Helmut Kury · Sławomir Redo   *Editors*

Refugees and Migrants in Law and Policy

Challenges and Opportunities for Global Civic Education

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Foreword

Cities of the world have the capacity to—and do—integrate millions of migrants and refugees every year, but the current feeling that a "migration crisis" is underway in many parts of the planet will not be overcome until a convincing vision and narrative regarding mobility and diversity will take its place and be supported by the political class in most countries.

As the head of Human Rights Watch, Kenneth Roth said, "if there is a crisis, it is one of politics, not capacity." There will be no tackling the present "migration crisis" (which is taking different shapes depending on the continent) until politicians delineate a long-term human-rights-based strategic mobility and diversity policy vision that will give meaning, coherence, and direction to whatever action or practice is undertaken.

We need to change our collective mind-set and accept that migrants will come to host countries that offer them jobs, security, and a future, no matter how high the barriers are. Trying to impede mobility is a rear-guard battle, and trying to govern it better would be a much smarter choice.

The push factors are well known: violence and poverty. But the pull factors are much less discussed: essentially, the huge demand for cheap labor, in underground and precarious labor markets, for jobs that citizens will not accomplish *at the conditions migrant workers are constrained to accept*. Millions of employers are calling for undocumented or precarious migrant workers who will have no choice but to accept without a whisper low wages and egregious working conditions, knowing full well that labor exploitation of migrant workers is barely repressed.

The goal must therefore be to have most migrants using official channels to enter and stay in host countries. Two axes will be key[1]:

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[1]These objectives have been detailed in several of my reports as Special Rapporteur. See: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants to the United Nations General Assembly: "Proposals for the development of the global compact on migration", A/71/40767, 20 July 2016: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/SRMigrants/DevelopingGlobalCompactOnMigration.pdf; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, to the United Nations Human

- developing refugee resettlement programs to serve considerably more refugees than the present 1%—private sponsorship will be part of that;
- recognizing our own labor needs *at all skill levels* and opening up considerably more visa opportunities or visa-free travel programs for migrant workers.

The potential benefits of such a plan are large, while the movements of people would generally be in tune with the needs of the market. After the 2005 EU enlargement, a million and a half Central Europeans came to the UK and Ireland and made a great economic contribution. When the crisis struck in 2009, many left the British Isles. This is a mobility to be celebrated, which matches labor needs and individual skills. We should want it not only between the cities of our countries, or within regional zones such as the EU, but also planet wide as a longer term objective.

Such facilitated mobility would have obvious advantages as it would

- considerably reduce the size of the underground labor markets where migrant workers are being exploited by unscrupulous employers;
- significantly reduce the market for smugglers and unethical recruiters;
- allow for security checks to be made mostly abroad, before departure;
- sizeably reduce the workload of refugee status determination systems in host countries;
- allow foreign workers to enter and leave the host country according to the fluctuations of the labor market and the needs of employers;
- allow for a transfer of investments from top-heavy repressive antiimmigration administrations to more efficient intelligence agencies.

However, most importantly, it would provide the opportunity to show the electorate of destination countries that borders are respected, that authorities are managing migration properly, that there is no "chaos on the beach," that reception mechanisms are in place, that employers are integrating migrants in the labor market, and that investments have been made in integration programs.

In effect, such policies would demonstrate that the fear-mongering discourse of nationalist populists is just that, a discourse based on stereotypes, myths, and fantasies. If there is a global civic education to be had, it will be in deeds rather than in words. Mobility and diversity have to be shown to be assets rather than threats.

Rights Council: "Bilateral and multilateral trade agreements and their impact on the human rights of migrants", A/HRC/32/40, 4 May 2016: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G16/091/19/PDF/G1609119.pdf?OpenElement; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants to the United Nations General Assembly: "Recruitment practices and the human rights of migrants", A/70/310, 11 August 2015: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/310; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, to the United Nations Human Rights Council: Banking on mobility over a generation: follow-up to the regional study on the management of the external borders of the European Union and its impact on the human rights of migrants, A/HRC/29/36, 8 May 2015, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Migration/SRMigrants/Pages/AnnualReports.aspx.

This type of mobility is not utopian science fiction. In the 1950s and 1960s, millions of North Africans and Turks entered Europe, either through state-supported labor transfer programs or without a visa or with an easily obtainable visitor's visa, which they were able to convert into a formalized work permit upon finding a job. There was almost no market for smuggling. No one died in the Mediterranean. Yet IDs and travel documents were controlled at every border.

The idea is thus not to diminish border controls. On the contrary, it is to make border controls more effective by reducing the incentives to circumvent them. By offering most foreigners easier access to appropriate travel documents, such as refugee resettlement visa, visitor visa, family reunification visa, work visa, resident visa, or student visa, we allow states to concentrate their intelligence and deterrence efforts on the minute percentage of individuals who really do represent a threat.

Responding to the complexity of human mobility, states need therefore to develop a long-term strategic vision of how their mobility policies will look like in a generation from now, with precise timelines and accountability benchmarks.

States do this strategic planning for energy, environmental, infrastructure, public transit, or industrial policies in order to determine the investments needed to achieve the objectives over the long period. States can set themselves the goal of achieving this mobility within a generation, say a quarter century, through the progressive expansion of visa liberalization and visa facilitation regimes that will bank on the migrants' agency and creativity.

Such a strategy will also command long-term investments in diversity and integration policies, education strategies, providing migrants with tools of empowerment, access to justice, and support for the fight against marginalization and discrimination that fuel disenfranchisement, in order to unleash the development potential that well-governed mobility can trigger.

In target 10.7 of *Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development*, states agreed to "facilitate" migration and mobility in the next 15 years. "Facilitating" means making migration easier, lowering barriers to mobility. It does not mean open borders or absolute free movement. It means broadening legal pathways and developing many more creative visa avenues for all migrants and refugees. This is the key objective, and it will require considerable political and moral leadership.

States and all other stakeholders should seize the opportunity of the negotiation of the Global Compact on Migration to ensure that it is not the end of the process but rather its beginning.

The United Nations Special Rapporteur   François Crépeau
on the Human Rights of Migrants,
2011–2017, Montreal, QC, Canada
10 December 2017

Foreword

This has been the year of migrants and cities—the urban centers where most of history's most mobile population are headed—relentlessly—to join the world's future. History shows us that migrants will go to where the schools and jobs are. They go from places scorched dry by climate change—where water is fetched in pails by girls who should be in school—to where it arrives directly to households. They leave the past to enter the future.

This is a process as old as mankind, and as enduring. Migration is the world's most successful antipoverty program and has been since the first migrants—probably hunters or herders—traveled across a broad plain, jungle, or mountains because they had come to believe that survival would be easier in that distant "someplace else," information conveyed by word of mouth and, perhaps later, by griots chanting adventure sagas or troupes of drummers. It continued through the era of printing presses and early broadcasting. Migration spurred by knowledge.

It continues still. We see an identical process unfolding today—now with things like mobile phones, Facebook postings, and WhatsApp.

Since 1951, my organization, the International Organization for Migration, based in Geneva, has been at the forefront of migration integration in the modern world.

The integration of migrants, or the two-way process of mutual adaptation between host society and migrant, is key to effective and comprehensive migration management. IOM takes a holistic approach to migrant integration and believes that migrants should be encouraged to fully engage and participate in their host society from a socioeconomic, political, and cultural perspective. Integration is essential for all stakeholders, not only as a way of providing economic and cultural benefits but also for ensuring the security and stability of societies as a whole.

IOM takes a comprehensive approach to migrant integration in order to ensure that migrants can fully engage with their host society from a socioeconomic, political, and cultural perspective. Programs are tailored to take into account specific migrant characteristics such as gender, age, duration of stay, and overall economic and societal trends in the receiving country.

