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The Lived Experience of Hate Crime

Towards a Phenomenological Approach

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Preface

This study is in two parts and contains six chapters. Part I is mainly analytical with an emphasis on descriptive explication, while Part Two is expressly critical. There is a deliberate step-by-step progression from descriptive elements of surface phenomena addressed in Part One to more critical analysis of depth and constitutive elements of hate crime as lived experientially, which we discuss in Part Two. Our approach is phenomenological in a distinctly Husserlian sense, as opposed to a would-be summation of post-Husserlian developments within a posited "phenomenological movement" whose borders remain both fuzzy and contentious.

We have attempted to follow Husserl's methodological as well as more substantive positions derived mainly from primary sources. Yet, we have avoided taking positions within internal Husserlian debates founded within the secondary literature or defending either Husserl or our own broadly Husserlian approach from familiar criticisms. Although this might attract criticism from those active in the secondary literature debates, our decision here remains in line with the Husserlian imperative to focus on "the things themselves," which in our case comprise:

1. Experiential aspects of a hate crime incident as lived, the correlation of its what qualities and underlying howness
2. The demands the latter makes upon an expressly formulated Husserlian analysis of this phenomenon that seeks to adapt itself to these demands even to the point of revising aspects of a Husserlian approach

Given this study is published in a book series devoted to phenomenology, not hate crime studies, the distinctly Husserlian dimension has been given far more weight and priority than our interview data and discussion of our concrete research methods. Perhaps, if the present study is well-received by those whose judgments we have come to respect and admire, we should write a second monograph to reverse this prioritisation to achieve a more complete, balanced and comprehensive balance?

Preston, UK

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Abstract

> [T]he most difficult problems of all are hidden problems, the sense of which is naturally concealed from all those who still have no inkling of the determinative fundamental distinctions. In fact, it is … a long and thorny way [to] phenomenological data. (Husserl 1982: 212)

> It is of the very essence of such prejudices, drilled into the souls even of children, that they are concealed in their immediate effects. (Husserl 1970: 120)

If true, the second short quote from Husserl, above, has major implications for the study of hate crime as a lived experience. This chapter outlines what we set out to achieve in the present study, its overall aims and objectives. It also explains our two-part structure. The descriptive-analytical Part I is concerned with the prejudicial mediation of experiences of hate crime-related issues by the natural attitude. This chapter prepares the ground for the more advanced Husserlian critique of the impact of such prejudicial presuppositions that comprises the task and bulk of Part II. The final chapter of Part II strives to spell out the constructive implications of such critique. Thus, our second part aims to both build upon and fulfil the overall potential and trajectory of an analytical movement initiated by Part I.

1 Introduction

Our study has many possible audiences. Their presumed expectations have helped influence, to some extent, what we have written and how we have written it. Without indulging in the vain exercise of telling readers how they should read and interpret our work, we nevertheless identify – perhaps more precisely speculate about – three different possible audiences, while explaining how our study is intended to contribute to each.

The present study contains an extended discussion of the pervasive – yet prejudicial – nature and obstructive characteristics of the so-called "natural attitude." It considers the negative effects of the natural attitude's objectivist presuppositions operating to embody, reiterate and reinforce societal prejudices that are familiar to

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students of hate crime.[1] As Moran rightly notes: 'Clearly, the "natural attitude" as an all-encompassing attitude must be shot through with prejudices of all kinds – religious, metaphysical, cultural, educational, technological and scientific.'[2] We regularly address the implications of these prejudicial characteristics for the rationale of a Husserlian phenomenology of hate crime formulated and justified as an "immanent critique" of prejudice: one that is developed from out of the implications of our experience of the topic itself, as opposed to being superimposed on the basis of external value-judgements.[3]

Each new chapter and section illuminate the multiple ways in which our radically experiential and reflective Husserlian approach to hate crime, as lived unfold and develop, in a manner that is fundamentally *incompatible* with the perspective of the natural attitude.[4] The sheer degree and intensity of an experiential and reflective approach is so incompatible that it has required the researcher's deliberate neutralisation, and then reversal, of the interpretive operations and fruits of the natural attitude. This process has, – we suggest – formed vital preconditions for the further step-by-step development of our own phenomenological approach to hate crime as lived. The initially purely methodological drivers for transcending the grip of the natural attitude supersede the bounds of the technical realm of methodological debate. This is because the implications of the reasons for such transcendence, as well as its own trajectories, both push us towards the realisation of a substantive social scientific critique of cultural prejudices relevant to hate crime-related issues.[5] The latter critique develops its own momentum towards developing the constructive implications of such critique of prejudice in terms, for example, of both methodological and substantive analyses. The latter, which demonstrate that Husserlian criticism is not critiquing for critique's sake: it embraces the "intersubjectivity" of

[1] Husserl elaborates on the idea of the natural attitude in his *Ideas* (1913, Husserl 1982), and *Ideas 11* § 49 (Husserl 1953). For Husserl, all interpretive and cognitive activities of our consciousness, including those of researchers, initially take place from a position of *already being entangled* within the interpretive matrix of often prejudicial belief (*doxa*) of the natural attitude (Hua 13: 112). Our extensive concern with the natural attitude is explicable because of how it functions as an always-already available interpretive resource and cultural source for all manner of often implicit, sometimes explicit, prejudices directed against one or more hate crime victim group.

[2] Moran 2012: 207.

[3] We recognise that this sounds close to Hegel's phenomenology, but we cannot argue this meta-methodological point here. Instead, will carefully demonstrate its implications for the incremental critique of the societal prejudices reiterated by the natural attitude.

[4] In the essay 'Philosophy as Rigorous Science' (1910–1911), this orientation is linked with a naïve naturalism/objectivism. However, the terminology here is potentially confusing. Indeed, Husserl deploys different phrases for this attitude, e.g., 'natural theoretical attitude' (1982: 94, Hua 3: 1 94) and, in *Ideas 111*, the 'natural-naïve attitude' (Hua 5: 148).

