



**CANADA AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

# **Justin Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy**

Edited by Norman Hillmer and Philippe Lagassé

**CANADA AMONG NATIONS 2017**



# Canada and International Affairs

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Norman Hillmer  
Philippe Lagassé  
Editors

# Justin Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy

Canada Among Nations 2017

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*For  
Maureen Molot  
and  
the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs  
on its 50th Anniversary*

## PREFACE

*Canada Among Nations* was first published in 1984, and it has seen the world turn many times since. Providing a scholarly description and analysis of developments and currents in Canadian foreign policy, the *Canada Among Nations* volumes have taken their place as the contemporary academic record of Canadians' approaches to the world. Our predecessors have published the research of emerging and established scholars, practitioners, and journalists, ensuring a variety of perspectives that have enriched the study of Canada's international policies. The 2017 edition, concentrating on the first two years of the Justin Trudeau government, is the first to be published with Palgrave Macmillan, as part of the newly established book series, *Canada and International Affairs*. *Canada Among Nations* will be its flagship publication.

Part of the *Canada Among Nations* tradition is a workshop, where editors and authors gather to exchange research and ideas. This year's meeting was hosted by the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History at the University of Toronto. We are grateful to Mr. Graham, Trinity College, and the Centre's John English, Jack Cunningham, and Jennifer Chylinski for their generous hospitality. Out of the workshop emerged a number of themes. First, and unavoidably, Canada is not alone in facing Donald Trump as president of the United States and the uncertainty that he breeds. Second, in both Canada and the United States, a yawning gulf is apparent between rhetoric and reality, and workshopers frequently found themselves comparing talk to action, or lack of action. Connected with that is a notable and frequent gap between political tactics and policy strategy; the former are apparent, the latter much less so, or not

at all. Third, members of the workshop frequently pointed to the centrality of politics high and low, not least in the Trudeau government's (often unsuccessful) desire to differentiate itself from the previous government's international policies. Fourth, we took note of the Canadian government's emphasis on gender equality and a feminist foreign policy. Last, but importantly, the workshop concluded with the sense that chapter writers should consider the challenges that lie ahead in their issue areas.

We thank Dane Rowlands, the director of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs when we undertook this project, and Yiagadeesen Samy, NPSIA's current director, for their steadfast support. Theresa Le Bane and Uriel Marantz carried out research and organizational work on our behalf. Joseph Le Bane prepared the manuscript as editorial coordinator, and he did a good deal more than that in rooting out errors and inconsistencies. Susan Whitney reviewed the manuscript and gave research and editorial advice to our and the authors' great benefit. David Carment, dynamic as always, was instrumental in making important arrangements with the publisher. At Palgrave, we have been assisted mightily by Senior Editor Anca Pusca, a team of peer reviewers, and Katelyn Zingg.

We dedicate this volume to Maureen Molot, esteemed friend and colleague, a former director of NPSIA, and often an author and editor in the *Canada Among Nations* series. We at the same time celebrate the 50th year of the Norman Paterson School.

Norman Hillmer  
Philippe Lagassé



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# ACRONYMS

ADS	Approved Destination Status
AI	Artificial Intelligence
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
BTB	Beyond the Border
CADSI	Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
CANSOFCOM	Canadian Special Operations Forces Command
CBC	Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CBSA	Canada Border Services Agency
CCC	Canadian Commercial Corporation
CCIC	Canadian Council for International Cooperation
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CERD	Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
CETA	Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (Canada-European Union)
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CO <sub>2</sub>	Carbon Dioxide
COP21	Conference of the Parties, Twenty-First Session
CPC	Conservative Party of Canada
CPLC	Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition
CPP	Carbon Pricing Panel

