





THE UNITED STATES AND MILITARY COUPS IN TURKEY AND PAKISTAN

BETWEEN CONSPIRACY AND REALITY

Ömer Aslan



The United States and Military Coups in Turkey and Pakistan

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Between Conspiracy and Reality

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*To my mother, father, and all martyrs of July 15,
the fallen heroes*

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFSOUTH	Allied Forces Southern Europe
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINCSOUTH	Commander in Chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe
CMR	Civil—Military Relations
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
DECA	Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement
DoD	Department of Defense
DP	Democrat Party
EUCOM	United States European Command
FY	Fiscal Year
GNA	Grand National Assembly
ICA	International Cooperation Administration
IMET	International Military Education and Training
ISA	International Security Affairs
JAMMAT	Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey
JUSMMAGG	Joint US Military Assistance Group Greece
JUSMMAT	Joint US Military Mission for Aid to Turkey
LSE	Land Forces Southeastern Europe
MAAG	Military Advisory and Assistance Group
MAP	Military Assistance Program
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NUC	National Unity Committee
PACOM	United States Pacific Command

PME	Professional Military Education
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
RCD	Regional Cooperation for Development
RPP	Republican People's Party
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
TAF	Turkish Armed Forces
TGS	Turkish General Staff
UN	United Nations

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Introduction: Military Coup D'état as a Two-Level Game

DANCING ON TWO FRONTS

While vanishing in several parts of the world (Perkins 2013), military coups continue to loom large in the political life of several countries. The failed July 15 (2016) coup attempt in Turkey has provided the most recent manifestation. Though several observers and experts correctly highlighted several motivations behind the putschists, its external dimension, including alleged US support, was immediately sensationalized. By a nice coincidence, however, the following observations by General Michael Flynn, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (2012–2014) under the Obama Administration and subsequently President Trump's National Security Advisor for a short period of time, on the July 15 coup attempt in Turkey during a campaign speech shows how significant military-to-military relations and professional military education programs may be to understanding the external dimension of a coup attempt:

Probably most of you do not know but there is an ongoing coup, going on in Turkey right now, right now. There is a coup. And *I was just literally going back and forth with a very great friend of mine, who trained with us, in the Turkish military*. And the Turkish military is, I do not know whether they are going to succeed or not but the Turkish military... they have been excised for many years by... what really became a *secular nation state, then began to turn towards Islamism, that is Turkey, under Erdoğan ... I am going to be very fascinated to see what happens because if the military*

succeeds, one of the things that came out of the military tonight... they said, we recognize our responsibilities with NATO, we recognize our responsibilities with the United Nations, and we want to make sure that world knows, we want to be seen as a secular nation. (italics added) (Mueller 2016)

General Flynn's remarks on a coup attempt in a NATO member in 2016 also underscore the continuing importance of bilateral relations and professional military education programs well after the end of the Cold War. Yet the civil-military relationship (CMR) literature has sorely understudied the role of external actors to explain *why* military coups d'état occurred and left unstudied military-to-military channels in making any sense of the external dimension of a coup attempt. The primary objective of this study is to close this large gap by discussing the US role in four military coups d'état during the Cold War: in Turkey (1960 and 1980) and in Pakistan (1958 and 1977). It asks if putschists considered and estimated likely US reaction to their coup attempts in these cases. It also explores whether US reaction (support or opposition) influenced coup success or failure. If the US reaction influenced the coup outcomes, what was the influence? How did the USA influence coups in these cases? Were there any differences between these cases in terms of US influence? How can we explain these differences?

Students of CMR often provide several 'domestic' explanations for coups and their success or failure. These explanations include factors that are both internal and external to the military, such as political decay, economic backwardness, corruption, factionalism, and the loss of legitimacy and military professionalism, and threats to military's corporate interests respectively (Danopoulos 1992, p. 3). At the cusp of the post-Cold War period, Rice claimed, "any number of factors can go into determining these civil-military boundaries and reinforcing them over time. History and tradition, the nature of the political system, and the relative strength or weakness of civilian and military institutions are all important determinants" (1992, p. 33).

However, in order for a coup d'état to succeed it must be well calculated and planned in advance, as attested by people who joined or watched coups from close quarters (Soyuyüce 2012, p. 35; Faik 2012, p. 10; Seyhan 1966, p. 43; Küçük 2008, p. 84; Aydemir 2010, p. 23; Esin 2005, p. 98). Some scholars have considered coup plotters to be 'rational actors'. "Coup conspirators will carefully evaluate their chances of success and should only attempt a coup when the expected rewards of the maneuver and its probability of victory are high enough to offset the

