Grey and White Hulls

An International Analysis of
the Navy-Coastguard Nexus

Edited by
Ian Bowers · Swee Lean Collin Koh

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACGF	Arctic Coast Guard Forum
AIS	Automatic Identification System
AOPV	Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessel
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARA	Armada Argentine [Argentina Navy]
ASB	Anti-Smuggling Bureau (China)
BAKAMLA	Badan Keamanan Laut Republik Indonesia—[Indonesian Maritime Security Agency]
BAKORKAMLA	Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut [Maritime Security Coordinating Agency]
C2	Command and Control
C3	Command, Control and Communications
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CARP	Administration Commissions of the Río de la Plata
CC2C	Changi Command and Control Centre (Singapore)
CCG	Canadian Coast Guard
CCG	China Coast Guard
CGS	Canadian Government Ship
CIWS	Close-in Weapons System
CMAG	Comprehensive Maritime Awareness Group (Singapore)
CMPB	China Maritime Police Bureau
CMS	China Maritime Surveillance
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CONICET	The National Council for Scientific and Technical Research (Argentina)

COSCOM	Coastal Command (Singapore)
CPC	Communist Party of China
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
CUES	Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea
DFO	Department of Fisheries and Oceans (Canada)
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DI/TII	Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia [Islamic Armed Forces of Indonesia]
DMD	Department of Militia and Defence (Canada)
DMF	Department of Marine and Fisheries (Canada)
DoD	Department of Defense (United States)
EDA	Excess Defense Articles
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EFZ	Exclusive Fisheries Zone
ERF	Emergency Response Forces (Singapore)
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
FAC	Fast Attack Craft
FBS	Federal Border Service (Russia)
FLEC	Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (China)
FPS	Fisheries Protection Service (Canada)
FPZ	Fisheries Protection Zone
FSB	Federal Security Service (Russia)
GAC	General Administration of Customs (China)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMF	Global Maritime Fulcrum
HA/DR	Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
HACGAM	Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting
ICA	Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (Singapore)
ICG	Iceland Coast Guard
IFC	Information Fusion Centre (Singapore)
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IMSO	International Mobile Satellite Organization
IUU	Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing
JCG	Japanese Coast Guard
JDA	Japanese Defense Agency
JGSDF	Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force
JIATF	Joint Interagency Task Force
JIIM	Joint Interagency Intergovernmental and Multinational
JMOD	Japanese Ministry of Defense
JMSDF	Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force
JO	Joint Operation
JRCC	Joint Rescue Coordination Centre
JSDF	Japanese Self-Defense Force

JTF	Joint Task Force
KCG	Korea Coast Guard
KMP	Korean Maritime Police
LEDET	Law Enforcement Detachment
LRAD	Long Range Acoustic Device
LRIT	Long Range Identification and Tracking
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MERCOSUR	Common Market of the South
MGP	Maritime Great Power
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs (Singapore)
MINDEF	Ministry of Defence (Singapore)
MIO	Maritime Interdiction Operations
MLE	Maritime Law Enforcement
MLEA	Maritime Law Enforcement Agency
MND	Ministry of National Defense (Vietnam)
MOA	Memoranda of Agreement
MOFA	Ministry of Ocean and Fishery Affairs (ROK)
MOTR	Maritime Operational Threat Response
MPA	Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore
MSA	Maritime Safety Administration (China)
MSA	Maritime Security Agency (Japan)
MSTF	Maritime Security Task Force (Singapore)
NAFO	Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NLL	Northern Limit Line
NMCOP	National Maritime Common Operating Picture (Singapore)
NMOG	National Maritime Operations Group (Singapore)
NMSG	National Maritime Sense-making Group (Singapore)
NMSS	National Maritime Security Strategy
NOA	National Oceanic Administration (China)
NORDEFCO	Nordic Defence Cooperation
NPAFC	North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission
NPCGF	North Pacific Coast Guard Forum
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
NWMP	North-West Mounted Police
OMSI	Oceanic Maritime Security Initiative
ONF	One National Fleet
OPCON	Operational Control
PAFMM	People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia
PAP	People's Armed Police (China)
PCG	Police Coast Guard (Singapore)
PLAN	People's Liberation Army Navy
PLH	Patrol Ship—Large Helicopter

