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The Evolution of UN Sanctions

From a Tool of Warfare to a Tool of Peace,
Security and Human Rights



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ISBN 978-3-319-60004-8 ISBN 978-3-319-60005-5 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-60005-5

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017943510

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Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Introduction

Fifty years ago, Africans fed up with colonialism insisted, together with many other state members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), on strong and comprehensive sanctions against white minority-led Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe). Their concern was not so much that the Rhodesian Front led by Ian Smith had seceded from British rule but that this new white racist party was vehemently fighting black empowerment while aspiring to become a Western bridgehead in Africa, on which, allegedly Soviets and Maoists were encroaching. The leaders of the African movement insisted in tense exchanges with the opposing British delegation, if not on the removal of Smith and his supporters by military force, then at least on comprehensive sanctions to paralyze his regime. Zambia's foreign minister, Simon M. Kapwepwe, also urged the cutting of South Africa's oil exports to Southern Rhodesia. British diplomat George Brown defended Britain's rich trade revenues with South Africa and cited logistical obstacles for opposing the Africans' demand. The stage was set for the Security Council to witness an unprecedented rise of the developing world against big power interests. In its 11 December 1965 edition, *The New York Times* described the confrontation: "Mr. Kapwepwe's solution was powerful; straight bourbon to Mr. Brown's light ale." Yet, the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, fearing for their valuable trade with white-dominated Southern Africa, prevailed. Security Council Resolution 232 imposed "selective, mandatory sanctions" against twelve commodities while omitting oil, critical to Western revenues.

That debate was a window into the inner workings of the Security Council as state members fought over the adoption of the first compulsory UN sanctions regime. The inception of the UN sanctions system had already revealed, warts and all, the self-interested wrangling among deeply divided permanent members of the council that undermined the UN Charter's fundamental values of human welfare. It would not be the last time disparities, animosities, and hypocrisies arose when the Council was called upon to coalesce around objectives of international peace and security.

In 1966, the application of mandatory sanctions was still a novelty, and the Security Council was one of the few venues where have-nots could plead for justice. The NAM had previously mobilized the Security Council to impose sanctions against the apartheid regime of South Africa, even before the Southern Rhodesia

crisis. Symptomatically for the Cold War period, the NAM did not succeed and only obtained voluntary sanctions against apartheid in 1963, with Resolution 182. A binding South Africa sanctions resolution would follow more than ten years later, after resistance by the leading Western countries finally faded, making possible the adoption of Resolution 418 in 1977. Which of South Africa's violations of international norms were actually turning points for Western states is not entirely clear. Had apartheid finally become sufficiently unpalatable to justify the UK's and US's policy reversal or was the actual trigger point the growing opposition to South Africa's rapid but illegal advancement of its nuclear weapons program¹?

However muddy the environment of UN sanctions may appear to some or how disjointed their implementation and subservience to big power politics tend to be, skeptics should imagine a world without them. For modern citizens of the world, it might be difficult to imagine a world where states never discuss or regulate global emergencies and humanitarian crises in a permanent mediation forum such as the Security Council. That was the norm over many centuries of mayhem, atrocities, and mass starvation. Not until the nineteenth century did the contours of the modern multilateral world start to take shape with the Paris Declaration of 1856 that established maritime law and outlawed piracy. This was followed by the Geneva Convention of 1864 to reform the treatment of wounded and sick soldiers on the battlefield which led to the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Despite these and other emerging instruments to regulate the interactions of states, throughout much of its history, humanity was left with no alternatives but to endure the consequences of disputes, wars, and occupations.

