

Contributions to Phenomenology 106

Federica Buongiorno
Vincenzo Costa
Roberta Lanfredini *Editors*

Phenomenology in Italy

Authors, Schools and Traditions

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Preface

Faced with the daunting task of adequately explaining the theoretical reasons behind a philosophical (and editorial) project, at times it is possible to borrow words from poetry. In a letter dated 3 May 1818 and addressed to John Hamilton Reynolds, John Keats voices some thoughts that prove most helpful: “For axioms in philosophy are not axioms until they are proved upon our pulses. We read fine things but never feel them to the full until we have gone the same steps as the Author.”

It seems to us that the process described by Keats closely corresponds to the overall direction (or intention, or—if we like—“spirit”) distinguishing the complex history of the Italian reception and interpretation of Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology. As is widely known, this history can be traced back to the first studies produced by Antonio Banfi in the 1920s. It continues with the rediscovery and revitalisation carried out by Enzo Paci and his school in the 1960s, down to the present day—which is marked by the endurance and broadening of an interest in Phenomenology that, in all its various and shifting forms, seems more alive and fruitful than ever before in Italy.

Certain episodes in this history are revealing of the particular connection established between Italian philosophical culture and Phenomenology: Banfi’s early appreciation of the relevance of Phenomenology as a means to redefine the relation between philosophy and science; the first ever translation into a foreign language of *The Crisis of European Sciences*, with the Italian version produced by Enzo Paci in 1961; the attempt to combine Phenomenology and Marxist theory; and the discovery of the logical and pre-categorical problem and its relation to the theme of history. These are but some examples of the (at times pioneering) acuity with which Italian scholars have received, understood and redeveloped Husserlian philosophy. They have been able to “feel them to the full” by retracing “the same steps as the Author” (to quote Keats)—no mean achievement, given that they had to engage with an essentially new philosophical program whose foundational texts only gradually became available in translation. Not only that, but they have also met the—more or less explicit and conscious—goal of developing a genuinely “Italian Phenomenology.”

While the features of this Italian philosophy are quite evident in the case of Paci and of his interpretative suggestions, certain convergences can also be found in the

different and variously formulated readings offered by the other philosophers discussed here as the chief representatives of the main phenomenological “schools” or “traditions” that took root in Italy. It is enough to recall their names to outline a geographical and thematic map comprising some of the most prominent representatives of twentieth-century Italian culture and philosophy: Antonio Banfi, Sofia Vanni Rovighi, Giulio Preti, Enzo Paci, Dino Formaggio, Giuseppe Semerari, Enzo Melandri, Paolo Bozzi, Carlo Sini, Giovanni Piana and Paolo Parrini—thinkers who, to this day, embody key moments in Italian cultural history, which has significantly drawn upon Husserlian Phenomenology.

It is precisely this context that we have sought to reconstruct in the present volume, without making any claim to exhaustiveness or wishing to impose a predetermined overall view: by inviting the pupils and scholars closest to the above-mentioned interpreters, we have sought to lend a voice to the differences and convergences emerging from the readings offered by the various authors. The outcome, in our view, is a volume which does not merely provide a historical reconstruction or theoretical assessment, but rather constitutes a genuine phenomenological exercise: through a double process of interpretation, the reading of Husserlian thought becomes all the more rich and critically insightful, the more it is nourished by the results progressively achieved by the multifaceted and essentially unbroken tradition of Italian Phenomenology.

We have endeavoured, therefore, to ascertain what Husserl has given or suggested to Italian philosophers. But, at the same time, we have also sought to evaluate and highlight what these philosophers have given or suggested to Husserlian philosophy as such, by influencing it to the point of making it something their own, something part of a specific historical reality and cultural climate that, in a way, was more suited to the reception and redevelopment of phenomenological thought than other European cultural traditions.

In order to appreciate the vitality of phenomenological studies even in contemporary Italy, we must (re)start from the—recent or remote—past we have here attempted to reconstruct. Our heartfelt thanks, then, go out to the authors who through their essays have contributed to the success of this project.

