Karl Marker · Annette Schmitt
Jürgen Sirsch *Hrsg.*

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Demokratie und Entscheidung

Beiträge zur Analytischen Politischen Theorie

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Vorwort

Diese „Festschrift“ wurde anlässlich des 65. Geburtstags von Ruth Zimmerling zusammengestellt. Die Beiträge stammen von ihren akademischen Weggefährtinnen und Weggefährten und sind (im weitesten Sinne) der *analytischen* Politischen Theorie zuzuordnen.

In ihrer thematischen Vielfalt spiegeln sie das akademische Schaffen von Ruth Zimmerling wider, die in so unterschiedlichen Bereichen der Politikwissenschaft forscht, publiziert und lehrt wie der Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft, den Internationalen Beziehungen und vor allem der Politischen Theorie.

Wir danken allen Beitragenden dafür, dass es keinerlei Überzeugungsarbeit bedurft hat, um sie für dieses Projekt zu gewinnen, dass sie pünktlich zum Geburtstag zumindest eine vorläufige Version ihrer Überlegungen auf den Gabentisch gelegt haben und dass sie den Sommer trotz vielfältiger Verpflichtungen genutzt haben, diesen Überlegungen den letzten Schliff zu geben, so dass wir jetzt mit Stolz und Dankbarkeit diesen wunderbaren Sammelband in Händen halten.

Many thanks to all authors: for their enthusiasm to join this project, for their willingness to invest so much of the rarest of resources: time, for their discipline in meeting our tight deadlines and for the fine pieces of work they have contributed to this volume.

Großen Dank schulden wir auch Wartan Hofsepjan, ohne den dieser Band erstens noch nicht fertig und zweitens nicht so schön wäre.

Und wir danken Springer VS für die unkomplizierte Veröffentlichung.

Oktober 2018
Karl Marker, Annette Schmitt und Jürgen Sirsch

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Introduction

Political Theory is a broad field, comprising subjects as varied as conceptual analysis, positive political theory, political philosophy, and the history of normative political thought. The present edited volume includes contributions to all of these fields: Contested concepts such as extremism or freedom are discussed, issues such as expertocracy, dirty hands, global poverty and inequality are tackled from a normative perspective; empirical topics such as the conditions of democratic stability or the relationship between rational action and informational inequalities are illuminated from a theoretical point of view, and "Eastern" critiques of "Western" political ideals are presented.

Political Theory, thus, represents a quite heterogeneous field of study and the present volume appears, at first sight, to be a collection of substantially highly varied contributions. So what is it that ties them together?

First of all: the authors of the contributions are academic friends and colleagues of Ruth Zimmerling's, and the variety of their topics reflects on her interest in a wide range of theoretical issues which she has been discussing in her publications, at conferences and in many seminars with her students.

Secondly, the contributions in the present volume have in common their adherence to a certain understanding of doing political theory – and political science more generally –, and this is their commitment to analytical methods and thought.

Often, analytical political theory is considered synonymous with rational choice political theory – or, more generally, certain modeling techniques. Seminal works such as those of Downs (1957), Olson (1965) or Ostrom (1990) readily come to mind. However, we do not share this restricted view of analytical political theory. Of course, all of the afore-mentioned studies represent works of analytical political theory. According to our understanding, though, analytical political theory is not characterized by a certain set of substantial commitments or the application of specific techniques. Rather, analytical political theory, from our perspective, is united by a specific methodology or a set of rules as to how theory is to be "done". Thus, we fully agree with Adrian Blau (2017):

"Miller and Dagger (2003: 446-9) outline five principles of analytical political theory: (a) it is essentially separate from deep metaphysical questions about the meaning of human life, (b) it involves conceptual clarity and argumentative rigor, (c) it is normative, (d) it addresses a plurality of competing values, and (e) it 'aims to serve as the public philosophy of a society of free and equal citizens who have choices to make about how their society will be organised.' I do not believe we need principles (d) and (e). More importantly, principle (c) only entails normative political theory, whereas

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[my approach] is wider. […] I see no reason to exclude […] questions [of positive theory] from analytical political theory" (Blau 2017: 7).

To put it in other words: Analytical political theory is pledged to eliminating ambiguity and vagueness of language, is "concerned with argument and justification" (Føllesdal 1996: 199), and is determined to rendering research intersubjectively comprehensible. In McDermott's words:

"What distinguishes the enterprise as analytical? […] It is … typically associated with certain features, such as clarity, systematic rigor, narrowness of focus, and an emphasis on the importance of reason" (McDermott 2008: 11).[1]

What makes these commitments so appealing? Firstly, as Popper (1994) argued, it must be the hallmark of scientific propositions that they can be subjected to criticism by others. For this, a proposition needs to be comprehensible, which, in turn, depends, among other things, on the way it is being formulated: If it is not clear what an author is trying to say or how she arrived at her propositions, it is impossible for others to properly test and criticize them. Thus, clarity of language and argument are necessary conditions for examining propositions intersubjectively.

While Popper was mainly thinking of the conditions under which the assumptions of positive theory can be subjected to empirical testing, analytical political theorists argue that these rules also apply to normative thinking: When normative principles and concepts are formulated precisely, they, too, can be criticized intersubjectively, for instance with respect to their compatibility with other principles or ideals (McDermott 2008, Rawls 1999, Zimmerling 1996).

