

Philosophers  
in  
Depth

**Ted Honderich  
on Consciousness,  
Determinism,  
and Humanity**

Edited by  
**Gregg D. Caruso**



# Philosophers in Depth

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Gregg D. Caruso  
Editor

Ted Honderich  
on Consciousness,  
Determinism,  
and Humanity

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# Preface

Ted Honderich is Grote Professor Emeritus of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic at University College London and a leading contemporary philosopher of mind, determinism and freedom, and morals. This collection assembles a world-class line-up of philosophers to provide the most comprehensive critical treatment of Honderich's philosophy, focusing on three major areas of his work: (1) Actualism, his theory of consciousness; (2) his extensive and ground-breaking work on determinism and freedom; and (3) his views on right and wrong, including his Principle of Humanity and his judgments on terrorism.

The collection begins with a comprehensive introduction written by Honderich. It provides a start-of-the-art summary of his current views and outlines his main thinking in the three areas. Fourteen original chapters separated into three sections follow the introduction. The first section addresses Honderich's work on consciousness—including his Actualism theory, his conception of the physical, and his approach to unconscious mentality. The second section explores Honderich's extensive contribution to the free will debate, including his views on determinism, freedoms, life-hopes, and punishment. The third section addresses various aspects of Honderich's Principle of Humanity and discusses a number of moral and political concepts, including distributive justice, the right to self-determination, the justification of violence, and terrorism. Each section

concludes with a set of remarks by Honderich, which address the contributions in that section and provide further insights into his views.

I would like to acknowledge that this collection is the result of an event at the Senate House, University of London, organized by the Royal Institute of Philosophy on February 9, 2016, celebrating the three independent parts of the philosophy of Ted Honderich. The event was presided over by Anthony O'Hear and James Garvey and the presenters included Noam Chomsky, Gregg Caruso, Tim Crane, Paul Gilbert, and Paul Snowden. At that event, I had the idea of putting together a collection containing pieces by various philosophers on Honderich's philosophy. Thanks to Palgrave Macmillan, and especially Constantine Sandis and April James, the project found a home in the *Philosophers in Depth Series*. This especially pleases me since Ted Honderich is the first living philosopher to be included in the series.

I would like to thank Ted Honderich, the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Constantine Sandis, April James, Brendan George, and all the contributors for making this book possible.

Enjoy!

Corning, NY

Gregg D. Caruso

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**Ted Honderich** is a British philosopher; Grote Professor Emeritus of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic, University College London; visiting professor at City University of New York Graduate Center, Yale; and so on. His work has been mainly about three things: consciousness and mind, including subjectivity, the mind-brain relation, and personal identity; determinism, its truth, and its consequences for freedoms and our human standing; and right and wrong, including his Principle of Humanity, its possible proof, and its bearing on democracy and terrorism. Other writings have been on the political tradition of Conservatism, supposed justifications of punishment by the state, and problems in logical analysis and metaphysics, including the nature of time, the definition of truth, and Russell's Theory of Descriptions. He has lectured in British, continental European, Irish, American, Canadian, Asian, Russian, and African universities. He is the author or editor of many books and also of a philosophical autobiography, *Philosopher: A Kind of Life*.

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**Paul Snowdon** read Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at University College, Oxford, followed by a B.Phil. there. In 1971, he was elected a Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at Exeter College, Oxford, and in 2001, he became the Grote Professor of Mind and Logic at University College London (UCL) (a post earlier occupied by Professor Honderich), from which he retired in 2014. He has written about the philosophy of mind, especially the philosophy of perception, metaphysics, and the history of philosophy. In 2014, his book *Persons, Animals, Ourselves* was published, which defends Animalism, and in 2016, he co-edited, with Professor Stephan Blatti, *Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity*. In 2018, he will bring out a book collecting his papers on perception entitled *Essays on Perceptual Experience*.

