

Studies in Public Choice

Joshua Hall · Marcus Witcher *Editors*

Public Choice Analyses of American Economic History

Volume 2



Springer

Studies in Public Choice

Volume 37

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ISSN 0924-4700

Studies in Public Choice

ISBN 978-3-319-95818-7

ISBN 978-3-319-95819-4 (eBook)

<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95819-4>

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018938802

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This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the Center for Free Enterprise at West Virginia University for support for this project.

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Chapter 1

An Economic Analysis of the 1st Nationalist Movement of 1783



John Lovett and Grant Ferguson

Abstract There is a strong tradition of both: (1) considering the Articles of Confederation a dead-end in U.S. constitutional development, and (2) examining the economic motivation behind the drafting and ratification of the U.S. Constitution. The constitutional movement, however, was not the first attempt at a stronger central government. This paper first overviews the 1783 drive to strengthen the Articles of Confederation that very nearly succeeded. Had this movement succeeded, the impetus for the drafting of the Constitution would have been significantly reduced. In short, the failure of the 1783 “1st nationalist movement” was not destined to happen, but is a critical turning point in U.S. constitutional history. After overviewing the importance of this turning point in history, this paper investigates the economic and geographic interests behind the “first nationalist movement.” A nationalist sentiment voting index is constructed for each delegate to the Articles of Confederation Congress. This index is regressed on state and delegate characteristics. Not surprisingly, nationalists tend to be from populous states and states less dependent on foreign trade. Being a military veteran is also associated with nationalist leanings. There are some surprises, however. State debts appear to play little role in nationalist sentiment and prior service in state government is positively correlated with nationalism. Finally, resulting measures of each delegate’s nationalist sentiment are examined.

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© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018
J. Hall, M. Witcher (eds.), *Public Choice Analyses of American Economic History*,
Studies in Public Choice 37, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95819-4_1

1.1 Introduction

The Articles of Confederation, the constitution governing the United States from 1781 until the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, are typically portrayed as a dead-end in U.S. history.¹ If anything positive is implied about the Articles, it is that they served as both: (1) a necessary step for keeping the states together during the war and, (2) a bad example to inspire those drafting and ratifying the Constitution. The relatively few works with a more positive, or at least nuanced, portrayal describe the Articles as an interim step in the development of the early American federal system (McDonald 2000; LaCroix 2010), namely moving part-way from a system of sovereign states to a federal system in which the national government is, overall, ascendant. Even among these works, the strong impression is that the Articles of Confederation were not only a sub-standard form of government, but also not a survivable form of government.

The goals of this paper are three-fold. The first is to argue that the Articles of Confederation were not destined to be a dead-end. In fact, there were very real attempts to strengthen the Articles in 1781 and then again 1783. This “first nationalist movement” was not the work of those wanting to keep an anemic Confederation alive. Instead, it was the best hope for, and led by, those favoring a stronger national government (“nationalists” as termed in this paper). After the failure of this movement, nationalists eventually abandoned hope of strengthening the Articles of Confederation and took a new track starting in 1785. This second, more famous path, involved replacing the Articles rather than modifying them. It led to the Mount Vernon Conference in 1785, the Annapolis Convention in 1786, the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, and finally the ratification of the Constitution. Had this earlier nationalist movement succeeded, which it very nearly did, it is entirely probable that the young United States would have been left with a national government more functional than the original Articles of Confederation but much weaker than the national government under the later Constitution. The impetus for replacing the Articles, via a relatively radical and quasi-legal convention process, would have been greatly diminished. The history of the United States would indeed have been very different. In short the failed attempt to strengthen the Articles should be seen as a turning point in U.S. history.