[5] The co-existence of sporadic critiques of irrationalism and Husserlian methodological rationalism is not especially well-blended in Husserl's own writings. The cultural critique related to "renewal" and critique of "crisis tendencies" within modern Europe is barely integrated into his more systematic critique of the prejudicial *cognitive* effects of the natural attitude of impeding the progress of science. We have aimed for a more coherent integration of these two elements.

the life-world as well as the possibilities of developing an empathetic understanding of the impact of being subjected to hate crime victimisation.[6]

At the outset, one challenge stems from the potential confusion that arises with the Husserlian critique of the natural attitude. This challenge stems from the words 'natural attitude' themselves. The terminological difficulty and problems arise in part because the correlate of the natural attitude, what its interpretive orientation refers to, is not "nature itself" – at least not in an objectivist/naturalistic sense of an *essentially physical realm supposedly independent of, and prior to, cultural understandings*.[7] Hence, the idea of there being a "natural attitude" orientation towards hate crime should not, in any sense, be confused with a "natural scientific" approach to this topic, such as a neurological or biochemical approach to hate crime offenders. Nor should it be thought that the natural attitude refers to the "natural" aspect of hate crime as experienced in any sense that equates what is "natural" with physical nature alone. Indeed, such a physicalist notion of reality is precisely one of the targets of our critique of the natural attitude's objectivist presuppositions.

Instead, what is meant by "natural" is "perceived of as natural in the sense of something conventional and in line with familiar and customary handed-down cultural expectations as to, say, traditional gender and sexuality distinctions. Indeed, when immersed within the natural attitude, the intentional reference of our consciousness of this (or any other) topic is primarily to the surrounding life-world of communalised ego-subjects, in the sense of whatever a more or less "shared" cultural framework currently considers (more exactly predefines, prejudges and takes for granted) *as* "natural" (or *as* "unnatural), *as* "normal" (or *as* "abnormal"). Such determinations of meaning arise relative not to physical nature in its strictly material qualities, properties, and tendencies but rather in relation to ever-contingent and historically-variable cultural projections and expectations.[8]

It is only through the mediation of the intermediary lens of the life-world's interpretive schema that it is possible for the natural attitude to address the significance-for-us (a hypothetical "us-together") of entirely natural objects, events, and processes, such as physical injuries. For its part, this mediating life-world is precisely that surrounding cultural world of meant things, situations, and relationships

[6] We follow Husserl in conceiving of the term intersubjectivity to designate a plurality of subjects and the ontological, affective and normative intertwinement of self and other relations that exists between them. Hua 13, 14, 15.

[7] Husserl's critique of naturalism and especially its mediation of the natural attitude's objectivism will be addressed repeatedly later in this and later chapters.

[8] For example, Husserl recognises that perceived bodily abnormalities and experiences that stem from these refer not to nature itself but rather to a certain interpretation of a rule-like regularity conventionally considered "normal" that arises as something interpretively constituted. 'the abnormal functioning of our lived-corporeality (which of course is itself only taken into account as constituted from a phenomenological perspective). However, every abnormality that belongs here as well—a blow to the eyes that modifies our visual images, a burnt hand whereby the tactile appearances break the rule of normality, and the like—even such abnormalities I say only indicate new rules for the interconnections between lived-experiences; they, too, belong in a grand preshaped constitutive nexus; …' Husserl 1991: 267. See also *ibid* xx, xxix, xxxvii, xlv. 27.

that we all wake up within and confront (and are confronted by), every new morning. It is an overarching life-context and cultural medium within which we subjectively "live out" and negotiate our way through the course of our days, frame-by-frame, as it were before, sleeping. That is, a frame-by-frame "handling" of the day's questions, frustrations, challenges and opportunities as we move from, say, family breakfasts, to commuting, work activities and pressures, commuting home, to evening leisure activities etc., all of which "mean something" to us. The mediating life-world also appears as a distinctly cultural/linguistic world of acquired *communicative practices* supplying the necessary background context of interpretive resources for all my intentional acts of coming to an understanding of whatever I become conscious.

The latter practices, to some extent, help "make sense" of hate crime issues, together with anything else I encounter within "my world" of lived experience.[9] This world of everyday life is, in part, lived through as "my" relatively permanent "surrounding world," or subject-centred "environment," complete with its own horizons of possible current and future possibilities. For us, this the background context of our lifeworld has included possibilities for conducting academic research into hate crime-related issues.

In sum, because of the natural attitude's pervasive and ongoing mediation of the life-world, there is nothing distinctly "natural," in the sense of physical nature, about this "attitude" (or better "orientation.") This "unnatural" nature remains the case even, or perhaps especially, whenever subscribers to the natural attitude denigrate transgendered or gay individuals as somehow "unnatural," or by means of other derogatory and vulgar phrases that carry a similar implication. On the contrary, the term "natural" within our conception of the natural attitude refers to the experience of having this interpretive orientation as a *taken-for-granted customary and unreflective default position:* one which is permanently on hand and – precisely because of its implicit character. The natural attitude only appears to "arise naturally" but – for us – this natural quality takes shape only in the culturally-specific sense of "as a matter of course," or "it is only natural to presume that …" In other words, what is "natural "about the natural attitude is to orient oneself towards whatever takes shape within one's lifeworld context through the lens of handed-down cultural-linguistic categories and distinctions that are typically pre-given and taken for granted as a matter of course. All derogatory and prejudicial slurs relevant to hate crime issues that rely upon customary conceptions of what is "unnatural" or "abnormal" with respect to gender, sexuality, bodily abilities etc., need to be critically analysed by our Husserlian approach. Here, they are addressed as outgrowths of customary and questionable cultural definitions whose status as such generally remains glossed over and concealed in ways that demand exposure and critique.

In this sense, we will later be able to show that there is no contradiction between two distinct phenomena:

[9] Husserl 1982: § 28; § 50.

1. Our phenomenological critique of "naturalism" (i.e., the reduction of all phenomena to the events, processes and causal characteristics of the strictly physical world of nature where these appear in the form of, say, physical injuries of a racist attack); and:
2. The authors' endorsement of the idea of there being a "natural attitude" towards hate crime-related issues, whose prejudicial results in terms of the reiteration of, say, racism and xenophobic reactions to designated "outsiders" in a religious, nationalistic or ethnic sense, needs to be taken especially seriously.

The challenge here is that even the most rigorous analytical effort to develop a Husserlian approach to hate crime issues in a strictly methodologically-controlled fashion, unaffected by any substantive social policy considerations and implications, would run up against its own limits. This is because it soon becomes apparent that the natural attitude's interpretive practices of dogmatic closure are themselves a substantive part of the various issues raised by the experience of hate crime-related prejudices. We must recognise that this is the case insofar as the natural attitude's orientation towards the experience of cultural difference is driven, in part, by a process of the "passive association" of perceived individual members of victim groups with derogatory general category-types, often stereotypes.

