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Richard Routley *Author*
Maureen Eckert *Editor*

Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond

The Sylvan Jungle — Volume 1

Springer

Synthese Library

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Volume 394

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The Sylvan Jungle

This book is part of a collection of four books that present the work of the iconic and iconoclastic Australian philosopher Richard Routley (né Sylvan).

The four books are:

- Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond
- Noneist Explorations I
- Noneist Explorations II
- Ultralogic as Universal?

All books are published in the Synthese Library.

Richard Routley *Author*
Maureen Eckert *Editor*

Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond

The Sylvan Jungle — Volume 1

with Supplementary Essays

Springer

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Editors' Preface

In 1980 Richard Sylvan (then named 'Richard Routley') published *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond: An investigation of noneism and the theory of items*. Even though this book has generated considerable debate and has contributed to the development of neo-Meinongianism, published through the Australian National University, it is now out of print and the few available second-hand copies are expensive. This, coupled with developments in the area since the book's original publication, have led us to think that there are benefits in reprinting this extensive work along with commentaries that situate and discuss the rich philosophical material contained in the work.

To this end, and with the support of Springer, we reprint the work here in four volumes. Volume One centres on the lengthy first chapter of the original work that describes noneism – Sylvan's neo-Meinongian position – and the theory of items. In addition to the commentary essays, the Volume also includes a later paper of Sylvan's revisiting and revising his item-theory. Volumes Two and Three include the remaining chapters from the original work (i.e. chapters 2 to 12 of the original) and further commentary essays including one by J.J.C. Smart, Sylvan's colleague at the ANU for many years. And the final volume, Volume Four, centres on Sylvan's Appendix, 'Ultralogic as universal?', with further commentary essays.

Some of the work reprinted in Volumes Two and Three contains material that formed part of a broad, ongoing research project that Sylvan pursued with Val Plumwood (formerly Val Routley). We have indicated where reprinted work is jointly authored.

We have sought to correct obvious errors, and have updated some references. While attempts were made to locate and reproduce the photographs that Sylvan included in the original publication (see the introductory essay by Hyde), the passage of time has erased their tracks and they too, like Sylvan, are sadly non-existent. We have, however, been able to find further photographs of the same area as that pictured in the original monograph

by one of the original photographers, Henry Gold, and with his kind permission reproduce his *Creek lilies, antarctic beech and epiphytes* in this volume.

For help in the production of this first volume, thanks go to: Louise Sylvan for her permission to reprint Richard's original material; *Grazer Philosophische Studien* for permission to reproduce 'Re-exploring item-theory'; the ever-helpful archivists at the University of Queensland Fryer Library (where Sylvan's extensive archive is housed); Michael Kebrt and the Word-to-LaTeX crew; and funding from the University of Queensland.

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A note on cross-referencing within and across volumes: when typesetting this volume, pagination was not available for subsequent volumes of this reprint of *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond*. With the four-volume reprint cited as "$EMJB_2$", page references are therefore only available for $EMJB_2$ Vol. 1. Other page references are to the first edition, cited as "$EMJB_1$" (available at http://hdl.handle.net/11375/14805). *Section* references are then also given for the later volumes of the reprint, to facilitate locating them in $EMJB_2$.

Maureen Eckert
Ross Brady
Filippo Casati
Nicholas Griffin
Dominic Hyde
Chris Mortensen
Graham Priest
Zach Weber

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Introduction: The Jungle Book in context

Dominic Hyde

The first thing one notices about the book that has become known as "the Jungle Book" – *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond. An Investigation of Noneism and the Theory of Items* – is its size. The original, single-volume monograph was more than one thousand pages in length; 1035 pages, to be exact. Its author was not unaware of its consequent alternate use as an "excellent and cheap doorstop".[1]

The second thing one notices, on turning to its Contents, is the associated scope of the work. Given Sylvan's[2] persistent, general view that "a coherent philosophy selects and develops its resolutions uniformly, with connected solutions for related problems"[3], and his particular concern in the Jungle Book that a "fundamental philosophical error" unites many existing approaches to a broad sweep of philosophical problems, one would expect that a uniform solution to these problems is called for. And that expectation is precisely what Sylvan attempts to meet in this ambitious work, developing a metaphysical view that makes room for non-existent objects, along with the necessary logical innovations involving intensional logics, paraconsistent and paracomplete logics, and relevant logics; and therewith showing how to go beyond perennial philosophical "problems" engendered by "the main philosophical positions of our times" – empiricism, idealism and materialism.

