

NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES

Series Editor: George Christou



The European Neutrals and NATO

Non-alignment, Partnership, Membership?

Edited by Andrew Cottey



New Security Challenges

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The last decade has demonstrated that threats to security vary greatly in their causes and manifestations and that they invite interest and demand responses from the social sciences, civil society, and a very broad policy community. In the past, the avoidance of war was the primary objective, but with the end of the Cold War the retention of military defence as the centrepiece of international security agenda became untenable. There has been, therefore, a significant shift in emphasis away from traditional approaches to security to a new agenda that talks of the softer side of security, in terms of human security, economic security, and environmental security. The topical New Security Challenges series reflects this pressing political and research agenda.

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Andrew Cottey
Editor

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September 2017

Andrew Cottey

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
BI	Building Integrity
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSBMs	Confidence and Security-Building Measures
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DEEPs	Defence Education Enhancement Programmes
EADRCC	Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC	European Community
EDA	European Defence Agency
EfR	Education and Training for Defence Reform
EOP	Enhanced Opportunities Partnership
EU	European Union
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
ICI	Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
IFOR	Implementation Force
IPAP	Individual Partnership Action Plan
IPCP	Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MAP	Membership Action Plan
MD	Mediterranean Dialogue
MTEP	Military Training and Exercise Programme
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRC	NATO-Russia Council
NRF	NATO Response Force
NUC	NATO-Ukraine Commission
OCC	Operational Capabilities Concept
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAP-DIB	Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building
PAP-T	Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism
PARP	Planning and Review Process
PCSC	Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PII	Partnership Interoperability Initiative
PJC	Permanent Joint Council
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
TEEP	Training and Education Enhancement Programme
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
WEF-5	Western European Partners - 5
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction

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Introduction: The European Neutral States

Andrew Cottey

The European neutral countries—of which Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland are the most prominent cases—are a distinctive group in European international politics. During the Cold War, most European states were members of one of the two military alliances which emerged in the context of the East-West division of the continent, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has expanded its membership to include most of the Central and Eastern European states stretching from the Baltic region in the north to the Black Sea in the south, reinforcing the idea of NATO membership as the norm for most European democracies.

The status of Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland as long-established European democracies but outside NATO is thus unusual in the larger context of European international politics. In the late 1980s and 1990s the winding down of the Cold War raised questions about the meaning and continued relevance of neutrality: to the extent that neutrality had been about being neutral in the context of the East-West conflict, did neutrality make sense or have utility in a world moving beyond that conflict? In the early 1990s Austria, Finland and Sweden decided to join what was about to become the European Union (EU), a process completed when

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they formally became EU members in January 1995 (Ireland had joined the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, whereas Switzerland remains outside the EU). Austria, Finland and Sweden's accession to the EU was an important turning point in these countries' foreign policies, reflecting their moving beyond the Cold War and joining the mainstream of Western European international politics. This was particularly the case for Austria and Finland—although also true for Sweden—because guarantees given to the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War had precluded them from joining the EU's predecessors. Austria, Finland and Sweden's accession to the EU, further, coincided with the Union's development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the early 1990s, followed by a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the 2000s. As EU members Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden have all actively participated in both the CFSP and the CSDP and argued that involvement in the CFSP and CSDP is compatible with policies of neutrality. The end of the Cold War, membership of the EU and participation in the CFSP and CSDP nonetheless involved some re-calibration of these states' policies of neutrality. To varying degrees Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden have redefined their national neutrality policies, with governments and officials often instead using terms such as military neutrality, military non-alignment or simply non-membership of military alliances. Switzerland, remaining outside the EU, has maintained a stricter or narrower interpretation of neutrality, although it too has modified its policies, in particular by joining the United Nations in 1992 and beginning to contribute to peacekeeping and conflict management operations (albeit within certain limits). All five states, however, have clearly maintained their neutrality in the sense of remaining outside military alliances and, in particular, NATO (as the only such alliance that they might realistically join). Although the maintenance of neutrality has in large part been an example of policy continuity on the basis of long-standing policies of neutrality, it has nonetheless also been an active political choice. The end of the Cold War and NATO's enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe put the issue of NATO membership on the political agenda in a way that was not the case during the Cold War. The European neutral states could have opted to pursue NATO membership but have (so far) chosen not to do so, even if that choice has been one of quiet continuity rather than prominent debate.