The second objective of this paper is to investigate the economic and geographic interests behind this first nationalist movement. Beginning with Beard (1913) and more recently with McGuire and Ohsfeldt (1984, 1986, 1989), McGuire (1988), and McGuire (2003), there is a strong tradition of examining the economic motivation behind the drafting and ratification of the U.S. Constitution. This paper conducts a preliminary analysis of voting to strengthen the Articles of Confederation in 1783. A “nationalist” voting index is first created for each delegate to the Congress. This

¹While the drafting of the Articles of Confederation was completed and submitted to the states for ratification in late 1777, they were not finally ratified until March 1, 1781. They did, however, guide the Second Continental Congress in the interim.

gives us a quantitative measure of nationalist sentiment during this little studied period. Next, this index is regressed against delegate characteristics. The results shed light on which economic/geographic interests favored a stronger national government.

Finally (the third goal), the nationalism voting index is examined in the light of common historical perceptions of some of the more famous delegates. The undeconstructed voting index offers a quantitative estimate of each delegate's politics in practice. The part of the index not "explained" by state interests (the residuals plus a bit more) can be viewed as a more "pure" or independent measure of each delegate's ideology.

1.2 The First "Nationalist Movement," 1781 and 1783

The Articles of Confederation have long been recognized as a very weak system of national government. The national government, via the Congress, did have the power to pass legislation. It also established a court to hear disputes between states. It was, therefore, more than just an alliance of sovereign states. Nonetheless, the ability of the national government to assert power was very limited. It lacked specified powers such as the authority to raise armies and, probably most important of all, to tax. Voting was by state with the default being a state votes "Nay." If a state delegation was absent, under-represented, or split, this was equivalent to an automatic "Nay."² In addition, a super-majority was required for passage: seven states voting "Yeah" for procedural issues, nine "Yeahs" for ordinary legislation, and 13 "Yeahs" for amendments. While this might have been partially offset by only having one house (versus two houses and an executive under the Constitution), the general consensus is that it was very hard for the Congress to pass much.

Those desiring a stronger national government recognized this and made attempts to strengthen the government under the Articles. A relatively broad-based movement (with the debate and correspondence actually beginning in late 1780) started in 1781. The main goal was to give Congress the authority and mandate to directly tax the states (by amending the Articles, i.e. requiring the consent of all 13 states) via a 5% "impost" or import tax. All but the Rhode Islanders eventually approved this. A second, more directed attempt was made in 1783. The Congress' Superintendent of Finance, Robert Morris, was the leader of this movement. Again, taxing authority was central. However, this second movement also dealt with other nationalist issues

²A state had to be represented by at least two delegates (and not more than seven) for it to cast a vote. Therefore states with zero or one delegate (ex. Georgia during all of 1783) were automatically "Nay" votes. States with an adequate number of delegates, but no majority among the state delegates, were likewise "Nay" votes. For example, if North Carolina has two delegates in attendance, two being the norm for most states, and one delegate votes "Yeah" and the other "Nay," North Carolina therefore votes "Nay."

such as the size, composition, and role of a peacetime army. It is this 1783 movement that this paper attempts to quantitatively analyze.

There are several reasons for limiting the study to 1783. First, the 1783 movement encompasses more issues than the 1781 movement. Finally, in 1783, one does not have to worry about military events (ex. Are the British on your state's soil?) dictating each delegate's voting pattern. Still, the final nature of the peace is uncertain, giving nationalists enough of a foreign threat to find support for a stronger government.

Although it may not have been evident at the time, the 1783 movement was the last hurrah for any nationalist attempts to reform the Articles of Confederation. While the impost is debated at the state level until 1787 (with New York being the main holdout this time, see Dougherty (2001, pp. 60–73)), Robert Morris and much of his proposals were gone by late 1784. This lack of a specific agenda makes the identification of votes for the voting index more difficult and results in fewer available votes after 1783. Once the Treaty of Paris is signed and the results become known, the spectre of a foreign threat greatly diminishes (although many aspects of the peace leaked out in the year proceeding the treaty's signing), temporarily weakening the nationalist movement. Supporting the idea that the nationalist movement declined after 1783 is research from authors attempting to identify factions in the Congress. These speak of a situation in which groupings shifted from nationalist versus localist factions in the years through 1783, to regional (in particular north-south) factions in 1784 and 1785.³ In short, it is difficult to develop a set of well-defined nationalism votes in 1784 and even more difficult thereafter.