PNA	Perfectura Naval Argentina [Naval Prefecture]
PPA	Offshore Multipurpose Patrol Ships
RCN	Royal Canadian Navy
RHCC	Regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Coordination Centre (Singapore)
RN	Royal Navy
ROCRAM	Operative Network of regional Cooperation among Maritime Authorities of the Americas
ROKN	Republic of Korea Navy
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade
RSAF	Republic of Singapore Air Force
RSN	Republic of Singapore Navy
SAF	Singapore Armed Forces
SAR	Search and Rescue
SatCen	European Satellite Centre
SC	Singapore Customs
SCDF	Singapore Civil Defence Force
SCGI	Sea and Coast Guard Indonesia
SICAP	Integrated Information System (Argentina)
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication
SMCC	Singapore Maritime Crisis Centre
SOA	State Oceanic Administration (China)
SOLAS	Safety of Life at Sea
SOMS	Straits of Malacca and Singapore
TAC	Total Allowable Catch
TACON	Tactical Control
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia [Indonesian Military]
TNI-AL	Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Laut [Indonesian Navy]
UNC	United Nations Command
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USN	United States Navy
VCG	Vietnam Coastguard
VPA	Vietnam People's Army
VPN	Vietnam People's Navy
WGCGF	Western Pacific Coast Guard Forum
WoG	Whole-of-Government
WPNS	Western Pacific Naval Symposium

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Introduction

Ian Bowers and Swee Lean Collin Koh

There are multiple sources of instability on the world's oceans. On a state level, geostrategic ambition and competition at sea have become almost inseparable from disputes over maritime territory and sovereignty creating littoral environments rife with geopolitical tension. At the same time, lawlessness, including illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, people smuggling and other transnational, transboundary maritime security threats, is growing in prominence and poses a significant challenge to good order at sea. The ramifications of this new reality at sea directly impinge upon security and stability on land and are driving significant changes in the operationalisation of maritime security and defence.

This evolving geostrategic environment at sea challenges traditionally held concepts of naval operations, mission delineation and the use and utility of civilian or paramilitary maritime law enforcement agencies (MLEA). For naval forces, the return of great power competition in both

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Asia and Europe has heralded a renewed emphasis on deterrence and warfighting. However, maritime security and good order at sea, concepts that gained substantial traction during the post-Cold War years, have simultaneously risen in prominence and are now central tenants of the national security thinking in maritime states across the world.[1]

National security and naval strategy are thus increasingly conceived across a continuum where warfighting and broader notions of maritime security are closely connected in both operations and strategic goals. Consequently, maritime law enforcement missions and the military and civilian agencies that carry them out have growing strategic relevance as the maintenance of maritime sovereignty, economic rights and the enforcement of good order at sea become hot-button strategic issues in capitals across the world.[2] This is evident in the maritime doctrines of states and international organisations which seek to provide a "comprehensive or holistic account of the challenges to be faced at sea".[3]

Traditionally, navies and MLEA have maintained a degree of operational distance. National defence and security are the primary determinants of any navy's operations. Therefore, first and foremost navies must equip and prepare for wartime contingencies.[4] However, most navies maintain a secondary emphasis on maritime security operations or what Booth describes as a policing function role.[5]

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[1] However, of course it is necessary to take into account the region-specific contexts and nuances. In East Asia, for instance, government authorities have long been grappling with such transboundary and transnational challenges at sea such as IUU fishing, human trafficking, arms and drugs smuggling, as well as illicit trade. As such, enforcement actions carried out against such lawlessness have long become a part of a traditional set of missions performed by maritime agencies in this region.

[2] The increasing emphasis by major so-called Western powers on the free and open use of the seas particularly in East and South Asia, but also in Europe and the Arctic is a demonstration of the importance of this issue. See Alex N. Wong, Briefing on the Indo-Pacific Strategy, US Department of State, April 2, 2018, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/04/280134.htm; Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Priority Policy for Development Cooperation FY 2017, April 2017, 9–10, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000259285.pdf.

[3] Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, "Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies," *International Affairs* 93, no. 6 (2017): 1297–1298.

