



PALGRAVE STUDIES IN
EDUCATIONAL FUTURES

Schizoanalytic Ventures at the End of the World

Film, Video, Art, and
Pedagogical Challenges

jan jagodzinski

palgrave
macmillan

Palgrave Studies in Educational Futures

Series Editor

jan jagodzinski

Department of Secondary Education

University of Alberta

Edmonton, AB, Canada

The series Educational Futures would be a call on all aspects of education, not only specific subject specialist, but policy makers, religious education leaders, curriculum theorists, and those involved in shaping the educational imagination through its foundations and both psychoanalytical and psychological investments with youth to address this extraordinary precarity and anxiety that is continually rising as things do not get better but worsen. A global de-territorialization is taking place, and new voices and visions need to be seen and heard. The series would address the following questions and concerns. The three key signifiers of the book series title address this state of risk and emergency:

1. **The Anthropocene:** The ‘human world,’ the world-for-us is drifting toward a global situation where human extinction is not out of the question due to economic industrialization and overdevelopment, as well as the exponential growth of global population. How to we address this ecologically and educationally to still make a difference?
2. **Ecology:** What might be ways of re-thinking our relationships with the non-human forms of existence and in-human forms of artificial intelligence that have emerged? Are there possibilities to rework the ecological imagination educationally from its over-romanticized view of Nature, as many have argued: Nature and culture are no longer tenable separate signifiers. Can teachers and professors address the ideas that surround differentiated subjectivity where agency is no long attributed to the ‘human’ alone?
3. **Aesthetic Imaginaries:** What are the creative responses that can fabulate aesthetic imaginaries that are viable in specific contexts where the emergent ideas, which are able to gather heterogeneous elements together to present projects that address the two former descriptors: the Anthropocene and the every changing modulating ecologies. Can educators drawn on these aesthetic imaginaries to offer exploratory hope for what is a changing globe that is in constant crisis?

The series Educational Futures: Anthropocene, Ecology, and Aesthetic Imaginaries attempts to secure manuscripts that are aware of the precarity that reverberates throughout all life, and attempts to explore and experiment to develop an educational imagination which, at the very least, makes conscious what is a dire situation.

More information about this series at
<http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15418>

jan jagodzinski

Schizoanalytic Ventures at the End of the World

Film, Video, Art, and Pedagogical Challenges

palgrave
macmillan

jan jagodzinski
Department of Secondary Education
University of Alberta
Edmonton, AB, Canada

Palgrave Studies in Educational Futures

ISBN 978-3-030-12366-6

ISBN 978-3-030-12367-3 (eBook)

<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12367-3>

Library of Congress Control Number: 2019930289

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2019

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover illustration: © Ron Wigglesworth

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG

The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

*This book is dedicated to
Ron, Bill, Jean, Izabella
Whose support, conversations, and laughter
I have had the pleasure to share.*

*Diane, Cathryn, Adriana, Ji-Hye
For their support in friendship.*

and

*To my dear friend Olenka
Who is always there when there is a need.*

'hugs' to you All

CONTENTS

1	Introduction: Schizoanalytic Ventures	1
---	---------------------------------------	---

Part I Filmic Ventures

2	Schizo Times in Cinematic Thought	29
3	Repeating <i>The Butterfly Effect</i> : Schizo Endings	43
4	Migrant Subjectivity and Territory Rethought	67
5	The Schizos of <i>The Broken Circle Breakdown</i>	81
6	Dreamland Welcomes You: <i>Last Resort</i>	95
7	The Batman Trilogy: An Ethics of Evil, the Law, and the Rise of Trump's Fascism in the USA	117

Part II Ventures in Video Games, Art and Pedagogy

8	The Prosthetics of Video Games	149
---	--------------------------------	-----

9	Between War and Edutainment	167
10	Explorations of the Analog-Digital: In Relation to the <i>Event</i> of the Artistic Process	183
11	Artistic Speculations and Pedagogical Challenges: Facing the Anthropocene	201
	Index	227



CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Schizoanalytic Ventures

The title, *Schizoanalytic Ventures At the End of the World: Film, Video, Art, and Pedagogy*, addresses the state of affairs in what is a precarious condition for our species living on the Earth, in terms of both an ecological crisis and a political crisis that shape contemporary global dynamics. While ‘end of the world’ sounds very dramatic, it is a call from the future that casts its shadow on us today. This call is a warning as to a final end that is projected if and when the Earth no longer becomes habitable; at the same time, it is also a call to the growing and overwhelming conditions that are giving rise to neo-fascism and its consequent dictatorships that are springing around the globe in various degrees of force, held together by populist politics that have enabled such a condition to emerge. As many have noted, democracies that shaped modernist thinking are failing, as a very small percent of the population is able to manipulate the political scene, supported by wealthy business interests. In both these senses, a suicidal course has been charted. As Deleuze and Guattari write in *Anti-Oedipus*: ‘the most disadvantaged, the most excluded members of society invest with passion the system that oppresses them, and they always *find* an interest in it, since it is there that they search for and measure it’ (*A-O*, 346).

Schizoanalysis comes from the process philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, which interrogates the global capitalist economic formation by exploring the dynamics of its ongoing formations and transformations.