While the commitment to clarity of language and rigor of argument is, as analytical theorists argue, essential to all scientific endeavors, it is, in addition, normatively required in liberal political theory. Being committed to a view of persons as free and equal, rational and reasonable actors and to democratic values that require that political discussion be broad and inclusive, liberal theorists insist that political principles should also be *public* in the sense of being comprehensible to all citizens, not only to experts in the field (Rawls 2005). Analogously, it is imperative to formulate propositions in political theory in a way that is accessible to as many individuals as possible. This view is not compatible with conceptions of political theory that, for aesthetic reasons for example, rely on metaphors, undefined concepts, and private linguistic intuitions. Contributions to political theory, access to which is restricted to the "inaugurat-

[1] What analytical political theorists "distinguish themselves from" is summarized by Pettit, namely "the counter-Enlightenment or continental tradition. They take their distance from more or less Romantic figures like Rousseau, Herder, Hegel and the early Marx, and from disciplinary approaches – say, in sociology or anthropology – that are heavily influenced by such thinkers. They distance themselves equally from philosophers of a more skeptical and anti-systematic cast like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche and from the many later thinkers, philosophical and non-philosophical, who identify with them. And, finally, they reject styles of philosophical thought that are distinctively shaped by certain traditions of religious, cultural or political commitment" (Pettit 2007: 5).

ed few“, are undemocratic since they erect unjustified and unjustifiable barriers of understanding and are, thus, not suitable for public academic discourse.

The present collection of articles is an attempt to demonstrate the breadth and richness of analytical political theory – as a tribute to Ruth Zimmerling for her 65th birthday, but also as a pledge to adhere as political scientists to the obligations imposed by liberal democratic principles on academic discourse.

The volume consists of three parts, corresponding to the three core areas of political theory.

Part I is dedicated to conceptual matters:

Marlies Ahlert proposes a bounded-rationality model of desire-based choice, modelling choice as the result of a sequence of decisions from the selection of the desire to be fulfilled and the degree of its fulfillment, to the analysis of feasible alternatives and their evaluation to, finally, the choice. It is a bounded-rationality model as she assumes that a set of coarse criteria is applied at each step of the decision-making process, leading to a rational, satisfaction-maximizing choice.

Both Kai Arzheimer and Jürgen Falter address the conceptual confusion around a family of terms characterizing an important branch of contemporary research in Political Science on voters and parties: Where exactly are the conceptual borders between the “‚extreme’, ‚radical’, ‚far’, ‚populist, ‚anti-immigrant’, or ‚new’ right“ (Arzheimer: 24)? While Arzheimer questions whether this confusion is all bad, and comes to the conclusion that it has had the salutary effect of inspiring a wide range of research which has led to the sharpening of the conceptual tools, Falter focuses on criticizing one conception of extremism quite prominent in the German research context, that is the normative-comparative conception advocated by Backes and Jesse.

(Social) Scientists and philosophers alike deal with issues they consider “important”. But what is important? The question as such seems to be innocuous enough, but it is not as Susanne Hahn demonstrates when she analyzes the kind of answers we may expect to receive when posing this question.

Jürgen Sirsch and Doris Unger take a closer look at Ruth Zimmerling’s critique of the republican conception of freedom as non-domination as advanced by Philip Pettit in particular. They reconstruct the two claims Zimmerling’s critique is based on and critically reflect her arguments. If, for instance, as Zimmerling argues, Pettit’s concept of non-domination does not imply freedom, it is possible for individuals to be non-dominated and nonetheless unfree. Focusing on the reduction of domination would, thus, not be justified. Sirsch and Unger argue, however, that this critique presupposes an interpretation of Pettit’s conception which is incompatible with some of his other central claims.

Part II is dedicated to Normative Political Theory in a double sense: While some of the articles are contributions *to* Political Philosophy, discussing normative issues normatively, others represent works *on* Political Philosophy, analyzing normative discussions from a "meta-normative" perspective.

Michael Becker's contribution belongs to the latter. Its subject is Buruma's and Margalit's work on "Occidentalism", discussing the nature and consequences of the misperceptions and prejudices of "the East", meaning Eastern (Political) Philosophy, concerning "the West". Agreeing with Buruma's and Margalit's analysis, Becker critically reflects on the Occidentalism propagated by authors as diverse as Thomas Mann and Anne Norton on the one hand, and Rabindranath Tagore and Hassan al-Banna on the other.

Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt discuss justifications of coercion in the contractarian literature, focusing on Nozick's *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* and *Calculus of Consent* by Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan. They point out that the authors arrive at roughly the same conclusions, though from different starting points. According to Brennan's and Kliemt's analysis, Tullock's and Buchanan's assumptions for justifying state coercion are more promising as they are – in contrast to Nozick's – compatible with the justification of political order.

Ernesto Garzón Valdés explores the relationship between human dignity, human rights and democracy, and concludes that democracy, understood as majority rule, can only be justified if it effectively safeguards human dignity. The protection of human dignity, in turn, requires the effective constitutional implementation of democratic, liberal and social rights.

Claudia Landwehr deals with issues of the legitimacy of non-elected expert panels in democratic decision-making. She points to shortcomings in justifications of the roles these panels play in modern democracies. Based on her discussion of deliberative experiments conducted in Mainz, Landwehr proposes to increase the legitimacy of expert panels by means of deliberative democracy: she argues that meta-deliberation on the design of these panels can enhance their democratic legitimacy.

Susan Mendus and Annette Schmitt both address the problem of "dirty hands" in politics, albeit from different perspectives. While Schmitt asks whether the problem of "dirty hands" is a moral or rather a psychological problem, Mendus focusses on the issue of "getting one's hands dirty" specifically in the democratic context: She observes that theorists of democracy on the one hand and authors focusing on the role of politicians on the other have very different views of the justifiability of political wrongdoing for some noble end. This is, she claims, due to their different notions of democratic accountability. She concludes that it is impossible to seriously reflect upon the problem of dirty hands in liberal democracies without also considering the specific demands of political representation.

