THE EUROPEAN UNION IN A CHANGING WORLD ORDER

Interdisciplinary European Studies

EDITED BY ANTONINA BAKARDJIEVA ENGELBREKT
NIKLAS BREMBERG · ANNA MICHALSKI · LARS OXELHEIM

The European Union in a Changing World Order

Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt
Niklas Bremberg • Anna Michalski
Lars Oxelheim
Editors

The European Union in a Changing World Order

Interdisciplinary European Studies

palgrave
macmillan

Editors
Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt
Department of Law
Stockholm University
Stockholm, Sweden

Niklas Bremberg
Department of Political Science
Stockholm University
Stockholm, Sweden

Anna Michalski
Department of Government
Uppsala University
Uppsala, Sweden

Lars Oxelheim
School of Business and Law
University of Agder (UiA)
Kristiansand, Norway

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
Stockholm, Sweden

ISBN 978-3-030-18000-3 ISBN 978-3-030-18001-0 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18001-0

Cover illustration: Robsonphoto / Shutterstock

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

Notes on Contributors

Claes G. Alvstam is Professor (Emeritus) of Economic Geography at the Department of Business Administration, School of Business, Economics and Law at the University of Gothenburg. His research interests include international trade and investment, and regional economic integration, with a special focus on Central/Eastern Europe and Asia.

Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt is Professor of European Law and Torsten och Ragnar Söderberg Professor of Legal Science (2015–2018) at the Faculty of Law, Stockholm University. She is Chair of the Swedish Network for European Legal Studies (SNELS). Her research interests include Europeanization and globalization and their influence on national law and institutions.

Sofie Blombäck is Lecturer in Political Science at the Department of Social Sciences, Mid Sweden University. Her research interests include political parties, populism, and multilevel elections, especially involving the European Parliament.

Pontus Braunerhjelm is Research Director at the Swedish Entrepreneurship Forum and Professor in Economics at the Department of Industrial Economics and Management, Royal Institute of Technology. His research interests include entrepreneurship, innovation and market dynamism.

Niklas Bremberg is an associate professor at the Department of Political Science at Stockholm University and a senior research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. His research interests include EU foreign

and security policy, European diplomatic practices, and climate-related security risks.

Douglas Brommesson is Associate Professor in Political Science at the Department of Political Science, Lund University. His research interests include Foreign Policy Analysis, religion and politics, party politics.

Per Cramér is Professor of International Law and Dean at the School of Business, Economics and Law at the University of Gothenburg. He holds the Jean Monnet Chair in European Integration Law at the University of Gothenburg. His research interests include the external identity of the EU, especially the relationship between the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Commercial Policy.

Ann-Marie Ekengren is Professor of Political Science and Deputy Head of the Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg. Her research interests include foreign policy decision-making, with a particular focus on Sweden and comparative case studies.

Johan E. Eklund is CEO of the Swedish Entrepreneurship Forum and Professor of Industrial Economics at the Department of Industrial Economics, Blekinge Institute of Technology. His research interests include entrepreneurship, industrial economics and regulations.

Björn Fägersten is Senior Research Fellow and Director of the Europe Programme at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Lund University. His research interests include European security, intelligence cooperation and political risk.

Sverker C. Jagers is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Centre for Collective Action Research (CeCAR) at the Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg. His research interests include environmental politics, especially public attitudes, democracy and sustainable development.

Lena Lindberg is Deputy Director at the Department for Asia and the Pacific, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. She holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Gothenburg. Her research interests include international trade and regulations, with a special focus on EU trade relations with Asian countries.

Anna Michalski is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Department of Government, Uppsala University. She is Chair for the

Swedish Network for European Studies in Political Science (SNES). Her research focuses on European foreign policy, EU-China relations, and socialization in international organizations.

Frida Nilsson is Research Assistant at the Department of Business Administration, School of Business, Economics and Law at the University of Gothenburg. She holds a Master's Degree in Political Science from the University of Gothenburg. Her research interests include environmental politics, public trust and collective action.

Lars Oxelheim is Professor of International Business and Finance at the University of Agder. He is the founder of the Swedish Network for European Studies in Economics and Business (SNEE). His research interests include economic and financial integration, corporate governance, and risk management.

Thomas Sterner is Professor of Environmental Economics at the Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law at the University of Gothenburg. His research interests include discounting and instrument design for climate and environmental policy.

Erik O. Wennerström is Director General for the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, Stockholm, Sweden. He holds a Ph.D. in Law from Uppsala University. His research interests include rule of law and human rights, particularly in relation to the development of EU law.

