The Battle for U.S. Foreign Policy

Congress, Parties, and Factions in the 21st Century

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ISBN 978-3-030-30170-5 ISBN 978-3-030-30171-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30171-2

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface and Acknowledgments

America is divided. Parties are polarized in modern politics, voters seem dug-in, and battles are raging among lawmakers over control of the policy process. While concerned individuals and groups with strong opinions have always tried to influence the policy process, most members of Congress have traditionally acted with comity. Today, though, these ideological and political divisions seem laid bare. Major party leaders have tried to maintain unity but are facing deep rifts among the groups in their caucus that can influence the policy process. The rise of Donald Trump as an outsider presidential candidate who eventually won over moderates to secure the Republican Party nomination is evidence of these divisions. So, too, is the activism of representatives like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) and Rashida Tlaib (D-MI) on the left who are pushing redistributive policies, challenging the establishment, and keeping an active social media presence. Even as moderate party leaders attempt to corral their membership, political scientists have charted dramatic fluctuations in party unity voting scores over the past two decades (Miller, February 28, 2019; Noel 2016).

We argue that these developments have created space for the emergence of strong dissident voices who seek to shape the political agenda, block major initiatives, and advance policy innovations. Party factions and factionalism appear to have become powerful dynamics in U.S. politics today. Dissidents and innovators in political parties in Congress are challenging authority, pushing new ideas, and changing the foreign policy-making environment. They employ traditional and nontraditional means, including persuasion, legislation, and issue framing—and they are making

a difference in the choices of the U.S. government at key crossroads in the foreign policy process. Research questions for this study include: What strategies have members of the Tea Party and Freedom Caucus and the Congressional Progressive Caucus developed to influence their party's positions on foreign and national security policy from the outside-in? Are factions more likely to employ traditional legislative maneuvers such as proposing legislation, or nontraditional instruments such as issue framing and problem definition? What are the implications of factionalism for foreign policy consistency? And can groups that seem "too small to win" actually influence foreign affairs?

This book is the product of three years of research collaboration, and we are indebted to a number of institutions and individuals for their support. Our ideas emerged from fieldwork for past research projects, where we were both confronted with the rising tide of insurgency politics in Washington, DC. Frank discussions with congressional staffers, in particular, helped solidify our understanding of the dilemmas that were emerging for both parties. Our work for this study has included primary and secondary research, along with conversations with other experts about our ideas. We are very grateful for suggestions and encouragement for this project from Ralph Carter, Jim Scott, Danielle Lupton, Juliet Kaarbo, James Curry, Jordan Tama, Jeffrey Peake, Michael Snarr, Jose Aguto, Matt Krain, Kent Kille, and Kevin Marsh.

Patrick Homan would like to thank Dominican University and all those on his campus who helped support this project, especially the unwavering encouragement from his Department Chair David M. Dolence as well as financial backing from the Faculty Development Committee for research stipends to work on this book over the past few summers. He was aided in his research and writing by two wonderful students—Andrea Tellez and Kassey Franco—both of whom provided invaluable assistance and energy for this project. He would also like to extend his gratitude to his co-author Jeff for his incredible stewardship of this project as well his mentorship and friendship over the years. Lastly, Homan is most grateful to his wife, Vimla, whose patience and support makes everything possible.

Jeffrey Lantis would like to thank The College of Wooster and the Henry Luce III Fund for Distinguished Scholarship, which supported interviews and archival research in Washington, DC. He has had valuable research assistance on this project from Wooster students Ghita Chiboub and Matt Mayes, whose curiosity and interest in the project have helped to propel this work forward. Lantis is also grateful for the support and

understanding of his family as he worked intensively on this project and watched way too much cable television news.

Finally, we thank the editors and staff members at Palgrave Macmillan, including Michelle Chen, who have been supportive of the project throughout its development. Helpful comments from anonymous reviewers also were critical in refining the arguments of the book, and their keen eyes and suggestions helped us to sharpen the focus of the project. Needless to say, any errors in the manuscript remain our own.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Congress, Factions, and the Battle for U.S. Foreign Policy

This nation is never beyond remedy, it is never beyond hope, it is never too broken to fix. We will be here, and we are going to rock the world.
—Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (2018)

You cannot compound a successful government out of antagonisms.
—Woodrow Wilson (1908)

U.S. foreign policy is at a crossroads today. Around the world, the nation faces numerous challenges, from immigration pressures and the rise of China to Russian meddling in democratic elections, rogue state nuclear ambitions, and global trade imbalances. At home, bipartisan consensus on foreign policy priorities has collapsed, and President Trump and members of Congress seem to disagree on even basic questions regarding international commitments. Studies of these dynamics often focus on explanations such as partisan polarization in Congress (Stonecash et al. 2018; Iyengar and Westwood 2015) or a failure by presidents to carefully consider grand strategy (Dueck 2015; Beinart 2018). This book contends that one of the most important and under-studied factors that shapes contemporary U.S. foreign policy is the splintering of political parties into ideological groups, or factions. Just as the gulf between Republicans and Democrats widened, so, too, have the differences within parties (Caldwell et al. 2018). Party unity voting scores have fluctuated dramatically in the past two decades, for example, and cleavages are presenting challenges to

P. Homan, J. S. Lantis, *The Battle for U.S. Foreign Policy*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30171-2_1

the leaderships of both parties (Miller, February 28, 2019; Noel 2016). This has created space for the emergence of strong dissident voices who seek to shape the political agenda, block major initiatives, and advance policy innovations.