One of the areas in which IOM works to facilitate migrant integration is through the development of predeparture orientation sessions for migrants as a way to prepare them both for their journey and to equip them with the factual knowledge, skills, and attitudes needed for success in their new communities.

IOM also runs Migrant Resource Centers in origin and destination countries to inform migrants about their options for regular (safe) migration, provide them with information about their rights and responsibilities, and offer other tailored services to support them.

IOM also works to build the capacity of receiving communities to effectively integrate migrants by informing and training local authorities, running awareness-raising campaigns to promote the positive contributions of migrants, and disseminating the results of research and policy development projects aimed at improving migrant integration policies.

In July, mayors of 50 of the world's largest cities landed in Berlin to attend the fourth Global Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration and Development. I was there as well, representing the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Migration Agency. In November, I traveled to Mechelen, Belgium, for the Global Conference on Cities and Migration.

There could not be a better time than now for such events. Cities are at the forefront of international migration. They are where the real work of integrating newcomers takes place—after the rhetoric fades to a TV sound bite or angry protestor's banner.

And cities do this, more and more often, drawing on the very limited support and resources that fall short of what they and their new residents need. Yet, despite the hardship, mostly they are succeeding. Engaging with leaders in these locations is where we learn to work together to ensure human mobility that is safe, legal, and secure for all.

Mayors every day face challenges in welcoming men, women, and children from every corner of the globe. They are leaders not only in putting new ideas into practice. They lead, too, by exhibiting patience and compassion as neighborhoods change and municipal budgets get pounded. Can you remember the last time you heard a mayor complaining that too many want to come? You probably cannot because no mayor ever does.

As I have reminded my IOM colleagues many times: "Mayors get it!"

They know what migrants need from cities to become productive, participating partners in their new communities. They know what cities need to ensure their own well-being: people.

That is because they know what happens when these newcomers stop arriving. Communities wither. Schools close and hospitals are relocated. Meanwhile, the costs of managing a dwindling, dying neighborhood far exceed those of welcoming newcomers willing to bet their future by staying. That is true even of penniless refugee families, hundreds of thousands of whom IOM has helped resettle just in the current decade.

We have seen it: newcomers are the ones who buy old homes and modernize them with new appliances and new coats of paint when old owners retire or move to

the suburbs. They are also the ones who fill storefronts that otherwise might sit empty or whose kids fill classrooms.

For the first time in history, more people are living in urban areas than in rural ones. So it comes as no surprise that cities are the main entry points for migrants since they provide the necessary economic opportunities and the desired social networks.

It has been this way since "migration" began, with the movement of tribes of hunter-gatherers settling into villagers of farms and livestock herders and then villagers journeying to cities. There they learned to live together peacefully, despite their many diverse backgrounds.

It was in cities that competing tribes learned to settle differences without resorting to violence—progress pay homage every time we use words like "civil" or "civilian" or "civilization."

The question now becomes, how can we continue this progress?

Rural people continue to flock to cities, for jobs, better access to health, housing, and education. Nonetheless, mostly these days such movements occur across national boundaries. The arriving villager is an immigrant.

We see it in Latin America, where the country folk migrating from Mexican camps are much more likely to try their luck in New York or Seattle than they are in Mexico City. Those still flocking to Brazil's great cities are more likely to come from Bolivia or Haiti than from Brazil's interior.

It is the same in Europe and Asia, where a newcomer to Seoul may be a Filipino or Cambodian. The Brussels homeowner of tomorrow is starting school today in Morocco.

So we must be realists: the world's young and restless are being born overseas, but they are coming soon to our cities. They will migrate legally if they can, irregularly if they cannot.

At IOM, we would like all migration to be legal. But we also want even more for migration to be safe. No one should have to risk his or her life to reunite with a family member. Access to a steady job should not be contingent on making a deal with ruthless criminal gangs. These criminals often may attach "surtax" by holding a man for ransom above what he earlier agreed to pay for transport or forcing a woman into prostitution to settle her "debt."

And we want migration to be secure for all. By "all" we mean just that: the arriving migrant, as well as the new community he or she is bound for. We believe governments, including the municipalities that are doing such good work welcoming immigrants, not only have a right to screen newcomers for potential dangers, they have also an obligation—just as public health authorities have an obligation to check communicable diseases.

Migration that is legal and safe is migration that is easier to keep secure.

We know we can have this for virtually all of human history we have. Let us keep up the good work.

International Organization for   William Lacy Swing
Migration, Washington, DC, USA

Prologue

Since earliest times, humanity has been on the move. But today we are witnessing an unprecedented level of human mobility. Some people move in search of new economic opportunities, and horizons for migration are embedded in economy. Others move to escape armed conflict, poverty, food insecurity, persecution, terrorism, or human rights violations and abuses. Still others do so in response to the adverse effects of climate change, natural disasters (some of which may be linked to climate change), or other environmental factors. Many move, indeed, for a combination of these reasons. More people than ever before live in a country other than the one in which they were born. Migrants are present in all countries in the world. Most of them move without incident. Most have moved to countries where they believe they will find better jobs and/or welfare benefits. As emphasized in the "New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants" from which comes the above account, in 2015, their number surpassed 244 million, growing at a rate faster than the world's population. However, there are roughly 65 million forcibly displaced persons, including over 21 million refugees, three million asylum seekers, and over 40 million internally displaced persons (A/RES/71/1, PP 1 and 3).

On the basis of results from Gallup survey, the "number of potential migrants worldwide tops 700 Million" (Esipova et al. 2017). The desire to migrate worldwide is at the level of 14%. US is still the "No. 1" desired destination; Germany became more attractive than earlier to potential migrants and United Kingdom less so. "In 31 countries and areas throughout the world, at least three in 10 adults say they would like to move permanently to another country if they could. These countries and areas are found in every region except Asia, Oceania and Northern America. In many of these populations, desire to migrate has increased significantly, likely pushed higher for a host of reasons – for example, the civil war in Syria, chronic high unemployment rates in Albania and Italy, and the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone." As many as 21% of migrants name United States as desired destination, 6% Germany and 5% Canada, United Kingdom, or France. Germany's popularity as preferred country for migrants rose significantly after Chancellor Angela Merkel published that refugees are welcome (Edmond 2017). The figures about migration

"show that following the global financial crisis, the desire to migrate diminished. But with an improving economic climate, alongside increasing unrest in some parts of the world, the number of people wishing to move is once again on the rise" (ibid.).

Against this background, in 2015, Member States of the United Nations in its Sustainable Development Goals Agenda 2016–2030 (A/RES/70/1) recognized that "the positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable development international migration is a multidimensional reality of major relevance for the development of countries of origin, transit and destination, which requires coherent and comprehensive responses. We will cooperate internationally to ensure safe, orderly and regular migration involving full respect for human rights and the humane treatment of migrants regardless of migration status, of refugees and of displaced persons. Such cooperation should also strengthen the resilience of communities hosting refugees, particularly in developing countries. We underline the right of migrants to return to their country of citizenship, and recall that States must ensure that their returning nationals are duly received." In Goal 10 entitled "Reduce inequality within and among countries," they operationalized their preambular statement and committed themselves in target 10.7 to "Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies."

In target 4.7, Member States also committed themselves to ensure by 2030 that "all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable development."

Even more expressively, this objective was emphasized by the 13th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (Qatar, 2015). Its Doha Declaration (A/RES/70/174, OP 7) stated that "education for all children and youth, including the eradication of illiteracy, is fundamental to the prevention of crime and corruption and to the promotion of a culture of lawfulness that supports the rule of law and human rights while respecting cultural identities."

Clemens (2017) emphasizes "Migrants will keep coming. We should give them the skills they need to thrive," better tools are needed to manage migration. "We have a rare window of opportunity now to do this. The world has set its attention on migration as hundreds of thousands of people move across Libya, Myanmar, Mexico and elsewhere. Migration has shaken the world's most influential elections and alliances." According to him, there is "no alternative to innovation. More migration is certainly coming. Consider the 800 million new working-age people in sub-Saharan Africa by the year 2050. That increase is 24 times the size of today's entire labour force in the United Kingdom."