It addresses the state of the global precarity that fluctuates between the capitalist poles of paranoia and schizophrenia. Both tendencies pull together and apart in every socius where the pretense to socialist democracy prevails as ennobled by a social justice agenda, yet capitalism sets the parameters for such a promising agenda. Schizophrenia is, by and large, a creative endeavor, both as a formation of the psyche and in its resistance to the socius (the set principles of the social order). It offers a form of ‘unlimited semiosis’ that unhinges fixed meanings; Deleuze and Guattari identify with such an orientation as a source of transformative change. Given that the marketplace is driven by profit motivations based on stochastic quantitative analysis, a nation’s bottom line as to its health/wealth is calculated via employment statistics, GNP growth, stock market indicators, import-export calculations, and so forth, such an ‘objective’ tendency of measurement overrides any meaning and belief system that lays claims to its foundation. Religious orientations fall into line in support, be they evangelical Christians in the USA, Hinduism in India, and the rise of Political Islam in Turkey where Islam and capitalism are reconciled. The ‘American dream’ is based on this fundamental economic tenet that is written on its currency: ‘in God we Trust.’ This schizophrenic side of capitalism enables a perpetual deterritorialization and decoding, a dismantling takes place so that new markets are always opening up, while others are shutting down. Global trade and expansion work on such a principle. The limits of this seem unlimited, except now that resources are becoming scarce for future survival. New systems of currency are developing (cryptocurrencies) like bitcoin that claim to circumvent state and the central banking system to open up new venture capital—‘in Digital We Trust.’ Algorithmic computing and encryption software become potentially new forms to measure wealth, shifting to immaterial currencies and credit money.

On the other side of the ledger is paranoia—the resurgence of neo-fascist propensities in democratic states, which we are witnessing on a global scale; a retreat into protectionism, an attempt to control all meaning, a libidinal economy of capitalist desire based on lack as Lacan had argued, manifested via commodity forms. The return is to a mythical past, to traditionalism, to wall building, and a delineation of us-and-them mentality played along psychological, ideological, and material lines. It is thoroughly despotic—there is a growing list of dictators and authoritarian personalities: Trump (USA), Putin (Russia), Xi Jinping (China), Erdoğan (Turkey), Duterte (Philippines), Orbán (Hungary), Duda

(Poland), Salvini (Italy), Maduro (Venezuela), Ortega (Nicaragua), Kim (North Korea), Netanyahu (Israel), and Bashar al-Assad (Syria); few countries seem exempt from this paranoid wave. If schizophrenia is the dynamic of a permanent revolution to open more territory for profit, then paranoia is the archaic residue, its inertia, a propaganda machine based on centered modes of social organization governed by the pomp, display of extravagance, military might, lies, and a justice and military department working for whoever is in charge.

Deleuze and Guattari differentiate different kinds of group formations: ‘subject-groups’ and ‘subjugated groups.’ Each is libidinally invested in these two poles: schizophrenia and paranoia. Subject groups are characterized by their investment in schizophrenic forms of ‘progress,’ while subjugated groups invest their preconscious affects by following paranoid forms of closure. This is never a simple either-or. In capitalist formations, ambivalence manifests itself that combines the freedom of economic production (an affirmative force), along with the tyranny of despotic power (a negative force). Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalytic project is to forward what they see as a ‘permanent revolution.’ By this, they mean an attempt to eliminate power and paranoia to enable schizophrenic free play, a form of delirium that releases ‘life’ in ways that has been entrapped by what they call ‘molar’ investments, the prevailing social norms that support ‘gregarity’ or ‘herd instinct.’ This refers back to the paradox mentioned earlier as to why desire and passion for one’s own oppression can come about: Desire and interests do not always line up, but can be at odds with one another: Unconscious libidinal investment (desire) precedes, and then interest follows. As they succinctly write: ‘The schizoanalytic argument is simple. Desire is a machine, a synthesis of machines, a machine arrangement—desiring-machines. The order of desire is the order of *production*: all desire is at once desiring-production and social-production’ (*A-O*, 325, emphasis in the original).

The fourth part of *Anti-Oedipus* is entitled, ‘Introduction to Schizoanalysis.’ It is Deleuze and Guattari’s rambling attempt to provide an outline for such an endeavor. Reading this section presents difficulties for any reader, just like the book itself. In 1982, I travelled to New York for a conference. Having a strong interest in Lacanian psychoanalysis, I had read that *Anti-Oedipus* was a must read as it offered a ‘critique’ of psychoanalysis. New York, as is well known, is famous for its bookstores, or was so at the time. I did find the book, which I still own. The physical

joy that went into finding it still lingers (like this memory). There was no Internet available at the time, no Amazon with its instant reach to whatever book you want or can afford. I had to search for it from bookstore to bookstore. The cover still remains vivid: the title spread over what looks like broad-brush strokes of purple water paint. First, published in 1977 by Viking press in New York, I recall opening it up, seeing the picture on its inside cover (*Boy with Machine*, Richard Lindner 1954), and then eagerly trying to consume its first few pages. The effort was short-lived; I had no idea what (the hell) I was reading. I had no way into it. It did not speak to me. I closed its covers and put it on my bookshelf to collect dust before it was to be reawakened yet again.

Since then, I have no idea as to the extent which I have been able to find my way back into its mysteries that were hermetically sealed from me back then. Along the way, I found out that Deleuze and Guattari had not made a complete break with Lacan; their critique was cleverly disguised without disparaging the master (Dosse 2010). A more complete break was to come with the publication of their second volume to *Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Thousand Plateaus*. The chapters that follow are my way of addressing the difficulties with schizoanalysis. I am under no illusion that these ‘ventures’ are on the mark, as they say, and take solace with the following review of a number of well-known Deleuzians who have addressed ‘what is schizoanalysis?’ I start there and then return to what I think I have tried to do in this book in answer to that distant but vivid memory.