Dresden, Sachsen, Germany
Firenze, Italy
Campobasso, Italy

Federica Buongiorno
Roberta Lanfredini
Vincenzo Costa

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Husserl's Phenomenology Through His Italian Translations



Federica Buongiorno

Abstract One peculiar way of embarking on the study of a particular philosophy is to critically examine how it has been translated into other languages. In this essay I do not wish to enter into an exercise in translation theory: rather, by setting out from my concrete work as a translator, I will try to reconstruct certain aspects of the process of translating Husserl in Italy (which is, partly, also the history of his reception in this country), in order to determine what this can tell to us about Husserlian philosophy. I will proceed by key points, concentrating on some of the decisive moments of the translation and reception of Husserlian thought in Italy, with particular reference to two complementary aspects of this reception: the subject of history on the one hand, and the problem of logic on the other.

One peculiar way of embarking on the study of a particular philosophy is to critically examine how it has been translated into other languages. There are multiple advantages (and complications) offered by such an approach; while the simple reading of a classic in translation already constitutes a more indirect access than the reading of the original, to dwell on a translation *as such* implies consideration of a twofold work: that of the philosopher who has been translated on the one hand, and that of the translator on the other. I do not intend, in this essay, to enter into a reflection on the relations between these two works, i.e. into an exercise in translation theory. Rather, by setting out from my concrete work as a translator, I will try to reconstruct certain aspects of the process of translating Husserl in Italy (which is, partly, also the history of his reception in this country), in order to determine what this can *tell to us about Husserlian philosophy*. In the pursuit of this aim, I will not follow a linear and consecutive development, reconstructing the history of the Italian translations of Husserl, and I will not pretend to examine such translations in their entirety—a venture that would far exceed the limits of this essay. I will rather proceed by key points, concentrating on some of the decisive moments of the translation and reception of Husserlian thought in Italy, with particular reference to two

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complementary aspects of this reception—whose origin is to be located in the 1960s, namely in the reading of Husserl first offered by Enzo Paci, which afterwards branched out (in the sense of its complication and diversification) through the work of interpreters near to him, who were interested in the subject of *history* on the one hand, and in the problem of *logic* on the other.

It is inevitable that we begin, in this reconstruction, with Enzo Paci's "Avvertenza" (Disclaimer) to the translation of *Crisis of European Sciences* realised by Enrico Filippini, published in Milan in 1961 by Il Saggiatore. "The present Italian translation of the last and crucial of Husserl's works," wrote Paci, "is the first translation of the *Crisis* to appear in the world which follows the edition which we owe to Walter Biemel, published in 1954 as Volume VI of the *Husserliana*, directed by Father Hermann Leo Van Breda."¹ This observation says a lot about the way in which phenomenology was received and interpreted in the Italian context at the beginning of the 1960s, which is to say, when Husserlian studies—first arising in the 1920s through the instigation of the first research undertaken by Antonio Banfi—began decidedly to flourish in Italy, thanks also to the ever more systematic work of translation of the original texts. Paci himself recognises this: "the translation of *Crisis*," he observes, "is published at a decisive moment for the rebirth of Husserlian studies in Italy."² The impact that the *Crisis* had in Italy and the programmatic use that was made of it by Paci and his "school" constituted in many ways a peculiarity of the Italian reception, which was unequalled—at least so far as its intentions go—in the rest of Europe; it was, in essence, the most emphasised Husserlian work among those translated up to then.³

Paci carries out a series of instructive reflections both on the level of the work of translation and on the level of its reception and interpretation: in the first case, commending Enrico Filippini for his extremely important and at the same time complex and demanding work, he writes that "to translate Husserl one must thoroughly know his thought, and not let the complex and multifaceted texture of the precise yet fluent phenomenological language slip one's grasp (...),"⁴ by supporting a principle of substantial loyalty to the Husserlian terminology and phraseology, which would constitute—even in the case of the irksome *Appendices* (*Beilagen*) to the text, initially not intended for publication—the highest merit of Filippini's work. "A certain spareness, certain propositions that seem unfinished, and that make one anticipate a

¹Paci, Enzo. 1961. *Avvertenza*. In: Husserl, Edmund. 2002. *La crisi delle scienze europee e la fenomenologia trascendentale* (trans: Filippini, E.). Milan: Il Saggiatore. 1. (All translations of Italian texts are my own).

²Ibid.

³The first Husserlian work translated into Italian was the first two volumes of the *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, translated in 1950 by Giulio Alliney (ed. Enrico Filippini) for Einaudi (Turin 1950). The translation of *Philosophy as Rigorous Science* (ed. Filippo Costa) followed in 1958 (Turin: Paravia).