These categories are handed down across generations from an appropriated cultural-linguistic tradition that might, for example, include a range of attitudes towards questions of the perceived nature of marriage, gender, "religious truth," ethnic, bodily and racial difference. The latter provides an always-available interpretive resource for the societal-cultural reiteration, mainly through language and sometimes physical violence, of deep-seated prejudices directed at – and against – those constituted as members of different hate crime victim groups. The result of such prejudicial understandings of meaning is that the range of positive qualities of such members are not fully perceived or otherwise grasped. Indeed, these qualities are often distorted in a one-sided way that is clearly an inadequate and insufficient basis for any credible form of cognitive judgement about what it means to be transgendered, experience physical or cognitive disabilities etc.

Thus, there is a strictly methodological imperative for our phenomenology of hate crime to bracket out, neutralise, and suspend, as far as humanly possible, the operations of the natural attitude precisely to allow a less distorted and prejudicial view of members of victim groups to emerge. In this respect, and despite arising from the abstract realm of research methodology associated with a striving for a more adequate descriptive elucidation of lived experiences, the demand to suspend and neutralise the natural attitude can, in itself, operate as a critical intervention: one that Part Two of the present study shows is clearly saturated with substantive ethical

and policy dimensions.[10] In this respect, even the *purely descriptive* thrust of our Husserlian phenomenology of hate crime is, from the start and almost despite itself, a critical intervention. Our investigations themselves participate in the ethical becoming of the very core structures of intelligibility of this topic that the present authors are also describing and explicating from within. Hence, through our critique of prejudices reiterated by the natural attitude the present phenomenology of hate crime develops itself into a *distinctly normative project*. It has evolved into a contribution, albeit in a modest manner, to the way in which these ethical structures develop and unfold historically as we carry out our analysis.[11]

This critical interventionist dimension of our phenomenology of hate crime may appear to many as an unfortunate contradiction, as well as a failure of adequate and sufficient descriptive rigour from a strictly methodological perspective. However, it may also need to be reinterpreted as a *positive gain* for the potential societal relevance of our applied Husserlian phenomenology: one for which no defensive reaction or apology is called for. Our phenomenological approach to hate crime must explicitly embrace a necessarily revised and refined version of the rationalistic Enlightenment and Renaissance projects.

Subscribers to these projects and orientations are expected to strive to overcome the unreasonable distortions of their prior acceptance-captivities where the latter stem from enslavement to traditional prejudices against, say, one or more hate crime victim group. Such societal prejudices, lacking any evidence-based justification of credible experiential grounding, are viewed as often shaping our perceptions of, and responses to, other people "behind our backs," as it were; and in ways that demand both recognition and possible correction.

Without ignoring evidence of deliberately and freely chosen malice among perpetrators, we must also recognise how prejudices relevant to hate crime rely largely upon a range of implicit and taken-for-granted assumptions that perpetrators themselves almost certainly have not consciously formulated as their "authors". The latter

[10] For Husserl's early work on ethical theory see his *Vorlesungen iiber Ethik und Wertlehre, 1908–1914*, ed. Ullrich Melle, Hua 28. Husserl suggested that phenomenology may have to recognise the invisible power of higher ethical realities linked to an extra-factual "purposefulness" or "teleology" internal to phenomenon, in the value-driven processes of completing the still-unfinished business of culture and human development more generally: 'In all this, since the rationality made actual by the fact is not a rationality demanded by the essence, there is a marvellous teleology. Furthermore: The systematic exploration of all teleologies to be found in the empirical world itself, for example the factual evolution of the sequence of organisms as far as human being and, in the development of mankind, the growth of culture with its spiritual treasures, is not yet completed with the natural-scientific explanation … [Phenomenological analysis] leads necessarily to the question about the ground for the now-emerging factualness of the corresponding constitutive consciousness. Not the fact as such, but the fact as source of endlessly increasing value-possibilities and value-actualities forces the question into one about the "ground"— which naturally does not have the sense of a physical-causal reason.' Husserl 1982: 134. Clearly, this claim about our mediation by a higher ethical power and source of normative obligations to each other can be read in both religious and secular terms.

[11] Steinbock 1995: 14–15.

contrast markedly with enlightenment ideals of rational freedom, autonomy, and self-determination that inform, as well as motivate, Husserlian phenomenology.[12]

Considered in terms of ethics, our phenomenology of hate crime responds critically to a culture and subcultures whose social cohesion is often scarred by the effects of often vicious religious, racial and other traditional prejudices. The latter's enduring – and in some contexts of rising and intensifying populist-nationalism – xenophobia also includes to prevailing crises of rationality generally and concrete rationalities in particular. Here, "reason" is understood as the governance of our words and deeds by experientially-grounded principles of optimal and demonstrable validity. In this sense, the negation of reason includes suppression of our latent human potential to interact largely free of unnoticed and taken-for-granted prejudices, especially those especially harmful and vicious prejudices directed against members of hate crime victim groups.

It is possible to assume that various voids of rationality, including those stemming from the conviction politics and "alternative facts" of contemporary populism, mean that these prejudices are themselves often widely misunderstood. To people located within the natural attitude without reflection, the ideas are frequently ideologically-misrepresented. The various devices of the natural attitude construct prejudicial understandings of culturally-defined difference (i.e., differences-from an always contestable and often falsely over-generalised "norm") – as if these are both self-evidently valid and as generally applicable.[13] Adopting a distinctly critical and corrective stance towards the natural attitude's role in such misrepresentation remains integral to even the *descriptive* elements of our phenomenological approach. This status stems from the inner logics of Husserlian phenomenology itself; and is thus optimally independent of the personal religious moral or political value-judgements of those carrying out Husserlian-based experiential research.

Insofar as it is rationally-grounded, such research can expose to criticism all manner of prejudices relevant to hate crime-related issues without total reliance upon its author's value-systems. This study has not been written for propaganda purposes or to articulate our personal opinions. So, it should come as no surprise if some of our hard-won critical analyses exhibit, say, a mixture of ultra-liberal and illiberal implications that do not themselves fully harmonise with one or both authors' prior personal convictions or opinions published elsewhere – or even their current ideological preferences.

Husserl remains the founder of contemporary phenomenology. Through his published and unpublished writings, he must be recognised as a vital source of our following experiment in devising a phenomenology of hate crime as both an inquiry into, and an example of, lived (inter)subjectivity. Some of Husserl's most important phenomenological insights were forged between 1933 and 1937. They arose both in – but also against – a specific historical context marred by the rise of extreme

[12] Husserl 1970: § 3, 290–91.

[13] Of course, this can be contested. Yet, attempts to think, argue and theorise ourselves out of a minimum core of rationalism are subject to performative self-contradiction akin to "fighting for peace."

right-wing nationalism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, militarism and outright Fascism within Spain, Italy, and his native Germany. The ideological expressions of these movements include viciously discriminatory ideas with genocidal implications that, today, would in many domestic legal systems be criminalised as cases of hate speech, or – at the level of international criminal law – as incitements to genocide.