EXPLORING ‘WHAT IS SCHIZOANALYSIS?’

Ian Buchanan is a central figure in *Deleuze and Guattari Studies*, in both the journal and the founder of an annual international conference and ‘Deleuze camp’ that explores the ‘applications’ of both Deleuze and Guattari to various aspects of the social order and the arts. The successful book series, *Deleuze Connections* published by Edinburgh press, has made a significant contribution in exploring schizoanalytic applications. There is a long list in fact, of titles that state: *Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of ... Art, Ecosophy, Literature, Religion, Cinema, Machinic Unconscious*. One quickly learns that each book in this series is a singularity in its own write/right.

In ‘Schizoanalysis: An Incomplete Project’ (2013), Buchanan provides an important and useful exposition of schizoanalysis, furthering

his more truncated overview in his earlier book, *Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: A Reader's Guide* (2008). Buchanan clearly points out that there really is no method, formula, or model to follow with any assurances, only guidelines of exploration. Guattari, in his latter writings, struck out on his own, calling on 'metamodeling' as another way of developing schizoanalysis. Again, metamodeling has no easy articulation as to what it is, only Guattari's own 'diagrams' as he works out his own problems. Both Janell Watson (2008) and Brian Holmes (2009) have developed their own interpretations of Guattari's particular direction. According to Watson, metamodeling riffs on the French term as both 'model' and 'pattern' in two ways: as a pattern of behavior that one is socialized into through familiarization, socialization, institutionalization, and sociopolitical regimes to establish prescriptive norms, and as a model of mapping processes and configurations. The bottom line is that Guattari invents 'diagrams' or refigures existing diagrams, which then open up new vistas and ideas by drawing on the potential that is available. These 'singularizing maps' are 'meta' in the sense that they are creative cartographies that offer future scenarios and imaginaries. 'What distinguishes metamodeling from modeling is the way it uses terms to develop possible openings onto the virtual and onto creative processuality' (Guattari 1995, 31). Guattari applied his cartography toward reworking Lacan's fixation on the unconscious that is 'structured like a language' and the capitalist system in general.

Schizoanalysis, as Buchanan says, is an 'incomplete project' because it exists in a state of 'permanent revolution' (164). As such, "everything begins in the middle"—there is no step-by-step way of applying schizoanalysis because life itself is not like that" (ibid.). The project is 'unfinishable.' To engage in schizoanalysis, to actually mark out some sort of 'method' where there is none, Buchanan suggests, is precisely what is expected to keep the project alive, as it were, to forward its potential. Buchanan succinctly identifies Deleuze and Guattari's two objections to Freudian psychoanalysis. The first is that desire as lack limits its production, and second, by the 'talking cure' fixated on the Oedipus complex as a *universal* premise, discourse itself was limited. Lacan's own reliance on Ferdinand de Saussure's structuralism will be replaced by their call on the asemiotics of Louis Hjelmslev and Charles Sanders Pierce. Yet, as Buchanan further argues, Deleuze and Guattari do not 'solve' the issue of why some associations are more important than others when it comes to assemblages we find ourselves in, where desire circulates in

its machinic capacity. The move they make is to think associations as affects. Buchanan maintains that their concept of the refrain (*ritornello*) as developed latter in *Thousand Plateaus* ‘goes to the heart of the entire schizoanalytic project’ (179), although it is a ‘partial and incomplete’ answer to this problem of associations. A refrain, as an ‘affective’ mechanism of association, ‘brings together forces, ideas, memories.’ As a musical refrain, for instance, it seems to harness power for personal, social, and cosmic purposes, centering and decentering the self. Buchanan equates refrain with association.

Buchanan follows up with Guattari’s (2011) definition of schizoanalysis as a ‘pragmatics of the unconscious’ (27), the way it works as a ‘factory.’ Desiring-machines (or assemblages) are the working parts of this machinic unconscious. Their operation, as a pragmatics of the unconscious, is what needs to be grasped. Schizoanalysis is now understood as the discourses of desiring-machines (assemblages). The process of desiring-production becomes the production of associations, which are the connections between thoughts, ideas, and feelings. Such desiring-production emerges through the ‘machines’ that are formed; in Deleuze and Guattari’s case, these are not physical things but ‘objects’ in process. Lacan’s *petit objet a* is not dismissed in *Anti-Oedipus* (1983). A rather obscure but extremely important footnote confirms this (p. 27). What they reject is Lacan’s emphasis on ‘the desire of the Other,’ which he was eventually to jettison in his Joyce seminar (S XXIII) with his concept of the *sinthome*, a direct reaction to *Thousand Plateaus* and Luce Irigaray’s critique of phallocentrism. The *sinthome* does away with the over-reliance of the Other. Despite the expression of tribute in *A-O*, the footprints, however, are left tracked all over Lacan’s body. Without blatantly calling the master out—lack, ‘familiarization, phallic symbolism, castration, ‘unconscious structured like a language’—*A-O* is replete with divergences away from Lacan’s reinterpretation of Freud, and his status as the ‘French Freud.’ Before the Joyce seminar in 1975–1976, Lacan maintained that reality and fantasy are deeply intertwined, with reality itself shaped by the empty signifier of the Phallus; the Phallus has no signified; its empty form was filled in by ‘the’ Law, while justice searched to appease judgment so that the system would not dissipate. Desire as lack was a capitalist libidinal formation. Fantasy was a way to sustain capitalist hegemony by fetishizing the commodity that always contained ‘a bit of the Real,’ but never the ‘real’ itself. Slavoj Žižek made this claim famous by pointing out that the demand of capitalism is