[4] Lyle J. Morris, "Crossing Interagency Lines: Enhancing Navy-Coast Guard Cooperation in Gray Zone Conflicts of East Asia," *Asia-Pacific Journal of Ocean Law and Policy* 3 (2018): 278–279.

[5] Ian Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare* (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 154.

In contrast, MLEA, which may include but are not limited to coast-guards, maritime police and maritime militia, carry out law enforcement and maritime security duties as their primary function.[6] MLEA have traditionally been tasked with a wide variety of missions including protecting maritime sovereign rights, enforcing national maritime laws as well as providing other public goods such as search and rescue (SAR) and environmental protection.[7] This does not mean that national defence does not fall under their operational orbit, but rather it is a lower priority when compared with their military counterparts.

The contemporary maritime environment is blurring the lines between the operations of navies and MLEA as they now frequently perform similar roles despite their different operational approaches and priorities. MLEA are now key instruments in a state's maritime policies and by extension security strategies. States which previously have not possessed such agencies or have hitherto accorded them low priority are now developing or bolstering them to manage the multitudes of maritime challenges they face. The MLEA of some states have found themselves on the frontline of interstate tensions, not just protecting maritime sovereignty and economic rights, but also contesting rival claims. This is resulting in the proliferation of larger and more heavily armed MLEA vessels particularly, but not exclusively, in the contested waters of East Asia. For those states that solely possess a navy which simultaneously performs traditional warfighting and maritime law enforcement missions, there has been an ongoing reprioritisation of roles directed towards the capacity to address low-intensity threats at sea while also maintaining warfighting capabilities. Vitally, states with more than one actor at sea are reconceptualising the way their maritime agencies work together. For instance, states are bringing their navies and MLEA closer together, promoting synergy between them and when feasible developing joint operational concepts and encouraging joint operations.

It is important to acknowledge the geographic scope of this shift in maritime operations. The near global promulgation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has codified international laws regarding the delineation of maritime territory and

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[6] Prabhakaran Paleri, *Coast Guards of the World and Emerging Maritime Threats*, Ocean Policy Studies, Special ed. (Tokyo: Ocean Policy Research Foundation and The Nippon Foundation, 2009), 51.

[7] Ian Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare*, 154–155.

economic rights. Although this has provided a degree of certainty when boundaries are agreed, the gaps within the provisions enshrined in the convention, especially with respect to the interpretations of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) regime, have, in the words of Geoffrey Till, "triggered as many disputes as it has resolved".[8] Essentially, UNCLOS has extended and magnified maritime sovereignty and economic disputes, turning them into issues of national pride and strategic importance.[9] Equally, the unregulated nature of the ocean as a global commons allows for the exploitation of the sea both as a medium of transport and as an easy, if over-exploited, resource trove. Crucially, lawlessness and human deprivation which originates from weak or unstable forms of governance on land are often transferred across borders via the sea.[10]

For example, in the East Asian geostrategic maritime environment, multiple and diverse military and civilian actors now operate at sea, contesting maritime territory, exploiting weaknesses and forwarding national strategic agendas in a coordinated manner that falls considerably short of traditionally understood war at sea. In maritime flashpoints such as the East and South China Seas, MLEA vessels or "white hulls" are interacting with naval "grey hulls" with significant implications for the maintenance of maritime crisis stability.[11] In the Mediterranean, a humanitarian crisis with substantial political and strategic ramifications for Europe continues to unfold. Military and civilian maritime agencies have deployed to meet the challenge of refugees crossing the Mediterranean to reach the shores of Europe while also managing the consequences of a renewed Russian presence and continued instability in the Middle East.[12]

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[8] Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*, 2nd ed. (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 311.

[9] Bernard Cole, *Asian Maritime Strategies: Navigating Troubled Waters* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 33.

[10] Examples of this include the mass movement of refugees across the Mediterranean since 2015 or the use of the sea as a means of transport for terrorist and other criminal activities. For an overview of these issues, see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Combatting Transnational Organised Crime Committed at Sea, Issue Pape*r (New York: United Nations, 2013).

[11] See Lyle Morris, "Blunt Defenders of Sovereignty: The Rise of Coast Guards in East and Southeast Asia," *Naval War College Review* 70, no. 2 (2017): 75–112.