CSO	Civil Society Organization
DACA	Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
DND	Department of National Defence
DP	Displaced Person
ECCC	Environment and Climate Change Canada
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council (UN)
EFP	Enhanced Forward Presence
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
FPIC	Free, Prior, and Informed Consent
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
FTE	Full-Time Equivalent
G20	Group of Twenty
G7	Group of Seven
G8	Group of Eight
GAC	Global Affairs Canada
GAR	Government Assisted Refugees
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GBA	Gender-Based Analysis
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDLS	General Dynamics Land Systems of Canada
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
HFC	Hydrofluorocarbons
IAR	International Assistance Review
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
Industry 4.0	Fourth Industrial Revolution
IR	International Relations
IRCC	Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
IS	Islamic State
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISDS	Investor-State Dispute Settlement
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
LAV	Light-Armoured Vehicle
LCFS	Low Carbon Fuel Standards
LGBTQ	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Queer
LPC	Liberal Party of Canada
MP	Member of Parliament

NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NALS	North American Leaders Summit
NAP	National Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP	New Democratic Party
NFTC	NATO Flying Training in Canada
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
P5	Permanent Five
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
POW	Prisoner of War
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSR	Privately Sponsored Refugee
PSRP	Privately Sponsored Refugee Program
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RCC	Regulatory Cooperation Council
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SOF	Special Operation Forces
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UN	United Nations
UNDRIP	United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNPFII	United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
US	United States
WEOG	Western European and Other States
WPS	Women, Peace, Security
WPSN	Women, Peace and Security Network
WPSN-C	Women, Peace and Security Network-Canada
WTO	World Trade Organization



## CHAPTER 1

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# The Age of Trudeau and Trump

*Norman Hillmer and Philippe Lagassé*

Two elections lie at the heart of this book. Justin Trudeau’s Liberals won power in October 2015, and they entered office fully clothed in pledges to remake Canada and at the same time remake the country’s place among nations. During Trudeau’s first six weeks as prime minister, his widely publicized trips to meetings of the G20 in Turkey, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Manila, the Commonwealth prime ministers’ conference in Malta, and the COP21 climate talks in Paris furnished him with what one commentator called “a new, worldly, political shield” at home and a dashing image abroad.<sup>1</sup> Liberal internationalism was in the saddle and Trudeau its glamorous ambassador to the global community. On the eve of another election, when Donald Trump startled his way to the United States presidency in November 2016, the *Economist* magazine’s cover Canadianized the Statue of Liberty, which was pictured with a smile, a maple leaf hat, and a hockey stick. The accompanying editorial purred that Trudeau’s Canada was the exception to a depressing international company of “wall-builders, door-slammers and drawbridge-raisers.”<sup>2</sup>

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Trudeau was labelled the anti-Trump by the *Washington Post* and the German newspaper *Die Welt*<sup>3</sup> and almost universally elsewhere, but he acted with disciplined politeness when he turned his face towards the new American president. Trump too had his big promises, including a vow that American alliances and trade agreements would be scrutinized and repudiated if they did not meet his approval. Canadian interests, most prominently those tied up in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), were directly on the line. All Ottawa governments look southwards, but the prime minister and his ministers and officials now fanned out all over the United States to make the case that Canada was too important to the United States for the ties between the two countries to be allowed to deteriorate. It was as if the fate of Canadians depended on the successful wooing of Trump's America.<sup>4</sup>

Justin Trudeau's election triumph brought Prime Minister Stephen Harper's near-decade-long Conservative government to an end. The Trudeau victory was not preordained, and the suspicion was that his carload of promises were a luxury that only the leader of the third party in the House of Commons could afford, since it was unlikely that he would have to form a government that would have to implement them. In the first half of an unusually (for Canada) lengthy electoral campaign, the social democratic New Democratic Party (NDP) was thought to have a much better chance of displacing Harper, and for a while there appeared the possibility that the Conservatives might cling to power after all. During the closing weeks of the campaign, however, voters opposed to the Conservatives coalesced around the Trudeau Liberals. Although future studies of the 2015 election may offer a more nuanced explanation, the Liberals had apparently succeeded in convincing voters, including many who often did not participate in the democratic process, that Trudeau was best placed to oust the Conservatives. "Real Change," the overarching Liberal message aimed directly at the unpopular Harper, propelled the Liberals to a commanding 184 seats in the House of Commons, as against 99 for the Conservatives and only 44 for the NDP.

