

THE DISINTEGRATION  
OF EURO-ATLANTICISM  
AND NEW  
AUTHORITARIANISM



**GLOBAL POWER-SHIFT**

VASSILIS K. FOUSKAS  
AND BÜLENT GÖKAY



## The Disintegration of Euro-Atlanticism and New Authoritarianism

“Well known among scholars for their insightful investigations into the difficulties experienced by the USA in maintaining its world hegemony over the last twenty-five years, Professors Gökay and Fouskas extend their area of interest to cover, among others, the problems of the EU and the Brexit process. They make effective use of the concept of ‘global fault-lines’ they themselves developed to explain the underlying determinants of the current world situation and the emergent new authoritarianism across the transatlantic world. I highly recommend this theoretically and historically informed account.”

—Professor Ben Fowkes, *London Metropolitan University, UK*

Vassilis K. Fouskas · Bülent Gökay

# The Disintegration of Euro-Atlanticism and New Authoritarianism

Global Power-Shift

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## PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

### A

Social and economic crises represent learning curves for ordinary people and public intellectuals alike, especially young ones. It is only then that class power reveals its ugliest nature, placing societies and families under extreme pressure and strain. Young progressive intellectuals that have never experienced a capitalist crisis in their lifetime come to realise the realities of it the hard way: they themselves see their meagre incomes and salaries hit and their mediocre savings and assets reduced in value.

The argument we present here is, among other things, an attempt at convincing young public intellectuals and students of a Europhile stock that there is something fundamentally wrong with the European project and that they should be, at least, tepid about it. But at the same time, we are “targeting” what Antonio Gramsci used to call, “common sense”. In fact, we are aiming at those very ordinary men and women who are now attracted by new, right-wing populist movements, never mind if they had once believed, or even voted for, progressive labour, socialist or communist parties.

The story we tell to these two vast and overlapping social categories is that the root-cause of right-wing populism and racism does not lie within civil society and the attitudes of each individual citizen as such but within the elitist institutions and high politics of the transatlantic world, currently in a severe crisis and decline, not least because of the observable global power-shift to Asian economies. *Authoritarianism*

*and austerity led from above cultivate right-wing populism and racism from below in conditions of global power-shift to China and other emerging economies.* Citizens are not primarily responsible for embracing extreme right-wing movements and parties; the banks and the public policy of austerity dictated by them are, although one could add to it the betrayal of European social democracy in that it embraced entirely the neoliberal agenda of austerity, thus frustrating the hopes of tens of millions of people. In the main, this is what this book is about. The main argument is presented comprehensively in Chapters 1, 2 and 6.

We take issue with the neoliberal/ordoliberal,<sup>1</sup> deeply authoritarian and “depoliticised” core of the institutions of the EU whose disciplinary and class identity is being revealed in the ongoing Eurozone crisis. And because Greece has been a particular victim of this German-led, rather neocolonial, public policy, a great part of our analysis dwells on both Greece and Germany (Chapters 3 and 5).

Europe’s turn to new authoritarianism is not simply the result of the Eurozone crisis per se and the erosion of the income of its middle classes. We argue that this is structurally connected to profound changes and shifts that have been taking place in the global economic and political system since the 1970s, the most important of which are the erosion of the economic power of the West as a whole and the rise of China and other emerging capitalist caucuses across the world. Thus, the ordoliberal-authoritarian management of the EU/Eurozone on the part of Germany and other surplus/core states during the current crisis is not reducible to a supposedly German conspiracy project aiming at the domination of Europe. German imperialism wants to dominate Europe as much as French, American or Dutch imperialisms want to. Rather, it has to do with Germany’s *defensive* position at the heart of Europe trying, unsuccessfully, to fend off the economic crisis and macro-historical disintegration of Euro-Atlanticism as a whole and, hence, of itself. As we write these lines, Germany is in a deep political and social crisis: a government coalition between the centre-right Christian Democrats (CDU), the Bavarian Christian Social Union and the SPD was announced on 7 February 2018 after months of negotiations at the moment when the trade unions are pressing for higher wages. In the end, what the SPD

<sup>1</sup> For a brief definition of neoliberalism/ordoliberalism, see Chapter 1 that follows. More nuanced and elaborated explanations of these two overlapping public policies are offered in the relevant chapters.