Thus Sylvan argues that his neo-Meinongian, so-called "noneist" (pronounced *none-ist*), theory at the heart of the Jungle Book casts new light on supposed long-standing problems like the problem of universals, perception, intentionality, substance, self, and values. Chapters are devoted to metaphysical and associated epistemological problems

[1] Sylvan 1995, Prologue.
[2] Richard Sylvan was known as Richard Routley until he changed his name in 1984.
[3] Sylvan and Hyde 1993, p. 1.

that emerge in the philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science, to developing a satisfactory epistemology more generally, to providing an adequate semantic account of fictional discourse, to an analysis and rejection of Russell's theory of descriptions and of Quine's objections to broadly-Meinongian approaches, and so on. The book's size matches its ambitions. And the book's author was a man of considerable intellectual ambition.

Published in 1980, it was available for $10 from the department in which Sylvan worked, and from which he published this and many other philosophical works. Though he published nearly two hundred articles and book chapters in the conventional manner, and six books with industry publishers, he was wary of the profit-motives of publishers, their gate-keeper role in deciding what was and what was not worthy of publication, and the form and length the work should take. Rarely accused of excessive brevity, he frequently chose to publish long essays, booklets and books in-house through the Australian National University presses. The Jungle Book was the lengthiest of these.

His tendency to write freely, and with considerable skill, was already evident in his earliest work. Writing his MA thesis at Victoria University, New Zealand – typically an 80 page piece of research – he produced a 385 page work, *Moral Scepticism*. Not only was it incredibly long, it was incredibly good according to its marker, Arthur Prior. Prior wrote some six years later in a reference for Sylvan that "he'd given it a mark of 95%, but this was not so much a mark as an exclamation mark".[1] Blackwells agreed to publish a condensed version of it but the necessary revisions were never carried out. So already as a young student he showed his capacity to write expansively, with great skill, with early signs of an aversion to the editorial work required by the establishment academy presses. And a couple of years later, while a graduate student at Princeton, he received the Tomb Essay Prize for an essay on time travel – at 100 pages its length obviously did not count too heavily against it. The Jungle Book, too, is big but Sylvan thought there was a lot to say and he was not shy in saying it *all*.

The book's size combined with the fact that it was published in-house is, in an important respect, regrettable. It has had the consequence that it has remained relatively inaccessible. In the Preface to the Jungle Book he had expressed doubts about the view that "truth and reason will out", and these doubts in relation to the views defended in the

[1] Goddard, to whom the reference was sent in 1963, in a speech to the Memorial Gathering for Sylvan upon his death, ANU June 24 1996.

Jungle Book are only exacerbated by the lack of serious consideration given to them by philosophers due to the work's relative inaccessibility. As with his early work on moral scepticism, Sylvan did have opportunities to air his ideas and arguments in more succinct form through well-recognised industry channels. Early versions of what eventually were expanded to become chapters 1 and 2 of the Jungle Book – Routley 1967 and Routley 1968 respectively – were accepted for publication in the late 1960s in the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* and the *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* but, partly due to dissatisfaction with their current forms at the time, he never followed through with their publication.

His general tendency to work outside and against the mainstream resulted in truly unorthodox and innovative philosophical work but also had the general effect of leaving the dissemination of this work to unorthodox channels of communication. As a consequence, I think it is fair to say that the Jungle Book has never received the broader consideration and discussion it deserves within the philosophical community. The reprinting of it in this four-volume set is an attempt to help rectify this regrettable history. Whether right or wrong, there is much to think about in the pages that follow, and many arguments that, as Sylvan said, cast new light on old problems. Only the most dogmatic will fail to be challenged in ways that help advance philosophical thinking – and dogmatism is the enemy of good philosophy.

Background

As with much of Sylvan's work, this monumental book includes ideas dating back a long way – back to at least 1964, but arguably right back to his graduate days at Princeton. He had gone there in 1959 to pursue a PhD at the urging of Jack Smart, rather than tread the more usual path to a British university, and commenced study under Alonzo Church.

> As a brash young man I set out from New Zealand for Princeton University with a project of trying to repair and renovate a derelict philosophy of science, resolving many of its evident problems, through an improved logical basis and corresponding theoretical set-

> ting. This project was hardly enthusiastically welcomed at Princeton, and I made comparatively little progress on it there ...[1]

He left after just two and a half years, having received his MA in 1961, and took up a lectureship at the University of Sydney in 1962. (The Jungle Book was later submitted to Princeton for examination for his PhD, and while they declined to examine it all, he received his doctorate for chapter 1 – reprinted in this volume.)

