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Non-Nuclear Peace

Beyond the Nuclear Ban Treaty



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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Tom Sauer, Jorg Kustermans and Barbara Segaert

In a time of turbulence in world politics, more than one observer will question the usefulness of an edited book volume that starts with the assumption that a world without nuclear weapons is desirable, not just as a long-term ideal, but as a political—albeit ambitious—goal. On the other hand, the enhanced nuclear rhetoric by Russia and to a lesser extent the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the uncertain future of the Iran deal and the end of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, as well as the North Korean nuclear threat also show that nuclear inertia may be a recipe for disaster.

The nuclear era not only gave birth to extremely powerful atomic (and later on even more destructive H-) bombs, but also marks the start

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of an ongoing discussion about the morality of the use-and threat of use—of these weapons. Nuclear pacifists categorically reject nuclear weapons on ethical grounds, or believe that the dangers that go along with these weapons outweigh their potential stabilizing effects. This volume aims to prolong the ideas behind this particular tradition of thought that we would like to brandish as non-nuclear peace. During the 'Long Peace' after the Second World War (Gaddis 1989), the world came close to nuclear disaster, in particular during the Cuban missile crisis and also later on in the beginning of the 1980s. The main objective of nonnuclear peace is preventing nuclear war. Just as negative peace means the absence of war, non-nuclear peace corresponds to the absence of the fear of nuclear war, something which can in all likelihood only be realized by eliminating nuclear weapons. We therefore define non-nuclear peace as a concept of peace that takes issue with the logic of nuclear deterrence and that envisions a peace order attuned to the exigencies of a post-nuclear world.

Throughout the nuclear era skeptics have come to believe that a world without nuclear weapons is a pipe dream (Payne 1998; Quinlan 2007-2008; Tertrais 2010; Waltz 1981). According to them, a nuclear weapons-free world is not only not feasible, it is also not desirable. They base their perspective on the idea that a strong deterrent is very useful (or even necessary) in an anarchic world in which the state units have to ensure their own survival, since no world government exists that might be relied upon in times of danger. Skeptics further point to the practice of international politics since the beginning of the Cold War, which seems to prove the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. No major war—let alone a world war—has been started since the end of the Second World War, which not by chance (the advocates of nuclear weapons argue) corresponds with the birth of the nuclear era. Nuclear hawks admit that a world without nuclear weapons would be ideal, but that it would be irresponsible to even try to make that happen. A non-nuclear peace, according to them, would be unstable and therefore dangerous. Certainly today, when US hegemony is being questioned due to the upcoming power of China, the growing assertiveness of Russia, and the worldwide rise of nationalism and populism, they argue that the international order should not be further destabilized by eradicating one of the main pillars of stability, namely nuclear weapons.

1 CHANGING CONTEXT, NEW DEBATE

That said, we believe that there is nevertheless reason to try to give a new impulse to the intellectual debate because of other changed international circumstances. This time not for the bad, but for the good (in the eyes of the nuclear pacifists), more in particular the negotiation and conclusion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons ('Ban Treaty') in 2017. While the latter, including the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN's) Nobel Peace Prize in 2017, did not receive much attention from mainstream media, the Ban Treaty can be regarded as revolutionary insofar as it for the first time forbids the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, testing, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. Once the Ban Treaty enters into force, which will probably occur in 2021 at the latest, the existence of nuclear weapons will not only be regarded as inhumane, and therefore immoral and illegitimate, but also illegal, not only by those who are already convinced, but in all likelihood also by more and more people and states that belong to the 'silent majority', even inside the nuclear armed states and their allies. Or that is at least the hope of the advocates of the Treaty (Sauer and Reveraert 2018).

The fact is that due to the aforementioned turbulence in world politics, numerous 'classic' nuclear arms control treaties have not yet entered into force (the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) (CTBT) or have been entirely unilaterally abandoned by the US (the Anti-Ballistic missile Treaty, the Iran deal, INF). Since the future of New Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty (START) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is also at stake, the possibility exists that the Ban Treaty will be the only nuclear disarmament treaty left (together with the regional nuclear weapon free zones treaties).

The Ban Treaty shows the impatience by the majority of states in the world with respect to the implementation of the legal promise of getting rid of nuclear weapons, made by the five formal nuclear weapon states in the NPT. The tables seem to be turning: for the first time ever, the non-nuclear weapon states are in the driving seat, while the nuclear armed states and their allies are a minority. This may result in them feeling stigmatized, but whether this situation will be sufficient to give a boost to nuclear disarmament remains to be seen. Advocates of nuclear weapons certainly do not like the Ban Treaty (Roberts 2018), but it is not always clear whether that is because they believe the Treaty

won't have any effect or whether it will (and therefore bring us closer to abolition).