Karolina Zurek is Senior Advisor at the National Board of Trade in Sweden. She holds a Ph.D. in Law from the European University Institute. Her research interests include international trade and regulations, especially with a focus on sustainability and development.

List of Figures

List of Tables

CHAPTER 1

The European Union in a Changing World Order: What Is at Stake?

Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, Niklas Bremberg, Anna Michalski, and Lars Oxelheim

Introduction

The international system is in a state of upheaval. In the last decade, much of public debate has been dedicated to global power shifts away from the United States and Europe and towards countries with strong economic growth or development potential, such as China, India, Brazil, and South

A. Bakardjieva Engelbrekt
Department of Law, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
e-mail: antonina.bakardjieva@juridicum.su.se

N. Bremberg (✉)
Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
e-mail: niklas.bremberg@statsvet.su.se

A. Michalski
Department of Government, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
e-mail: anna.michalski@statsvet.uu.se

L. Oxelheim
School of Business and Law, University of Agder (UiA), Kristiansand, Norway

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm, Sweden
e-mail: lars.oxelheim@telia.com

A. Bakardjieva Engelbrekt et al. (eds.), *The European Union in a Changing World Order*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18001-0_1

Africa. This trend grew stronger in the wake of the financial and economic crisis in 2008–2010, the Eurozone crisis in 2010, and the relatively weak economic recovery in numerous parts of the western world, which further underlined the vulnerability of the liberal market model (see e.g. Bernitz et al. 2018). New security threats in the form of terrorism and acts of violence by non-state actors are shaking Europe and its neighbours, while war, instability, poor governance, and climate change have forced over 65 million people from home (see e.g. Bakardijeva Engelbrekt et al. 2018a, b). Meanwhile, major technological shifts in the form of digitization, robotization, and artificial intelligence have already begun to upset traditional patterns of economic and social interaction (see e.g. Teigland et al. 2018).

These developments have the effect of seriously unsettling the liberal international order as we know it. This order was shaped in the decades following World War II and it lead to the exponential spread of democratic norms and values after the end of the Cold War. However, this liberal order is now facing severe challenges, threatening ultimately to lead to its demise. In terms of external challenges the growing influence of rising great powers is particularly notable. Many of these great powers do not share western values, and are openly defying established principles of international cooperation by advocating alternative world orders. In terms of internal challenges, equally vociferous contestation towards the liberal world order have been coming from inside the West, where populism and nationalism are posing a threat to the very foundations of liberal democracy. As we are approaching the end of the 2010s, most European countries are wrestling with anti-democratic forces that are challenging prevailing values and forms of government whereas the United States is being torn apart by a growing partisanship divide while President Trump is openly defying long-cherished rules and government practice.

In 2018 the EU celebrated the 60th anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome. In the course of its history, the Union has suffered serious setbacks and navigated through a number of crises. Yet, the above described foundering of the liberal world order arguably constitutes the Union's most complex challenge to date. Much of the complexity resides in the fact that the EU is at once the product of this world order and a guarantor of the same. The mutual dependency between the EU and the liberal world order raises fundamental questions: How should the EU work to maintain international free trade in a context marked by an escalating trade war, and how is the new protectionist US trade policy affecting the EU and the Euro? Can the strong waves of neo-mercantilism

triggered by a number of great powers be stopped, and what effects will economic nationalism have on the advancement of global financial regulation? Can the European-style welfare state survive in a changing world order that is marked by uncertainty and divisiveness? How is the weakening of multilateralism and global regulation influencing EU's capacity to act in the rest of the world? What impact will Brexit have on European cohesion and the future shape of the EU? What influence will right-wing populist parties have on EU member states capacity to act in common and pursue European policies? Can international law and the rule of law survive in an increasingly illiberal world order, and how can the consistency of the EU legal order be ensured against nationalist forces? How will the media image of the EU and EU communications policy be affected not only by social media but also by disinformation and propaganda?

This is the second book in Palgrave's Interdisciplinary European Studies book series. The book is published at a time when the EU is facing the most complex challenge of its existence: that is, how to stay true to the principles of its own inception in an increasingly less liberal world order. Considering the profound changes arising from global power shifts and contestation towards liberal values and forms of government, the book's interdisciplinary, holistic approach is particularly apt. Order at the international level, however, is a complicated concept. In various ways, therefore, the authors of this book address how a changing world order is affecting the EU and how the EU, in turn is trying to shape the emerging new order by recalibrating its policies and actions in various domains, ranging from the Union's relations with the rest of the world, the relations among the member states and EU institutions as well as the impact of the Union's current and future policies. In order to pave the way for the following chapters in the book, this chapter, by way of introduction, aims to shed light on how tightly the EU and the liberal international order are entwined and discuss the likely impact on the EU of a changing and, most likely, less liberal world order.