dire consequences of a failed putsch” (Powell 2012, p. 1019). Coup making is a serious business; severe costs from demotions to death sentence may be inflicted from failed coup attempts¹ (Geddes 1999; Utku 2006, p. 73; Kechschull, pp. 575–577; Subaşı 2004, pp. 92, 108). This book assumes that military officers are not reckless agents; they are, similar to other political actors, rational, calculating, and “thinking and observing” (Subaşı 2004, p. 17) agents, who follow very closely not only intra-military politics and balance but also domestic, regional and global developments to use as inputs in their decision-making processes. As Kaplan, who joined in the May 27 coup as a Staff Major, said, “we used to sit and ask ourselves ‘what is going to happen, why the country is in this poor situation, why things have gone wrong’... you cannot cork officers’ hearts, feelings; officers do not just take orders and obey. They too ponder, they too have brains” (Kaplan 2012, p. 24; see also Subaşı 2004, p. 91; Elevli 1960, p. 165; Chishti 1989, p. 63; Bölügiray 1999, p. 120). They estimate possible resistance essentially on two fronts: whether or not people and other political actors will welcome them on the domestic front, because if large-scale resistance erupts this may lead to a civil war, which is one of the most threatening outcomes militaries may fear.

Some students of coups d'état claimed that coup plotters are not concerned with popular opposition since people rarely stand up to a coup attempt (Singh 2014a, p. 17). However, others insist that domestic resistance may hamper coup success because “non-state organizations constitute a powerful safeguard against military intervention when they ‘talk back’ or resist a coup by mobilizing protests or refusing to comply with plotters’ orders” (Belkin and Schofer 2005, p. 157; also see Varney and Martin 2000, pp. 53, 61, 65; Bölügiray 1999, pp. 134, 233; Roberts 1975). “Indeed, civilians have the potential to make a polity completely ungovernable in a postcoup environment.” (Thyne et al. 2017, p. 4) Popular opposition increases the risk that coup plot will be resisted from within the military as well. If that happens, the military may fall into fratricidal conflict, a war between brothers-in-arms, and may aggravate the risk of a civil war (Singh 2014a, pp. 22–23; Khan 1967, pp. 71–72). This helps explain why some coup plotters before the May 27 coup d'état in

¹It is for this reason that General Zia sent his wife and family to London until the coup attempt he led was secured. See Hyman’s Introduction to Chishti (1989, pp. ix, 63, 73), Perkins (2013, p. 77).

Turkey watched coups in Iraq and Syria with concern in the 1950s (İlcak 1975, vol. 2, p. 571; Esin 2005, p. 55; Rapoport 1968, pp. 551–572; Barracca, 2007, pp. 140–141).

The other critical, but neglected front for the officers to care for is the external; putschists often feel they must try to predict possible external reactions to their actions to make sure that they will not be totally isolated from the international community or their attempt will not trigger a foreign intervention. For Luttwak, considerable political independence from the great powers and wide immunity of internal political life to influence of foreign powers is one of the pre-conditions of the coup (1979, p. 44). As Goodspeed (1962) pointed out, “the international situation must be favorable before the rebels strike, unless they are willing to risk their *coup* turning into war.” (p. 214) Military coups are therefore “simply too important to be left to the vagaries of domestic politics” (David quoted in Gunn 2015, p. 124). External actors constitute at least one of the reasons behind some failed coup attempts (Kebeschull 1994, pp. 571–572; Singh 2014b). As Taylor pointed out, “opportunities definitely matter. Intervention is difficult when structural barriers to coups are severe” (2003, p. 30). Nogaylaroğlu opined that “officers who plan a coup consider external support. They are thinking people like you and me. When they set themselves on such a course, they consider its likely effects, for instance, what the US might say and how Europe might react. Most likely, they also try to get an idea from these people about how external actors will react, perhaps some also directly to talk to foreign actors” (personal communication, June 9, 2015). A powerful external actor such as the United States may play an extremely critical role in coups d’état in other places because external assistance may help coupists decrease the potential external costs of their action (Shah 2014, p. 91). Hilmi Özkök, a former Chief of the Turkish General Staff, did not mince his words when it came to the importance of external actors for the successful implementation of a coup d’état. After saying that he could not confirm US involvement in the September 12 coup d’état because he was not a witness to events as they unfolded, General Özkök continued:

We may think of the connection between coup d’état and the US in the following way... the US is a powerful nation with a large clout... It has sway over the NATO, the UN, Security Council, wherein it retains the veto power. This is to say that when a revolution [*ihtilal*] is staged, this comes to the agenda in certain international institutions. When it does, somebody has to give you [the putschists] protection, for instance the

World Bank, IMF etc. If you fail to find someone in these international institutions to protect you, they will immediately bring down your economy and you will therefore fail. (2012, pp. 12–13; see also Abramowitz 2000, p. 263)

When retired military officers such as Ahmet Er, Orhan Erkanlı, who partook in the May 27 coup d'état, thought that there was heavy external involvement in the September 12 coup—ironically not their own coup—it would be a mistake to deny any actorship to the external powers (Er 2003, p. 183; Esin 2005, p. 105; Cotter 2002, p. 38).