The Trudeau electoral platform was laced with progressive policy promises and not so subtle suggestions that a Trudeau government would dismantle Harper's legacy. The Liberals talked of renewing Canadian leadership in the world, notably by confronting climate change and reengaging with the United Nations and peacekeeping operations. A new government would implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), end the Canadian military's combat

mission in Iraq, welcome thousands of Syrian refugees, reinvest in development assistance to the “world’s poorest countries,” and reexamine Canada’s approach to international trade.<sup>5</sup> Harper had shunned the world, and Trudeau would counter his blinkered vision.

*Canada Among Nations 2017* is an assessment of Trudeau’s first two years of international policies. The book begins with three overview articles that revolve around the very high expectations that the prime minister fostered and with which he must now live. Roland Paris applauds Trudeau’s fierce defence of economic and security interests, vocal promotion of openness and inclusion, and skilful handling of the relationship with the United States. But in his potential, Paris warns, lurks the danger that Trudeau will fail to meet his own call for global leadership. Kim Richard Nossal does a tally of promises made and promises kept in a mid-term report card that gives passing marks to the government’s management of the politics and process of foreign policy. His conclusion is that the pledges of 2015 are not weighing the government down. Jerome Klassen and Yves Engler, on the other hand, deliver a scathing indictment of the prime minister’s leadership, which they argue raised unrealistic hopes for “socially-progressive and liberal values, worldwide.” Trudeau’s cheerleading for a transcendent politics, international and otherwise, is for them an illusion or, worse, a lie. Klassen and Engler claim that, as the globe plummets into disorder, the Trudeau government stubbornly maintains Canada’s allegiance to Washington, militarism, and the imperialism of corporate capitalism.

Creating distance from Stephen Harper was not as easy as it looked. Trudeau has undoubtedly shifted the rhetoric away from his predecessor’s combative insistence that international amity had to be subordinated to a righteous struggle against the evils of a dangerous world.<sup>6</sup> In foreign policy tone is not nothing, but continuity with the recent past defines a good deal of Trudeau international policy. “What a splendid job Justin Trudeau is doing in carrying out Stephen Harper’s foreign policy,” contended John Ibbitson, Harper’s biographer, in March 2017. Trudeau had promised his Canada would be “a caring country committed to doing its share, and he’s kept his word. Canada is indeed doing it share—the same share that it contributed under the Conservatives.”<sup>7</sup>

International trade was at the top of the Harper agenda, and it has remained there under Trudeau. The Liberal government embraced the Conservatives’ Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and looked towards a remodeled Trans-Pacific

Partnership (TPP), which struggled to survive without Trump, who dismissively walked away from it early in his presidency.<sup>8</sup> Trudeau's trade ministers have elaborated a progressive approach to trade, with an emphasis on environmental protections, worker rights, and an equitable sharing of the benefits of trade. Meredith Lilly's chapter stipulates, however, that those same progressive elements were already present in the CETA, TPP, and Canada-Korea Trade Agreement texts worked out by the previous government. Lilly also points out how difficult it is to humanize trade in negotiations with a protectionist Trump administration and a China that desires free trade without an overlay of Western values. It is hard to be a progressive without willing partners.

Indigenous voters rushed to Trudeau because he made an eloquent case that their causes were his. Speaking to the UN General Assembly in September 2017, the prime minister declared that Canada had been built on the ancestral land of Indigenous peoples, but without "the meaningful participation of those who were there first." Their experience had been "mostly one of humiliation, neglect, and abuse." Canada had campaigned and voted against the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Trudeau lamented, but his government was proudly on a path of reconciliation with First Nations, Métis nation, and Inuit peoples. The Declaration was its guiding light.<sup>9</sup>

Trudeau's good intentions are easier to express than apply, and, as in so much, his vocabulary about Indigenous peoples gives rise to hopes that are almost impossible to fulfil. Sheryl Lightfoot's analysis recognizes the ways in which Trudeau has woven the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples into his ambitions for global leadership, but at the same time makes abundantly clear the extraordinary complexities of Indigenous politics in Canada. Lightfoot is pessimistic, concluding that the government "is engaged in a difficult dance. It has promised to adopt and implement the UNDRIP, yet it is cognizant of the scope of structural changes to do so, and so it remains hesitant—even resistant—to making real change." The talk is remarkably different, but the substance "is quite consistent with the Harper government."

