

Memory and the Management of Change

Repossessing the Past

Emily Keightley and Michael Pickering

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Memory and the Management of Change

Repossessing the Past

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To Eva and Sam Armfield and Lucy and Joseph Pickering

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Contents

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Remembering Subjects

Across the past two centuries we have turned to various communications technologies to compensate for the elusive quality of human memory. In the predecessor to this book, we explored how two such technologies, photography and recorded music, act as resources for conveying memories or stimulating their reawakening, regardless of whether they are centred on past events, people, or places. We showed that these are the two most salient technologies of memory in everyday life, and we demonstrated at considerable length how they operate within that context, helping to establish patterns of continuity and handle the changing contours of temporal experience. Their salience can be explained in part because they are for many people the most powerful artificial resources for remembering they know, and in part because in their manifest contrast, appealing as they do to different human senses, and being both immediately situated and distantly mediated in their production, they implicitly—and at times explicitly—complement each other. They do so by providing ways of keeping the relatively same past resonant within the present through their alternative yet mutually reinforcing capacities for transmitting or facilitating memory. Our previous book also made clear that neither phonography nor photography is sufficient unto itself as a means of recalling or drawing upon the past. While we showed that both images and sounds in these reproduced forms can be highly effective vehicles or catalysts of memory, it remains the case that they, or any

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other mnemonic conveyance, cannot be relied on for making long-term sense and meaning of the past, or for bringing past and present over the long term into a sustainable and fulfilling relationship. The means by which this is achieved is the mnemonic imagination.

This is the final instalment of a trilogy in which we have dwelt at length on the concept of the mnemonic imagination and shown how it works. The first book was devoted in its entirety to setting out all that we considered as being entailed in the concept. Among many other things we strenuously argued against the long-enduring commonsense separation of memory and imagination, demonstrating that in practice they operate together in an interactive process of productive tension. Obviously they possess different characteristics, and at certain times it is imperative that we insist on keeping them to the fore, but they do not exist in splendid isolation from each other and cannot be considered as irrelative faculties or dimensions for interacting with, orienting to and making sense of what has gone before. Memory acts on the imagination and imagination works with the material provided by memory as we move through our lives, adapt to changing times and change in our ways of seeing and thinking, whether through points of radical transition or through processes of gradual modification. The mnemonic imagination is the product of their dynamic interplay, enabling us creatively to bring together the relentless succession of experience in time and the (re) interpretation of it across time. It is because of its location in the temporalized space between the remembering I/we and the remembered me/us that the concept is also central to thinking about the complex relations between our own pasts and the pasts of others, between personal and popular memory as this traverses the lines of distinction marking out in any particular place or time those who are relatively close to us on the one hand and those who are relatively distant from us on the other. That is why the mnemonic imagination applies to both firsthand situated experience and secondhand mediated experience as we relate to our own pasts and to the pasts of others (Keightley and Pickering 2012).

In the follow-up book we showed how the mnemonic imagination operates with the material provided by photographs and recorded music, using its associations with the past as ways of managing the alternating currents of change and continuity, and holding to them as symbolic ballast against an always uncertain yet nevertheless desired, even longed-for, future: our new home, our dream holiday, our child still within the womb. We demonstrated in example after example how pieces of the past

are brought together and synthesized as interlinked elements of a larger and more coherent whole both in life-narratives and in stories of social groups, with meaning, value and significance being distilled from what we take from the past and what we make of it in an always mobile present where we are looking both at where we have come from and where we might be headed (Pickering and Keightley 2015). Our position in both previous books has been that it is only through the mnemonic imagination that we move from shadow dancing with the past to dancing between past and present in a series of cross-temporal interanimations that allows the past to have, in the continuing stories we make of it, an active and fertile presence within the present. That is why the concept runs centrally through both books and why it remains the predominant concept in the present book. It does so through the specific focus we maintain throughout.