simply to ‘Enjoy!’ Deleuze and Guattari turn to an affirmative notion of desire as a way to question the [false] needs that capitalism perpetuates. Psychoanalysis is not entirely dismissed; rather, desire as lack is recognized as a particular assemblage formation. ‘[N]eeds are derived from desire; they are counterproducts within the real that desire produces’ (*A-O*, 27). Desire is claimed to be affirmative but *without an object*, it can only be ‘productive’ and intransitive. Productive desire becomes an actualizing assemblage of forces. In this sense, desire is actual, while the Oedipus complex is virtual. Capitalism dwells on desire as lack and hence produces an object—the commodity fetish. It is a social-production as well. Lacan’s *objet a* more than not becomes concretized as a transitive object. Its expressions: paranoia and schizophrenia are socially produced in the capitalist order. In this regard, the entwinement of the actual/virtual, that is to ‘actualize the virtual,’ should not be understood simply as creating something that was in the imagination and then ‘actualizing’ it in concrete terms (as an object or thing, artwork); rather, this means that something sensual from the Outside has been given attention or actualized consciously or unconsciously (such as a preoccupation with something). The entwinement of the actual/virtual (what will be called a ‘fold’ latter in Deleuze’s *Leibnitz* book) is a coexistence, mediated by the membrane of the skin. Buchanan concludes that the virtual/actual couplet must be understood in a ‘psychological sense’ (183) rather than being ontological or metaphysical, suggesting (surprising for many) that schizoanalysis is meant to be a cognitive activity.

Jean-Claude Polack worked alongside with Félix Guattari and Jean Oury from 1964 to 1972 at the La Borde clinic in Cour-Cheverny. The first sentence by Jean-Claude Polack’s (2018) essay, ‘What is Schizoanalysis’ immediately puts to question the ontological status of such an undertaking. ‘What is?’ undergoes the same sort of questioning as it did for Buchanan: There is no ‘is’ of schizoanalysis. Instead, Polack develops a genealogical approach readily admitting that since its appearance the term ‘has constantly caused surprise or provoked bizarre definitions’ (49). Nevertheless, as he says, ‘Schizoanalysis aims from the outset to test pragmatically ... a theory of the Unconscious deeply rooted in the determinations of the socius and politics ... Capitalism and Schizophrenia’ (*ibid.*).

For those of us who have little knowledge of the clinical practices of Guattari and no access nor privilege to any sort of archives aside from Guattari’s (2006) *The Anti-Oedipus Papers*, a point Buchanan also raises,

who mentions that even their biographer François Dosse (2010) offers precious little to nothing about Guattari's practice, Polack provides some feel as to what took place. We are told that Oury had taken to heart two forms of *alienation*: one mental and the other social. Mental alienation was perhaps genetic, the dominant mode of psychiatry that sought to formulate a universal code of mental disorders (in the American context, now referred to as the DMS-5: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders). Guattari was asked to bring these two forms of alienation into confrontation through practices that would be progressive in their 'de-alienation.' Such an undertaking in a clinic is hampered by social and administrative constraints organized by the State. The margins of freedom are almost zero. Yet, Guattari taking charge of the organization of daily life, the institutionalization of the clinic did manage to make some changes. Polack's example is Marcel, a 'resident' of eight years who was allowed to buy a bike in town without having to 'work' for it. This (surprisingly) opened up a change in his behavior: The mental and social alienated dynamic was disturbed in a positive way.

Polack also provides us with a sense that Guattari, 'an unclassifiable leftist,' played an important role in the revolt of 1968; he always practiced an 'ethics of precarity and finiteness.' Guattari had a taste for 'risk and experimentation,' intervening in bureaucratic or ritualized militant activity. Oury and Guattari shared a total militant and political complicity, says Polack. What divided them was the anti-psychiatry movement of Lang and Cooper in England. Guattari was for it, Oury against. The turning point for Guattari came in 1969, linked not only to his meeting Deleuze but also with his break from Lacan's apolitical stance, introducing machinism as his materialist basis for describing the desiring psyche. The publication of this radical stance was offered to him in *Scilicet*, but it had to be anonymous as Lacan was its sole reviewer. Guattari refused, and Polack says that this decision effectuated the rupture.

Polack has the range and ability to show us how Deleuze's own 'conversation' with Lacan through his writings led to an impasse, even crediting Slavoj Žižek (2004) for his misconstrual of Deleuze as a Lacanian to make this impasse evident. The seduction exerted by Guattari over Deleuze, says Polack, can be gleaned from the preface Deleuze writes to Guattari's text: *Psychanalyse et Transversalité*. Deleuze identifies in these essays three problems and provides three answers. In an all too brief summary, the three problems are: What form should politics take

if politics is in the unconscious itself? How to introduce psychoanalysis into revolutionary military groups? Lastly, how can therapeutic groups influence political groups and also influence psychiatric and psychoanalytic structures? Deleuze answers: The unconscious is related to a whole social, economic, and political field and not to the *universality* of the mythical structure of Oedipus; political groups are of two forms: subject groups and subjugated groups, the former are agents of enunciation that ward off hierarchy and totality, the latter accept hierarchy and ward off death and dissipation, and lastly, ‘a transformation of psychoanalysis into schizoanalysis implies an evaluation of the specificity of madness’ (62).