As a German and mildly nationalistic citizen with a Jewish ancestry living his final years in Nazi Germany, Husserl had personal, familial, as well as strictly intellectual, issues with the rise of this form of irrationalism.[14] Professionally, his rationalistic form of social scientific and philosophical analysis was at risk of being sidelined. To many academics, it became seen as both irrelevant and outmoded relative to the fascistic spirit of the times. It was often compared unfavourably with the growing popular and academic interest in "irrationalist" life-philosophy and so-called existentialism, including that problematic version developed by his former mentee, and sometime Nazi supporter, Martin Heidegger, which repudiated scientific values in favour of an essentially poetic appreciation of the mysteries of Being.[15]

The latter extended elements of phenomenological studies fall outside the vital framework of (social) scientific critical rationalism for whom questions of evidence and evidence-based judgements, developed and refined through repeated private and interpersonal self-criticism and peer-reviewed dialogue, is pivotal. Nothing could be further from Husserl than the cult-like Being-mystique of Heidegger. The latter found a ready audience precisely because of the cultural crisis of rationality taking place in late-modern European civilisation, whose mixture of cultural and moral relativism with nihilistic implications, so disturbed and provoked Husserl's final published studies.

The tone of Husserl's late works during the fateful period of 1933–37 radiate, for us, youthful vitality and a sense of being engulfed in an emerging crisis and in the midst of an urgent mission, which is remarkable for a person in their final years. Arguably, this urgent tone, which is not merely a question of style, stemmed from his concern to defend the rationalist legacy of his phenomenological movement shaped by Hegel, Descartes and Kant, and confront what he diagnosed as the intellectual, cultural and spiritual crises besetting mid-1930s Europe marred by the rise and expansion of extreme nationalistic, irrationalistic and fascistic prejudices that had even diverted his mentees like Heidegger. This was, he argued, a crisis in credibility and foundations both affecting and undermining the entire scientific cultural

[14] Nazism appeared to Husserl, not as an approach that correctly registered and recognised a pre-existing material reality of "racial" difference; but rather as a new worldview: one that interpretively (re)constituted such "difference" as having a particularly emphatic prejudicial significance *as its own performative accomplishment*. See Husserl's correspondence in the 1930s, *Briefwechsel*, 4: 313 cited in Moran 2012: 206.

[15] For Husserl, Dilthey, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Scheler, and Simmel each developed irrationalist life-philosophies that had lost faith in scientific rationalism. It is possibly instructive to contrast the intense humanism of Husserl 1970, with Heidegger's nihilistic critique of such humanist ideals in his 'Letter on "Humanism"' (1947). It is questionable whether Heidegger's massively important intellectual legacy, some of which was derived from Husserl not always with open acknowledgement, cannot be reduced to his deplorable one adherence to Nazism.

tradition of Europe, for which elements of the often-self-contradictory practices of scientific investigations, especially by the positive sciences founded upon misplaced objectivism and naturalism, were in part responsible.

Husserl begins his *Crisis* work (1936/Husserl 1970) by announcing a 'crisis' in the 'total meaningfulness' of cultural life within Western Europe, and belief in the continued importance of European civilisational values and goals that originated from Classical Greek philosophy, including aspirations towards enlightenment from taken-for-granted prejudices.[16] For Husserl: 'Europe's greatest danger is weariness,'[17] in that – at this time – its development was characterised by nihilistic tendencies towards 'despair' relative to the optimistic thrust of this continental culture's earlier enlightenment ideals.

In addition, during the early to mid-twentieth century, there had arisen a general loss of belief in generally valid and binding values, such as generic respect for cultural differences, sufficient to guide interpersonal relations. More generally, for Husserl, we have witnessed a hollowing out of the basis for the responsible and mutually respectful conduct of human life, including by reference to reasonable laws and public policies. This cultural and civilisational crisis has also surfaced in a widespread sense of alienation, estrangement, the collapse of confidence and, ultimately, to cultural conditions under which it becomes increasingly difficult to withstand a revival of xenophobic 'barbarism.'[18]

For Husserl, the previous abstractions of reductive naturalism and objectivism had become expanded to the point of operation as pervasive cultural forces driving all manner of viciously prejudicial orientations and actions. Reductionism includes the tendency to take one among a range of factors about a person as somehow definitive for what they are in essence. Hence, Husserl himself, despite his Christian faith, could be categorised as "nothing but a Jew;" while "Jewishness" could, in turn, be characterised by the Nazis' master race ideology in purely biological/naturalistic terms of "race."

In turn, the mediation of everyday "common sense" by reductive forms of objectivism and naturalism had become increasingly problematic. This mediation had made it difficult for "subscribers" to either understand or show respect not only for the importance of humanistic values and ideals, including mutual recognition and respect for difference, but also for our own subjectivities capable of being mutually recognised as persons, not as mere things.

The cluster of Husserl's already published and unpublished works associated with the *Crisis of European Sciences* amount to a spirited defence and would-be renewal of an increasingly endangered critical rationalism and "enlightenment" values that had always implicitly informed his own phenomenological approach. This lively defence is directed against the growing tide of European irrationalism of the times, which Husserl defined as a historical "wrong turn" and denigration of the

[16] Husserl 1970: 12, § 4.

[17] *Ibid*: 299.

[18] *Ibid*: 298–9.

possibilities and goals of the human spirit. Husserl came to present phenomenological investigation as an exemplar of an endangered form of critical rationalism within both philosophy and the cultural and social sciences.

Yet, such rationalism was becoming increasingly vital to help with the urgent task of restoring a critically-informed scientific culture: one grounded upon genuine and distinct human values and potential. Phenomenology must, he claimed, both defend the role of critical philosophy as a reasonable critique of prevailing irrationalistic tendencies menacing European culture; while also promoting within the realm of ideas at least the conditions for the self-creation of a 'new humanity'.[19]

There may well be no direct connection between these points and contemporary hate speech and crime. Our contemporary situation is in one sense far removed from mid-1930s Europe and the emerging Holocaust. Echoes of a fascistic form of xenophobia found within the hate speech of contemporary populism, white supremacism and xenophobia within, for example, Australia, North America, Italy, Germany, Austria, Britain, Hungary, and Poland are almost certainly not precursors to an exact repeat of the 1930s. Historical events only happen once, at least in their precise details.[20]

Furthermore, our effort to develop a phenomenology of hate crime has, of necessity, involved plumbing the obscure deaths of Husserlian studies of highly technical subjects quite distant from Husserl's critique of the claimed cultural crisis of the mid-1930s within Europe. For both these reasons, we need to be especially careful about drawing overly close parallels between Husserl's 1930s critique of irrationalism and contemporary forms of hate speech and crime. It is an open question whether the latter are reflective of even a broadly similar type of 1930s xenophobia. A recent hate crime atrocity involving a mass killing of Moslem worshippers in Christchurch New Zealand appears to claim historical inspiration from Serbian anti-Moslem role models, including convicted war criminals.[21] Contemporary populist movements, from President Trump to the Italian and Hungarian nationalist movements seem to more closely resemble Mussolini-style fascism that a genocidal Nazism. For all these reasons, it would be dangerous to draw exact historical parallels with the rise of Nazism.

