PALGRAVE STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Social Movements and the Change of Economic Elites in Europe after 1945

Edited by Stefan Berger & Marcel Boldorf

Palgrave Studies in the History of Social Movements

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Around the world, social movements have become legitimate, yet contested, actors in local, national and global politics and civil society, yet we still know relatively little about their longer histories and the trajectories of their development. This series seeks to promote innovative historical research on the history of social movements in the modern period since around 1750. We bring together conceptually-informed studies that analyse labour movements, new social movements and other forms of protest from early modernity to the present. We conceive of 'social movements' in the broadest possible sense, encompassing social formations that lie between formal organisations and mere protest events. We also offer a home for studies that systematically explore the political, social, economic and cultural conditions in which social movements can emerge. We are especially interested in transnational and global perspectives on the history of social movements, and in studies that engage critically and creatively with political, social and sociological theories in order to make historically grounded arguments about social movements. This new series seeks to offer innovative historical work on social movements, while also helping to historicise the concept of 'social movement'. It hopes to revitalise the conversation between historians and historical sociologists in analysing what Charles Tilly has called the 'dynamics of contention'.

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Palgrave Studies in the History of Social Movements
ISBN 978-3-319-77196-0 ISBN 978-3-319-77197-7 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77197-7

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018937897

Cover illustration: Kladno steel works (Czechoslovakia), 1947 © CTK / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Series Editor Preface

Around the world, social movements have become legitimate, yet contested, actors in local, national and global politics and civil society, yet we still know relatively little about their longer histories and the trajectories of their development. Our series reacts to what can be described as a recent boom in the history of social movements. We can observe a development from the crisis of labour history in the 1980s to the boom in research on social movements in the 2000s. The rise of historical interests in the development of civil society and the role of strong civil societies as well as non-governmental organisations in stabilising democratically constituted polities has strengthened the interest in social movements as a constituent element of civil societies.

In different parts of the world, social movements continue to have a strong influence on contemporary politics. In Latin America, trade unions, labour parties and various left-of-centre civil society organisations have succeeded in supporting left-of-centre governments. In Europe, peace movements, ecological movements and alliances intent on campaigning against poverty and racial discrimination and discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual orientation have been able to set important political agendas for decades. In other parts of the world, including Africa, India and South East Asia, social movements have played a significant role in various forms of community building and community politics. The contemporary political relevance of social movements has undoubtedly contributed to a growing historical interest in the topic.

Contemporary historians are not only beginning to historicise these relatively recent political developments; they are also trying to relate them

to a longer history of social movements, including traditional labour organisations, such as working-class parties and trade unions. In the longue durée, we recognise that social movements are by no means a recent phenomenon and are not even an exclusively modern phenomenon, although we realise that the onset of modernity emanating from Europe and North America across the wider world from the eighteenth century onwards marks an important departure point for the development of civil societies and social movements.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the dominance of national history over all other forms of history writing led to a thorough nationalisation of the historical sciences. Hence social movements have been examined traditionally within the framework of the nation state. Only during the last two decades have historians begun to question the validity of such methodological nationalism and to explore the development of social movements in comparative, connective and transnational perspective, taking into account processes of transfer, reception and adaptation. Whilst our book series does not preclude work that is still being carried out within national frameworks (for, clearly, there is a place for such studies, given the historical importance of the nation state in history), it hopes to encourage comparative and transnational histories on social movements.

At the same time as historians have begun to research the history of those movements, a range of social theorists, from Jürgen Habermas to Pierre Bourdieu and from Slavoj Žižek to Alain Badiou, as well as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe to Miguel Abensour, to name but a few, have attempted to provide philosophical-cum-theoretical frameworks in which to place and contextualise the development of social movements. History has arguably been the most empirical of all the social and human sciences, but it will be necessary for historians to explore further to what extent these social theories can be helpful in guiding and framing the empirical work of the historian in making sense of the historical development of social movements. Hence the current series is also hoping to make a contribution to the ongoing dialogue between social theory and the history of social movements.

This series seeks to promote innovative historical research on the history of social movements in the modern period since around 1750. We bring together conceptually informed studies that analyse labour movements, new social movements and other forms of protest from early modernity to the present. With this series, we seek to revive, within the context of historiographical developments since the 1970s, a conversation

between historians on the one hand and sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists on the other.