Kerstin Pohl argues that civic education is tightly wed to normative political theory as civic education is a political matter and, as such, in need of justification. In her contribution to this volume she points out how debates in Civic Education mirror debates in Political Theory by giving a comprehensive and systematic overview of justifications of civic education since the 1970s.

While social scientists and political philosophers agree that global poverty is one of the most pressing problems of our times, there is profound disagreement as to what kind of problem it is, its causes and possible justified solutions. In his paper, Eduardo Rivera-López explores the methodological requirements that must be met in order to remove some of the obstacles, especially with respect to the relationship between empirical and normative aspects, that presently stand in the way of developing a theory of global poverty eradication.

Christine Tiefensee investigates whether moral responsibility can be ascribed to individuals in cases of causal over-determination. Is the individual driver morally to blame for global climate change even though her car-using behavior does not have any discernable effect on global warming? In her contribution to this volume, Tiefensee argues that individual (in-)action can be morally evaluated in this type of situations by drawing on Mackie's INUS account of causation.

Albert Weale analyzes questions of how to deal with inequalities of power in a democracy that arise from virtuous behavior of individuals. He observes that individuals who, for instance, are patient and, thus, have lower rates of time-discounting will often have advantages in bargaining games. From this, the problem arises whether inequalities, which result from virtuous (i.e. patient) behavior, should be rectified – as mandated by contractarian theories of justice that define justice as the outcome of bargaining under conditions of equality – or whether these inequalities are justified. Weale goes on to discuss several options to solve this problem.

Part III addresses issues of Positive Political Theory:

Michael Baurmann takes a closer look at a rather disturbing assumption by Kurt Shell, according to which the stability of democratic systems is based predominantly on pure force of habit. Suggesting several explanatory mechanisms which link certain epistemic and power-oriented beliefs to collective patterns of behavior such as conformism and acquiescence, he concludes that rational "apathy" (273) and rational ignorance mutually reinforce each other.

Dominik Klein, Johannes Marx and Simon Scheller investigate the possibility of feedback effects of rational action on the rationality of beliefs. On the basis of two agent-based computer simulations (dealing with political revolutions resp. economic bargaining), they demonstrate how information asymmetries emerge as a direct consequence of rational decision behavior, or, more precisely: the agents' choice of certain

strategies. They furthermore discuss the implications of their results, especially with respect to the assumption of orthodox Rational Choice Theory that beliefs are (and have to be) independent of choices.

In his contribution dealing with so-called "election promises" or "campaign pledges", Karl Marker focusses on three questions: (1) Why is it that these speech-acts cannot be conceived of as genuine promises? (2) What are the main differences between campaign promises and other kinds of propositions that merely seem to be promises such as predictions or declarations of intent? (3) What are the political consequences of neither politicians nor citizens carefully distinguishing between these different kinds of speech-acts? The paper suggests that election promises should be understood as performance guarantees. As such, they must be perceived as mixed blessings.

José Martí discusses the continuing relevance of Ruth Zimmerling's article on "Globalization and Democracy: A Framework for Discussion" (2005), in which Zimmerling not only presents but also critically reflects on the state of the literature concerning the impact of globalization on democracy. Martí points to the political, social and technical developments that have characterized the process of globalization since 2003 and the ensuing challenges for democracy (such the digital revolution and populism) on the one hand, as well as to corresponding research projects and new approaches in political science and international law on the other.

Employing the theory of agency, Arne Niemann and Friedrich Plank explore how and to what extent agents of EU conflict management (most notably those within the EAD) are capable of enhancing their executive discretion. To this end, they analyze the institutional framework and the political dynamics of EU conflict management in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty. Differentiating between structural and interest-based forms of discretion, they come to the conclusion that both forms are important but not equally so, as certain structural factors (such as the external environment of this specific policy field) seem to improve conditions for extending interest-based discretion as well.[2]

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I Taking Concepts Seriously – Die Bedeutung von Begriffen

A Conceptual Model of Desire-Based Choice

Marlies Ahlert[1]

1 Introduction

The aims of this paper are conceptual. It proposes a formal model of how an individual deals with the fact that she cannot always get what she wants since she can only choose an option from the feasible set. We propose some modes of individual evaluation structures based on a set of the individual's desires. Evaluations lead to a choice of some option from the feasible set. This choice then defines actions an individual would have to take in order to fulfill the chosen combination of fulfillment of desires.

Our concept is based as far as possible on variables that have an empirical basis. It will be possible to ask subjects to name or select the variables and to observe subjects' evaluation process.

Eventually, the aim must be to find out how real world individuals go about their decision-making process against the background of desires. The model proposed here has a descriptive choice making component and also a partially normative one. It is laying out some standards of minimum rationality that may or may not be fulfilled. This should be open to empirical testing.

In section 2 we will present the framework and define the desire grid of options. Section 3 deals with different restrictions of the feasible set of options. In section 4 we develop several evaluation procedures, and section 5 concludes.

2 The Model

Consider an individual with a certain finite number of desires. Desires of the individual are denoted by $D_1,\dots, D_n$. We assume that each desire D_i, $I = 1,\dots,n$, can be fulfilled to a certain extent. The individual relies on a "coarse structure" to assess and classify the degree of fulfillment of the desire. Degrees of fulfillment of desire D_i are denoted by f_i. For the sake of simplicity we assume that there are a finite number p of degrees the individual perceives, and that this set is the same for all desires. The set of degrees is denoted by F.

As a specific illustration one can imagine that each desire D_i may be fulfilled not at all $f_i = 0$, or to a low degree $f_i = l$ or to a medium degree $f_i = m$ or to a high degree $f_i = h$ or completely $f_i = c$. This exemplary coarse structure $F_i = \{0, l, m, h, c\}$ stands in for any other empirically relevant finite structure of p degrees between zero fulfillment and complete fulfillment of a desire. This coarse structure of five or, in

[1] The author thanks Manfred Holler, Hartmut Kliemt and David Schmidtz for very constructive and encouraging comments. Suggestions by Katharina Sträter and remarks by participants of the Adam Smith Seminar at the University of Munich were very helpful, too.

