

Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 1

Sebastian Luft
Ruth Hagengruber *Editors*

Women Phenomenologists on Social Ontology

We-Experiences, Communal Life,
and Joint Action

 Springer

Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences

Volume 1

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Editors

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Action

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Series Foreword

Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences

The history of women's contributions to philosophy and the sciences dates back to the very beginnings of these disciplines. Theano, Hypatia, Du Châtelet, Agnesi, Germain, Lovelace, Stebbing, Curie, Stein are only a small selection of prominent women philosophers and scientists throughout history.

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The Springer Series *Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences* will publish monographs, handbooks, collections, anthologies, and dissertations.

Paderborn, Germany
Cleveland, USA
Vercelli, Italy

Ruth Hagengruber
Mary Ellen Waithe
Gianenrico Paganini
Series editors

My Memories of Gerda Walther

by Linda López McAlister

When I went to Germany in 1973 as a Fulbright research scholar at the University of Würzburg, I had already been very involved in the United States with women philosophers who were meeting together and beginning to explore feminist philosophy. They founded the Society for Women in Philosophy and were instrumental in eventually founding *Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy*. Yet, despite my interest in German philosophy and women philosophers, I had never heard of Gerda Walter.

When I got to Germany one of the things I was very interested in was meeting German women philosophers. At Würzburg I was assigned, apparently quite arbitrarily, to one of the two Philosophy Institutes, located on opposite sides of the magnificent Baroque palace, the Würzburg Residenz. Despite the beautiful surroundings, my welcome to the Philosophisches Institut I, to which I had been assigned, was a complete disappointment. The head of the institute briefly said hello and then had a graduate student assign me a desk and that was all. After a few days it became clear that no one there had any interest in me or my work and, needless to say, no one there was at all interested in women philosophers. I was feeling quite alone in the palace.

Then one morning I walked to the other side of the Residenz to check out the Philosophisches Institut II, where, to my utter amazement and joy, I was greeted with warmth and enthusiasm by a woman philosopher—Prof. Dr. Wiebke Schrader—and by the director of the Institut, University Professor Rudolf Berlinger. They wanted to know all about me and my work, they took me to lunch and made me feel completely welcome. Needless to say, I promptly made my academic home on their side of the Residenz.

Of course, I asked Wiebke if there were other women philosophers in Germany. She knew a few, but not many. So almost immediately we decided to start a project to identify women philosophers in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, and then invite them to come to a weekend conference at the Philosophisches Institut II in the Spring of 1974. In those days before computers and the internet, that meant spending endless hours going through university catalogues, looking at lists of women who had received degrees in philosophy (and finding their addresses), and

seeking names of people who had written about German women philosophers. Finally, we had our list and made plans for the conference; we sent out the letters of invitation, and waited. But not for long.

The very first reply we received, almost immediately, was from Gerda Walther. She told us how excited she was that we were organizing this conference and said that two of her contemporaries who had already passed on, Edith Stein and Hedwig Conrad-Martius, would have also been pleased that we were doing this.

Unfortunately, however, she would not be able to attend either. She wrote that she was “too old, too ill, and too poor to make the trip.” She was, by that time, 77 years old (the age I am now) and living in a retirement home in Dießen on the Starnberger See outside of Munich. She had no family, but Dr. Eberhardt Avé-Lallement, a philosopher at the University of Munich whose teacher and mentor had been Hedwig Conrad-Martius, looked after her. In fact, at her suggestion, we invited him to be the featured speaker at our conference so he could speak about Conrad-Martius.

The conference turned out to be a huge success with around 25 women philosophers (and a few men) from three countries in attendance, sharing their work and getting acquainted. By the end, plans were already being made to organize the next one. In two years, led by Elfriede Tielsch, the first meeting of the International Association of Women Philosophers was held in Berlin. It has been holding conferences every two years since then and celebrated its 40th anniversary in Melbourne, Australia in 2016.

I did not get to meet Gerda Walther while I was in Germany in 1974, but we kept in touch with occasional letters and cards. I bought and read her amazing memoir, *Zum Andern Ufer: Vom Marxismus und Atheismus zum Christentum*, which gives a remarkable view not only of her life but of twentieth Century Germany in general. It takes you from her Socialist childhood, World War I and its aftermath, her study of phenomenology with Husserl, the impossibility of a woman philosopher being employed in her field, her quite unexpected introduction to parapsychology which became her major focus for many years, the (sometimes subversive) work she did censoring mail during World War II, and, in her later years, her conversion to Christianity. She told me that after *Zum Anderen Ufer* was published in 1960, a government program selected it to be placed in every library in the country.

Gerda Walther and I finally actually met when I travelled to Germany again in 1976. A friend and I went to visit her at the retirement home on the Starnberger See. I already knew from her letters how much she disliked being there. The problem wasn't the place itself, which was quite nice; her room was small but adequate, filled, as you might expect, with books and papers. The problem was the people. There was no one there with whom she could talk about philosophy or ideas. I recall her saying, “All they're interested in are fashion shows!”