The end of the Cold War also triggered changes within NATO, in particular the development of partnerships with states outside the Alliance, which have resulted in what may be viewed as a quiet revolution in relations

between the European neutral states and NATO and are the focus of this book. Historically, non-membership of military alliances has been the defining element of policies of peacetime neutrality. Since engaging with an alliance, even short of joining it, might be viewed as an infringement of neutrality, neutral states have largely not sought cooperation with alliances (although to varying degrees, the five countries which are the focus of this book also ‘leaned West’ during the Second World War and the Cold War). During the Cold War, NATO’s own focus was centrally on defence and deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the Alliance therefore had no policies or institutions for partnerships with non-members. As is explored in the chapters on Sweden and Switzerland in this book, these two countries did have elements of undeclared cooperation with NATO, but these were the exception to the more general pattern of a non-relationship between NATO and the European neutral states. Beginning with the Harmel report in 1967, however, NATO began a policy of engagement with the Soviet bloc countries. This grew into a political dialogue and military confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in the 1970s and 1980s, which also included the European neutral states in the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe or OSCE). When the Cold War ended, this policy was transformed into one of partnerships with non-members. Initially targeted at the post-communist Central and Eastern European states, the Partnership for Peace (PfP), as the new programme was called, was also opened to the European neutral states. In the 1990s and 2000s, NATO also established partnerships with the southern Mediterranean states, some Middle Eastern states and a group of ‘global partners’, as well as other international organisations, in particular the UN, the EU, the OSCE and the African Union. Today, NATO defines ‘cooperative security’—of which its partnerships are the central element—as one of its three core missions, alongside defence of its member states and crisis management beyond its borders (NATO 2010). Additionally, from the early 1990s, NATO began to play an important role in peacekeeping and crisis management—in particular in the Yugoslav conflict in the 1990s and then in Afghanistan in the 2000s—and this became an important focus of cooperation between NATO and its partners. The five European neutral states have all become active partners of NATO since the 1990s, now engaging in a range of political dialogue, military cooperation and shared initiatives with the Alliance, as well as contributing to NATO’s peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. This book explores this

new relationship between the European neutral states and NATO, seeking to understand the dynamics behind the relationship, the nature and limits of cooperation between these states and NATO, and the significance of the relationship for both the European neutral states and NATO. Additionally, although all five countries have chosen to maintain their long-standing policies of neutrality, the issue of possible NATO membership remains. As the country chapters in this book indicate, in the Austrian, Irish and Swiss cases NATO membership is simply a domestic political impossibility. In the Finnish and Swedish cases, however, there is ongoing debate on NATO membership—a debate intensified by the wars in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014–15 and growing concern about a renewed ‘Russian threat’. This book therefore also explores the circumstances in which Finland and/or Sweden might join NATO and the factors shaping debate on this issue. The rest of this introduction examines which European states may be viewed as neutral, reviews existing academic literature on the foreign and security policies of the European neutral states and situates the analysis of the European neutral states’ relations with NATO in the wider fields of international relations theory and foreign policy analysis.

WHO ARE THE EUROPEAN NEUTRAL STATES?

Before reviewing existing academic literature in the area, the issue of which European states are neutral should be addressed. Historically, quite a wide range of European states adopted policies of neutrality in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, in particular in the context of the two World Wars. Many of these states, however, abandoned these policies in the wake of invasion in one or both of the two World Wars or in the context of the Cold War. Sweden and Switzerland are the longest-standing European neutral countries, having formally established policies of neutrality towards the end of the Napoleonic wars in the early nineteenth century (although a Swiss policy of avoiding being drawn into wars involving neighbouring states can be traced back even further to the sixteenth century). Both countries have maintained policies of neutrality ever since. Ireland established a policy of neutrality at the beginning of the Second World War, and has likewise maintained that policy since then. Finland and Austria became neutral in the context of the Cold War, in Finland’s case via a bilateral treaty agreed with the Soviet Union in 1948 and in Austria’s case in 1955 in the framework of US-Soviet-British-French negotiations on the

future of Germany and Austria. Communist Yugoslavia also adopted a policy of neutrality after it split with the Soviet Union in 1948. These six states—Sweden, Switzerland, Ireland, Finland, Austria and Yugoslavia—were generally recognised as neutral states in the European Cold War context and over time came to be viewed as a distinctive group. This sense of their being a distinctive European neutral group was reinforced by their shared support for and cooperation in the CSCE from the 1960s to the 1980s (Fischer 2009). Ireland's accession to the EEC in 1973 led to some questioning of whether the country could remain neutral and Ireland did not participate in the neutral cooperation in the CSCE because EEC states were themselves coordinating policy towards the CSCE. Irish governments, however, argued that EEC and later European Community and EU membership was compatible with neutrality and Ireland was generally also recognised as a neutral state.