This focus is signalled in both the title and subtitle. The title emphasizes how, with memory as our starting point, we strive to manage the shifts and turns, disruptions and shocks that are integral to our experience in the long term. We strive to manage such change within our own lives and in relation to the lives of those who are close to us. We also manage such change within the contexts of the social formations, institutional structures and cultural media in which we have, in myriad ways, a participatory involvement, and we do so as these formations, structures and media are themselves in continual, although variably paced, processes of change. Such change is multilayered and wide-ranging in how it is manifested, registered and handled. The subtitle of the book emphasizes how in concerted recollection and the development of an ongoing life-narrative we have continuously to take possession again of what the past has bequeathed us in its fragmented forms; we have to turn them into a cohesive pattern that is greater than its parts. In fostering and facilitating this, the mnemonic imagination entails repossession of the past in the interests of long-term patterns of identity, relationship and belonging. Engaging with change and transition in and over time by actively repossessing the past in altered conditions and circumstances is the theme that runs throughout the book. Our main line of interest abides in how memory underlies and embeds the management of change, or more specifically how the mnemonic imagination engages with the forces and patterns of change that affect or have affected us in our everyday lives and our ongoing trajectories of living. Without such engagement, we would be temporally forlorn, faced only with fleeting shadows from the past.

While our two technologies of memory continue to be discussed in this book, they take less of a central position than they did previously. In *Photography, Music and Memory* we were preoccupied by their differential yet complementary roles as vehicles or catalysts of remembering. We attended in great detail both to how they inform and influence voluntary acts of recollection and commemoration, and how they feature in processes of involuntary remembering, when memories come back unbidden and can sometimes almost shock us with their stark vividness or accompanying affective force. Here we take a quite different tack, attending more specifically and more concertedly to how these media figure in the management of change, with such management itself now becoming our major preoccupation. Discussion in this book will be based around our elaboration of the general conceptual issues we wish to highlight throughout. These general issues concerning change and transition are set out in Chap. 2. Their overall relevance is then demonstrated through more specific analytical lenses during the rest of the book. This consists of case study chapters dealing with three key forms of experience faced by everyone at some stage in their lives: breakdowns and ruptures, or at least major alterations, in close relationships with conjugal partners, families, or friends; irreversible moves from one place to another, whether proximate or distant; and intense periods of grief and mourning after the death of a loved one when we have to somehow assimilate this loss into our own ongoing lives. These forms of experience generally entail considerable change in our lives and require extensive and sometimes protracted management, both in relation to ourselves and others. It is because of this that they inform and provide illustrations of our overall preoccupation in the book. Although this is crucial, the primary reason for choosing these case studies is that the experiences to which they relate loomed largest in our fieldwork, conducted between 2010 and 2013, thus showing how common and widespread they are, and how ubiquitous are the questions they raise for acts and processes of recollection.[1] Those questions are addressed in a variety of ways, but they are informed by the more general issues discussed in the first chapter precisely because these issues have also been identified through fieldwork analysis.

The management of change involves many issues. The first of these, which is of focal concern to us throughout the book, turns around the relationship between memory and the constitution of selfhood—how it is formed and maintained, how it changes over time and how such

changes are handled, assessed and used. Our interest in selfhood is primarily centred around its symbiotic relation to memory and the stories people tell of their lives, always seeing these in particular social and cultural contexts. Remembering subjects on the one hand and social arrangements and formations on the other cannot be understood separately; they are mutually constitutive, with neither able to exist without the other. They also coexist in and across time. For this reason, a predominant issue in the relationship of selfhood to memory and remembering is how we look back from the present to the person we were—or believe we were—in years gone by. Looking back in everyday life from the changed perspective of the present is an interest we pursue in each chapter of the book, and individual remembering subjects within small social groups come to the fore here because, as Agnes Heller (1986, p. 158) has put it, if 'we seek to reconstruct everyday life we must take as our point of departure the standpoint of the subject: the participant within everyday life'. Our focus throughout the book on the concrete processes and practices of remembering is intended as a way of offsetting the tendency to see what is social in abstract, fixed forms, and instead conceive of its relations with self in terms of everyday relationships and lives lived in interaction with other lives, in specific conditions and contexts.

Selfhood in relation to the remembering subject may be one of those essentially contested concepts in the human sciences, but it remains indispensable in memory studies, not least because an abiding requirement of all remembering practices is a relative continuity and coherence of self as a sine qua non of being able to take action in the world, however small a part we may play in shaping it. Attaining and maintaining this continuity and coherence through the mnemonic imagination necessarily entails, to a significant degree, the agentic capacity of an authorial self, and while this in itself will receive extensive discussion in the initial chapter, we should make clear at the outset that in developing this discussion we accept the centrality of language in (re)constructing the past, with memories being discursively produced in the course of our everyday social relations, but we disavow linguistic monism and its associated eclipse of selfhood. Likewise, we acknowledge that self-formation and maintenance occur in relations of inequality and power, but we reject a Foucauldian conceptualization of the self-regulating subject constituted entirely in relations of social control. In doing so we agree with Steven Best (1994, p. 46) that this conceptualization has 'reduced consciousness and identity

formation to coercive socialisation and failed to grasp the individualising possibilities created by modernity'. The 'radical antihumanism' represented by this conceptualization of self poses 'the obvious problem of seeking social change without free and active agents'. Christopher Nash (1990, p. 216) backs this up in a well-made point:

> With any consistent obliteration … of discrete persons as agents of discrete events and intentions – or with any description of the subject as simply a manifestation of impersonal collective forces, we can't hope either to account intelligibly for change, explain to ourselves how we feel ourselves to be in disagreement with someone else, or hold anyone responsible for his or her acts. Nash (1990, p. 216)

In contrast to determinist approaches, we work with an alternative nonunitary, antiessentialist conception of the self, one that takes account of relations of power and structures of authority while also recognizing the limited but crucial capacity of exercising individual agency and developing positive forms of self-knowledge. We take that as our starting point in thinking about the remembering subject precisely because of 'the irreducibility of the individual person to the rules of large-scale systems' (Levin 2001, p. 101).

We also pursue this concern with selfhood because we believe it is worth more development than it has thus far received in the fields of both memory studies and media studies.[2] In media studies much work is focused, rightly enough, on national and transnational information and communications technologies, and the media institutions and corporations associated with them. Far less attention is paid to how, at the micro-level settings of everyday life, the content of such technologies is interpreted and used. We hope to offset this imbalance, in however small a way, by continuing the exploration we began in *Photography, Music and Memory* and looking closely at how visual and auditory media are taken up and integrally woven into people's lives, developing in this process an inside-out perspective. Our enquiry in both that book and this is particularly directed towards practices of localization in vernacular memory, or in other words towards how people at meso- and micro-social levels *make their own* the images and sounds that become key elements in their acts, processes and conventions of remembering. It is through attention to these localizing practices that we bring media and memory studies together, but as already mentioned, we're paying rather more attention

here to how our two key mnemonic resources inform and help form the ways in which individuals develop and sustain a sense of selfhood across the shifts and alterations of time.

Remembering is inextricable from the construction of such a sense of selfhood even while it is also an indissolubly social process. This duality has not been adequately taken up in memory studies, mainly because there has been far greater emphasis placed on collective and public forms of remembering, and by contrast a diminution of attention to memory from below—the phenomena of vernacular memory and remembering practices among small groups and by specific individuals. Concern for the ways in which common pasts are communicated has produced a significant body of studies critiquing the hegemonic purposes to which the past is put, whether in national political discourse or in mass-mediated representation. Some of the most significant historical events of the 20th and 21st centuries have been considered in this way, including the memorialization of the Cambodian genocide and the mnemonic commodification of terrorist atrocities (Benzaquen 2014; Hughes 2003; Sturken 2007). Much of this growing range of work is highly commendable, but it has construed collective or cultural memory mainly as an ideological battleground, an arena for the malign or progressive articulation of cultural, social and political power through the construction of narratives which legitimate or disturb established orders of domination and inequality. It is on times of rapid social and cultural change or radical historical rupture that these explorations of memory have most often been focused. As a result, remembering has been widely recognized as one of the processes through which social and cultural change can be managed, from tragic catastrophes such as 9/11 to more gradual but wide-ranging upheavals in social norms and expectations. With historical changes of these kinds, both event and process provide opportunities for struggle over their meaning and significance in the cultural practices which are then deployed in remembering them.

While providing a necessary critique of macro-level sociocultural constructions and uses of the past, this approach to remembering allows the social to be too easily hived off as an abstract domain distant from, and even independent of, the local and localized processes through which remembering is performed in everyday experience. It takes us back to the problem identified earlier, which we must now strive to overcome. The corollary of this abstracting effect is that individuals and their remembering practices are either consigned to the scrutiny of the psychologist or neuroscientist, or they are pressed into service as having an assumed

analogical value in revealing the nature and operation of group-level collectivities, exemplifying, or in aggregate terms illustrating, the ways in which large social categories and societies as a whole actively reconstruct the past, or use the past in interested and partisan ways in order to legitimate various kinds of social exclusion and inequality. These are undoubtedly critical aspects of the social and cultural character of popular remembering, but how popular memory and its articulation in public forms of communication and culture relate to the intersubjective processes of mnemonically constructing personal identities, and a sense of self over time, routinely goes unexamined and unexplained.