At Sydney he met student Val Macrae (later Val Routley and then Val Plumwood) and together they soon moved on to the University of New England. It was here, while Sylvan worked with Len Goddard on topics in non-classical logic and paradox, that he first published papers on problems of existence and associated logical issues, and in discussion with Plumwood first identified what they came to see as "the fundamental philosophical error" – the Reference Theory.

This error, levelled across the board at empiricists, idealists and materialists alike, was the acceptance of the "naive and mistaken" view that "all proper use of subject expressions in true or false statements is referential use, use to refer [to some existing item in the actual world], and thus according to which truth and falsity can be entirely accounted for, semantically, in terms of reference to entities in the actual world. That is, the only factor that determines truth is reference [to actual existing items]." Granting the assumption that meaning is a function of truth, the theory is sometimes expressed as a theory of meaning according to which "the meaning of a subject expression is given by, or is a function of, its reference [to actual existents]".[2]

Thus a perceived characteristic of the fallacious Reference Theory was "the rejection of all discourse whose truth-value cannot be determined simply in terms of the reference of its (proper) subject-terms [to actual existents], particularly intensional discourse".[3] And an obvious corollary, then, of the fallacious Reference Theory was what Sylvan termed "the Ontological Assumption", the view that one cannot make true statements about what does not exist and that, consequently, "nonentities are featureless, only what exists can truly have properties".[4]

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[1] Sylvan 2000, p. 7.

[2] Routley and Routley 1973a, pp. 234–5, where the Reference Theory is first named, in work which was first submitted for publication in 1965.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 235.

[4] $EMJB_2$ this volume, p. 29.

His arguments for the falsity of this theory then led, most notably, to his advocacy of noneism – a theory of objects which aims at

> a very general theory of all items whatsoever, of those that are intensional and those that are not, of those that exist and those that do not, of those that are possible and those that are not, of those that are paradoxical or defective and those that are not, of those that are significant or absurd and those that are not; it is a theory of the logic and properties and kinds of properties of all these items.[1]

It was this theory that he identified as being at the heart of the neo-Meinongian project that the Jungle Book went on to lay out – following "a great, largely subterranean, philosophical tradition ... stretching from the Epicureans to modern times".[2]

Initially though, developing on his intended doctoral project at Princeton, one key area where problems generated by ontological assumptions emerged was precisely in the philosophy of science where mathematical and theoretical language could not be adequately analysed, Sylvan argued, without a recognition of the standing of non-existent items. One of his earliest papers, "What numbers are" (1965), argued that they were to be analysed in intensional terms; numbers are properties, with the analysis using a noneist variant of the standard logicist analysis. And in the following year he published "Some things do not exist", which took as a key example quantification over ideal (non-existent) items for the formulation of scientific laws (cf. Routley 1966, p. 259). The development of a logic and metaphysics capable of adequately accounting for non-existent items, nonentities, was already a central goal of this early work.

This concern for an adequate ontology for mathematics and the theoretical sciences and concern, more generally, to argue for a viable alternative to the perceived detrimental effects of an empiricist philosophy of science – one of Sylvan's *bêtes noires* given its dominance in the philosophical landscape – is an important theme in the Jungle Book, with two chapters devoted to it (chapters 10 and 11; reprinted here in Volume 3).

> The more comprehensive case for the importance of nonentities includes, as especially significant, their role in mathematics and their roles in theoretical explanations of science – the whole business, that

[1] $EMJB_2$ this volume, p. 7.
[2] Routley 1976, p. 191.

> is, of appealing to ideal simplified objects, which suitably approximate real objects, in problem solving and theoretical explanation. More generally, the theoretical sciences are seriously non referential, both in having as their primary subject matter nonentities, and in being ineradicably intensional. This thesis runs entirely counter to empiricist philosophies of science, which have long dominated the subject (to its detriment), according to which the language of science is, or ought to be, referential.[1]

And already in these very early papers, too, Sylvan saw a need to make room in the domain of the logic being developed for "impossible items" – though he hesitated, at this early point, before giving them full logical standing – and for empty domains. It was here, too, at this early stage that Meinongianism emerged as a source for an adequate theory that rejected classical ontological assumptions and all that went with it. In 1967 Sylvan drafted a lengthy (125 page) essay "Exploring Meinong's jungle" (subsequently circumscribed as "Exploring Meinong's jungle I").