Jennifer Pedersen's chapter is another example of the difficulty in matching human rights aspirations with government practice. Her subject is Canada's lucrative arms export industry and, specifically, the sale of Canadian-made light-armoured vehicles (LAVs) to Saudi Arabia. The LAV deal, worth \$15 billion over 15 years and generating 3,000 jobs at the General Dynamics plant in Southwestern Ontario, was concluded by the

Conservatives in 2014. It became controversial for the Trudeau government in 2016, after the Saudis carried out a mass execution of 47 dissidents. The Liberals refused to turn away from their Conservative inheritance. They tied themselves in knots with implausible assertions that the contract could not be cancelled, simultaneously declaring that their hearts bled for the victims of Saudi violence, some of whom were on the wrong end of weapons made in Canada. NDP members of Parliament were themselves in a delicate position, since one of them held the House of Commons seat where the General Dynamics plant was housed. They chose to concentrate their fire on the Liberals' lack of transparency and oversight. The government meanwhile piled poor communication skills on top of its hypocrisy.

In the Liberals' more open door to China, surely a break with the recent past was evident. Where the Harperites had been wary, Trudeau was almost giddy, to the extent that one well-placed observer accused him and his colleagues of being "smitten with the dynamic, entrepreneurial and innovative China that dominates the business pages, while remaining largely silent about the China that tramples human rights at home and intimidates rivals abroad."<sup>10</sup> Trudeau visited China, as his father had done as prime minister. Ottawa set about exploring a Sino-Canadian free trade agreement, eased investment rules, and allowed the sale of a Canadian technology company to a Chinese firm that the Conservatives had blocked on national security grounds. For the Trudeau government, the benefits of building stronger ties with an economic colossus and Canada's second largest trading partner outweighed the risks. Those risks included alienating a public that is suspicious of getting too close to China, or letting the Chinese security state get too close to Canadians.<sup>11</sup>

Philip Calvert, whose Canadian foreign service career included three periods in Beijing, is not so sure that Trudeau's China policy is all that novel, apart from the obvious transformation of "styles of engagement." The claim to a principled foreign policy and a greater emphasis on North America to the detriment of Asia in the early Harper years did lead to a cooling of relations between the two countries. But Calvert explains that the thinking soon shifted, in part because of pressures from business. He details sustained increases in trade and investment, in education links, and in the flow of Chinese tourists to Canada in the Conservative decade after 2006. What was lacking, he regrets, was a balanced and comprehensive strategy. Calvert sees none of that under Trudeau either. He offers specific recommendations about the manner in which Canadian interests can be advanced through a multifaceted and comprehensive approach based on a

realistic understanding of China today and its expanding (and expansive) global presence.

When the Harper Conservatives deployed special operations forces to Iraq in August 2014 to train and assist local fighters in their battles against the Islamic State (IS), the Liberals supported the government's decision. However, when the Harper government opted to send CF-18 fighter aircraft to conduct strikes against the IS in October 2014, the Liberals resisted this overtly offensive element of the mission. Their opposition to the deployment continued throughout the following year and into the 2015 election campaign, when Trudeau was adamant that the aircraft would be withdrawn if he formed a government. While it took it several months to act on this promise, the government ultimately ended the CF-18 deployment to Iraq in 2016. At the same time, it increased the number of Canadian trainers. The Liberals continued to draw the fine distinction that the Conservatives had between a combat mission in which Canadian soldiers directly engage the adversary and a training and assistance endeavour that sees the special forces involved in firefights against the Islamic State when necessary for self-defence or in support of local allies. As Jeffrey Rice and Stéfanie von Hlatky argue in these pages, the current government puts the Iraq emphasis in a different place, yet the commitment to this undertaking and to the previous government's Latvian and Ukraine operations remains steadfast. Trudeau might appear, sometimes deliberately, the reluctant warrior and Stephen Harper the very opposite, but the similarities in military policy between their two governments are much more pronounced than the differences.

