and economic elites retain their perks and veto positions. Democratic reform is shallow and vulnerable to military or executive coups. In contrast, revolutions, whether violent or peaceful, can constitute a vibrant and capable civil society and generate a feeling of efficacy among participants and observers and can be a powerful symbol for the future generations.

But not all revolutions have the same effects. Violent insurgency leads to thousands—sometimes hundreds of thousands—of battle-related and indirect deaths. It destroys people's livelihoods and displaces them from

their homes. Also, whereas successful nonviolent resistance inaugurates political transition in a divided but broadly still intact society, successful armed insurrection leads to a transition under the worst possible circumstances. The country is left in ruins, there are severe humanitarian challenges needing immediate attention, and society is deeply split. Democratization is a risky process even under favourable conditions; to have to do it in a post-war context makes it even less likely to succeed (Cederman et al. 2010).

THINKING ABOUT NONVIOLENCE

From an ethical perspective, nonviolent strategies are clearly the superior choice. In a disciplined movement, violence by protesters is rare. What few casualties there are during nonviolent resistance occur mostly at the hands of oppressive governments. There is much less disruption of the everyday lives of citizens and displacement is kept at a minimum. Societies undergoing peaceful revolutions are not as divided as those that emerge traumatized from violent conflict. Principled nonviolence is often associated with popular figures like Mahatma Gandhi or Martin Luther King and religions like Hinduism or Christianity, but the norm to refrain from violence is anchored in each of the major faiths and most major philosophies through some variant of the Golden Rule: ‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you’ (Küng 1998).

But there are also pragmatic reasons for choosing nonviolent forms of resistance (Sharp 1973). Study after study has found that nonviolent protest is much more effective at achieving its goals than violent forms of dissent. This has been demonstrated by, among others, a landmark study by Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works* (2011). Using detailed data on 323 resistance campaigns collected in the *Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcome* database (NAVCO), Chenoweth and Stephan find that nonviolent campaigns are the most frequent form of resistance campaigns and have a higher probability of success than other forms of resistance. In contrast, violent transitions to a stable democracy are extremely rare. In 218 instances of violent resistance, democracy emerged in only 5% of cases (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, p. 209). In contrast, nonviolent campaigns often trigger a transition towards democracy in autocratic regimes (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013) and have a significant and positive impact on the probability of a democratic regime persisting five years later (Chenoweth and Stephan

2011, p. 213). Clearly, nonviolence works even when it is used in a purely instrumental manner and without an ethical commitment to pacifism.

Chenoweth and Stephan's book was instrumental in pushing what had been a relatively obscure research field into the public limelight. Policy-makers and the media started to pay attention to nonviolent resistance and academic researchers were galvanized into action. Since its publication eight years ago, the book has been cited widely and is rapidly becoming a modern classic of political science scholarship. In its wake, dozens of follow-up studies were conducted and the interdisciplinary field of Resistance Studies emerged, with its own research community, journals, and conferences.

But praising the impact of *Why Civil Resistance Works* should not distract us from recognizing the long and deep intellectual traditions upon which the field rests. Prior empirical works, for example by Ackerman and Karatnycky (2005) and Johnstad (2010), had already produced similar results, albeit based on more limited datasets. There are also scores of studies on single cases or discussing particular aspects on nonviolence (for an overview, see Ackerman and Rodal 2008; Dudouet 2011). Much of this earlier research was inspired by the work of Gene Sharp, who took a pragmatist approach to the issue of nonviolent protest. With his seminal three-volume *Politics of Nonviolent Action* (1973), Sharp became one of the academic pioneers in the study of nonviolent action. Building upon the insight that the power of an authoritarian ruler is based on the consent of the population, Sharp not only developed a theory of power but also compiled 198 techniques of nonviolent resistance suitable for challenging authoritarian rulers. In contrast to Gandhi or King, Sharp did not make a moral or religious argument about the necessity of nonviolence. Instead, his aim was to develop a strategic approach towards nonviolence suitable for people around the world, earning him the nickname 'the Clausewitz of Nonviolence'. His works had a tremendous impact: *From Dictatorship to Democracy* (Sharp 2008) has been translated into more than 30 languages and served as a source of inspiration for activists in places as diverse as Serbia, Burma, and Egypt.

Aside from Sharp, issues of nonviolence are also discussed prominently in many works of political thought (Boersema and Brown 2006; Attack 2012). The earliest theory of nonviolent resistance was elaborated in the sixteenth century by Étienne de la Boétie (1975 [1576]). Having witnessed the bloody absolutist rule of Henry II of France, de la Boétie laid the groundwork for most modern theories on nonviolent resistance.

In his *Discourse on the Voluntary Servitude*, posthumously published in 1576, he tried to answer the question of how so many people can suffer from a single tyrant who has no more power than each of them individually. He concluded that it is the voluntary servitude of the people that allows a single person to rule over so many, an idea that had a substantial impact on later scholars of nonviolent action and civil disobedience.