Part 4 of *Anti-Oedipus* for Polack is a materialist critique of the Freudian and Lacanian Unconscious. It also presupposes a productive force to engage clinical psychoses as well as to trouble the follies of history. Two regimes, the libidinal and the political economy, are fused together into a single nature over the spread of historical evolution in these two volumes subtitled *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Richard Lindner’s picture inside the cover (*Boy with Machine*) is a prelude, warning the reader of *Anti-Oedipus* that ‘its words and rhythms, espouses the climate of industrial machines. ... It heats up, emits and captures. It breaks down and starts again ... A war [is] declared by schizoanalysis on the denomination of language’ (65). Semantic and material arrangements do not follow any intrinsic logic of organization or mathematical laws of development. Drawing on Hjelmslev, they elaborate ‘a machinic economy of components and signs that lie outside the semantic and syntactic facts of language’ (ibid.).

Maurizio Lazzarato (2014) has taken up Guattari’s asemiotic position and updated it to the contemporary capitalist order. Like Guattari, he rejects the signifying semiotics of language. Content and expression are dismembered or uncoupled. Lazzarato follows Guattari by differentiating signs that owe their efficiency to their passage through representation and consciousness—so-called impotentized signs, as opposed to ‘power signs’ that do not owe any influences through mediated representations. ‘Asignifying semiotics’ has become a common occurrence; machines are no longer ‘just’ things, but semiotic assemblages that consist of the human, inhuman (mechanical or electronic devices), and incorporeal elements (code). This multiplicity of semiotic systems is subsumed under the logic of capital.

Polack takes us through Deleuze and Guattari’s reworking of Melanie Klein’s partial objects to show how they form heterogeneous elements

of desiring-machines (assemblages), and then onto some familiar territory that is further developed in *Thousand Plateaus*, the biological, physical, and chemical terms that form a new description of the unconscious: molar, molecular. 'But in reality the unconscious belongs to the realm of physics; the body without organs and its intensities are not metaphor, but matter itself' (*A-O*, 311). In a particularly difficult passage, they write: '*Partial objects are the direct powers of the body without organs, and the body without organs is the raw material of the partial objects.* The body without organs is the matter that always fills space to given degrees of intensity, and the partial objects are these degrees, these intensive parts that produce the real in space starting from matter as intensity = 0. The body without organs is the immanent substance, in the most Spinozist sense of the word' (*A-O*, 326–327, original emphasis).

What does that even mean? Polack's take away is the following: Matter and intensity are the same substance—interchangeable; one can add that they coexist like the quantum wave-particle phenomenon. Unicity and multiplicity are also coexistent, rather than contradictory. This is basic Spinoza: All (univocity—Nature—cosmos—God) is one changing substance, and the modes (multiplicities) within it are also undergoing continuous change. Finally, desiring-machines are composed of two elements—partial objects and the body without organs (BwO). Together, the stasis of organicism is resisted, to which can be added, the danger of total dissipation is staved off. A machinic assemblage must 'resist' within these two extremes, which would end in 'death,' i.e., entropy.

The 'schizo' in schizophrenia carries with it splintering, fragmentation, and decoding at all levels of logic when it comes to living. The wager is that such a schizophrenic process is likened to capitalist deterritorialization; the psyche and society are comparable in their decoding flows. However, the reterritorializations that follow are quite at odds. 'Psychoanalysis settles on the imaginary and structural representatives of reterritorialization, whereas schizoanalysis follows the machinic indices of deterritorialization' (*A-O*, 316). Oedipus defiles sexuality, subordinating desire by organizing its flows to determine gender forms, ways of loving, setting up erotic norms: 'the shameful universe of "perversions"' (68). In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari advocate n-sexes: anoedipal lines of singularity. Moreover, they posit desire as a power of Nature, non-human, and non-anthropomorphic sex. Such desire precedes and produces the inter- and intrarelated assemblages. 'Sexuality is not a means in the

service of a generation; rather, it is the generation of bodies that is in the service of sexuality as auto-production of the Unconscious' (*A-O*, 116). It should be pointed out, however, that Deleuze and Guattari are not outright dismissing Oedipal relations in *Anti-Oedipus*. It is not a question that such a position is invalid. Rather, it is a question of its evaluation within capitalism that is crucial. Oedipus is *not a universal phenomenon*; rather as a 'complex' of the nuclear family, it does function in a particular way within capitalist assemblages. The Oedipus complex has a *relative* validity within capitalism, always a factor within capitalist assemblages. For instance, in *TP* (228), they equate 'microfascisms' with 'micro-Oedipuses.' As Holland (2008) puts it: 'Just as capital privatizes surplus appropriation, the nuclear family privatizes reproduction. Just as the nuclear family interposes the power of the father between the infant and the mother as its means of life, market society interposes the power of capital between the worker and the earth as its means of life' (85).