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# 1

## Introduction

Ted Honderich

### 1.1 Consciousness and Mind: Actualism

Actualism, if it is as much a workplace as a final theory of consciousness and mind, is indubitably also a long way from two main fairy tales still told or remembered.

One fairy tale is that consciousness is just physical—physical stuff or anyway a physical fact. A little more clearly, if not much, consciousness is objectively or scientifically physical. Is that more declaration or even declamation than explanation?

Anyway, it's said to be material stuff in your head, soggy grey matter as the philosopher Colin McGinn contemplated. Only *neural networks*, however wonderfully related within and between themselves or to other things. Somehow not different in kind from the stuff or kind of thing, the nature, of the chair under you, or that growing aspidistra plant in the pot over there, or the London bus that got you here.

---

T. Honderich (✉)  
University College London, London, UK



The second fairy tale is that consciousness is ghostly stuff, as in the old, old Greek philosophical theory of *mind-brain dualism*—Plato and all that. To use the term “mind-brain dualism” that way, incidentally, is to go on misusing it—for there being two things with one of them not physical at all and somewhere somehow floating above or around the other.

Or, to forget the ancient Greeks, and come right up to date with this dualism, consciousness is the entirely similar ghostly stuff, said to be “an abstract sort of thing,” in the *abstract functionalism* of very much twenty-first-century cognitive science, in what can also have the name of being *computerism* about consciousness.

It’s not good enough that abstract functionalism like the ancient dualism makes consciousness *different* from everything else, which it does and which any decent theory absolutely has to. It doesn’t help, either, by the way, that abstract functionalism is tied to and owes a lot to the more than uncertain proposition of what is called multiple or variable realizability or realization. That is, to the effect that *exactly and precisely* the same conscious thought or hope or whatever can go with *different* brain states. That’s why it’s not identical with any one of them. It’s a good step towards making the floating thought or hope unreal, of course. But we don’t have to go into that.

Abstract functionalism also seems to have among its various shortcomings another one, close enough in my mind to making it nonsensical. The somehow non-physical consciousness itself—however it is somehow tied to what is underneath it or what it’s said to be supervenient on—is itself what philosophers call *epiphenomenal*. That is to say that unlike what somehow just goes with it, it itself doesn’t cause anything. It never has any ordinary physical effects at all. Yours wasn’t in any way causal, and wasn’t in that way explanatory, with respect to where you are right now, which, you may willingly agree, in good American English, is nuts.

Maybe we do not have to wait for an Einstein of consciousness in order to try to do better than the two fairy tales. And we do not have to join a lot of pessimists in our setting out to solve the problem of consciousness right now. Is it really all that hard, by the way? The hardest problem of all?

Some say so. Maybe if they’re not fully acquainted with other problems in philosophy? Is it as hard as the problem of truth, of what the truth of a proposition is or comes to—maybe the roles in it of what is called correspondence to fact and coherence with other propositions? Is consciousness as hard as right and wrong? As hard as justifying inductive

reasoning from past to future? As hard as the nature of time—say the relation of the temporal properties of past, present, and future to the temporal relations of earlier than, simultaneous with, and after?

Anyway, with consciousness, there is something we can start with. This is not just a good idea, which some philosophers get one morning. Quite a few have got one about consciousness.

We can start with a rich *database* on consciousness in the primary ordinary sense, the main sense in a good dictionary. We can start with this admittedly figurative or metaphorical database, derivable from the language of philosophers, scientists, and others, including you: about 40 items. Owed to their holds on their own consciousnesses, and I trust to yours. Owed to remembering what it was to think something a moment ago, and so on. No stuff there about introspection, inner peering, which led to a lot of dubious psychology in the nineteenth century.

The database includes our taking being conscious in this sense as being *the having of something*, if not in the literal way you have ankles or money. It includes being conscious as something's *being right there*, its being *open*, its being *transparent in the sense of being clear straight-off*, its *not being deduced, inferred, constructed, or posited* from something else. Also its being *given*, its *somehow existing*, its being what issues in a lot of philosophical talk of *contents* or *objects*. The database includes something's being *present*, its *being presented*, its being *to* something, its being what McGinn speaks of as *vividly naked*, and so on.