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general, p degrees can be applied to each desire D_i, I = 1,…,n, in principle. But it may well be the case that for some specific desire not all degrees make sense. For instance, in case of the desire to own a Rolls Royce, either you own one or you don't, reducing the set to {0, c}. We will take care of this in the discussion of reasons for non-feasibility.

In order to present the choice possibilities of the individual we define the Cartesian product $G = \{(f_1,\ldots,f_n) \mid f_i \in F\}$. G contains all combinations of degrees of fulfillment of the n desires and is called a grid. Elements in G are called options. We interpret options as states of affairs representing some circumstances of an individual's life. In the example of owning a Rolls Royce the desire is not defined by the object but by the state of affairs of owning it. Example 1 shows a two-dimensional grid with five degrees of each desire.

Example 1
Desire Grid
In general there are n desires with a finite number of p degrees of fulfillment. In the example we consider two desires D_1 and D_2 with the degrees 0, l, m, h, c.
Two desires and five degrees lead to a two-dimensional 5 x 5 Cartesian product or grid:

Fulfillment Degrees of D_2

c					
h					
m					
l					
0					
	0	l	m	h	c

Fulfillment Degrees of D_1

We say that an option is feasible if and only if there is a set of actions the individual can perform in order to achieve this option. Assuming a world of certainty concerning consequences of action we need not calculate expected degrees of fulfillment. This is ruled out formally since it would not make sense in a model with merely ordinal rankings. In substance it is also not in line with the mental representations individuals use in the process of mental modeling complex action situations.[2] An individual judges a certain combination $g \in G$ to be feasible when the individual owns at least one plan of actions that would result in the realization of g.

[2] See on this view also Güth 2014.

3 Non-Feasibility

The grid G is the starting point of the analysis. There is a so called ideal option $\bar{c} \in G$ with $\bar{c} = (c,\ldots,c)$ where all desires are completely fulfilled. If this option is feasible, i.e. there is a plan of actions such that $\bar{c}$ is the outcome, we shall assume that the individual will be happy to choose this plan and the resulting complete realization of all her desires. This individual gets what she wants in all dimensions.

However, an individual may not always get what she wants. Therefore, in our context we have to deal with circumstances where $\bar{c}$ is not feasible. In addition, the same may hold true for other vectors in G, too. Holler (2014, 2015) refers as "editing" to the process the individual has to apply in order to account for all combinations of desires that may be feasible or may be good options. How individuals in fact form their desire grids and edit them is an empirical question. We study the editing process in principle starting with the search for incompatibilities of desires.

3.1 Logical Restrictions and Incompatibilities "on the Grid"

To start with the most trivial example, there may be desires that can be completely fulfilled or not at all. This is a case in which all degrees of fulfillment between 0 and c do not make sense. Therefore, all vectors in G with intermediate degrees of fulfillment of such a desire are not feasible.

There may also be limitations by nature that restrict certain desires to some extent. E.g. the desire of a person to fly like a bird cannot be fulfilled for natural reasons.

In addition, considering subsets of desires it may follow logically that the fulfilment of them is bound to restrictions. Let us consider the case of two desires $D_i \neq D_j$. We can define for this pair of desires that the fulfillment of desire D_i to a certain (non-zero) degree is strictly incompatible with the fulfillment of D_j to a certain (non-zero) degree and vice versa: $f_i \neq 0 \leftrightarrow f_j = 0$. This is equivalent to $f_j \neq 0 \leftrightarrow f_i = 0$. E.g. the desires to be a dwarf and the desire to be a giant are strictly incompatible due to logical reasons. If you are a giant you are not a dwarf and vice versa.

Yet there exist weaker versions of pairwise incompatibility. Let us consider the desire to be a person of public interest and the desire to lead a calm and reclusive life. One can think of situations where a person having completely or to some high degree realized the desire to be of public interest will for obvious reasons not be able to realize a calm and reclusive life to any positive degree (or to some medium or higher degree). The thought behind this weakening can be generalized to a notion of general incompatibility. For any vector of desires we can define vectors of degrees of fulfillment of these desires that are incompatible. These incompatibilities depend on the definition of the degrees of fulfillment of a desire and therefore on empirical issues. The degrees have to be defined by the individual depending on her perception. Logical

considerations in an application of the model can only be made afterwards, taking degrees a given.

Note that the preceding considerations concerned structural relations in the result space. Independently of what is possible in the action space it is not meaningful at all to try to achieve the results since they are incompatible as results. Obviously there are also issues of feasibility in the action space.

3.2 Limited Resources

In order to undertake the actions necessary to realize vectors of fulfillment of desires the individual needs certain amounts of resources. We assume that these amounts are limited, implying that not all combinations of fulfilment of desires are feasible even if they are compatible. This second step of editing further restricts the set of feasible combinations in G. To construct this type of restriction on G empirically the budgets of relevant resources have to be known and the amounts necessary to realize certain vectors in G. For the exercise at hand it is important to bear in mind that compatibility in result space is different from feasibility according to action space restrictions. Normative restrictions may concern both the acceptability of certain desires themselves and the acceptability of feasible actions leading to compatible combinations.