Understanding circumstances that *make* a coup *possible* matters as much as the reasons and objectives of coups for democratic theory. The literature on transition to democracy and democracy consolidation is in agreement that though curbing the influence of a military is no guarantee for democratic consolidation, coups and military intervention certainly impede democracy. This is why “... the military is the most consequential actor in post-authoritarian transitions and the success or failure of these processes to a large extent hinges on its political behavior” (Barany quoted in Tusalem 2014, p. 483).

The Arab Spring has provided the most recent manifestation of how important the role of militaries is for and during democratic transitions. Both the July 3 coup d'état in Egypt, the critical role of the Syrian military in what turned out to be a civil war, and the facilitating role of the Tunisian army since the deposition of Zeinel Abidin Ben-Ali underline the crucial role of armed forces in any—democratic or otherwise—transition period in this region as well. In particular, the July 3 coup d'état in Egypt—the first Arab coup in the 21st century—shows that even after an authoritarian ruler is deposed, militaries may remain the major barrier before democracy. Surely, and as stated before, the weakening of a military's political influence is not a sufficient condition for democracy; civilian control of military does not necessarily mean democratic consolidation, as exemplified best by the Soviet Union and China (Aydınlı 2009).

However, the absence of coups cannot be the sole indicator of consolidated democracy. As Koonings and Kruijt state, “political armies have been and still are one of the key variables shaping the origins and the course of democratic transitions. Democratic consolidation depends on, among other things, the manner in which political armies still interfere—or abstain from interfering—in civilian politics” (Koonings and Kruijt 2002, p. 2; also see Desch 1999, p. 5; Diamond and Plattner 1996; Shah 2014, p. 11; Karakatsanis 1997, p. 289). Pakistan and Turkey are two

cases in point. Despite multi-party competition, observers of Pakistani politics doubt country's democratic credentials and point fingers at the continuing high influence of Pakistani armed forces in civilian politics (Cook 2004, p. 4). Understanding the external dimension of coups d'état may produce significant policy recommendations for democratic transitions and democratic consolidation by showing how external actors may help coups d'état and, therefore, directly and indirectly support continuation of military influence and undermine democratic transition. If mechanisms and instruments of external support are grasped this gives policy makers better knowledge and opportunity to adjust and modify, or even resist to, these mechanisms.

MOTIVE VS. OPPORTUNITY

A good way of starting to locate the place of external actors in military coups d'état is distinguishing *motives* from *opportunities*, as Finer had done (1988, p. 20) or *need to intervene* from *ability* to intervene (Klieman 1980, p. 143), and placing the external dimension within the realm of opportunities and ability. As Brian Taylor argued, "domestic and organizational structural accounts help explain the opportunities that officers face, whereas the corporate interest and organizational culture perspectives focus on officers' motives" (Taylor 2003, p. 29). Alternatively, as Klieman put it, "military, internal cohesion, skill structure, career lines, social recruitment, and education" may count for a military's ability to intervene but complications arising from martial law declaration may explain a military's *need* to intervene (Klieman 1980, p. 143). To put it more succinctly, militaries may intervene in civilian politics not *because* they enjoy popular support and receive assurances that no civilian and international resistance will follow but rather thanks to the *opportunity*, the latter factors may provide. A military's *disposition* to intervene and *ability-to-supply* a coup are different matters (Piplani and Talmadge 2016, p. 5).

It may be said that the distinction between motives and opportunity or the need to intervene and the ability to do so corresponds to Doty's critical distinction between *why* and *how-possible* questions. Though Doty explained the idea behind this distinction in discursive formations and forming of certain subjectivities in the tradition of *critical security studies in International Relations*, she remains correct to claim that "explanations for why questions are incomplete in an important sense. They generally take as unproblematic the possibility that a particular decision or course of action could happen" (Doty 1993, p. 298). In this sense,

high popular and bureaucratic support, and lack of resistance by political parties and other actors would explain *how it becomes possible* for militaries to take over power (Bou Nassif 2017, pp. 159–161). Praetorian organizational culture, on the other hand, gives us the primary actor's motive, and therefore may tell us *why* militaries seek political influence in the first place. As the retired Pakistani Air-Vice Marshal Shahzad Chaudhry remarked, “the coup planning clique certainly ponder how the United States may react if they manage to overthrow the existing government. However, the trigger is always local; the local trigger is what the coup makers respond to. Everything else comes next” (personal communication, September 29, 2015).²

The local trigger—whether corporate interests or organizational culture or something else—may answer the *why* question whereas the international reaction also helps us answer the *how-possible* question. Support or promise of support by the United States may make a critical contribution to a military's confidence and assurance that it has the ability to *supply* a coup. This is to say that it is not only ‘domestic’ factors—making sure that “all of the right people to be in the right place at the right time” (Piplani and Talmadge, p. 6)—that gives a military the ability and the edge to *produce* a coup. This means that we may explain coups in an *ideal* two-step model, in which a sufficient and strategically placed number of officers first firmly decide to stage a coup and only then they will try to find out about opportunities, both domestic and international, to see if they can pull it off.