Apart from the mechanism to unwind the proliferation sanctions in Iran, there are at the time of writing 13 UN sanctions regimes, perhaps as many as one hundred sanctions regimes if EU and African Union sanctions, as well as those of the United States and dozens of other countries, are included. Only the Security Council, responsible for maintaining and restoring international peace and security, has the legal authority to apply globally binding sanctions. The UN applies these coercive policies to reinforce internationally accepted norms of peace and security, usually enshrined in international law. Typically, they are expected to help to restrain cross-border aggression, prevent terrorism or WMD proliferation, and protect against human rights abuses and sexual and gender-based violence, including those targeting children. Unilateral sanctions by individual states or those applied by international regional organizations contrast with UN sanctions, in that they do not always reflect UN Charter principles. Instead, they are sometimes reminiscent of old-style economic warfare strategies aimed at enforcing national security interests. The intermingling of objectives further complicates distinctions between UN and other sanctions, as some states attempt at times to encourage sanctions resolutions couched in the language of UN Charter principles when in fact the actual policy objectives are related to national security interests. A recent case in point is the use

¹The preamble to Resolution 418 (1977) expressed "grave concern" about South Africa's nuclear weapons program, and Paragraph 4 of the same resolution slipped in the following decision: "Further decides that all States shall refrain from any co-operation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons."

of the Responsibility to Protect² principle in Resolution 1970 (2011) on Libya when, as it turned out, the hidden aspiration of some powerful states was regime change.

Countries and by extension their regional organizations are required to accept and carry out Security Council decisions as an obligation of UN membership. In the rough and tumble of international politics, these legal obligations are often overshadowed by aggressive demands of other technical or regional organizations or states, fueling rivalry and consternation among some states and the private sector. An example is the skepticism that the 120 member states of the Non-Aligned Movement bring to all sanctions systems, including those applied by the Security Council. Sanctions require a high degree of investment in capital and skills to get compliance right. The more complex the conflicts and threats, the more complex the implementation mechanisms required to make sanctions effective. Sometimes, detractors see these high financial and institutional costs as an opportunity to agitate against sanctions. They forget that the alternatives—particularly armed confrontation—are far more costly in treasure and blood. In an ideal world, UN sanctions offer a path to a peaceful, rules-based world order, while the alternatives may lead to global governance that will more readily employ military force.

The multilayered world of sanctions has attracted its fair share of academic attention. Our work takes a very distinct approach by insisting on the unique qualities and political purposes that separate UN sanctions from other sanctions regimes, coercive economic policies, or economic warfare used by regional organizations or individual countries. The central question of this book is whether the UN sanctions system fulfills Charter objectives, foremost the UN's role to promote fundamental human values. We present an analysis that may not reflect the perspective of certain powerful voices. Many other authors focus on bringing some normative structure to what at first glance seems to be a political art rather than science. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, and Barbara Oegg from the Peterson Institute deliver consistently important academic analysis and definitional efforts by distinguishing, for example, between “senders” (sanctions issuers) and “targets” that are typically aggressors such as a country, individual, organization, or company (Hufbauer et al. 2007). Another developing delineation is among conflict types to which sanctions are typically applied. Andrea Charron has delivered the most recent study on this subject by breaking 29 UN sanctions regimes into four categories: interstate, intrastate, international norm-breaking states, and support to terrorism (Charron 2013). The disastrous unintended humanitarian and socioeconomic consequences caused by some sanctions have drawn significant scholarly and, even more

²The outcome document of the 2005 United Nations World Summit (A/RES/60/1, para. 138–140) delivered the first official definitions of the three pillars of the Responsibility to Protect: States have the primary responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement; the international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist states in fulfilling this responsibility; the international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other means to protect populations from these crimes, including collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The concept was further elaborated in the Secretary-General's 2009 report (A/63/677) on implementing the responsibility to protect.

so, politically and advocacy-driven attention. David Cortright and George A. Lopez were the preeminent observers and researchers of the transition from the early post-Cold War comprehensive targeting of states to the current subtler sanctions practices of targeting individuals and entities. In addition to their influential book, *The Sanctions Decade* (Cortright and Lopez 2000), they have published over the years many other books and research reports on sanctions-related developments.

Going beyond analytical assessments of these cases, many studies also focus on how unintended results impair sanctions effectiveness, undermine political will, or signal the need to abolish the use of this political tool.³ Because of the inherent contentious questions that sanctions raise, their effectiveness is by far the most hotly analyzed and debated topic among sanctions academics.