A number of other small and micro-sized Western European states have adopted policies of neutrality or may be viewed as neutral in the sense that they remain outside NATO. Cyprus (i.e., the Greek Republic of Cyprus on the southern half of the divided island) and Malta both have declared policies of neutrality. Andorra, the Holy See (Vatican City), Liechtenstein and San Marino are micro-states that have membership of the OSCE but are outside NATO. Of these states, only Malta participates in NATO's PfP, but its small size makes it less significant than the five states which are the focus of this book. In Cyprus's case, the division of the island and Turkey's refusal to recognise the Republic of Cyprus—Turkey being an important NATO member—have precluded Cypriot participation in PfP. None of the micro-states participate in PfP.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism led to debate about the possibility of Central and Eastern European states becoming neutral or even the establishment of a belt of neutral states between Western Europe/NATO and the Soviet Union/Russia. The majority of Central and Eastern European states, however, sought full integration with the West, including membership of NATO. For these states, in contrast to the Western European neutral states, partnership with NATO was viewed essentially as part of the path to full membership of the Alliance—a goal most of these states achieved in the late 1990s and 2000s, as NATO expanded into Central and Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, a number of post-communist states have sought, at varying points, to maintain policies of neutrality. As Yugoslavia disintegrated amongst bitter wars in the 1990s, the former country's

neutrality was an irrelevance. Serbia, however, as the main successor to Yugoslavia and wary of NATO given the Alliance's interventions in the Yugoslav conflict (in particular its airstrikes against Serbia during the 1999 Kosovo war), has adopted a policy of neutrality. Nonetheless, Serbia joined PfP in 2006 and has since then established quite substantial cooperation with NATO. In the former Soviet Union, a number of post-communist states have also, at various points since the break-up of the Soviet Union, pursued policies of neutrality. The most clear-cut case has been Turkmenistan which has formally pursued a policy of neutrality since the early 1990s (Anceschi 2009). Other former Soviet states, in particular Ukraine and Moldova, have at various points and with varying degrees of commitment and/or ambiguity, adopted policies of neutrality or non-alignment. In both Ukraine and Moldova, however, neutrality and the alternative of pursuing NATO membership have been politically divisive issues: political forces closer to Russia (or at least wishing not to antagonise Russia) have generally supported neutrality, while Western-oriented political groups have been wary that neutrality might condemn their countries to coming under a permanent Russian sphere of influence and/or exclude them from deeper integration with the West. All of the former Soviet countries joined PfP in the 1990s and some, in particular Georgia and Ukraine, have established substantial cooperation with the Alliance. The former Soviet states' partnerships with NATO, further, are centrally intertwined with the larger geostrategic context of Russo-Western relations and, in particular, the debate over NATO enlargement. Although Finland and Sweden's relationships with NATO are also significantly shaped by this Russo-Western dynamic, the overall relationship between the Western European neutral states and NATO is very different from that between the former Soviet states and NATO.

In summary, while a larger number of European states have sometimes claimed to pursue policies of neutrality or may in some sense be viewed as neutral, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland form a distinctive group, in particular on the basis of having long-established and fairly clear-cut policies of neutrality dating back at least to the early Cold War and in some cases earlier. Since the Cold War ended in 1989–90, all five states have maintained their long-standing policies of neutrality but have adapted their foreign and security policies to the new, post-Cold War political and geostrategic environment, including by joining NATO's PfP; it hence makes sense to examine these countries, and their relations with NATO, as a distinct group.