Besides losing an identifiable nationalist agenda, alternative methods for strengthening the federal government, other than via actions on the floor of the Congress, began to appear viable starting around 1785. After these years prospects for expanding federal powers in the Congress were much more limited. It became obvious that the nationalists were not going to get significant, if any, extensions of federal power on the floor of the Congress. The prospects for legislation, emanating from the Congress itself, that significantly strengthened the national government are described as reaching a high point shortly before the Treaty of Paris (1783) and to have visibly declined thereafter. Much of this decline is attributed to the removal of wartime pressures for a unified and powerful national government (Ferguson 1961; Rakove 1979). Further, the possibility of a convention outside of the Congress which would strengthen or even replace the Articles was becoming very real.⁴ By 1785 some nationalists would come to believe that the best way to promote a strong

³On this point see Jillson and Wilson (1994, pp. 244–267) and Henderson (1974, pp. 281–378). In fact, 1783 is the only year that Henderson specifically identifies nationalist/anti-nationalist factions.

⁴The first serious calls for an outside convention came in 1785 (Jensen 1979, p. 33). In this instance the Massachusetts legislature instructed its delegates in the Congress to propose such a convention. The Massachusetts delegates, however, refused. The first two convention outside the Congress, were between Maryland and Virginia, were also in 1785. This was limited to trade issues. In 1786 the Annapolis Convention would be held. This convention called for the Philadelphia Convention

national government was to vote against measures in the Congress which would strengthen the Articles. The logic was that any strengthening of the Articles would only be minor and would halt any impetus for action through outside conventions. James Madison, a Virginia delegate and supporter of the 1783 nationalist movement, stated in December of 1785, “*I think it better to trust to further experience and even distress, . . . than to try a temporary measure which may stand in the way of a permanent one.*”⁵ Other delegates were beginning to share Madison’s belief that a limited strengthening of the federal government would prevent more sweeping reforms (Rakove 1979, pp. 370–381).

The question arises of whether or not this movement, like the constitutional movement a few years later, had strong economic and geographic bases. Did this push for a stronger central government take place before the nationalist/anti-nationalist divide congealed around economic and geographic interests? This movement occurred before political coalitions were well-established. Peace was newly at hand, but there was not yet a peace treaty. It is not impossible to imagine a period in which nationalism was based mostly on ideology and shared experience within the Congress. A second question is, if economic and geographic interests were aligned with this nationalist movement, what were these interests?

1.3 Overview of the Methodology

Research on the causes of votes in legislatures typically identifies three key aspects: (1) party, (2) constituency effects, and (3) the personal ideology of the representative (Kuklinski 1977; Lawrence 2007; Rosenson 2003; Ramey 2015). These three factors, or some combination of them and other influences, are known as the “standard model” of legislator representation in Congress (Hill 2015). Interestingly, America’s Congress under the Articles of Confederation lacked parties (Aldrich 1993). While there were groups of legislators that tended to vote the same way on certain issues, such clustering was fleeting (Jillson and Wilson 1994); there was nothing resembling the party structures that would be seen under the Constitution. This is, in a way, fortunate, because there are numerous mechanisms by which parties can influence voting and thereby mask both constituency effects and personal ideology (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Miller 2005; Rohde 2013; Cox and McCubbins 2005). As shown below, the reduced “standard model” of legislator voting under the Articles of Confederation is just a combination of constituency effects and personal issue preferences.

which drafted the Constitution, the document which would replace the Articles and provide for a much stronger national government.