The essay again addressed the themes of mathematical and theoretical entities, but also extended into new areas and saw the discussion as "closely related to Meinong's discussion of objects".[2]

> Why try to further Meinong's theory of objects? ... First, a theory of items provides a way of avoiding Platonism without abandoning talk of abstract items such as numbers and abstract classes. ... Secondly, various problems in the philosophy of mathematics can be given attractive solutions ... How mathematical theories can treat of seventeen dimensional spaces, of ideal points and masses, and of transfinite cardinals is easily explained: these theories treat of *non*-entities. ... Thirdly the theory of items provides a basis on which quantified intensional logics can be erected; for the theory provides a partial solution to the problem of quantifying into intensional sentence contexts. ... Fourthly, the philosophical difficulties over the interpretation of quantifiers in chronological logics can be resolved[3]

[1] $EMJB_1$, p. 769; i.e. $EMJB_2$ Vol. 3, chapter 10, opening passage.
[2] Routley 1967, p. 1.
[3] A "resolution" was laid out in considerable technical detail in Routley 1968 – i.e. "Exploring Meinong's jungle II" – a paper already in draft form.

> ... Lastly, a theory of items has its advantages as a basis for recent revolutionary, but atheist-like and bizarre, religious positions which consider God as a non-entity ... Seriously, however, an ontologically neutral logic, unlike classical logics, provides a basis on which various religious positions can be reformulated and formally assessed by an atheist.[1]

There was ample reason to "further" Meinong's theory. Meinong was clearly now "in the frame".

An important requirement for a decent theory of items through a proper reworking of Meinongianism, identified by Sylvan right from the beginning of these enquiries, was the need to abandon classical logic. Meinong's theory had suffered, he thought, from a lack of the necessary logical innovation required to model the behaviour of the objects to be countenanced in the new theory. In fact, "Meinong scarcely develops the logic of his theory of objects" at all but there was clearly a "need for revision of classical logic".[2]

Already in "Some things do not exist" Sylvan had moved beyond classical logic, using (non-existentially-loaded) neutral quantifiers, for example. And by 1967 he was considering failures of both the Law of Non-Contradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle in the face of impossibilia and incomplete items.[3] (By the time this material appeared in print in chapter 1 of the Jungle Book, these apparent failures were somewhat qualified – cf. $EMJB_2$ this volume, p. 114. For further discussion of the absence of a more radical non-classical approach see the Griffin essay, this volume.) With the Reference Theory subsequently identified as the fundamental error, and given that "the Reference Theory yields classical logic, and directly only classical logic", classical logic was marked out as "the logic of the Reference Theory" and all the worse for that. He called for "a logical revolution" going beyond consistency and completeness assumptions, in addition to neutral quantification theory, to accommodate the non-classical behaviour of the many items whose standing he now sought to recognise. And he saw the subsequent work of the Canberra Logic Group, focused on developing satisfactory non-classical relevant logics, as a central component of his broad and systematic reworking of the philosophical landscape, alongside work on paraconsistency with Graham Priest (a regular member

[1] Routley 1967, pp. 2–6.
[2] Routley 1967, pp. 1 and 22 respectively.
[3] See Routley 1967, pp. 24 ff .

of the Group). *Relevant Logics and Their Rivals I*, summarising nearly a decade of the Group's progress in the field and appearing two years after the Jungle Book in 1982, was described as "a companion volume" to the already-lengthy treatment of the broad range of philosophical problems tackled in the Jungle Book. And though it would not appear with an "industry press" until 1989, Priest and Sylvan were well-advanced on their edited collection *Paraconsistent Logic. Essays on the Inconsistent* – a further elaboration of the necessary "logical revolution" and applications.[1]

This revolution went hand-in-hand with the idea that "all logical phenomena are admitted and studied for what they are and as far as can be without distortion or subjection to preassigned and quite possibly defective moulds, positions and logical structures".[2] Sylvan sought to account for language as it appears, as much as possible.

> Just as logic functions, on the noneist picture, not as a superior replacement for actual language, but as an addition to it, as extension of it, so linguistic analysis becomes a superstructure built on natural language which does not require reduction to a "deeper" canonical form. The fact that a canonical form cannot cater for surface structure commonly shows, not the unsatisfactoriness of the surface form, but the inadequacy of the canonical forms.[3]

The canonical forms as dictated by classical logic were clearly inadequate, so he argued at length.