I can't say that our visit helped fulfill her desire for intellectual conversation since my friend was not a philosopher nor a German speaker. But it was a nice visit, nonetheless. We went out for a drive around the lovely countryside and stopped at an outdoor restaurant (where she ordered Leberkäse, as I recall).

I had brought my copy of *Zum Anderen Ufer* to get it autographed, which she did when we got back to her room. She simply wrote, “In Erinnerung an den Besuch in Dießen am 15 VIII 76. Gerda Walther” and handed the book back to me. Then she asked for it back, went over to her desk, and put a little sticker on the bottom of the page. It says, “War is not healthy for children and other living things.”

Albuquerque, New Mexico
May 2017

Linda López McAlister

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Introduction

This volume brings together the majority of the talks delivered at the conference “Women Phenomenologists on Social Ontology,” held at the University of Paderborn in February of 2016. The event was organized by Paderborn’s Director of the Teaching and Research Area History of Women Philosophers and Scientists, Ruth Hagengruber together with the then DAAD Visiting Professor Sebastian Luft from Marquette University. The conference consisted of two days of talks by invited international speakers, followed by a day of presentations by graduate students and postgraduate researchers. The papers selected for inclusion in this volume were authored by both the invited speakers and the additional conference participants, and are based on their conference presentations. All texts which appear here have undergone peer review prior to final acceptance. The conference organizers would like to thank all authors for agreeing to publish their texts in this conference proceedings.

A few words on the theme of the conference and how the event came to be realized. Social ontology, phenomenology, and their intersection, are shared interests of Ruth Hagengruber and Sebastian Luft. When Luft decided to come to Paderborn for a one-year visiting professorship, they immediately began collaborating to organize a conference that would span these mutual interests. On the one hand, Luft is an internationally renowned researcher in Husserlian phenomenology, and has regularly offered a course on the social thought of Edith Stein and others at Marquette for over a decade.¹ On the other, in addition to her work on Émilie Du Châtelet, for many years Hagengruber has promoted the teaching and research of the three most well-known women in early phenomenology, Edith Stein, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, and Gerda Walther. She has been interested not only in their phenomenological and metaphysical views, but also their writings on community

¹Of Luft’s work in the area of phenomenology, we would like to mention his “*Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie*”. *Zur Systematik und Methodologie der Phänomenologie* (Springer 2002), *Subjectivity and Lifeworld in Transcendental Phenomenology* (Northwestern 2011). Luft is also the editor of vol. XXXIV of the *Husserliana* and author of numerous articles in phenomenology above and beyond Husserl.

and the state. The result was a conference on “Women Phenomenologists on Social Ontology”—the first of its kind.

Hagengruber’s interest in the women phenomenologists and their contributions to social ontology was virulent well before coming to Paderborn. In the 1990s, she began lecturing on the works of Gerda Walther, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, and the middle writings on social philosophy of Edith Stein at Koblenz University and Albertus Magnus University in Cologne. In Koblenz, she was supported by Elisabeth de Sotelo, director of the *Koblenzer Frauenstudien*, and Wolfgang H. Müller. Müller was a Husserlian scholar interested in highlighting the differences between Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and the phenomenology of Heidegger, as well as the differences between the conceptions of phenomenology we find in Heidegger and Edith Stein.² Hagengruber made it her goal at this time to reintegrate these figures into the landscape of phenomenological research and the philosophical canon more broadly.³ To that end, she published a number of essays on the early women phenomenologists and edited volumes based on her seminars on women philosophers at Koblenz.⁴

The female voices in phenomenology, many of which had a formative impact on the movement, have been kept relatively silent for many years. Even at the University of Cologne, famous for its phenomenological tradition and home to one of the satellite Husserl Archives, discussions of the women phenomenologists were limited primarily to historical points concerning Stein’s work as Husserl’s assistant.⁵

²Müller, Wolfgang H. *Die Philosophie Edmund Husserls nach den Grundzügen ihrer Entstehung und ihrem systematischen Gehalt*, Bouvier-Verlag: Bonn 1956. This work can be seen as a precursor to the views expressed in the studies of Mette Lebech. Cf. Lebech, Mette, “Heidegger and the Meaning of Being,” in: Lebech, Mette, *The Philosophy of Edith Stein. From Phenomenology to Metaphysics*. Peter Lang: Bern 2015, 147–165.

³Hagengruber, Ruth. *Klassische philosophische Texte von Frauen*. Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag: München 1998.