THE EUROPEAN NEUTRALS: EXISTING ACADEMIC DEBATES

There are relatively few general academic books on neutrality (primarily Karsh 1988 and Leonhard 1988).¹ These works have sought to discuss the nature of neutrality as a form of foreign policy behaviour, noting the range of circumstances that may lead states to adopt policies of neutrality (or have neutrality imposed upon them), the different ways in which states seek to maintain or reinforce policies of neutrality (such as the extent to which states seek to maintain strong armed forces to defend their neutrality—as in the concept of ‘armed neutrality’) and the particular contributions which neutral states have sought to make to international security (e.g., in the areas of mediation and peacekeeping). Historically, there has been a strong legal strand to work on neutrality, reflecting concern about the rights and duties neutral states (and of other states towards neutral states) and the extent to which these rights and duties are enshrined in international law (Brewer 1916; Chadwick 2002; Lauterpacht 2004; Neff 2000). Authors have also sought to trace the historical development of neutrality (Jessup et al. 1935–36), including to as far back as the ancient Greek city states (Bauslaugh 1991). A number of books have focused on the two World Wars and the inter-war period, a particularly challenging time for states trying to use neutrality as a means of staying out of great power conflicts and war. These works have explored the successes and failures of various states’ policies of neutrality during this period, the political and moral compromises made by neutral states in order to stay out of wars (especially the Second World War) and the domestic political and socio-economic impact of the two World Wars on the neutral states (Kitchen et al. 2011; Leitz 2000; Lettevall et al. 2012; Packard 1992; Reginbogin 2009; Wylie 2002). More recently, Abbenhuis (2013, 2014) has sought to rescue the concept of neutrality from at least partial obscurity, arguing that neutrality was in the ‘long nineteenth century’ (1815–1914) used in a more widespread way than has been generally recognised, not only as a policy for small or weak states, but also by the great powers both as a direct policy option for themselves in relation to particular conflicts and as a tool for managing conflicts over other states by making those states neutral.

The Cold War generated a new body of literature examining the European neutral states in the context of the East-West conflict and a divided Europe, and focusing on the Western European neutral states and Yugoslavia as a distinct group (Bissell and Gasteyger 1990; Hakovirta 1988; Kruzell and Haltzel 1989; Neuhold and Thalberg 1984; Papacosma and Rubin 1989;

Sundelius 1987). This literature pointed to a number of conclusions. First, although these states shared the basic commonality of neutrality or non-alignment in the Cold War context, there was significant diversity in the national and international circumstances which resulted in their being neutral and in the ways in which they sought to maintain and project their neutrality. Second, for the European neutral countries and in particular those on or near the geographical frontline of the Cold War (Austria, Finland, Sweden and Yugoslavia), neutrality was an ongoing balancing act of maintaining their foreign policy and domestic independence while avoiding antagonising the Soviet Union. Third, the European neutral countries sought to act as mediators and peacekeepers: this was a policy that reflected both a national interest in defusing or reducing East-West tensions and a normative commitment to ideals of international peace and cooperation. Symbolically, Helsinki, Stockholm, Geneva, Vienna and Belgrade hosted various important East-West diplomatic meetings and/or became the homes of a number of international organisations within the 'UN family'.

The post-Cold War era resulted in a new generation of literature on the European neutral states' foreign and security policies (Agius and Devine 2011; Engelbrekt 2002; Ferreira-Pereira 2007; Gstohl 2002; Jopp and Ojanen 1999; Ojanen 2003). A number of strands and approaches can be identified within this literature. One focused on the integration of Austria, Finland and Sweden into the EU (Harden 1994; Miles 2005). Titles such as *Fusing with Europe* (Miles 2005), *Security Policy Reorientation in Peripheral Europe* (Engelbrekt 2002) and *Inside the Fence but Outside the Walls* (Ferreira-Pereira 2007) reflected a concern with identifying the dynamics which had resulted in once 'outsiders' joining the EU, including its new foreign, security and defence policy dimensions. The general conclusion was that there were broad pressures towards EU-centred European integration, but that national responses varied and states maintained elements of distinctive national foreign and security policies. A second strand in the academic literature has examined the issue of how far these states should still be viewed as neutral and/or the concept of neutrality has been redefined (Agius 2011; Goetschel 1999; Loden 2012). The consensus on this issue is that while these states remain neutral in the sense of not joining a military alliance (NATO), they have significantly redefined their foreign and security policies towards a set of dominant norms and practices of which active engagement with the EU and NATO are a major part—hence the use of terms such as post-neutrals. There remains ongoing debate, however, about how far the neutral states continue to advance