Factions and factionalism represent some of the most interesting, yet under-studied, dynamics in U.S. politics today. Dissidents and innovators in political parties in Congress are challenging authority, pushing new ideas, and changing the foreign policy-making environment. They employ traditional and nontraditional means, including persuasion, legislation, and issue framing. By working alongside other groups, tapping into civil society and public attitudes, and confronting the establishment, they are fostering policy changes. In the Republican Party, for example, two conservative intraparty factions, the Tea Party and Freedom Caucus, have emerged as more visible and influential forces over the past decade. Their members have steadily moved the GOP to the right through a combination of strategic dissent and policy innovation. The Tea Party and Freedom Caucus helped block comprehensive immigration reform during the Obama administration, and Freedom Caucus members allied with President Trump to end U.S. engagement in the Iran nuclear deal. Meanwhile, Democrats are also divided. These differences were clearly illustrated in the 2016 presidential primary contest between Progressive Bernie Sanders and Centrist Hillary Clinton, as well as the rise of other candidates on the far-left. The number of Democratic voters who describe themselves as liberal grew from 30% in 2001 to 50% in 2018 (Edsall, October 18, 2018), and Progressives gained the largest number of seats in history in the 2018 midterm elections. Newly elected representatives like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) demanded seats on powerful committees as well as access to Democratic fundraising programs (Carter, November 15, 2018), while Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) promised to end America's longest war in Afghanistan and cut the military budget. At this writing in 2019, far-left and far-right factions in Congress have become active and energized, while moderates and establishment party leaders seem increasingly defensive.

The stakes of this battle among factions are quite high for U.S. foreign policy. Yet, at the very time when the president and congressional leaders might need to present a unified front on critical matters in foreign affairs, the country is exhibiting more incongruence than certainty. Divisions seem rife. Beinart (2018) describes the situation today as "a crisis of foreign policy solvency," where there are more questions than answers about international commitments (Lippmann 1943). Studies also show a signifi-

cant rise in affective polarization and "negative partisanship" in Washington politics that has made it harder for members of Congress and concerned citizens to find room for compromise (Campbell 2018; Iyengar et al. 2012; Schultz 2018; Sitaraman, April 15, 2019). It is in this environment, perhaps best characterized as disequilibrium, that radically different lawmakers are offering radically different solutions to the solvency crisis. And in certain circumstances, these voices have greatly influenced foreign policy development. Cast in this light, attempts by some scholars to dismiss factionalism as a temporary distraction from politics-as-usual, or as a "dysfunctional aberration," seem especially shortsighted (Belloni and Beller 1978: 2; Lasswell 1951; Miller and Schofield 2008).

This book presents the story of the contemporary battle over foreign policy. It focuses on factions and the sophisticated strategies they have developed for "minority" influence, and it charts their impact on the policy process and outcomes. Our new model draws on insights from social psychology and studies of political parties. We explore propositions for the significance of factional strategies of influence, including the importance of direct legislation, issue framing, and persuasion. This study conducts a plausibility probe of the model through a structured, focused comparison of eight critical instances of activism by the Tea Party, the Freedom Caucus, and Progressives Democrats over the past decade. We find that factions that are persistent in issue framing, consistent in support of minority positions, and employ entrepreneurial legislative and non-legislative challenges can influence the scope and direction of foreign policy commitments. In short, groups in U.S. politics that some have dismissed as "too small to win" may sometimes have a profound impact on its engagement with the world.

Congress Matters: Representation and Policy Influence

Presidents often promote their own foreign policy agendas in a separation of powers system, and they work with members of Congress to achieve their policy objectives (Dewan and Squintani 2016; Howell and Pevehouse 2007a, b). Indeed, presidents are typically described as dominating the foreign policy process by asserting their authority, especially their power as commander-in-chief of the armed forces (Rudalevige 2008; Weissman 1995). Article II of the U.S. Constitution vests the president with power to establish the executive branch of the federal government to carry out and enforce federal laws. The president commands the armed forces, while

at the same time controls diplomatic means such as treaty negotiation and bilateral engagements through appointed ambassadors. Political scientist Aaron Wildavsky's "two presidencies" thesis argued that even when domestic political debates are fraught, presidents often enjoy significant, bipartisan support for major initiatives in Congress for foreign policy initiatives (1966). A corollary to this can be seen in Arthur Schlesinger's early 1970s model of the "imperial presidency," which catalogued the dominance of the executive branch in U.S. foreign policy-making during the Cold War. Facing a series of challenges to national security, Schlesinger claimed, presidents have pursued an "unconstitutional executive usurpation of authority" through "the appropriation…of powers reserved by the Constitution and by long historical practice to Congress" (1973: viii). Subsequent works have linked the imperial presidency to dominance of security and trade policies, as well as the potential for overstretch (Wolfensberger 2002; Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis 2008).