Unlike most of the concepts and theories developed by social scientists, we do not see social movements as directly linked, a priori, to processes of social and cultural change and therefore do not adhere to a view that distinguishes between old (labour) and new (middle-class) social movements. Instead, we want to establish the concept 'social movement' as a heuristic device that allows historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to investigate social and political protests in novel settings. Our aim is to historicise notions of social and political activism in order to highlight different notions of political and social protest on both left and right.

Hence, we conceive of 'social movements' in the broadest possible sense, encompassing social formations that lie between formal organisations and mere protest events. But we also include processes of social and cultural change more generally in our understanding of social movements: this goes back to nineteenth-century understandings of 'social movement' as processes of social and cultural change more generally. We also offer a home for studies that systematically explore the political, social, economic and cultural conditions in which social movements can emerge. We are especially interested in transnational and global perspectives on the history of social movements, and in studies that engage critically and creatively with political, social and sociological theories in order to make historically grounded arguments about social movements. In short, this series seeks to offer innovative historical work on social movements, while also helping to historicise the concept of 'social movement'. It also hopes to revitalise the conversation between historians and historical sociologists in analysing what Charles Tilly has called the 'dynamics of contention'.

Marcel Boldorf and Stefan Berger's *Social Movements and the Change of Economic Elites in Europe after 1945* contributes to social movement research in two original ways. In doing so, this edited collection also develops an important optic into post-1945 European History as both post-war and post-fascist history. Business historians have, for quite some time, pointed to the complex continuities between fascist or National Socialists and post-1945 configurations. But within the framework of this research, the socio-political background context has, by necessity, taken a secondary role. This is the point of departure for this volume: Berger and Boldorf have brought together an exciting collection of case studies that analyse what happened to critiques of that seamless transition from fascism to post-1945 capitalism or state socialism and ask for the continuities of

anti-capitalist thought and action from the 1930s beyond 1945. The chapters in this volume examine in fascinating detail case studies where this anti-capitalism took the form of grassroots social movements. They thus shine a spotlight onto sections of the labour movements that have been ignored in more traditional approaches so far. And they highlight their organisational and ideological positions, rather than merely zoom in on party-political social democracy and communism.

Conceptually, this volume thus significantly broadens our view and question the neat distinction between 'old' and 'new' social movements. This, in turn, allows them to develop a novel conception of post-1945 European history, which highlights the openness of the post-1945 constellation and its constant contestations rather than its order and structure. They open up not merely new vistas on little known aspects of labour history. But they also help us to see eastern and western Europe in their complex and multiple entanglements.

Bochum, Germany — Stefan Berger
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Social Movements and the Change of Economic Elites in Europe: An Introduction

Stefan Berger

Introduction

The end of 1945 marked a major caesura in Europe's political, social, economic and cultural development. German hypernationalism had left the continent in ruins with tens of millions dead and much of the continent transformed into a wasteland of dead bodies, ruined cities, destroyed infrastructure and environmental disaster. 'Postwar'[1] faced diverse challenges that were interconnected by the overriding question of how the reconstruction of the continent should proceed. The answers to this question were closely related to the post-war search for guilty men, i.e. those responsible for the destruction of Europe. In international politics, the Nuremberg trials answered that question—the National Socialist leadership

[1] Tony Judt, *Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945* (London: Allen Lane, 2006).

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S. Berger, M. Boldorf (eds.), *Social Movements and the Change of Economic Elites in Europe after 1945*, Palgrave Studies in the History of Social Movements, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77197-7_1

and those serving its ideology and politics were tried and sentenced in an attempt juridically to lay the past to rest. But it was not just a question that looked for answers in international law and politics. The search for guilty men was going on in many countries of Europe, including all those that had been occupied during the Second World War and in which cases of collaboration had occurred.