⁴Paci, *Avvertenza*. In: Husserl, *La crisi delle scienze europee e la fenomenologia trascendentale*, 1.

development which in the end never comes, are what they are, and the translator was neither able nor permitted to intervene in the name of the presumed improvement of the text, as that would have been a betrayal.”⁵ To use Walter Benjamin's words, “The task of the translator consists in finding that intended effect upon the language into which he is translating which produces in it the echo of the original.”⁶ This observation is not at all trivial, if one considers that this was the beginning of the translation activity of the phenomenological texts in Italy: it was necessary in the first place, then, to establish a style and a vocabulary of Husserlian translation that would inevitably constitute a precedent (a sort of “canon”) for the successive works of translation.⁷ With this, Enzo Paci broke trail for “that generation of students (...) who had translated Husserl and Merleau-Ponty in the years in which those philosophers were discovered in Italy;”⁸ that is, a genuine cultural operation in which the activity of translation was functional to a precise interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology.

Thus we come to the question of reception and interpretation: *The Crisis of European Science*, it has been said, was inserted into the framework of a unified cultural programme. Francesco Saverio Trincia rightly observes in his *Guida alla lettura della “Crisi delle scienze europee” di Husserl* (Guidelines to Reading Husserl's “Crisis of European Sciences”):

It was precisely in our country that the *Crisis* had a genuine turn of “fortune,” meaning with this word not only the generic discussion of a transposed text within the cultural debate of reference, but most of all its systematic use in the framework of a coherent programme and a philosophical movement, which aspired to consciously address the Italian culture of the period. In this sense, it is useful to distinguish between what was a more or less commonplace reception of the Husserlian work, progressively translated into the most important European languages, and its “fortune,” which appears in all respects an especially Italian peculiarity.⁹

As is known, this was a matter of applying the late Husserl as a function to a specific intellectual tradition of thought which was, in those years, decisive in the Italian historical context, namely Marxist theory, in the attempt to found a “phenomenological Marxism” based on the Husserlian notion of historical teleology. In 1960, just a year before the publication of the Italian translation of *Crisis*, a text edited by Enzo Paci himself was published, entitled *Omaggio a Husserl* (Tribute to Husserl¹⁰), which brought together a series of contributions for the centenary of the German philosopher's birth, written by important philosophers and interpreters—

⁵Ibid.

⁶Benjamin, Walter. 2000. The Task of the Translator. In: *The Translation Studies Reader*, ed. Lawrence Venuti, 75–83. London: Routledge. 75.

⁷It is undoubtedly also for this reason that the 1961 Filippini translation has resisted revision to this day, as well as any updates in the light of the vast number of subsequent translations.

⁸Boella, Laura. 2007. Traduttori per caso. *aut aut* 334:7–20. Here 14.

⁹Trincia, Francesco Saverio. 2012. Fortuna dell'opera. In: *Guida alla lettura della “Crisi delle scienze europee” di Husserl*. 186–207. Rome-Bari: Laterza.

¹⁰Paci, Enzo (ed.). 1960. *Omaggio a Husserl*. Milan: il Saggiatore.

such as Enzo Melandri, Guido D. Neri, Giuseppe Semerari, Franco Bosio, Franco Voltaggio, Mario Sancipriano, and Renzo Raggiunti—who, indeed, tried to centre their reflection on the historical theme and to corroborate Paci's thesis, according to which:

When the first two parts of the work were published in *Philosophia* magazine in Belgrade, in 1936, it was still possible to believe that the historical interest in Husserl was marginal and secondary. Now the complete text of the *Krisis* demonstrates precisely the contrary: the theme of history is an essential one. It is not an “added” theme, but a theme that necessarily inheres in phenomenology, and without which phenomenology could not have been what it has been, and could not be what it is.¹¹

Paci further defined his own interpretation here, advancing the hypothesis that phenomenology consented “a possible and free critical revision of the entirety of Hegelian philosophy, and, in particular, of the problem of dialectic (...). It has been clear from the start that intentionality implies the problem of dialectic, which is to say the most challenging problem of modern thought.”¹² The ventures of the early 1960s (the translation of the *Crisis* and the volume *Omaggio a Husserl*) sealed a period of systematic revival of phenomenological studies in Italy, whose fundamental stages were the Gallarate symposium of 1955 (with its proceedings, *La fenomenologia*, published in 1956), the two issues of the *Archivio di filosofia* (Archive of Philosophy) on *Il compito della fenomenologia* (The Task of Phenomenology, 1956) and on *Tempo e intenzionalità* (Time and Intentionality, 1960), and G. Pedrolì's monograph dedicated to *La fenomenologia di Husserl* (Husserl's Phenomenology) published in 1958.