The EU and the Emergence of the Liberal World Order

The founding of the European Economic Community (EEC) with the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome in 1958 marked a key step in the creation of what is now the EU. At the time, a customs union was created

through the EEC among the six original member states: West Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Following the creation of the customs union, the EEC also crafted a common external trade policy. The customs union and the trade policy can both be regarded as important components of the US post–World War II goal of promoting economic exchange between the countries in the "free" (western) world. US efforts to strengthen the liberal order, primarily through the Bretton Woods Institutions, were further advanced by several significant free trade talks in the 1940s, '50s, and '60s within the framework of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), in which the EEC was able to negotiate as a unified party. Another important dimension of the European external trade policy was the possibilities it offered countries like France, Belgium, and the Netherlands to maintain economic influence over the former colonies in Africa and Asia as well as to uphold the responsibility for ensuring efficient trade with these countries through the establishment of trade and cooperation agreements with the same, from Yaoundé (1963–1975) to Lomé (1975–2000).[1]

As economic integration within the European Community (EC) deepened in the following decades, more western European countries joined the organization, starting with the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark in 1973. This was soon followed by the accession to the EC by the southern European countries, first Greece in 1981 and soon thereafter Portugal and Spain in 1986. For these three new member states, the decision to seek and obtain membership of the EC was aimed at securing democratic consolidation and bolstering the difficult path to socioeconomic modernization (Michalski and Wallace 1993). Then, in the beginning of the 1990s, the deepening of market integration and the momentous geopolitical shift in guise of the end to the Cold War both contributed to the creation of the European Union (EU) through the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. The end of the Cold War also allowed for the accession in 1995 of Sweden, Finland, and Austria, whose neutrality had hitherto prevented such a step. The swift "EFTA enlargement" that brought in the three members of the European Free Trade Association into the EU was succeeded by a long period of adjustment to conditions of membership for the ten formerly communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe, along with Cyprus, and Malta, which acceded to the EU in 2004 and

[1] On the development of EU trade policy and its role in the global economy, see e.g. Tsoukalis (1997), Meunier (2005), Baldwin (2006).

2007. In a way, the role of the EU as a stabilizing force in Europe came to fruition with this major eastern enlargement. That the EU had, in a sense, found its geopolitical calling in a united continent was apparent in the increasingly explicit conditions imposed on countries that applied for membership, which were compelled to demonstrate a functioning market economy, democratic government, and the effective rule of law (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). The European integration process and the role of the EU in the emerging liberal order were thus entwined from the outset, and in that sense the process of market integration in Europe and the regulation of international trade can be regarded, from a European perspective, as two sides of the same coin.

But European integration has obviously not only served a strictly economic purpose. The safeguarding of liberal democracy in Europe has been equally important, partly in the attempt to prevent the return of fascism to countries like Germany and Italy and partly as a way to counteract Soviet influence in Europe. The refusal to allow the authoritarian regimes in Spain, Portugal, and Greece to join the EEC before the 1980s is thought to have helped garner support for democratization among national elites, and EU membership has thus become strongly associated with liberal democracy and the rule of law (Linz and Stepan 1996). US support, primarily in the form of economic aid to rebuild Western Europe after World War II and later as a guarantor of national security during the Cold War, also strengthened the impression that European integration and liberal democracy work hand in glove (Dinan 1994). This was further strengthened by the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007, which were made possible by several years of democratic and free market reforms in Central and Eastern European countries supported by the EU's pre-accession policy (Michalski 2014). In this process, the EU worked with other regional organizations dedicated to democracy, market economy, the rule of law, and human rights, such as the Council of Europe, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) (see e.g. Checkel 2007; Sadurski 2012). The sustained focus on democracy, rule of law and human rights in the course of this last EU enlargement contributed not least to the stronger constitutionalisation of these values and principles within the Union itself (De Burca 2003; Sadurski 2004).

However, the US and the EU have not always seen eye-to-eye on foreign and security policy, and they have tended to put economic and political considerations above their inclination to defend human rights around

the world. Although the US and the EU have diverging views on matters including power, global governance, and national obligations in the global community, they have nonetheless been driving forces in the spread of liberal democracy and free trade that the world has witnessed since the end of the Cold War (Anderson et al. 2008). The EU and the US are thus both essential components of the liberal world order. The question of whether this world order is still viable is therefore crucial, as is the question of what the EU can do to safeguard important advances on the international level.