security policy norms and practices which challenge or modify dominant Western ones and how far the processes at play leave scope for such differentiation or will inevitably result in the neutral states' ever deeper integration with dominant Western norms and practices (Agius 2011; Devine 2011; Loden 2012). It is also worth noting that some analyses frame the European neutral states not solely or primarily in terms of their shared neutrality, but as examples of small states, peripheral states (whether politically or geographically) or, in the cases of Finland and Sweden, the Nordic states as a distinctive region/group (Bailes et al. 2006; Dorfer 1997; Engelbrekt 2002; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998; Ingebritsen 2006). Hence, whether neutrality is the most important or useful point of reference for analysing the neutral states' foreign and security policies is itself a point of contention.

Earlier academic literature on neutrality in general and on the European neutral states in the Cold War sought to explore the meaning and practice of neutrality but was not particularly informed by theory (in the sense of trying to explain the foreign policy choices and behaviour of the European neutral states in more general theoretical or conceptual terms). Since the end of the Cold War, however, a new generation of literature on the European neutral states has emerged, with a more explicit theoretical focus. A number of authors have taken a social constructivist theoretical perspective, which focuses on the ways in which states' foreign policies are constructed through processes of political discourse and rhetoric, and hence closely linked to national identities (Agius 2006; Agius and Devine 2011; Browning 2008; Malmberg 2001; Tonra 2012). This has also led to work exploring not only how policies of neutrality have been socially constructed historically, but also how they have been re-constructed in the context of European integration and in particular EU membership and involvement in the EU's CFSP and CSDP (Rieker 2002; Devine 2011). Analysts have also applied the concept of Europeanisation from the literature on EU foreign policy, seeking to assess how far EU membership and involvement in the CFSP and CSDP has resulted in the national foreign, security and defence policies of the European neutral states shifting towards a set of EU security policy norms and practices (Alecu de Flers 2011; Jokela 2011). In line with the general literature on EU foreign policy Europeanisation, the conclusion seems to be that the neutral states' foreign policies have been Europeanised, but that this is a flexible process allowing for continued national differentiation and that it is also a two-way process with member states seeking to 'upload' national foreign policy

preferences to the EU level alongside ‘downloading’ of EU policies to the national level. In this context, academics have also used the concept of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (derived from the wider literature on international norms) to analyse the European neutral states’ foreign policies, especially in the EU context. It is argued that the European neutral states have sought to promote a particular set of security policy norms and practices (centred around peacekeeping, conflict prevention, mediation and peace-building) and that the EU has become a key focus for their entrepreneurial role in this area (Bjorkdahl 2007; Ingebritsen 2002; Stromvik 2006; Vayrynen 2006).

Compared to this literature on neutrality in general, the European neutral states as a distinct group and the interaction between EU membership/CFSP/CSDP and the European neutral states’ foreign and security policies, rather little has been written on the the relationship between the neutral states and NATO. During the Cold War, almost nothing was written on the neutrals-NATO relationship *per se*, reflecting the fact that no formal relationship existed and there appeared to be very little interaction between them (although, as has subsequently become clear, there was closer cooperation between Sweden, and to a lesser extent Switzerland, and NATO during the Cold War than was publicly acknowledged at the time; see Dalsjo 2006 and Rickli 2004 and the chapters on Sweden and Switzerland in this book). Since the end of the Cold War, a number of article/chapter length works have examined national relationships of individual countries with NATO (Arter 1996; Dahl 1997, 2001; Ishizuka 1999; Michel 2011; Pursiainen and Saari 2002; Vaahtoranta and Forsberg 2000; Wagnsson 2011), although these works have focused very largely on Finland and Sweden. Only a small number of article/chapter length works have sought to provide a broader analysis of the European neutral states relations with NATO (Cottey 2013; Petersson 2011). This book addresses this gap by providing a comprehensive comparative assessment of the five main European neutral states’ relationships with NATO, focusing on the post-Cold War period, but placing the analysis in the context of the longer-term history of these states’ foreign and security policies and the evolution of NATO since it was established in 1949. The book explores the nature of the post-Cold War partnership between the European neutral states and NATO, patterns of commonality and divergence in the neutral states relations with NATO and the factors shaping the relationship between the European neutral states and NATO, as well as the question of whether and in what circumstances any of these states may join NATO.