Even in cases where presidents do not try to exert dominance, critics charge that Congress has abdicated its own authority in foreign affairs (Lindsay and Ripley 1992; Goldwin and Licht 1990). For example, Stephen Weissman has condemned the congressional "culture of deference" to the White House—an "acquiescence in foreign affairs [that] is the product of a powerful set of internal norms and attitudes, customs and institutions" (1995: 3). Norman Ornstein and Thomas Mann have suggested the demise of congressional influence could be traced to a "loss of institutional identity among its members, an abdication of institutional responsibility vis-à-vis the executive…and the consequent deterioration of the deliberative process" (2009: 215). They argued congressional oversight in foreign and national security policy "virtually collapsed" in the first six years of the George W. Bush presidency, for example. One critic said Congress, had "voluntarily removed itself" from foreign policy debates after 9/11 "and went up into the cheap seats with the reporters and the pundits" (Lindsay, qtd. in Fessenden and Cochran 2003: 677). Many others have echoed these concerns, lamenting the loss of legislative constraints on presidential foreign policy power and latitude (Marshall and Prins 2011; Ornstein and Mann 2008).

Yet, Congress can and does push back, and the reality is that the foreign policy decision-making process is far from orderly. Political scientist Edward Corwin's characterization of the Constitution as an "invitation to struggle" over foreign affairs (1957: 171) captured these tensions

well. A substantial body of literature has examined this struggle, with studies offering a counterweight to the imperial presidency model by arguing that Congress can and does influence U.S. foreign policy development. Lawmakers may pass legislation using the blunt force of governing majorities, as well as through appropriations and treaty ratification (Kriner 2018; Lindsay 1994; Campbell et al. 2003; LeLoup 1993; Dodd and Schraufnagel 2013). The Constitution provided them with rulemaking authority to run the deliberative body (Wolfensberger 2018). David Auerswald and Colton Campbell contended that "two factors most determine the extent of Congressional influence over national security policy: whether Congress possesses the will and the capability to affect policy" (2012: 189).

Some of the direct powers of Congress to shape foreign policy are vested in the Constitution, including authority under Article I to legislate and tax and spend for the common welfare, a broad mandate for members of Congress to help shape day-to-day management of domestic policies, the power of ratification of international treaties, the regulation of commerce, and the power to declare war (Kriner 2018). Political scientists William Howell and Jon Pevehouse advanced a simple formula for congressional assertiveness: "When the opposition party holds a large number of seats or controls one or both chambers of Congress, members routinely challenge the president and step up oversight of foreign conflicts; when the legislative branch is dominated by the president's party, it generally goes along with the White House" (2007b: 96). In sum, a critical mass of studies assert the importance of Congress as an actor in the U.S. foreign policy process.

Party Majorities, Minorities, and Factions

Other important players in the policy process include political parties that are represented in Congress, as well as the intraparty organizations within them (Rubin 2017). While the Constitution did not mention parties—and the framers did not expect them to emerge so quickly after the founding of the nation—they became well established in U.S. politics in the 1800s. Consequently, studies of party systems in the United States have proliferated (Mayhew 1986, 2002; Schattschneider 1942, 1960; Key 1942). Many treatments have focused on their organizational power and influence, and in turn, how these factors have played out in executive-legislative relations

(Crabb and Holt 1992; Bond and Fleisher 2000; Dodd and Oppenheimer 2013). Parties have been characterized as critical institutions that help organize, shape, and convey the political will of voters through the policy process. Hofstadter (1969) detailed how parties served as especially useful institutions with the expansion of suffrage over time, allowing more voters to work with organized identity structures and platforms. U.S. electoral laws favor the emergence of a two-party system, and historically, party affiliation has been the single best predictor of congressional voting behavior (Finocchiaro and Rohde 2008). National party organizations try to foster unity of purpose on both ideological and utilitarian grounds in modern U.S. politics, and voters favor candidates from their parties by a wide margin (Azari 2016). Indeed, partisanship has remained a strong predictor of voting behavior.

The traditional wisdom in the parties literature is that the majority party controls and dominates procedures and sets the legislative agenda (Aldrich and Rohde 2000a, b; Dewan and Squintani 2016). According to Cox and McCubbins' "cartel agenda model" (2002, 2005), for example, majority party leaders can exercise a great deal of negative agenda control. That is, they can advance their own interests while preventing the development or advancement of legislation that would harm a majority of their co-partisans. This is an expressly party-centered perspective on congressional activity, which sees parties as deeply committed to winning elections and confirming party majority status by establishing a record of legislative accomplishments. Majorities try to usurp the procedural rulemaking and committee assignment powers to produce outcomes favorable to majority members. Party leaders can act as effective gatekeepers of the legislative process, insisting upon procedural control to achieve their objectives (Jenkins and Monroe 2012). Among their tools are information (Curry 2015), control over chamber rules (Straus and Glassman 2017), party processes, funding (McGee 2017), and control over agendas in both the House and Senate (Gailmard and Jenkins 2007).