⁴Hagengruber, Ruth. 2004. Das Unsichtbare sichtbar machen: Die soziale Wirklichkeit und ihre Grundlagen in der Philosophie von Edith Stein. In *Edith Stein Jahrbuch* 10, 157–175; Hagengruber, Ruth 2006. Sozialphilosophie als “strenge Wissenschaft”: Überlegungen zu Edith Stein und Edmund Husserl. In Beate Beckmann-Zöller und Hannah Barbara Gerl-Falkovitz (eds.), *Die unbekannte Edith Stein: Phänomenologie und Sozialphilosophie*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 59–72. Hagengruber, Ruth, Stein, Otti, Wedig, Sigrid (Eds.): *Begegnungen mit Philosophinnen. Seminar “Feministische Ethik”*. Verlag Ralf Quast: Koblenz 1996. As well as: Ruth Hagengruber, Philosophinnen. Eine Einführung in die Philosophiegeschichte, in: Elisabeth de Sotelo (ed.): *Feministische Hochschuldidaktik. Materialien der Koblenzer Frauenstudien*. Lit-Verlag, Münster 1998.

⁵Even today in Cologne, one of the editorial projects is a re-edition of Husserl’s *Ideen II und III* that attempts to restore Husserl’s original pencil manuscript and remove Stein’s additions and edits to the text. This will replace the current Hua 4 and 5. While there are certainly good philosophical and philological reasons to restore the original draft of the text, at the same time it raises questions about how we understand the importance of Stein as Husserl’s editor and assistant, and what the effect of quite literally erasing her work from the text might be in terms of how she is regarded by contemporary phenomenologists.

Their own philosophical contributions were never taught. Coupled with the fact that the vast majority of the writings of these women were only available in German,⁶ this heritage of exclusion at the institutional level has limited the access that students and researchers have to their ideas.

During her time at Cologne, Hagengruber had the opportunity to meet Linda López McAlister, a renowned scholar of Franz Brentano, who told her about her personal encounters with Gerda Walther. López McAlister had written the entry for Walther in the then recently published *History of Women Philosophers*,⁷ and had met her years earlier in 1976. The editors of the present volume have invited López McAlister to share her memories of Walther herein.⁸

Walther grew up in a politically active family—her father, Otto Walther, had met Friedrich Engels and was friends with August Bebel, Klara Zetkin, Rosa Luxemburg, among other famous German socialists. In the Winter Semester of 1915/16, Walther enrolled at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich to study politics and sociology. During her first year in Munich, Walther came under the influence of the phenomenologist Alexander Pfänder and her attention shifted to philosophy and psychology. Early in her studies, Pfänder introduced Walther to the work of Edmund Husserl. She transferred to Freiburg and spent six semesters studying with Husserl, Heidegger, and Stein. Walther delivered the inaugural lecture of the Freiburg Circle—“Zur Problematik von Husserls reinem Ich”—before returning to Munich to complete her dissertation, *Ein Beitrag zur Ontologie der Sozialen Gemeinschaften*.⁹ In this work, which was published in Husserl’s *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* in 1923, Walther expands on Pfänder’s concept of “inner joining” in order to explain how communities are formed, and develops the concept of we-experiences. In October 1922, she moved to Heidelberg to begin work on her habilitation under the supervision of

⁶For instance, with the exception of “Ways to Know God,” *The Thomist* 9/3 (1946), 379–420 and *On the Problem of Empathy* (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1964), Stein’s works were not available in English until the late 1980s. The only English translations of Hedwig Conrad-Martius are the rather crude one of her essay “Phenomenology and Speculation,” *Philosophy Today* 3/1 (1959), 43–51, a handful of passages from her Introduction to Reinach’s *Gesammelte Schriften* which were published in *Aletheia* 3 (1983), xxx–xxxi, and Susi Ferrarello’s recent translation of her “Acceptance speech at the ceremony for the award of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany, March 1st, 1958,” *Studia Phaenomenologica* 15 (2015), 51–63. Finally, while some of Gerda Walther’s publications on parapsychology were written in English, none of her philosophical writings are accessible to the Anglophone world. This is a regrettable situation, as English has become the international language of academic philosophy.

⁷Linda López McAlister, Gerda Walther (1897–1977). In: Mary Ellen Waithe (ed.): *A History of Women Philosophers*, vol. 4 *Contemporary Women Philosophers 1900–today* (Springer, Dordrecht 1994), 189–207.

⁸López McAlister has also donated her personal copy of Gerda Walther’s *Zum anderen Ufer*, which includes a dedication from the author, as well as photographs from Walther’s student years to the *Center for the History of Women Philosophers* at the University of Paderborn.

⁹For a detailed account of Walther’s student years, see Rodney Parker, Gerda Walther and the Phenomenological Community, *Acta Mexicana de Fenomenología* 2 (2017), 45–66, and Walther’s own autobiography, *Zum anderen Ufer: Vom Marxismus und Atheismus zum Christentum* (Reichl, Remagen 1960).

Karl Jaspers. However, this project was eventually abandoned. In her later years, Walther became close friends with Hedwig Conrad-Martius.

