The Mass Deportation of Poles to Siberia, 1863–1880

ANDREW A. GENTES

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palgrave
macmillan

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ISBN 978-3-319-60957-7 ISBN 978-3-319-60958-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-60958-4

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017944565

Cover image: © A. Sochaczewski, Farewell, Europe! [detail], 1894, MW collection/ Independence Museum, Warsaw

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

For Dinah

Preface

The uprising began in Warsaw on January 22 (January 10 o.s.), 1863 and soon spread to disaffected elements throughout the Kingdom of Poland and the so-called Western Provinces—the latter a region roughly equivalent to modern-day Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. During the two years prior to the January Uprising, patriotic demonstrations rocked the region. In October 1861, the Russian viceroy of Poland declared martial law. He banned public gatherings and issued arrest warrants for certain leaders.

The vast majority of insurrectionists were ethnic Poles. Fighting alongside them were much smaller numbers of Lithuanian peasants and members of other ethnic groups. Most hailed from the petty nobility (i.e., the Polish *szlachta*) or town estates, though peasants and wealthy estate owners also accounted for a significant portion of the insurrectionists. Jews, who mostly lived in the Western Provinces, played a small role in the January Uprising, in contrast to their role in the uprising of 1830–1831. In 1862, Alexander II considerably broadened the rights of Poland's Jews (though not for Jews living in the Western Provinces), and this served to derail their participation in the protests that culminated in the January Uprising. Some Jews did join the uprising; by and large, however, they maintained an allegiance to St. Petersburg and hoped that the rights they won in 1862 would not be lost.

Hundreds of ethnic Russians and foreign nationals, inspired by the Poles' national aspirations and their resistance to the imperial Goliath, joined the struggle. Russian university students, awakening to the nascent populist movement, were inspired to leave their studies and join the uprising. Other Russians left the military to do so. Some foreigners were

inspired by Giuseppe Garibaldi and his march on Rome a year earlier. Most probably knew their cause was doomed, but nonetheless regarded it as a romantic and heroic effort. One such foreign fighter was Francesco Nullo, of Bergamo, Italy, who formed an Italian legion of twenty fighters. He and most of his associates had been officers in Garibaldi's army. Arriving just in time for the Battle of Krzykawka on May 5,1863, the legion was destroyed. Nullo and several others were killed; the rest of his men escaped to Galicia or were captured and exiled to Siberia.

The uprising's social heterogeneity rendered it a truly popular rebellion, a fact that helps explain the harshness with which Alexander II suppressed it. Within the empire, ethnic Russians accounted for only slightly more than half the total population, and though there is no indication that the January Uprising inspired other subject populations to rebel at the time, the emperor undoubtedly calculated that a harsh repression of the Poles would forestall problems elsewhere. St. Petersburg may also have been alarmed by the Taiping Rebellion in China, still raging at the time of the January Uprising, and which involved an army of as many as half-a-million peasants battling the troops of the Qing dynasty. Ever since the Time of Troubles during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the Russian Crown had learned to fear the fury its subjects could unleash.

For nearly a year, soldiers led by General Mikhail N. Murav´ëv and other top commanders fought to reassert Russian dominance over Poland and the Western Provinces. Murav´ëv's pacification methods won him renown as "The Hangman." Murav´ëv did summarily execute many insurrectionists. Yet, with his emperor's approval, he deported many more. Ultimately, the Russian government would deport tens of thousands of Poles and other residents from the Kingdom of Poland and the Western Provinces during the period 1863–1880. Most deportees were sent to Siberia.

Whereas historians have written about the January Uprising, little scholarship exists on the insurrectionists' actual deportation to, and exile in, Siberia, and nearly all that does exist is written in Russian. *The Mass Deportation of Poles to Siberia, 1863–1880* is the first book in English to discuss the deportation of the Polish insurrectionists, their experiences in Siberia, the tsarist government's administration of them, and the consequences of one of the largest forced migrations of Europeans prior to World War I. This is not a simple tale of heroes and villains. It is first of all an analysis of why the Russian government chose certain policies, and how it enacted (or failed to enact) these policies. This is a study of the tsarist bureaucracy, with a particular focus on the Siberian context. Secondly,

and no less importantly, this is a social history of the Polish insurrectionists in exile. It seeks to illustrate both the realities they faced as well as the world they made for themselves. Many notable and educated Poles were exiled as a result of the January Uprising, and many later wrote memoirs about which other historians have written. However, most of the Polish exiles were neither of noble birth nor particularly well-educated. This study examines this group of so-called subaltern actors in particular so as to return them to the historical narrative.