3.3 Social Norms

In a third step of the editing process the individual has to decide which laws and informal social norms of her social environment she will respect when realizing her desires. These norms may exclude some desires, but also specific actions to be used to realize certain desires.[3] Norm compliance restricts the feasible set further on. Norms may concern actions as well as desires themselves. To start with the latter, it may be stigmatized in a society to have certain desires and the individuals having them will feel guilty. For instance, certain sexual desires may be present but not be deemed desirable by the actor herself. It does not seem self-contradictory to have a desire to keep within the bounds what is deemed desirable according to norms or standards. Likewise as far as actions are concerned some can be feasible and desired but again due to norms be deemed undesirable. An individual may not want or cannot always follow the norms she generally finds important. Consider an individual having the desire to own a Rolls Royce and the desire to obey the norm “do not steal”. In this case the fulfillment of the first desire may be possible in circumstances where the second desire is not fulfilled. Norms that are seen by the individual as not fully binding are modeled as desires, and feasibility under norm fulfillment is edited similar to other incompatibilities.

[3] For a discussion of the relation between rationality and the acceptance of norms cf. Gibbard (1992).

Example 2
For the case of two desires and five degrees of fulfillment each we can represent G* in the grid of example 1 by denoting feasible options by crosses.

G* Fulfillment Degrees of D_2

c					
h	x	x			
m	x	x	x		
l		x	x	x	x
0				x	x
	0	l	m	h	c

Fulfillment Degrees of D_1

So far we have applied different types of restrictions to the set G. We denote the resulting subset of feasible fulfillment vectors by G*. We interpret G* as the result of the editing process. We will call elements on G* feasible options. The next step deals with evaluations of elements in G*. If the feasible set contains more than one element further evaluations must take place.

4 Evaluation and Choice

The evaluation of options presupposes that the individual has some idea how her well-being is derived from the fulfillment of her desires and how to trade off the different aspects combined in an option. The focus may be positive on the quality of life, the satisfaction or the happiness the individual will experience if she chooses some option. On the other hand being unable altogether to fulfill a desire may be of greater importance and then avoidance of frustration or keeping dissatisfaction small may be in the foreground.

We may introduce a status quo d in G* and assume that the individual evaluates all choices compared to d. d is the state the individual expects to emerge in continuity with the present one unless she realizes an altering option.

The option the individual chooses will depend on the type of evaluation and on the results of this evaluation. We offer evaluations that lead to an ordering of options and assume rationality of choice, i.e. the individual chooses an undominated element with respect to her evaluation ordering.

4.1 Lexicographic Orderings

In the evaluation step the individual may compare desires themselves or vectors of degrees of fulfillment. Let us start with the assumption that the individual ranks desires with respect to their strength. There are stronger desires and weaker desires. In-

stead of strength one can also think of importance or urgency of desires (cf. Scanlon 1975) or needs like in Maslow's pyramid (c.f. e.g. Maslow 1943) dependent on the context of the decision problem. All these examples lead to the assumption that the individual is able to construct a linear ordering of her desires "$>$" such that w.l.o.g. $D_1 > D_2 > \ldots > D_n$. We could conceivably assume that this ordering does not depend on her actual circumstances of life. But we could also assume that it is contextually influenced. In the latter case the status quo of the individual would be a typical influence on the ordering and it would be assumed that the ordering is only valid for one decision, namely a prospective change of the status quo.

We model strength of desires in the following way: if one desire is stronger than another one, the individual will look for options such that the stronger desire is fulfilled as well as possible. Among these options the individual looks for the maximal degree of fulfilment of the weaker desire. Applying this idea to the set of all desires a lexicographic ranking R_{lex} of options emerges. If $(f_1,\ldots,f_n) \neq (g_1,\ldots,g_n)$ are vectors in G we say that $(f_1,\ldots,f_n)\ R_{lex}\ (g_1,\ldots,g_n)$ applies if and only if the following holds: let s be the smallest index such that $f_s \neq g_s$. Then $f_{s+1} > g_{s+1}$. (Remark: s exists since $(f_1,\ldots,f_n) \neq (g_1,\ldots,g_n)$). Here we implicitly assume that given a fixed desire a higher degree of fulfillment of that desire is always preferred to a lower degree.

R_{lex} is an ordering on G and therefore also on G*. Facing G* the individual chooses the unique maximal option in G* under R_{lex}. This option is the one that maximizes the satisfaction of the individual given that the restrictions, the strength ordering and the lexicographic aggregation rule hold. In the plausible case that the individual orders her desires related to need, she might find that she does not always get what she wants, but what she needs most.

Let us turn to the negative focus and the attempt to avoid frustration or dissatisfaction. We can assume that the individual constructs a linear ordering of the desires with respect to their importance to avoid dissatisfaction. If the importance ordering to avoid frustration is different from the ordering with respect to strength, we rearrange the desires again such that $D_1 ,\ldots, D_n$ reflects the importance ordering with respect to avoidance of frustration. We assume that the degrees of frustration are inversely ordered to the degrees of fulfillment. Then we define R_{lex}^{frust} similarly to above for distinct vectors: $(f_1,\ldots,f_n)\ R_{lex}^{frust}\ (g_1,\ldots,g_n)$ if and only if the following holds: let s be the smallest index such that $f_s \neq g_s$. Then $f_{s+1} > g_{s+1}$. This means the degrees of fulfillment are identical for all most important indices up to s in f and g, but the degree of fulfillment in f is higher in desire s+1, i.e. the frustration is lower in f. The individual then minimizes aggregated frustration by choosing a maximal element in G* with respect to R_{lex}^{frust}. In the special case where considering the importance of dissatisfaction leads to the same order of the desires compared to considering their strengths R_{lex}^{frust} and R_{lex} are identical.