Conrad-Martius began her academic career at the University of Rostock in the Winter Semester of 1907/08. After three semesters in Rostock and one in Freiburg, Martius transferred to the University of Munich, where she took courses with Max Scheler and Moritz Geiger, met her future husband, Theodor Conrad, and became involved in the *Akademischer Verein für Psychologie*. In 1910, Geiger sent Martius to study with Husserl in Göttingen. Conrad-Martius was a prominent member of the Göttingen Circle, becoming chair of the group in 1911. In 1912, she was awarded a prize from the University of Göttingen for her essay *Die Erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus*, beating out approximately 200 other anonymous submissions. Having a woman win the essay prize in philosophy did not sit well with many of the professors at the university, and so they blocked her from obtaining her doctorate. She therefore returned to Munich and submitted her *Preisschrift* as her dissertation with Pfänder serving as her promotor. In the years following the completion of her doctorate, Conrad-Martius settled in Bad Bergzabern where they formed the Bergzabern Circle of phenomenology, which included Jean Hering, Alexander Koyré, Hans Lipps, Edith Stein and Alfred von Sybel. In 1916 and 1921 respectively, Conrad-Martius published her “Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Außenwelt” and “Realontologie” in the *Jahrbuch*, and throughout the ‘20 and ‘30s she devoted her research efforts to developing a universal ontology. In April of 1949, Martius began teaching natural philosophy in Munich, and in 1955 became honorary professor at Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich.

Hagengruber had become familiar with the writings of Conrad-Martius when she studied with Heribert Maria Nobis, himself a former student of Conrad-Martius, at the Deutsches Museum in Munich. After the *Center for the History of Women Philosophers and Scientists* was established, Hagengruber reached out to Nobis’ family to ask that he write down his memories of Conrad-Martius to be included in the present volume like those of López McAlister. Sadly, Nobis had passed away only a few days earlier on 6 February 2017.

As we have already hinted above, Edith Stein’s life was connected to both Walther and Conrad-Martius. In 1911, Stein enrolled at the University of Breslau, attending lectures by the psychologist William Stern (the father of Günther Anders) and the Neo-Kantian philosopher Richard Hönlswald. In 1913, she transferred to the University of Göttingen to study under Husserl on the recommendation of her cousin Richard Courant, but also in part because Stein had read about one of his female students, Conrad-Martius, winning the essay prize in Göttingen.¹⁰ While they

¹⁰Stein, Edith. *Life in a Jewish Family* (ICS, Washington 1985), 218.

never met in Göttingen, Stein became personally acquainted with Conrad-Martius in Bad Bergzabern, attending the gatherings of the Bergzabern Circle.

It was at the Conrad-Martius' farm that Stein began reading the works of Teresa of Ávila, which played a pivotal role in her conversion from Judaism to Catholicism. When Stein was baptized into the Roman Catholic Church in 1922, Conrad-Martius as her godmother.

In the spring of 1916, Husserl joined the faculty at the University of Freiburg, and Stein followed. She defended her dissertation, *Das Einfühlungsproblem in seiner historischen Entwicklung und in phänomenologischer Betrachtung*, that summer. Parts II–IV of the dissertation were published under the title *Zum Problem der Einfühlung* in 1917. After completing her dissertation, Husserl hired Stein as his private research assistant—a position she held from October 1916 until February 1918. In SS 1917, Stein began teaching the seminar for beginners in phenomenology—her “philosophical kindergarten,” which included Gerda Walther. After leaving her position as Husserl's assistant, Stein began preparing her habilitation, even though women were not awarded such degrees at that time. Her *Habilitationsschrift* of 1919, *Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften*, was rejected by the University of Göttingen. It was published in the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* in 1922. Building on the results of her dissertation, the First Treatise of the text, *Psychische Kausalität*, discusses the relation between the psyche and the natural and social worlds. The Second Treatise, *Individuum und Gemeinschaft*, analyses the relationship between the mind or spirit [*Geist*] and the life of the individual and the community. Here she develops a concept of communal experience, and argues that personal experience is inextricably immersed in, yet distinct from, communal experience. These investigations served as a basis for her *Eine Untersuchung über den Staat* (1925). Stein interprets phenomenology as laying the groundwork for a formal, regional ontology. Her overall project is about sense-making, and how we create meaning, following Husserl's eidetic phenomenology.

At first glance, one gets the impression that, unlike Walther and Conrad-Martius, Stein's name was never forgotten within the phenomenological community. A victim of the Nazi Regime and murdered at Auschwitz, Stein was well known during her life, and is regarded today as a brilliant phenomenologist and philosopher of social ontology. However, contemporary interest in her writings is only relatively recent—following her death, they had all but vanished from the view of academic philosophers. Even after the publication of her collected works, it took decades to establish her legitimacy as a philosopher rather than a Christian mystic. And while the name of Stein has now solidified its place in the phenomenological movement, phenomenology has not yet fully recovered from the setbacks it suffered due to the First and Second World Wars. It is high time that the contributions of the women phenomenologists especially are brought back to the forefront, rather than kept in the margins, and properly reintegrated into the rich tradition of women philosophers.