Taking the Vernacular Turn

This is in one sense unsurprising. The problem of the precise nature of the relationship between individual and collective remembering *over time* has continued to dog memory studies since Halbwachs's seminal theorization of collective memory and remembering and Bartlett's work on mnemonic schemas in the 1920s (Halbwachs 1980, 1992; Bartlett 1932; Keightley and Pickering 2012, Chaps. 2 and 3). In 2002, Wulf Kansteiner wrote a wide-ranging critique of the failure in collective memory studies to address this issue both methodologically and conceptually. Despite that intervention, there remains a largely unchecked extrapolation from individual memory to vast agglomerations of peoples with little if any sense of what is involved in this transposition.

One of the important points made by Kansteiner (2002, p. 189) was that it is because 'collective memories are based in a society and its inventory of signs and symbols … on the level of families, professions, political generations, ethnic and regional groups, social classes, and nations' that they 'can be explored on very different scales from the most intimate private settings to the public sphere'. What happens across these different scales cannot be run in together. Movement occurs between them, with memories becoming transferred from one scale to another, but what this involves and how the meanings of memories change as a consequence of such movement cannot be properly understood unless the scalar differentiations are themselves built into the analytical equation. In this respect, how individuals remember and how societies remember do not simply parallel each other, not least because of the huge variation in both individual remembering and collective remembering of past events or periods, with collective memory

in particular being found in small social groups, nationwide commemorations and anywhere in between. Kansteiner (2002) rightly cautioned against the imposition of the practices and processes of individual remembering onto the collective. He argued for recognition of the qualitatively distinct processes that collective forms of memory involve and advocated a turn to reception studies in order to address this problem. This is indeed a necessary move in order (among other things) to understand the particular ways in which cultural representations of the past are made our own in practices of vernacular remembering. Yet despite a concern for interpretive processes, Kansteiner retained broad-based public forms of memory as the primary analytical concern in memory studies. This is to get stuck at one scalar level and lose sight of interscalar movement. As an indirect consequence of this, he provided us with precious little sense of mundane collective processes of remembering by those who move in the same social midst.

In memory studies there has been a general failure to address the fundamental problem of how we should conceptualize or analytically approach the relationship between differential scales and modalities of remembering. This is of critical importance when the role of remembering in managing and negotiating change is considered primarily in the register of public culture because it leads, at least by implication, to a top-down model of collective memory. Considering the diversity of reception practices and the meanings they generate is all to the good in helping to offset this, but the kinds of change it sensitizes us to go analytically untackled when memory frames remain large-scale and mass-mediated in character, and when the ways in which change and transition are not only understood but also actively managed in everyday life through a personal/interpersonal mnemonic negotiation of experience are largely overlooked. Furthermore, the complexity of vernacular remembering, the diversity of cultural resources it draws on and incorporates, along with the ways in which the locally intersubjective aspects of social life shape and inform our experience of change, are radically underestimated.

In Kansteiner's account, large-scale public pasts are presented as a kind of primary definer of collective memory, and 'audiences' respond to them in the process of making sense of change over time in a predominantly reactive mode. A range of cultural products which refer to the past are widely distributed, and as a result, we develop a sense of widely shared memories—for example, as with the commemorative media coverage in the UK of the queen's 90th birthday, which mobilized a

predictable repertoire of British national memories weaving together a story of collective progress over the course of her exalted lifetime. For audiences this may have entered into and reinforced the symbolic assemblage of national memory in a variety of ways, contributing to a shared discursive mnemonic terrain, if not a consensual unitary narrative of Britishness and British identity. However, attending critically to this assemblage alone is insufficient because we operate simultaneously as individual and collective rememberers who work with a broad, heterogeneous range of experiences which are always in a myriad ways both intimately ours and broadly shared. We also need to consider how these same symbolic resources are mobilized and made our own in the process of interpreting our own experience. Such experience also opens up such resources to a wide range of use, including that which is critical as well as concurring.