Many European countries are confronted on the one side with a decreasing population size but on the other side vote worldwide having a lower immigration level. Esipova et al. (2015) point out: "Well before the flow of migrants into Europe reached crisis proportions this year, a Gallulp study of attitudes toward immigration in 142 countries found people in Europe, on average, were the most negative in the

world toward immigration. The majority of residents (52%) said immigration levels in their countries should be decreased. In every other major region of the world, people were more likely to want immigration levels in their countries to either stat at their present level or to increase, rather than to decrease." Globally, 34% voted for less migrants, in Oceania 26%, Northern America 39%, Latin American and the Carribbean 39%, Asia 29% and Africa 40% (Esipova et al. 2015a, b).

In the above UN declarations, shifting powers and vectors are evident. Commensurate policy responses in host countries are needed in terms of multicultural integration and economic assimilation. Rather than the timeline for migration policies based on the now, with states focusing on "stopping migration now," "sending back migrants now," or "bringing in technicians or low-skilled migrant workers now," there should be a long-term strategy for multicultural integration and economic assimilation. The Special Rapporteur on human rights of migrants suggests such one for 2035 (HRC/35/25).

Drawing on the above United Nations vision, the objective of this anthology is to present civic education issues and approaches involved in orderly, safe, regular, and responsible migration and mobility of people. Academics and practitioners (altogether 61 experts) wrote for this anthology social science texts addressing several facets of countering through civic education "non-documented"/"irregular" migration (A/RES/3449 (XXX)) with a view to addressing it in a more viable than now way.

The problem of migration is old as the world is. Ironing out what may but not necessarily must ensue from it in the form of excessive cultural-differences-facilitating crime, abuse, victimization, and other incivilities will continue. But with the recent arguments and findings on world climate change, its dimensions and implications outgrow its former dynamics and patterns, and irregular migration became an outstanding issue. The succeeding generations to whom so distant may have become the early transatlantic immigration and the tragedies of the First and Second World Wars, these generations will be confronted with that new dynamics and patterns of irregular migration with the unprecedented challenges by the civil unrest and military conflicts and the calls for a new global order that accounts more constructively and viably for the imminent economic, social, and multicultural welfare needs of the incoming migrants in the host societies. If we want to avoid continuing the uncanny First/Second World War parallels, then the migration problems of today alert to the changes needed in a delicate political, cultural, and economic equilibrium between the newcomers and host societies, between working and dependent social groups (Süssmuth 2006).

Criminologists (e.g. Grafl 2009, p. 449) recall in this context what Austrian Franz von Liszt (1851–1919), professor of German criminal law, an international law reformer, and a proponent of the modern sociological school of law, once said, that the best criminal policy is social policy. If we see this dictum through the fact that the number of displaced people fleeing from war, conflict, or persecution who look for a better future in other countries in 2016 has exceeded 65.5 million (UNHCR 2017)—the highest number since Second World War—the question

remains whether it is still sustainable to uphold the welfare principles, so much cherished since then by most of the welfare reformers.

Refugees and international migrants (a part of the above displacement) pose the question whether or not the active working groups may financially afford social protection to the newcomers because the growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP) may lag behind the pace of the new arrivals. In other words, immigration into welfare-developed host countries may undercut this equilibrium because of the increasing benefit dependence. This equilibrium may later be reestablished or realigned through the following:

- higher GDP rate on the condition of reducing benefit dependence and welfare fraud because of suitable work opportunities, including vocational training and retraining;
- economy's competitiveness secured by innovations to which the (re)trained immigrants contribute as legitimate members of a host society; and
- lowering the welfare dependence by disincentivizing unemployment benefits.

Example of the latter approach is the Austrian law on integration. Among various measures intended to that effect, the law stipulates that an asylum seeker who stands good prospect of granting asylum is allowed work after the first 3 months of the official start of the application process. S/he may be requested to perform unpaid community-service work. Applicants declining to take part in the integration courses or community-service work stand deprived of a portion of a welfare benefit (BGBLA_2017_I_68, § 6). It remains to be seen whether or not in countries of the North with such regulations this will be motivating enough a factor for the refugees for the eventual integration or it can dissuade them from pursuing work placements and other forms of job intermediation (see further Martin et al. 2016, vol. 1, p. 41).

In the context of incoming migrants, the "refugee problem" for the host societies is the most existential and implicit for standard setting in civic life in view of very pronounced intercultural challenges for refugee's integration in the above way. Vocational training in a new labor culture may be a case in point.

On the one side, it brings up the question how a host society can for itself absorb the refugees and other immigrants. On the other side, it brings up the question how they may have to recast their roles for the service economy of a modern democratic state with its labor culture, given not only their level of education but also possible regression, for instance to religious fundamentalism, in reaction to modernization experienced as discriminatory, exploitative, and destructive to identity (Castles et al. 2014, p. 63)—the respect for which is the cornerstone of culture of lawfulness envisaged by the Doha Declaration. More often than not, in the years to come, this conflict of modernization with cultural identity may grow under the impact of new technologies. However contentious this will become, inadvertently employees should readapt through harnessing transversal skills to meet the evolving calls from the northern countries' economies in a new culture of lawfulness.

Modern culture of whatever type, origin, sense of lawfulness or of whatever role of gender basically and eventually yields to the requirements of service economy (physical strength is not a factor), however unduly it can imperil culture. Very rarely

in the service economy, tax breaks allow to spur the creation of a new home-repair service industry.[2] They aim at providing much-needed jobs for new immigrants who lack formal education. Otherwise, in contemporary world, which as per the 2030 United Nations Agenda should be "prosperous" and "sharing," there probably is no other way to achieve that goal than with an old-type service economy that carries a disturbingly troublesome baggage of "loose people" who only can earn for their living through shadow and black economy—crime and other lawlessness, in short. And since there is in a democratic society no other more persuasive "common language" than service economy, it first commands learning a natural language or languages of a host country and incorporating its values and norms, rights, duties, and responsibilities implied by that economy. It hopefully can "pay back" by creating and sharing new jobs, which legitimately accommodate immigrants and refugees.

Teaching host country's language(s), especially to immigrant children, offers an opportunity to convey, appreciate, and adapt its valors sincerely, for their mind is especially open to any codes of conduct, which can also be critical thinking or primary ethics. Critical thinking can be taught in schools because it involves learning a language with a determinate method "such that, if you understand what a moral question is, you must know which arguments are legitimate, in the same way in which, in mathematics, if you know what mathematics is, you know that certain arguments in that field are legitimate and certain arguments not" (Hare 1992, p. 149).

Ideally, this would make civic education like learning mathematics. In reality, this needs much more. A few factors that must not be overlooked in successful civic education were pointed out by UNESCO. First, it found that students involved in fights in school were more likely to score below a low international benchmark in an international mathematics assessment (TIMSS) than others. Second, education in a language that learners understand is crucial. In multiethnic societies, pursuing education in a dominant language has frequently been a source of grievance linked to wider issues of social and cultural inequality. Third, therefore, in countries with high proportions of minorities, teaching in children's mother languages is important. For refugees and internally displaced persons, UNESCO recommends implementing policies that expand the pool of qualified teachers proficient in their languages and address the issue of official validation and certification of learning by refugees. Refugees who were teachers in their home countries could be an important resource (UNESCO 2016, p. 106).