Geopolitics and Multilateral Institutions in a Changing World Order

Order has multiple meanings.[2] In the everyday sense, "order" usually refers to something that occurs regularly and is relatively formalized. Regular cooperation that arises spontaneously when individuals have similar interests or shared problems constitutes a kind of order, even if it naturally does not uphold the same measure of formality as the legal order through which the rights and obligations of citizens are regulated in modern states governed by the rule of law. The term "world order" can also be said to encompass both these aspects. First, there is the notion that a world order is apparent in the regularity with which states and other important actors interact with each other, which can be regarded in terms of social practice and is manifested in, for example, the diplomatic code of conduct (Bicchi and Bremberg 2016). Secondly, the term refers to the structure of the international system, which in its liberal version is informed by generally accepted norms and organizations, such as UN bodies and the World Trade Organization (WTO). According to the realist perspective on international politics, it is problematic to imagine an international order being anything more than a balance of power among the global great powers that dominate geopolitics in any given epoch (see e.g. Waltz 2010 [1979]; Gilpin 1983). Accordingly, prospects for achieving a permanent and peaceful international order are dim, and when such order does arise, as in the nineteenth-century Congress System in Europe, it is subordinate to great power politics. Historically speaking, international order has ultimately been upheld by a hegemonic power, such as Spain in the sixteenth century, Great Britain in the late nineteenth century, and the US since 1945.

[2] On the concept of order in international politics, see e.g. Bull (2012), Guzzini (2013).

In contrast to the realist understanding of international order, the liberal perspective on international politics suggests that order is created when states and other actors, especially economic actors, believe there are advantages to common rules and institutions (see e.g. Moravcsik 1997; Slaughter 2009). US hegemony was indeed essential for the emergence of the liberal world order as it emerged after World War II but what made it distinct from previous orders was that the interests, values, and vulnerabilities (particularly the common threat from the Soviet Union) of the US and leading western European states coincided to a large extent. After the end of the Cold War, the liberal world order expanded through free market and democratic reforms in many areas of the world. In connection with this transition, Francis Fukuyama (2012 [1992]) famously expressed the idea in *The End of History and the Last Man* that liberal democracy and market economy had settled all ideological battles about which model of society can best meet the needs of humanity. Geopolitical developments have, however, shown that liberal norms and values are not easily transferable to countries beyond the West, and may even be perceived as a threat to the status of national elites in many countries. In addition, political developments in Western countries since the 2010s have laid bare the vulnerability of pluralist political systems to domestic criticism and populism, where citizens' anxiety about the future must clearly be addressed.

In contrast to realist-inspired analyses of ongoing power shifts from the West to Asia that emphasized the increased risk for armed contestation (e.g. Mearsheimer 2010), John Ikenberry (2011) has argued that these risks might be overstated and the odds that the liberal international order will survive are actually better than they might seem at first sight. While Ikenberry does not deny the force of this power shift, he contends that the liberal order should be able to persist even if the US loses its hegemonic position. His argument is based on the assumption that rising great powers like China and India will ultimately benefit by preserving the order because it provides for a range of public goods in the form of common rules for world trade and institutions for collective action to manage shared challenges such as security threats and climate change.

According to Ikenberry, it would be much easier (and more advantageous) for the rising powers to embrace the liberal international order than to overturn it. A prerequisite for Ikenberry's scenario, however, is that the US and the EU are capable of integrating the new great powers into liberal institutions and concede that they are going to affect the

structure of these institutions, for instance, through an adjustment of the current rules. Even though the EU and its member states have demonstrated a relatively high degree of flexibility on this issue, such as by supporting China's membership in the WTO and its right to vote in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the US has shown reluctance to give rising powers, China in particular, a place at the table. Consequent upon Donald Trump becoming US President, the American attitude has hardened with regard to the country's role as a world leader. Paradoxically enough, the Trump administration's repudiation of the liberal world order and aversion to honouring previous agreements has considerably weakened the international stature of the US and eroded trust among its allies in the western world.

But the actions of the US President are not the only reason that faith in the political success of the liberal world order has recently been displaced by uncertainty and increasingly pessimistic visions of the future. The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 is a violation of international law and a breach of the security order in Europe, which relies on the norm of the inviolability of national borders. But in Russian rhetoric, its actions are merely a response to the threat it perceives in post–Cold War EU and NATO enlargements. In addition, the governments of several EU member states, such as Hungary and Poland, have been actively working for some time to undermine liberal principles and, above all, the rule of law, in their own countries while painting the EU as a threat to their national sovereignty. Populist politicians like Marine Le Pen in France, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and Matteo Salvini in Italy also depict the EU as a threat to the sovereignty of the French, Dutch and Italian peoples. What unites these actors is their explicit opposition to the values and principles that are the pillars of the liberal world order.