The most dedicated researchers of the effectiveness of sanctions are Hufbauer et al. who for over 35 years have compiled data, developed performance criteria, and provided important analytical leadership on the impact of economic sanctions. In *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, they assess sanctions effectiveness in terms of their contribution to foreign policy goals, by achieving a single purpose (among multiple purposes), i.e., coercing change in the target's behavior. They acknowledge that behavioral change is the most difficult objective to achieve and that by using other criteria, some cases they considered failures could be considered to be successes. The authors posit that economic sanctions are normally brought to bear along with other tools such as diplomacy and the use of force and offer seven recommendations for improving conditions that enhance their effectiveness. Sanctions success varies according to the foreign policy goal and is higher for modest policy goals (51 per cent) than for more ambitious goals such as regime change or democratization (31 per cent, 34 per cent of total cases respectively).

Robert A. Pape in *Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work* (Pape 1997) reexamines the Hufbauer data to "assess the independent usefulness of sanctions." He concludes that Hufbauer's study is flawed because it fails to control for the use of force and fails to differentiate between economic sanctions and economic warfare. The difference, he says, is that economic sanctions seek to coerce the target by inflicting economic pain, while economic warfare does not: "to the extent that it seeks to coerce, it does so by persuading the target state that its reduced military strength makes certain political objectives unattainable."

Daniel A. Baldwin, in his article "The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice," holds that the debate about whether or not sanctions work is "mired in a scholarly limbo." The questions of whether sanctions should be used and whether they work are related but separate, and answers for either can only be found by considering costs, including those for alternative policy instruments such as diplomacy and the use of force.

³The pioneer of unintended socio-economic and humanitarian consequences is Johan Galtung and his study, *On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia*; *World Politics, Volume 19, Issue 3, April 1967*, pp. 378–416. For a broader examination, see also C. Daase and C. Friesendorf (eds.), *Rethinking Security Governance: The Problem of Unintended Consequences*; Routledge 2010

A more recent exercise was undertaken in a joint effort between Sue Eckert of the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University, Thomas Biersteker of the Graduate Institute and Marcos Tourinho of the Center for International Relations of the Fundação Getulio Vargas (Biersteker and Eckert 2016). They segregate only UN targeted sanctions regimes into distinct episodes and quantify the effectiveness with the assistance of over 250 criteria. With the emergence of the European Union as the world's most prolific sanctions issuer, a specialized body of research and analysis is being developed with the work of Francesco Giumelli (Giumelli 2013). He also follows the mold of the new generation of sanctions academics by segmenting sanctions into distinct episodes and by measuring their effectiveness according to their core functions, identified as coercion, constraint, or signaling. While Hufbauer and his colleagues have built a strong analytical track record of the working of economic sanctions, academic attention lags in terms of the mechanics of related restrictions that the UN regularly applies. Insufficient attention is being paid to the principles that determine the success of embargoes on conventional and unconventional arms (WMD), commodities, or luxury goods; individual travel bans, blocking, or intrusive inspections of international aviation and maritime transportation means; or measures used to curtail diplomatic, cultural, or athletic activities.

While this book provides a concise description of the typically applied UN sanctions measures, its principal aim is to answer a central question:

Does the current use of UN sanctions attain the UN's high principles and aspiration to promote human rights and peace and security, and if not, what needs to be done to better achieve this objective of overarching importance to the world today and in the future?

Key Points

To explore whether UN sanctions are used in a manner consistent with the underlying values of human welfare as enshrined in the UN Charter, the first part of this book describes the creation of the UN sanctions system and its continuous shaping by the struggles of war and peace over the past fifty years. However, the transition from the traditional tool of economic warfare to the UN's modern, preventive, protective, and coercive sanctions system began long before the UN was established in 1946. Sanctions practices developed gradually over centuries, as the play for power evolved from leveraging brute dominance to orchestrating a balance of power to, finally, the formulation of international legal and collective security arrangements. The drivers were always autocrats, rulers, and democratically elected leaders—or more to the point, their pomposities, deceptions, and, occasionally, virtuous aspirations for the common good. Centuries of trial and error and deep thinkers and grand dreamers such as Dante Alighieri, Hugo Grotius, Immanuel Kant, and Woodrow Wilson gradually brought us to today's UN sanctions ecosystem, and its very

modest legal roots in only one paragraph—Article 41 of the UN Charter (United Nations 1945)—provide the legal authorization for its use, without even mentioning the term “sanctions.”