The analyses in this book should also be placed in the context of wider academic theories of International Relations (Doyle 1997; Dunne et al. 2016; Viotti and Kauppi 2010) and the sub-field of Foreign Policy Analysis (Alden and Aran 2012; Beach 2012; Breuning 2007). Realist theorists of International Relations have long argued that the anarchic nature of the international system and the distribution of power between states (the balance of power) are central to understanding the international system as a whole and the foreign policy behaviour of states. In particular, Realists have argued that balancing and bandwagoning are central forms of state behaviour, with states either balancing against hegemonic or rising powers or, alternatively, bandwagoning with such powers in order to benefit from cooperation with the dominant power (Walt 1990; Waltz 1979). Neutrality does not fit easily into the balancing versus bandwagoning dichotomy. As a policy of staying out of other states' wars, and more generally seeking not to be drawn into great power conflicts, neutrality can be viewed as an attempt to avoid the choice between balancing or bandwagoning (and the costs that might come with either). To the extent that neutrality is a means of reassuring a hegemonic or rising power that one does not threaten it or its interests, neutrality may be viewed as a particular form of bandwagoning. To the extent that neutrality includes elements designed to deter attack or infringements on one's neutrality (as in the concept of 'armed neutrality'), it may be viewed as a form of balancing. While neutrality does not fit easily into the balancing versus bandwagoning dichotomy, the history of the European neutral states, especially during the Second World War and the Cold War, nonetheless indicates that balance of power considerations were central to the circumstances which resulted in these states becoming neutral and the specific ways in which they practised neutrality. In contrast to Realists, Liberal theorists of International Relations emphasise the role of international institutions—ranging from norms for state behaviour to formal international organisations such as the UN or the EU—and domestic politics in shaping the international system and the foreign policy behaviour of states (Russett and Oneal 2000). In this context, neutrality can itself be viewed as an international institution: a norm agreed by states and codified in international law. The European neutral states have arguably been able to maintain their now long-standing policies of neutrality in part because the institution of neutrality has become embedded in international society and is respected by other states (Raymond 1997). Realist theorists may, of course, counter that the historic willingness of great powers to ride roughshod over the neutrality of

other states when it suits their needs suggests that the neutrality norm in international politics is relatively weak and that the neutrality of specific states is underpinned by particular configurations of the balance of power. A second strand in Liberal thinking in International Relations focuses on the ways in which domestic politics—in particular, the distinction between democracies and authoritarian states—shapes the foreign policy behaviour of states and hence international politics as a whole. This logic has not been particularly applied to neutrality in general or to the European neutral states. It is worth noting, however, that at least in the Swedish and Austrian cases after 1945, the Social Democrats were the dominant political parties and that the national policies of neutrality were (and to some extent still are) strongly associated with these parties. More generally, in all five countries examined in this book, neutrality has sat alongside a number of other policies, including support for the United Nations, détente, Third World development and nuclear disarmament. Although the governments of the five European neutral states have not always been left or centre-left in character, there is an argument that neutrality can be viewed as part of a wider foreign policy that may be described as left or centre-left in global terms. As noted above, more recently academics have sought to apply Social Constructivist approaches, with their focus on discourses/narratives and national identity, to the study of the European neutral states (on Social Constructivism generally see Finnemore and Sikkink 2001 and Katzenstein 1996). This approach makes a persuasive case that the neutrality policies of the European neutral states have become embedded in national narratives about their countries' role in the world—in particular as promoters of peace through support for the UN, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and the like—and are now an important and established part of each country's national identity. Additionally, the analysis of the European neutral states via the lens of foreign policy Europeanisation should be viewed in the context of more general Liberal and Institutionalist literature on the impact of involvement in international institutions on states' foreign policies (Wong 2011). This perspective also raises the questions about whether and in what ways engagement with NATO, albeit as partners rather than members, has impacted on the foreign and security policies of the European neutral. These various broader themes—the balance between external and domestic factors in shaping states' foreign policies, the relationship between national identity and foreign policy and the impact of involvement in international institutions in states' foreign and security policies—are addressed in various ways in the individual country chapters in this book and returned to in the conclusion.