As with comments made elsewhere, for example in applied ethics[4], Sylvan thought that the entrenchment of objectionable theory was driving a plethora of objectionable and unnecessary philosophical theses. "The contemporary state of complacency with respect to the manifold deficiencies of classical logic and classical theories reflects ... the usual (if deplorable) scientific process of entrenchment whereby once revolutionary young theories become, as they age, conservative members of the establishment".[5] Where his opponents

[1] Sylvan continued with this rich vein of research right up until his death. Posthumous publications in the area include his 2000 *Sociative Logics and Their Applications* and the long-awaited *Relevant Logics and Their Rivals II*, completed by Ross Brady in 2003. For a nice overview of some of the innovative Australian work in non-classical logic which Sylvan was helping develop and which he was drawing on, see Martin 1992.

[2] $EMJB_2$ this volume, p. 358.

[3] $EMJB_2$ this volume, p. 359.

[4] Cf. Sylvan 1993.

[5] Routley, Meyer, Plumwood and Brady 1982, p. xi.

entrenched classical theory and committed to the consequences, however problematic, he took the problems to be symptomatic of bad underlying theory. As they say, one person's *modus ponens* is another's *modus tollens* and what Sylvan saw as the primacy of the non-distorted data led him to apply *modus tollens* more frequently than almost any other philosopher.

Also central to the noneist program was, of course, the topic of reference and associated issues to do with significance, what can meaningfully be spoken about, and a theory of aboutness more generally. For example, classical theory took the aboutness relation to be a "reference" relation – a relation to something existent – but Sylvan took the non-distorted data to show that 'a' may be about, signify, or designate something that need not exist. A more general theory of aboutness was needed than one which simply equated it with "reference" – a fallacious equation which he took to be "a source of the R[eference] T[heory]".[1] This and the topic of significance, more generally, were the focus of the other "companion volume" to the Jungle Book, Sylvan's 1973 treatise with Goddard, *The Logic of Significance and Context*.[2]

A grand ambition underlying all this work was a universal semantics and universal logic in a noneist fashion – "the interwoven (large, ambitious, and rather exhausting) project of furnishing a logico-semantical theory for natural languages, and a semantics for English in particular".[3] A universal logic

> is one which is applicable in every situation whether realised or not, possible or not. Thus a universal logic is like a universal key, which opens, if rightly operated, all locks. It provides a canon for reasoning in every situation, including illogical, inconsistent, and paradoxical ones. Few prevailing logics stand up to such a test.[4]

Certainly classical logic, and its main alternatives, fail to stand up. In the Appendix to the Jungle Book, "Ultralogic as universal?" (reprinted here in Volume 4), Sylvan contends that a relevant logic ought provide a suitable foundation. What is sought is an "ultramodal" intensional logic – one that goes beyond the usual modal logics that admit

[1] $EMJB_2$ this volume, p. 74.
[2] It was listed as "Volume I", with a second volume intended. But with the deaths of both Sylvan and Goddard, this second volume will remain nonexistent.
[3] $EMJB_2$ this volume, p. 456.
[4] $EMJB_1$, Appendix, p. 893; i.e. $EMJB_2$ Vol. 4, "Ultralogic as universal?", opening paragraph.

of substitution *salva veritate* of strict equivalents; a hyperintensional logic as a key to the logical universe.

With work already published on a universal semantics (cf. Routley 1975), a beginning on a universal logic is described in the Jungle Book.

> Here a logico-semantical framework has been presented, but few are the details so far given as to *how it is to be applied*, how the impressive variety of English parts of speech are to be semantically encompassed within the framework. ... the framework gives little guidance as to how such nondeclarative sentences as imperatives and questions are to be encompassed, rather it leaves a range of options open.[1]

As with much of Sylvan's work, he saw himself as making a beginning, a start in the right direction. But much more work remained to be done.

The broader landscape

It is rather staggering to think of just how wide-ranging and productive Sylvan's philosophical enquiries were around this time. He had arrived at the Australian National University, Canberra, in 1971. He was soon joined by Malcolm Rennie and, in 1974, Bob Meyer arrived to join Sylvan and pursue work on relevant logics. Goddard also headed there on leave from St Andrews to continue work with Sylvan after their days together at the University of New England (in New South Wales), and the Canberra Logic Group grew. Goddard recalled that:

> [i]n a very short time, the ANU Department under John Passmore became a major world centre in relevance logic. So much so that when I arrived there in 1974 for a two-year visit, I was greeted in the corridor by a plaintive Stanley Benn who groaned good-naturedly as he said "Not another bloody logician!" ... Poor Stanley must have felt that it was raining logicians and he had been caught without an umbrella. The rains continued for several years as visitors and students came from all over Australia and the world.[2]

[1] $EMJB_2$ this volume, p. 456.
[2] Goddard 1992, p. 178.