The shortcoming of lexicographic orderings is that they presuppose importance rankings that are independent of the actual options to be compared. To put it in economic terms, they do not allow for trade-offs in which compensation takes place between dimensions. Since decision making in the shadow of scarcity does of necessity involve trade-offs unless there is a single undominated alternative, imposing a lexicographic ordering of dimensions conceals some essential problems. It is an empirical question whether and when the assumption of situation-invariant lexicographic orderings is reasonable. That it is universally applicable is certainly not likely. We should be prepared to offer a more general aggregation rule that deals with satisfaction and frustration simultaneously and also incorporates status quo dependence.

4.2 Weighted Aggregation

It is an empirical question how detailed and specific individuals may weigh different degrees of fulfillment of desires and how they may manage to cardinally compare degrees of different desires. In reality there will be only a few attractive candidates for choices in G* and the whole evaluation procedure may boil down to a small enterprise. Since individuals somehow explicitly or implicitly form such trade-offs, we assume that they can in principle be constructed by the individual. We offer a general model that does not presuppose specific assumptions on the definition of weights for each degree of fulfillment for any desire, however, we will use an additive structure of the weighing process, i.e. the evaluation is presented by a separable function. We assume that the individual can construct n x p positive numbers on the desire grid. For each $k \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$ and desire D_k and for each of the p degrees of fulfillment $f_k \in F$ the positive number $w_k(f_k)$ transforms the fulfillment of D_k to the degree f_k to a real number. We call w_k a weight function of desire k, and we want w_k to be monotonic in f_k, i.e. higher degrees of fulfillment receive higher weights.

For any option $g = (g_1, \ldots, g_n)$ in G the result of the evaluation is defined by $W(g) = \Sigma_{i=1,\ldots,n} w_i(g_i)$. The individual's choice from G* with respect to W is then an option that maximizes W in G*.

We do not assume any regularities of the vector $w = (w_1, \ldots, w_n)$. However, by restricting possibilities for w, for instance, the lexicographic ordering can also be presented by some weight function with appropriate differences in sizes between $w_1, \ldots, w_n$.

A model for the negative view of frustration by not achieving the fulfilment of desires to some extent can be presented e.g. by positive frustration weights $v_k(f_k)$ for each $k \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$ and desire D_k and for each degree of fulfillment f_k of desire k. The weights $v_k(f_k)$ are decreasing in f_k. The evaluation function V in terms of frustration is defined by $V(g) = \Sigma_{i=1,\ldots,n} v_i(g_i)$. The individual chooses an option from G* that minimizes V. It is, of course, easy to model choice under frustration in a maximizing con-

cept. One could e.g. use negative weights, the higher the frustration the smaller the weight.

Evaluations and the choices with respect to W and V may not be equivalent. W is concentrated on hypothetical gains in satisfaction, whereas V is concentrated on hypothetical frustration which can be seen as derived from a loss compared to complete fulfillment of desires. From experimental choice theory it is known that losses are perceived differently than gains. Thus also the evaluation of happiness or quality of life will depend on what is empirically considered, hypothetical gains compared to some fictitious situation of zero fulfillment of all desires or frustration compared to complete fulfillment of all desires.

Another variation of the concept stems from the perspective of comparing all hypothetical gains and losses in satisfaction to the situation the individual lives in. In this case we consider a weight function that depends on the status quo $d = (d_1,\dots,d_n)$ which is an option in G*. The evaluation then may be modelled in different forms. We suggest assigning positive weights to gains and negative ones to losses compared to the status quo d. d would receive zero evaluations in all desires. However, we could also equivalently use an overall positive weighing with positive weights for d, too. In any case we assume that for any $g = (g_1,\dots,g_n)$ in G the weight difference considering desire k $w_k(g_k) - w_k(d_k)$ is non-negative if $g_k > d_k$ and non-positive if $g_k < d_k$. Weight differences are monotonic in steps of changes of degrees. W is defined like above by $W(g) = \Sigma_{i=1,\dots,n} w_i(g_i)$. Then W is maximized to select a choice option.

This last most general aggregation rule also includes cases of lexicographic orderings where the importance ranking depends on the status quo. This might be an appropriate model when degrees of fulfillment are interpreted as aspiration levels. There exists empirical evidence that the importance ranking may depend on achieved levels (Selten et al. 2012).

We use the grid from example 2 in order to apply different evaluations. In case of lexicographic rankings, if D_1 is the most important desire in Example 3 option (c, l) will be chosen. If D_2 is the most important desire option (l, h) will be chosen. If we apply monotonic degree weights the choices will be between the options (l, h), (m, m), and (c, l) dependent on the concrete weights. These are the strongly Pareto-efficient options in terms of degrees of fulfillment.

Example 3

Fulfillment Degrees of D_2

c					
h	x	x			
m	x	x	x		
l		x	x	x	x
0				x	x
	0	l	m	h	c

Fulfillment Degrees of D_1

Now we introduce a status quo d = (l, m) (cf. Example 4).

Example 4

Fulfillment Degrees of D_2

c					
h	x	x			
m	x	d	x		
l		x	x	x	x
0				x	x
	0	l	m	h	c

Fulfillment Degrees of D_1

Let us e.g. define that a loss of one step in degrees compared to d has a negative impact in the aggregation which is twice as high as the positive impact of a gain of one step. Then the maximal options are (l, h), (m, m), and (c, l). These options have identical aggregate weights. Here it is important to note that (l, h) and (m, m) are weak Pareto-improvements in terms of degrees compared to the status quo, whereas (c, l) is no Pareto-improvement compared to d. It is also easy to find examples in cases of low weights for frustration such that the maximal option is not a Pareto-improvement. In our example in case of lower weights for frustration the choice would be (c, l).