The Role of the EU in a Changing World Order

For most of the EU's (and its predecessors) existence, the question of its role in the liberal world order was never made explicit. From a geopolitical perspective, its obvious place was to implicitly facilitate peace and stability in Europe and spread democracy and market economics as fundamental components in the process of post-World War II modernization and development. With the Maastricht Treaty, the Union's foreign and security policy role was strengthened. In the major geopolitical shift in the early 1990s caused by the fall of the Soviet Union, the EU's role became more

explicitly to promote security and stability in Europe, but this time in relation to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The inherent symbolism that the EU (with the accession of these countries) would unite basically the whole of the European continent led to greater self-awareness of the role of the EU in the global system.

What role was the EU meant to assume? In academic debates, the EU has often been called a normative power, to use a term coined by Ian Manners (2002). Manners argues that the power of the EU is derived from the values and norms upon which the Union was created and that are written into its treaties. But in many ways "normative power" is more a description of the EU's self-image as a foreign policy actor than an accurate description of its actions. Nonetheless, the EU is something of an anomaly in the international system: an actor that is not a state and yet displays clearly state-like features and whose actions can in many ways be equated with those of a state. It would therefore be more accurate to describe the EU in terms of a post-sovereign actor called upon to uphold aspects of the liberal system that further its interests and reflect its specific composition and nature. The EU is therefore expected to assume special responsibility for disseminating values such as human rights, democracy, rule of law, and international law, as well as principles of global governance, such as multilateralism and a rules-based international system (Van Vooren 2013). These values and principles are the framework of the EU's approach to international cooperation and bilateral agreements with countries and international organizations. The EU's climate change policy, development assistance, and neighbourhood policies are notable expressions of this approach. In addition, the EU has demonstrated a predilection for multilateral negotiations and close cooperation with international organizations, like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, and UN bodies that approach global issues in a similar way.

Nevertheless, the EU's rules-based, functionalist-oriented approach has come under increasing pressure since 2003, when power politics and ideologically motivated interests once again dominated the international system, partly as a result of the US invasion of Iraq. Power politics is also the clearest driver of Russian foreign policy and coincides well with how international politics is understood in China and many other emerging powers. In addition, a number of non-state actors that are propelled by ideology with religious overtones are having profound influence on security in Europe and surrounding regions. But power politics and

self-interested orientations have also advanced their positions in areas other than security and stability and have changed the conditions of global governance. World trade is now dominated by regional or bilateral trade agreements, international development assistance is increasingly regarded as a foreign policy tool, and rich countries like China are enticing poorer countries in Africa, Asia and eastern and southeast Europe with investments, loans, and direct financial aid, thus influencing the global political economy. Finally—and not least importantly—the liberal system is being challenged by several countries with populist governments in the western sphere that are touting economic egoism, isolationism, and nationalism as answers to widening domestic income gaps.

This development is challenging the EU on several fronts. It has even been couched in terms of existential survival by the Union's representative for foreign and security policy, Federica Mogherini, in the EU Global Strategy of 2016 (EU 2016). In this context, the EU has been forced to navigate between a multilateral, rules-based international system and increasingly bold power politics. Thus far, the Union's approach has been informed by two principles. The first can be regarded in terms of a balancing against the prevailing power perspective in which the EU has chosen a middle way, where this power perspective is acknowledged but multilateralism is simultaneously presented as—to quote former President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso—"the right mechanism to build order and governance in a multipolar world" (2010). This can be seen in the EU's success at making association and partnership agreements with South Korea, Canada, Japan, and, not least importantly, Ukraine, and at initiating talks with New Zealand and Australia, as well as in EU support for the Paris Climate Change Convention, even though its logic was not the one primarily championed by the Union.

The second principle can be expressed in terms of the EU seeking to solidify its position in the international system by reinforcing its identity and agency, and by strengthening its capacity to act through the more effective use of common resources. The foreign policy identity of the EU is being articulated with increasing clarity in terms of opposition to the policies of the Trump administration, solidarity in the face of Brexit, and in more forceful action against Polish and Hungarian reforms of the judicial system and media that are questionable from a rule of law perspective. Its agency has been reinforced by building bilateral agreements with key states in "strategic partnerships" and by taking a more realistic position in the fight against terrorism, organized crime, and illegal immigration.