did was to put some restrictions on short-term job contracts in the 177-page agreement signed between the three parties, brushing off requests for higher wages—one of the secrets of Germany’s surpluses. Meanwhile, the far-right Alternative for Germany will be the largest opposition party in the *Bundestag*. The ordoliberal coalition formed cultivates the right-wing populism and racism of the opposition. A similar development is being registered in Italy in the aftermath of the national election of 4 March 2018. Similarly, it is the structural and macro-historical power-shift to the “global East” (China, India, Russia, South Africa, etc.), coupled with the disintegrative tendencies of the Euro-Atlantic core and Germany’s hegemonic assertiveness during the crisis, that has been shaking up British politics for decades culminating in the Brexit vote of June 2016. The “Road to Brexit” (Chapter 4) deals precisely with this while at the same time placing austerity in the context of neoliberal class politics in Britain.

As readers will realise, this book contains much more. However, what we would like to point out in this short Preface is what many readers would already be asking: what do you propose politically that it is realistic? Clearly, there is a lack of genuine and original left democratic alternative at both national and European levels to put things in place and explain to people what is really going on. This book tries to open up such a perspective in the Postscript.

We decided to keep this Preface deliberately short as we want the reader to go straight into our first chapter that summarises our theoretical hypotheses, providing important guidance for the chapters that follow. This chapter is the result of many years of joint research and collaboration in the compound fields of international relations, international history and international political economy. Indeed, part of our arguments here can be found in our *The New American Imperialism* (2005) and *The Fall of the US Empire* (2012).

## B

No coherent argument and, indeed, no book, can come together without the help of dozens of people. We have been assisted by our administrators and colleagues at Keele University and the University of East London (UEL). Vassilis K. Fouskas would especially like to mention the massive help received from Edel Ryall (now at LSE) and Kelly Travers (UEL), administrator and librarian, respectively, as well as the group

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## CHAPTER 1

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# The Study of Global Politics and Economics Today

### INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we lay out the theoretical concepts and postulates upon which the arguments developed in this book rest, and vice versa: historical and empirical evidence backing up this Introduction can be found in the chapters that follow. Thus, these postulates are neither arbitrary nor they constitute an imposition upon reality and history. They are theorisations and further elaboration of empirical and historical material already searched and reviewed. In addition, they draw from findings included in our previous work, namely *The New American Imperialism* (2005) and *The Fall of the US Empire* (2012). Having said this, this introductory essay aims to accomplish two tasks; first, to set out our approach to international relations, modern history and political economy, looking at structural/constant features while exemplifying the notion of *global fault-lines* (GF) and assessing critically some other approaches; second, to introduce the framework in which the notion of (global) *power-shift* should be studied and understood.

Inasmuch as this is mostly a theoretical chapter, we have opted to present our postulates and concepts in a structured and numbered manner so that reading can be facilitated. Further, readers would be in a position to contemplate more creatively on our text, perhaps even offering critiques from which we would most certainly benefit.

\* \* \*

## I

Our post-Cold War era is defined by *intra*-imperialist and *inter*-imperial contradictions. The former concerns core–core relations (North America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia) developed during the Cold War under the hub-and-spoke system of American primacy (see below). The latter concerns geo-economic and geopolitical concentrations of capital, especially in South and South-east Asia (e.g. China) and East-central Eurasia (e.g. Russia), whose market operations, accumulation strategies and security are not controlled by the American state but by geopolitically rival imperial states and capitalisms, such as China and Russia. The *inter*-imperialist contradictions of Lenin’s era have shifted to a different level. Yet, as the global financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis have clearly shown, regional *intra*-imperialist caucuses can unravel. This book argues that neoliberal/ordoliberal Europe is held together by what we call here as *new (neoliberal) authoritarianism*. The more the crisis of the neoliberal/ordoliberal model deepens, the more the authoritarian neoliberalism/ordoliberalism, as crisis management policy, becomes. We have a top-down approach to the phenomenon of authoritarianism. We see it as a direct consequence of the breakdown of the global economic order and the turn of ruling elites in many countries to either authoritarian crisis management techniques or unconstrained economic and political nationalism *cum* imperialism—even *formal* imperialism. We see it also as a means aiming at containing the unravelling of *intra*-imperialist contradictions caused by uneven development and the global fault-lines of capital accumulation on a world scale. In the final analysis, this is the result of what Martin Wolf called “the long and painful journey to world disorder” (Wolf 2017). In this context, we are not only examining the relative weakness of the USA and its Western allies, but also taking into consideration China’s global expansion and its geo-economic imperatives, and increased confidence of Russia imposing its authority in Eurasia with strength as well as the great impact that these have been making on the global distribution of power. Our assessment is that they are driving a wedge among the *intra*-imperialist assemblages, further undermining the hub-and-spoke system of US neo-imperialism. China’s interaction with US-led globalisation, whether deliberate or not, sets sight on snatching the leadership of globalisation away from the USA and not to succumb to the US-led globalisation, which is clearly in retreat. China, as an imperialist power, is building its global hegemony