Taking into account the rich philosophical output of these three women, a number of compelling questions arise. For one, how did it come to be that the

phenomenological movement included so many gifted women? This was not the case with logical empiricism and Neo-Kantianism.¹¹ At the same time, it would be misleading to say that Husserl and the other founding members of the phenomenological movement had a particularly feminist agenda. It is, nonetheless, a remarkable fact that this movement had female members at all, and that Stein, Walther, and Conrad-Martius were such prolific and brilliant ones. One may speculate that it might not have been accidental after all. Indeed, one of the defining ideas of the movement, the famous call “to the things themselves,” means more than just a call to pay attention to the phenomena in their richness. It also implies the call to reject intellectual authorities and frameworks, including those of society, which would close-off doors to those traditionally left out, such as women.

Another question is how the philosophy of these women is part in the phenomenological tradition. The history of the phenomenological movement is not one of dogmatic followers of a method and set of philosophical positions or problems but one of disagreement, divergence, and heresy.¹² Husserl’s students struggled with the systematic structure of his phenomenology, and few were interested in the fundamental epistemological questions that he concerned himself with. He never occupied the field of social living in his published writings, and seemed to have little interest in political matters. He offered lectures on intersubjectivity, i.e., the social nature of consciousness in our interaction with others, which he placed under the general term “empathy.” In his private research manuscripts, Husserl dealt with broader notions of the phenomenon of sociality, e.g., in considering the intentional nature of communities and social structures, “we-acts” and other topics. Most of these analyses lay in his private research manuscripts, the bulk of which did not see the light of day until 1973.¹³ As is known, however, his private assistant Stein did read and prepare for publication what was only after the war published as *Ideas II*, where Husserl discusses the constitution of socialities. Husserl has certain essential limitations in his treatment of intersubjectivity and social reality. Broadly construed, he never went beyond the most general descriptions of these phenomena. Members of the phenomenological movement such as Stein (who was close to

¹¹Regarding Neo-Kantianism, it is well known that, “There are no women in the entire movement. Indeed, one feature that made newer philosophical movements attractive, especially phenomenology, was that they actively welcomed women into their circles. Indeed, women abounded in phenomenological circles...” (Sebastian Luft, *The Neo-Kantian Reader* (Routledge, New York 2015), xxvii) Of course, depending on how we define Neo-Kantianism and what qualifies as being a part of the movement, there may be some exceptions to this, such as Gertrud Kuznitsky, Afra Geiger, or Margarete Susman. Similarly, with respect to the Vienna Circle we might think of Rose Rand, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, or even Susan Stebbing. But in neither case, women did not play the central roles that they did in the phenomenological movement.

¹²Paul Ricoeur, *Husserl. An Analysis of his Phenomenology* (Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1967), 4.

¹³Here we have in mind the three volumes *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität* edited by Iso Kern, *Husserliana XIII–XV* (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1973).

Husserl but who did not follow his analyses in all respects), Walther, and Conrad-Martius, entered the scene with a peculiar interest in social ontology as treated from a phenomenological standpoint.

The organization of this volume is as follows. In the first section, we have grouped together essays on the social ontology of Stein and Walther. The first two papers, by Calcagno and Mühl, offer a comparison between the two. The next four articles, by Tullius, Galvani, Jani and Togni, take a closer look at Edith Stein, while the next four texts in this section, by Szanto, Schmid & Wu, Piazza, and Luft, focus more specifically on aspects of Gerda Walther's work.

The second section with articles by Miron and Massa, focus on the ontology of Hedwig Conrad-Martius. This separate section is justified through the specific nature of her ontology, which is less concerned with social-ontological questions.

The third section consists of texts by Thonhauser, Robaszkiewicz, Schaupp and Heinämaa on issues of politics, body politics and sociality as treated in the work of Hannah Arendt, Edith Stein and Simone de Beauvoir.

The organizers are grateful for both the conference that lead to this volume and to publish this collection itself, and above all for the community that was willing to dedicate its research to these philosophers. Forthcoming titles in the newly founded series *Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences* by Springer are a testament to that fact that this kind of research is only in its nascent stages. In 2016, the Minister of Culture and Education of North Rhine Westphalia financed the *Center for the History of Women Philosophers and Scientists* at the University of Paderborn. The Center HWPS is happy to have the internationally recognized scholar of the phenomenological movement, Rodney Parker, as a researcher focusing on the women of early phenomenology.

This work will ensure that the contributions of figures like Stein, Conrad-Martius, and Walther will find their proper place in the philosophical canon, and that their work will become necessary reading for current and future researchers.