The database, I say, of which I didn't make any of it up, does what none of five leading ideas of consciousness do—even if their owners contribute to the database. They are the five ideas about what are called qualia, something it's like to be a bat, subjectivity, intentionality or aboutness, and phenomenality, whatever it is. The database, that is, *adequately initially identifies* the subject of primary ordinary consciousness—makes sure that people around here seeming to be disagreeing about consciousness are really answering the same question, not talking past one another. There's a lot of that in both the past and present of philosophy and science about consciousness. It has a lot to do with disagreement and pessimism about consciousness.

The database, we can say, lets us sum up primary ordinary consciousness or anyway label it satisfactorily as being *something's being actual*. As its being *actual consciousness*.

This consciousness, by the way, is not all of *the mental* or *the mind*. It is not that greater stream than the one in William James's still-cited talk of a stream of consciousness, not the greater one that includes more than consciousness in our sense or any ordinary sense. The mental or the mind includes in it, say, standing or ongoing dispositions or capabilities that enable me right now to do what is different from them, *think* for a moment of my age or *have the feeling* that time is passing. And the mental or the mind includes an awful lot more in neuroscience and such related inquiries as linguistics.

The figurative or metaphorical database, with some significant help, including contemplation of various shortcomings of various existing theories of consciousness, and thus the assembling of a specific set of *criteria* for a good theory, sure leads somewhere—as in many different cases in the history of science itself, including hard science. The figurative database leads to an entirely *literal* theory, an account of the nature of something, saying what it is, what it comes to, or comes down to: the theory that is *Actualism*.

The whole theory, as you might expect, given the database, will consist in due course in very literal answers as to (1) *what* is actual and (2) what its being actual is.

More particularly, the theory in its first section is of *what* is actual in each of the three different sides of consciousness—perceptual, cognitive, and affective, which roughly means consciousness in seeing etc., consciousness that is thinking, and consciousness that is wanting or feeling or that latter two of those together. Actualism is therefore very unusual, as good as unique, in the philosophy of *consciousness in general*, complete theories of all of consciousness taken together. It is different in respecting the differences of those three sides, which you may and definitely should find reassuring. Seeing etc. really isn't like believing—or wanting etc.

The second answer in Actualism, as I say, is of course to what *being actual* is in the three cases, the three sides of consciousness, what the data comes to in that respect. Not all the same in all cases.

Of course, Actualism is *a* dualism in the sense that any sane theory of anything is. It makes a difference between consciousness and the rest of what there is. As you will be hearing, that isn't to say it puts consciousness *above* anything else, whatever facts there may be that call for or tempt us to such talk.

The database itself, at least most of the pieces of data, seems to have something to do with something's being *physical*—maybe or maybe not in the standard sense in science and philosophy, which is to say objectively or scientifically physical.

So too does physicality come up somehow with virtually all theories of consciousness in history. Starting with the denial of physicality in ancient dualism and continuing through a ruck of theories, including materialisms and naturalisms, say Dan Dennett's, that are to the effect instead that consciousness is somehow objectively or scientifically physical. Presumably, all the theoreticians weren't ninnies in that preoccupation.

Why not spend some real time getting really straight what being objectively physical is? Why not act with respect to the situation implied quite a while ago by the admirable paper by Tim Crane and Hugh Mellor, "There Is No Question of Physicalism"? It was so titled out of the conviction that no adequate conception of the physical was available, certainly none to be got by exclusive reliance on science.

Could it be that a second source of disagreement and pessimism and worse about the subject of consciousness in philosophy and science, a source in addition to no adequate initial clarification of a subject matter, has been no concentration on the separate question or questions of the physical?

Why not, without following any philosopher's or scientist's leap or flight to a generalization, just ask what characteristics the physical world has? Proceed pedestrianly, walk over the ground, work through a subject? Put together a checklist? Didn't Einstein plod in order eventually to do some leaping, by the way?