Moreover, the EU has taken new initiatives aimed at strengthening the Union's external border controls.

How Does a Changing World Order Affect the EU and What Can the EU Do About It?

The following nine chapters of this book address in various ways the question of how the unfolding crisis of the liberal world order is influencing the EU and how the EU can influence the emerging new world order. As the US under Trump is changing the course of its foreign policy to the point of undermining multilateral international cooperation and international free trade regimes, how is this affecting the conditions for autonomous action by the EU in foreign and security policy? What can the EU do to continue promoting global free trade based on fair and effective rules? Should the EU recast its overall strategy for promoting external trade and focus even more narrowly on bilateral and regional trade agreements? How should the EU protect the value of sustainable development in light of ongoing shifts of power? Can we expect the EU to remain a leading force in international climate change policy in the future? What must the EU and its member states do to ensure the survival of the welfare state in an era of mass migration? How is EU foreign and security policy affected by the spread of mediatization and new forms of digital communication in international politics? How can the EU best respond to the challenges to the rule of law and liberal democracy presented by the rising wave of populism in Europe, and what means provided under EU law and the EU treaties can be used to safeguard the fundamental values upon which the European project is based? These are some of the questions addressed in the book.

In the book's second chapter Björn Fägersten analyses how the EU as a foreign and security policy actor is being affected by a changing world order. Fägersten argues that the EU is in many ways a product of the liberal order that has shaped international relations since 1945. But the liberal order is now being shaken to its foundations, as manifest in various ways in Europe. Fägersten argues that the turbulence is leading to a fragmented world order in which cooperation among state and non-state actors is patchy and occurring in changing constellations. Furthermore, two overarching logics of interaction co-exist side by side—cooperation-

oriented globalism and geopolitical competition, although they are affecting various policy areas in different ways.

To determine how this fragmented world order is affecting the EU as a foreign and security policy actor, Fägersten develops a framework of analysis that stipulates that a collective actor needs coherence (consensus), capacity (resources for pursuing policy), and context (a permissive setting). He argues that the EU is in some areas being strengthened by the prevailing turbulence. For example, both Brexit and Trump have enhanced coherence in parts of the EU and created potential for further capacity building in foreign and security policy. But at the same time, Brexit is impairing coherence and capacity in the EU because when the UK leaves, it will take military and diplomatic capacity with it out of the EU, while widening differences in values in the EU are exacerbating the risk of schisms among the member states. Fägersten recommends that the EU should make better use of the intelligence gathering that the Union is capable of so that it can act with greater congruence in its strategic sphere. The EU should also engage in structured and constructive cooperation with the UK in the area of security policy to mitigate the negative consequences of Brexit. The EU should also prepare alternative strategies to promote the Union's values and interests if Trump's lack of goodwill towards the liberal world order proves to be a symptom in the US of increasing and persistent disdain for the same.

The third chapter by Per Cramér seeks to identify structural changes in the regulation of international trade consequent upon Trump and Brexit. The point of departure is that both of these political changes were driven by similar populist-tinged lines of argument in which matters related to the design of foreign trade policy are central. The chapter begins with a retrospective look at the main elements of the development of international trade regulation. Cramér argues that a field of tension has arisen since 1945 between a multilateral ideal, on the one hand, and the development of regional and bilateral preferential trade agreements, on the other, in the form of free trade areas or customs unions. Against this backdrop, the chapter recounts the changes in US foreign trade policy during the current administration and the likely effects of the British withdrawal from the EU. The primary result of Brexit will be that the country's foreign trade policy relationships will be regulated largely through bilateral agreements. Brexit also entails a change of the internal dynamics in the EU, which will inevitably affect the shape of the Union's external trade policy in the future, with potentially serious consequences.

Cramér describes four trends in international trade that will inevitably be strengthened by Brexit and the Trump administration's international trade policy agenda. In short, these trends involve higher prioritization of bilateral trade agreements combined with weaker multilateral regulation within the framework of the WTO and accelerated use of trade policy protection measures, which risk leading to a general increase in protectionism. Moreover, the ongoing shifts in the geopolitical balance are being hastened, resulting in a weakening of US and European influence, in relative terms, over the design of regulation of international trade conditions. In light of historical experience, Cramér concludes his chapter by underscoring how important it is that the EU manages to buck these trends and actively works to bring about modernized multilateralism that more fully responds to the challenges facing global society, not least by promoting non-economic considerations such as basic working conditions, environmental protection and actions to prevent climate change within the framework of multilateral cooperation.