The immediate historical functionality of the Pacian interpretation of the late Husserl is rendered yet more evident in the “Preface” to the third Italian edition of the *Crisis*, written in the fateful year of 1968, in which Paci makes the radical affirmation that “the history of Italian philosophy will be divided into two parts. The first part will include the works written before the translation of the *Crisis*, the second those written afterwards”.¹³ This Pacian prophecy did not come to pass to the epochal extent he had hoped by recognising in the combination of Marxism and phenomenology a new revolutionary potential which would enable “a radical transformation that will positively establish a society in which no man will be exploited, and which will intentionally establish a new dialectic of infinite perfection.”¹⁴ As

¹¹ Paci, *Avvertenza*. In: Husserl, *La crisi delle scienze europee e la fenomenologia trascendentale*, 2. Certain variations are present in the contributions offered in *Omaggio a Husserl* by the various authors involved: in particular, one can observe a tendency to make the problem of history emerge from a critical reflection on Husserlian logic, on account of how that logic has been structured since the first phase of Husserl's thought. For a further consideration of this aspect, I take the liberty of referring to my essay: Buongiorno, Federica. 2011. Husserl in Italia (1955–1967). *Il Cannocchiale* 1:77–116.

¹² Paci, Enzo. 1960. *Nota introduttiva*. In: *Omaggio a Husserl*, 5.

¹³ Paci, Enzo. 1968. *Prefazione alla terza edizione italiana*. In: Husserl, *La crisi delle scienze europee e la fenomenologia trascendentale*, 7.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.

Trincia observed, “the great experience of the movements of 1968 explains the sincere enthusiasm shown by Paci, and his projecting a politico-social ideal onto a future of revolutionary social reform.” Nonetheless, “the emphasis here adopted by Paci conflicts with the effective oblivion—until the 1980s—of *The Crisis of the European Sciences* and its presence in the cultural debate in Italy,” to the point that one might ask oneself “if the Pacian interpretation of Husserlian philosophy has not been, in its radicality, a factor restricting the echo that the ‘humanistic’ message of the *Crisis* hurls against its disenchanted reader.”¹⁵

1968 was, on the other hand, the year of the publication of the first Italian translation of *Logical Investigations*, edited by Giovanni Piana.¹⁶ In just 4 years the three principal logical works of Husserl were translated into Italian: in 1965, *Experience and Judgement* was published in Filippo Costa’s translation, followed in 1966 by *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, edited by Davide Guido Neri. Thus an in-depth overview was offered of the vast topic of the “logical” Husserl and of the relations between the logical sphere and the phenomenological investigation proper. Although the *Investigations* have predominately taken on, in the course of their reception, the sense of a trenchant critique of psychologism and of the reduction of logic to the principles of psychology (even that experimental psychology introduced in a systematic way by Franz Brentano, Husserl’s Viennese teacher), their importance far exceeds the disciplinary question and concerns the very self-comprehension of phenomenology as a critique of consciousness. As I have attempted to show elsewhere, and as has been recognised by important studies in this field,¹⁷ the *Investigations*

¹⁵ Trincia, Fortuna dell’opera. In: *Guida alla lettura della “Crisi delle scienze europee” di Husserl*. 186–207.

¹⁶ Husserl, Edmund. 1968. *Ricerche logiche*, ed. G. Piana. Milan: il Saggiatore.