on the same geography, the very territory and terrain of *intra*-imperialist contradictions and by way of carefully penetrating them. We show, in this respect, that the Eurozone crisis and the stylised and separable—but not separate—public policies of Anglo-American neoliberalism and German-led ordoliberalism, themselves *imperialist* and deeply *authoritarian* public policies, are contributing as much to the coherence of transatlantic relations as to their decomposition.

## 2

A definition of GF is provided in our previous work (Fouskas and Gökyay 2012) in which we also subscribe to some tenets of world systems theory. Suffice to say here in brief that GF conceive of and visualise the social whole as “tectonic plates”, each occupying relatively separate domains: geopolitical-geographical, political, economic, ideological and cultural-civilisational. We do not accept the primacy of economics, or of any domain in particular determining “in the last analysis” all other domains. In other words, we tangle up Marx’s “base/superstructure” metaphor, preferring in its stead another analytical guidance of his to help us untangle the domains of GF, one that goes as follows: “the concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse” (Marx 1857/1973: 101). A truly global imperial power, an empire, must be in a position to master *primacy* in every single domain, that is to say, to make all “tectonic plates” converge somewhat harmonically under the single imperial-hegemonic design of a specific state. Some neoliberals reduce this to the economic level alone, arguing that “the world is flat” under the dominance of free market economics centred upon the USA, meaning that global capitalist integration of the entire world has been achieved. Theoretically, this is thinkable, hence (empirically) possible. Historically, and for good reasons, it has never been experienced. For instance, the USA tried first to establish itself in Central and Latin America—the so-called Western Hemisphere of the Monroe Doctrine—and then followed an Open Door imperialist policy in Eurasia and other parts of the globe towards the end of the nineteenth century. However, for nearly 200 years now, the USA has failed to build an informal empire even in its own backyard, Latin America, let alone the globe: many times during the course of the twentieth century, Latin American countries and peoples have not only dropped off the US bandwagon but have even risen to popular revolutions, the best example

being socialist Cuba and, later, the Bolivarian strand of socialism which renewed its influence with the powerful anti-neoliberalisation movement of Caracazo in Venezuela in February 1989, followed by the rise of Hugo Chavez in power.

## 3

There are, of course, authors that disagree with our GF perspective in particular and world systems theory in general. For example, in their prize-winning, *The Making of Global Capitalism*, Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin (2012) argue that the USA today has achieved full capitalist integration of the global economic system, the making of global capitalism having American colours under the US-led policy of neoliberal globalisation. Even if this is correct, something which we doubt, the authors abstract from geopolitical and political factors in order to establish such a claim: they abstract, for example, from the problems the USA is facing in Northern Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East. In addition, as we shall see below when examining the Greek/Eurozone crisis, at a purely financial-operational level, US-led institutions, such as the IMF, are so weak that cannot influence even Germany's Finance Ministry, one of the masters—together with the Bundesbank—for setting out monetary policy and rules in the EU/Eurozone. Moreover, the trans-nationalisation of capital (see MNCs) serves many states, not just the American state, as many scholars close to Panitch's and Gindin's arguments have so far argued (among others: Kiely 2010; Starrs 2013). China has risen to global prominence because of the combined development boosted by the trans-nationalisation of capital accumulation on a global scale. Thus, from a GF perspective, the USA has never achieved *empire*, total hegemony, because it has never been in a position to exercise *primacy* in every domain of the social whole. Obviously, as Christopher Chase-Dunn has argued “all cores define themselves as the centre of the universe” (1998: xiv). But he immediately rushes to add a comment that derives from the Gramscian tradition and which is espoused by all world systems theorists: “But it is the ability to back up this claim with force and economic power that constitutes true hegemony” (ibid.). A GF perspective posits that a theoretical definition of imperial hegemony on the basis of a coercion/consensus alternating dyarchy must be applicable to every individual domain of the social whole. This, we repeat, maybe theoretically feasible but historical experience to date has proved otherwise.