Fascistic Tendencies

The most vexing question *Anti-Oedipus* opens up is why people voluntarily desire their own oppression; that needs and interests result in many combinations, raising the difficult problem between what may be a revolutionary project or a turn to fascist violence. Put in another form: The indecisive zone between preconscious (needs and interest) and the unconscious (desire), 'between molar repression and the creative power of the molecular,' (69) is from where the problematic emerges. The question of fascism looms large today with the rise of dictators, oligarchs, and authoritarian figures all over the world under the guise of democratic governments and 'free' elections. What, if anything, has really changed today? In the Greek context, the paradigm of a nascent democracy, a tyrant (the name given to an illegitimate ruler or king, a position that usually went to the firstborn son), himself a member of the 'party of the land' (nobility), paid off the 'party of the hill' (the poor who lived in caves) to riot and complain so that concessions could be made to the 'party of the coast' (the rising merchants and traders) so they can support the 'legitimacy' of the tyrant's rule. Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis argues that the masses aren't somehow tricked or duped into supporting fascism; they actively desire it. Unlike psychoanalysis (e.g., Wilhelm Reich) that maintains repression makes desire irrational. Ideology then converts this repressed desire into what is an irrational susceptibility

to authoritarian figures and fascist slogans of othering. In distinction, schizoanalysis maintains that such categories as rational and irrational, or ideology and psychology, are of secondary importance. Fascism operates on another level. Desire is ‘always already’ socially engineered by means of propaganda and representations that are directly registered on the ‘body without organs’ (BwO). Affect is prior to ideology. The masses have to be *massaged* before they are *massaged*. The desire circulating on the body is captured and directed, more or less, via social representations (negative ads for instance) that set and form images that convey a direct, bold, and hardline edge. The degree of paranoia and fascist tendencies is increased by the intensity of the frame’s form. It is no accident as to why contribution funds for television time and advertising are such an issue when it comes to elections. Money is pumped in to ensure a candidate’s message is well massaged. The BwO in *A-O* is the locus of *social libidinal investments*. Schizoanalysis addresses both the psychological and sociopolitical terms for these effects: ‘the paranoiac, reactionary, and fascisizing pole, and the schizoid revolutionary pole. ... The two poles are defined, *the one* by the enslavement of production and the desiring-machines to the gregarious aggregates that they constitute on a large scale under a given form of power or selective sovereignty; *the other* by the inverse subordination and the overthrow of power’ (*A-O*, 366, original emphasis).

Eugene Holland (2008) has attempted to explore this question in relation to the twenty-first-century rise of fascism beginning with the Bush era in the USA, which is so easily extended to the Trump presidency as the Obama presidency has been slowly eroded through his concerted efforts to overthrow any achievements Obama’s administration has been credited with. Minimally, ‘America First’ might be understood in Roger Griffin’s terms (1991) as a ‘palingenetic ultranationalism,’ where the core myth is to achieve a ‘national rebirth,’ to restore USA to its mythical glory days after Second World War when it was world leader. Brexit is a variation in kind. Populism, as Lance Bennett et al. (2018) have argued, is a poor term. One should call what’s going on for what it is: ‘right-wing anti-democracy.’ What attracts desire, argues Holland, ‘is *the degree of development of productive forces or of power*, not the social representations and institutions in and by which those forces are registered and generated’ (76, original emphasis). Drawing from Nietzsche, this is a will to power that amasses more power through a social assemblage; the active desire for fascism by the masses (e.g., Trump’s base) is that their feelings of power are augmented; they ‘feel’ as if they are

exerting power through their leader. It is not the psychological ‘subjective feelings’ of any one individual; it is the contagion that develops through the social-production of desire, driven by slogans, placards, and the leader’s voice rebuking his enemies, and so on. Deleuze and Guattari treat this as a ‘cancerous body.’ ‘[W]hat makes fascism dangerous is its molecular or micropolitical power, for it is a mass movement: a cancerous body rather than a totalitarian organism’ (TP, 215). As is often pointed out, Leni Riefenstahl’s ability to aestheticize the myth of the German Third Reich is not unlike what goes on at Trump’s rallies coalesced around America First. The USA is used to such spectacles that are staged throughout the year via national and state football rivalries. It is under particular historical circumstances and under specific social institutions that enable the augmentation of power. In the US case, it is the way the Electoral College functions, which disregards population distribution according to each state, the right-wing push by the GOP, the role of the FBI in relation to Clinton’s e-mails, Russian meddling via social media sites on the Internet, Cambridge Analytica’s role in targeting citizens with Republican propaganda, racist figures like Steve Bannon and Steven Miller as key influences in the White House, and so on. The affective forces of these heterogeneous elements would provide a preliminary analysis as how the fascist affects of power have emerged, channelled by the ‘charisma’ of Trump, being a mixture of both intentional media engineering and blind contingent ‘luck.’

Holland points out that fascism undergoes a change from *Anti-Oedipus* to *Thousand Plateaus* in the sense that ‘desire moves too fast rather than too slow’ (76). Its speed is related to the BwO. In *A-O*, the BwO is evaluated more pragmatically or experimentally in the way it may be over-invested, ushering in the fixation on paranoia. It cannot accommodate movement or change; or, perhaps the BwO repels all investments and becomes catatonic—a symptom of emptiness—hollowed out, as it were. In *A-O*, Deleuze and Guattari question further the pragmatics of the BwO: perhaps it is open to other investments of desire. Has it been open to free-flows to break habits of organization? In relation to ‘lines of flights’: have these been blocked? Have they spun off into a void or joined other lines to forge new weapons for escape? In *TP*, Holland (when answering John Protevi’s [2000] own assessment as to their shift into understanding fascism in terms of nihilism and suicide) says that there is a shift to addressing a ‘microfascism,’ ‘being the cancerous BwO of a fascist *inside us*’ (TP, 163, original emphasis). Unlike totalitarianism,

which comes to power through the revolutionary actions of a vanguard, or in case of a military dictatorship that mobilizes a State army, historical fascism transforms the ‘populist’ movement into a regime. ‘When fascism build itself a totalitarian State, it is not in the sense of a State army taking power, but of a war machine taking over the State. ... [F]ascism is constructed on an intense line of flight, which it transforms into a line of pure destruction and abolition’ (*TP*, 230). Holland addresses such a formulation in the time of George W. Bush’s second term in office when the stock market crash of 2008 was developing, and there was a worry as to what will happen politically.