The availability of and easier access to archival resources today put researchers in a much better position to discuss the role of external actors on civil-military relations and democratic breakdowns in many places starting from Latin America to Middle East (Forsythe 1992, pp. 387–389; Gott 2005, p. 83). Truly, thanks to archives opened and first-hand accounts of major policy-making actors researchers are more certain of the direct US involvement in the coup d'état against Prime Minister Mossadegh in Iran in 1953 (Kinzer 2003), 1949 and 1951 coups in Syria (Little 1990; Mufti 1996, pp. 49, 55; Copeland 1969, p. 42; Massad 2011; O'Connell and Loeb 2001, p. 19), 1957 coup plot

²When General Ayub Khan was asked about the reasons he took over in 1958, he said “the compelling reasons to change a social order or an established government could also be for reckless or selfish reasons, but in our case, it was really the last desperate day to save the country from complete disintegration” (Ghani 2010, p. 99).

in Syria (O'Connell and Loeb 2001, p. 18), and April 12 coup in Liberia (Moose 1980, pp. 26–28). CIA played a crucial role in the Ba'ath coup d'état in November 1963 against PM Qassim in Iraq (Mufti, p. 145), against Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana (O'Connell and Loeb, p. 20), and against Patrice Lumumba in Congo (Haynes 2011, p. 38). Britain and the United States were active in the process starting with supposedly left-wing coup attempt in 1965 to the coup by Suharto against President Sukarno in Indonesia (Hilton 2001; Schonhardt 2012).

Fitch shares similar sentiments on the role of external actors when he claimed that the CIA had a hand in coups in Ecuador in the 1950s and early 1960s (Fitch 1977, pp. 56, 60, 67).³ The United States was also active in blocking a coup attempt in Jordan in the summer of 1958. As the CIA's covert channel to Jordan's King Hussein, Jack O'Connell, admitted, "had the CIA not intervened, there almost certainly would have been a coup. Given the number of senior officers involved in the plot, it might have succeeded" (O'Connell and Loeb 2001, p. 12). Or, alternatively, scholars are also in a better position to raise a counter-argument, suggesting the non-involvement of United States with regards to the 1964 Bolivian coup (Kirkland 2005) or 1958 coup in Iraq (Karam 2017). Yet again, this study does not seek to research the kind of connection between an external actor (or actors) and other militaries similar to the connection found between the United States and Britain and "devoted royalist and bon vivant" General Zahedi in Shah's Iran (Meyer and Brysac 2008, pp. 334–335; Kinzer 2006, pp. 6, 13).

This study has four objectives: first, by studying the cases of 1960 and 1980 coups in Turkey and 1958 and 1977 coups in Pakistan it seeks to explore whether and to what extent coup plotters anticipated any possible US reaction. Second, it also seeks to explore whether and what 'role' the United States played in those coups. Third, it tries to reveal what differences and similarities there were between the US position toward these particular coups in Turkey and Pakistan, and if there is, how we can explain different US reactions. Last but not least, it brings in 'socialization hypothesis' into the analysis and tests it with the cases of Turkey and Pakistan.

³For US efforts to destabilize other governments, manipulate political environment to install right-wing governments and support coups from Greece to Chile, see Schlesinger et al. (2013, p. 434) and Kinzer (2006).

BOOK STRUCTURE AND METHODOLOGY

This book explores the US role in coups d'état in Turkey and Pakistan during the Cold War through a comparative historical case study. Pakistan and Turkey make an interesting pair of cases to explore the role of a powerful external actor for several reasons. To begin with, during the Cold War both Pakistani and Turkish militaries were powerful political actors in their domestic politics. Here were two 'political armies' (Koonings and Kruijt 2002), dismissing elected government on particular charges but both were hugely popular among their people. When both Pakistan and Turkey made their transition to a democracy at the end of the 1940s, though the dynamics and duration of those transitions were different, they had gotten out of rules under towering leaders, respectively Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Kemal Atatürk, though the duration they spent under these leaders differed as well. Both countries came to acquire strategic roles in the US grand scheme to contain Soviet expansion, though the strategic edge of Turkey and Pakistan waxed and waned throughout the Cold War. Their primary strategic significance derived from their geographical positions as natural barriers in the southern arc to block Soviet's expansion to the south.