Indeed, it is a language that makes people think in civic terms, especially when such terms are taught by educators. However, a refugee language that does not contain such civic terms is only the second best choice. In this context, it is worth recalling the much-debated Sapir–Whorf language hypothesis. It says that there are certain thoughts of an individual in one language that cannot be understood by those who live in another country with a different language. The hypothesis originated from Whorf's observation that the word "empty drum" (a drum originally filled with

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[2]Sweden is such an example (Orange 2016).

petrol) for nonindigenous Americans implied the remaining presence of a highly explosive vapor. However, for Indians (incidentally, cigarette smokers), it meant that drum is absolutely void ("empty = harmless"). *Ergo*, "[t]he limits of our language are the limits of our thoughts" (Obenauer, n.d.). In other words, civic education terms for refugees and migrants may be void of any sense unless they are taught to them in a language of a host country that meaningfully exercises democracy and the rule of law: rights and responsibilities.

"Meaningfully" here is not a superfluous word in a developing world, especially in the African context with the highest number of youth in the world. A good example comes from the 2009 proceedings of the SANTED[3] workshop *Uphuhliso-sigama ngenjongo yokuphuhlisa iilwimi zesiNtungokugqibeleleyoof*, i.e. "Terminology Development for the Intellectualisation of African Languages," held in English, *isiXhosa* and *isiZulu* in South Africa (Maseko 2009). The workshop discussed modalities of introducing English natural and political science terminology into discipline-specific glossaries of South Africa's local languages of Zulu and Xhosa tribes so as to apply it in social work, by prospective employees in court of law, etc.

The report is self-explanatory:

> One of the many highlights of the workshop was a short practical terminology development session where delegates were required to translate some technical terms. The idea was to use the knowledge learnt during the previous sessions, as well as get a hands-on experience of the process of terminology development. Although there were only four terms that were supposed to be translated . . . the group had not reached a consensus on the definitions of the terms given, nor their equivalents in either isiXhosa or isiZulu. The debates were around the appropriateness of the definition given (technical experts debated this extensively) and whether the equivalent term suggested in isiXhosa or isiZulu captured the essence of the meaning in the original language. The discussion kept going back to some of the points [earlier – added] raised . . ., especially that the equivalent term suggested in terminology development should be a representation of the concept presented by the original term (ibid., p. 7).

This highlights the importance of working for a "common language of justice" to use metaphorically this term, borrowed from the UN Secretary-General (S/2004/616). Refugees and immigrants coming to Europe from Africa hardly are aware in original terms of their native languages what civic terms of the rule of law, rights, and responsibilities mean in a host country, let alone in their own.

Civic education is not only about terminology. First of all, it is about critical thinking in participatory, experiential, pragmatic, and consequential way. Any natural language then becomes a practical medium of civic instruction.

It is this context in which one may better appreciate the results of two recent school studies of, respectively, 700 vocational trainees and 1006 students of

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[3]"South Africa-Norway Tertiary Education Development" project implemented in the African Languages Studies Section of the School of Languages at Rhodes University. The project is a joint venture of the South African and the Norwegian governments in educational development at the institutions of higher education in South Africa.

pedagogy in Austria. In the first study, 48% of trainees who at home speak Arabic, Bosnian, or Turkish in this host country felt that "Jews in Austria have too much influence," while only 24% of German-speaking trainees likewise felt so (Lauß and Schmid-Heher 2017a). In the second study, which did not control for the ethnic background of respondents, altogether 57% felt so (Lauß and Schmid-Heher 2017b).

Separately, another study found that in Austria, the level of competencies among Syrian asylum seekers with high-school education matches the level of Austrian peers (Hundstorfer et al. 2017). However, the same study demonstrated that competencies of younger Syrian asylum seekers with eight-class education equal competencies of a four-class native Austrian pupil. No wonder, therefore, that regarding the recent job-seeking asylees, they must learn the host country's language, for "[w]ithout basic knowledge of German one cannot get an unskilled job – everywhere there are markings, digital designations" (Berger 2017). Ateia and others in this book confirm this observation in their article "Labour Market Access and Labour Opportunities for Refugees Examples from Freiburg." They write: "[T]argeted and job-specific promotion of language skills and other necessary specialist skills like Maths is indispensable. For example, employees working in the construction industry or carpentry must learn the length measurements used in Germany from scratch. Ensuring that such support measures are available without restriction is a key factor in their success."

This means that civic education of such applicants lags behind the level of the native peers, probably throughout the entire primary and secondary education. In Austria, Iraqi, and Afghani asylum seekers are even more behind the native peers. However, this fact cannot be credited to the Austrian school system—albeit in comparison with France, Germany, Switzerland and the UK, it may be "considered to be not very conducive integration" (BF 2017, p. 6)—but rather to a fundamental lack of civic education in the two source countries.

Moreover, the immigrants' intended host country language preference, possible family relatives there and their related status (economic or political, as a refugee) combined with the prospective welfare entitlements and—last but not least—the traumatic experience of flight are also at play in a successful integration, which calls for the eventual command of the host country's language(s). In short, the "refugee problem" involves going beyond legal instrumentalism into administering and exercising human and social justice rights structurally and responsibly and the integration successfully. It goes into the unpacking and reanalyzing the question whether and, if so, how within the service economy civic education can facilitate that integration in line with individual and collective rights and responsibilities *vis à vis* others and their (new) local communities, starting with the most essential and existential requirement, namely learning the official language(s) of a host country.

This book primarily focuses on the intercultural side of global civic education prompted by incoming refugees and other migrants so as to make them think like their hosts, hence making integration work on both sides. Depending on the level of success in cultural and socioeconomic integration, there still will be some lesser or greater degree of noncompliance in observing civic rules of a host society. Moreover, they are not cast in stone. Martin Luther King (1929–1968), US civil rights

activist, was branded a radical upstander for what now is a standard in civic interracial conduct. No doubt, various dynamics and forms of crime and victimization emerge with which a host society must deal with because of refugees and migrants, as it does more or less successfully nowadays. Among violent crimes, most alarming are homicides and rapes, but there are also other crimes by refugees and migrants about which the contributors to this anthology write and—in our opinion—make sober analyses.

Next, in the above context, the book focuses on the presentation of the issues involved in immigration (the "refugee-problem" including) in different parts of the world, on empirical data about the development in history and especially in the last decades. Additionally, its focus is on the socioeconomic and political (ideological) restructuring of international relations, as per the 2030 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals Agenda, to facilitate continuously caring about these standards and norms intergenerationally and universally as we confront developments that may encourage some of their actors to disavow these standards and norms or propose new ones, eventually acceptable, though with a lower threshold. The civil society organizations (CSOs), including the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), are among those that should have the interest and capacity to involve and integrate such actors and respond in line with progressive standards and norms.

In view of the above, there has never been a simple recipe to restructure the world order, strengthen and/or upkeep universal ethics, and provide a new impetus for its incremental implementation. This new paradigm is not an exception. And so is its "refugee" part about which is this book. Moreover, so far, educating in global civic values has—perhaps—been done too mechanistically and simplistically.

Whether or not this needs to be done Eurocentrically may, inter alia, depend on conclusions one draws from the following considerations: first, the tragedy of some 500,000 Rohingya people to flee their homes in Myanmar to Bangladesh and India (see Swati Shirwadkar's article in this book), forming a new humanitarian crisis. In its background, there is a conflict of faiths between Muslim and Buddhist populations in Myanmar, far away from Europe. But would not this also be a "hidden genocide" (Ibrahim 2016), hence qualifying to the originally European concept of that crime?

Second, two surveys—one by the Bertelsmann Foundation (BF 2017), another one by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Human Rights (FRA 2017)—investigating tolerance and trust of minorities in a number of EU countries have found that immigrants living in them feel attached to the host country they live in, trust its institutions, and are comfortable interacting with people of different religious or ethnic origins. Given quite a sizable number of respondents sampled in each survey and the fact that both surveys involved control groups, one may be pleased to note that they both equivocally confirm that most Muslim respondents (in the case of FRA survey, also other minority respondents) feel satisfied with their living (see the chapter by Kury et al. in this volume).