Trump wants to pick up where George W. Bush left off. Throughout his two presidencies, Bush laid down the groundwork for fascist forms of government utilizing 9/11 for political advantage, as many have already analyzed (Lyons 2007). In this scenario, Obama’s achievements need to be erased. It would seem in Trump’s case that the State machine is well on its way in establishing a fascist regime. Jerry Harris et al. (2017) present a six-month report card as to whether Trump can be called a fascist. At that time, their assessment is damaging enough without calling him one. ‘[Trump’s administration] contains elements and possibilities of fascism, but is closer to authoritarian state transnationalism than a dictatorship of reactionary nationalism’ (11). They conclude: ‘[I]f we do use the term fascist to describe the current constellation of power, it must be qualified with many differences from classic fascism, and in doing so it risks losing its analytical power, causing distortions in tactic and strategy’ (15). It is worth the risk for calling him fascist as a lot has changed since that initial summary. The one-year assessment of the Trump administration by seven political academics (Steinberg et al. 2018), who draw on Deleuze and Guattarian theory of fascism, is much more worrisome. Yet Carl Boggs (2018) maintains his reservation. In his preface, he writes, ‘I have chosen to view Trump as representing an *interregnum* between existing power arrangements—that is, a militarized state-capitalism—and potential American fascism’ (original emphasis). This is but a suspension—a wait and see—as to what happens next. For Boggs, Trump is the ‘ultimate billionaire capitalist’ whose outlooks and policies favor the extreme corporate banking priorities, which are combined with his own brand of ultranationalism.

The above is a fair range of current analysis by political scientists. I am writing this after the mid-November elections in 2018 when the Democrats were able to take back the House of Representatives.

Trump administration is slowly eroding the legitimacy of the Justice Department by constantly questioning its competency, disregarding FBI intelligence reports and its investigative checks (the FISA filings). The Mueller investigation into Trump's election campaign and its Russian links is Trump's main target; key figures in his administration have been rapidly replaced to do his bidding, and the Republican-held House of Representatives is not only silenced in providing checks and balancing on Trump, but there are openly moles to keep him informed and protect him from any investigations penetrating into his family circle. The Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Devin Nunes openly attempts to stall any kind of judiciary investigations into the Russian connections. He has effectively sabotaged the House's investigation on Russian electoral interference, making up accusations and harassing the FBI; the 'firing' of the Attorney General (Jeff Sessions) and replacing him with an interim acting sycophant (Matthew Whitaker) to do as much of Trump's bidding as is possible before the Democrats take over the House of Representatives in January of 2019 is another sign of the corrosion of the US Justice Department; Fox News as Trump's propaganda machine, along with his 'fake news' mantra, which targets the Free Press, especially when CNN senior reporter Jim Acosta's White House press card was withdrawn (and then reinstated through a court decision) simply on the grounds that he persistently asked too many penetrating questions, annoying Trump, is a serious sign that the First Amendment (free speech) is being tested. Trump's employing the army to 'patrol' the Mexican-US border to keep out the asylum-seeking hordes coming from Central America via Mexico, his constant appointment of conservative judges around the country and managing to position two conservative Supreme Court judges that are beholding to him—Neil Gorsuch and the controversial Brett Kavanaugh appointment—add to him amassing power. Kavanaugh maintains that a sitting US president cannot be subpoenaed and put on trial is another assurance that he can continue pushing the Law and the US Constitution. To this, we can add Trump's warmongering—first through the call to eliminate ISIS and then support right-wing governments like that of Israel's Netanyahu, and the Saudi Regimen of Mohammed Bin Salam (MBS), who had 'clearly' ordered the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. This was still not enough for Trump to condemn the act, based on the premise of an arms deal that the two countries share, and of course, oil as a potential bargaining tool for political advantages in the future for curbing Iranian oil. Perhaps

one of the most ironic developments has been his ability to be ‘forgiven’ by right-wing evangelical Christians for his outright ‘womanizing’ and sexual misconduct, a trait that (sadly) seems to be accepted and overlooked among white working-class women who support their working-class white husbands. For them, Trump offered the only alternative to their plight of low wages and poor living conditions (Wrenn and Waller 2018). Paula White, the thrice-married woman, counsels Trump regarding evangelical matters. The evangelical religious right, since the Bush years, has become progressively more supremacist, xenophobic, strongly patriarchal, and viciously set against abortion and homosexuality.

Historically, one thinks of ‘the Führer that politically overcodes all pre-existing economic and social relations—including war machines—and aligns them on himself as head of the German State and the thousand-year Reich’ (83). The comparison with Trump is not that different. Consider: Trump’s own narcissism as someone who knows best, makes all the decisions, increases military spending and arms sales, pumping up Wall Street via tax relief for corporations, pushing for some ‘pure’ American citizen to be protected from the likes of Islam and the barbarians at the gates who want in; the ‘wall’ as a symbol of his xenophobia, spouting conspiracy theories, neglecting disaster relief and assistance to the island of Puerto Rico; blurting out his use of the word ‘nationalism’ to fortify his ‘make America great again,’ hitting back especially hard at African-American football players for not rising to the singing of the National Anthem in protest for police brutality against ‘Blacks’; turning his back on European allies and rebuking his trading partners: Canada and Mexico. Taken as a whole, Trump exemplifies a form of macrofascism, a rule-breaker who does what he wants, when he wants, makes money through laundry schemes, and has sex ‘on demand.’ Judith Butler (2016) says it well, ‘[His] vulgarity fills the screen, as it wishes to fill the world.’ Perhaps, contra to Holland, Deleuze and Guattari were right given the state of globalism today, and Trump’s abusive position of power: The war machine finally prevails over the State after the end of Second World War as the global war machine subordinates all political and social considerations to the aim of capital accumulation. What makes Trump happy is when the Dow Jones figures are up and the economy is humming with the job unemployment down to record numbers, regardless if this percentage is statistically ‘cooked’ to taste right for his regime (Farren 2018).