There was a need for something in that area of the world, because on one end you had Turkey, which was a part of NATO, and at the other end was going to be Pakistan, which was a part, I believe, of SEATO. That was to be the connection from SEATO to CENTO to NATO, so you had a security ring of alliances around the Soviet Union... We were trying to connect up the three countries: Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, and then the U.S. and the British. We were trying to connect up their communications, transportation, and through any projects that would enable them to cooperate with each other. (Martin 2006, pp. 112–113; Stern 1998, p. 85; Brzezinski 1983, p. 356)

In its ultimate objective to contain and defeat the Soviets, the United States saw Turkey and Pakistan as being part of the same natural defense line (Van Hollen 1998, p. 9). Both countries were close US allies and received a large amount of military, political, and economic assistance and both signed bilateral agreements with the USA ensuring US protection. The origins of internal and external threat perceptions as potential causes of military intervention too were similar. Not only did both Turkey and Pakistan feel threatened by the Soviet Union in their vicinity,

but both also felt very insecure due because of the action of their next door neighbors, Greece and India, respectively. It must be pointed though that while Turkey and Greece, as co-members in NATO, did not fight each other during the Cold War, Pakistan and India, which led the Non-Aligned Movement, fought immediately after Pakistan's independence first as well as in 1965 and 1971. On the domestic political front, neither country felt consolidated at this time. Both perceived acute internal threats to their unities. Yet, notwithstanding these similarities, the nature and channels of their access to the United States had been qualitatively different. Turkey enjoyed denser political, military, social, and economic ties to the United States as a NATO member whereas although Pakistan was referred to as 'the most allied ally' of the USA because it was a member of both CENTO and SEATO, its connection to the USA lacked the content, passion, and access NATO membership provided.

This comparative historical case study employs 'process-tracing' that will allow the author to closely track down through "histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources" (George and Bennett 2005, p. 6) how coup plotters in four coups in Turkey and Pakistan approached the issue of US reaction before, during, and after the coup d'état in question. Concerning the underexplored issue of socialization through professional military education given by the United States since early in the Cold War—underexplored with respect to Cold War period—process-tracing allows "the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events" (George and Bennett 2005, p. 5). When it comes to US support after the coup, I take into account US military, economic, diplomatic, and political support for two years after it but also compare the numbers with data for two years before the coup.

Though a retired four-star Turkish general argued that "coups have no records, just like bribery has none" (Yirmibeşoğlu 1999, vol. 1, p. 413), the data for coup records for this study originate from five sources. To begin with, though not yet fully opened for researchers' perusal, declassified US archives will be the primary and most important source of data. These records, which are available for all three cases except the September 12 coup in Turkey, it is hoped, will help the researcher find out how the USA approached political developments before and after coup d'états in Turkey and Pakistan, and, therefore, what role they played. This study will also utilize electronic telegrams sent from

and to United States embassies around the world for particular years (1973–1979), recently declassified by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). The same goes for State Department Bulletins. A significant number of memoirs written by retired Turkish, Pakistani, and US officers, politicians, and ambassadors will complement these archival sources. Feroz Ahmad recently argued, “historians should not take memoirs at face value” because “all memoirs tend to be self-serving and merely justify the author’s prejudices” (Ahmad 2015). Truly in using memoirs as a source we need to “consider who is speaking to whom, for what purpose and under what circumstances” in order to assess the meaning and evidentiary worth what is conveyed through texts (George and Bennett 2005, pp. 99–100). However, if used with the necessary caution and diligent crosschecking from other sources available, memoirs may prove to be extremely useful. For instance, it is thanks to a memoir written by a former CIA Istanbul station chief that we learn that the CIA was had advance knowledge of the March 12 1971 military coup (Clarridge and Diehl 1997, p. 117).⁴

As for the memoirs of US ambassadors, though no ambassador openly confessed to involvement in military coups d’état, their accounts are still very helpful in deducing certain clues and making more informed analyses. It is important to know what judgment went out from US embassies in Ankara and Karachi and later Islamabad before/after/during a coup because there is a good chance that US policy towards that event may be shaped by the recommendations of US embassies. For instance, when Zeinel Abidin Ben Ali took over premiership from the ailing Bourguiba in 1987, the embassy’s judgment of the event was that it was not a coup and Ben Ali enjoyed the support of important domestic political players to keep his rule and therefore the United States should recognize the new government as legitimate. Washington duly followed this advice and recognized the new government (Hull 2009, p. 76). This does not guarantee that all US ambassadors had good command of events in their host country and their recommendations turned into official policy, but

⁴Nazar also claims that Cemal Madanoğlu, one of the leading officers of the 1960 coup, came to him in the wake of the March 12, 1971 military memorandum and asked his help in getting U.S. support for their planned coup. Nazar reports declining his request and implying notifying both Turkish and U.S. authorities, which in turn helped, if not allowed, Turkish Intelligence to know for sure that a leftist coup was in the offing and to prevent it (Altaylı 2013, pp. 359–360).

how they characterized events and what messages they say they relayed to their counterparts in their memoirs still render these worthy resources.