The replacement of the aged CF-18s was another area where the Liberals sought to separate themselves from the Conservatives during the 2015 election. Trudeau declared that his government would not acquire the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and that the replacement for the CF-18s would be chosen following an open competition. Once in power, Trudeau softened his stand against the F-35, but the government has since been focused on acquiring an interim fleet of fighters to complement the legacy CF-18s in the short term, while the contest to replace Canada's fighter aircraft is only slated to begin in 2019. The Liberals have adopted the Conservatives' caution regarding this most controversial of military procurements.

The government promises to invest more in the military than the Conservatives. Benefiting from a willingness to accept prolonged and deep budget deficits, the Liberals issued a defence policy statement, *Strong,*

*Secure, Engaged*, which outlined significant investments in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).<sup>12</sup> The policy aims to recapitalize the military within the next decade and to enhance the CAF's capabilities in the cyber and space domains. Skeptics noted that investments in the military will only ramp up following the next federal election, leaving them vulnerable to a change of policy or government. Early on in the Harper government, the military had also been given prominence, but substantial increases in defence spending did not materialize.

Rather than merely detailing what the Trudeau government has pledged to do in its defence policy document, Andrea Lane examines the gender politics that have characterized commentaries about the military, the Liberals, and the prime minister himself. Lane notes that the questioning of Trudeau's (and Liberals') masculinity has been a routine part of defence debates. She encourages a critical consideration of the manner in which Canadians speak about military affairs and of the veil of objectivity that covers the consensus position of the defence community. Lane finds in Trudeau's reputation as an anti-militarist an opportunity to be supportive enough of the military that he can be all things to all voters—"masculine and feminine, tough and tender, killing and caring." Like his father before him, Trudeau may end up spending far more on defence equipment and in the rebuilding of the military than the Conservatives. The Liberals might accomplish in deed what the Harper government only achieved in words.

Trudeau touted a revival of peacekeeping, and explicitly linked it to his announcement in March 2016 that Canada would seek election in 2020 to a nonpermanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).<sup>13</sup> This brought together two proud foreign policy practices from not-so-recent days: Canada had been a leading peacekeeping country until the early 2000s, and it had served on the UNSC in every decade from the 1940s to the 1990s. The Harper government had been indifferent to peacekeeping and to the United Nations, and it had failed in 2010 to secure a berth on the Security Council. There was no better way to prove that Canada was back in the world, the Liberals declared, than to return to a prominent role at the UN and earn the international respect thought to have been lost by the previous government.

Peacekeeping remains very popular with Canadians, three-quarters of whom (according to an Angus Reid poll) believe that Canada should focus on such missions rather than "combat preparedness."<sup>14</sup> The Opposition response is that modern peacekeeping often involves combat and that a

risky peacekeeping expedition is being contemplated for the sake of Trudeau's global ambitions. Yet the government found it difficult to identify an appropriate UN peace operation for the Canadian military. Two years into its mandate, the government was still considering options, and it was unclear when and where the armed forces would be sent on a UN peacekeeping operation.<sup>15</sup> Nor will Canada easily find its way to the UNSC when the time comes. Andrea Charron's assessment of Trudeau's bid (if he is still prime minister in 2020) for the Council is that competition will be very stiff and that Canada lacks some of the appeal it once had in the international community. The election might end in defeat, a humiliation not unlike Harper's ten years before.