Anyway, here is a comparative table, a summary table, a table of physicalities in general. You can more or less satisfy yourself, I say, that this objective or scientific physicality has 16 characteristics. They are the ones in the left-hand column under the heading "Objective Physical World" in the table. An enlarged version to which we will come of this table of physicalities in general, incidentally, will include an additional column—this having been prompted if not suggested by Noam Chomsky's chapter in this book (Table 1.1).

I'd better say that putting the whole table in here is in a way putting the cart before the horse or letting the whole cat out of the bag. The table as a whole from the top heading down has all of it been a kind of

Table 1.1 Table of physicalities in general

PHYSICALITY			
SUBJECTIVE PHYSICALITY			
	OBJECTIVE PHYSICAL WORLD	SUBJECTIVE PHYSICAL WORLDS: Perceptual Consciousness	SUBJECTIVE PHYSICAL REPRESENTATIONS Cognitive and Affective Consciousness
	<i>ITS PHYSICALITY</i>	<i>THEIR PHYSICALITY</i>	<i>THEIR PHYSICALITY</i>
1	in the inventory of science	in the inventory of science	in the inventory of science
2	open to the scientific method	open to the scientific method	open to the scientific method
3	within space and time	within space and time	within space and time
4	in particular lawful connections	in particular lawful connections	in particular lawful connections
5	in categorial lawful connections	in categorial lawful connections, including those dependency-relations with (a) the objective physical world and (b) the conscious thing as neural	in categorial lawful connections, including those dependency-relations with (a) the objective physical world and (b) the conscious thing as neural.
6	a matter of ordinary world or macroworld or perception but microworld deduction	dependent subjective physical worlds <i>constitutive</i> of macroworld perception	not perceived, but dependent importantly on macroworld perception
7	more than one point of view with macroworld	more than one point of view with perception	no point of view at all
8	different from different points of view	different from different points of view	no differences from points of view
9	primary and secondary properties, whatever they are	primary and secondary properties despite (5b) above?	no primary and secondary properties at all
	<i>ITS OBJECTIVITY</i>	<i>THEIR SUBJECTIVITY</i>	<i>THEIR SUBJECTIVITY</i>
10	somehow separate from consciousness	not somehow separate from consciousness	not separate from consciousness
11	public	private	private
12	common access	some privileged access	some privileged access
13	truth and logic, more subject to?	truth and logic, less subject to?	truth and logic, still less subject to?
14	open to the scientific method	open to the scientific method despite doubt	open to the scientific method, despite doubt
15	includes no traditional self or unity or other such inner fact of subjectivity inconsistent with any of the above properties of the objective physical world	each subjective physical world is one element in an individuality that is a unique and large unity of lawful and conceptual dependencies including the above dependency-relations of subjective physicality	each representation is one element in the individuality that is a unique and large unity of lawful and conceptual dependencies including the above dependency relations of subjective physicality
16	hesitation about whether this objective physicality includes consciousness	no significant hesitation about taking the above subjective physicality as being that of actual perceptual consciousness	no significant hesitation about taking this subjective physicality as being the nature of actual cognitive and affective consciousness

summary of the Actualism theory of consciousness as a whole—to which we're on the way. But so what? This isn't a detective story or murder mystery. Our use of the table right now is just for its column summing up of what objective or scientific physicality comes to.

Can that understanding of objective physicality somehow lead us to an answer or rather answers to what ordinary consciousness in its three sides comes to? Maybe different answers with perceptual consciousness as against cognitive and affective consciousness, and somewhat different answers with the last two?

But think now about the database that preceded the table and that first question of *what* is actual with a part or side of consciousness, perceptual consciousness in particular. What is actual right now with your own perceptual consciousness? I give you the answer free. You'd give it to me if you were asked. It's the place you're in, probably *a room*. A room out there. No other answer is possible. No other kind of answer.