In 1975 the Group was further bolstered by Graham Priest's arrival at the University of Western Australia, and he became a regular contributor and collaborator. Other regular members included Ross Brady, Errol Martin, Michael McRobbie, Chris Mortensen, John Slaney, and Paul Thistlewaite.

In terms of overall output, in the decade 1971-1980 the Canberra Logic Group published 124 articles and 5 books. By 1986 its output amounted to 175 articles, 16 monographs and 7 books.[1] While this research program in logic was galloping along, alongside other work in modal logic that he was engaged in with Hugh Montgomery, and while he was working away on logical, metaphysical and epistemological issues that he would eventually articulate in the Jungle Book – publishing twenty associated journal articles from the ANU in the decade before the Jungle Book appeared – Sylvan was simultaneously pioneering an entirely new field of philosophy with Plumwood.

Environmental philosophy had been emerging as an area on the teaching curriculum in the USA for a few years, but 1973 is generally acknowledged as the year that it emerged as a research field. In that year both Sylvan and the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess published papers that were squarely aimed at the defence of a "new, environmental ethic" and that stimulated much discussion and further work across the globe.[2] New journals devoted to the field were started, and in Australia alone Sylvan and Plumwood's work in the area spawned conferences, articles and edited collections focusing on their controversial views.

Together, Sylvan and Plumwood had been moved to write on environmental issues (under the names Routley and Routley) when they became aware of national forestry plans to clear five million acres of Australian hardwood forest to make way for a softwood pine industry. They responded within two years with an economic, social and environmental critique of national policy that was published by the Australian National University Press, *The Fight For the Forests*, in 1973. Published in the face of considerable opposition from the industry and the University, the book was reprinted three times in ever-expanding editions (from 290 pages to 400 pages in its third edition), and all editions

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 179.

[2] Cf. Naess 1973 and Routley 1973. It is here that Sylvan's famous "Last Man Example" is first presented, a counter-example to "the prevailing Western ethical systems", that he eventually took as grounds for the broad extension of "intrinsic value" beyond humans.

sold out. Pugilistic and utterly uncompromising in its tone, the book was both revered and reviled, depending on which side you were on.[1]

Those sympathetic to forestry interests were outraged, and Sylvan and Plumwood were vilified as "ill-mannered and ill-informed eco-louts". As the former Head of the Commonwealth Forestry Economics Research Unit, Neil Byron, later commented, "it angered the foresters that two people who had never studied economics or forestry could produce the most incisive and devastating economic analysis of forestry, of plantation development and woodchipping that has ever been done in Australia".[2] Industry insiders who assisted the Routleys with information were considered traitors and their careers threatened. But the book's value was clear. Environmental historian William Lines was not alone in his praise.

> No Australian author or authors had ever combined philosophical, demographic, economic, and ecological analysis in one volume as part of one connected argument. The Routleys were unique. They challenged conventional academic boundaries as barriers to understanding and dismissed claims to objectivity as spurious attempts to protect vested interests. They exposed both wood-chipping and plantation forestry as uneconomic, dependent on taxpayer subsidies, and driven largely by a "rampant development ideology".[3]

While the book had the practical effect of undermining the immediate threat posed by the forest-clearing program and shifting the boundaries of industry accountability and practice in Australia, it was merely the applied outcome of an emerging underlying environmental philosophy for which Sylvan and Plumwood were to become well-known. Between the publication of *The Fight For the Forests* and the Jungle Book they were circulating ground-breaking papers in this new field of environmental philosophy, developing arguments against anthropocentric, "human chauvinist" traditional ethics as well as associated papers in social and political theory with an environmental focus. Associated work on applying noneism in these areas, amongst others, appears in the Jungle Book

[1] For more on this remarkable episode in public policy analysis and attempts at its suppression see: Hyde 2014, chapter 2.
[2] Byron 1999, p. 53.
[3] Lines 2006, pp. 144–45

(especially chapter 8, section 11; reprinted in $EMJB_2$) and elsewhere (e.g. Sylvan 1986 and Routley and Routley 1980).

In fact, Sylvan also drew heavily on Meinong's work in value theory, as well as metaphysics. He thought that "[i]n very many respects ... Meinong, as usual, told it like it is, provided an accurate account of the way of values, and in so doing avoided the familiar shoals of value theory."[1]

Conferences largely spurred by their work in environmental philosophy resulted in the 1980 publication of the edited collection *Environmental Philosophy*, containing two one-hundred page papers by Sylvan and Plumwood, alongside papers by others focussed on their views. This was all alongside papers in applied ethics critiquing the nuclear energy industry, with important contributions to arguments concerning future generations, papers in political philosophy defending anarchism, and sundry other topics that popped up.