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Part I
Social Ontology in Edith Stein
and Gerda Walther

Edith Stein and Gerda Walther: The Role of Empathy in Experiencing Community



Antonio Calcagno

Empathy

Gerda Walther has no developed account of empathy; rather, she draws from the writings of early phenomenologists and psychologists on empathy. Generally, for Walther, empathy is an act of mind that permits the understanding of another's consciousness and experience. Edith Stein, in many respects, lays the ground for a phenomenological account of empathy. Stein's treatment of intersubjectivity and the nature of intersubjective acts such as empathy draws greatly from Husserl. There exist three primary sources for Stein's analysis of empathy, all of which were written while Stein was still in direct contact with Husserl either as his student, assistant or as a private researcher attempting to habilitate. The primary and better known source is Stein's doctoral dissertation published originally in 1917, titled *On the Problem of Empathy*. The text, which is the only extant portion of her doctoral dissertation, sets the stage for Stein's later work on the subject. Husserl was pleased by Stein's selection of the topic, but he wanted her to give more of a historical overview, with special reference to Lipps' work. Hence, the text is replete with discussions of notable philosophers like Scheler, Dilthey, and Lipps. The second major work that addresses empathy is to be found in Stein's *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities* (*Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften*).¹ This work was published in Volume V of Husserl's *Jahrbuch* and consists of two principal texts: *Psychic Causality* (*Psychische Kausalität*) and *Individual and Community* (*Individuum und Gemeinschaft*). This text comes from Stein's period during and after her assistantship with Husserl. The text is largely,

¹ Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*. Hereafter parenthetically cited as PPH.

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but not exclusively, based on her work on Husserl's *Ideen II*. The last source is Stein's research manuscript titled, *Einführung in die Philosophie*.² Here, Stein carries out a further discussion of empathy, and though many points made in her earlier dissertation reappear, one does notice more attention on movement as a significant access way to the mind of the other, especially the movement of the lived body.

What, then, is an empathic act? Stein believes, as does Husserl, that empathy allows one to become inwardly aware and understand the consciousness of the foreign I. Stein believes that empathy, understood as an act, is an experiential act *sui generis* that is "primordial as present experience though non-primordial in content" (E 10). Empathy is not like any other act of consciousness. It is peculiar unto itself. One does not experience the consciousness of the alter ego as one would the lamp resting on the desk next to the computer. In order to explain what she means by the distinction primordial (*Originarität*) and non-primordial (*Nicht-Originarität*), Stein gives the example of a man who is saddened by the death of his brother. Stein perceives the man's long face, his countenance, and the pain. But the object of her perceptions, namely the sadness and the pain, is not objects of outer experience; that is, they are not things in the world like a cat or an inkwell, and they are not given to me immediately, like I am to myself. I only recognize them in the other only by perceiving the other. They do not belong to the proper sphere of my ownness. I do not experience the other's sadness as if it were my own actual sadness, identical with my own sadness. It is only when "I try to bring another's mood to clear givenness to myself, the content, having pulled me into it...[that] I am no longer turned to the content but to the object of it, am at the subject of the content in the original subject's place" (E 10). In an empathic act, I feel myself in the alter ego's place. I know the experience of the other as my own because I have entered into or find myself "living" the other's experience of pain. There is a kind of exchange that takes place; in a sense, the other's experience is transferred on to me. What is primordial is the co-givenness of the other as other, yet my experience of the other's pain is always experienced non-primordially. "The other subject is primordial although I do not experience it as primordial. In my non-primordial experience I feel, as it were, led by a primordial one not experienced by me but still there, manifesting itself in my non-primordial experience" (E 11). Hence, empathy is described as led and not absolutely projected. Ultimately, empathy is basic for the understanding of intersubjective experience (E 64).

Stein has managed to articulate what Husserl earlier called primary presence and appresence. The ego and alter ego are originally co-present, but the experience of the alter ego is not like the primary experience of myself presencing immediately to myself even though I enter into the experience of the other and live the other's experience to some extent as my own, that is, in my own consciousness. Here, Stein does not use analogical transference to describe and account for how precisely one takes the other "subject's place." The language that Stein uses is much more vivid in that one "lives in the experience" of the other and one "takes the place of the other." Later in her doctoral dissertation, Stein will indeed make reference to analogy. The

²Stein, *Einführung in die Philosophie*. Hereafter parenthetically cited as EP.

descriptions used by Stein may be different in various places in the dissertation, but the essence of her assertions is the same. That is, they strive to account for the way in which the ego comes to experience the other, always making sure never to reduce the ego and the other to a relation of identity.