Mentioning here the methodology is important, especially because the Foundation's report involved a control group of Turks living in Turkey. With this, the findings of both studies, which point that immigrants in the host countries indeed feel

themselves satisfied, warrant not only special emphasis but also the reference to what, since the time of the United Nations Charter, the Organization pursues as the goal of living "in larger freedom," also declared in the Agenda.

Both studies show that people look for larger freedom and appreciate it in the Global North. However, when it comes to everyday immigrant's life in a host country, this picture is not rosy. The FRA survey revealed a considerable level of everyday discrimination when looking for work and at work, when trying to access public or private services, such as a doctor's practice or a restaurant. People who wear visible religious symbols, in particular women wearing a headscarf, are more likely to experience discrimination and harassment, ranging from inappropriate staring to physical attack. The Bertelsmann Foundation's findings reveal that devout Muslims, even the well educated, earn less income and are less likely to be employed. We find comparable results in the USA with the integration of immigrants from black Africa; until today, they have less chances for good jobs (Goffman 2014).

This flies in the face of the Agenda's framers and reignites the debate on immigration policies, especially after the US' withdrawal in December 2017 from the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. On paper, and only that of the Agenda, all Member States of the United Nations recognize that all cultures and civilizations can contribute to and are crucial enablers of sustainable development. They acknowledge the natural and cultural diversity of the world. Member States pledge to foster intercultural understanding, tolerance, mutual respect, and an ethic of global citizenship and shared responsibility (para. 36). In reality, the resilience to ideologies of discrimination is weak.

This resilience should be improved. To some extent, the Agenda's pledge interplays with what the intercultural education is about. It may and can be one panacea for discrimination. But this is a surmise only because, according to UNESCO, "intercultural education" aims to go beyond passive coexistence to achieve a developing and sustainable way of living together in multicultural societies through the creation of understanding of, respect for, and dialogue between the different cultural groups. There is no mention of global ethics and shared responsibility understood as building and expanding trust (and the questions on shared responsibility are missing from the Bertelsmann Foundation's and FRA's findings). Nor does "multicultural education" comprise them. According to UNESCO, it merely uses learning about other cultures in order to produce acceptance, or at least tolerance, of these cultures. Hence, the former is the operational tool of the latter (UNESCO n.d.).

Continuing this comparison, Will Kymlicka, an eminent political sociologist and expert on multiculturalism, compared "multicultural education" to "equality" (Kymlicka 2007, p. 91), best communicated via the United Nations General Assembly in its 1992 "Declaration on the rights of persons belonging to national, ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities" (A/RES/47/135). Completing this comparison, we now may add that the functional equivalent of "interculturalism" is "equity," best communicated in the 2012 "United Nations principles and guidelines on access to legal aid in criminal justice systems" (A/RES/67/187). This most modern and

comprehensive UN legal instrument may be very helpful in enhancing distributive justice across the world.

The first resolution is rights based; the second is operational. "Global ethics," "global citizenship education," "shared responsibility," and "culture of lawfulness" are supraconcepts serving both. And so is "tolerance" highlighted in the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (A/RES/36/55) and recast by UNESCO in its 1995 Declaration of Principles on Tolerance. The latter goes beyond exclamations and rhetorical pathos about tolerance: among various forms of intolerance, for the first time, the declaration sounded an alarm regarding terrorism, perhaps the most profound expression of "uncivil societies"—an incipient concept then.

It came into the United Nations life shortly thereafter. First, in 1996, the International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme (ISPAC) convened the International Conference on "Migration and Crime. Global and Regional Problems and Responses" (Schmid and Melup 1998). Experts made their intellectually very nuanced criminological analyses and forecasts involving migration. For example, Lolita Aniyar de Castro, then Minister in the Permanent Delegation of Venezuela to UNESCO, addressing a saying that "Men are like birds: when they do not have food, they go for it wherever it is," wrote that "The old utopia of a 'world citizen' will become a reality. And according to it, people will look for food wherever it is" (de Castro 1998, pp. 124–126). Eduardo Vetere, then the UN senior official, emphasized in the ISPAC Conference that the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice was concerned about a variety of migrant-related crimes threatening the rule of law: bribery, corruption, smuggling of migrants, trafficking of women, and racist and xenophobic crimes (Vetere 1998, p. 20). Ineke Haen Marshall (also the contributor to this book) emphasized that "there appears to be a general consensus that – if there are any marked differences between the criminal involvement of immigrants and natives – they are manifested in the criminal involvement of the children of immigrants (second-and third generation immigrants). It is argued that the children of immigrants will have higher expectations; they will have changed life aspiration, attitudes, such as consciousness of deprivation and socioeconomic inequality, . . .longing for prestigious consumer goods. . ., and disillusionment with the country of residence, . . .which separate the ideological texture of this generation from that of its predecessors" (Marshall 1998, p. 253). Rein Müllerson saw in the long-term interest of international stability the inevitability of marrying human rights diplomacy with realistic foreign policy, an "intermestic" (international/domestic) affair that more successfully than then addresses the sources of migration in the sending and destination countries (Müllerson 1998, pp. 129 and 131).

Second, and consequently, in 1997, Kofi Annan, then the United Nations Secretary-General, designated the United Nations International Drug Control Programme and the United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention, both operating in the United Nations Office at Vienna, to be the Organization's

center of fight against uncivil society at the core agenda of which was the counter-action to organized crime (Redo 2012, p. 153[4]).

Since then, in the United Nations, it has gradually become clearer that to educate in global ethics and civic values globally, there is a need to differentiate transnational from domestic organized crimes, criminal from terrorist acts, justice from security in order to dissect cultural habits from faith, bad practices from good practices, economic migrants from political refugees, toxic ideology from education but not economy from the rule of law because neither social justice nor freedom of religion can be sustained without the rule of law.

Until mid-90s, such distinctions have been more pronounced at the domestic level than in the United Nations. From that time until now, the foundational content of "uncivil societies" means much more than what the corollary United Nations treaties against drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, and corruption entail. The Organization and its agencies have separate mandates to deal with various other forms of crime, nontolerance of otherness (e.g., xenophobia), terrorism—among many other forms of individual and group conduct that offends our civic conscious-ness and may undermine peace, security, and the rule of law, including the conduct that manifests itself through questionably cultural habits, claiming immunity under the caveat of "respecting cultural identities." After the 13th United Nations Con-gress, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime launched a global "Education for Justice" (E4J) initiative, which embraces primary/tertiary and postgraduate teaching and training in culture of lawfulness. A few contributions in this anthology cater to this variety of types and levels of civic education.[5]

Do we really need "the Other" to define our cultural identity? Is "the Other" constitutive of any culture and a person? Nils Christie (1928–2015), an eminent Norwegian criminologist, in the book *The Good Enemy* ("Den god fiende," 1985), introduced a narcotic drug addict as such a one, designated by an authority regardless of the opinion of others. Important in justifying this designation is that he should appear dangerous but defeatable with the use of drastic legal measures prompting collateral "moral panic." An authority (e.g., a government, the media) creates a fitting image of an enemy (a "fake enemy," to use David Kid-Hewitt's term) to mismanage emotions and gain political capital easily achievable with changes in criminal law (or immigration law) rather than pursuing far-reaching socioeconomic counteraction (see Bauman 2016; Hestermann 2016). Important is that the enemy cannot defend herself/himself because she/he is excluded.

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[4]In the following year, he emphasized the difference between the civil and the "uncivil": "By civil, I mean civilization: the accumulated centuries of learning that form our foundation for progress. By civil, I also mean tolerance: the pluralism and respect with which we accept and draw strength from the world's diverse peoples. And finally, I mean civil society: the citizens' groups, businesses, unions, professors, journalists, political parties and others who have an essential role to play in the running of any society" (Annan 1998).

[5]This topic is also on the agenda of a special issue of "Białystok Legal Studies" under preparation for the Fourteenth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (Kyoto, Japan, 2020) by S. Redo (Guest Editor).