5 Conclusion

We offer a framework to model individual choices of an individual. This framework is based on a concept of desires. In contrast to standard economic choice theory the choice model in this paper does not use the relation between utility functions and choices. We also do not talk about preferences on outcomes. In addition we do not assume all rationality requirements formulated in economic decision theory to be ful-

filled. Our concept is embedded in theories of bounded rationality, instead. The first element of our concept belonging to this field is the assumption of bounded perception of differences in degrees of fulfillment of desires. We work with a coarse structure of finitely many degrees of fulfillment. Then there is no necessity to consider the spaces of the contents of desires more closely. Different types of desires can be handled in the same model without problems since the aspects we are focusing on are degrees of fulfillment. These are one-dimensional and can be assumed to be of the same kind for all desires.

The second aspect of bounded rationality is that we allow for different kinds of restrictions of the set of options, including bounds the individual imposes on herself by following certain social norms. The third aspect governed by bounded rationality is that we model very coarse evaluations of the feasible options. There are aggregation functions and choices induced by lexicographic rankings known from descriptive decision theories to be very prominent in real decision making (c.f. for instance Payne et al. 1993). Here one important rationality condition enters the model. We assume that the individual chooses a maximal element with respect to the constructed ordering of options. We refine these procedures by assuming weights on degrees of fulfillment. Here again a rationality assumption is used. We assume that weights are monotonic in increasing degrees of fulfillment. This assumption reflects the monotonicity in satisfaction derived from higher degrees of fulfillment of desires and seems very natural in view of the purpose of the choice e.g. to maximize satisfaction.

The concept is variable enough to model the attempt of the individual to aim for satisfaction or to avoid dissatisfaction or frustration. It is also possible to include satisfaction and frustration simultaneously. Here we may use weight functions that are dependent on a status quo or some option the individual aspires to. We present ways to model different types of weight for gains in fulfillment of desires and for losses.

The theoretical presentation of the model suggests a sequence of steps, first the individual selects desires and degrees of fulfillment, then she checks feasibility, afterwards she evaluates feasible options and finally chooses. In the model these steps are formulated separately and sequentially for structural reasons in order to distinguish different categories of the choice process. It is an empirical question whether and how individuals integrate elements of these steps. Let us assume that an individual wants to proceed fast and does not want to invest too much or unnecessary cognitive effort (cf. e.g. Gigerenzer et al. 1999). In this case one can well conceive of the following proceeding. Confronted with a choice problem the most important desire comes to an individual's mind. She checks to what maximal degree this desire can be fulfilled and considers only options with this property. After this first selection she decides on her second most important desire and searches for the best feasible degree of this second desire among the options under consideration. This process might continue as long as

there is more than one option left such that the individual may include some further desire in order to discriminate. Such a procedure saves cognitive effort since in case of lexicographic evaluations it is not necessary to check the feasibility of all options. In addition it may also be the case that not all potentially relevant desires have to be included if the set of options under consideration already shrank to just one element. Such a process is one conceivable empirical realization of some desire-based choice with status quo and context dependent importance rankings of the desires. Because of the sequential revelation of the importance ordering of desires in a generalized version of this approach the next important desire may even depend on the set of options that are still under consideration.

Since, to a large extent, our model uses variables that can be inferred from subjects and their behavior in experiments it is a challenge to find out how far the concept is suited to describe decision making by subjects in experiments.

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Conceptual Confusion is Not Always a Bad Thing – The Curious Case of European Radical Right Studies

Kai Arzheimer

1 Introduction

Over the course of many years, as a teacher, scholar, and friend, Ruth Zimmerling has impressed on me the importance of precisely defining one's concepts. After all, if there is no agreement on the intension and extension of a concept, it is impossible "to assess the truth or falsity or, more generally, the correctness or incorrectness, of propositions, hypotheses or theories" (Zimmerling 2005: 15). The statement is almost self-evident: Without precisely defined concepts, the whole endeavour of science becomes pointless, and scholarly discourses are bound to turn into dialogues of the deaf.

In her magisterial monograph, before she moves on to dissect and then reassemble the concepts of power and influence in a bid to clean up the mess that others have left, almost *en passant* Zimmerling makes a couple of important observations. First, she notes that in everyday situations, all of us use words which lack clear definitions, yet most of the time, we are able to communicate "reasonably well" (Zimmerling 2005: 15). Although "we must do better than just understand each other reasonably well" (Zimmerling 2005: 15) in the realm of science, one unspoken implication is that the difference between scientific language and everyday language is often a gradual one. Second, she coins the notion of the "bicycle concept": a concept "which is unproblematic as long as one does not stop to think about how exactly it works" (Zimmerling 2005: 15).

While it would be difficult to disagree with Zimmerling's plea for conceptual clarity on a general level, I think that, at least for the sake of an argument, it is possible to read these two observations against the grain. Unlike Zimmerling, I would like to argue that "bicycle concepts" *can* have their virtues (even if they might sometimes land one "flat on one's face"): The very shininess of bicycle concepts may stimulate discourses by attracting new scholars to an emerging field, whereas their inherent flexibility and agility facilitates movement across disciplinary boundaries.

In a bid to backup this claim, in this chapter I will look at the development of a subfield of Political Science, namely what I will call for want of a better name "European Radical Right Studies" (henceforth ERRS), that clearly suffers from the problems identified by Zimmerling and yet has arguably made some progress over the last decades. ERRS presents an extreme case in several ways:

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- It clusters not around one, but several bicycle concepts.
- It cannot even agree on the most appropriate label for the core bicycle concept that defines the field: is it the “extreme”, “radical”, “far”, “populist”, “anti-immigrant”, or “new” right?
- It consciously abandoned conceptual reflection in favour of empiricism, then, a decade later, relatively quickly adopted a very specific (and highly useful) set of definitions, both under the influence of a single scholar.

My analysis is largely exploratory, probably affected by selection bias, and relies on messy data. Even worse, I may not have too clear a concept of “progress”. This irony is not entirely lost on me.