Speaking in terms of relief, Stein elicits an image of a co-presencing, which ultimately needs to be made more distinct. The distinctness can come to show itself more clearly, in part, through empathy. The I is never deduced from the other. Rather, it comes to be seen in relation to the other just as the I sees the other's world as a modification of the I's world (E 62). Ultimately, Stein's description of empathy follows Husserl's account in three significant regards. First, Stein affirms that the I and the other are given simultaneously in original experience. Second, in empathy, the other "lives in me" originally as an other I, but the content of the other's experiences are not primarily given like the other is to the ego's consciousness. Third, the I and the other form one another in empathy. *Einfühlung* is not a unilateral act. One can understand the content of the perception of another's consciousness, but not as identical with one's own consciousness of perception. There is no *Einsfühlung*. One feels like one is taking the other subject's place in order to experience what the other is experiencing; however, the other's experience precisely remains other and the ego still remains ego, even though there is a mutual understanding—a coincidence and non-coincidence.

Empathic acts can take on many forms. The most basic form of empathy is achieved in sensation, emotion, and bodily expression. The sensations of pain or cold are just as absolutely given as the experience of willing, judging, and perceiving. Sensations, however, are peculiar in that they do not radiate from the pure ego like in the case of acts of judgment, willing, and perception in so far as sensations do not take on the form of a *cogito* in which the I turns toward an object. Sensation is localized in a certain space somewhere at a distance from the I. One can never find the ego in this space though reflection; nevertheless, this space is not an empty space. "All these entities from which my sensations rise are amalgamated into a unity, the unity of my living body, and they are themselves places in the living body" (E 42). Stein clarifies her meaning when she claims that in sensation there is a distance between the ego and the space in which the sensation is localized in consciousness. This distance is mediated by the ego as zero point of orientation. In the *cogito*, the ego of the cogito is immediately grasped in the pure ego, whereas in the sensation of coldness the feeling of coldness is not rooted in the ego as zero point of orientation; it is rooted somewhere else like my foot, my leg (E 43). In addition to experiences of sensation giving one a sense of the lived body, Stein believes that sensations are not isolated events or moments. They also open up fields of sensation (E 44). Fields of sensation refer to more general experiences of the specifically sensed experience. For example, I may experience the hardness of the table against my body when I hit it. The sensation of hardness is localized in my body; however, in addition to this specific feeling of hardness being localized in my body, I also form a general concept of "hardness" by which I can judge other experiences (E 44–45). Hence, we know the specifically localized as well as the more general experience of hardness. Like Husserl, Stein affirms the connection between ego and body, but Stein also wishes

to affirm a distance between them as well. In sensation, not only do I feel pain, but my foot also feels pain. There is doubleness in sensation affecting both the I and the localized point of sensitivity.

The experience of the other's bodily sensation is achieved through analogy, but not an inference by analogy, as is the case with thinkers like Mill and others. The analogy is not inferred: Its content really comes to presence and is graspable in lived experience. I understand in my experience of my own ego and its various lived experiences a certain sensation. I also know analogously the feeling of the other because of my own experience. I understand the other's experience with reference to my own similar experience. But my experience is not identical to the experience of the other and vice versa (E 59).

Feelings and emotions are phenomena that also enable the ego to enter into the life of consciousness of the alter ego. Not all emotions and feelings are the same, nor are they experienced to the same depths. For example, there are general feelings and moods that are not acts but only color acts, for they do not exist fully in the lived body but on the "topmost or outermost level of my I" (E 100). There are also feelings and emotions that have other people as their object. Such feelings include love, hate, and vengeance (E 101). One can feel these emotions and feelings to greater or lesser degrees, with greater or lesser depth.

Emotions and feelings are not pure psychic experiences, for they also manifest themselves in and through the body. Anger can result in a more rapid heartbeat, flushed face, and trembling. I can know the emotional state of another person by observing the other's bodily comportment. Again, I know the other's emotional state not immediately as I would know my own. There is trading places that happens permitting me to identify the other's emotional state as such. Stein and Husserl both maintain that there is never a feeling of oneness that occurs (E 16–18). Both the ego and the other retain their distinctiveness (seen in relief with each other), yet they still are capable of experiencing an aspect of each other.

Stein, like Husserl, sees the theme of bodily expression as relevant to the discussion of empathy. The understanding of bodily expression is based on understanding the foreign body as "already interpreted" as a living body of an "I" (E 82). The experience of a body as an I is a primary experience given to us immediately. In order to understand the other's bodily expression, I simply "project" my experience into it, thereby recognizing it as similar as my own. "I project myself into the foreign living body, carry out the experience already co-given to me as empty with its countenance, and experience the experience ending in this expression" (E 82). Here, empathy is described as projection, but recall that one is led first by the immediate presence of the other, led in such a way that one projects oneself into the other's place. Projection is never absolute. The discussion of projection must be clarified. Before, Stein can project herself back into the experience of the other, and she has to have already recognized or understood the other's experience within her own sphere of immanence, namely the sphere of the ego. The mere projection into the other (without reference to the ego as zero point of orientation) is not how acts of empathy are generally constituted. Husserl speaks more of analogical transfer than projection, but the sense in which Stein uses projection is in line with other descriptions of the

analogization that takes place between the ego and the alter ego. I understand the meaning of certain bodily expressions and what they may reveal about the other first through my own experience, which serves as the basis for understanding the experience of the other as expressed in body language. Hence, the experience of the other's joy as expressed in the other's smile is understood only as an expression of joy in so far as I am able to recognize such an experience within my own sphere of experience. There is a seizing of one through the other, an "*ineinandergreifen*" (EP 219). I, then, perceive the expression of joy through the smile, as given only after I see the similarity between my experience of a joyous smile and the experience of the other.