## 4

We endorse the empirical-descriptive distinction put forth by world systems theorists, namely the distinction between *core*, *semi-periphery* and *periphery*. The imperial order itself is premised upon this division, and no modern imperial order can exist without establishing itself firmly across the *uneven* chain of this *uneven* division. This division is not a static or geographical distinction but a descriptive-dynamic categorisation subject to qualitative and quantitative findings resulting from concrete analyses of concrete historical situations and processes. For example, many capitalist countries were deemed as semi-peripheral in the 1960s and 1970s enjoying middle income levels while economically and politically dependent on the USA and NATO (e.g. Argentina, Greece, Portugal); today, they may have been either downgraded to a peripheral status or being entirely dependent on high debt levels and borrowing—a key feature of financialisation—in order to maintain that status. However, as many contemporary researchers have noted, income inequalities in the post-1970s era of neoliberal financialisation and austerity have substantially increased in both core and peripheral zones and states (Milanovic 2016; Piketty 2014). Many heterodox economists, such as Costas Lapavistas and Heiner Flassbeck, wrongly in our view, believe that the core-periphery cleavage within the EU/Eurozone is the result of the introduction of the Euro in 1999, underpinning the Eurozone crisis that ensued (Lapavistas et al. 2010; Lapavistas 2013; Flassbeck and Lapavistas 2015). Others are very sceptical in accepting that such a cleavage exists at all at the systemic level (Milios and Sotiropoulos 2009a, b); or that it has any meaning at all to dwell on forms of “dependency” of the periphery upon the core, although they accept dependencies and inter-dependencies among members of the core (Panitch and Gindin 2012; Kiely 2010; Milios and Sotiropoulos 2009a, b). GF suggest that a key feature of imperialism is an appropriation of international value, and as such, it is premised upon a systemic and elastic core-periphery–semi-periphery divide, whose key operational function is the transfer of profits and rent from the periphery to metropolitan centres, or from one metropolitan centre to another. In the context of the EU, core-periphery structures have long predated the introduction of the Euro and go as far back as the nineteenth century. Core-periphery cleavages are not conditioned by monetary undertakings but by the level of economic, social and technological development. *Relations of dependency, tensions and contradictory/negotiating*

*processes between core and periphery/semi-periphery states and elites, as well as intra-core dependencies/inter-dependencies, are characteristic of a politically divided global capitalist system that needs to be reproduced as such in order to maintain and augment the rate of profit and the appropriation of it by the key economic-imperial configurations of that system, such as MNCs and financial/banking interests.* Capitalism rests on a heavily hierarchical—both in terms of class and in terms of administrative/institutional divisions—structure. There can be no capitalism without these hierarchies (states, aggregation of geopolitical blocs, class divisions, separation of state and civil society), which are, essentially, typical *hierarchical-theological* divisions between rich, poor and those that somewhat stand in the middle, with the important qualification that class divisions *cut across* states and geopolitical blocs. Core, periphery and semi-periphery are descriptive and flexible divides/categorisations that have to be grounded on qualitative and quantitative findings resulting from concrete analyses of concrete historical situations. In addition to the above, these are not cleavages that apply to the level of the global system alone. Importantly, they apply within regional caucuses and nation states. There is a lot of wealth in London/South-east England, but also a lot of poverty in London itself, and a lot of poverty in the de-industrialised periphery (Wales/East Midland, Cornwall and the de-industrialised North) of the UK. Most mega-cities, London, New York, Shanghai, Berlin, are socially and ethnically segregated. Discourses and educational strategies of “inclusion” and “integration” aiming at “embracing diversity” fail repeatedly to accomplish their mission, not least because neoliberal economics lacks such integrative capacity. Indeed, a pronounced fault-line of the capitalist system today is, on the one hand, its liberal and goodwill declarations about “inclusivity”, “human rights”, “gender and race equality” and, on the other, imposition of harsh austerity measures and welfare state retrenchment. The illusion is that free markets can accomplish those noble aims.