This book describes the efforts that went into converting the original economic warfare blueprint with which US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin won WW2 into a system that is supposed to be respectful of global principles set forth in the Preamble of the UN Charter and in even more concise language in the four purposes declared in Article 1:

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Unsurprisingly, meeting these high-minded guiding principles presents a challenge to the international community as it deals with serial crises and emergencies. The Cold War smothered the Security Council’s power to effectively apply UN sanctions until, with the creation of the powerful third global group, the NAM states, sanctions were finally put to use for their intended purpose of promoting human welfare through the maintenance of peace and security, as enshrined in the UN Charter. But big power politics quickly snuffed out these hopeful beginnings. Only during the unipolar world that emerged after the Cold War were sanctions consistently utilized as part of the UN’s conflict-resolution policies. Some states, particularly voices from the African continent where most sanctions were applied, soon refuted UN sanctions as merely another policy tool to assert Western dominance.

A fresh chapter in sanctions policies had to be written when unprecedented challenges arose with a new class of threat actors. International peace and security was no longer under attack by state actors alone; armed groups, militias, organized crime groups, insurgents, and terrorist organizations took aim at countries and entire world regions, some acting out of long-held grievances over colonial abuses, others from raw hunger for power and economic gain. Often lacking clearly demarcated territorial boundaries, tangible institutions or assets that could be confronted with traditional tools

of statecraft, these new conflict vectors also proved immune to traditional state-to-state comprehensive embargoes. To contain these new actors, asymmetric policies and sanctions responses were developed, called “smart sanctions” by optimists until the more technical term “targeted sanctions” prevailed. These new sanctions tools forced the international community toward heretofore untested collaboration with private sector actors, principally companies and civil society groups.

There are some positive signs. Conflict-resolution policies of the past 25 post-Cold War years, including the UN sanctions component, have proved to be surprisingly effective. More conflicts have subsided than new wars have ignited, and the economic prospects are markedly better than they were even ten years ago, for example, in Africa and Latin America. Among the many indicators for improvements, international tracking efforts of direct and indirect conflict mortality show marked decreases.⁴ And yet, the precarious worsening of relations between the P5, BRICS⁵, and many other regionally influential states is an ominous signal of increasingly dysfunctional collective security arrangements.

Analytical Framework

Rather than treating all sanctions regimes as a monolithic block of equal norm-enforcing interventions, practitioners are keenly aware of the disparities and distinctions in policies and objectives that divide the many senders of sanctions, whether the United Nations, regional organizations or individual states. Glossing over the distinctly different strategies of the various categories of senders causes confusing and faulty conclusions about underlying policies and sanctions effectiveness that undermine confidence in the collective security arrangement that the Security Council is tasked to implement. For this reason, the present study concerns itself only with the workings of the UN system. In the analytical process, the many layers of unilateral and multilateral actions and interests—that are often counterproductive to UN objectives—are peeled away. The goal is to provide scrutiny, from the perspective of practitioners, of the mechanics of Security Council sanctions, the political ecosystem, and inhibitors that weaken the instrument.

The analysis will unfold over five stages, beginning with the singling out of the major sanctions resolutions that serve as the chief drivers for each of the 30 UN cases, including the voluntary regime in Cambodia, and separating the case of the former Yugoslavia as one of the breakaway republics from that of Kosovo. The next step assesses the language of resolutions to identify the stated political objectives and the measures with which these objectives are addressed. The conflict dynamics as reported by official reporting entities and primary and other credible actors are followed, and an individual assessment of the performance of each sanctions measure is also conducted. Finally, in the fourth step, an overall assessment of relevant

⁴See, for example, annual reports of the Human Security Report Project at <http://hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/human-security-report.aspx> (accessed 30 Jan 2017).