And what is it for a room to be actual? I suppose the response that will come to you is that the data in the database at least in good part must bring to mind the idea that things being actual is their being *physical*.

Objectively physical? Not if you spend time thinking, walking around here too. The response has to be that a room's being actual is that it has characteristics related to but different from the characteristics of the objective physical world. A room's being actual is that it is having the run of 16 characteristics in the middle column of the table.

The most fundamental or crucial characteristic, you may say, is indeed number 5—that a room's actuality consists in its existing dependently on two dependencies—its existence depending on the objective physical world and also on the perceiver neurally. But all of the 16 characteristics are important for the understanding of perceptual consciousness, relevant to the question of its nature.

They're obviously related to the ones in the first column, those of the objective physical world, but different. They answer the question of what it is for a room to be actual. It's for it to be, as there are reasons of likeness and difference for summing it up, *subjectively physical*.

So in perceptual consciousness, consciousness in perceiving against the consciousness that is thinking and wanting and so on—*what* is actual is

indeed *subjective physical worlds* out there. Or rather, more carefully, stages of them, often stages of rooms. These worlds and their stages, if your intellectual personality of realism and down-to-earthness are already kicking in suspiciously—yes, these are myriad in number, and mostly fleeting. But, I answer, no more than piles of objective things in science.

Now cognitive and affective consciousness, and the first question there. *What* is actual in the variety of cases of thinking, wanting, and so on is certainly different. What is actual are representations or aboutnesses or signs or images or the like *of* other things, the things we say they *stand for* or *mean* or the like. More particularly, what's actual with cognitive and affective consciousness is representations-with-attitude, taking something as somehow true or somehow good. These representations are definitely not out there in the world, whatever is the case with what they're of.

And to think about the representations of cognitive and affective consciousness—and to ask about *their* actuality, what their being actual is—is to see of course that it is in fact a matter of characteristics also related to those of the objective physical world and related differently to the characteristics of the subjective physical worlds of perceptual consciousness.

All that about perceptual and then cognitive and affective consciousness has been pretty fast progress. But you may also agree that we have at least the guts of an answer or rather answers to what consciousness comes to, what the three sides of consciousness come to. From the metaphorical or figurative table, we've got to a literal understanding of consciousness.

Something else hardly needs adding: (1) objective physical things, (2) subjective physical worlds, and (3) subjective physical representations, the latter two being subjective physicality, make the great category that is simply that of *physicality*—the genus physicality in general. This is the fact, or these are the facts, and nothing else is, that have led inevitably to concern with physicality in connection with consciousness.

Of course, all that you've heard can do with more distinguishing and noting of questions arising and also objections—more than can be contemplated here.

First is perceptual consciousness. Yes, it does indeed consist most fundamentally in characteristic 5: worlds existing out there in the two dependent ways, worlds being dependent in the two ways. Perceptual

consciousness doesn't consist in just the worlds out there themselves, as the good philosopher Crane has been too inclined to object with understandable incredulity.

As also can usefully be kept in mind, as we have, perceptual consciousness also consists in another sense in *stages* of the dependent worlds—just as we can also think and speak, by the way, of the objective physical world and stages in it.

Perceptual consciousness, again, does *not* consist at all in representations or aboutnesses or of-nesses of any kind whatever. No sense data, none of the philosopher-psychologist's mental paint. It does not consist in them, no matter what registration-without-representation, as we can call it, there may be of the objective physical world on a perceiver. Registration with effects on cognitive and affective consciousness. But skip that, along with some other complications.

That my perceptual consciousness now consists fundamentally in a room's dependent existence, you will agree, is happily consistent with the entirely pre-philosophical fact that we don't take rooms to be representations, to be things that literally are about things. They're not signs, not like the pictures on the wall. Just for a start, we don't always walk around in representations.

Our account of perceptual consciousness is a long way from an idea persistent in the history of the philosophy and science of perception, something you may have heard of. Maybe that idea does deserve the name that Freddie Ayer the Logical Positivist gave to it—*Naïve Realism*. Other good philosophers, like the definite but diplomatic Mike Martin, of both University College London and the University of California in Berkeley, and Heather Logue at the University of Leeds, now speak of Common-Sense Realism or Direct Realism and have at least sympathy with it.