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Acknowledgements

I wish to thank all the librarians and archivists who made available the sources on which this study is based. Their dedication to their professions is most sincerely appreciated. Thanks to my editor, Emily Russell, and everyone else at Palgrave Macmillan for seeing this book through to publication. Thanks to my colleagues, Sarah Badcock and Ted Weeks, for reading portions of the manuscript. I benefited from their comments and corrections as well as those of my anonymous reviewer, even if I did not always agree with them. I alone remain responsible for any errors. I would also like to acknowledge a debt to S. A. Mulina for her book on those Polish insurrectionists exiled to Western Siberia, which helped me to better discuss that region in addition to Eastern Siberia. Finally, I am especially grateful to Mr. Witold Alexander Herbst for gifting me a copy (along with warm encouragements) of his hard-to-find translation of Ignacy Drygas's memoir.

A Note on Terminology and Usage

This book uses a modified version of the Library of Congress transliteration system for Cyrillic that leaves out diacritical marks at the end of words so as to facilitate use of the possessive "s." Both the reference notes and bibliography fully conform to the system.

My research for this study is primarily based on Russian archival sources and publications. I have had to transliterate into English Polish personal and place names that were originally transliterated (sometimes erroneously) into Russian. In terms of place names, I have tried to avoid confusion by giving, first, the Russian version and then, in parentheses, the Polish. For some places, e.g., Ostrow, I give the German version first, followed by the Polish. The names of minor towns and villages are generally rendered only in their Polish versions. In terms of personal names, I have done as much cross-referencing as possible to assure that my transliterations faithfully recreate the original Polish spellings in the Latinate alphabet. Toward this effort the website "Genealogia Polaków" (http://www.genealogia.okiem.pl/powstanies/) has proved especially helpful. However, many names that appear in this book belong to subaltern historical actors whose names could not be found, so I have relied on educated guesswork as to their correct spellings. For this reason, any readers hoping to use this book for genealogical purposes should proceed with caution.

Tsarist Russia used the Julian (aka "Old Style") calendar, whereas Congress Poland used the Gregorian. During the nineteenth century, the former was twelve days behind the latter. In the pages that follow, when I describe events within Congress Poland, the dates will be based on the Gregorian calendar. When I describe events within the Western Provinces,

Russia, or Siberia, they will be based on the Julian. When I describe events within Congress Poland that had significance in terms of imperial policy-making, I give the dates according to both calendars.

Finally, the January Uprising of 1863 and the mass deportation that followed involved individuals of different ethnicities, nationalities, and religions. However, ethnic Poles accounted for the overwhelming majority of individuals. Whereas I acknowledge in the pages that follow that Lithuanians, Belorussians, Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, and others played roles in the accounts described, I often use "Poles" as a metonym to collectively refer to the insurrectionists and deportees.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In 1901, Pëtr Kropotkin published a letter in the *North American Review*, in which he sought to persuade readers that between 1861 and 1863 Alexander II had been on the verge of establishing a constitutional monarchy. However, Kropotkin argued, "Foreign rather than domestic causes prevented Alexander II from taking in the sixties further steps in the constitutional direction." Kropotkin identified these foreign causes as the Polish Uprising and Napoleon III's "menaces of intervention in favor of the Poles."[1] Kropotkin implied that, had it not been for the Poles and the French, the Russians would now (i.e., 1901) be living under a constitutional monarchy. Tellingly, Kropotkin wrote these words at a time when Nicholas II (who would prove to be Russia's last tsar) was rumored to soon announce the establishment of a constitutional monarchy—a rumor that Kropotkin explicitly mentions in the same letter and seemed to believe. Around that same time, reports of anti-Jewish pogroms in Russia were turning American public opinion against the imperial government and the United States was flexing its muscles overseas. Kropotkin apparently cited the constitutional opportunity lost during Alexander II's reign as a way to warn against American pressure on Russia in the current situation.