[12] See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *The Sea Route to Europe: The Mediterranean Passage in the Age of Refugees* (New York: UNHCR, 2015).

Meanwhile, in the Arctic, warming waters are altering the strategic picture, potentially creating a new environment for competition at sea.[13] In all of these theatres, the maritime security structures of multiple nation-states are adjusting to this new set of strategic challenges.

Understanding the Navy-Coastguard Nexus

Using case studies, this volume seeks to explore these new maritime strategic dynamics. It examines how states have created or are transforming their maritime security architectures to meet the realities of today's security challenges in the maritime domain. We call this organisational and strategic approach the navy-coastguard nexus. This term does not imply a dual agency approach to maritime security, as is seen for example in the United States; rather, it is an expression which encompasses how a nation-state's strategic and organisational structures respond to a blurred maritime landscape. In doing so, the volume seeks to answer the following questions.

- What are the internal and external drivers of the navy-coastguard nexus?
- What are the operational, cultural and organisational barriers to altering the navy-coastguard nexus?
- What implications does a shifting navy-coastguard nexus have for stability at sea?

Navy-Coastguard Nexus Organisational Typologies

There is a wide array of national organisational structures designed to manage the navy-coastguard nexus. There is no one optimal approach as each organisational structure and consequent delineation and prioritisation of missions and areas of operation is determined by a wide array of internal and external factors. However, we have identified three broad organisational models which can help define how states approach the navy-coastguard nexus:

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[13] See Rolf Tamnes and Kristine Offerdal, "Introduction," in *Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic: Regional Dynamics in a Global World*, ed. Rolf Tamnes and Kristine Offerdal (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 1–11.

- The **sole agency** structure has one primary actor which meets most if not all a state's maritime security requirements. That actor could be either a navy which also has total responsibility for maritime law enforcement and the provision of public goods or a MLEA that has a limited or no military function. While this sole agency approach is more commonly associated with smaller, resource-limited states such as Ireland, Iceland or New Zealand, larger states including the United Kingdom have also adopted this organisational structure. This is a commonly observed structure, with many of the world's navies taking responsibility for the entire spectrum of peace- and/or wartime operations. In this structure, the sole maritime agency will work alongside other relevant agencies such as police, customs and immigration and SAR services but may also possess limited or full constabulary powers.
- The **dual agency structure** is the most commonly understood, but by no means the most commonly seen, maritime security architecture. In this case, there are a single defined civilian or paramilitary MLEA which operate separately from the navy. The United States, Japan, South Korea, Sweden and others have adopted this approach. Traditionally, this has resulted in a clear delineation of labour between both forces, with each having its own procedures, equipment, operational priorities and areas of operation.[14] Coordination between both agencies may occur, dependent on bureaucratic, strategic and geographic approaches and priorities. Further, in some cases, a state will have a navy and a coastguard, but both are operated under one single parent agency. This is true in the case of Norway, where naval officers are "dual-hatted" sometimes serving on naval vessels and other times on coastguard ships.
- The **multiple agency structure** has several MLEA operating alongside a military naval force. In this case, often there can be overlapping responsibilities and jurisdictions between the diverse MLEA. China for instance operates a coastguard and a maritime safety administration alongside a navy. Similarly, Italy has a number of civil

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[14]It is important to note that this clear delineation may for some countries exist more in theory than in practice, especially when the navy, for example, has to step in to intervene on behalf of its MLEA counterpart simply because the latter lacks the requisite capability to perform certain tasks.

and paramilitary forces operating at various distances and locations around the Italian coast. This multiple agency structure may also take the form of a navy and a single civilian or paramilitary organisation having certain jurisdiction or control over diverse, multiple MLEA. This is the case for Indonesia which has a navy and a maritime security agency that has several MLEA under its umbrella with varying degrees of control over each.