On the other hand, Husserl's already published and unpublished studies still retain contemporary relevance for hate crime studies. They address the way in which the "natural attitude" of everyday life is vulnerable to a type of "common sense" awareness saturated with unnoticed and taken-for-granted prejudices, some of which overlap with the words and deeds of hate crime perpetrators. Such "common

[19] See Vienna Lecture, Appendix to Husserl 1970.

[20] This perhaps over-optimistic view is based on the notorious instability of xenophobic movements, their tendency to internally fracture and ultimately disappoint their one-time supporters. The rise and fall of UKIP within the UK, and the National Front and BNP before them, is perhaps instructive. Developments in Hungary, the USA and Italy may be seen as providing counter-examples.

[21] https://www.nytimes.com/.../asia/new-zealand-gunman-christchurch.htm

sense" can be appropriated and mobilised by ideologies of cultural prejudice that are all-relevant to contemporary experiences of hate crime and speech.

In part, this appropriation occurs because of a combination of the natural attitude's interpretive naiveté, lack of critical self-reflection, and outright dogmatism. These are characteristics that not only immunise prejudicial mindsets from the overcoming of those viciously harmful prejudices all-too-relevant to hate crime issues, but also obstruct the possibility of both the identification of prejudice and critical reflection upon their "dehumanising" effects, including by phenomenologists concerned with such issues.

Our final chapter's Husserlian model of prejudice directed against those from different cultural backgrounds, or sexual or gender orientations, is vital here. This critical analysis suggests that relations between subscribers to parochial homeworlds pitted against their own projected alienworlds, need not be entirely or permanently prejudice-driven: at least not in an unreflective way immune from self-questioning. Instead, life-world overlapping commonalities can sometimes be identified through a process of understanding of differences, which begin to build bridges across divergent homeworlds. Where this occurs to some degree, members of each divergent homeworld may begin a process of overcoming – or at least diluting the intensity of – specific prejudicial stereotypifications that each possessed regarding members of the other.[22] The precondition for this is set out in our Husserlian model of prejudice that better allows us to identify and differentiate various kinds of prejudice relevant to hate crime studies.

Another highly technical – and apparently non-political – element related within Husserl's writings to the topic of prejudice, which we have investigated when preparing the present study, is "passive association." That is, the pre-reflective form of association of all members of X hate crime victim group (all-Xs) with Y derogatory and prejudicial characterisations of the essential nature of each. A fully-developed phenomenology of hate crime, which is only foreshadowed here, must address in optimal detail how such association operates experientially to help renew, reiterate and further entrench cultural prejudices in ways that operate almost on autopilot, as it were, with a minimal degree of conscious ego-involvement.

We must further recognise Husserl's enormously complex account of how acts of making value judgements operate experientially within such passive constitution of prejudicial understandings of victims. There is also the related question of their linkages to underlying and, by now habitualised and taken-for-granted, prejudicial cultural beliefs, interests and emotionally-driven "allure" and "affections." We must

[22] We have no illusions that social groups who are victimised by hate crime perpetrators are entirely free of their own prejudicial stereotypes concerning *other* victimised groups, which can be expressed as hate speech. Identifying oneself as gay is, in itself, no protection against ingroup racism or sexism, for example; any more than becoming a victim of anti-Moslem violence a guarantee of a rejection by all victims of prejudices directed against one or more of *the other* legally-protected groups. Hence, we do not use the terms "victim" and "perpetrator" to refer to discrete and mutually exclusive empirical realities involving nothing but "pure" victims in both senses of this term. There are clearly degrees of prejudice relevant to each group spread across a wide spectrum, which may itself be widely shared among hate crime perpetrators and victims.

also recognise the mediating connections of such value-judgements with apparently "immediate" intuitive evidence given by our perceptions of surrounding life-worlds, which appears to corroborate the prejudicial starting point of perpetrators and their supporters for example. Each of these elements operating with the depths of passive consciousness, are not only richly varied but also extremely difficult to identify, fully grasp and clearly explicate.

And yet, throughout the present study our creative adaptation and extension of Husserl's own studies, we have sought to illuminate how those one-sided value-judgements and prejudicial perceptions, which are so endemic to hate speech in particular, operate experientially. It has proved especially important to generate a critical understanding capable of disclosing how these interpretive sense-constitutive operations operate, especially by exposing and analysing their often-latent preconditions and covert foundations.

Only in this reconstructive way can a fully-developed phenomenology of hate crime realistically hope to find ways of both disclosing and exploiting the vulnerabilities of these prejudicial stereotypifications to being challenged and dismantled in a manner that remain consistent with Husserl's critical social scientific and philosophical rationalism. At different stages of our analysis, this ulterior critical purpose may not always be clearly apparent to our readers. This is especially the case when our study ventures, with neither a reliable map nor a compass, through the often dense and thorny thickets of Husserl's not always consistent ideas, claims and research methods. As a result, it may now be useful to readers to provide a brief overview of our study, a large-scale map.

2 Overview

The core of the present book critically addresses the apparently "common sense" approach of the natural attitude to the experience of perceived essential differences between persons insofar as these are interpreted in prejudicial ways and expressed as hate speech and hate crime. The authors focus on how, within everyday life and more specialist social worlds, the pervasive – yet unreflective and dogmatic – orientation of the "natural attitude" both creates and sustains such prejudicial understandings within different subcultural "homeworlds." We aim to show how, in principle, a distinctly Husserlian phenomenology of hate crime, deploying the interrelated methodologies of sense-explication, intentional analysis, and generative analysis, can be adapted and refined in ways that lead to genuinely critical insights and interventions. We refine these methodological approaches to both identify, and then successfully challenge, the interpretive basis upon which such prejudicial orientations directed towards one or more hate crime victim can be constituted, reiterated and sustained.[23]

[23] There are few published phenomenological studies of hate crime in the Anglophone world, with the exception of work by Danny Willis, which focused upon gay males. D. G. Willis, 'Hate crimes

The authors are aware that our social scientific project directed critically towards one area of societal prejudice may strike many social scientists as contradictory. This is because Husserlian phenomenology is commonly associated with *an essentially descriptive and static form of analysis:* one that lacks any evaluative potential or social dimension.[24] Yet, there is a credible argument for beginning our research work with a largely static and structural form of Husserlian analysis. The latter is concerned to correlate the perceived "whatness" of a prejudicial understanding, with the underlying "howness" of its interpretive constitution. Our Husserlian contention is that it is preferable to *initially* address and explicate a phenomenon "at rest" – as distinct from starting off with the complexities of its temporal movement.