Regardless of the exact impact of the Ban Treaty, it is useful to start thinking about the next phase, namely how to imagine non-nuclear peace in light of contemporary and future global political and cultural conditions. This is therefore not another edited volume in which proponents and opponents of nuclear elimination repeat their well-rehearsed arguments. The objective here is to leave the trenches and to make another constructive step forward in the thinking on how to reach and sustain a peaceful order without nuclear weapons.

2 Non-Nuclear Peace and Scholarly Responsibility

If there is one scholar without whom nuclear weapons would probably never have been invented, it is Albert Einstein. We refer of course to his scientific inventions that led to the splitting of the atom, but even more to the letter that he and his Hungarian colleague Leo Szilard wrote to US President Roosevelt in 1939. In their letter they warned that German scientists under Hitler were making progress in developing a superweapon. That letter helped convince Roosevelt to set up the gigantic and secret Manhattan Project that led to the development of the first atomic bombs ever produced by humankind, which in turn destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki within a few months. Einstein later admitted that writing that letter was his biggest mistake ever. Einstein was a pacifist right from the beginning. He publicly spoke out against a letter in which the German authorities minimalized the atrocities that happened in the first weeks of the First World War in Belgium. In the 1930s, he had to flee his country to reach the US by boat via Antwerp. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he became an outspoken critic of nuclear weapons. His last public action, right before he died in 1955, was the signing of the so-called Russell-Einstein manifesto, of which the bestknown sentence is: 'Remember your humanity and forget the rest'. It was a warning against the nuclear arms race, signed by different scientists and intellectuals of that time. One of them was Bertrand Russell, the famous British philosopher, pacifist, and socialist. He had actively resisted the UK's participation in the First World War, for which he was jailed for six months. Russell was also an outspoken critic of atomic weapons: in 1959, he published the essay (in the form of a book) 'Common sense and nuclear warfare'. Later on, he founded the International War Crime

Tribunal on Vietnam. One of the other members of this Tribunal was the German philosopher Gunter Anders, born Gunther Stern, cousin of Walter Benjamin, and Ph.D. student of Edmund Husserl. Anders was shocked by what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and later became known in Germany as the 'Atom philosopher'. In his book The Obsolescence of Humankind in 1956, Anders warned of our inability to imagine the destruction that nuclear weapons could provoke. Gunther Anders was first married to Hannah Arendt, who already as a child had read Emmanuel Kant. Before becoming a famous philosopher and political scientist, Arendt studied under Heidegger, had a brief affair with him, and moved to the US because of Nazism, just like Einstein and Anders. Arendt criticized our reliance on nuclear weapons in her book On violence, published in 1972. Last but not least, there is Hans Morgenthau, one of the founding fathers of the study domain of International Relations and known as a quintessential Realist. Nevertheless, just like Anders and Russell, he was against the Vietnam War and against nuclear weapons, and for that reason, championed a world government.

What is remarkable is that these five scholars, who acted not as a group but as individual scholars, all lived through two world wars in the pre-nuclear era, and later on did not embrace nuclear deterrence as a panacea for world peace (see also the chapter by Sylvest in this volume). On the contrary, they strongly believed that the development of nuclear weapons would lead to their use, and in all likelihood, to the end of humankind. They acted as public intellectuals—or norms entrepreneurs as they would be called today (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998)—by writing and speaking out against nuclear weapons. Nowadays, one is surprisingly hard-pressed to find any so-called Realist who opposes nuclear weapons—with Campbell Craig as a notable exception, see also his chapter in this volume. Worse, it is hard to find any public intellectual with the stature of Hannah Arendt who speaks out against nuclear weapons. Is it because there are no intellectuals of that degree anymore? Or is it because current intellectuals have not experienced war themselves? Or because they never lived through a period when nuclear weapons have been used? Or is it because the world has become more dangerous to the extent that even Einstein, if he were alive today, would not have spoken out any longer against nuclear weapons? Or is it because fatalism is far more prevalent today?

In the context of the dearth of scholarly voices publicly speaking out against nuclear weapons, we-as scholars-made the explicit choice to give voice to those experts who believe nuclear elimination is desirable, and that everything should be done to make it feasible. We are proud that some of the most innovative and independent thinkers on nuclear weapons—political scientists, historians, and natural scientists—were willing to contribute to this academic volume. We can only hope that their writings may inspire students of international politics to think harder about how to manage the nuclear weapons threat in the coming decades.