One answer to the question who was to blame came in the form of anti-capitalism. Left-of-centre political forces, from communists to anarcho-syndicalists, social democrats and left Catholics prominently argued for a connection between capitalism and fascism. Max Horkheimer's famous statement: 'Whoever does not want to talk about capitalism, should be silent about fascism',[2] has its roots in those inter- and post-war debates about the close interconnections between fascism and capitalism. Communism had long claimed that fascism was a political system that served the interests of capitalism in economic crisis by suppressing the working-class revolution.[3] Yet at the end of the Second World War, anti-capitalism went far beyond Communism and became, for a short period, a mainstream trope of politics. Many 'capitalists' had collaborated with the fascist occupiers during the war and had made healthy profits under and with war. The memories of the economic depression of the interwar period was still fresh in many people's minds and further contributed to a negative perception of capitalism as an economic system that benefitted the wealthy few and disadvantaged the vast majority of those toiling under capitalism.[4]

The Red Army, advancing on Berlin, brought the message of anti-capitalism with it into Eastern and East-Central Europe. Where the Red Army stood, communist regimes were established with force in the post-war period, suppressing all those opposed to Communism. The Soviet Union ended capitalism in one half of Europe and its antifascism stressed that this change of economic system was the prime condition for uprooting fascism and paving the way to a social system that would hand power

[2] Max Horkheimer, 'Die Juden und Europa', in idem, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 4 (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1988), p. 380f. [first published 1939].

[3] On Communist interpretations of fascism see Stanley G. Paine, 'Interpretations of Fascism', in Roger Griffin and Matthew Feldman (eds), *Fascism. Theories and Concepts* (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 56f.

[4] On the strength of anti-capitalist sentiment in post-war Europe see also Keith Lowe, *Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II* (London: Picador, 2013).

to the workers and farmers.[5] This was a challenge to the capitalist economic systems of the Western allies. Hence, the USA, as foremost capitalist power in the world in 1945, took measures to stem the advances of Communism. The birth of the Cold War, so soon after the end of the Second World War, had as much to do with the battles of economic systems as the battles of political systems. Those in the west critical of capitalism were divided between the followers of Soviet communism and those who wanted to find a 'third way' between Soviet Communism and American capitalism. Various forms of 'third force' arguments were prominent between 1944 and 1948 contributing to a vigorous debate about the future of capitalism in the post-war Western world.[6] Ultimately the force of the capitalist defence was such that the 'third force' movements lost out everywhere in Western Europe, and from the late 1940s to the late 1980s, a rather static global binary divide between a liberal capitalist West and a Communist anti-capitalist East became the accustomed scenario.

The challenge to capitalism came to the fore after the end of the Second World War but it was rooted in the Second World War and its prehistory in the interwar period. Hence, 1945 does not represent a sharp break but rather a political caesura allowing particular forms of discourses about economic systems and their elites to move to the fore that had been presented and prepared over almost three decades from the end of the First World War and the Bolshevik revolution onwards.[7] The subsequent chapters will deal with those discourses, and the actions that arose from them, over a range of different European countries. It will discuss who demanded the replacement of economic elites that were deeply embroiled in the history of capitalism and fascism and who launched plans for some form of alternative economic system. It will ask what resistance those actors, and the social movements they formed, met and how they ultimately failed in the

[5] On the Communist transformation in Eastern Europe see Ann Applebaum, *Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe 1944–1956* (New York: Anchor, 2013).

[6] On 'third force' arguments in Britain, compare Darren G. Lilleker, *Against the Cold War: The History and Political Traditions of Pro-Sovietism in the British Labour Party, 1945–1989* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013); Jonathan Schneer, *Labour's Conscience: the Labour Left 1945–1951* (London: Routledge, 1983).

[7] An interesting attempt, in the German context, to relativise the significance of 1945 as a decisive break is provided by Martin Broszat and Klaus-Dietmar Henke (eds), *Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform: zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990).

West to bring about change, whilst in Eastern Europe Stalinism forcibly imposed change.

This introduction will, first of all, discuss the concept of social movements and how it applies to the situation in and around 1945. Subsequently it will develop some of the themes and questions that the editors put to all the authors of the subsequent chapters to lay down the common framework that unites the contributions to this volume. It falls to the concluding chapter by Marcel Boldorf to sum up and reflect comparatively upon the conclusions drawn in the different chapters.