⁵Quoted from Rakove (1979, p. 369).

$$\text{Delegate } i\text{'s Voting Pattern} = \text{Constituency Effects} + i\text{'s Ideology/Issue Preferences} \quad (1.1)$$

As is common practice, voting patterns are measured by a voting index. In this case an index, termed NAT, measuring the frequency in which a delegate votes in favor of a strong national government is constructed. Constituency effects are proxied by measurable characteristics of each delegate's state and the local area in which he normally resides. A delegate's ideology/issue preferences is assumed to be a function of both measurable characteristics of the delegate (ex. military service) and unmeasurable personal preferences. The voting index values (NAT) are then regressed on state level and individual characteristics of the delegates.

The magnitude and confidence levels of the estimated coefficients give us insight into which interests supported a stronger national government and which opposed it. In addition, the estimated effects of individual delegate characteristics (ex. wartime military service) plus the residual can be interpreted as the delegate's ideology/issue preference. In fact, it has long been standard practice in voting index studies to interpret the each individual's residual as a measure of pure ideology (Kau and Rubin 1979; Kalt and Zupan 1984, 1990; Carson and Oppenheimer 1984; Levitt 1996; Voeten 2005). Indeed, Lopez and Ramirez (2008) note that variations of this technique appear "pervasively." Further, unlike other common and otherwise valuable techniques for identifying the preferences of members of Congress, such as DW-NOMINATE (Poole and Rosenthal 1997), preferences obtained through the residual technique are theoretically free of the influence of parties and less formal vote trading groups.

Finally, the small size of the Congress of Confederation should be noted. After discarding a few delegates who were present only for one or two votes, there are only 48 delegates in the voting index. This means the number of explanatory variables has to be rather limited. It is also natural to expect relatively low levels of confidence for the results. However, that is the nature of the data.

1.4 Choosing the Nationalism Votes

The first step in choosing the votes for the index is to define nationalism. Nationalism is broadly defined as desiring a central government with much power and a large role relative to that of the state governments. Nationalism is defined, more specifically, according to the agendas put forth during this period by Robert Morris and Alexander Hamilton. Morris was the biggest figure in what is sometimes referred to as the "nationalist" period in the later days of the war and the early post-war years, roughly 1782–1784 (Ferguson 1961). During these years he served as Superintendent of Finance and led the initiative to give the Congress greater powers.

Alexander Hamilton was a friend and correspondent of Morris.⁶ Hamilton had already espoused many of his arguments for a stronger central government by 1782. These can be found in a series of writings termed *The Continentalist* (Hamilton 1904a). Hamilton would later author many of *The Federalists Papers*, lead the fight for the ratification of the Constitution in New York, and actively work to strengthen the federal government as Secretary of Treasury in Washington's administration.

The following five tenets, from Morris' and Hamilton's agendas, are used in choosing votes for the voting index.⁷

- Taxes: Nationalists favor taxes specifically for the use of the U.S. government. Preferably, these should be collected and administered by agents of the U.S. government.⁸
- Public Credit: Nationalists favor U.S. government, not state, assumption of most of the Revolutionary war debt. Such debt should be funded but not completely retired.
- Military: A permanent and professional army was desired by nationalists. Issues of pay to the Army, including severance pay and pay non-active officers (the half-pay for life issue) also fall under this category.⁹
- Bureaucracy: A professional and relatively large bureaucracy for the U.S. government was sought by nationalists.¹⁰

⁶See "Letter of Hamilton to Robert Morris" (Hamilton 1904d) in *The Works of Alexander Hamilton*.

⁷Three very prominent features of Hamilton's political thought are not explicitly mentioned in these five tenants. The first of these is regulation of foreign trade. We haven't included this as a separate category because it is implicitly a part of taxing authority and expanding the jurisdiction of U.S. government. The second missing feature is Hamilton's desire for a strong executive. This is excluded because: (1) we do not have writings to indicate Morris advocated this (although his actions indicate he favored much authority and strong actions for the quasi-executive boards), (2) the desire to have a professional bureaucracy is quite similar, and (3) there aren't any votes regarding a true executive in this period. Finally, Hamilton advocated the establishment of a National Bank. Morris, obviously after his role in establishing the Bank of North America, was also a proponent of this. This is not included simply because there are no votes regarding the bank during the years studied.