This static-structural starting point allows the relatively "simple" surface-level dimensions to be first clarified by first asking what-type questions. Once the qualitative whatness of experienced hate crime-related understandings have been clarified in terms of their perceived meanings, and clusters of meaning-connections, implications, and associations, we can then move on to more challenging constitutive investigations. That is, to begin to address the undoubted complexities of temporal syntheses and originating genesis involving all manner of many-levelled intersubjective dynamics. Here, there is a logical progression from the starting point of what-type questions to more complex how-type questions: e.g., how – over lived-time – does the interpretive dimension of a racist perception of an individual or group continually re-constitute the latter's enduring and habitual significance in the eyes of perpetrators?

Husserl refers to phenomenology's initially descriptive phase as:

> 'the task of continuing the pure description and raising it to the status of a systematically comprehensive characterization, exhausting the breadths and depths of what can be found as data accepted in the natural attitude (to say nothing of the attitudes which can

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against gay males: An overview,' 25(2) *Issues in Mental Health Nursing*, (2004): 115–132. Phenomenological contributions to the study of criminology, criminal justice, sociology or social psychology exist. Yet, they are rarely adequately grounded in Husserl's works and methodology: Cf. E. Buchbinder and Z. Eisikovits 'Battered women's entrapment in shame: A Phenomenological Study', 73/4 *Am Journal of Orthopsychiatry* 2003: 355–366; P. K. Manning, 'On the Phenomenology of Violence' 14 *The Criminologist* (1999) 1–22; J. M. Clinton, *Behind the Eurocentric Veils: The Search for African Realities*, Massachusetts: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1992.

[24] Following the publication of his *Logische Untersuchungen* at the turn of the twentieth century, Husserlian phenomenology has been widely presumed to be an essentially a descriptive science: one whose method requires faithfulness to the way in which phenomena, the "things themselves," present themselves to our consciousness of them. This descriptive project initially appeared as a static approach focusing on the distillation of the "essential structures" (essences or eidos) of a phenomenon. Yet, almost from the start, a more credible supplementary *counter-impulse* that can be termed "generative" phenomenology related to experienced temporality, passive association, cultural, and historical phenomenon (including the intersubjective origins and habitual reiteration of specific prejudicial beliefs relevant to our project) also made itself felt. A. Steinbock, 'Generativity and the Scope of Generative Phenomenology,' in Donn Welton (ed.) *The New Husserl: A Critical Reader*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003: 32.

> be harmoniously combined with it). Such a task can and must be fixed — as a scientific task; and it is an extraordinarily important one…'[25]

The vital point to recognise here is that, when taken as a whole, our phenomenology of hate crime's *descriptive impulse* is a defining characteristic of only the opening and – in one sense – immature phases of Husserlian analysis. The descriptive character of the necessary first steps of a phenomenology of hate crime is not to be confused with what the entire journey aims to achieve.[26]

Steinbock has successfully argued, and demonstrated in impressive detail, the absolute centrality within Husserlian phenomenology of distinctly *evaluative issues*. These largely concern the recognition and non-recognition of interpretively constituted "difference" from continually posited and renewed cultural norms. In particular, he has critically addressed what it means to belong-to relative "insider" and comparative "outsider" communities and subcultures. Steinbock specifically cites hate crime as a topic for a renewed and essentially critical form of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity and cultural differentiation into relative "insider" and "outsider," "homeworld" and "alienworld" groupings[27]:

> Questions concerning the philosophical problematic of identity and difference are never so poignantly formulated as when they bear directly on the dimensions of social life. It is here that such questions gain a privileged experiential weight because they are framed in terms of our very coexistence. The problematic of identity and difference is formulated when we ask, for example, what it means to belong to a family, to a group of friends, or to an organization. How is it possible to say "we" or to speak of "our" community? Is unity asserted to the exclusion of difference? Who counts as a stranger? If we tend to be the same for ourselves, how is it that we can experience ourselves as different? When we pose such questions, we are also inquiring into sharply contended political and historical issues: What is the sense of ethnic and attempts at so-called ethnic purification? … When individuals or groups are identified as "different," say, women, who are claiming the voice of "the same"?

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[25] Husserl 1982: 56. He immediately goes on to state that this descriptive element is *not* the whole of phenomenology and rapidly moves on to its other features and aspects.

[26] However, as Husserl recognises, we must not discount the difficulties of securing in practice even the initially descriptive dimension, of clarifying the nature of descriptive analysis itself: 'If phenomenology, then, is to be entirely a science within the limits of mere immediate Intuition, a purely "descriptive" eidetic science, then what is universal of its procedure is already given as something obvious. It must expose to its view events of pure consciousness as examples and make them perfectly clear; within the limits of this clarity it must analyse and seize upon their essences, trace with insight the essential interconnections, formulate what is beheld in faithful conceptual expressions which allow their sense to be prescribed purely by what is beheld or generically seen; and so forth. This procedure, followed naively, serves at first only for the sake of looking about in the new province, acquiring some general practice in seeing, seizing upon and analysing in it and becoming somewhat familiar with its data.' Husserl 1982: 150–51. He then proceeds to show how much taken-for-granted methodological *naiveté* there is in such an apparently "obvious" notion of "pure description." The idea of a purely descriptive-qualitative approach to hate crime purely as experienced is less a "solution" than a statement of a methodological problem.

[27] More generally, see Klaus Held, 'Heimwelt, Fremdwelt, die eine Welt,' in *Perspektiven und Probleme der Husserlschen Phänomenologie: Beiträge zur neuen Husserl-Forshcung*, Freiburg (Br.)/München: Alber, 1991.

> Does asserting one's national identity of necessity result in crimes of hate, neo-Nazism, or totalitarianism?[28]

We note – and draw some inspiration from – Steinbock's final sentence in particular.