Enoch Powell (1912–1998), one of the outspoken conservative British parliamentarians with the following 1968 statement, may be credited as giving the inspiration to the above academic concept: "We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependents, who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the immigrant descended population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre... As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see 'the River Tiber foaming with much blood'. That tragic and intractable phenomenon which we watch with horror on the other side of the Atlantic but which there is interwoven with the history and existence of the States itself, is coming upon us here by our own volition and our own neglect. Indeed, it has all but come" (The Telegraph 2007).

The Conservative leader, Edward Heath, dismissed Powell from his post as Shadow Defence Secretary. After 50 years since the time of Powell's *Rivers of Blood* speech, it has made no impact on Britons: according to the 2017 opinion poll, 79% of conservative respondents wanted a "sensible policy" that protects immigration levels that support the economy of the UK after its exit from the European Union (Grice 2017). The above contradictory opinions highlight the core issue in the contemporary immigration debate. The UK as one of the most advanced rule-of-law countries is still committed to continuing with immigration despite its side effects.

It appears that the public opinion impact of terrorist attacks is in the above terms negligible. This view interplays with results of a rather dispassionate econometric analysis of the impact of terrorist attacks conducted in 1971–2004 on the 18 Western European countries. The analysts found that "The negative growth effects results, in part, from terrorism reducing growth-enhancing investment and increasing more growth-neutral government spending. In the case of transnational terrorism, an additional incident per million people reduces economic growth by about 0.4 percentage points. At first sight, this seems like a huge effect since most countries grow on average by just 2%. To provide a better perspective on this magnitude, consider France with a population of 60 million people. Transnational terrorism would have to increase by a full 60 incidents for growth to drop by about 0.4 percentage points. If, say, there are ten more terrorist attacks, then income per capita growth would fall by about 0.06 percentage points. This is consistent with findings in past studies [. . .] for different time periods and sample countries. The influence of domestic terrorism on economic growth is half of this effect. For Western Europe, these modest effects agree with recent studies that argue that mature economies are sufficiently diversified to withstand a moderate terrorist campaign" (Gaibulloev and Sandler 2008, p. 422).

But, of course, each country has its own perception whether it "pays-off" to accept refugees and other immigrants and how in kind a country wants to respond to a potential security threat. Important is that the threat assessment is based on facts, not alarmistic impressions. Two studies on the news coverage show a clear mass media bias in this regard.

The first study examined *The New York Times'* coverage of terrorist attacks worldwide between 1998 and 2012. First, suicide missions, irrespective of causalities, received significantly more coverage than other attacks, which could explain

their increased popularity among terrorist groups. Second, the newspaper devoted less attention to attacks in countries located farther away from the US. Third, terror attacks experienced in countries governed by leftist administrations drew more coverage. However, this finding is not confirmed for suicide attacks conducted in countries governed by leftist administrations. Fourth, the more a country trades with the US, the more media coverage an attack in that country receives. Finally, media attention of any terror attack is predictive of both the likelihood of another strike in the affected country within 7 days' time and a reduced interval until the next attack (Jetter 2014).

The second study examined news coverage from *LexisNexis Academic* and *CNN. com* for all terrorist attacks in the United States between 2011 and 2015. Controlling for target type, fatalities, and being arrested, attacks by Muslim perpetrators received, on average, 449% more coverage than other attacks. The researchers concluded that given the disproportionate quantity of news coverage for these attacks, it is no wonder that people are afraid of the Muslim terrorist. More representative media coverage could help bring the public perception of terrorism in line with reality, which in Europe reflects, to quite an extent, that of the United States (Kearns et al. 2017).

Ignorance breeds fear. As long as not evidence but ideology determines the antiimmigrant rhetoric, fear and moral panics are its essentials. However, in terms of sustainable development, this rhetoric is unhelpful for the "universalization of new ethnic diversity" (Coleman 2012, p. 191), let alone for "the changing face of the West" (Orgard 2015, p. 32).

Ethnic identity is changing. According to Coleman, the larger the immigrant-origin communities become, the less is their need to adapt to local norms. Save the temporary exception of the economic realm (work), local norms may have to adapt to the newcomers. Initially, local schools, other public facilities, and, finally, labor markets acquire a new ethnic character.

This book inscribes with its own ideas into the latter train of thought but doubts if this kind of universalization of ethnic identity is presently meant by the United Nations for a global culture of lawfulness. As just noted, the current politics of identity breeds moral panics. The Organization does not yield to it. The UN emphasizes now the progressive ethnic transformation of people's identities or identity through the educationally and criminologically relevant spectrum of its recommendations, driven by the 2016–2030 Sustainable Development Agenda "Transforming Our World" and the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, with its "win-win" philosophy in social and economic life. Both declarations are the evidence that democracy is a work in progress.[6]

Moreover, from the standpoint of the present anthology, its editors think that the rule of law and other precepts are so important to the sending countries that they in

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[6]"Democracy is a process, not a static condition. It is becoming rather than being. It can easily be lost, but never is fully won. Its essence is eternal struggle." (Justice William H. Hastie, the first Afro-American Federal judge (1904–1976)), quoted in Boyte and Skelton 1995, p. 2).

the first place should address the needs of their own economies, according to the new UN paradigm. The 2011 World Bank study forecasting institutional transformation for the rule of law in developing countries shows that depending on the rule of law's present level there, ideally it would take 17 years, but practically 41 years, to reach "good enough" level, and in the control of corruption, respectively, 16 and 27 years (WDR 2011, p. 11). However, since that study did not account for the need of institutional transformation concerning the integration of own nationals through preschool and other education in line with the global culture of lawfulness, the transformation may take longer, for this can only slow the transformation process down. Since 86% of all refugees live in developing countries, especially Ethiopia, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey, and Sudan (de Haas 2017), the transformation process for the rule of law with civic education component in those countries is more complex and even more fundamentally important than in developed countries.

Before the outbreak of the South-North refugee crisis, experts estimated that at the current rate, it would take over 80 years (*sic*!) to resettle all other refugees, that is, those in the "protracted exile" (the term used by the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees). These are 7.1 million people who stayed more than 5 years in a refugee camp (Castles et al. 2014, p. 230). Using a more candid term of the US Committee on Refugees of "warehoused refugees" (ibid.), it is clear that this group of refugees has no better life prospects. As put, this time by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, this implies "a devastating effect on the physical and mental health of migrants" (A/HRC/35/25, para. 58). There is a huge "gap between the protection needs of refugees, and what states are willing to provide. This is the crux of the real crisis for refugees. . . . violations occur when refugees are on the move, once they have reached 'safe' territories, and even when they have found shelter. Consider refugee camps, for example, in which access to economic and social rights, and durable solutions, are scarce. Furthermore, the number of resettlement places is diminishing, along with funding that even at its highest levels was not enough to meet the needs of refugees" (Jubilut 2017, p. 1).

This is the candid rule-of-law context in which the United Nations calls in the New York Declaration, and the 2016–2030 SDG Agenda for the humanization of the treatment of refugees should be heard by politicians, particularly those not aware of and, surely, not sensitive to the refugees' plight all over the world. With the limited opportunities for work and education, the refugees will never have a better life. Thus, they are the best resource of successful intergenerational radicalization that humankind has ever created to its own detriment.