What is it? That has not been clear to me—far from it. It seems to have been and to be to the vague effect that in our seeing there is some kind or other of *direct* connection with the objective physical thing seen. That is certainly *not* what we are contemplating; indeed, a lot lot less than what we are contemplating.

To come now to cognitive and affective consciousness, as against perceptual consciousness, they are in our view very different. That, by the



way, is very much in accord with all the other parts of the whole history of the philosophy and science of perceptual consciousness as against that of consciousness in general. A reassuring fact. Whether or not those people thought about it, there must have been a relevant big reason they took perceptual consciousness itself as different from cognitive and affective.

For us, cognitive and affective consciousness are indeed different, since they are representations with attitude in here—the two attitudes having to do, respectively, with truth and with good. Still, cognitive and affective consciousness can't be *just* or *only* such representations, of course. Say like other words or images or the like. They're different from just the printed words, lines of type on this page or screen, and so on, which definitely aren't conscious at all. They aren't conscious despite being perfectly good representations, say connected by rules with other things.

Cognitive and affective consciousness, rather, as you've heard, consist in *actual* representations, which is now to say representations that are subjectively physical. That is what is missing from all the useful industries on representation or intentionality in the philosophy of mind and maybe linguistics. The actuality of representations, as literally understood, itself distinguishes Actualism from the rest of the industry on representationism in the philosophy and science of mind, language, and so on.

Was the move OK from the sides of consciousness being actual, being according to the database, to the conclusion in the theory or systematic and full analysis that they are subjective physicality? Is that a leap of the sort mentioned earlier that other people have taken to what objective physicality is? I say no, we've worked our way there. I recommend that response to your consideration.

You'll agree there is none of ancient or contemporary ghostly stuff in the story. Or sense data, or that "mental paint," or the vagueness of "content" or "object." Or some damned thing first discernible in the Cambridge of G. E. Moore if you try hard—you're supposed to discern it while it still remains wholly *transparent*.

Our story doesn't have in it either a theatre of the mind with a spotlight or any other such thing. Let alone the more substantial idea of behaviourism—being conscious *is* behaving—from which Chomsky awakened several whole professions and their fans. And we're not going in for physical

functionalism on its own, a thing that's physical, not abstract, being effect and cause—which has more to say for it than abstract functionalism. We might get around to tolerating it as a possible further component in theory, secondary, maybe in our theory, but skip that.

Nor in our story of perceptual consciousness itself is there any vulnerability to the tired old objections from illusion and hallucination—the general lines where you can't tell the difference between seeing and really hallucinating and so there isn't something *real* in the seeing. The objections are thought to finish off Naive Realism's story of a direct relation with objective reality out there. They don't touch Actualism. Nor, by the way, in our story of perceptual consciousness itself, are there any representations so-called elsewhere in the wider category of the mental.

And thinking of objections, philosophers have said of some standard physicalist theories of consciousness that something could be conscious in the sense of the theories and still be what the philosophers call a *zombie*—something going around the place without being conscious at all, anyway in the ordinary sense. Well, I put it to you that something that is conscious in our explained sense is not likely to be taken as such a zombie by you or by anyone else with their head screwed on.

Nor either in Actualism is there the elusiveness of talk of phenomenality, which for the terminologically liberal Ned Block is somewhere or somehow in just thinking as well as seeing. Nor in Actualism is there anywhere any of the circularity of so much utterance on consciousness. Such as in the leading idea consisting in being conscious of what it's like to be something, courtesy of Tom Nagel and Timothy Sprigge. That, I put it to you, comes down to saying, consciousness is what it's like to be conscious.