Another precious source of data is the hundreds of interviews conducted under the auspices of Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training with scores of retired officers in US embassies across the world, which are immensely helpful but very little known and explored. The data for economic and military aid provided by the United States to Turkey and Pakistan are fairly accessible. Finally, this researcher conducted twenty-two elite interviews with retired officers, politicians, and expert scholars in both countries. As expected, gaining access to retired officers proved to be an onerous task. Among retired Turkish generals, the researcher contacted in Turkey, the retired generals Tamer Akbaş and Yalçın Ergül turned down our request. Sabri Yirmibeşoğlu and Nevzat Bölügiray could not accept it due to their health issues. Several others in both Turkey and Pakistan did not respond to our requests. The major limitation of this book has been a lack of access to General Staff archives in Turkey and Pakistan. An analysis of these could have given us a better and more accurate understanding of what coup makers thought before the coup, and what negotiations, *if any*, went into their calculations about the likely level of outside support. The cost of this general absence of indigenous archives is that the researcher has not had the chance to learn about their perspective in their own words. Their absence leaves the researcher in a position where we are able to know what coup plotters and military governments thought before and after coups in Turkey and Pakistan only from outside perspectives in external archives and subjective personal memoirs. It needs to be noted, however, that these problems are some of the usual obstacles before research into military affairs (Aziz 2008, p. 83) but should not deter researchers.

A few caveats are in order to clarify the objectives and boundaries of this study. To begin with, this book does not attempt to establish a causal relationship between external actors and coups/military interventions. In other words, the aim here is not to point at the 'United States' as the immediate cause and culprit of military coups d'état in other places. On the contrary, a main premise in this study is that armed forces do *not* take over *because* an external actor or actors (state, state agencies, or non-state actors) force it to do so. It is domestic factors that provide the principal rationales for military coups d'état. International actors may wish that there was a regime change in a country by military takeover, yet a simple external prodding would scarcely be enough to

finalize an event such as a coup. The international environment may be *permissive* of a coup d'état, but it is not likely that any officer would dare to carry out one *just because* the international structure is ripe; it is rare that military generals would be hired or bought off to do US bidding by overthrowing their own government. As Demirel rightly pointed out with regards to US involvement in the 1980 coup d'état in Turkey, "the Turkish Armed Forces did not need US encouragement or instigation to intervene in political processes and abolish the parliament to take things over. For the military had already been disposed to a coup" (Demirel 2003a, p. 272). International structure may only *allow* a coup to take place because the *will to start a coup* may not be sufficient on its own.

The second caveat is that a conscious effort will be made in this study in order not to succumb to the alluring threat of conspiracy mentality. It is therefore important to make a very selective use of existing secondary sources. As an illustration, Mehmet Ali Birand's *The General's Coup in Turkey: An Inside Story of 12 September 1980* does not appear to be a reliable source to understand the September 12 coup in Turkey. Birand's main argument throughout the book is that the USA had not only known of the coup beforehand, but had also urged the military to intervene. Birand claims that an article written in *Armed Forces Journal International* by a retired senior State Department official under a pseudonym "gave the message that the only exit for Turkey was military intervention" (Birand 1987, p. 127). However, when the reader visits the source given by Birand, the article cited claims in fact that "The Turkish Army is not a cure to Turkish democracy, but rather a major cause of the disease" and "the Army can still play a major stabilizing role as long as it stays out of power" (Galen n.d.).

The same warning about sources to be utilized for this study is valid for Hale's otherwise seminal book on the Turkish military and their role in politics. When Hale discussed the international dimension of the 1980 coup d'état, he writes that "US military chiefs had dropped broad hints to their Turkish colleagues that they were perturbed by the situation in Turkey and expected something to be done", which, if true, would be very significant for the purposes of this study. Such 'hints' are notable as 'signals', and hence may count as external incentives for the coup makers. However, when the reader goes to Hale's references for this rather bold and, if true, important claim, one finds three sources: Weiker's book dated 1963!, Hasan Cemal's *Tank Sesile Uyanmak*, and United States Ambassador James W. Spain's *American Diplomacy* (Hale 1994,

p. 323; also see related footnote no. 48, p. 334). The author could not find any such information in Spain's memoirs or Cemal's book.

With these remarks made; the first part of this book will continue with a survey of civil-military relations literature to show the gap related to the role(s) of external actors in military coups d'état. The next chapter elaborates on the argument that external actors have played a significant role in coups d'état during the Cold War. It tries to show that coups cannot be explained with reference only to indigenous motivators and some domestic-level opportunities such as popular support and lack of resistance. It is in this chapter that the researcher broaches an extended discussion of professional military education (PME) programs that Turkish and Pakistani military officers have been attending in the United States for several decades, albeit with brief periods of interruptions. This chapter also brings in 'military-to-military relations' as an important but understudied issue to be addressed in a better understanding of civil-military relations. Indicators of US support that this book will look for and three stages of US 'role' are also discussed in this chapter.