Scholars have also studied the significance of interparty competition in the policy process. Over time, Downs (1957: 82) claimed, parties in the United States came to operate much like athletic teams in a competition—a dynamic that helped "sustain democracy by offering citizens a choice between them." DiSalvo has characterized interparty competition as the life-blood of the democratic system, arguing, "The parties adjust, adapt, and adopt new techniques in their efforts to win votes" (DiSalvo 2012: xiii). Schattschneider also famously weighed in on this dynamic, saying,

"Democracy is not to be found *in* the parties but *between* the parties" (1942: 60). Even though important asymmetries remain between the Republican and Democratic party organizations, they remain significant players in political discourse who have proven essential for successful democratic consolidation (Grossman and Hopkins 2015, 2016; Fiorina and Mayhew 1996; Smyth 2006) (for more on this, see Chap. 3).

Meanwhile, another compelling counter-narrative that has begun to emerge in the parties literature challenges the majority party dominance thesis by recognizing conditions in which minority parties and actors can and do influence the policy process. The spirit of this work reflects calls for more democratic processes, such as in Madison's writings in the *Federalist Papers.* Madison advocated for a fair and just process, in contrast to an "unstable" process in which "the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minority party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority" ([1787]1961: 7). Political scientist Charles O. Jones advanced this concept in his classic book *The Minority Party in Congress* (1970), which elevated the importance of opposition parties in shaping rules, procedures, and decisions. Later, Dion argued that there are select conditions in which minorities may be more successful at innovation and obstruction, including when the majority party is large and less cohesive (1997). Political scientist Matthew Green took up this research in his persuasive contemporary study, *Underdog Politics* (2015). He described how minority party strategies and tactics have adapted in the face of increasing polarization. Green rejected the premise that majority-rule is the ultimate determinant of policy outcomes and instead systematically studied the tactics of minority parties in Congress over decades. By examining decades of legislative assertiveness and activism in the *Congressional Record*, he identified ways that minority parties can advance their causes, including blocking legislation, protests, and obstruction. Ultimately, the study provided a convincing record of minority party activism in the U.S. House of Representatives in recent decades.

Finding Factionalism

Intraparty factions can also play important roles in the domestic and foreign policy process. They represent ideological subdivisions of major parties—the minorities within the majority and minority parties who

demonstrate their own levels of activism and assertiveness. Factional disputes regularly arise inside American parties, in part because they are mass catch-all organizations that include within them diverse ideological perspectives. Karol highlights that parties are made up of coalitions with disparate interests (Karol 2009), and these coalitions are constantly evolving. Noel also argued that there has been a sharpening of ideological coalitions over time in party structures, describing them as "coherent divides" that shape the policy process (2013, 2016). "What splits parties," he argued, "are rifts between ideologically pure, less compromising members, and more pragmatic, moderate ones" (2016: 167). The result is that pressures for policy innovation or change tend to originate as much from within parties as across the political aisle.

Scholars have recognized the significance of factions over time, but a majority of studies have focused on centrist factions because of the potential "pivotal significance of the median voter in legislative affairs" (Clarke 2017: 2; Goldman 1990; Roback and James 1978). Examples include works on the New Democrat Coalition (Medvic 2007), the Republican Main Street Partnership (Lucas and Deutchman 2007), and the Blue Dog Democrats (Yoshinaka 2015).

At the same time, however, there is a puzzling dearth of scholarly works on more extremist factions, at the very time that these groups are more energized and active in U.S. politics (McGee 2017). Possible explanations for this might be found in political culture, in traditional scholarship, and in the policy discourse. For example, factionalism has always seemed to carry a certain political stigma in the United States, with many preferring to see it as the pursuit of private gain over public goods and more as an aberration than a norm (Lasswell 1951; Miller and Schofield 2008; Thomsen 2017). Critics contend that the national political character should be so strong in democracies that any partisan or ideological differences pale in comparison to universal commitment to the liberal ideal (Gerring 1998: 40). This bias was a centerpiece of writings by David Hume, who argued in 1742, "factions subvert government, render laws impotent, and beget the fiercest animosities among men of the same nation." In the Federalist Paper No. 10 (1787), Madison warned against the "mischiefs of faction" and said the proposed Constitution would help "guard against" factional discord.

Both of these classic perspectives on "factions" actually referred to the emergence of political parties, but a broader point was that they distrusted subsets of individuals that might seek to undermine public will. In this

sense, parties and factions were characterized as forces of chaos. This frame took root in political culture, despite the clearly emerging realization that factional and ideological differences were producing policy innovations and enhanced policy legitimacy. Centuries after Madison and Hume, Belloni and Beller asserted that factions are still regarded as "interesting curiosities or as dysfunctional aberrations that appear in times of controversy" (1978: 2). Factions have been characterized as challenging party structures and threatening good governance (Koger et al. 2010; Gerring 1998).