Yet, just a couple years earlier, Kropotkin had characterized Alexander II's failure to establish a constitutional monarchy rather differently. In his memoirs, originally written in English and published in 1899, Kropotkin declared: "The Polish insurrection was the definitive close of the reform period."[2] He reported that some of his fellow university students actually

A.A. Gentes, *The Mass Deportation of Poles to Siberia, 1863–1880*,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-60958-4_1

left to fight alongside the Poles; that Russian soldiers were shot for refusing to attack insurrectionists; and that "funds for the insurrection were collected all over Russia—quite openly in Siberia."[3] Kropotkin's *Memoirs* characterize the Polish Uprising, its violent suppression, and the mass deportation that followed as symptomatic of a regime that was structurally and morally moribund, one all too ready for an excuse to curtail liberal reforms and reinstitute police measures.

The founder of Anarchism, Kropotkin, was a keen observer of the autocracy, and perhaps its only outright opponent with personal knowledge of its inner workings. It therefore helps to better understand who he was. Born in 1842, Pëtr Kropotkin hailed from an aristocratic family that traced its lineage back to Russia's original Rurikid dynasty. His father bore the title "Prince of Smolensk." At the age of fourteen, he was enrolled in the Corps of Pages and became personally familiar with members of the royal family. Kropotkin graduated from Moscow University in 1862—a year after Alexander II emancipated the serfs. Aspiring to a career in government and having been trained as a geographer, he traveled to Eastern Siberia, where he became aide-de-camp to Transbaikalia's military governor, Boleslav K. Kukel.

Kukel appointed the young man to head a prison reform committee. Kropotkin later recalled that his research and proposals for institutional reform were replicated by hundreds of similarly optimistic young civil servants in every province of the empire. Arriving in Eastern Siberia when he did, Kropotkin was present at the height of the mass deportation of Poles. He witnessed first-hand the arrival of thousands of insurrectionists and the working and living conditions of those assigned to the Nerchinsk mines and state saltworks. This initially zealous believer in the power of government to improve the lives of the people soon found his goals thwarted by the corruption and malfeasance that were the hallmarks of the Siberian bureaucracy. Remarking in his diary about officials' brazen violations of statutes concerning the administration of exiles, Kropotkin quotes one official in the territory's capital of Chita telling him: "As for the law, it's us."[4]

During his time in Siberia, writes Kropotkin, "I soon realized the absolute impossibility of doing anything really useful for the mass of the people by means of the bureaucratic machinery."[5] He consequently lost faith not only in the Russian state, but in *the State*, and decided to become an anarchist. If this was the lesson that a privileged member of the Russian aristocracy—a prince, no less—learned from the mass deportation of the Poles and the conditions confronting exiles overall, then it leaves little

doubt that both the deportees themselves and many of the lower officials who had to administer them also lost whatever faith they had in their government. For Kropotkin and others, the mass deportation of Poles showed that the autocracy was an anachronism that needed replacing.

When Emperor Nicholas I died in 1855, he was a broken man. Russia was losing its ill-conceived war against England, France, and the Ottomans in the Crimea. Its landed nobility was morally and economically bankrupt, kept afloat through government loans that everyone knew could never be repaid. Riots and everyday resistance by enserfed peasants were on the rise. And serfdom, which enslaved nineteen million Russians, was perpetuating a feudalist economy that had been faring poorly in comparison to England's free labor capitalist system for more than a century. Nicolaevan Russia's boasts to be a powerful empire had proven to be a self-deluding myth.

Russia maintained a standing army of 800,000 men—the largest in the world. To pay for it, the state increasingly squeezed all it could out of peasants and petty townsmen. The peasantry's condition had steadily worsened since serfdom began during the late sixteenth century. As of 1855, under increased pressure from greater taxes and recruitment levies for the Crimean War, peasants' standard of living was perhaps lower than at any other time in Russian history. Poverty similarly characterized the urban population. Fëdor Dostoevskii devoted his first novel, *Poor Folk* (1845), to describing the hardships average city dwellers faced. "I have been to pay the parents a visit of condolence, and found them living in the direst poverty and disorder," the book's protagonist, Makar Devushkin, writes to Varvara Alekseevna, in one of the letters that form the book. He goes on to tell her of the death of a nine-year-old child in the building he lives in. "Nor is that surprising, seeing that the family lives in a single room, with only a screen to divide it for decency's sake."

Dostoevskii did not have to wrack his imagination to find such characters. Leaning in doorways with outstretched hands and hollow, consumptive eyes, ragged beggars crowded Russia's towns and cities. Many were former soldiers who, because of wounds both physical and psychological, could not possibly find employment. Recruits were made to serve twenty-five year terms, and those veterans not released early as invalids were typically elderly and had no families or homes to return to after they completed service. If they did not take shelter in the dosshouses where cholera, tuberculosis, typhoid fever, typhus, and other diseases raged, then these and other

homeless men spent their nights sleeping in alleyways or the woods. For many, a term in prison for vagrancy was nothing less than salvation.