3 The Structure of the Book

The book will be organized around three central themes. The first part of the book-titled Criticism of Nuclear Deterrence and Proliferation: Old and New-sets the stage for the main part of the book by synthetizing the arguments with respect to the desirability of nuclear weapons. Casper Sylvest goes back to the first decades of the nuclear era to reveal different conceptions of the Bomb. He points out the largely forgotten point that public intellectuals like Anders, Russell and Morgenthau, but also Mumford and Herz were willing to question what he calls the normalization of the nuclear condition. In the second chapter, Patricia Lewis asks similar questions for the current period. She believes that the idea that the nature of these weapons prevent largescale war is increasingly being challenged. As the belief in nuclear deterrence wanes and waxes, the risk calculations and the moral discourse about nuclear weapons are also changing. Katarzyna Kubiak concludes this first part with a critical analysis of the most under-researched type of nuclear proliferation, namely vertical proliferation: both the quantitative and qualitative build-up of nuclear arsenals within the existing nuclear weapons states. Obviously, she concludes, developing new nuclear weapons, prolonging the life of existing stockpiles and renewing the nuclear weapons complex are counterproductive to the goal of nuclear disarmament. Apart from some potential disarmament-inducing side-effects, like reducing the numbers and the yields, that approach would ultimately take us further away from a state of non-nuclear peace.

For the intellectual criticism of nuclear peace to lead to a world without nuclear weapons, the arguments need to be mobilized politically. Scholarly arguments need to be transposed to the public sphere and need to be introduced into political decision-making (Ish-Shalom 2006). The second part of the book titled, On the Road to Non-Nuclear Peace: From Ridicule to Stigmatizing Via Prohibition, describes some of

these processes. After the Cold War, as Rodger Payne points out in his chapter, one could witness such politicization of anti-nuclear arguments, when more and more practitioners—former diplomats and retired generals—changed their minds and started to criticize and ridicule nuclear weapons. The most recent and arguably the most promising wave of dissent, however, is the so-called Humanitarian Initiative (starting around 2007) that led to the Ban Treaty. How did the Treaty come about? And what will be the likely effect? For Tannenwald, the Ban Treaty certainly has the ability—despite its limitations—to further strengthen the nuclear taboo. Michal Onderco, in contrast, is more critical, afraid that the Ban Treaty may even undermine the future of the NPT.

The third and last part of the book grapples with the questions of feasibility of this long-term project: what are the steps beyond the Ban Treaty that would allow the creation of a moral-political climate and institutional context that favours the eradication of nuclear weapons? What are the necessary preconditions for creating a world without nuclear weapons? What additional instruments does the world need to create and to maintain peace in a world without nuclear weapons? Is a world government needed, as Campbell Craig argues in the final chapter? Or would it be sufficient to have a second look at the global collective security regime, as Harald Müller recommends? Answering these questions requires that one comes to terms with the particularities of a non-nuclear peace. A non-nuclear peace will be different from a nuclear peace, but will it also be different from a pre-nuclear peace? In other words, to what extent is a non-nuclear peace a post-nuclear peace? How will the memory of the pre-nuclear and nuclear era, but also the legacy of nuclear technology, inform the new-the newly to be imagined and newly to be organized—non-nuclear peace? That is what is addressed in the last part of the book, titled Sustaining Non-Nuclear Peace: Government or Governance in the Longer Term.

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Criticism of Nuclear Deterrence and Proliferation: Old and New

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CHAPTER 2

Conceptions of the Bomb in the Early Nuclear Age

Casper Sylvest

From the time of their invention, nuclear weapons have been associated with a demand for new ideas and a new kind of politics. Trite as it may seem, this is a good starting point for tackling a subject as daunting as this. In fact, due to their deep imbrication in modern politics, science and society nuclear technologies constitute fertile ground for intellectual historians. In recent decades, intellectual history has become increasingly focused on the specific contexts in which ideas were advanced, challenged and defended. It has also extended its purview beyond elite discourse and culture, further underlining its interdisciplinary promise. These positive trends have also, however, highlighted the importance of perspective. It is far from simple to recover 'what people in the past meant by the things they said and what these things "meant" to them', as the late John Burrow defined the enterprise (in Cuttica 2014, p. 914). There are multiple histories, and the choices of the historian matter a great deal.

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