To conclude this brief discussion on empathy, we must examine phenomena of life such as aging, illness, growth, and development. Stein admits that her discussion of these phenomena derives from Scheler (E 68–69). In observing another person, I can detect certain qualities that reveal something about his or her condition of life. If I see a man who walks slowly and is bent over with greying hair, I recognize him as suffering the consequences of aging. I recognize the aging as a "modification" of my own youthful life (E 98). The empathy that ensues is a result of my understanding of myself and the understanding of what is given in perception about the other person. Life phenomena need not always be experienced in identical fashion by the other in order for them to be empathized or mutually understood. Stein gives the example of the doctor. A doctor may see someone and know they are sick. Red spots and problems in breathing may be a sign of tuberculosis. The doctor himself has never had tuberculosis, but knows through other analogous cases the signs and symptoms indicate the presence of tuberculosis and can even empathize the discomfort and suffering caused by the illness. In fact, the empathized discomfort might help bring to clarity the diagnosis.

Empathy implies a coincidence or mutual understanding of a given experience, object, or state of affairs, but it does not necessarily imply an absolute identity of the contents of understanding between ego and alter ego.

Let us now turn to a discussion of values and their relation to acts of empathy. The experience of the other's personal values is consciously experienced in two senses. First, I can empathize with one's values in so far as I share similar values with an other. I bring to full givenness the other's experience in my own egological sphere, and in so doing, there is a fulfillment in a mutual understanding of value. Moreover, even if one cannot live what the other experiences in terms of value, one can live by empathically representing what the other has lived. This is not an immediate experience. For example, I may not know what it means to be brave or courageous, for I have never had these experiences for myself. That is, they have never been given properly to myself. Nevertheless, I can understand someone else's experience as "brave." I then re-present or project the other's experience into my own experience. In this sense, the other becomes a model of a value, namely courage (E 115). The other becomes a catalyst for my understanding of what it means to hold a certain value without first ever having experienced it directly in my own egological sphere.

of experience. Hence, as in Husserl, my subjectivity is not completely determined by myself but is also formed by the other through the reciprocal understanding implied in empathy.

With the second kind of value experience, I may understand the other's values and the motivations behind adopting certain values, but I do not necessarily share the other's values as my own. In this case, one understands the other's values even though there is a non-fulfillment of sorts on my part. Stein gives the example of the religious man. Even though she may not share the man's religious sentiments, she can understand his values (E 115). When values conflict, as in the case of religious and non-religious values, I understand that the other has been motivated to adopt certain values. It is this experience of motivation that allows me to understand the other's adoption of certain values. Though the content of the motivation, namely religious values, may be variable, I still understand the idea of motivation as facilitating the adoption of certain values. I understand motivation first in my own egological experience and then transfer it onto the other, an analogical transference of the ego onto the alter ego.

The final distinguishing feature of Stein's description of empathic acts is her discussion of the significance of empathy for the constitution of our own person. Empathy is vital in that it helps us evaluate ourselves as a personal unity of body, psyche, and spirit. "By empathy with differently composed personal structures we become clear on what we are not, what we are more or less than others. Thus, together with self-knowledge, we also have an important aid to self-evaluation" (E 116). In understanding the foreign consciousness, and because such understanding mostly refers back to the egological sphere of immanence, we see how we are unlike the other or how we are similar. We can see difference as well as similitude. For example, in empathic acts concerning value, the very experience of value is very basic to our own value. When new values are acquired through empathy, one's own unfamiliar values become visible. If I experience industriousness in another person, I may see how lazy I have been in comparison with the other even though I understand what industriousness as a value means in my own, immediate egological sphere of concrete immanence. I may have known what it was to be industrious, but my evaluation of that particular value changes when I see a new, greater degree of industriousness before me in the other. One sees how one lacked understanding or familiarity in the past now that a new value is acquired (E 116). Empathy, then, does not only concern understanding or inner awareness properly, but may also affect the shape of our lives by the values we accept or reject through empathy.

This discussion of evaluation is interesting, for one can evaluate one's personal value as a whole against the experience of another. In my experience of the alter ego, I may be struck by the other's brilliance, intelligence, modesty, and generosity. I understand what these are, but I see that I lack such qualities to the degree the other embodies them. Hence, I feel inferior. One, of course, may reverse the example, thereby accounting for a feeling of superiority. "We learn to see that we experience ourselves as having more or less value in comparison with others" (E 116). Again, empathy *vis-à-vis* values affects the way we value our own persons.