¹⁷ I have dwelt on this subject, which is to say on the possibility of a more “continuist” reading of Husserlian thought in the light of the presence, already in the *Logical Investigations*, of a pre-categorical problem, in the re-elaboration of my doctoral thesis (Buongiorno, Federica. 2014. *Logica delle forme sensibili. Sul precategoriale nel primo Husserl*. Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura). In particular, I have availed myself of the observations already made by important scholars of Husserl: Costa, Vincenzo. 1999. *L’estetica trascendentale fenomenologica. Sensibilità e razionalità nella filosofia di Edmund Husserl*. Milan: Vita e Pensiero; De Palma, Vittorio. 2003. *Forma categoriale e struttura dell’esperienza. Paradigmi* 21:159–165; Lohmar, Dieter. 1998. *Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken. Hume, Kant und Husserl über vorprädikative Erfahrung und prädikative Erkenntnis*. Dordrecht: Kluwer; Lanfredini, Roberta (ed.). 2006. *A priori materiale. Uno studio fenomenologico*. Milan: Guerini e Associati. The study of the monographs dedicated to Husserlian logic by certain Italian interpreters proved crucial; these interpreters contributed to the aforementioned “rebirth” of Husserlian studies in Italy, initiated by Enzo Paci, and they—in surprising advance of the times—have grasped and investigated, within Husserl’s logic, the “question of the precategorical,” with various allusions and nuances, and with particular reference to the *Investigations* and to *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, bringing to light the difficulties posed by this to Phenomenology as a whole (see Bosio, Franco. 1966. *Fondazione della logica in Husserl*. Milan: Lampugnani Nigri Editore; Melandri, Enzo. 1960. *Logica e esperienza in Husserl*. Bologna: il Mulino; Raggiunti, Renzo. 1967. *Husserl. Dalla logica alla fenomenologia*. Florence: Le Monnier; Sancipriano, Mario. 1962. *Il logos di Husserl*. Turin: Bottega d’Erasmus; Voltaggio, Franco. 1965. *Fondamenti della logica di Husserl*. Milan: Edizioni di Comunità).

cannot be reduced, at least in certain significant points (I am thinking in particular of the *Fifth* and the *Sixth Investigation*), to their traditional characterisation as “pre-phenomenological” work. Rather, they present—if only in embryonic form and between the lines, so to speak—what appears to me to be the decisive problem of phenomenology as a philosophical proposition and as a new, radical theory (and critique) of consciousness, namely: the problem of the pre-categorical, and of its relations with the formations of higher logic. This problem is essentially equivalent to that of the relations between phenomenology and logic, as Giovanni Piana emphasises in his “Introduction” to the Italian edition of *Investigations*. We read at its opening:

The work of Husserl in the field of the problems of logic, which finds a first and noteworthy expression in his *Logical Investigations*, proves difficult to evaluate even now, above all if one attempts to consider it in the light of contemporary logic in its entirety. This uncertainty is visible both on the part of Husserlian interpreters, and on the part of the specialist in logic.¹⁸

The uncertainty in question has deep theoretical roots: whereas the *Prolegomena* address a radical critique to psychologism, positing the bases for a “pure” logic in the mathematical sense of the term, the six *Investigations* do not seem to be designed to develop and construct any such “mathematising” logic; rather, they constitute an exercise in genuine phenomenological analysis.¹⁹ The question which inevitably follows concerns, therefore, both the structural passage from the critique of psychologism carried out in the *Prolegomena* to the *Investigations* themselves, and the very relationship between phenomenological research and logical theory: the inquiry conducted in the six *Investigations* tend “to break the circle of strictly logical interests, to the point of attempting an elaboration, which has already been relatively accomplished, of intentional acts in general, as happens in the *Fifth Investigation*”.²⁰ From here arises the accusation—levelled at Husserl—that he even fell into psychologism, in spite of the critical preliminary reflections contained in the *Prolegomena*. Although Husserl many times denied this accusation, justly noting its incoherence,²¹ there remains the problem of the impossibility of accessing the execution of the logical problem delineated in the *Prolegomena* (namely, the

¹⁸ Piana, Giovanni. 1968. *Introduzione*. In: Husserl, *Ricerche logiche*, xi.

¹⁹ Piana observes that “through the studies of logicians whose background—as in the case of Husserl himself—lies in arithmetical and geometrical studies rather than in German Romantic philosophy, the idea emerges of logic as a mathematical discipline (...). That this idea of the mathematicalness of logic ought to be connected to a critique of the psychologistic tendency was not immediately obvious (...).” *Ibid.*, xiv. This is the reason for the Husserlian interest in Leibniz and, above all, for the logical doctrine of Bernard Bolzano in the *Wissenschaftslehre* of 1837—whose rediscovery, as is known, Husserl is explicitly credited with in the *Entwurf einer “Vorrede” zu den “Logischen Untersuchungen”* of 1913, published in 1939 in *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie* (1:106–133 and 2:319–333). Here 129, note.