As already noted, during the following phenomenological investigations, our Husserlian methodology develops itself from an initial position as a predominantly *descriptive* to – in later more advanced reformulations – an authentically *critical* social scientific approach to hate crime or other *essentially intersubjective phenomena*. The latter involves the *phased subversion* of the generally *unreflective dogmatism* of the natural attitude's objectivist ideological practices. This subversion is not wholly destructive because it serves to renew an authentic phenomenological sensitivity and receptivity towards the lived experience of *interpretively designated* cultural differences. (Differences relevant to hate crime issues cannot – for reasons we address later, be taken to exist in themselves as simple and immutable "facts-in-themselves" after the fashion of natural attitude's naturalism and objectivism.)

Adequately understood, our Husserlian receptive sensibility to the experience of cultural differences is located at the very opposite end of the spectrum from the dogmatically closed orientation of many of those who are engaged in hate speech and crime. As a result, any self-reflective phenomenology of the significance of such criminality must, despite containing an initially and provisionally descriptive element, consciously develop its critical potential. This, in turn, needs to be developed in a methodologically-controlled social scientific manner. The latter cannot be confused with the all-too-common strategies of an "external" form of criticism of prejudice: one that merely superimposes the critics' own ideological preferences and prejudicial understandings as a singular and absolute normative benchmark for the whole world to conform to.[29] Instead, our approach needs to reconstruct from within its own *potential critical implications* for the fruits of the natural attitude, as well as in relation to the generative dynamics of this attitude itself. The latter, a form of immanent criticism, is the watchword for the majority of our chapters.

In demonstrating our overall thesis concerning the often-ideological *complicities* of the natural attitude generally, together with the latter's interpretive constitution and reiteration of prejudices characteristic of hate crime and speech, we also provide some substantive – as well as distinctly methodological – insights. For example, we offer an expressly formulated account of the nature, objectives and methodological stages of our version of an *applied phenomenology of this topic*.

Our study has both reinterpreted and deployed Husserlian research methods of "sense-explication" that researchers must necessarily carry out in a reflexive and

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[28] See Anthony J. Steinbock, *Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1995.

[29] On the immanent vs external critique distinction, see G. Pearson and M. Salter, 'Getting Public Law Back into a Critical Condition: The Rule of Law as a Source for Immanent Critique,' 8(4) *Socio-Legal Studies*, (1999): 483–508.

self-critical manner: one that proceeds step-by-step.[30] In particular, the practice of such explication moves our focus progressively from "surface" to more deeply "buried" levels of lived-experience of hate crime, from what-questions about the already constituted sense contents of hate speech for example, to how-questions. Here, the goal of this transition is to unveil and probe the obscure depths of how the significance of prejudicial understandings of, say, victim groups becomes is "re-constituted" (or "achieved again through being performed"). We can ask: "How are such derogatory interpretations constituted anew in – and through the medium of – the interaction between various interpretive acts (of perceptual- judgement, perception, recollection, anticipation, imagination, willing, fearing, linguistic signification etc.). Such interpretive acts not only arise from but are also directed towards real-world contexts: contexts just as these appear and take shape within the perceptual judgements, recollections, etc. themselves).

As we identify and become limited by various problems arising from the initially descriptive and static methods of *immature versions* of Husserlian phenomenological research methods for studying hate crime as lived, it has become necessary to integrate more genetic and generative approaches. Husserl's more mature investigations developed these but only in a patchy manner. The latter supplementations are, we suggest in the final chapter, far better attuned to addressing the distinctly cultural, linguistic and temporal characteristics of hate criminality as these take shape experientially. These aspects need to be investigated just as they are (inter)subjectively being lived and experienced within collective linguistic traditions of a home-world's shared cultural prejudices directed – sometimes from one generation to the next – against those constituted as relative "outsiders" or denizens of "alienworlds."[31]

A vital point to stress here is the *internal logic* of such transitions. Husserl's radically experiential qualitative method of sense-explication (of the "whatness" of a range of relevant prejudicial understandings) leads, by its own internal logic, to a constitutive analysis of the latter's "howness," whose implications explore and transcend a static structural approach. Taken together, these radically qualitative methods for carrying out experientially-grounded social research into hate crime as lived aim to provide a rich resource with *still untapped potential*: one that other social

[30] Without doubt a more fully-fledged applied phenomenology would need to include an extensive PhD-style methodology chapter outlining the character and stages of Husserlian sense-explication, bracketing of the natural attitude's general thesis, intentional analysis of noematic-noetic correlations of whatness and howness, egological, genetic, generative and life-world analyses. However, it is not until our final chapter that we set out how a Husserlian critique of the contradictions stemming from the natural attitude's prejudicial interpretive practices opens the door to – and provides a clear rationale for – a remedial type of intentional and life-worldly analysis.

[31] The static dimensions of phenomenology include a constitutive analysis concerned with *how* something is given or *modes* of givenness, as well as identifying unfolding *essential formal and material structures.* e.g., the "criminality" of hate crime, etc). Such analysis can address the meant features of hate crime as experienced, the defining qualities of interpretive acts through which meaningful experiences of this topic take shape experientially, as well as intentional relations of correlation between such acts and intentional objects, e.g., between a hate incident as perceived and the structure of the act of perception through which the former takes shape.

scientists – including PhD students – can usefully draw upon, irrespective of their particular topics and academic disciplines.

Our general methodological aims are among the more fully developed aspects of the present study. This is because we have extracted, and then re-edited, its contents from a far longer original, yet horribly unwieldy, manuscript. The latter's revision may, perhaps, generate further volumes in which we set out, and illustrate in far more detail, both the nature and limits of phenomenological sense-explication as an initially descriptive – but ultimately critical – social science research method. In such a follow-up study, themes of a phenomenology of the experience of *ideologies* of prejudice, as well as a *passive association* as a vehicle for the application and reiteration of such ideologies, would take centre stage.

Nevertheless, the present study still devotes attention to critically analysing the natural attitude's ultimately prejudicial role in reiterating often viciously negative understandings relevant to hate speech and crime. These understandings are generally reiterated in a dogmatic and unreflective manner *as if* they amounted to a self-evident "common sense" approach to designated cultural differences relevant to hate crime issues. An underlying presumption here is that such "common sense" must be accepted without radical questioning of its qualitative basis, underlying value-judgements, and other interpretive preconditions.