It was a busy decade leading up to the publication of the Jungle Book. And between 1975 and 1980, most of the work was written up in a tent, and later a shed, in the forest on Plumwood Mountain 100kms east of Canberra, where Sylvan and Plumwood were building a stone house and a lifestyle compatible with their increasingly counter-cultural attitudes and philosophy.

One reason that Richard and Val spent much of their lives from 1975 onwards living in the forests outside of Canberra was that they found such profound pleasure in them. They marvelled at their ecology and the wonder of their inhabitants. Goddard remembered Richard as

> the good companion ... telling me the names of all the trees, flowers and grasses, collecting seeds, and leading me to lyrebirds' nests. He took such a delight in nature, not so much the delight that a romantic might take in the overall beauty of it all, but a delight in its richness and complexity, in the detail that he found in the structure of mosses and in the behaviour of insects. I too liked walking, and I liked the forest and most natural things, but I have never had the eyes that he

[1] Sylvan 1986, p. 12.

> had, to see it as he did. It's as if in a strange way he was part of it, and in a way that I could never be.[1]

But in the forest they also found what they took to be an ethically acceptable way of living that was consistent with their emerging philosophical views and which they thought was largely compromised in our modern cities. These forests had value in themselves, which Sylvan enjoyed, but were also a valuable means to a satisfactory life, he thought (and argued at length – see Sylvan and Bennett 1994, for example).

Of these forests, rainforests held a special place for him. In them, biodiversity reached a peak and he studied them at length and campaigned for their protection at a time in Australian history when they were coming under assault from the modernised industrial-forestry complex. The intensifying forestry industry, that included the emerging practice of wood-chipping entire swathes of ancient forest, saw these forests through the lens of what he and Plumwood called "the wood-production ideology" – the view of the forests solely in terms of their value for wood-production to the exclusion of other values.

This negative view and consequent reduction through logging of such complexity and diversity as was to be found in the rainforests served as a powerful metaphor, Sylvan thought, for the negative appraisal and consequent attempts at reduction of the complexity and diversity of noneist metaphysics. What was intended as disapprobation in the mouths of his opponents, describing both the rainforest and Meinongian metaphysics as a "jungle", he saw, on the contrary, as approbation.

> Meinong's theory provides a coherent scheme for talking and reasoning about all items, not just those which exist, without the necessity for distorting or unworkable reductions; and in doing so it attributes ... features to nonentities – not merely to possibilia but also to impossibilia. It is these aspects, in particular, of Meinong's theory which have given rise to severe criticism, especially from empiricists: it is claimed that nonentities, especially impossibilia, are hopelessly chaotic and disorderly, that their behaviour is offensive and their numbers excessive. For most philosophers, Meinong is a bogeyman, and Meinong's theory of objects a treacherous, dangerous and over-

[1] Goddard, in a speech to the Memorial Gathering for Sylvan upon his death, ANU June 24 1996.

> lush environment to be avoided at all philosophical costs. These are the attitudes which underlie remarks about "the horrors of Meinong's jungle" and many others in a similar vein ... For these sorts of bad philosophical reasons Meinong's theory is generally regarded as thoroughly discredited ...[1]

And, similarly, the devalued rainforests – seen by many as chaotic, disorderly and decidedly inhospitable – were mere "jungles" ripe for elimination or reduction. But for Sylvan there was nothing "mere" about jungles. Both Meinong's and those under threat from logging were valuable, and their values could be articulated and defended. As he says in the epigraph to the Jungle Book:

> To those who have troubled to learn its ways, the jungle is not the world of fear, danger and chaos popularly imagined and repeatedly portrayed by Hollywood, but a complex, beautiful and valuable biological community which obey's discoverable ecological laws. So it is with Meinong's theory of objects, which has been disparaged, under the "jungle" epithet, as a place to be avoided or razed. Indeed the theory of objects *does* share some of the beauty and complexity, richness and value of a jungle: the system is not chaotic but conforms to precise logical principles, and in resolving philosophical problems, both longstanding and new, it is invaluable.