## 5

The American state, at least from the 1890s onwards, operated—not without turns, temporary retrievals and oppositions—an “Open Door World” international capitalist policy. Essentially, this policy advocates and promotes free markets and liberal political institutions and ideas abroad. However, it does not confine itself to these things alone.

*In essence, it is designed to transplant the American model of free market capitalism within the jurisdictions of all other states in the world.* In other words, it aims at transforming, under the aegis of the US state, the domestic *social* environment of other states after America's image. Thus, as William Appleman Williams maintained, empire becomes a "way of life". Christopher Layne has argued that this policy has been conceptualised in the minds of US policy-makers as a perversion: "US grand strategy is based on the Open Door derived assumption that political and economic liberalism cannot flourish at home unless they are safe abroad" (Layne 2006: 32). This ideational perspective, however, fails to capture the operational contradiction of "Open Door" imperialism, which is the "financing of freedom abroad", including financing and supporting dictators, in case a state accepts Open Door and free market institutions *without* endorsing liberal political pluralism and democracy. This was the case of Pinochet's dictatorship in Chile, also famously endorsed by arch-neoliberal/authoritarian thinker, Friedrich A. Hayek, or the military junta in Greece in 1967–1974. This contradiction has been captured by revisionist historian Williams as "Open Door's tragedy". Williams wrote the first remarkable account on the Open Door, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (1959/1972).

## 6

In a way similar to the free trade imperialism of Britain, US Open Door imperialism has never managed to integrate economically, or control politically and culturally, the entire interstate world system. Nor it ever will. Further, a major contradiction of Open Door (and free trade) liberal (and neoliberal) imperialism is that its global expansion generates its downfall by way of creating geopolitical competitors and new systemic contradictions fuelling crises that, eventually, lead to structural pressures effecting hegemonic power-shifts and transitions. Typical in this respect is the hegemonic transition period extending from the 1890s to Second World War, during which time the USA replaced Britain at the top of the global imperial order. During this long historical transition period in which the power-shift occurred, the global order, especially the European order, presented a fragmented and highly anarchical picture, only partially captured by Keynes's *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* and E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis* published in 1936/1993 and 1939, respectively. The imperial hierarchy broke down and

core–core relations and international institutions disintegrated, leading to assertions of national sovereignty, protectionism and, eventually, war. In this case, power-shift and hegemonic transition occurred within an imperial order dominated by a pecking order of—mainly European—formal imperialisms conditioned by the collapse of the Gold Standard, with each imperial country building its geopolitical currency bloc in a relationship of externality with each other (Polanyi 1944/2001). This point of view has been argued in our previous work (Fouskas and Gökay 2005), and we hold to that. Effectively, the argument is that the European imperial order was bound to contract due to its embedded *inter-imperialist* contradictions, and from this perspective, we agree with the analyses by Nikolai Bukharin and V. I. Lenin, as against those of Karl Kautsky and other Marxist theorists and politicians of the Second International. The global ascendancy of the USA was achieved against a background of inter-imperialist European conflict and collapsing/contracting imperial order. But it took two world wars, a massive economic crisis, a revolution in Russia with a major international impact and the experience of interwar authoritarianism in continental Europe to make Britain, France and the entire formal system of European imperialisms around the world to crumble and concede defeat, also amidst massive anti-colonial uprisings.

## 7

Post-1945, new American (Open Door) imperialism was qualitatively different. Its key concern was to unite all former, particularistic colonial powers of the core forcing them to do away with formal colonial arrangements and abandon separate and competing colonial blocs. *This was achieved by way of informal imperial undertakings articulated via hub-and-spoke arrangements in the spheres of politics, economics, ideology and security: the epoch of intra-imperialist rivalry and cooperation began.* It should not be forgotten that the USA rose to global prominence on an “anti-imperialist” platform, whereby imperialism = formal imperialism = European colonialism. Amalgamating informally a coherent intra-core bloc under US core *primacy* was, after all, an ideational necessity in feeding the ideological propaganda of the Cold War along the lines of a Schmittian-style, simplistic, binary division: here are my *friends* (Western Europe and Japan); but these are my *enemies* (Soviet, Chinese and global Communism). As Kolko (1968), Lafeber (2002),