²⁰ Piana, *Introduzione*. In: Husserl, *Ricerche logiche*, xviii.

²¹ Suffice it to mention his words in the *Preface to the Sixth Investigation* (1920) and in the *Entwurf* of 1913.

realisation of a theory of the possible forms that is configured as an authentic “pure” logic), unless one preliminarily passes through phenomenology. A further question derives from this: in what relation do phenomenology and logic stand to one another? Does formal logic lead one to phenomenology, in the sense that it must in reality precede it—which is to say, does formal logic emerge in its insufficiency only in the light of the phenomenological approach? For while on the one hand logic for Husserl—*contra* Brentano and, in this respect, *pro* Kant—does not need to be based on psychology, on the other hand it (if only as a formal logic) does not seem capable of that self-sufficiency and perfect completeness attributed to it by Kant in the *First Critique*.

This is not a trivial problem. If we examine the aforementioned monographs of that Italian scholar who, following Enzo Paci, thematised the problem of history in the late Husserl beginning with the theme of logic (in monographs—it should be noted—written before the Italian translation of the *Logical Investigations*, with the exception of the Raggiunti text, and even before the publication of the Italian edition of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, which dates to 1966), we observe a full awareness of the difficulties and even of the aporias deriving from the complex relation which Husserl instituted between phenomenology and logic—a relation that, wishing to avoid the classic foundational dynamic, sets before the phenomenologist the great challenge of the “order” or the “framework” (*Einordnung*, to use the Husserlian term) of logic within phenomenology. As Piana justly observes, Husserl himself was not entirely conscious of this complexity in the *Logical Investigations*: in order to untangle the knot of this problem, “what proves crucial is the idea of the justification of the arithmetical and geometrical construction through the concepts of theory and of the form of theory—a justification, that is, which is based on the distinction of formal levels and thus on the passage to the higher formal level.”²² However, “this point of view is not adequately developed in the *Logical Investigations* and neither, ultimately, in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (...).”²³

To find an initial systematic discussion of this specific theme and an authentic awareness of its various problematic aspects, we will have to wait till some years after the publication of the *Logical Investigations*, namely 1906–07, when Husserl held a cycle of lectures on *Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge*, whose publication in *Husserliana* occurred however long after (in 1985) the period of time under consideration (namely the 1960s). To complete the picture, it is necessary to jump to 1966, the year of the publication of the Italian edition of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, in the translation by Guido Davide Neri and with a “Preface” by Enzo Paci. The latter text is of particular importance, since it illustrates the connection between Husserlian logical elaboration and the problems inherent in the *Crisis*. It could be said that, in Paci’s view, the question of the relations between formal logic and transcendental logic reproduces (or anticipates) the problem of the relation between positive science and philosophy. Paci first warns the reader that

²² Piana, *Introduzione*. In: Husserl, *Ricerche logiche*, xxiii.

²³ *Ibid*.

“it has often been observed by scholars that Husserl’s fundamental interest always lays in logic (...)” and that “this thesis has its element of truth, but cannot be pushed to the point of isolating the problems of logic from those of general phenomenology, which includes, precisely in relation to logic, the analysis of the experience and of the subjective constitution (...).”²⁴ He then adds:

In *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, the foundation of logic is presented even as an analysis of the historical formation of logic itself: from this point of view the genesis of logic must be reactivated and reconstituted. This task is joined to that of unifying the sciences beginning from their “roots” (...). This awareness must reactivate the sense and the function of the sciences: the theme of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, from this point of view, is above all the awareness of the logic.²⁵

This quotation is important for two reasons: in the first place, it affirms the continuity between the investigations conducted by Husserl in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and the considerations on the “self-oblivion” of positive science, conducted in *The Crisis of European Sciences*. In the need for a transcendental foundation of formal logic Paci identifies the inadequacy of the latter, with its merely objective character, to constitute itself as a “guide to critical self-awareness” for the positive sciences—an inadequacy emphasised by Husserl himself, but which here is expressed with particular awareness (and we thus arrive at the second reason for the importance of the aforementioned step) of the necessity to critically bind formal logic (in the Kantian sense of the term as a “self-sufficient” and “self-satisfied” discipline)—to transcendental logic in the Husserlian sense: “(...) formal logic is not sufficient,” writes Paci, quoting Husserl, “because ‘it is unable to satisfy the idea of an authentic doctrine of science and so to rise to the status of a norm for all the sciences’ (...). To formal logic must then follow transcendental logic, which is to say the study of the subjective aspect of logic, which is ever connected to the critique of the psychologism.”²⁶ Paci does not fail to connect the question of the transcendental to the precategorical (or ante-predicative) problem (which was central in *Experience and Judgement*, whose translation had appeared just a year before, in 1965, it too accompanied by an “Introduction” by Paci²⁷):