It is clear that there is an active and expanding research agenda for the field of nonviolent resistance that is able to draw on a rich tradition of scholarship. But within the context of this unfolding agenda, there are still many unanswered questions. We are interested in two issues in particular: does nonviolent resistance have *long-term* benefits for democracies, as the examples at the beginning of this chapter suggest? And if so, what are the underlying causal mechanisms?

THE CASE FOR DEMOCRACY

The focus of the nonviolent resistance literature is on a particular technique rather than the aims which actors are trying to achieve. Previous work has covered resistance against various forms of injustice and oppression and for all kinds of goals, like national independence, gender equality, ethnic autonomy, religious freedom, or the redress of socio-economic grievances. Why, then, do we focus on the impact of nonviolent resistance on democracy? The answer has scholarly, normative, and practical elements.

From a scholarly perspective, we have chosen to ask these questions simply because they have not been answered before. Many contributions have *asserted* that peaceful resistance can help instal democratic regimes that are more resilient and more likely to consolidate than democracies which came about in other ways (Ackerman and Duvall 2001; Ackerman and Rodal 2008; Dudouet 2011; Sharp 2005, 2008), but these claims have not been systematically evaluated. In this sense, analysing the long-term impact of nonviolent resistance on democratic consolidation represents an intriguing puzzle, the answers to which might move the research programme on nonviolent resistance forward.

In a normative sense, the authors of this book share an ethical commitment to democracy that we want to be transparent about. We view the spread of democracy over the past centuries as a political achievement that is worth defending, in spite of all its faults. As such, we agree with Winston Churchill that ‘democracy is the worst form of government, except

for all the others', but we also believe that there are more positive reasons to be in favour of democracy. Citizens in democracies live more freely and have greater agency and capacity to shape their own lives. This becomes very obvious when citizens become dissidents and choose to resist certain laws or policies of their government. While freedom can be construed as a developmental goal in itself (Sen 1999), citizens in democracies are also better off in material terms. Democracies are wealthier and show better progress in human development than non-democracies (Gerring et al. 2012). Which way the causal arrow runs has been the subject of much controversy: Does democracy cause well-being, or does a well-off citizenry opt for democracy (Przeworski 2000)? Whichever answer is preferred, both are arguments in favour of democracy. Either democracy is the cause of socio-economic development or it is seen as a worthwhile goal by ordinary people around the world who find themselves in a position to influence their political system.

Beyond whether democracy is desirable at all, the quality of democracy matters a great deal (Munck 2016). Formal democracy only requires competitive and open elections, but the boundary between such a minimalist conception of democracy and electoral autocracies, where elections are also held without ever challenging ruling interests, is thin. So we want democracies that are not just democracies in name only but full, consolidated, high-quality democratic systems that are characterized by a separation of powers, the rule of law, unconditional respect for political rights and civil liberties, functioning state institutions, an active and engaged citizenry, and a clear and unequivocal commitment to democratic ideals among societal elites. High-quality democracies are inclusive: they have institutions that are representative of the *demos* and that provide for the basic needs of all citizens. We expect that nonviolent resistance is helpful in moving democracy towards this ideal.

In practical terms, our research may also be of interest to actors and activists within social and resistance movements, and to policymakers engaging with them. This is a particularly timely issue now that we are firmly in the backlash phase of the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991; Diamond 2008). After large gains in the number of democracies in the 1990s, the tide has turned, although there is considerable debate how broad and deep this reversal truly is (see the controversy between Foa and Mounk 2016, 2017 and Inglehart 2016), with Waldner and Lust pointing out that while there is some backsliding in terms of the

quality of democracy, there are few instances of true democratic breakdown in terms of reversion to autocracy (2018, p. 94). Since reversals typically occur in ‘young’, less consolidated democracies, we wish to learn more about the process of consolidation and what role mass movements can play therein. We therefore echo the sentiment of Kadivar, Usmani, and Bradlow who point out: ‘In an era of anxiety about the antidemocratic proclivities of the mass public, our results are a reminder that ordinary people have advanced the cause of democracy and not hindered it’ (Kadivar et al. 2019, p. 2).

RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS

The question of the long-term effects of nonviolent resistance has received comparatively little attention. Chenoweth and Stephan analyse the impact of nonviolent resistance on democratic survival up to five years post transition but are silent on the longer-term prospects. The mechanisms that make nonviolent resistance work are also still shrouded in mystery. Chenoweth and Stephan argue that nonviolent campaigns are more attractive than violent resistance to large segments of the population owing to their less extreme means (see also Schock 2005). They offer ‘an opportunity to people to participate with varying levels of commitment and risk tolerance’ (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, p. 37). Accordingly, the larger number of participants as compared to violent insurrection is crucial for a nonviolent movement’s success (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, pp. 39–40). A broad movement also requires consensus-seeking among disparate opposition groups and an inclusive approach in their demands. Furthermore, Sharp (2005) expects that government repression of peaceful protest would increase mobilization and give the opposition access to external support. Ackerman and Rodal (2008, p. 118) argue that the moral superiority of nonviolent resistance may help fracture regime coalitions and entice security forces to defect or to remain neutral. However, many of these assumptions have not yet been fully substantiated by empirical research and even Chenoweth and Stephan’s monograph does not fully answer its own title, *Why Civil Resistance Works*.

In this book, we take a slightly different approach, comparing different modes of transition. We distinguish cases based on whether transition was induced by civil resistance, violent resistance, or through a top-down process of elite-led liberalization. We conduct a range of statistical analyses to gauge the effect of nonviolent resistance on different

measures of democratic consolidation. Based on a dataset that combines information on democratic regimes with information on the presence of nonviolent resistance during the transition of these regimes, we estimate the effect of nonviolent-resistance-induced transition on three different outcome measures of democratic consolidation: (1) democratic survival, (2) accomplishing the two-turnover test, and (3) quality of democracy.

Our findings demonstrate that nonviolent resistance during the transition to democracy has a long-term beneficial effect on the odds of democratic survival, on the likelihood of a democracy seeing two peaceful turnovers of power, and on the quality of democracy. For some indicators, these effects persist for over a decade. This is particularly intriguing—how can the form of resistance have a stabilizing effect on democracies years, even decades, after the resistance movement has demobilized? How are these stabilizing effects transmitted and the legacy of resistance kept alive in post-transition democracy?

To answer these questions, we combine the statistical work with a series of case studies of consolidating democracies in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. Using a ‘Most Different, Similar Outcome’ logic (De Meur and Berg-Schlosser 1994), we selected two cases where democracy resulted from nonviolent resistance (Benin and Chile), two cases where democracy resulted from violent struggle (Namibia and El Salvador) and two cases of top-down transition (Cape Verde and Paraguay). Data for the African cases was collected by Markus Bayer via interviews and archival research during ten weeks of fieldwork in each country. The Latin American cases were conducted as desk studies by Matteo Dressler and Katrin Planta at the Berghof Foundation, supplemented by interviews with country experts and in-country key informants.

Our findings from a comparison of these cases and from more detailed statistical tests indicate that nonviolent resistance stabilizes democracies and helps them consolidate via three key mechanisms. First, nonviolent resistance ‘levels the political playing field’. It is effective at dislodging incumbents without replacing them with another dominant political force. This uncertainty about power relations during the transition process leads to the creation of more inclusive institutions and procedures of government and to more effective checks and balances on the executive. Second, successful nonviolent protest promotes civic activism and creates a more democratic political culture. The resistance movement also leaves behind a symbolic reference point for future remobilization. The general

population sees political activism in a more positive light and is supportive of crucial political rights like freedom of expression and freedom of association. Third, nonviolent resistance avoids the ‘praetorian problem’ of the military getting involved in politics by working towards healthier civil–military relations. In contrast, democracies installed by violent resistance and or through top-down resistance tend to have more military involvement in politics and run a higher risk of being toppled via coups d’état.

Given the small number of case studies, we need to be cautious about overgeneralizing from our findings. However, evidence from other successful and unsuccessful cases of nonviolent resistance suggests that the results are also applicable to other circumstances. At the very least, our results suggest avenues for further research, opening the way towards a more nuanced discussion of the causal mechanisms underpinning the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance. We see particular potential in disentangling the drivers of political transition from its process. Our findings suggest that whereas resistance movements have great potential to pressure regimes into political reforms, elites still exercise greater agency in shaping the specific institutional process of transition.

OUTLINE OF THE BOOK

The book proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 sets out our argument on how nonviolent resistance fosters democratic consolidation. It briefly surveys the literature on nonviolent resistance and democratic consolidation, explains democratization in terms of critical junctures and path dependence, and introduces our model of transition as an interaction between incumbents, oppositional elites, the security forces and citizens. Chapter 3 presents results from quantitative tests of the first part of our argument. Comparing cases of nonviolent resistance with cases of violent resistance and top-down liberalization shows that the former produce democracies with much higher odds of survival and significantly better indicators of democratic quality. Chapter 4 presents our findings on the underlying mechanisms of nonviolent resistance’s long-term democratizing effect. The chapter focuses on the two case studies of nonviolent resistance, Benin and Chile, giving brief narrative histories for each. It then discusses individual causal mechanisms and their interaction which we contrast with cases of top-down and violent transition to highlight the specific effect of nonviolent resistance on democratic consolidation. Chapter 5 brings