Determinants of Structure and Transformation

How a state understands and operationalises the navy-coastguard nexus is driven by several factors. Geoffrey Till argues that such a nexus usually develops in one of two distinct ways. The first is an organic process, where a state's needs evolve over time and organisational shifts occur gradually in response to internal and external circumstances.[15] The second is a "conscious decision" to develop a specific maritime security architecture.[16]

While true, this division of determinant processes does not provide an adequate framework for the central questions this volume poses. Instead, this volume draws upon the literature on military transformation and innovation. This literature has limitations including, a US-centric bias, an overt emphasis on technological drivers and a lack of analysis on innovation at times between war and peace.[17] However, it does lend a guiding hand in determining both why and how security organisations innovate.

Table 1.1 draws upon a framework developed by Theo Farrell to explain British military innovation. Adjusted and adopted for the navy-coastguard nexus, this framework identifies three major factors to determine why a nation-state both creates and adjusts its maritime security architecture, and four significant factors that shape, both positively and negatively, how this process occurs.

The state's perception of its external maritime security environment constitutes the primary driver of the navy-coastguard nexus. This security environment determines how states prioritise and respond to threats

[15] Till (2009), 315.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, "New Sources of Military Change—Armed Forces as Normal Organisations," *Defence Studies* 16, no. 3 (2016), 312–326, 319–320.

Table 1.1 Deriving the determinants of the navy-coastguard nexus

Determinants of military innovation		Determinants of the navy-coastguard nexus	
Drivers	External threat Emulation	Drivers	National maritime interests Maritime operations Emulation
Shaping factors	Resources Domestic politics Military culture	Shaping factors	Resources Maritime geography Strategic culture Bureaucratic/domestic politics

Source Adapted from Theo Farrell, "The Dynamics of British Military Transformation," *International Affairs* 84, no. 4 (2008): 777–807, 708–783

to their national maritime interests. The use of the term "national maritime interests" is deliberately chosen over the often used "maritime security". Maritime security is an imprecise term, with its meaning often dependent on the needs of the user.[18] National maritime interests better encapsulate the linkage between security at sea and national security and are preferred in this context due to the increasing breadth of security interests and threats at sea.[19] As described above, interests may transcend direct military threats and could include civil and non-state actors. Further, such interests may not emanate from sovereign or jurisdictional maritime zones but from further afield.

The United States provides a good example of the potential diversity of maritime interests and their impact on the navy-coastguard nexus. The US Navy, being the primary power projection instrument of the United States is largely engaged in military blue-water operations. Thus, traditionally, there has been a clear separation between it and the US Coast Guard which is primarily designated with protecting the continental US coastlines from both national security and law enforcement threats. However, as Jonathan G. Odum highlights in his chapter in this volume, direct challenges to national sovereignty and security or shifts in international legal structures can alter this delineation. This has resulted in reprioritised naval and coastguard operations and the

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[18] See Christian Bueger, "What Is Maritime Security?" *Marine Policy* 53 (2015), 159–164.

[19] Paleri, *Coast Guards of the World and Emerging Maritime Threats*, 189.

creation of new integrated structures designed to cope with these new challenges.

Closely connected with the security environment are the changing nature of maritime operations and the requirement to respond to such changes. As has been described, operations at sea have become increasingly blurred between naval and civilian actors. There is evidence that states are using civilian or paramilitary actors to enforce or contest sovereignty and advance their strategic interests. One reason is that assigning a warship equipped for high-intensity warfighting to fisheries/EEZ patrol not only wastes capabilities but may create a militaristic impression when none is needed and give observers a misleading impression of force disproportionate to what is required.[20] Moreover, responding to such actions is made more difficult by the ambiguous nature of the threat presented. China, Vietnam and Iran have all developed models of the navy-coastguard nexus which allows them to use paramilitary actors at sea in a more offensive or assertive role.

Emulation is also a determining factor in deciding the nature of the navy-coastguard nexus. The US Navy and Coast Guard model has been replicated by several countries, particularly those with close relationships with the United States. South Korea and Japan both have maritime security architectures which closely mirror that of the United States in terms of structure, if not priorities. It can be argued that Vietnam, having witnessed the success of the Chinese approach where naval, MLEA and maritime militia operate in concert, is emulating this structure to counter Beijing's actions in the South China Sea. Hanoi has described its coastguard as the "core force in protecting national security, and maritime order and safety",[21] and is allocating more resources to bolster its strength.