⁸For Hamilton's views on this point, see *Letter to James Duane*, 3 September, 1780 (Hamilton 1904b), *The Continentalist No. IV* (Hamilton 1904a), and *Letter to George Washington of 08 April, 1783* (Hamilton 1904c). See also Ferguson (1961, pp. xv, 116, 142–143, 146–148, 160–161) and Main (1961, p. 15, Chap. 15). The prefatory notes to the *Journals of the Continental Congress* for the years 1783–1785 also refer to an independent income for the federal government as one of the principle issues of these years. These prefatory notes were written in the twentieth century by the editor(s) compiling the various papers and into the *Journals of the Continental Congress*.

⁹For Hamilton's views on this point see Hamilton (1904b), Jensen (1965), and Ferguson (1961, pp. 50, 115, 157–159, 164, 169–170).

¹⁰For Hamilton's views on this point see Hamilton (1904b), *The Continentalist No. VI* (Hamilton 1904a), Wood (1987, pp. 81–93), Main (1961, pp. 15–17), and Ferguson (1961, p. 116).

- Jurisdiction: Nationalists favored expanding the jurisdiction of the U.S. government relative to that of the state governments.¹¹

In addition, the vote must, in the context of the proceedings within the Continental Congress, have a clear nationalist position (either yeah or nay). For example, on 07 January of 1783, there were four recorded votes on the issue of how to honor (or fund) outstanding Continental dollars. This is clearly an issue with nationalist/localist ramifications. Nonetheless, it is difficult to discern which position would enhance the nationalist position for each vote. The four votes include a vote on whether to postpone consideration of the matter (for which there could be a nationalist reason), changes in wording, etc. Based on the context in the *Journal of the Continental Congress* (Ford et al. [Various](#), pp. 30-042 (vol. 24)), none of these votes has a definitively nationalist or localist position.

Descriptions of the votes used can be found in Tables [1.1](#) and [1.2](#). To identify each vote by number, we used New York State Historical Association's *Atlas of Congressional Roll Calls, Volume I* (Lord [1943a](#)). The *Journals of the Congress of the Continental Congress* are the primary source of the vote, and the immediate debate surrounding it.¹²

1.5 Calculating NAT, the Voting Index Measure

In simple voting indices, each vote counts the same. This is appropriate if there is low absenteeism among the voters and there are a great number of votes. However, if some delegates are present for only few votes, they are likely to have inaccurate index values. High rates of absenteeism were chronic in the Congress of Confederation.¹³ Consider the case of a delegate, present for only a few votes, who is roughly in the middle of the Congress when it comes to nationalist sentiment. If the delegate's few votes are ones in which only a few extreme localists vote in favor of strengthening the central government, he will vote "pro-national" on all the votes.

¹¹Hamilton wrote in 1780 (Hamilton [1904b](#), p. 213) that "The fundamental defect is a want of power in Congress." He referred to Congress' need for more power other times in *Letter to James Duane* and the *The Continentalist No. 1* such as on pp. 41–43, and p. 51 of *The Continentalist No. III*. Although he doesn't specifically use the word jurisdiction or authority he is obviously talking about these. Furthermore, it seems difficult to eliminate a general expansion of congressional authority from the more specific points (a to d) given above.

¹²Ford et al. ([Various](#), pp. 5–6). This reference is from the prefatory (i.e. editor's) notes. Beginning with the first Continental Congress in 1774, daily notes or journals were kept of the body's proceedings. These journals were more succinct and haphazard than the House and Senate journals later seen under the Constitution. At times there were multiple journals in existence, none of which, by themselves, gave a complete description of events. In the early twentieth century these various journals were compiled into the *Journals of the Congress of the Continental Congress*. The same name is applied to the records of the Congress both before and after it adopted the Articles of Confederation.