⁵BRICS includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

factors identifies to what degree the UN's fundamental human values and political objectives have been met. For the fifth and concluding step, the many analytical threads are pulled together to formulate observations and recommendations for policy makers.

Covering as ambitious a theme as the evolution of coercive policies and the implementation of all UN sanctions regimes over a fifty-year span requires the examination of a large library of contemporaneous documents as well as studies and interpretation of many historic events written from today's vantage point. Attention to the overall objective must be maintained in order to avoid the production of an extensive history lesson that misses the point of the book. Any methodical analysis of the available quantity of texts requires careful prioritizing. The preferred choice was therefore to select, wherever available, original works by innovators and their detractors or contemporaries, who commented on or recorded events. Works that contextualize coercive policies and implementation mechanisms and evidence-based research within the prevailing political dynamics are also consulted for this study. The researching and validation of historic contributions toward gradually evolving multilateral sanctions practices require attention to celebrated and well-known figures. In some instances, however, these celebrities stood on the shoulders of lesser-known or even obscure figures of the past. The decisive criterion for whether to cite and rely on a historic source is finally based on whether their thoughts and writings impacted the historical evolution of coercive policies in the short or long term.

The long historical arc of sanctions has created difficult definitional challenges for most of the key terms associated with the sanctions system. There is a long history of aversion to using the term "sanctions" because of the tool's coercive power. Diplomats, in particular, prefer whenever possible not to be associated with the word "sanctions." The tendency has been toward avoidance of the use of the term in favor of more benign terms or diversionary concepts such as blockade, embargo, prohibition, restriction, injunction, edict, decree, forfeiture, punitive measure, retribution, quarantine, and—the UN's favorite term—"measures." For the purpose of this study, actions that apply temporary coercive means without military force to compel a state, a region, or individuals and entities to change their behavior or contain the impact of their behavior, are considered to be synonymous with sanctions.

The terms "peace" and "security" pose similar ambiguities because they signify the benchmark for sanctions aspirations. Is peace the absence of war, and must the absence of war be codified with a treaty or peace agreement in order to establish security? Does any type of armed hostility represent a threat to both peace and security? In the context of the UN and the League of Nations, defining sanctions is a core institutional task. According to Article 39 of Chap. VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council must "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42"—that authorize the imposition of "measures." Criteria such as "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" become far more complicated in the absence of a common global interpretation of their meaning. Autocratic rulers of the past and present may understand the challenge entirely in the context of conditions relative to their

position, rule, and support system, ignoring the conditions the general population must endure. Highly organized, democratic societies living in peace might expect nothing less than the absence of any form of violence, regardless whether triggered by armed insurrection, organized crime, or random violence, in order to consider that their condition is secure. Because political actions and reactions are often driven not by academic insights but by subjective and popular perceptions of any given situation, the authors will define “peace” and “security,” for the entire historical scope of the study, within their contemporaneous context, as defined in sanctions resolutions and related Security Council statements. Specifically, each UN sanctions resolution results after the Security Council has determined whether a threat to international peace and security exists.

Structure

The book is structured in three parts, the first one defining the UN sanctions system and narrating its history, evolving structures, and purposes and adjustments made to the system in the face of emerging challenges. The second part describes the political context of the 30 UN sanctions cases and the struggles between countries who would like their values and interests to be reflected in UN sanctions and those who disagree with either these values or UN sanctions in general. Another aspect these narratives explore is the attempt to turn UN sanctions policies over time from an indiscriminate and punitive economic warfare tool into a coercive policy mechanism to protect the human values at the heart of the UN Charter.