Social Movements and the Immediate Post-War Context

Sid Tarrow famously described 'social movements' as 'moving targets'—indicating that definitions of what exactly constitutes a social movement are notoriously vague and fuzzy.[8] The word field is indeed broad—we can think of social movement, political party, trade union, private interest group, association, religious congregation and others more, concepts which can and arguably should be delineated. But how can we do it? And is there not still a considerable overlap between them, however much we attempt to create firm borders between them? All of them surely are relevant in the history of, to use another of Sid Tarrow's key terms, 'contentious politics'.[9]

The fuzziness of conceptual borders extends into the fuzziness of political borders. It is a widespread misconception, not least due to the conflation of the political sympathies of many social movement researchers with the object of their study, that social movements are necessarily progressive, emancipatory or on the left. Just because social movement research has long been blind on its right eye, it does not mean that fascism and other right-wing nationalist and authoritarian movements should not also be studied as social movements.[10] However, for the purpose of this book, the fascist and right-wing authoritarian social movements had been discredited

[8] Sid Tarrow, '"Aiming at a Moving Target": Social Science and the Recent Rebellions in Eastern Europe', in *Political Science and Politics* 24:1 (1991), pp. 12–20.

[9] Sid Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 3rd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

[10] Kevin Passmore, 'Fascism as a Social Movement in a Transnational Context', in Stefan Berger and Holger Nehring (eds), *The History of Social Movements in Global Perspective. A Survey* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 579–618; Theodor Schieder (ed.), *Faschismus als soziale Bewegung: Deutschland und Italien im Vergleich* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983).

by the end of the Second World War. Although some right-wing dictatorships, such as Francoism in Spain, survived the end of the war, the challenges regarding the capitalist reconstruction in Western Europe came from the left broadly conceived.

Here we arrive at a third misconception common in social movement studies, namely the widespread attempt to demarcate the new social movements from old social movements. This distinction goes back to Alain Touraine who, in the 1960s, was deeply disillusioned by the old social movements, i.e. the labour movements, as carriers of social revolution. Instead, he pinned his hopes on what he called new social movements—only to be disappointed again, but that is a different story.[11] Subsequently researchers working on new social movements have often stressed, with Ronald Inglehardt, that they are based on postmaterialist values, which allegedly distinguished them from the more materialist values associated with the socio-economic advancement of the working classes that allegedly was the central concern of the old social movements.[12] Hence, new social movements were supposed to be more middle-class. They focussed on the sphere of reproduction rather than production. They were decentralised, radically reformist and in favour of participatory democracy. Old social movements, by contrast, were working-class and focused on the sphere of production. They were centralised, revolutionary and more inclined to be led from the top down. This, however, is a highly ideal-typical differentiation, which, I would argue, breaks down before serious historical investigations. Studies on the labour movement have confirmed that they were supported by an important segment of middle-class voters almost from the beginning, even in the case of the German Social Democrats, which, for a long time, were thought of as particularly working-class in its support.[13] The Italian labour movement even was predominantly middle-class well before 1914.[14] It is not the case that the 'old' labour movement was not interested in the sphere of reproduction, whilst many 'new' social movements took a strong interest in the sphere

[11] Alain Tourraine, *The Voice and the Eye: an Analysis of Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[12] Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

[13] Jonathan Sperber, *The Kaiser's Voters: Electors and Elections in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[14] Robert Michels, 'Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie: Parteimitgliedschaft und soziale Zusammensetzung', in *Archiv für Sozial- und Wirtschaftspolitik* 23 (1906), pp. 471–556 and 25 (1907), pp. 148–231.

of production. Furthermore, there are no clear-cult dichotomies between degrees of centralisation or revolutionary potentials between 'old' labour and 'new' social movements. So overall, I would very much urge caution about such delineations between 'old' and 'new'. For obvious reasons, in this volume, we almost exclusively deal with 'old' social movements, mainly the labour movement, as the 'new' social movements only came into existence in the context of the aftermath of the long 1960s.

Nevertheless, if we follow my line of reasoning above, then old social movements should just as much be classed as social movements as new social movements, so that it is more than justified in this volume to talk about social movements challenging economic elites and the capitalist economic system after 1945, in particular as these movements went far beyond the labour movement and included many left Catholic and left Liberal political forces that were loosely connected in an anti-capitalist network. Dieter Rucht defines social movements precisely as 'a network of individuals, groups and organizations that, based on a sense of collective identity, seek to bring about social change (or resist social change) primarily by means of collective public protest',[15] and Friedhelm Neidhardt talks about them as 'mobilised network of networks'.[16] Indeed, many definitions of social movements emphasise the network character of social movements, their loose form of association and organisation, something that fits the anti-capitalist movement in the aftermath of the Second World War perfectly.