The remaining chapters are devoted to detailed discussions of the US role in four cases of military coups d'état in Turkey and Pakistan during the Cold War in the light of theoretical insights given in the second chapter. The third chapter discusses US involvement in two classical military coups in Turkey during the Cold War, namely those that occurred in 1960 and 1980. The fourth, penultimate chapter opens a debate on the US role in another set of two classical coups in Pakistan, in 1958 and 1977. The final chapter provides a brief overview of the USA's continuing role in civil-military relations in general and further military coups in Turkey and Pakistan after the Cold War. The book closes with a comparative discussion of the USA's role across four primary cases from the Cold War period.

A SURVEY OF THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS FIELD

The next section of this chapter provides a review of state of civil-military relations literature by dividing it into domestic and external factors. 'Domestic factors' are divided into two subgroups, based on whether these factors originate from the country's armed forces, or from elsewhere. In order to pinpoint the role of external actors in cases of coups d'état in Turkey and Pakistan, it is necessary to start with domestic-level factors that actually provide the indispensable spark for many coups.

DOMESTIC FACTORS

One strand of thought in civil-military relations regarding the reasons for the military's foray into politics through a coup d'état focuses on the organization itself. The military as an institution may like to preserve and advance its interests by seeking to increase its share from the budget, preserve its autonomy in personnel promotions and improve living and work conditions, protect itself against rival institutions (Danopoulos 1992b, p. 3). "The military [behaves] essentially as a trade union looking out for its own interests. When these are affected—and only then—the officers move to protect their budgets, their autonomy, their promotions, salaries, pensions, and perquisites" (Horowitz, as quoted in Singh 2014a, p. 18). Therefore, armies can be considered as an institution similar to others, and it is important to understand how, at a particular moment, this institution defines its interests, norms and values to understand its behavior (Shah 2014, pp. 25–28). In this regard, the coup is only one of the instruments available to a military to fight for its corporate interests. This does not mean that militaries define their interests, norms and values in a vacuum, in absolute immunity from influence external to the military (Shah 2014, p. 28). However, according to the advocates of this approach, it is still the military-as-institution that needs to be focused on to explain a military coup. In the final analysis, a sustained sharp decrease in their funding or the application of austerity measures may trigger a military takeover (Tusalem 2014, p. 483; Ibrahim 2009).

Corporate interests of a military may have been distended by its deep involvement in economics, as in Algeria, Pakistan, and Egypt. There is a common consensus that a negative correlation exists between economic involvement and military professionalism and civilian control (Springborg 2011, p. 399; Siddiq 2007, pp. 2, 12).⁵ As Mani pointed out, "where a legacy of military entrepreneurship exists, civilians seeking to establish responsible political control over the institution will face the daunting task of eroding a discreet, but nonetheless established,

⁵For instance, some students of CMR have tried to explain recent 2013 military coup in Egypt through a historical institutionalist perspective. According to this perspective, the Egyptian military forsake President Mubarak to protect its institutional interests and privileges it amassed over the years, see Kandil (2014, pp. 2–3, 5). Likewise, with that perspective in mind, Aziz argues that "the military coups in Pakistan are a predictable response of the military to safeguarding of its institutional interests, rather than manifestations of ethnic, religious or regional dynamics" (2008, p. 55).

prerogative to economic power and autonomy” (Mani 2007, p. 592). Economically powerful militaries tend to be politically influential and interventionist.

A low opinion of civilian politicians when contrasted with disciplined, uptight, professional, and patriotic officers usually accompanies interventionist military culture. Distrust against politicians almost invariably accompanied the interventionist culture of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) (Yirmibeşoğlu 1999, p. 33). The same may be said of Pakistan (Khan 1963, pp. 180, 192). We may underline the disdain, low view Pakistan’s first military ruler, Muhammad Ayub Khan came to have vis-à-vis Pakistani politicians when he became the local Log Area Commander in what was then East Pakistan (Amin 2012, p. 51; Musharraf 2006, pp. 78–84; Khan 1967, pp. 41–42, 49, 58, 61, 68, 80). In his ‘broadcast to the Nation’ after declaration of Martial Law on October 7, 1958, Ayub Khan remarked that, “these chaotic conditions, as you know, have been brought about by self-seekers who in the garb of political leaders have ravaged the country or tried to barter it away for personal gains... our so-called representatives in the Assemblies shifted from one party to the other without turning a hair or feeling any pangs of conscience” (Ahmed 1959, p. 237).

The external and internal threat situation and the ensuing predicament for survival may also play a role for a military to become political and see itself as the last line of defense in matters of survival. For instance, the economic, military and political weaknesses of Pakistan from its inception and its perception of imminent, existential threat posed by India, especially given the immediate post-independence conflict between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, may have boosted the Pakistani military’s interest in domestic and foreign politics in the absence of a strong civilian leader following the death of *Quaid-i Azam* [Great Leader] Muhammed Ali Jinnah (Khan 1963, pp. 40, 139, 153). Under those circumstances the perception was that the survival of Pakistan hinged on the strength of the army, which was the only ‘shield’ for the ‘fledgling’ nation (Ayub Khan 1967, p. 21; also Khan, F.M. 1963, p. 241). This self-perception also feeds into an interventionist organizational culture.