Some of Trudeau's promises held more promise. The welcoming of more than 40,000 Syrians to Canada was a signal achievement. The Harper reaction to the Syrian refugee crisis had been stingy. His government had admitted only 2,300 refugees from the civil war by the time of the 2015 election. Trudeau said he would perform many times better and turned the project into a personal crusade and a governmental priority—good politics plus good feelings if it worked, as Julie F. Gilmour illustrates in her chapter, but disastrous if it didn't. Gilmour demonstrates how the government tapped into a longstanding Canadian practice of private refugee sponsorship. Canadians, some of them former refugees themselves, set up collectives, raised money, made sponsorship applications to the government, put pressure on it to do more and do it more quickly, and gave “the global media a case study in engaged citizenship.” In March of 2017, the *New York Times* published a front-page feature article one year after Canada had “embraced Syrian refugees like no other country.” It was Month 13, when the sponsors' support of the Syrians was by agreement coming to an end. The story sensitively caught the flood of emotions on both sides as the sponsors moved away from the refugees, and the Syrians moved tentatively into Canadian society, on their own now.<sup>16</sup>

The prime minister did not stop with his Syrian enterprise. The day after the Trump administration imposed a 90-day ban on travellers from selected Middle Eastern and African countries, Trudeau tweeted on 28 January 2017: “To those fleeing persecution, terror & war, Canadians will welcome you, regardless of your faith.” Asylum seekers poured illegally over the Canada-United States border, some 8,500 of them crossing into Quebec during the summer months of July and August. They would have to prove to the Immigration and Refugee Board, which had a backlog of more than 40,000 cases by late October, that they legitimately feared persecution and were not using the opportunity to find a better life than they

had in the United States. The adjudication process was painfully slow, and at least half of the claimants would be unsuccessful, but medical care, a monthly stipend, and a work permit were available while they waited for a decision. The prime minister spoke to the media and reworded his tweet, saying that there was “no advantage to irregular migration over regular migration.”<sup>17</sup>

The Trudeau government innovated with the adoption of a feminist international assistance policy. Pledging to empower women and girls in the developing world, the new policy is notably centred on gender equality, in contrast to the Conservatives’ focus on maternal health. However, the policy did not come with an increase in development assistance spending, which languished at 0.26 per cent of gross national income (GNI), distant from the UN objective of 0.7 that was being met by Germany, the United Kingdom, and Sweden.<sup>18</sup> Whether the shift in emphasis will compensate for a stagnant budget is uncertain. In their contribution to this volume, Rebecca Tiessen and Emma Swan see encouraging (but not definitive) progress towards a feminist foreign policy in the aid promise and other pledges to make gender equality crucial to the government’s human rights strategies. Tiessen and Swan argue that such efforts must be comprehensively pursued across all of government and underwritten by a feminist epistemological foundation. Without a deeper understanding of the power dynamics and varieties of oppression that surround gender, the goals of an avowedly feminist prime minister will fall short of achievement.

Advancing Canada as a champion in the battle against climate change was Trudeau’s most visible break with Harper foreign policy. The Conservatives held that Canada’s efforts against climate change had to be balanced against economic growth and the success of the country’s natural resource industry. Trudeau and his forceful environment minister, Catherine McKenna, confidently assert that this argument presents a false dichotomy. Economic prosperity and efforts to better the environment can be achieved simultaneously: the latter will promote the former. One of the first major international acts of the Trudeau government was the signature of the Paris climate accord. The government subsequently brought the document before the House of Commons for a symbolic vote, reaffirming its commitment to the agreement and compelling the Opposition to vote against it, another unsurprising illustration of the fact that Trudeau and his advisors, like their counterparts from the Harper era, craft domestic victories out of their international affairs.<sup>19</sup>



Debora Van Nijnatten's chapter establishes that the Trudeau government from the start embedded commitments to greenhouse gas emissions, clean technology promotion, and sustainable practices into foreign and domestic policies. Multilateralist overtures reached out to the United States president, to the American states, to Mexico, and to China. The first of these environmental initiatives worked well when Barack Obama had control, at least of his own administration, but the Trump shock put an end to progress. Van Nijnatten has Trudeau and McKenna grinding on regardless, hindered by the sheer complexity of the problem, domestic political pressures, competition for scarce government resources, and the amount of oxygen being consumed in coping with Trump's America. In October 2017, the federal commissioner of the environment and sustainable development circulated reports criticizing the government's stewardship of these files.<sup>20</sup>

Environmentalism has been a prime target of Trump populism. As president, he quickly jettisoned the Paris accord, leading the *Guardian* newspaper to depict a deflated globe held up only by a clothespin under the headline "How US became a rogue state."<sup>21</sup> In the Trump grip, the United States will effectively cease to support global efforts to curb climate change. While this will not stop Canada from pursuing its own efforts on that front, an American refusal to engage with other countries will limit the effectiveness of any agreements and possibly amplify the economic impact that climate change compacts have on Canada. In light of Trump's anticipated attacks on other environmental protections and regulations, the full impact of his presidency on the Canadian environment and Canada's global environmental policies is unknown, but troubling.