Holland (2008, 79–82) argues that Deleuze and Guattari are mistaken when maintaining that historical fascism is ‘suicidal’ as well as

‘contagious.’ The turn to total war by the Nazi State, he says, was for historical contingent reasons. The jury, however, is still out on such an assessment. Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing Likud party wouldn’t exist if it stopped waging its war with the Palestinians; like Trump, Netanyahu needs a constant enemy to insure peace as war. His government already boasts that their Wall has been built. Holland points to Theweleit’s schizoanalysis of the *Freikorps* in *Male Fantasies* (1987, 1989) to explore the everyday microfascism as played out between male soldiers and their images of women and female sexuality. Trump’s male fantasy of women, his misogyny, and his form of masculinity: a stance where he never apologues, never acknowledges his mistakes and stupidity, rarely says sorry and always competes to win that brings fits of anger and hysteria when he loses, have yet to be adequately explored within this emerging fascist narrative. Recall that Hitler too had fits of rage and studied voice and radio so as to reach the masses. Is this so different than Trump’s media (television) savvy and the invention of his own sociolect at rallies and on talk TV (*Fox and Friends*): the jokes, the name calling, the faces, the outright exaggerations and lies, the slogans, scatological allusions, not to mention his provocations (‘nationalism’) and outright busts of spiteful anger. All this is consumed by his base and then ‘spit out’ over the Internet. Hatred is unleashed as ‘their’ leader confirms their own desires for exclusion. The danger is not to reduce these questions into a simple psychologism (‘the’ leader), but to recognize the sociocultural desire that actualizes this potential for such expression; much like the question as to why there are mass killings in the USA on such a regular basis? It is not *only* the madness of some mentally deranged person suffering from PTSD, nor is it the madness of Trump per se, it’s the assemblages of desire that emerge within the US socius, enabling acts of mass murder to take place, and leaders like Trump to emerge from the shadows.

One such strong force is Christian evangelical fundamentalism of the right which wages its own war machine. Holland (2008, 89–90) shows them to have been active during the Bush era, suffering defeat during the Obama presidency, but now fully in force with Trump. Holland points out that during the Bush era the Christian Right formed an ‘unholy alliance with US supremacists’ (‘white supremacists’ who are defined ethnically rather than racially). This alliance has been strengthened and invigorated under Trump. Both groups see America’s God-given mission to rule the world (a version of ‘America First’). For both groups, Clinton and Kerry were anathema, the former for his cultural

corruption surrounding the ‘Lewinski affair’ and the latter for engineering the withdrawal from Vietnam and Iraq, and legislating gay marriage. Given the above analysis, it does appear that Trump’s war machine is taking over the State. ‘[W]hen fascism builds itself a totalitarian State, it is not in the sense of a State army taking power, but of a war machine taking over the State’ (*TP*, 230). When this happens, Deleuze and Guattari maintain, a path toward suicide is set. If a point is reached where there are no means to subdue the turbulence, the result is self-destruction. One thinks here of the tenuous stability of the ‘Trump-Kim Jong-un accord.’ It could easily fail. How long can Trump tolerate Kim’s stall tactics at nuclear disarmament? Trump is developing a war economy as he tries to amass a position of power to occupy a global bully pulpit. These are events on the macrolevel. On the microlevel, contagion, corruption, and cancerous contamination continue to circulate microfascist agendas through the many assemblages of desire.

Calling on Guattari’s (1984, 1995) thoughts on fascism, Gary Genosko (2017), one of the most, if not ‘the’ most astute commentators and explorers of Guattari’s oeuvre in the Anglo-speaking context, has written an essay on Trump’s fascism that directly addresses the micropolitical fascism which Foucault addressed in his preface to *A-O*. To recall Foucault’s (1983) assertion that *A-O* was a book on *ethics*, it was not only the historical fascism of Hitler and Mussolini that is always a concern, ‘but [especially] also the fascism in all of us, in our heads and in our everyday behaviour, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us’ (p. xiii) (Holland 1987). Fascism is immanent to desiring-production as it ‘seems to come from the outside, but finds its energy right at the heart of everyone’s desire’ (Guattari 1995, 245). Genosko tells us that Guattari develops a threefold typology toward fascism, and the first two macropolitical approaches do not entirely satisfy him, one a sociological approach and the other a neo-Marxist approach that falls into a reductive dualism: The obedient mass follows the ‘revolutionary’ leader. The last is an analytic-political approach that he makes his own where desire is multiple and different, consisting of singular intensities that combine with one another in (seemingly) incompatible ways rather than as identities to be totalized by a party apparatus—that is ‘by the totalitarian machine of a representative party’ (Guattari 1995, 231). It is precisely the way desire emerges in various assemblages that fascist potentials never really disappear but