Another famous definition of social movements that is relevant for this volume comes from Charles Tilly. In his survey on social movements from the mid-eighteenth century to the beginning of the twenty-first century, he defines social movements as 'a sustained series of interaction between power-holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, in the course of which these persons make publicly visible claims for changes in the distribution of the exercise of power, and back those demands with public demonstrations of support.'[17] An important element here is protest—'publicly visible claims

[15] Dieter Rucht, 'Studying Social Movements: Some Conceptual Challenges', in Stefan Berger and Holger Nehring (eds), *The History of Social Movements in Global Perspective. A Survey* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), p. 45.

[16] Friedhelm Neidhardt, 'Einige Ideen zu einer allgemeinen Theorie sozialer Bewegungen', in Stefan Hradil (ed.), *Sozialstruktur im Umbruch. Karl Martin Bolte zum 60. Geburtstag* (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1985), p. 195.

[17] Charles Tilly, 'Social Movements and National Politics', in Charles Bright and Susan Harding (eds), *State-Making and Social Movements* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), p. 306.

for changes'. Protest, as we shall see in subsequent pages, was indeed a marked characteristic of the anti-capitalist movement after 1945. These anti-capitalist protests were very much about the interaction of the movement with power-holders—both in the political and economic spheres. The nature of the change pursued by these anti-capitalist movements differed substantially. It ranged from a revolutionary overthrow of capitalism and the liberal-democratic regimes associated with it to the reform of capitalism through measures of socialisation, nationalisation and workers' participation, in other words a hedging-in or taming of capitalism that would, in the eyes of the reformers, produce a capitalism with a human face.

The widely differing aims of the post-war anti-capitalist movements often meant that they shared little else beyond rather diffuse anti-capitalist sentiments. If social movement studies stress the importance of collective identity as a basis for collective action,[18] such collective identity was fragmented, even fractured, in the anti-capitalist movements at the end of the war. Identitarian concepts were therefore difficult to employ and the performative character of the anti-capitalist movements lacked a strong 'us' versus 'them' orientation, as both the 'us' and the 'them' was too heterogeneous. This is also the reason why the semantics of the movements could not police its borders very effectively. Whereas other social movements developed complex symbols and myths, and produced a range of objects such as T-shirts, buttons, stickers and posters to frame its collective identity, the anti-capitalist movements after the Second World War were struggling with that. All the semantics were produced within sub-milieus that did not share any wider programmatic vision about how to arrive at which post-capitalist society. The milieus, lifestyles and subcultures of anti-capitalist movements was simply too heterogeneous.

The most important difficulty by far of the post-war anti-capitalist movements was the effective mobilisation of resources. In social movement studies the resource mobilisation approach asks how social movements compete for influence and resources within wider political and social fields.[19] The restabilisiation of capitalism in the West shortly after 1945 meant that anti-capitalism could mobilise few resources, especially as

[18] Aidan McGarry and James Jasper (eds), *The Identity Dilemma: Social Movements and Collective Identity* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2015).

[19] For an introduction to resource mobilisation approaches in social movement studies see Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy, 'Resources and Social Movement Mobilization', in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds), *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 116–152.

it could easily be identified with the hated Communism behind the emerging Iron Curtain. The strength of anti-Communism in the West soon fractured the anti-capitalist networks, with non-Communist forces seeking various realignments with the defenders of capitalism.

When social movement studies scholars talk about 'Political Opportunity Structure' (POS), they have in mind that social movements have been more or less successful in establishing themselves and realising their aims depending on how open existing political institutions have been towards them.[20] In other words, how much have existing elites disagreed/agreed on key issues of nascent social movements and to what extent has this opened up opportunities for them? To what extent have social movements been able to rely on important societal allies? How willing has the state been to consider the active repression or encouragement of social movements? In relation to the nascent anti-capitalist movements after 1945 it can be argued that, in the Cold War, they increasingly faced a lack of openness and a climate of harassment on behalf of the state. Hence, the snowballing of different political groups into a powerful movement was, by and large, prevented. Targeted acts of provocation attempting to communicate the aims and ambitions of anti-capitalism drew a heavy-handed response from the state after 1946/1947. Under these circumstances local protests often remained local and did not transform into national, let alone transnational, forms of protest.[21]

The importance of communication for the success of social movements is underlined by social movement studies that have argued convincingly that the impact of social movements cannot easily be measured in terms of policy outcomes but manifests itself primarily in reorienting discussions within societies about political-cultural norms.[22] Such reorientation was made difficult after 1945 by the strength of conservative forces in favour of keeping traditional capitalist economic systems and leaving political systems in place that were not keen on notions of a renewal.