Traditionally, factionalism has been treated as deviation from party norms—and acts of defiance have been met with punishment from leaders in the major U.S. political parties. For example, Green and Bee (2017) describe regular instances of leadership response to straying legislators or "general disloyalty" that has included voting against party policy priorities on the floor of the House of Representatives, challenging rules, and voting against policy initiatives launched by the Speaker of the House. Traditional scholarship outlines the power of the leadership to take these decisions against perceived "defections and disruptions from rank-and-file members" (McGee 2017: 2). Punishments have included removal of members from coveted committee and leadership postings and redirection of campaign finance funding to other candidates.

The parties' literature also operates on the base assumption that party organizations are strong, yet this, too, is debated more frequently today. Traditional theories focus on the importance of their functions of integrating mass participants into the institutional structure and transforming democracy into mechanisms of accountability and responsiveness to public demands (Aldrich 1995; Schattschneider 1942; Stokes 1999). Mass-based theories of partisanship rest on strong assumptions about the nature of their organizations and their capacity to act in government. Theorists assume unity and purpose in party organizations—that members march in lock-step to achieve their legislative objectives.

However, contemporary trends in U.S. national politics tell a different story: Party unity has fluctuated significantly over the past 20 years. While there is an overall trend of rising rates of party unity on legislation since the 1950s, year-by-year analyses suggest surprising changes. Party unity votes in the House of Representatives dropped by 17% from 2017 to 2018, for example, one of the largest fluctuations since the 1950s. And some years in recent memory that one associates with the rise of factionalism—such as the emergence of the Tea Party in 2010—were years in

which there was dramatically lower party unity voting. The year 2018 demonstrated a significant decline once again, with party unity scores in the Senate dropping by 20% to their second-lowest rate since 2002 (Miller, February 28, 2019). Meanwhile, scholars have scrambled to account for these changes, with some ascribing this to a temporary blip (Caldwell et al. 2018) or the "Trump effect" (Keller, January 15, 2019). For example, Samuel Issacharoff (2016) has argued that the ability of American parties to coordinate political action has been undermined by reforms and legal restrictions including the decline in patronage, the increased reliance on primary elections, and campaign finance reform that disproportionately targets highly visible fundraising by parties. Whatever the cause, Issacharoff argued, the result is a political system led by "hollowed out institutions that are vulnerable to hostile takeover" (2016). Julia Azari argued that it is imperative we better understand a "defining characteristic" of our political moment: why parties are weak but partisanship remains strong (2016). This conforms to a broader scholarly interest in increasing party system volatility across democracies around the world (Liddiard 2018; Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2017).

At a deeper level, some equate problems of U.S. partisan divisions with a dangerous culture war playing out in ideology, political messages, and elections (Mead 2017; Milner and Tingley 2015). One sociological treatment suggested that political antagonisms have played out "not just on the surface of social life (that is, in its cultural politics) but at the deepest and most profound levels; not just at the level of ideology, but in its public symbols, its myths, its discourse, and through the institutional structures that generate and sustain public culture" (Hunter 1991: 4). These dynamics have been visible in recent years, including through the 2016 and 2018 election cycles. Conservatives labeled proposals by Progressives like Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, including a platform of "Medicare for all" and "tuition-free" college, as extremist. Meanwhile, liberals charged that presidential candidate Donald Trump, himself a fringe player in the Republican Party at one time, espoused dangerous nationalist rhetoric that bordered on racism and xenophobia. These and many other examples demonstrate how factionalism has become increasingly salient in U.S. politics today. Nevertheless, the phenomenon remains somewhat "invisible" in academic studies. Many assume that major parties will eventually corral their dissidents and foster a unity of purpose. Factionalism is also sometimes difficult to measure—deviant positions like obstruction can sometimes result in non-events (i.e., no legislation comes up for a roll-

call vote in Congress to mark these episodes), making it harder for political scientists to capture this phenomenon in data. Coding of the U.S. political system as factionalized in the Polity IV dataset, for example, may tell us more about interparty competition than intraparty differences (Cole 2018). Nevertheless, these critically important forces seem to bubble just below the political surface, and we charge they can have distinct effects on foreign policy decision-making.

Finally, even works that do recognize factions must overcome biases in explaining their potential significance for the policy process (Gervais and Morris 2015; Ragusa and Gaspar 2016; Clarke 2017). For example, Gerring (1998: 24) contends, "when viewed in a broad, cross-national context, factionalism does not appear to be a salient characteristic of the American party system." The United States, he argues, represents "no analogue to the faction-ridden parties of Japan, Italy, and France." Indeed, political scientist Howard Reiter has called factionalism, "one of the most widely discussed but under-theorized aspects of party politics" (2004: 251).