The narrative starts in Part I with WW2 and expansion by the US of its rich experience of economic warfare to lead an international alliance against the Axis powers (Chap. 1). The visionary force of President Franklin D. Roosevelt drove US diplomacy with its military and economic prowess to unite the UK, Russia, and China to create the foundations of the UN (Chap. 2). Benefitting from the less successful sanctions of the post-WW1 League of Nations, the planners of the UN sought improvements and banked on the major world powers’ ability to ensure a peaceful UN-facilitated world order (Chap. 3). However, the moment the UN took up operations, the world’s greatest powers became the principal causes of violence and instability, paralyzing the UN for the duration of the Cold War. For a brief, deceptive interval, the sanctions dynamics seemed to shift from the Security Council to the General Assembly. But it was the creation of the NAM that prodded sanctions in the direction of the UN Charter’s principles of human values (Chap. 4).

As the Cold War came to an end, conflicts seemed to almost exclusively fester among NAM state members. But with the end of the Cold War and the abandoning of former allies of the superpowers, the humanitarian costs of indiscriminate comprehensive sanctions (those including blanket trade bans) were no longer acceptable to a global public that expected the end of human carnage and rich peace dividends. A firestorm of protests against the humanitarian impact of sanctions forced rethinking, reform, and the creation of targeted sanctions (Chap. 5). With the rise of terrorism, however, many of these innovations were swept away by the broad brush of

retribution that demanded quick and unapologetic punishment instead of precise targeting of the most important threat actors. Once the pendulum had swung too far, more designated individuals and entities voiced their protest, and many industries were facing impossible implementation tasks. The UN Charter's essentially human welfare mandate became a powerful counterforce for due process and far more careful evidentiary standards for individual targeted sanctions (Chap. 6). As the sanctions system recovered to include the protection of human values and promotion of human welfare, the repertoire of five distinct groups of measures has grown ever more sophisticated: arms embargo, travel ban, asset freeze, luxury sanctions, and diplomatic restrictions (Chap. 7).

If a combination of these measures contributes valuable coercive force to the resolution of today's conflicts, widely applied commodity sanctions appear to miss their mark as they have throughout history (Chap. 8). Finally, the first part of the book concludes with a discussion of emerging threats and specifically how the Security Council sometimes grapples with abuses of cyber space. These efforts are disproportionately weak compared with the very rapid evolution of cryptology and distributed ledger computing or many other cutting-edge technologies that propel conflict mechanisms into new, unknown, and dangerous dimensions (Chap. 9).

Part II of the book travels along the trajectory of economic warfare toward preventive and protective UN sanctions on the narratives of the early comprehensive sanctions regimes. It starts with the Cold War sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and South Africa (Chap. 9). The history tracks the unfolding humanitarian neglect that became apparent, albeit belatedly, with sanctions on Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, and Haiti (Chap. 11). The emergence of asymmetric threats from non-state armed groups in Somalia, Cambodia, Angola, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Liberia, Congo (Zaire), Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, Libya, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, Yemen, and South Sudan takes the newly reformed and now targeted UN sanctions regimes toward new and unexplored implementation challenges (Chap. 12). At the same time, the rise of international terrorism, first confronted with UN sanctions in Libya and Sudan, stretches to a global mandate against the violent insurgencies of al-Qaeda and ISIL, with a peculiar terrorism episode in Lebanon, while driving the UN sanctions implementation system into new humanitarian challenges, reforms, improvements, and enhanced due process practices (Chap. 13). While UN targeted sanctions proved to assist in the resolution of conflicts in developing states, new dimensions of targeted sanctions arose with the nonproliferation projects of Iran and North Korea and the undoing of the autocratic and wealthy Libyan government of Muammar Gaddafi (Chap. 14).

Part III offers a comprehensive qualitative analysis of the narratives in Part II in order to arrive at a coherent understanding of the circumstances under which UN sanctions were applied and implemented consistent with UN Charter purposes and aspirations. The first analytical effort is to identify the political context and objectives that led to specific sanctions measures in each of the 30 cases, whether these objectives were met, and whether the overall outcome was consistent with, and advanced UN values and purposes. The second qualitative analysis is a determination of specific ways in which these values and purposes of the UN are met or not met. Finally, the authors offer policy recommendations for addressing some of the concerns and issues raised in this study.