Noble status was no guarantee against poverty either. Born into the petty nobility, Dostoevskii himself lived an impoverished existence until he became a famous novelist. Many petty noblemen, whether because their families piddled away their estates or because they were ennobled through state service rather than birth and therefore had no class inheritance, eked out lives worse than those of peasants.

Despite these and many other problems, when Nicholas I's son Alexander II took the throne, he stood as the world's most powerful monarch. His was a vast realm that stretched from the Baltic Sea south to the Black Sea, east to the Bering Sea and Sea of Okhotsk. His subjects totaled nearly seventy million and, alongside the predominant population of Great Russians, included Ukrainians, Belarusians, Finns, Poles, Germans, Jews, Tatars, Kazakhs, Kirgiz, Georgians, Circassians, Roma, and a plethora of Siberian native peoples. The Russian Empire's religious complexion was similarly rich, ranging from Orthodox Christian to Uniate to Roman Catholic to Jewish to Muslim to Buddhist to numerous native belief systems.

The new emperor had no firsthand knowledge of the plights his subjects faced, but he was keenly aware of the rot that lay at the center of his empire. He knew that reforms were needed to ensure Russia's continued existence in the face of a rapidly developing Western Europe. He also knew that in order to accomplish these reforms he would have to swallow his Russian pride and ape some of his international neighbors' mechanisms of change. Yet, at the same time, he wanted to maintain as much as possible the autocratic system that empowered the Romanovs to become Europe's oldest and wealthiest dynasty.

Alexander II's first act was to acknowledge that Russia's ambitions in the Middle East would have to be suspended and peace made with his Crimean War enemies. As a signatory to the 1856 Treaty of Paris, Russia would no longer contest the Mediterranean or even the Black Sea for decades to come. Yet, at the very time that St. Petersburg renounced its ambitions in the West, it renewed them in the East. Abrogating the Treaty of Nerchinsk that his predecessor Peter the Great signed with China in 1689, Alexander II reclaimed the Amur Territory that Russia's first emperor had lost. The Qing dynasty was slowly collapsing and could do little to keep Russia from exerting control over the region. Alexander II also continued the expeditions to Sakhalin that began under Nicholas I.

With the explicit goal of preventing this massive island's annexation by Japan, he reasoned that if Russia could not control the Black Sea or share in the Mediterranean's spoils, it could nevertheless leverage its power to acquire new territories in Asia.

Alexander II's second major act occurred on the domestic front and established the commission that eventually resulted in the 1861 emancipation of the serfs and cessation of state subsidies for the landed nobility. Serf emancipation inaugurated an epochal change in Russia's development. Those once bound to private owners or to the state, occupying a status barely distinguishable from that of American slaves, were now—at least theoretically—accorded the same rights as other subjects. The arbitrary authority their owners once wielded over them was replaced by the law, and the government accordingly created whole cloth a new legal apparatus, the so-called "peace courts," to adjudicate matters in the countryside.

Like Mikhail Gorbachëv with *perestroika* and *glasnost*, Alexander II did not think through the consequences of serf emancipation and other measures now collectively known as the Great Reforms. In both the 1860s and the 1980s, Russia's leaders inaugurated changes they primarily intended would strengthen existing political structures but which actually loosed waves of social change for which they had no adequate responses. In both instances, the bureaucracy was hampered by an absence of systematic and rational decision-making. The autocratic system that first took shape under the tsars and went on to characterize the Soviet state prevented leaders from acquiring accurate and comprehensive information from various levels of government; it likewise prevented truly socially-minded bureaucrats from effecting administrative reforms. Like Gorbachev, Alexander II wanted to loosen up the system so as to allow it to reform itself. But both men also insisted that they remain in control of their reforms. The tension these conflicting desiderata produced eventually brought them both down: Gorbachev's official title of president of the Soviet Union became irrelevant after this polity ceased to exist; Alexander II was assassinated in 1881 by revolutionaries who sought to punish him for failing to create a constitutional monarchy.