Theories of Factionalism

Despite the biases outlined above, we identify ready foundations for our study of factionalism in the comparative politics literature, as well as studies of U.S. state politics. A number of scholars have recognized the complexity of party organizations and their very nature as catch-all organizations comprised of coalitions of different actors. Françoise Boucek has emphasized, for example, that, "political parties are not monolithic structures but collective entities in which competition, divided opinions and dissent create internal pressure" (2009: 455, 2012). Yet, while this dynamic is well recognized in today's advanced industrial democracies, factionalism itself seems to defy the common logic of organization that party unity is essential to electoral success.

Comparative approaches capture some of the complexity of parties. Studies have examined specific typologies of intraparty groups with different attributes, including organization, stability, function, and role (Bettcher 2005; Hine 1982; Janda 1979). Many of these works also discuss projected impacts on political outcomes. For example, Frank Belloni and Dennis Beller's classic *Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspective* (1978) explored factions as agents in a diverse range of political systems, from India and the Philippines to Israel and Bolivia. Other studies identify fascinating links between fac-

tionalism and party government, as well as Cabinet durability in parliamentary regimes (Köllner and Basedau 2005; Leonardi and Wertman 1989; Kohno 1992). Meanwhile, Boucek (2009, 2012) suggested that the organization of factions is not static, but rather fluid in relation to different political issues.

Studies of political parties also adopt different approaches to analyze the organization and activity of factions. For example, some works identify factionalism as a dependent variable, versus an emphasis on its agency (Zariski 1960; Epstein 1980). Others focus on aggregate measures of party unity (Cox and McCubbins 2005) and the power of majorities in gatekeeping proposals. Party unity scores have traditionally provided insights into how the organizations achieve their objectives, but such approaches may also bias how one measures the power of various factions. Some scholars point out analytical distinctions between party cohesion, party discipline, and party unity (Hazan 2006; Rice 1928; Carey 2009). Christian Stecker (2013) asserted that measuring unity through vote aggregation misses key variance in the institutional effects of party structures. Additional studies show that simply relying on high-profile votes may not capture individual entrepreneurship involved in non-legislative resolutions (Heidar and Koole 2000; Laver and Schofield 1998; Hazan 2003). More recently, specific types of political parties have garnered more attention in comparative politics, including the rise of the populist radical right (Verbeek and Zaslove 2015; Mudde 2007, 2013; Schori Liang 2007; Chryssogelos 2010) and its potential influence on policy issue areas such as migration policy and European integration. In summary, comparative political studies of these dynamics demonstrate the importance of factions in select democratic systems, as both agents and products of distinctive political systems.

Scholars also have studied factionalism in U.S. state politics (Key 1949; Sindler 1955; DiSalvo 2012). For example, Howard Reiter (2001, 2004) adopted a functionalist approach, describing factions as the product of exogenous factors, primarily discussing the history of challenges of factions within political parties. These symbolize intraparty divisions from the fully institutionalized and disciplined blocs found in other countries. Factions may be organized, cohesive, and disciplined, and these dynamics can produce bifurcated cleavage structures within parties. Reiter also explored the development of factions and twentieth-century history of U.S. political parties, from Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Edmund Muskie to William Proxmire, using a dominant-minority balance to dis-

cuss the ebb and flow of factions. Sin (2015: 11) also explored the implications of factions for national politics. These "clusters of individuals within a party who share an ideology and a set of core policy preferences" can be more influential in select circumstances, she argues. In more recent work, Gregory Koger, Seth Masket, and Hans Noel have used social network methods to characterize the place of factions within larger information-sharing clusters, or "expanded party networks," that also include interest groups, consultants, and segments of the media (2010). Subsequent work began to examine the shifting balance of power between factions in parties (Budge et al. 2010; Dewan and Squintani 2016).

Ruth Bloch Rubin (2017) offers a valuable theory of intraparty organization at the national level, designed to call attention to the value of party groupings and sub-groupings to help "resolve serious collective action and coordination problems that would otherwise prevent them from effectively challenging congressional leaders for legislative control" (2017: 4). She describes intraparty organizations as capturing more contemporary demands and pace "of an electorate whose increasingly diverse membership the framers could scarcely have imagined." These organizations are "smaller and more agile than majority-seeking party coalitions" and serve to "give voice to constituencies with views and interests that would otherwise be subsumed by demands of coalition-building in a two-party system." Deeper cleavages have become manifest within the parties, as well as across them (Cole 2018: 186). Rubin concluded, "intraparty organizations often exacerbate partisan tensions and forestall legislative compromise by amplifying the voices of legislative minorities" (2017: 5).