Our initial effort to develop a *self-consistent critique* of such "common sense" approaches to types of cultural difference relevant to our topic is, we suggest, a vital supplement: one that is implied from the start of any form of phenomenological analysis of this topic. This is because such reiteration is the area where a *distinctly critical and ethically-charged* form of Husserlian analysis (as opposed to "only" descriptive, uncritical one-sided appropriations), has the most relevance for the future development of qualitative hate crime studies.[32] At this point, however, we are reminded of a distinctly hermeneutic truth, which is rich in self-critical implications: namely, that every academic publication is but one necessarily partial – and non-definitive – contribution to a forever-provisional ongoing conversation: one that has not only already started, but also which many others will continue, each in their own way. Furthermore, these future contributions can be neither predicted nor

[32] Husserl's advocacy of a radically experiential qualitative approach rehabilitates the potential integrity of everyday perceptions of, say, hate crime victims, founded upon a belief in what appears in the perceived world as, for all its relativities and contingencies, an integral part of the web of (social) scientific knowledge. He connects fields of knowledge to the realm of lived experience. He then orders the latter to show how they rest upon our ordinary and everyday engagement with things saturated with a primordial belief in both the surrounding intersubjectively relative life-world, and the integrity of our everyday perceptual engagements with it. Belief and knowledge are not, therefore, defined as polar opposites. If falsely divorced from his critique of the natural attitude, extensively discussed, developed and applied below, Husserl's epistemological restoration of belief would encourage an uncritically descriptive form of qualitative analysis. This misapplication would lack any critical edge of the ethical and social scientific type that our phenomenology of hate crime surely requires. Instead, such a misconceived and one-sided form of qualitative analysis would merely reinterpret, clarify and cross-reference experiences of the status quo only in the latter's own ideological terms. Our approach entirely rejects this conservative approach for reasons explained and illustrated more fully in the final chapter.

controlled in advance by any single contributor to this overall ongoing dialogue. It follows that our phenomenology of hate crime can, at most, be a logbook entry of an ongoing and, in principle, unfinishable journey: one characterised by both open horizons and infinite tasks.

In practice, Husserlian phenomenology does not first conceptualise a research method free of experiential concreteness, and then execute its methodologies mechanically – as if the latter constituted a self-contained, off-the-shelf and self-sufficient "qualitative research method." Rather, our conceptualisation of the phenomenological method has been refined and – in part – accomplished anew *through its very application in successive drafts* on a "trial and error" and "learn from our mistakes" basis. In turn, the draft text's repeated revision has been guided, even in part driven, by our self-critical reflections upon *the limits* of what such deployments have, to date at least, been able to accomplish in practice.

Through systematic and sometimes accidental forms of self-reflection, our sense of what it could mean to "apply" Husserlian phenomenology to the lived experience of hate crime issues has developed incrementally, sometimes haphazardly, over numerous drafts. It has changed markedly as we have repeatedly attempted to describe, explicate and refine different dimensions of this challenging phenomenon through phenomenological investigations. Along the way, we have been discovering various nuances of what, for us, *actually constitutes* the production of viable forms of phenomenological research in a distinctly Husserlian sense of this term. The viability of the Husserlian method, (more precisely mixture of methods that are never *purely* methods in an empirical social science sense), and what has proved necessary to enhance a Husserlian approach, have themselves become secondary research topics.[33]

Hence, during our preparation of the final draft of this study not only has the adequacy, in the sense of potential experiential-grounding, of the initial approach been reconsidered and repeatedly revised but so too has our idea of what counts as the least bad starting point for a distinctly Husserlian phenomenology of hate crime. We have had to rethink anew the justification for the research methods considered appropriate to this challenging subject matter. These methods and rationalisations have – during a confrontation with aspects of different sides and dimensions of the phenomenon itself – been revised continuously. We have revised these to further advance our overall project in an optimally self-consistent, as well as suitably self-critical, manner. For all its shortcomings, the present version – made up of less than 50% of the draft chapters – represents a hard-won culmination.

Such a process of reflexive and self-critical revision has proven necessary, and in one sense, has forced itself upon us in an instructive – if sometimes vexing – manner. This is because the phenomenologically unavoidable question of what precisely constitutes "the research field for a Husserlian phenomenology of hate crime," remains a stubbornly open and complex question for us to confront and respond to thoughtfully. As Husserl recognised, as an interpretive realm, the research field itself is not simply "there" to be "grasped" – like the juicy, low-hanging fruits of an orchard.

[33] *Ibid*, 7.

The very question of just what comprises the research field of a Husserlian interpretation of hate crime, the intelligibility of both its complex of meaning and their scope, and how best to proceed to analyse this field's defining qualities, cannot be resolved arbitrarily. In particular, we cannot resort to the familiar type of a legislative-style stipulation of operational definitions from on high. Instead, and as our investigations advance, the very nature and implication of such questions must themselves carefully addressed as reflexive – and hence highly challenging – research topics in their own right. As Husserl states:

> But how can we find the right beginning? As a matter of fact, the beginning is what is most difficult here, and the situation is unusual. The new field does not lie spread out before our view with a wealth of salient data in such a manner that we can simply reach out and be sure of the possibility of making them the objects of a science — to say nothing of being sure of the method by which we ought to proceed.[34]

It follows that our analysis must, as it unfolds over time, become increasingly scientifically rigorous even though it begins from a pre-scientific basis. This goal can be achieved by optimally securing the very possibility of our methodological foundations, not least by critically reflecting upon and clarifying the core components of its own analytical procedures. It is important to give the latter a fulsome grounding in the data of lived-experience. We must, according to Husserl, expressly demonstrate and clarify the nature of those: 'modes of givenness functioning in it, on the essence, the effect, the conditions of perfect clarity and insight as well as of perfectly faithful and fixed conceptual expression…' For 'any given case' such reflective clarification of, say, hate crime as lived: 'allows for practising a limiting and improving criticism by applying the strictly formulated norms of method.'[35]

In turn, we can neither avoid nor bypass a striving for reflexive self-improvement through self-critical feedback loops with respect to still-unclarified procedures and underlying analytical categories. Indeed, for Husserl, they demonstrate: 'the essential relatedness of phenomenology to itself.' We must no longer refer glibly to notions of "common sense," "prejudice" "hate crime" "description," "critical," etc., as if the core meanings, significance, and implications of these notions and analytical practices, as well as the latter's outcomes, are somehow self-evident and "obvious." This is because the clarification of such analytical ideas and idea-driven practices *are themselves*: 'included in the domain of phenomenology.' Indeed, all that we can secure and acquire by such reflective analysis must be rooted in the intuitions of immediate experience:

> must square with the norms which they formulate. Therefore, one must be able to persuade oneself at any time, by new reflections, that the predicatively formed affair-complexes asserted in the methodological statements can be given with perfect clarity, that the concepts used actually conform faithfully to what is given, etc.[36]

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[34] Husserl 1982: 147.

[35] *Ibid*.

[36] *Ibid*: 151.