Achcar (1998), Cafruny et al. (2016), and Gowan (1999, 2001, 2010) have perceptively argued, the political terrain of the new international order was conscientiously and deliberately divided by the new American imperial project in order to assert primacy within an ensemble of other members of the core, intrinsically connected with the US hub and dependent on it, rather than fight the USSR in a hypothetical Hot War. The Soviet threat against the “free capitalist world”, which was non-existent in the 1940s, had to be exaggerated purposefully in order to glue together a new transatlantic order, amalgamate a bilateral alliance with Japan, all the while launching and leading a new developmental agenda for all core capitalisms in each end of Eurasia. This pro-growth plan rested on the internationalisation of the New Deal of the 1930s; intervention in the aggregate demand management to stave off crises while protecting employment; and the 1944 Bretton Woods arrangements, creating a new global political economy of the dollar pegged at \$35 to an ounce of gold. The dollar became “as good as gold”. The destroyed political economies of European and Asian sub-hubs, West Germany and Japan, had to be rebuild and aided with US funds, unlike the post-First World War vindictive arrangements at Versailles in 1919 that borne the stamp of Britain and France, pushing Germany to revisionism.

## 8

Hub-and-spoke arrangements privilege not just the friend–enemy binary terrain of international and domestic politics, aggregating friends, on the one hand, and defining enemies, whether Communists or Muslim terrorists (after 9/11), on the other. Importantly, America’s hub-and-spoke neo-imperialism celebrated the *centrality* and *utility* of US economic and political-military power for each subaltern member of the core, a central relationship that it is of far greater importance than any possible relation or, even worse, alliance built between those subaltern members. Thus, the intention of hub-and-spoke new American imperialism is to prevent its rims from becoming separate, politically organised, forces. Alexander J. Motyl captures that very well, when he notes that hub-and-spoke imperial arrangements are successful only if they operate *in the absence of a rim*. One could reasonably argue that the USA has managed to deliver on that strategic intent during the so-called Golden Age of capitalism (1950–1970), although this remark is applied to intra-core/intra-imperialist relationships and on the proviso that the erosion

of US economic power by Japanese and West German competition is taken into account. As regards Western Eurasia, NATO institutionalised the dependency of Europe upon the USA, whereas American multinationals came to dominate European markets especially from the 1960s onwards. In the Far East, bilateral Treaties with Japan secured American primacy in the Pacific theatre (Fouskas 2003; Fouskas and Gökay 2005). However, *The New American Imperialism* failed to embed in the periphery, witness the successes of Arab nationalism, the Cuban revolution, the dominance of Communist forces in all anti-colonial movements—the sole exception, perhaps, being Cyprus—and, last but not least, the disastrous American war in Vietnam. Contrary to what Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin argue, the US-led making of global capitalism in the periphery during the Golden Age was an utter failure. More to the point, as Robert Brenner has, among many others, argued, the Golden Age nourished West German and Japanese political economies to such a degree as to undermine America's economic primacy from within. Open Door *intra*-imperialism began unravelling. This is paramount: whereas the power-shift of the previous imperial order took place by way of competition between externally related geopolitical and currency blocs fighting for supremacy, what Lenin and Bukharin called *inter*-imperialist contradictions, concession of economic power to the two ends of Eurasia whose post-war reconstruction owed so much to the USA occurred within the US-dominated core proper. This was the result of intrinsic relations of *intra*-dependency, cooperation, rivalry and combined development built in the very structure of hub-and-spoke international politics and economics under the primacy of the USA: *it was an intra-imperialist conflictual power-shift*. It does not indicate economic integration and quasi-American primacy, but it does indicate integration *cum* power-shift.

## 9

We determine that the present historical phase of global power-shift opens up in the late 1960s and concerns the relative loss of US economic power to West Germany/Europe and Japan, on the one hand, and the political-security failure of the USA and its Cold War allies to control and/or manage affairs in the periphery (Latin America, South Asia, Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa). Under pressure by the political-economic caucuses of Western Europe and Japan, the USA took