Of course, while the three above factors act as drivers for establishing or altering a navy-coastguard nexus, a number of other elements also have crucial roles to play. Resources, including available finances and personnel, have a substantial role in determining the size and shape of a state's maritime security architecture. In a maritime environment with multiple potential missions, resource limitations may restrict

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[20] Harold J. Kearsley, *Maritime Power and the Twenty-First Century* (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth, 1992), 46.

[21] "Vietnam Coast Guard—Core Force in National Security Protection," *The Voice of Vietnam*, August 28, 2018.

the number and type of roles both navies and MLEA can carry out. Often, resource constraints constitute a core factor in determining the type of organisational structure a state will pursue to meet its maritime interests, and this is indicated in the large number of maritime security structures which utilise a single agency approach as this tends to be more cost-effective. However, such a choice under conditions of limited platform availability reduces the type of missions a navy or MLEA can perform.

Maritime geography also plays a substantial role in determining the navy-coastguard nexus. The size and security of a state's EEZ, the state's proximity to threatening maritime powers, sea lanes of communication and strategic chokepoints and the ratio of relative strategic importance between the land and the sea all influence the size and shape of a state's maritime security architecture.

Strategic culture often shapes how a maritime security architecture transforms itself and can act as a brake on innovation within the navy-coastguard nexus. Strategic culture consists of the "identity, norms and values" that have developed within both military and civilian security organisations.[22] These are often difficult to change and can require substantial external shocks to surmount. In the case of the navy-coastguard nexus, often navies and MLEA have very different cultural and operational beliefs which can be difficult to overcome. Additionally, in an environment where closer cooperation can often result in overlapping jurisdictions, internal prejudices and jealousies may reduce the effectiveness of the navy-coastguard nexus.

Finally, and relatedly, domestic politics—which are often overshadowed by external factors such as threat perceptions and international or regional geopolitical dynamics—also play a substantial role in determining the nature and transformation of the navy-coastguard nexus. Christian Bueger highlights that the provision of maritime security is a major inter-agency challenge even on a national level.[23] Like strategic culture, domestic political preferences and constituencies may act to hinder transformation if it is perceived as damaging to special interests. Inter-agency divergences over how national maritime interests are defined could result in varying forms of the navy-coastguard nexus.

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[22]Theo Farrell, "The Dynamics of British Military Transformation," *International Affairs* 84, no. 4 (2008), 783.

[23]Bueger, 163.

However, it should be noted that strong civilian leadership can result in significant institutional change, particularly if they have the support of the institutions themselves.

STRUCTURE OF THE VOLUME

Taking a cross-regional approach in examining the navy-coastguard nexus, this volume includes large, medium and small states in Asia, Europe and the Americas. This broad range of case studies, including China, the United States and Russia, highlights the diversity in approach to the navy-coastguard nexus and reveals that there is no one optimal, "one size fits all" organisational structure. Instead, there is a wide array of drivers that influence a nation-state's maritime security architecture and its organisational approach to managing security at sea, or broadly speaking, securing its national maritime interests.

Part I examines the navy-coastguard nexus in Northeast Asia. This is a region that sees substantial and sustained tensions in the maritime domain. There are a number of potent naval and maritime law enforcement actors, working together and competing with one another. In Chapter 2 Zheng Anguang analyses how China has consolidated its MLEA and how they are used alongside the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to promote China's maritime interests across East Asia and beyond. The central part of this chapter examines the China Coast Guard (CCG), its development out of a diverse pool of MLEA and the consequences of its recent placement under, what is effectively, military administration.

In Chapter 3 Shimodaira Takuya highlights how Japan's perception of its external maritime security environment and its emphasis on the primacy of international norms at sea is transforming its approach to maritime security. He argues that while both the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) are operating in an increasingly close manner, further integration is required if Japan is to meet its strategic goals in East Asia. Further, he argues that this close cooperation could lead to the value-added benefit of Japan contributing to maritime security in waters beyond its immediate vicinity. In Chapter 4 Sukjoon Yoon examines the case of the Republic of Korea. In this chapter, Yoon argues that better cooperation between the coastguard and the navy is an optimal outcome to meet the challenges the ROK faces. However, he also highlights how structural, bureaucratic and operational