Trump's first months in power were characterized by a series of astounding statements, resignations, and firings, as well as a bewildering approach to international affairs. Combining a Jacksonian worldview<sup>22</sup> with the temperament of a New York mobster, Trump became the pariah of the international community. He antagonized and alienated allies and threatened nuclear war, all while being remarkably gentle towards Russia. As his behaviour grew increasingly erratic, the military men that served in his White House and Cabinet did what they could to contain the president's outbursts and return American foreign policy to familiar ground. Their success has been intermittent. It is impossible to believe that they would have wanted him to speak as he did in his menacing September 2017 address to the UN, in which he threatened the destruction of North Korea and the ending of the Iran nuclear agreement.<sup>23</sup>

Stephen Blank and Monica Gattinger begin their chapter on Canadian-American relations with the crushing uncertainties caused by a disorganized Trump presidency: “we are pretty much left peering into a cloudy crystal ball and interpreting continuing campaign rhetoric, leaks, and, of course, tweets.” They choose to look beyond Trump to broader bilateral and international trends, and in particular to the issues thrown up by profound demographic and social change, fundamental alterations in the energy and climate systems, and emerging technologies that are disrupting and transforming the domestic and global economies. In these arenas, all of which will have far more impact on the Canada-United States relationship than any president, Canada faces daunting challenges. Blank and Gattinger want much more attention paid to northern North America’s long-term prospects and to problem-solving that they advise be carried out with strategic foresight and long-term planning within a collaborative continental framework.

Among America’s traditional allies and partners, Canada has arguably positioned itself best to deal with the new administration. Considering the closeness between Trudeau’s prime minister’s office and President Barack Obama’s White House, this may seem surprising. But the underlying reality of the continental relationship is that the Canadian government devotes a vast amount of time and energy to understanding and managing its southern neighbour, even more so when Washington is troublesome. Although the Trudeau government would have preferred that Hillary Clinton win the presidency, and was caught off guard by Trump’s election (who was not?), the prime minister, his Cabinet, and his counsellors did what they could to retain Canadian influence in Washington and keep the mercurial president (relatively) civil towards Canada. Noting, for example, the heavy military presence in Trump’s White House, the Trudeau government named former Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie as parliamentary secretary to the minister of foreign affairs, with a focus on Canada-United States relations.<sup>24</sup> There were also reports that Trudeau’s principal secretary, Gerald Butts, had befriended Steve Bannon, who served as Trump’s chief strategist until his departure from the White House in August 2017.<sup>25</sup> In addition, the government worked assiduously to cultivate ties with American states and cities in an effort to reinforce the importance of the Canada-United States relationship outside of Washington.

President Trump has forced the renegotiation of the United States-Canada-Mexico NAFTA. He has always mixed his messages, but left no

doubt about his bias against trade pacts, which seemed to him (in the words of a *New York Times* reporter) occasions “for the United States to get mugged in a global marketplace in which countries are either pillaging or getting pillaged.”<sup>26</sup> In mid-October 2017, Trudeau met Trump at the White House. When the two talked to the media afterwards, the prime minister kept his composure when Trump repeated his threat to terminate NAFTA. A few miles away, in the fourth round of the NAFTA talks, the United States was putting on the table demands so impossible that they seemed to stun even the American negotiators. Mexico and Canada vowed to keep calm and carry on, and the talks were extended into 2018.<sup>27</sup> Trudeau and his team put their faith in American business, the Congress, and US states and cities, where they had made strong allies. Ottawa had no faith in the Trump administration, called by Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland the most protectionist US government since the 1930s.<sup>28</sup>

Trump warned America’s NATO allies that he expected them to meet their commitment to spend two per cent of GDP on defence. When the Liberals released their defence policy in 2017, there was speculation that the spending increases announced by the government were meant to appease the United States. Although the Liberals’ planned investments in the military will not meet the two per cent target, and while there are significant reasons to doubt whether the increases were intended to respond to Trump’s demands, Canadian efforts to placate the president may guard against cuts to the promised defence dollars.