[20] Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[21] An interesting approach to social movement studies that could perhaps be employed usefully here and that focusses on questions of the life cycle of social movements is Suzanne Staggenborg, *Social Movements*, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

[22] Dieter Rucht, 'Öffentlichkeit als Mobilisierungsfaktor für soziale Bewegungen', in Friedhelm Neidhardt (ed.), *Öffentlichkeit, öffentliche Meinung, soziale Bewegungen* (Opladen: Leske & Buderich, 1994), pp. 337–358.

'Experts' have often been of vital importance to reorient discussions, boost the credibility of social movements and enhance their abilities to mobilise greater numbers of people for their causes. If one thinks of Bertrand Russell, Albert Schweitzer and the Göttingen appeal of 18 German atomic physicists, their 'expert knowledge' had an important impact on the fortunes of the peace movement.[23] In a similar vein, biologists and environmental 'experts' have been vital to lend credence to the claims and demands of the ecological movement.[24] And medical expertise was at the heart of the battle surrounding abortion reform between the feminist movement and the anti-abortion movement, itself, of course, also an important social movement.[25] With the debates surrounding capitalism at the end of the Second World War, we also observe in various countries a struggle over which economic paths to renewal and reconstruction was the more promising. Yet, ultimately, as we shall see, the expert cultures aligned with the defence of a reformed capitalism were far stronger than those arguing for the abolition of capitalism.

The importance of communicative strategies for social movements was augmented with the occupation of public and private space through a rich repertoire of social protest, including strikes, petitions, the vote, mass demonstrations, conferences and various forms of street politics, including blockades and occupations of squares and/or factories.[26] Another increasingly popular form of protest associated with the occupation of space included bodily protests, such as performances, singing, the formation of human chains, the display of mutilations and disabilities in anti-war protests and self-immolation as a last-resort form of protest.[27] In the

[23] Benjamin Ziemann, 'Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and USA since 1945: an Introduction', in *Moving the Social: Journal of Social History and the History of Social Movements* 32 (2004), p. 14.

[24] See, for example, the emphasis on expert cultures in Liz Sonneborn, *The Environmental Movement: Protecting our Natural Resources* (New York: Infobase, 2008).

[25] The importance of medical expertise is stressed in Alesha E. Doan, *Opposition and Intimidation. The Abortion Wars and Strategies of Political Harassment* and, for an earlier period and different place, Atina Grossmann, *Reforming Sex: The German Movement for Birth Control and Abortion Reform 1920–1950* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

[26] Marc Traugott, *Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995).

[27] Dieter Rucht, *Modernisierung und neue soziale Bewegungen: Deutschland, Frankreich und die USA im Vergleich* (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 1994); J. Craig Jenkins, 'Social Movements, Political Representation and the State: an Agenda and Comparative Framework', in idem and Bert Klandermans (eds), *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives*

subsequent chapters we shall also encounter such occupation of space as one vital strategy of anti-capitalist movements after the war.

Occupying space was often accompanied by violence.[28] Historically speaking, the methods of social movements frequently included violence, even if they rarely advocated the use of violence, not least as this would have provoked strong reactions of states, which, in the modern period, insisted on and thoroughly policed its own monopoly over the use of violence. In 1945 the state was incredibly weak in many parts of Europe, so that violence on behalf of social movements could not always be met by state violence. Yet, as the state recovered in the post-war period, the violent overthrow of economic and political systems appeared less likely, signaling a preference for reformist agendas.

Finally, an important function of social movements is the canalisation of social protest—emerging in everyday culture and known in all human societies.[29] In post-war Europe, social movements also performed this function. And it is the nature of this canalisation of contentious politics in the post-Second World War wave of mobilisation that we shall be concerned with in this volume.

Social Movements and the Anti-Capitalist Moment at the End of the Second World War

So far we have shown that the anti-capitalist movements after 1945 showed all the hallmarks of a social movement mobilising for a substantial and radical policy change under conditions not conducive to this overall aim. But what were the specific conditions under which these challenges took place in different parts of Europe? What type of military occupation during and after the Second World War created which conditions for a critique of capitalism and capitalist economic elites? To what extent did the issue of collaboration feature prominently in demands to change

on States and Social Movements (Mineapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), pp. 14–35.