To do this we need an analytical starting point that is an alternative to macro-scale forms of public memory. This would allow the personal and the public dimensions of memory and remembering to be held continually in view of one another across whatever comes between them. As Ricoeur (2004, p. 131) suggested, there is 'an intermediate level of reference between the poles of individual memory and collective memory, where concrete exchanges operate between the living memory of individual persons and the public memory of the communities to which we belong'. This intermediate level of reference is the domain we are referring to as vernacular memory. In our previous book, we looked through the conceptual lens it offered at the ways in which photography and recorded music operate in the interstitial spaces between personal and popular memory (Pickering and Keightley 2015, pp. 8–18; Pickering and Keightley 2013, pp. 97–112). It is within these in-between spaces that vernacular remembering occurs, where both home-mode and mass-produced cultural resources are given local meaning and value through our own everyday processes of making narrative sense of experience. They become vitally important for us in constructing and reconstructing an active sense of cross-temporal transaction as time inexorably passes and our lives inevitably change. For this and other reasons, the interstitial spaces and places of vernacular memory, in which change and transition, both the historically notable and the locally significant, are experienced and negotiated, require the same degree of concern as the large-scale collective memory of spectacular ruptures and cataclysms. We remain preoccupied with the former throughout this book.

Handling Change and Transition

Past experience and present identity are interwoven by narrative regardless of the particular cultural form such narrative takes. It is through the stories we tell of what happened in the past that we generate a sense of who we are in any given present, and of where we are—or believe we are—heading towards in the future. We can think of this process as the bringing together of a life, or more partially of bringing certain lineaments of experience into definition around key themes which help coordinate what we mean when we talk about that which gives a life some degree of unity and coherence. There are many such themes, with the central means in determining how they are brought together in the interests of continually aligning and realigning past experience and present identity being the mnemonic imagination. It is through the workings of the mnemonic imagination that the otherwise fragmentary pieces of the past are assembled, given pattern and order and assigned long-term meaning and significance. Without at least some effort after this we would be temporally adrift, floating hither and thither on currents over which we have little or no control. This process is of course not implemented in social isolation; it is shared most immediately with others close to us and is linked in vernacular memory to various communal narratives shared among families, friends and interest groups. In addition, we are continuously affected by our everyday social encounters and interactions, and some of these may slip out of the usual run and surprise us: a sudden lovelorn glance in a post office, a miscalculated conversational exchange at a bus stop. All of these encounters and interactions nevertheless occur and proceed in the absence of anticipation of any radical severance from what is usually expected in our lives. Such is the scope of everyday human hope, except of course among those who are desperate or who feel that mundanity is central to their existential crisis. Mostly we cleave to such hope, albeit in varying degrees, while at the same time knowing in a broader perspective outside of our daily routines that nothing is guaranteed, nothing is permanent and big-time change is potentially around every corner. Tragedy can strike whenever. A turn of events that is completely unforeseen may lead, by however many or few twists and turns, to major transformation in our lives or in society. This broader perspective is realized when, from time to time, pattern and order, meaning and significance are disrupted, or even ripped apart, by certain events and certain lines of development.

The bringing-together process thus must be reactivated in a way that is a good deal more concerted than is the case when life runs smoothly from one point to another, registering only small measures of change along the way. The pain of loss, the hazards of negotiating disastrous turnabouts of fortune, the perils of marked confusion over what to think or how to act in uncharted social territory—all subsequently call for stories that will make satisfying and sustainable sense of these experiences, thus helping us move beyond them by finding a relatively stable way of looking back at them. Developing new narratives and re-emplotting what has happened to us is central to remembering painful pasts well, or at least in ways that enable us to reach some point of reconciliation with the sense of malaise they have incurred. In doing so we draw on the mnemonic imagination to help us transform the pain, confusion and hurt we have endured and eventually turn the past towards other possibilities of being. Change and transition can of course be either welcome or unwelcome. From losing a parent to moving abroad, we involuntarily and voluntarily break with settled patterns of experience and with our own previous self-narratives. In either scenario, though, the past may jar and grate against a now inharmonious present, and we must then seek out new ways of working with the past as a resource for making sense of who we are and of our experience of ourselves over time if we are not to lose a more or less coherent sense of ourselves as being in the world. In finding them, re-evaluation and reinterpretation of the past exceeds the capacity of memory alone and requires the creative and synthesizing capacity of the mnemonic imagination. We explore the operation of the mnemonic imagination throughout the three case studies in the book. These are presented in a particular order: we move from a topic that has been considerably neglected in memory studies to one where a good deal of attention has been paid, and we finally turn to another that has been a major preoccupation for those who study memory and forgetting in an interdisciplinary manner.