Claes G. Alvstam and Lena Lindberg discuss in the fourth chapter of the book the EU's common external trade policy in light of economic and political changes in the world. The authors establish that EU external trade policy is currently facing some of its greatest challenges ever. This is not only a consequence of Brexit, considering the equally great demands for continuous adjustment to worldwide structural changes in international trade. In the past, an oft-used rule of thumb was that the growth rate in external trade of a state was about twice as high as its GDP growth, but this seems no longer to be the case. Despite the fact that trade in goods and services has stagnated in recent years, global GDP has nevertheless increased during the same period. The question that Alvstam and Lindberg address in this chapter is how EU trade policy vis-à-vis the rest of the world should be modified and renewed in pace with external changes.

The chapter analyses the changing world order in the form of a new US trade policy, the British withdrawal from the EU, and China's increasingly prominent place in the international arena. In light of this, the authors consider various possible alternatives for the EU's external trade policy. Is the most appropriate strategy to try to assume the role of global leader in defending the multilateral trade order in the vacuum left in the wake of Trump, or would it be more realistic to instead intensify efforts to achieve far-reaching bilateral and regional agreements with key partners in various parts of the world? The role that the relationship with the post-Brexit UK will play in formulating an effective trade policy for the EU is a central

question here. In conclusion, the authors present what they consider an important recommendation: the EU should first and foremost take vigorous action to defend the multilateral trading system. In other words, the EU should work to "Make the WTO Great Again," in harmony with continued initiatives towards ambitious bilateral and regional agreements.

The fifth chapter of the book by Karolina Zurek examines the efforts of the EU to promote sustainability within the framework of the Union's free trade agreements. From the vantage point of the changing nature of global trade, the chapter first describes how sustainability issues have been managed within EU external trade policy. Although there are strong tendencies towards greater protectionism all over the world, international trade has come to be regarded as a central tool for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals under the UN 2030 Agenda. At the same time, global civil society is pressing ever-higher demands for a socially and environmentally aware trade policy. The chapter recounts how the EU is striving to meet these challenges by focusing on the implementation of and compliance with the sustainability provisions of the EU's free trade agreements with international partners. Since 2008, the EU has systematically included horizontal Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters in its free trade agreements. Zurek investigates both substantive and procedural aspects of the TSD chapters and discusses the proposed reform on stronger implementation recently presented by the European Commission.

Against the backdrop of an ongoing and growing discussion of the scope of the EU's authority and competence in external trade policy, Zurek considers two aspects of the European Court of Justice's opinion on the Singapore agreement. First, the court confirms that the TSD chapter falls under the EU's exclusive competence. Second, the Court confirms that a breach of the commitments concerning sustainable development in the free trade agreement should be regarded as a breach of the Vienna Convention and thus be sanctioned, regardless of whether the agreement itself provides opportunities for sanctions for breaches of the sustainability provisions. In light of the Singapore opinion and based on the European Commission's proposed reform, Zurek concludes by presenting a number of recommendations aimed at strengthening implementation of and compliance with sustainability provisions in present and future EU free trade agreements.

As EU member states are about to implement the Paris Agreement, EU climate change policy is pursued in a new international context, according to the sixth chapter of the book by Sverker C. Jagers, Frida

Nilsson and Thomas Sterner. New economic powers have emerged on the scene in recent years and, along with declining economic power and diminishing emissions reductions in the EU, the Union no longer retains the prominent position in international climate change negotiations it had historically. With an increasing number of economic players in the game, it has become more difficult to achieve binding climate agreements that all parties perceive as fair. With the Paris Agreement, the international community has reached a compromise, but at the expense of clear burden sharing of emissions reductions. The authors argue that the EU presented a strong, united front in the process leading up to the Paris Agreement, but there are clear differences in terms of both ambition and approach in the actual climate change policies of EU member states, is due to variation in political culture, values, and political institutions in European countries.

With this in mind, the chapter considers the EU's role as an actor in climate change policy with regard to its historical role, current position, and future status. The authors begin by presenting Europe's early industrialization, which led to prominence in terms of both economic power and the level of emissions of greenhouse gases. Relying on statistics covering GDP, population, and greenhouse gas emissions in recent decades, the authors determine that Europe's position looks very different today, and they emphasize that even though the EU maintains a united front in climate negotiations, climate policy differs widely among EU member states. Jagers, Nilsson, and Sterner stress that it does not seem too likely that the EU will be able to implement a common, and effective, EU-wide climate policy. The authors conclude by recommending that decision-makers must be responsive to the various national contexts within the EU and show openness to applying different control mechanisms in different countries. Regarding the EU's future as a climate policy actor, they suggest that the EU is likely to become less important, but could in a positive scenario still play a significant role as a forerunner in an increasingly fragmented world order.