Preface

When we left our respective positions in the UN sanctions system and after having spent many years on the diplomatic, field, and conflict front lines, it was with a sense of unfulfilled purpose. We considered the UN sanctions system indispensable for an effective multilateral security arrangement. We also saw its susceptibility to misperceptions and poor implementation, and we recognized its frequent failure to deliver in restoring and maintaining international peace and security while respecting underlying UN Charter principles of human welfare.

Deciding that our work was unfinished, we partnered with states and nongovernmental organizations to formulate sanctions-specific UN system-wide training and implementation skills enhancement courses. We also began to write about sanctions from our practitioners' point of view. Interested states embraced our proposals to engage in a sustained exploration of possible improvements, for example, with the High Level Review of UN Sanctions, sponsored by Australia, Finland, Germany, Greece, and Sweden (2014–2015).

We also participated in research endeavors with academic institutions and international organizations around the world. We worked with the African Union Peace and Security Council on their sanctions handbook; taught courses at major universities to undergraduate and graduate students, as well as specialized training for advanced professionals in the public and private sector. We participated in conferences with sanctions policy makers of some of the most powerful states, while pursuing projects with the most destitute and conflict-wracked communities around the world. Together with dozens of sanctions academics, we participated in a quantitative assessment of sanctions performance. All these efforts still left us frustrated with the status quo.

The fissure between intellectual and sometimes theoretical discussions and the gritty needs of the real world caused us to doubt the utility of seeking improvements in UN sanctions practices. The glaring reality is that four-fifths of the world's population are never even represented, i.e., never show up where decision-makers gather to seek enhancements to UN sanctions mechanisms. Why do the representatives of the poor and weak, the majority of the global populace and the most frequent victims of international threat actors, not participate in shaping one of the UN's most

powerful, non-violent conflict-resolution tools? Despite the preventive and protective role of sanctions, as articulated by many participants to the High Level Review of UN Sanctions, overall support for UN sanctions implementation is low. Many state representatives offered sobering insights: *We have no purpose for UN sanctions. Others make decisions that we must implement. But we don't believe that sanctions help us.*

Many foreign policy experts appear to be unfazed by the contradiction that those who most urgently need fair, transparent, and effective sanctions appear to be uninterested in taking advantage of these mechanisms. Some shunt aside their non participation as an unfortunate but inevitable consequence of third-world government officials preoccupied with all kinds of ills such as illiberalism, terrorism, socialism, nationalism, fascism, and, of course, always corruption.

In our view, these answers are too easy, and erroneous as well, built on a fundamentally flawed analysis of the political context in which sanctions are applied. To fully understand the claim often made by academics and others that “sanctions don’t work” requires an evaluation of sanctions from the perspectives of senders, targets, and innocents who suffer unintended hardships.

Does international peace and security hold the same meaning or importance to people in different parts of the world? For example, for many who live in poverty and endemic violence, their basic needs such as food, shelter, and individual security are often even more urgent matters. They and their leaders cannot be faulted for their inability to relate to the all-consuming focus of some on counterterrorism or nonproliferation. Borrowing from the brilliant insight of Pulitzer Prize-winning Viet Thanh Nguyen in his book *The Sympathizer*, for them, perhaps, nothing is more important than international peace and security.

Our book will have served its ultimate purpose if it inspires others to reexamine the UN’s conflict-resolution practices, including sanctions, from a perspective freed from the well-worn mindset that currently dominates most published work. We do not advocate against ideas of specific states or groups of states. However, we believe that if multilateral tools and the UN are expected to continue to play a valuable role in history, it is time to consider viewpoints and perspectives other than those that currently dominate the sanctions agenda.