So it was that he decided, at the height of what have become known as the "forest wars" of the 1970s and 1980s on east-coast Australia, to include photographs of these analogously "rich and complex" systems in the printing of the Jungle Book. The cover consisted of the book's title printed over a copy of M.C. Esher's 'Another World' superimposed on a photograph of rainforest, and further photographs, sourced from recognised landscape photographers Henry Gold and Colin Totterdell, were used on separator pages ending chapters 1, 2, 6, 7, 10, 11, and the book's Bibliography.

[1] $EMJB_2$ this volume, p. xlii.

Beyond the Jungle Book

Though Sylvan thought that much of his work was merely the beginning of a decent alternative to orthodox philosophical positions in logic, metaphysics and value theory (to name a few), and that it was "early days" with many outstanding problems and much more work needed, he was remarkably consistent in the direction of his intellectual development. The search, in particular, for logics capable of removing the defects of orthodox logical theory through weakened paraconsistent, paracomplete and intensional approaches, and for suitable metaphysical foundations capable of accommodating non-existent items, intensional items, impossibilia and other classically-anomalous objects of thought and talk was persistently pursued from these earliest days right through to his death. His last published paper before his death (reprinted in this volume, chapter 3) was a yet-further development of item-theory – what he sometimes called "deep-item theory" or "sistology"[1] – extending beyond the views expressed in the Jungle Book, to accommodate his pluralist turn, amongst other things: a development that began to emerge in the mid-1980s.[2]

His other major intellectual pursuit, an adequate environmental philosophy (including ethics, meta-ethics, political and social philosophy) capable of delivering environmental justice beyond the human sphere, was also dovetailed to the non-classical logic and metaphysics he saw as fundamental to so much philosophical inquiry (alongside the largely autonomous realm of ethics, where he endorsed the fact/value distinction). The logical analyses and noneist metaphysics that he developed were subsequently employed in semantical analyses of value, metaphysical analyses of value-properties, etc.[3] This work, too, displayed remarkable consistency. From his first (groundbreaking) work on the topic in Routley 1973 he – again with Plumwood as collaborator until the early 1980s – pursued a similarly eclectic, unorthodox position, set against nearly all others in the field, developing an intellectual trajectory that seemed unerring in its general course.[4]

[1] Cf. Sylvan 1991.

[2] For a comprehensive account of his distinctive species of pluralism, see Sylvan 1997. And for further discussion see the Casati essay in this volume.

[3] For a clear example of just how thoroughly some of his technical logical theory played a role in his value theory see Routley and Routley 1983.

[4] See Sylvan and Bennett 1994 for a mature account of what Sylvan came to call his "deep-green theory".

This consistent development of themes and ideas from his earliest days reflects the fact that his systematic and decidedly unorthodox philosophy constituted what Lakatos would call a "progressive research program". So long as it continued to offer novel solutions to philosophical problems and continued to throw up new ones, there was good reason to continue to pursue the development of his very broad philosophical system. And he did so until his early death at the age of 60, in 1996.

As time went on he spent less and less time describing the flaws in orthodox approaches to the problems that interested him, and more and more time developing his theories, ideas and systems – declaring in the early 1990s, for example, "I will never read Quine again!". The negative theses, taking issue with those whom he thought got things wrong, increasingly gave way to positive theses, developing and defending his preferred position. Having already marked out an heterodox position in range of fundamental areas like logic, metaphysics and ethics, his subsequent development of a broad over-arching philosophical position built on these foundations. For example, his late work in sistology builds on his earlier neo-Meinongian work; his late work on what he called "sociative logics", or "broadly relevant logics", builds on earlier non-classical, especially relevant, logic[1]; and his late work in environmental philosophy builds on his earlier work in meta-ethics, some of his earlier work in logic, and some of his earlier work in metaphysics.

Such an heterodox, complex and unified philosophy is – like the jungle – sometimes daunting to the outsider. Sylvan himself was not unaware of this problem with respect to the Jungle Book, in particular: "the explanation of item-theory in [that book] was undoubtedly excessively forbidding, by prevailing philosophical standards. The sheer length ... scared many people, symbols deterred others ..."[2] And, at the time of his death some thirty years after first publishing on the topic, he was preparing a new, "simplified" account – Sylvan 1995. Nonetheless, the Jungle Book remains a remarkably audacious and exciting work, with few rivals in the modern philosophical landscape. Despite its problems, the effort to engage with it is worth the reward.

While some philosophers continue to work on this neo-Meinongian project (see, for example, Priest 2005), Sylvan's means of dissemination of the Jungle Book has presented a further barrier to its careful consideration and evaluation. We hope that this more

[1] For some of this work see Sylvan 2000.
[2] Sylvan 1995, "Prologue".