In summary, scholars have recognized the importance of Congress and parties in the U.S. political system, but specific roles and strategies of factions in the foreign policy process remain under-studied. The development of distinctive ideological groups, including far-left and far-right clusters of politicians, raises important questions about how minority groups make their voices heard. There is also a healthy debate underway today about whether factions may be more or less influential in a polarized political environment. Party polarization and fragmentation also have impacted contemporary interbranch struggles in the United States, though scholars disagree on its potential impact for foreign policy (Sin 2015; Carter and Scott 2017; Theriault 2008; Rohde 1991; Bond and Fleisher 2000). Some argue that polarization and divided government are conditions that hinder the ability of the executive to secure their preferred policy

outcomes (Binder 2003; Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007). Other works (Jeong and Quirk 2019; Mayhew 1994; Marsh and Lantis 2018) have asserted that polarization may not prohibit foreign policy entrepreneurship. Slightly more nuanced studies have suggested that other factors, such as institutional preferences and intra-branch friction (Binder 1999) and the goals of pivotal players in the process (Krehbiel 1998), may account more fully for the policy record than partisanship.

Factions and Foreign Policy

This study builds upon previous work on factions as agents of change in shaping domestic and foreign policies. We argue factions can play important roles as insurgents in the policy process—more often as obstructionists than innovators. Political scientist Daniel DiSalvo defined factions as (2009: 31): "a party subunit that has enough ideological consistency, organizational capacity, and temporal durability to influence policy making, the party's image, and the congressional balance of power." He added, "Factions exist when some party members share a common identity, are conscious of differences that separate them from other party members, and vote collectively on a range of issues" (2009: 32). They represent important units of analysis between the "responsible party" and the lone legislator, and serve as "agents of preference formation, agenda setting, and coalition building" (2008: 27). They are also considered "ideological cohorts that are smaller and more agile than the party as a whole" (DiSalvo 2009: 27).

Seen in this light, factions may be engines of political change that react to initiatives, help mold them into workable policies or to defeat them, and monitor them through the policy process. Factions "help decide which measure make it onto the agenda and whether they are voted up or down," DiSalvo contended. And often, their activism helps define the very nature of the political party and its effectiveness. He added, "The battle among competing factions or between factions or other groups within the party might be characterized as the struggle for the 'soul' of the party" (2010: 272). While they seek to organize and focus their energies, they also operate "informally by altering folkways and norms under the existing procedural rules." Factions thus become vehicles for members to pursue their own electoral interests by shifting the party's ideological positioning and image to the right or to the left. The coordination functions factions perform can also help members realize what they deem good public policy (McAllister 1991).

Arguments about the agency of factions in U.S. national politics relate well to studies of broader congressional agency and activism in the foreign policy process. For example, according to the theory of congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship developed by Carter and Scott (2009, 2010, 2013, 2017), entrepreneurs are, "legislators who initiate their own foreign policy agendas" (Carter et al. 2004: 280; Kernell 1997; Sinclair 1997). Carter and Scott's policy entrepreneurs are innovators, characterized as "an actor who advocates and seeks to change policy by exploiting opportunities and employing entrepreneurial strategies" (Kingdon 2003: 21). Carter and Scott suggested that congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs exhibit several common characteristics. First, these individuals aspire to be policy leaders (2009: 25; Schneider and Teske 1992; Riker 1986; Bianco and Bates 1990). They are individuals or groups "sufficiently dissatisfied with the administration's existing policy (or lack of a policy) to push for their own initiatives" (Carter and Scott 2009: 19). They often have unique perspectives as problem-solvers—the potential to engage their creative imagination in deliberating potential solutions, as well as the authority to allocate government resources to achieve their goals (Marsh and Lantis 2018; Malnes 1995). Individual entrepreneurs may also demonstrate "social acuity, defining problems, building teams, and leading by example" (Mintrom and Norman 2009: 649; Kingdon 2003). As alert individuals, they are able to identify and seize windows of opportunity for policy change.

It is also important to recognize that factions do not necessarily work alone. Members of factions may generate greater momentum when they work together in coalitions to shape the policy process. Members of factions may find supporters among civil society groups and ally with interest groups and lobbies who share their values. In select circumstances, factions on the far-left and far-right of the major political parties may even find common ground in their challenges to administration initiatives. This is certainly consistent with a pluralist approach to the study of U.S. politics, which recognizes potential links between governmental authority and nongovernmental organizations who use resources to attempt to influence the political process (Dahl 1961). Factional members may reach out to other actors, and find support for broader initiatives in select circumstances. Modern examples include Progressive caucus support from nongovernmental organizations like Moveon.org and NetrootsNation, as well as strong links between the House Freedom Caucus and President Donald Trump. In various forms, these coalitions may help players attain short-term and long-term objectives.