Nor in Actualism is there any vestige of my own old Union Theory of interdependent effects, also known as psychoneural pairs. Or Donald Davidson's Anomalous Monism, seemingly to the wonderful effect, the news, that you need a lot of very original argument for the astonishingly true conclusion that there is no lawful connection, no such relation, between what only seem to be two things but are really just one. And nor is Actualism Galen Strawson's breathtaking revival of the aspectual theory of panpsychism. "Little minds in lettuce leaves?" as I used to ask the same Sussex panpsychist Sprigge.

And, to be up to date, our theory doesn't have in it entities of the worthy but all-inclusive, blanketing and flattening recent and previous contemporary universal externalisms about consciousness, making *all* of it somehow external—anyway so-named externalisms. It doesn't have in it meanings or individuations or actions or extended minds or whatever is found in *all* of perceptual, cognitive, and affective consciousness—properly unorthodox but to me very resistible theories of Hilary Putnam, Tyler Burge, Alva Noe, and Andy Clark. All worthy of attention, but not here.

And yes, we have in Actualism a solution to the mind-body problem, the problem of how consciousness is connected or related to brains or whatever. The problem of the relation between the neurons and the wondering or the dreaming and all that. That problem is just done for. The connection is just ordinary lawful connection which itself is no mystery, which itself can be made clear and unmysterious. That is, connection to which not too many others than my old pal and public combatant, and now pal enough again, McGinn, are superior to—say in speaking of it as just “brute correlation,” seemingly dismissing the mere truck of mere science.

Can you use a good summary of Actualism with respect to perceptual consciousness, an aphorism? Bishop Berkeley said of things out there that for them to be is for them to be perceived—really an inner fact. We say that being perceptually conscious is for something out there in a way to be, an outer fact.

Of course, there are questions about Actualism. Say Chomsky's implied and unsettling question about whether we can have an adequate conception of the physical at all despite science not having really and truly provided an effective one since about as far back as Newton. And, I guess, there is a question on my bringing together science and the rest of our knowledge in that table, including philosophical. Look through the table again. And, of course, there are questions about the relation of consciousness to the rest of the mental—thus, the relation of Actualism to *mentalism* in a very general sense, the running together of the conscious mental and the unconscious mental—or *mentalism* in Chomsky's particular sense.

Maybe a further question is about *where* consciousness is, despite the plain and fundamental, if not further examined, answer we have. Mediaeval philosophers spent a lot of time on where states of affairs or properties of things are, as against the things themselves.

There is no question, I am sure, of whether the story of Actualism about perceptual consciousness somehow reduces to intentionality or aboutness—although I have sensed that question near to the lips of a listener or two. There is the question, of course, not of how well Actualism defeats the fortress of intentionality or aboutness as the nature of all consciousness, a fortress standing since the mediaevals and then since Brentano in the nineteenth century, and newly fortified by Tim Crane.

You've heard enough about that, but there's the additional thought here that well before, indeed always before, we ourselves got to the database and any theory of consciousness whatever, we all knew that perceptual consciousness is different from cognitive and affective—that consciousness in seeing the room is different in kind from thinking of the room on the way up the stairs, having a thought of it, or anywhere wanting to change it or keep it the same.

And is Actualism the very nerve or strength of Searle's lovely and celebrated Chinese Room argument against computerism about consciousness? About the man who gets translations right without understanding Chinese? Could be. I hope so. Reflected glory for us?

And there's still the question regularly avoided about what aboutness is, what it really comes down to. Maybe about how a representation "carries the mind" to something or does whatever makes those few words sound right. Maybe the magic and mystery about all of that reduces a lot when you think of the episode of naming a child and then beginning to use the name. The representing is a case of just remembering a decision or resolution and making use of it? So representing is not simple but not so elusive either? Only about as hard as remembering?

And, finally, the question of whether ordinary consciousness, consciousness in the primary ordinary sense, *actual consciousness*, is the right subject of consciousness? Well, clearly there isn't just one right subject. But ours is *the* necessary one. All others depend on the primary ordinary sense. So they depend on a hold on actual consciousness. The very definition of general mentalism including consciousness, but with the rest of the mental identified by way of the consciousness, depends on it.