2 “European Radical Right Studies” - a messy field

Extremism and radicalism are venerable concepts in Political Science. Their long and convoluted history has been explored in detail elsewhere (Lipset and Raab 1971, Backes 1989, Backes 2007). In postwar Europe, their use was confined to organisations at the very margins of the political spectrum and their supporters – communists of different strands on the one hand and right-wing parties and movements that harked back to the authoritarianism of the interwar period on the other.

However, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, an apparently new party family that was not easily classified as extremist rose to prominence in Western Europe. While some of its putative members were connected to traditional right-wing extremism through their history, ideology, and membership, others were unencumbered by such political baggage (the Danish and the Norwegian Progress Parties in particular, see Svåsand (1998)). More importantly, not a single one of the electorally relevant members of this family campaigned to replace democracy with some authoritarian alternative, and very few openly espoused traditional biological racism or antisemitism (although more covert references are not so unusual). Some of these parties such as the Dutch LPF and PVV or the Norwegian FrP even argue, in sharp contrast to traditional right-wing positions, that they are defenders of the rights of sexual minorities. What ultimately unites these parties (at least since the early 1980s) is their sharp opposition to *non-Western* immigration on the one hand and their problematic and ambivalent relationship with *liberal* democracy on the other (Arzheimer 2008: chap. 1.2.4): While they claim to be champions of some aspects of European democracy such as majority rule and freedom of speech (at least where it favours their own interests), they are highly sceptical of others (minority rights, representation, deliberation).

The early successes of these parties were sometimes mistaken as a return of interwar right-wing extremism (see Hagtvet (1994) for an example), but more often, they were perceived as worrying in their own right. Both perspectives have certainly contributed to the enormous and perhaps disproportionate (Mudde 2013: 2) scholarly at-

tention the phenomenon has received over the last three decades or so. Mudde's claim that "more than a hundred scholars from across the globe work on the topic" (Mudde 2013: 2) is an understatement - "several hundreds of scholars" (counting PhD students, PostDocs and established researchers) would be a more realistic assessment. Their work spans various subfields, most notably party and party system research and voting behaviour, but also political communication, political economy, political psychology, and several others. It is also interdisciplinary: while most scholars in the field are political scientists or sociologists by training and affiliation, contributions have also come from economy, psychology, history, and education.

A sizeable part of this research is documented in an extensive bibliography on the field that I maintain. This bibliography began as a list of references that I had perused in my own work from the 1990s up to and including my 2009 monograph on the electorate of these parties. Since 2010, the bibliography has been publically accessible on the internet[1]. Every six to eight months it is updated, using input from content databases and journals on the one hand and colleagues on the other. At the time of writing (January 2018), the bibliography contains 659 titles: 98 books, 121 chapters, and 439 articles from learned journals.

However, this literature's disciplinary and conceptual diversity is often seen as problematic. As early as 1989, Uwe Backes bemoaned the "confusion of tongues" in the (much more narrowly defined) field of (German) research into right-wing extremism (Backes 1989: 33). Reflecting on this observation and various other attempts to bring more conceptual clarity to the field, Cas Mudde wrote seven years later: "In 26 definitions of right-wing extremism that are used in the literature, no less then 58 different features are mentioned at least once. Only five features are mentioned, in one form or another, by at least half of the authors…" (Mudde 1996: 229).

In this short contribution, I will focus only on the most obvious conceptual problem, namely the disagreement over a proper label for the field's "core bicycle concept". I will argue that this confusion has not prevented the emergence of a large body of scholarship on the subject, and, more importantly, that this scholarship displays a high degree of interconnectivity and has not degenerated into a dialogue of the deaf.

3 Data

The main advantage of using my own bibliography is that it is shaped by my attempts to consciously identify a coherent (yet diverse) research community and its outputs. While I hope that the result contains much of the relevant research on the topic, it is important to point out some serious limitations and biases.

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1 Siehe: http://www.kai-arzheimer.com/extreme-right-western-europe-bibliography.

First, the bibliography's substantive focus is on electorally relevant parties and their voters in Western Europe. Social movements and fringe parties, as well as Central and Eastern Europe get some coverage too, but in a much less comprehensive manner. Other geographical regions (North America in particular) are hardly represented at all when it comes to parties and voters, whereas research on potential antecedents and consequences (attitudes towards immigrants and even attitudes of immigrants) may be included, irrespective of the country on which the research was conducted.

Second, the bibliography contains just under ten per cent sources that are written in German, with the rest almost exclusively in English. Literature in other potentially relevant languages (in particular French and Italian) is neglected. For the analyses here, all sources in other languages than English are consciously excluded.

Third, the bibliography leans towards publications in peer-reviewed journals. While this is in line with developments in the field, and in Political Science more general, it still constitutes a source of bias. Finally, what is essentially a one-person endeavour can never compete with comparable commercial or institutional databases and will always be shaped by the author's personal preferences and prejudices.

To offset these problems, I will also make use of a commercial reference database (*Web of Science/Social Science Citation Index*). These sources have some problems of their own. The bias towards English-language sources and towards (certain) peer-reviewed journals is even more pronounced. Also, the selection of references pertaining to a subfield is largely driven by simple keyword searches, not by human expertise. On the other hand, the commercial nature of these databases means that conditional on these limitations, they provide unrivalled coverage of the literature. Moreover (again, within these limits), they provide the data necessary for bibliometric analyses.

4 Findings

4.1 What kind of "Right"?

Table 1: Distribution of various phrases in the literature

Phrase	Percent
Any Phrase	61
Radical Right*	27
Extreme Right*	21
Right-Wing Populist*	10
Populist Radical Right*	7
Far Right*	6