Finally, to date, a limited number of studies have begun to link factionalism and *foreign* policy (Hazan 2000; Mead 2011; Giannetti and Benoit 2009; Dueck 2010). Informed by counter-intuitive approaches such as Mayhew's *Divided We Govern* (1991), Peake (2002) challenged conventional wisdom that divisions necessarily lead to legislative gridlock. Specifically, he explored conditions that contribute to foreign policy challenges, as well as factors that might lead to greater opportunity for creative coalition-building and advancement of foreign policy agendas. An empirical investigation of patterns from 1947 to 1998 found support for his thesis that factionalism does not always yield gridlock, and in some cases actually may foster vibrant political discourse (Peake 2002; Peake et al. 2012). Rathbun (2013) offered an extension of these ideas in his study of the Tea Party as an influential subunit in U.S. foreign policy deliberations. Rathbun (2013) argued that the Tea Party values are more reflective of the Jacksonian tradition in American political thought regarding foreign affairs, not the more isolationist Jeffersonian values. This raises the potential for compromise with establishment Republicans and even some Democrats on foreign policy issues. In 2019, Sitaraman argued, the division between conservatives and Progressives is "perhaps the most interesting—and most misunderstood—development" in foreign policy debates (April 15, 2019).

Theoretical and Empirical Preview

In an era of increased polarization and partisanship, it is imperative that we better understand how minority factions in political parties influence the development of U.S. foreign policy. Among the questions we address are the following: What strategies do minority factions employ, and why? Under what conditions are they more or less successful? How can dissent both stop establishment initiatives and foster innovation in foreign policy?

This book advances a novel framework to examine the impact of factions on foreign policy development in the Obama and Trump administrations. Drawing on insights from social psychology, foreign policy analysis, and comparative politics, we present a multidimensional model of factions as agents in the foreign policy process. We identify three points of leverage for these insurgents and innovators: motivations, strategies, and instruments of influence. This helps cut across biases in the scholarship on democratic systems that disregard factions as more as a "dysfunctional aberration" than a norm (Belloni and Beller 1978: 2). We conduct

a plausibility probe of the minority influence model through process tracing and a structured, focused comparison of eight original case studies. Evidence suggests that factions that demonstrate persistence and consistency in support of minority positions do appear to influence the scope and direction of foreign policy commitments, votes on major legislation, and non-votes over time. It appears that dismissing minority positions on foreign policy and national security may be both politically and analytically shortsighted. This study also offers suggestions for future study of congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship and the rise of factions and populism for foreign policy development.

Case studies offer insights including:

- From 2013 to the present, the Tea Party and Freedom Caucus have played a profound role in debates over comprehensive immigration policy, limiting efforts by centrists in both political parties to find a compromise. Led by activists including Representatives Steve King (R-IA) and Michele Bachmann (R-MN), the faction employed a range of strategies to block reforms during the Obama administration. Freedom Caucus members also cheered on President Trump when he orchestrated the longest shutdown of the federal government in U.S. history in his fight for a border wall in 2018–2019.
- U.S. participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement collapsed under the weight of opposition from anti-globalists, including Progressive Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Bernie Sanders (I-VT). Their challenges to the TPP emboldened opponents on the left and right. When Donald Trump became president in 2017, one of his first acts in office was to withdraw the United States from the trade pact.
- When Bashar al-Assad's regime used Sarin nerve gas in an attack on a suburb of Damascus in 2013, killing more than 1400 people, President Obama appeared to hesitate to follow up his pledge that such an action would cross a dangerous "red line." The White House knew that establishment Democrats and Republicans in Congress might support military retaliation, but factions in both parties were opposed. In a surprise move, the president reversed course on military action and instead sought a face-saving diplomatic route for negotiations with Russia to dismantle Syria's chemical weapons arsenal.

- President Trump faced serious political challenges from Progressives and Democrats in response to his executive orders creating travel bans during his first year in office. When Trump tried to block citizens from specific countries from entering the United States in 2017, Progressives countered that the president was instituting an unconstitutional "Muslim ban." They led the charge in decrying the executive action, advanced legislative challenges to executive excesses, and supported court challenges to block the action.
- Another highly contested dimension of U.S. foreign assistance policy has been the question of whether the United States should fund aid organizations that provide reproductive healthcare, family planning information, and population control measures in developing countries. With the support of the Freedom Caucus, the Trump administration has attacked all forms of federal funding associated with reproductive healthcare, cutting funds, and seeking legislation to block future appropriations.

In summary, this study offers a policy-relevant and timely account of how the United States develops responses to international challenges of the twenty-first century as well as ongoing debates about foreign and security policy. It speaks to political debates within the hyper-partisan environments of the Obama and Trump administration and highlights the role of key foreign policy actors in a liberal democracy.

This book is organized as follows: Chap. 2 develops our minority influence model of foreign policy. It surveys the social psychology literature as a foundation for the development of research propositions focused on the attributes of factions and traditional and nontraditional strategies of influence. It then links this model to broader debates about U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy. Chapter 3 provides a rich look at the evolution of the political party system in the United States over time. It explores the history of political party formulation in the United States and the rise of centripetal political forces that threatened the "Cold War consensus" model of bipartisan foreign policy development. This sets the stage for an examination of liberal and conservative factionalism that have emerged as powerful dynamics in recent decades: the Tea Party and Freedom Caucus inside the Republican Party and the Progressive Caucus in the Democratic Party.

Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 present a series of original case studies of the activism of factions in both major parties. Chapter 4 examines Tea Party