Migrants' assimilation should imply to be an actor on a job market but not a welfare beneficiary. But getting a first job after 5–10 years of stay (OECD 2017) is certainly a very frustrating if not also antagonizing experience. It stands in the way of social integration and makes people idle and desperate. It quite rightly legitimizes living on welfare benefits or, in their absence, living from crime. On the other side, the population of the guest country "learn" that refugees are not willing to work, cost much money, and are not willing to be integrated. Kohlmeier and Schimany (2005) present data of the project "European Migration Network," cofinanced by the

European Commission. The authors emphasize that studies show a positive financial effect of immigrants on the host societies. Negative effects on the income of the domestic population could not be found; immigration increased the number of jobs and had positive effects on the local economy. In Germany, the decreasing population against the background of a low birth rate has the effect that industries need immigrants. "Even with a net immigration of 250,000 per year, the German population is estimated to shrink to 66,1 million in 2050 and 50 million in 2100 from a current population of around 82 million" (p. 19). A successful integration in jobs is an important factor in a successful politics (Bauer 2002; Bonin 2002).

When, and if eventually, it comes to employment, there is work ethos and ethics to learn. Complying with the same standards and norms and with the same labor culture gives a lesser chance to be so different from one another. Recruitment mechanism, dependency on superiors, and vocational training impact work skills, personal relationships, self-concepts, or work attitudes (Huang and Yang 2011). Migrants from other legal cultures are particularly vulnerable to a new work environment. In addition, criminological findings suggest doubts as to employment's blanket appeal in the reduction of youth crime (Williams et al. 1996). Consequently, the dark side of assimilation through employment involves various forms of stress and conflict with the law.

An indirect confirmation of some issues involved in the difficult refugee/immigrant assimilation through labor provided a publication of the German Institute of Labour Economics (IZA). Its international team of econometrists (Papageorge et al. 2017) looked into the UK and US longitudinal analyses of the assimilation process for the answer to whether teaching school children some noncognitive skills (e.g., perseverance and grit) warrants later returns in the labor market outcomes in terms of decent earnings in adult life. The authors found that among economically underprivileged children who were violent, those skills could not help them on the labor market to obtain "higher" earnings. African American children faced higher earnings penalties than white children, probably on account of higher rates of interaction with the criminal justice system for more violent African Americans. However, in all other cases, UK and US violent children (whether boys or girls) with poor educational attainment had the same level of higher earnings as compared to nonviolent children with good educational attainment. The only, but fundamental, difference between one and the other group was that those higher earnings were made by the first group illegitimately and by the second group legitimately.

For those social reformers appreciating the viability of Edwin Sutherland's differential association theory ("Criminal behaviour is an expression of general needs and values, but it cannot be explained by those needs and values alone"; "The process of learning criminal behaviour is the same as learning any other type of behaviour"), this may be the avenue to deal with the enhanced inculcation of noncognitive skills for public good. "Decent work" (SDG 8) is as much important to refugees and immigrants as to anybody else on the labor market. Therefore, vocational training should embrace this social learning concept. In general, it now awaits action-oriented research in the context of the employment of refugees and

immigrants, with additional proviso for language and civic concepts involving labor (e.g. see the SANTED project, noted above).

Conflict with the law includes various abuses by or involving immigrants. Particularly, the Europeans will feel the intercultural impact of their aging. Owing to the falling old-age support ratio (constant ratio 15–64/65 years or older), they need migrants in many sectors of economy, in public service, health care including. Physical abuse of the nursed elderly comes into picture as the next form of crime, not only by native medical staff but also by nonnative assistants. Separately, abuse of welfare benefits by immigrants should be added.

But even though refugees' and immigrants' rationale for living may occasionally be different from that of typical job seekers' and welfare beneficiates' rationale, conflicts with the law in many areas are not really immigrant specific. Neither terrorist acts nor violence against women are immigrant-specific. These forms only signal an emerging group of perpetrators who can also enter street and organized crime, which through the ethnic networks may grow into transnational crime. However, at least since the time of immigration into the United States by Italian emigrants, some of whom brought into that country Mafia-type ethnic-network crime, this is really nothing new. This is a universal problem.

Ideally, multicultural integration should be a self-regulatory process of give and take according to a universal law of reciprocity. And so we should see the UN 2016–2030 Agenda, which sets out new paradigm for making this process work in this way. Actually, however, European and other courts' jurisprudence is full of regulatory verdicts and opinions intervening in this process, which impact it (Garlick 2015; Orgad 2015). Some countries fare better than others. However, even in those countries with quite inclusive policies, there were court verdicts, undermining the universal norm of equality.[7]

Divisive thus as conventional jurisprudence occasionally is, in the absence of less divisive solutions, one has to take such a controversial jurisprudence on board but find it unreflective. Rather than leaving it as such, countering such inhuman and degrading customarily backed practices seems to be an actionable way to test, pursue, monitor, and modify the progress of sustainable livelihood in this modern age of migration in host and source countries alike without coming into conflict with genuine prescriptions of faith.

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[7]For example, in 2007, a German judge cited the Koran (*Sura* 4, An-Nisa (Women)) in her rejection of a Muslim woman's request for a quick divorce on the grounds of domestic violence. Judge said the German woman of Moroccan descent would not be granted a divorce because she and her husband came from a "Moroccan cultural environment in which it is not uncommon for a man to exert a right of corporal punishment over his wife," further stating that "that's what the claimant had to reckon when she married the defendant" (Connolly 2007). The judge was removed from the case shortly thereafter. While as of this writing, the Moroccan legislation and practice still accepts the above cultural canon, Tunisia has passed a new law which allows women to seek protection from acts of violence committed by their husbands and other relatives and also includes provisions on harassment in public spaces and economic discrimination (The Independent 2017).

Therefore, regardless of the meandered and, at times, unnecessarily conflated with faith way in which human progress and multicultural integration will continue, the United Nations invariably calls for a firm countering of culturally motivated violence to sex and gender (zero tolerance) and makes also headway in anticorruption education, in both cases emerging as new universal minimum standards.

For cultural relativists, this may be unthinkable and unrealistic (e.g. "torture is normal"), but the extremes to which relativism may and can carry us way from the contemporary and future moral core is likewise unthinkable. In 1937, the epitome of cultural relativism was well captured by Ellsworth Faris, the president of the American Sociological Association: "For we live in a world of cultural relativity and the whole furniture of earth and choir of heaven are to be described and discussed as they are conceived by men. Caviar is not a delicacy to the general [population]. Cows are not food to the Hindu. Mohammed is not the prophet of God to me. To an atheist, God is not God at all" (Faris 1937, pp. 150–151).

In 2015, this quotation still resounded in the reedition of Marshal Clinard's "Sociology of Deviant Behaviour" (Clinard and Maier 2015, p. 11). In our view, it strongly echoes the past, which in no way spells the future. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the framers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and contemporary intercultural philosophers, psychologists, and other experts dismissed such prewar arguments (Morsink 1999 and 2011). They emphasize that "since the Holocaust, cultural relativism is dead" (Hoffman 2001, p. 273). Despite this obituary, some claim the revival of cultural relativism, while still some others go even further and pursue anti-Semitism.

Also multiculturalism receives death notices. Christian Joppke (2017, p. 154), a reviewer of these notices, questions them. In resuscitating multiculturalism, he recalls the most eloquent report on the actual whereabouts of multiculturalism. Its author finds that "[L]liberal democracies today seem to be in something of a state of limbo regarding multiculturalism: retreating from it in certain policy respects and suspicious of the word, but, at the same time, institutionally and attitudinally reshaped by its commitments and norms; reaching for a new idiom and a renewed emphasis on commonality, yet reluctant to quash diversity and reinscribe brute assimilationism" (Levey 2009, p. 77).

We feel that this "new idiom" is in the 2030 UN Sustainable Development Agenda and the 2016 New York Declaration with their vision of addressing new demographic prospects in a "win-win" fashion in a migratory world. If until 2016 the above statement could stand on its own, then now it may be a preamble to both UN declarations.