The seventh chapter of the book by Johan E. Eklund and Pontus Braunerhjelm asks how migration might affect the economies of European welfare states. The welfare state is put in the perspective of the refugee crisis that Europe has experienced since 2015 and the massive reception of asylum-seekers, particularly in Sweden and Germany. The chapter seeks to shed light on the economic costs and benefits that migration can generate against the background of comprehensive welfare ambitions and economic redistribution in many European countries. Conditions in Europe are

compared with the US, and the authors refer to research showing that immigrants are often a very heterogeneous group with regard to level of education and language skills and that this has profound impact on opportunities for economic integration in recipient countries. Large-scale asylum-based immigration often entails economic costs for the recipient country, at least initially, but the authors also show that immigrants often contribute to economic development through innovation and new networks. Demographic developments and aging populations are also putting pressure on European welfare states that could be alleviated by higher levels of immigration.

Eklund and Braunerhjelm underscore that an effective integration policy is critical to national economic performance, as well as the future scope and design of welfare policies. One of the main issues brought up in the chapter is whether the most expansive welfare states in Europe will be able to maintain their universal nature or whether welfare entitlements must somehow be differentiated. Consequently, there is substantial policy scope to shape the ultimate outcome of higher immigration. The authors argue that a successful integration policy in EU member states must employ several different instruments with regard to aspects including wage formation, social transfers, and investments in education. At the end of the chapter, the authors recommend that the EU should strengthen the common asylum and migration policy and establish mechanisms to make it easier for EU member states to learn from each other in order to strengthen economic and social integration in European societies.

Douglas Brommesson and Ann-Marie Ekengren engage, in the eight chapter of the book, in a critical discussion of the mediatization of policy in general and of EU foreign and security policy in particular. According to a large body of research on mediatization, alignment with media norms and practices in society is increasing due to factors including the impact of social media and other social changes, mainly of a technical and economic nature. The burgeoning interest in digital diplomacy and "fake news" in the wake of Donald Trump's twitter storms are clear signs of the times. A common argument in public debate and in research is that the media logic, with its focus on polarization, intensification, and personification is increasingly affecting how policy is formulated. Brommesson and Ekengren are critical of this, as they see it, oversimplified perspective, and they also analyse EU foreign and security policy from the opposite point of view in this chapter. Foreign policy is usually described as a conservative policy area, in the sense that it is informed by caution and a long-term

perspective, and foreign policy is not the subject of public debate to the same extent as other policy areas. Based on this reverse perspective, the authors ask whether policy actors are actually taking advantage of the opportunities provided by mediatization to strengthen long-term policy objectives.

The chapter sheds light on the relationship between policy and mediatization through a comparative analysis of two important strategy documents within the framework of EU foreign and security policy: the European security strategy of 2003 and the EU global strategy of 2016. The authors discuss the overarching question of whether the formulation of EU foreign and security policy is dominated by media logic, in other words, whether this policy has been mediatized. The authors determine that although aspects of media logic have increased since the turn of the millennium, its effects on the formulation of EU foreign and security policy are limited. Based on their analysis of elements of media logic in EU global strategies, Brommesson and Ekengren outline two general recommendations. First, the EU and its representatives should continue to focus on political institutions and policy content and, second, should carefully use the opportunities that media logic nevertheless offers. It is worth pointing out that policy-makers at the European and national levels in the area of foreign and security policy still have tremendous power to choose whether to use the media or not.

Populism as a challenge to the EU and democracy in Europe is analysed in the ninth chapter of the book by Sofie Blombäck. Even though populism as a phenomenon has received a great deal of attention lately, there is no consensus, in political debate or in social science research, as to how it should be defined. Blombäck argues that what primarily defines populism is the anti-pluralist notion that a homogeneous people stands in moral opposition to a more or less corrupt elite. Populists often present themselves as the true champions of the people against the elite. And because populist messages can be combined with other ideological positions, there are populist parties on both the left and right sides of the political spectrum. The chapter also addresses the important role that crises play in populist rhetoric, and Blombäck argues that populist parties can influence the content of the EU project through their presence in governing bodies at the EU level, but success at the national level is required to fundamentally change the European project. It is also at the national level that the complicated relationship between populism and representative democracy can most clearly be appreciated.