¹³On absenteeism, see Jillson and Wilson ([1990](#), pp. 153–163) and Montross ([1950](#), pp. 382, 396).

Table 1.1 Nationalism index votes, 1st half of 1783

Date	Vote	Description	Natl	Yea	Nay
06 Feb 1783	912A	That the states be required to pass laws and appoint commissioners to procure accurate estimates of the value of all lands (including buildings and improvements) and to pass laws to collect taxes to meet Congress' requisitions (rejected)	Yea	16	9
12 Feb 1783	914	To adopt proposition stating that Congress is of the opinion that the establishment of permanent and adequate funds on taxes or duties to operate in just proportions throughout the US are indispensably needed to do justice to public creditor, restore public credit, and meet the exigencies of war (adopted)	Yea	24	5
14 Feb 1783	916	To postpone consideration of the report calling for each state's legislature to submit the name of a commissioner to oversee the estimation of the value of all land (including improvements) within that state (14 Feb 1783)	Nay	9	20
17 Feb 1783	917	To adopt resolution report calling each state's legislature to submit the name of a commissioner to oversee the estimation of the value of all land (including improvements) within that state and to report these values to the Congress; said values are to serve as the basis for proportioning sums to be raised to support the public credit and contingent expenses (rejected)	Yea	18	9
17 Feb 1783	918	To adopt the above resolution with the following changes: the date to submit the commissioner's names to Congress is delayed from 01 Jan '84 to 01 Mar '84 and to a grand committee be appointed by Congress rather than a committee of commissioners from each state (adopted)	Yea	22	5
26 Feb 1783	920	To amend resolution granting officers of the Continental Army full pay for 5 years (adopted)	Yea	20	8
26 Feb 1783	921	To amend resolution referred to above by granting officers full pay for 5 years (adopted)	Yea	21	7
26 Feb 1783	922	To adopt paragraph granting officers full pay for 5 years (adopted)	Yea	22	8
10–15 March: Newburgh Conspiracy/Letter					
12-March: News reaches Philadelphia that a preliminary US-Britain peace was signed					
19-March: British commander Guy Carlton confirms the preliminary treaty					
18 Mar 1783	929	To adopt resolution granting officers full pay for 5 years (rejected)	Yea	27	8
21 Mar 1786	932	To take up for consideration and completion the part of the report on the public credit which relates to imposts on imported goods and merchandise	Yea	9	22
18 Apr 1783	947	To adopt the act recommending to the states that they invest in Congress the power to levy duties on imports for 25 years, that they appropriate substantial revenues to paying off the federal war debt, make acceptable cessions of western lands, and ratify the proposed revision of the articles so that states shall pay for expenses for the common defence and general welfare based on their population (free citizens + 3/5 slaves) (adopted)	Yea	25	4

Table 1.2 Nationalism index votes, 2nd half of 1783

Date	Vote	Description	Natl	Yea	Nay
07 Aug 1783	974	To postpone motion that the Commander-in-Chief be requested to attend Congress, that a committee be appointed to confer with him on the peace arrangement and to report the proper manner of receiving him, in order to consider motion that a committee be appointed to report the proper measures to be adopted with respect to the reception of the Commander-in-Chief (rejected)	Nay	13	12
07 Aug 1783	975	To appoint a committee to confer with the Commander-in-Chief on the peace arrangement (carried)	Yea	20	6
13 Aug 1783	976	To substitute “union” for “government” in the letter responding to the inhabitants of New Jersey; said letter states “. . . Congress received with pleasure their congratulations on the success of the war, are obliged by the respect and affection for the federal government in their address, and highly approve of their patriotic disposition. . . ” (rejected)	Nay	4	20
27 Aug 1783	981	To amend the motion to take into consideration what powers exist in Congress by the Confederation, for the purpose of forming a military peace establishment “to consider the question of a peace establishment” (rejected)	Yea	14	10
16 Sept 1783	995	To let the words preserving the Agent of the Marine’s position stand in the act eliminating the Marine Department except for the agent of Marine (accepted, words stand)	Yea	15	6
17 Sept 1783	996	To retain the provision providing that officers who do not accept the proposal of their state shall nevertheless be granted the benefits granted by the Congress (accepted, words stand)	Yea	20	4
26 Sept 1783	1010	To adopt the paragraph proposing that a special committee be appointed to deliberate and report on a means of strengthening American commerce with Europe through obtaining additional support of the Union from the several states. . . ” (adopted)	Yea	16	6
04 Nov 1783	1063	That the Commander-in-Chief be authorized to and directed to, after the evacuation on New York by the British, to discharge the federal army except for 500 men and officers, or such as he feels necessary (rejected)	Nay	12	3