Without doubt, all of Husserl’s effort is oriented toward overcoming the division between the material and the formal, between experience and judgement, between original modality and logical structure. Authentic evidence is the pregnant evidence of experience: the common thread which should be chosen is precisely the genesis of the judgement from experience (...). It is thus that one arrives at precategorical or ante-predicative evidence.²⁸

²⁴ Paci, Enzo. 1966. *Prefazione*. In: Husserl, Edmund. 1966. *Logica formale e trascendentale: saggio di critica della ragione logica* (trans: Neri, G.D.). Rome-Bari: Laterza. (Republished in 2009, Udine: Mimesis). 9–10.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Husserl, Edmund. 1965. *Esperienza e giudizio: ricerche sulla genealogia della logica* (trans: Costa, F.). Introduction by E. Paci. Milan: Silva (republished in 2007, Milan: Bompiani).

²⁸ Paci, *Prefazione*. In: Husserl, *Logica formale e trascendentale*, 11.

(Formal) logic, the transcendental theme and the historical dimension, are, in the eyes of Paci, elements of the same theoretical web that, far from delineating a contradiction between the “various Husserls” or various souls of phenomenology, passes throughout Husserlian thought by determining its continuity.²⁹ We are therefore brought back to the problematic order identified by Piana in relation to the *Logical Investigations*, namely the theme of the relations between logic and phenomenology, between the objective domain and transcendental sphere. As I have anticipated, this problem was already systematically addressed in volume XXIV of the *Husserliana*, containing the lectures on the introduction to logic and the theory of knowledge of 1906/07.³⁰

The case of HUA/XXIV is particularly significant and complex for the author of the present essay, for the simple reason that she personally produced its Italian translation, which has been published earlier in 2019. Naturally, multiple and complex relative factors enter into play here, on the one hand in the concrete work of translation of and engagement with the original text, and, on the other, with my personal understanding of the Husserlian discourse.

In the very act of addressing myself to this challenging translation —by now many years ago—of a volume of the *Husserliana*, I bore in mind Klaus Held's admonition with regard to the methodology of scientific translation, expressed in an interview dating back to 2000:

My experience collaborating with colleagues from the most various linguistic realms has taught me that it can be, if not fatal, certainly hindering to the productive reception of the thought of a philosopher in a specific linguistic culture, as well as the source of endless misunderstandings which are in themselves avoidable, when translations are carried out separately, and the translators do not communicate with each other and do not mutually take one another into consideration. Instead of a single Japanese Heidegger, we then encounter half a dozen!³¹

Fortunately the foremost Husserl translator active in Italy today, Vincenzo Costa, has followed the process of my translation, which also availed itself early on of Stefano Besoli's advice. While my work certainly took comfort and greater security from this, the experience of having to make translation choices remained quite unavoidable and in some ways overwhelming: the translation of a classic poses to the translator, on the one hand, the challenge of finding, if not “inventing,” the “right

²⁹ It is well known how strong the inclination was, already in Husserl's time, to read the different “turns” of his thought in a markedly critical and discontinuist way: it suffices to recall, as I have already done, the misunderstandings to which the *Fifth* and, above all, the *Sixth Logical Investigation* were subjected by virtue—as Husserl himself complained—of their phenomenological character; or the “transcendental turn” of *Ideas I* in 1913, which was greeted with great disappointment by Husserl's most direct pupils, who saw in this a betrayal of the programme presented in the *Logical Investigations*, or even a subjectivistic mystification of phenomenology.

³⁰ Husserl, Edmund. 2008. *Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge. Lectures 1906/07* (trans: Hill, C.O.). Dordrecht: Springer.

³¹ Marini, A., Rizzoli, L. (ed.). 2000. Intervista a Klaus Held sulla traduzione di Husserl e Heidegger. *Magazzino di filosofia* 2:5–17. Here 7.