These prospects have already been outlined in the second year of implementation of the 2000–2015 United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The UN MDGs report with its middle projections scenario foresaw by 2050 a decrease of labor force in the Global North (UN DESA 2001). According to that medium scenario, if in that force the declines in the size of a population and declines in the population of working age 15–64 were to be offset by international migration, then by 2050, Germany, for example, would need to accept altogether over 10,200

million new immigrants (or 204,000 annually), Russia 5448 million (109,000), and the United States 38 million (760,000) (ibid.). The UN projections on the so-called replacement migration aiming at avoiding the decline of the total population and the decline of the working age population show that this would require the admission of altogether 1.6 million migrants a year (ibid.).

Between 2016 and 2030, at least 470 million jobs are needed globally for new entrants to the labor market to compensate for the growth of the working age population (UN 2016). Hence, the future of work is about the future of intergenerational social justice and the future counteraction to welfare and other crime and abuse, including of the elderly. Today and in the future, they are a valuable resource to be protected but also to be drawn from—health, motivation, and their own welfare permitting—for a voluntary assistance in integrating refugees and immigrants.

Presently, automation of jobs instead of a large immigration may in some sectors of the economy reduce immigrants' number. But whatever is the reduction, within the remaining number in any sector, first of all, highly trained employees are needed, including in such emotionally sensitive sector like health care, especially for the aging population.

It is clear that planning *en masse* immigration is unrealistic. It also is not viable in terms of effective multicultural integration, which mostly takes place in cities where the newcomers live, and even less effective in terms of assimilation. There should not be too many strangers in an arrival city in one time to inculcate quickly in host countries' common language(s) the sense of urban stewardship for the safety of men, women, and children. There will be too many diversified "feeling rules" and "emotion norms" (Basu 2004, p. 91) in one time and place to manage safety and education successfully. Already feeling that accelerating diversity in Scandinavia, Finnish kindergarten educationists discuss new integration methods (see Redo in this book). On the basis of data of the World Economic Forum (2017, p. 10), "Migrants overwhelmingly settle in cities once they arrive in their destination country. . . . Cities address the immediate needs of migrants and respond to some of the challenges of integration. Given the projected increases in urbanization and migration, cities will continue to play an integral part in human mobility in the next few decades. Although the key role of cities as first responders to migration is uncontested, they are in general far from adequately involved in national and international migration decisions. With a high volume of migrants arriving in cities, city leaders are faced with the challenge of providing vital urban infrastructure and services to meet the needs of the migrant population. This includes affordable and social housing, quality education and health services, simple access to basic utilities (water, power, etc.), robust and congestion-free roads and transportation infrastructure as well as, finally, ensuring integration and social cohesion for the increased diversity."

Whatever integration problems exist in practice, UN framers and the like-minded actors emphasize one "conscience of humanity." Indeed, after the Second World War, a tremendous moral and socioeconomic progress took place in the world, thanks to which no Third World War was possible. Since the adoption in 1948 of

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in 1955 of the first United Nations crime prevention and criminal justice standards and norms, they are foundational for it and set the goals to achieve. Thus, in contradiction to the Faris classical quotation, Emilio Viano, the president of the International Society of Criminology (one of the cofounders of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Program), in his closing statement heard by the undersigned at the 2016 World Congress of Criminology, remarked that in modern times, academic criminology should not hesitate to take on board the normative dimension of sustainable livelihood. Certainly, not only the UN human rights, crime prevention, and criminal justice standards and norms but likewise the 2030 UN Agenda and the 2016 New York Declaration for Migrants and Refugees are very fitting and interrelated cases in point on the now checkered scene of human rights and responsibilities.

In the above context, some of this book's texts account for a one-time, happenstance humanitarian decision of German Chancellor Angela Merkel (previously a critic of multiculturalism, together with French and UK counterparts (Joppke 2017, p. 44)) to allow in 2015 a massive entry of refugees and irregular immigrants into her country. This unprecedented decision, which outsized the expectations, prompted volatile and divisive opinions and actions across Europe and beyond (see Kury et al. in this volume). And no wonder, because Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy, and France provide for 63% of the total EU population and 77% of the migrants stay there (see Póczik and Sárik in this volume).

This massive entry initially blurred the legal distinction between one and another type of migrants. But soon thereafter, it highlighted different sets of issues concerning their rights to reach the Global North countries of their personal choice, live and work there. Eventually, as the influx of nondocumented immigrants continued throughout 2017, and it has become clear that mostly they are economically motivated, the reactions in Europe have more and more attuned to the Agenda's goal to "[f]acilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies" (10.7). As of this writing, the European Union Member States have started reconsidering their previous divisive intake policies with a view to achieving a more agreeable outcome across the internal divides.

In this book, several of its contributors seek to muster and assess criminologically relevant facts involved in this dramatic and troubling situation, both for the refugees and irregular migrants and for the European governments facing extremely hard choices. The authors address also the effective countering of related hate crime, etc., and look for the avenues to advance sustainable livelihood prospects for the refugees and migrants in their new countries. The book imparts that not only Germans but also other Europeans and residents (earlier immigrants) of the old continent and across the world (in Canada, the United States, and the Republic of South Africa especially) "feel the heat" of the immigrant challenge. Some quarters of the host population experience the crisis of heart and mind concerning further acceptance of refugees and migrants. In the years to come, this difficult feeling will also be echoed in the UN implementation of the sustainable development goal 16, which reads: "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide

access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels."

Not surprisingly, while in the variety of legal cultures there are different specific responses to that immigrant and SDG challenge, in generic terms the immigrants seem to pursue the same reasoning to get a chance for better life, whether this is, e.g., Germany or South Africa. This book accounts for this fact. In diplomatic and scientific circles, it ignited many reactions and reinvigorated the academic discourse on hate crime, xenophobia, organized crime, victimization, and other aspects of civic education. The book seeks to address them in a constructive fashion to find out how rather than whether *wir schaffen das* in the "Global North" and elsewhere. It seems that the chasm between northern countries accepting and not accepting applications for the refugee status is a demonstration that for "good governance" in the EU terms, only some countries managed to drew pragmatic lessons, while others deny the need to be solidary. This divisive approach complicates and slows down arriving at the anyhow inevitable common solutions to the "refugee problem."

In contrast with this recent challenge for the Global North ensuing from low fertility rate, aging, and immigration, and in reference to the high fertility in the Global South (in 88% a "youth bulge"), experts assessing the viability of achieving the United Nations Millennium Development Goals thwarted there by the population explosion challenge estimated that one year of extended girls' education in the Global South countries lowers future fertility rates by 0.3–0.5 children (Abu-Ghaida and Klasen 2004). Somewhere in between these high ceiling and rock-bottom estimates, there is an array of other ones, including the minimum replacement fertility rate of 2.08 children per women, with countries in Asia where that rate dropped from 7 to below 2, the estimate for the African countries with the opposite process (Goldstone 2012; Haas 2012), and with the likewise impressive fact that in developing countries now live nine out of every ten of the world's children under 15 (Kaufman and Toft 2012, p. 4).

According to UN estimates, in 2017, Europe stood at 742 million people while Africa at 1256 million. By 2100, the European populations will decline by 12%, and African will increase by 74%. Nigeria's population may rise from 200 million to over 793 million by 2100, thanks in part to declining infant mortality, while Italy's may drop from 59 million to 47 million because of persistently low birth rate. By that time, some other European nations and Japan are on track to lose nearly one half of their current populations. Poland, for example, may lose 47% of its current population. Other countries less: Hungary −34%, Slovakia −30%, the Czech Republic −16%. Germany may lose 14%. In the same period, Finland's population may rise from 5.5 million to over six million, while Austria's may stay on the level of eight million. Finally, Canada's population may steadily grow from 36 million people to 51 million people (UN DESA 2017). In any of these latter cases, the projected population size may be credited to migration policies and higher fertility rates, especially among the recent immigrants. In some scenarios, the 2050 demographic developments in countries of the North involving rapidly aging populations are rather poignantly shown in a coffin shape, as, e.g., is the case for the European Union and Russia, while such demographic developments in countries of the South (e.g., Nigeria, the Republic of