Therefore, his NAT will equal 1 indicating he is an ardent nationalist. However, the nature of the votes in question, not the delegate’s preferences, were the main factor in determining this high ranking.

Weighting each vote based on how strongly national or localist the outcome is the ideal solution for this problem. However, it would be preferable to avoid subjective weightings. Instead the rarity of the two positions is used as an indicator of how

strongly national or localist they are. For example, voting pro-national in a case in which only 20% of the delegates vote pro-national is more strongly indicative of nationalist sentiment than voting pro-national when 80% of the delegates do likewise. These weights used are equal to the ordinal ranking (from 0% to 100%) of the average delegate voting a particular position. In particular, the following weighting scheme, $\%ProNat_j$ is the proportion of delegates voting the nationalist position on vote j , is used.

$$Weight_{ij} = \frac{1 + (1 - \%ProNat)}{2} = 1 - \frac{\%ProNat}{2} \quad (1.2)$$

if delegate i votes a pro-national position on vote j . Otherwise,

$$Weight_{ij} = \frac{0 + (1 - \%ProNat)}{2} = 1 - \frac{\%ProNat}{2} \quad (1.3)$$

if delegate i votes a localist position on vote j . For illustration, if there are 100 members in the legislature, and a vote is split 50–50, the average delegate voting in favor of the nationalist position has an ordinal ranking of 75%. The average delegate voting against the nationalist position has an ordinal ranking of 25%. On another vote in which 80% of the delegates voted pro-national, the ordinal position of the average “yeah” vote would be 60% (halfway between 20% and 100%), whereas the average anti-national voter’s percent rank is 10% (halfway between 0% and 20%).

NAT is simply the average of a delegate’s weighted values for all votes for which he was present.¹⁴

$$NAT_i = \frac{\sum Weight_{ij}}{n} \quad (1.4)$$

where n = the number of votes for which delegate i was present and where $Weight_{ij} = 0$ if the delegate was absent.

In case one has doubts about this weighting scheme, solace can be taken in the fact that the resulting measures are not greatly changed from the unweighted values. The correlation coefficients for the weighted and unweighted values of NAT are

¹⁴Since NAT is bounded, there is the possibility of a clustering of measures at the extreme values. There is also the possibility of forecasted values of NAT falling outside of the feasible range (see Kau and Rubin 1979). For this reason, the natural log of the odds ratio, i.e. $\ln[(upperbound) - (NAT/(upperbound - NAT))]$, is often used. The upper bound for NAT is 1 if the unweighted values are used. It differs when weighted values are used. We do not use this weighting procedure for two reasons. First, with our data, there is not a clustering of values at the extreme ends of the spectrum. Instead they have a relatively normal distribution. Secondly, fitted values do not fall outside of the feasible range. Since the problems this transformation is designed to fix are not present, the simpler, untransformed values are used. Consistency was the criteria for choosing this weighting. In particular, consider a case in which delegate A was present on all votes for which delegate B was present. In addition, A was present for an additional set of votes. Further assume that on the set of votes common to A and B, A voted pro-national more often than B. A should have a higher value for NAT than B to be consistent. The weighting scheme used in this thesis improved this consistency.