Though not a direct effect of any of Trump’s actions or policies, brewing trade wars between Canada and the United States have complicated the Liberals’ defence plans. In late 2016, Minister of National Defence Harjit Sajjan announced that Canada would consider the acquisition of 18 Boeing Super Hornet fighter aircraft. Sajjan explained that these interim fighters were needed to allow the Royal Canadian Air Force to fulfil their North American and international obligations simultaneously, without any risk management. A few months later, Boeing accused Canadian aerospace darling Bombardier of receiving unfair subsidies. Since that time, the Trudeau government has declared that it will not conduct business with Boeing, jeopardizing Canada’s Super Hornet acquisition. Journalist Patrick Leblond wrote that, inspired by the president’s “America First” trade policies, Boeing’s moves against Bombardier reflect “Trumpism at its worst.”<sup>29</sup>

The American president could render the Liberals’ defence priorities still more complicated in the future. Contrary to his posturing during the

2016 election, Trump has increased America's international military commitments. In the summer of 2017, Trump announced an increase in the United States' efforts against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Although the details of his plan remain vague, Trump indicated that the United States would undertake more military operations in the country. To the relief of the Trudeau government, the president did not state that he expected allies to contribute forces or increase their presence in Afghanistan. No Canadian government would be keen to redeploy the military there after the CAF withdrawal in 2014. However, given the government's efforts to maintain a stable relationship with the president, Trudeau could feel compelled to answer Trump's call should it ever come.

According to media reports, the Liberals' delayed decision on a UN peacekeeping operation is partially tied to Trump's election.<sup>30</sup> After the American election, the reasoning goes, the Trudeau government felt that it needed to assess Trump's reaction to a Canadian peacekeeping deployment. The connection between the two is speculative, though it is possible that the Liberals did not want to risk a military mission that the United States would be unwilling to support. Trump's disdain for the United Nations could dampen Canada's campaign to obtain a seat on the Security Council as well. If the relationship with the president takes precedence over being seen as a champion of the UN, the Trudeau government could choose to play down or quietly abandon its hopes of securing a seat. There may also be no energy left in Ottawa to do anything but navigate the Trump turbulence. It is equally possible that the government will see a seat on the Council as a way of supporting the UN and the liberal international order during a disruptive Trump presidency. Truth be told, the president is unlikely to give much thought to Canada's Security Council ambitions.

Commentaries about contemporary politics are always perilous, but they become downright dangerous when the man in the White House is so unpredictable, so untethered by principle, so alienated from the system of which he is a part. As the first anniversary of Donald Trump's election to the presidency approaches, his approval ratings hover at record lows, scandal haunts his administration, Republicans in Congress war with him and themselves, and doubts accelerate about his fitness for the presidency. Yet no one can underestimate, or ignore, the Trump Effect. The Canadian government's foreign policy, for all Trudeau's sunny multilateralism, will largely succeed or fail in Washington. The Age of Trudeau is handcuffed to the Age of Trump.

## NOTES

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4. Taylor-Vaisey (2017, 20–24).
5. Liberal Party of Canada (2015a).
6. Hillmer (2016, 258–268).
7. Ibbitson (2017, A5).
8. Global Affairs Canada (2017), Campion-Smith (2017, A1, A18).
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18. Zilio (2017, A2).
19. Lagassé (2016).
20. Office of the Auditor General of Canada (2017).
21. Morrow (2017a, A6; b, A4).
22. Mead (2017).
23. Trump (2017).
24. Fife (2017).
25. Radwanski (2017).
26. Goodman (2017, B1, B3).
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28. CBC Radio *The Sunday Edition* (2017).
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