[28] Donatella della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence and the State: a Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

[29] For Germany, Dieter Rucht has attempted to differentiate different waves of social movement mobilisation; See Dieter Rucht, 'Zum Wandel politischen Protests in der Bundesrepublik: Verbreiterung, Professionalisierung, Trivialisierung', in *Vorgänge* 4:3 (2003), pp. 4–11; whether or not his framework can be generalised for Western Europe as a whole is something that needs to be tested further by comparative research.

fundamentally the economic system and its elites? How did the division into perpetrators, victims and bystanders structure the discourse about economic reorganisation? What about countries that had been defeated in the war, countries that had emerged victorious and countries that had officially stayed neutral?

At the end of the Second World War, traditional power structures had been broken in many countries. For a brief moment a power vacuum reigned into which social movements could step to develop their programs for economic and political renewal. How successful were their attempts to do this? What counterforces did they have to contend with? What role did the victorious Allies play in this process? How did armed resistance movements, active during the Second World War, influence the demands for restructuring the economy? Neutral countries, such as Sweden, experienced the end of the war differently from those countries participating in the war. No major power vacuum occurred here and the continuity of institutions, personnel and ideology was overwhelming.

It is also intriguing to take a look at those countries which became communist after 1945: to what extent did the Soviet influence override national traditions? Wherever the Red Army stood, social movements could not act independently of Soviet tutelage. Yet, did it matter whether anti-capitalist movements had genuinely popular support or if they were simply puppets of the Soviet occupation regime without any roots in national politics? What about integral parts of the Soviet Union, like the Ukraine, that had been occupied by the German army? What impact did the restructuring of the economic sphere have after the Germans had left?

The subsequent chapters will also ask to what extent different, even conflicting, developments occurred in the same country, either at the same time or during particular phases of development in the post-war period. To what extent were different social movements responsible for creating different scenarios with widely diverging ideas about what should happen in terms of economic restructuring? What kind of reconstruction of the nation can we observe at the end of the Second World War? Who were the key actors? What long-term trajectories were having what impact on developments? After all, the widespread perception of the need for a thorough reconstruction were not just related to the immediate crisis of the post-Second World War world, but often they went back to the end of the First World War and the interwar period. Yet anti-fascism and the anti-fascist resistance had heightened the perceived need for change. At the same time

as we witness massive demands for change, we also see a strong desire to stabilise the post-war situation in the midst of unprecedented upheaval.

Many of the following chapters focus on continuities and discontinuities between the old pre-war labour movements and the anti-capitalist movements emerging in and after 1945. In post-war Europe the split in the labour movement that occurred in the aftermath of the successful Bolshevik revolution of 1917 had prevented a united front of Social Democracy and Communism even in the face of the fascist threat. The anti-capitalist movements of the post-war years focused to different degrees on democratising the economic sphere and abolishing capitalism. How did these two demands sit with each other in different post-war nation states? How did the pre-war strength of Social Democracy and Communism respectively impact on those post-war debates ideologically and in terms of practical policy outcomes? What alliances were built in the post-war years between the different political groups seeking reconstruction? To what extent did the rift between Social Democracy and Communism reignite again over the question of the removal of economic elites?

This volume does not only take into account social movements. It also examines the industrial and economic elites. Did it matter how important specific industrial centres were in any given society? To what extent did the pre-war positioning of economic elites vis-à-vis the labour movement influence their ability to fend off challenges from the anti-capitalist social movements in the post-war era? Did perhaps a more consensually oriented rather than a conflictual strategy of employers pay off at the end of the war through relatively weak challenges of social movements to the existing economic order?

Furthermore, the fascist regimes did not simply disappear without any trace following their military defeat. The chapters that follow will ask about continuities between fascist ideas and structures of economic organisation after 1945. In Germany, for example, the Weimar Republic in the interwar period already tinkered with practices of tripartite corporatism. In both Imperial Germany and National Socialism, more bipartite forms of corporatism (very different in themselves), largely excluding labour, were in place. How did these traditions of corporatism become actualised in the social partnership model developed after the war? If we take the example of Spain, here the right-wing authoritarian regime of Franco that was closely allied to the fascist countries successfully managed the transition to post-war and was allowed to join the Western democracies in their