Militaries may dismiss civilian governments not because they would like to conserve their institutional interests but because their ‘organizational culture’ urges or allows them to (Demirel 2009, pp. 347–348; Sarigil 2011). Here “organizational culture refers to collectively held

beliefs, norms and ideas that prescribe how an organization should adapt to its external environment and administer its internal functioning and structure” (Schein 1985, p. 6). It provides “the pattern of assumptions, ideas, and beliefs that prescribe how a group should adapt to its external environment and manage its internal structure” (Legro 1994, p. 115). When used in the context of civil-military relations, the concept covers the particular image the armed forces have of themselves, their view of politicians and politics, and their ideological orientation and perception of their roles in their respective political systems (‘guardianship’, ‘ruler’, etc.) (Sarigil 2011, p. 273). A military’s organizational culture defines its collective identity, which then affects how the military will see itself within the political system and where it will locate its institutional interests (Sarigil 2011, p. 273). Having an interventionist organizational culture and looking out for corporate interests may also not be exclusive variables either.

It is equally significant to locate the origin and development of a military’s organizational culture. Organizational culture may spring from ideological mission an army attributes to itself. This attribution may stem from the role of the military in state formation. One former Commander in the Turkish Air Force, General Ergin Celasin, referred to the same origins when he talked about the founding ideology of the Turkish state and duty given to the Turkish army to protect Atatürk’s revolution. Having such a duty the military saw the regime as its child and showed utmost care necessary to protect it from any danger. “As the military you are the founder and you cannot salute your Chief of Staff or Prime Minister when the apple of your eye [the regime] slips from under feet like a carpet” (personal communication, July 23, 2015; Çelikoğlu 2010, pp. 28, 74).

Organizational culture is sustained and passed over to the next generations of officers through both the system of military education and the impact of previous coups. As Celasin pointed out, “in the military schools you start from physical threats but then the understanding of threat expands: economic collapse, cultural imperialism, for example, also start counting as threats. In other words, domestic issues too are thrust into the circle of threats gradually. And it is your job as a soldier; you have a mission, you get up in the morning and you read newspapers and watch television to see what is going on in the country. You look at the bigger picture. You are programmed to do so” (personal communication, July 23, 2015; Okan 2015, p. 56). On the Turkish and Pakistani

cases, military officers' memoirs and interviews reveal how interventionist organizational culture develops and how important it is to democratize it to liberalize civil-military relations in a coup-prone country (Ergül 2014, pp. 36–38, 57–58; Akbaş 2014, pp. 197, 209; Başer 2014, pp. 307–309; Çelikoğlu 2010, pp. 22, 28, 74; Kıyat 2010, p. 52; Temel 2007, pp. 135, 145, 204; see also related remarks in Pekin and Yavuz 2014, pp. 301–303; Şenocak 2005, pp. 100, 112, 120–122).

Coups themselves have their own impact of aggravating the interventionist organizational culture in the armed forces. Scholars talk about the 'additive impact' of previous military coups. "Countries that have had a recent coup tend to be more vulnerable to another attempt" (Powell 2012, p. 1028). Or, as in the words of Douglas Hibbs, "an 'interventionist' history is likely to develop a tradition or 'culture' that makes current interventions more likely than otherwise would be the case" (Hibbs quoted in Taylor 2003, p. 18). As norms that allow for military coups in a polity and are maintained through repetitive military interventions they may acquire a "taken-for-granted" character" (Hibbs quoted in Taylor 2003, p. 18) and, therefore, continue to guide action.

WEAK POLITICIANS AND REGIMES

The other domestic-level perspective seeks to draw our attention not to the military but to the weak political and institutional structure of the society at this time. In other words, militaries intervene in politics and dismiss governments due not to "... social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of the society" (Huntington 1968, p. 194; also see Needler 1966, p. 619; A. Yavuz, personal communication, December 16, 2015). In other words, a military intervenes to eliminate such diseases as corruption, stagnation, stalemate, anarchy, and subversion of the established political system that may afflict the body politic. "Their job is simply to straighten out the mess and then to get out" (Huntington 1968, p. 226; Harris 2011; Perlmutter 1974, p. 13; Heper and Güney 1996, p. 620; Shah 2014, p. 205).⁶ These 'diseases' reduce a government's legitimacy, its 'right to rule', which then may provide a toxic environment for coups d'état: "coups occur when a government faces a legitimacy crisis" (Powell 2012, p. 1021).

⁶For a criticism of this perspective see Aziz (2008, pp. 63–64).