New York, New York
February 2017

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Acronyms

ADFL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
AFRC-RUF	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council-Revolutionary United Front
AG	Australia Group
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AML	Anti-money laundering
ANC	African National Congress
AQAP	Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AU RTF	African Union Regional Task Force
BDA	Banco Delta Asia
BINUCA	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, and China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CAR	Central African Republic
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CIAT	Comité International d'Accompagnement de la Transition
CNDP	Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPP	Cambodian People's Party
CTC	Counter-Terrorism Committee
CTF	Counter-terrorist financing
DARPA	US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea
EC	European Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group

ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEBC	Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission
ENDIAMA	National diamond company of Angola
EU	European Union
EUFOR RCA	European Union military operation in the Central African Republic
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FDR	Franklin Delano Roosevelt
FAPC	Forces Armées du Peuple Congolais
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FUNCINPEC	Cambodia's royalist political party
G8	Group of Eight (France, Germany, Italy, the UK, Japan, the US, Canada, and Russia)
G20	Group of Twenty
GA	General Assembly
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters
GNC	General National Congress
GOE	Group of Experts
GSSP	Special Presidential Security Group, Garde Républicaine
GURN	Government of Unity and National Reconciliation
HCOC	Hague Code of Conduct
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICFY	International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
ICGL	International Contact Group on Liberia
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IEDs	Improvised explosive devices
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
IRISL	Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line
IS	Islamic State
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
KFOR	Kosovo Force
LAIP	Libya Africa Investment Portfolio
LAS	League of Arab States
LIA	Libyan Investment Authority
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MESAN	Movement for the Social Evolution of Black Africa
MICIVIH	Mission Civile Internationale en Haïti

MIF	Multinational Interception Force
MINUCI	United Nations Mission in Ivory Coast
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MISCA	International Support Mission in the Central African Republic
MISSANG	Angolan technical military mission
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MONUA	UN Observer Mission in Angola
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFZ	No-fly zone
NCRI	National Council of Resistance of Iran
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NTC	National Transitional Council
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFAC	Office of Foreign Assets Control of the US Department of the Treasury
OFFP	Oil-for-Food Programme
ONUC	Opération des Nations Unies au Congo
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PDK	Party of Democratic Kampuchea
P3	Permanent three members of the Security Council
P5	Permanent five members of the Security Council
POE	Panel of Experts
PICAO	Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SAMCOMM	Sanctions Assistance Missions Communications Centre (also SAMCOM, SAM, SAM's)
SC	Security Council
SNC	Supreme National Council
SLM/SLA	Sudanese Liberation Movement/Sudanese Liberation Army
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SSLA	South Sudan Liberation Movement
STCE	Strategic Trade Control Enforcement Implementation Guide (WCO)

THAAD	Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
TSZ	Temporary security zone
TWEA	Trading with the Enemy Act
UFDR	Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union—United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNAMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAVEM II	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICOI	United Nations International Commission of Inquiry
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNITAF	Unified Task Force in Somalia
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSA	United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
UNSTAMIH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTCOK	United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea
USC	United Somali Congress
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WCO	World Customs Organization
WEU	Western European Union
WFP	World Food Programme
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction
WW1	World War I, World War 1
WW2	World War II, World War 2
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front
ZANU/ZAPU	Zimbabwe African National Union/Zimbabwe African People's Union

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CCSI is a partnership of sanctions practitioners led by Enrico Carisch and Loraine Rickard-Martin, providing advice, analysis, and training on sanctions compliance and implementation. CCSI partners have been practitioners for more than twenty years in effective sanctions implementation policies for the public and private sectors. The partners work with states, international and nonprofit organizations, companies, and academics institutions to enhance all aspects of sanctions policy and implementation and develop supporting mechanisms, services, and tools.

CCSI has pioneered and conducted UN system-wide sanctions training and has been retained by numerous UN delegations in preparation for their work on the Security Council and by companies for enhancing their sanctions compliance measures. The CCSI partners initiated and co-organized, together with Sue Eckert of the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs (Brown University), the High Level Review of UN Sanctions and follow-on processes. The HLR was supported financially by the governments of Australia, Finland, Germany, Greece, and Sweden and has resulted, among others, in the November 2015 release of the HLR compendium and the 2017 release of the Assessment Report: Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities Resulting from the Recommendations of the Compendium of the High-Level Review of UN Sanctions.