Our first case study chapter is concerned with the ways in which the experience of relationship breakdown is managed through the remembering process. While the degree to which people undergo the disintegration of personal relationships with close ones varies, experiences of this nature feature in everyone's lives at some point. Failures of or fractures within relationships lead to intervals of transition which we have inevitably to navigate; in doing so, we hope to maintain or salvage some viable sense of self-integrity. We do this in face of the punctuating role in

our life-narratives which they retrospectively acquire. Such retrospective significance can of course vary with the magnitude of the remembered experience. From the first time a lover leaves us to a full-scale estrangement from a family member, these separations and ruptures in our personal lives require us to manage the changes they wreak. A key aspect of this is the re-establishment of at least some degree of continuity in our lives, no matter how difficult this may be. In connection with this, we examine the ways in which the mnemonic imagination operates in coming to terms with personal losses and ruptures within intimate relationships. We also discuss how in this context remembering well involves reconciling the disparity between the fuller relationship that was and the residues that remain. Among other things, the role of the mnemonic imagination in this process involves us in considerations of what could have been and what may yet still happen so that, in all of this, we maintain some sense of both perdurance and possibility in our sense of self and our relations with others.

Over the long course of time we may look back and remember certain close relationships we have lost. When we belonged in them they were enormously significant for us, and when they failed and broke apart the experience was full of emotional distress. Since then we have moved on, and memories of those lost relationships have become etiolated, feeble, without strength or substance. These memories are now relatively marginal in our life-narratives; they are stripped of their affective power, and if they are occasionally reactivated, then they are always so in relation to current narrative configurations. Helen Dunmore (2003, p. 145) has pointed to at least two causes of memory recession of this kind. The first of these occurs 'when there's no way of organising the past into a pretty shape, or even a shape you can live with'. The second occurs 'when there's no need to … because you've closed the door on it and you're never going to see any of those people again'. It may well seem strange 'how strong emotions can be so easily diminished as your life continues; how deepest intimacies become commonplace half-recalled memories', but it remains true there is no longer any regret at what we have managed to put behind us and more or less forget. This remains true even when there are photographs still in existence as evidence of those times and people: 'Those must have been my hands that squeezed the shutter, my eye that looked in the viewfinder and checked that everything I wanted was in the frame. But I don't remember any of it. It's all been wiped away with a clean click' (see also Boyd 2016, p. 179). In such

circumstances the mnemonic imagination has no work to do because it has nothing—or nothing with any warrant—to work on. The past has been erased or diluted as a resource, and our forgetting has proved the most fruitful process of handling change, arriving at accommodations with the past and opening up the possibility of renewal. We mention this because over time, memory recession of this kind is often experienced to a greater or lesser degree, and it is important to register this. However, in the case study it is not our major concern. Our concern lies far more with painful pasts that continue to haunt us, hamper us, fill us with unresolved emotional conflicts, leave us feeling paralysed, or present what may seem insuperable obstacles to our moving on. In such cases the mnemonic imagination has much work to do in turning the past into a fecund source that gives positive meaning to what we have done, or at least enables us to think well enough of what we have done that we are able to move forward into a different future. Such work can only be done when the past remains an active resource, when one wholesale section of it has not been wiped clean away; when the past can be actively repossessed and put to work in giving order to experience, or at least some semblance of it; and when the past can be distilled for forms of significance and value.

Our second case study chapter addresses the common experience of spatial mobility by exploring moments in the story of a life or of closely interrelated lives where a change of residence occurs. This occurs across the scales from the smallest of movements, such as flitting from one house to another within the same town during the course of childhood and growing up, to the most radical of movements, such as forced migrations after war or famine, regime change or racial persecution. While there are numberless differences between them, these experiences of changing places are made sense of through the processes of everyday remembering, and they involve assessments of both experiential loss and gain in differing degrees and configurations. This case study examines how these moments of movement feature in our lives and considers how we establish narrative continuity across them. How do changes of place and the conditions under which that change occurs pose challenges for telling the story of ourselves and reconciling not just me-then with me-now, but me-then-there with me-here-now? How do past places serve as evaluative frames for the present, and how do they provide us with reference points through which we can articulate experiences of loss, lack and longing? How do these changes of place implicate broader social and