And really finally, is Actualism a fertile theory, even pregnant? Good for philosophy and also science? Sure is, as you know already.

## 1.2 Determinism/Explanationism and Freedom

An old and doubted, and indeed sometimes condescended-to, story I put to you is just true. That's the start and basis of what I have to say here.

All spatio-temporal *events* or *happenings* or *states* or *properties of things* or *things themselves*, of whatever extent or duration without exception, as distinct from anything else, of course, that isn't an event, are *effects or lawful correlates*. That is to say, each has a fundamental *explanation*. It has what may be used to be called a sufficient condition as against necessary conditions. A causal or other lawful circumstance, in the case of the first, is a set of conditions including one usually called the cause.

That is, to be clearer, each event in a very general sense is this: such that if or given a particular causal or other lawful circumstance or set of conditions, whatever else were also happening, the event would still have occurred.

That kind of conditional or "if-then" statement is true of all events as distinct from a lot of other things, including merely logically, conceptually, linguistically, mathematically, or theoretically connected items or stages, say "2+3" and "5," and maybe bits of Quantum Theory. It was a pretty dumb determinist, if there ever was one, who included numbers himself, say 5, as distinct from inscriptions of it, in his effects. Or propositions, where those are different from any expression of them, say any particular sentence or utterance.

Causation and lawful connection in sum is no mystery or problem. It is as plain as that strong or whatever-else conditional statement. Causation includes no "natural necessity" if that is something more than conditional connection as defined. And causation and lawful connection include no metaphysics—say in the usual vague sense of the word or in terms of Freddie Ayer's Logical Positivism.

His Verification Principle of meaning, in fact a principle misnamed since it is about what is true or false rather than about meaning generally, rather than about anything in language that has meaning, is a principle both over-estimated and under-estimated by him. In fact in my own idea it is open to be taken as an empirical generalization from what good science, philosophy, and so on does—what it regards in fact as having a truth value.

Since it is that, by the way, it escapes the hopeful thought that it applies to itself and thus makes itself neither true nor false.

Explanationism, as I myself now am more inclined to call it, in order to avoid the misleading heavy connotations of “determinism,” shared with “fatalism,” fate, predestination, iron necessity, and all that—explanationism is at least a reasonable assumption, in fact the gravamen of naturalism and empiricism, those general facts of almost all science and of good philosophy.

Explanationism is at least reasonable despite our supposedly revealing personal “I could-have-done-otherwise” experiences after having decided or acted—testimony relied on even by otherwise rationally down-to-earth philosophers like Searle. To my mind, he depends very insecurely on these bits of autobiography—as well as on his very own not only earlier-later causation but also up-down causation.

Like others, he is also impressed by wonderful philosophical and metaphysical rather than really scientific interpretations of the mathematics of Quantum Theory. The interpretations, rightly spoken of as weird, and so on, by their own proponents and by approving reporters, are to me, I admit, about as hopeless as Schrodinger’s cat. That aid to understanding of Quantum Theory, you may remember that famous thought-experiment, is to the effect that the cat in a box is both alive and dead until it is observed by somebody.

Also in favour of explanationism, I remind you of the absence of real chance in roulette wheels and of the absence of levitating spoons at breakfast and the absence of any such indubitable wonders in machines and what-not, including all the rest of science outside of Quantum Theory and so on. Thinking of the rest of science, indeed the rest of physics, say engineering informed by it, why don’t we occasionally discover that bridges fell down really for no reason at all?

And another connected thought. It is necessary, if we turn to the brain or whatever, to suppose either that there isn’t indeterminism down below in the microworld rather than the ordinary macroworld or that if there is, then it doesn’t translate upward or sideways to where it would count, say the level of neurons.

And, it occurs to me to add, explanationism is about a thousand sea miles or couches from Freud and psychoanalysis and other mysteries and mysterianisms and spiritualisms and confidence jobs.