Serf emancipation is the best example of Alexander II's tendency to initiate reforms while trying to retain autocratic authority. Just as he used eastward expansion to make up for Russia's retreat from the West, he attempted to offset emancipation's deleterious impact on serf owners. In addition to private individuals, both the Crown and the state had owned

serfs, and Alexander II agreed with all vested parties that the newly freed peasants should not get off scot-free. The emancipation commission divided the lands occupied by peasants and landlords roughly in half, despite peasants' preponderant numbers, and saddled former serfs with an annual tax levy designed to compensate both private landowners and the Imperial Treasury for the loss of their lands. This arrangement failed to allot peasants a sufficient amount of land at the very moment their population began to explode. Like the freed slaves forced into debt servitude after the American Civil War, suffering from a vicious debt cycle they could never escape, most Russian peasants found themselves in a worse economic situation *after* emancipation than before it. Their inability to pay ever-escalating tax arrears eventually resulted in the collapse of the emancipation arrangement and the impoverishment of both the nobility and the peasantry. Peasants' dire straits and growing numbers hastened Russia's demographic shift to the cities, where the influx of desperate people looking for jobs and housing increased the misery described by Dostoevskii.

Economic exigencies and demographic fluidity shattered traditional mores and social structures. The anonymity of city life, women's growing economic empowerment, and the legacies of violence that thousands of military veterans brought back from the Crimean War were just three of many factors that contributed to what Stephen Frank and others have observed was "a substantial increase of serious crimes" following emancipation.[6] Crime and its perpetrators and victims are leitmotifs in the works of Dostoevskii—the premier social chronicler of this period—from his *Notes from a Dead House* to *Crime and Punishment* to *The Brothers Karamazov*.

It reveals much about Alexander II's regime that it was strengthening Russia's police apparatus even before the rise in crime could statistically register. In 1862, a year after emancipation, the government deported 9570 people to Siberia. Each of these exiles passed through Tobol´sk Prison, on Siberia's western border. Here, at the gateway to the Siberian exile system, the Tobol´sk Exile Office (*Tobol´skii Prikaz o ssyl´nykh* [TobPS]) processed deportees before forwarding them to their final destinations further east. Between 1807, when the government first began keeping reasonably accurate records, and 1861, Russia forcibly deported a total of 336,737 people to Siberia. The annual number of exiles fluctuated throughout the century, but was generally higher at the beginning of this

period and generally lower during the late 1840s and early 1850s. The overall average for 1807–1861 was 8213 deportees per annum.[7]

To better illustrate the true nature of Alexander II's reign, it must be emphasized that the period of the Great Reforms corresponds precisely to a steep rise in the annual deportation rate. The 9570 exiles deported to Siberia in 1862 represented a 21% increase over the number for 1861. The following year, 1863, Russia deported 10,108 to Siberia. Between 1865 (as Alexander II came under increasing pressure from officials and educated civilians alike to institute a constitutional monarchy) and 1881 (the year he was assassinated) the regime exiled a total of 267,462 people to Siberia. The resulting average of 15,733 exiles per annum for the period 1862–1881 is nearly twice that for the period 1807–1861.[8] What is more, the regime deported additional thousands to such other imperial peripheries as Arkhangel Province and the Caucasus.

According to the journal of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), as of 1860, 16,301 male and 10,005 female exile-settlers (*ssyl'no-poselentsy*) were assigned to locations throughout the empire.[9] It is an indication of the government's increasing use of exile that, by 1886, Irkutsk Province *alone* had 12,540 male and 5530 female exile-settlers. The same province had a total of 28,406 persons in all exile categories. Yet even this figure does not include the large number of former exiles who had completed their sentences but were prohibited from leaving Siberia.[10]

The growth in the number of people being judicially exiled to Siberia was matched by an increase in the number of those sent there using administrative procedures. Since the mid-eighteenth century, village and urban communal associations (*obshchestva* and *meshchanstva*, respectively) had possessed the authority to turn their own members over to government officials for exile. *Obshchestva* existed even among serfs, and were key to the self-regulatory system that characterized both serfdom and rural administration in a country where vast geographic expanses and poor logistics stymied central government efforts to police the population. Like many tyrannical systems, such as that in British India, Russia's survived thanks in large part to society's cooperation in its own subjugation. Had they wanted to (and, at times, they did), Russia's peasants and urban underclasses could easily have overthrown the small number of officials and soldiers assigned to police them, especially in locations far from St. Petersburg. This paucity of state power in the countryside explains why *obshchestva* retained exilic authority even after 1861, when serf owners lost theirs. Indeed, the vacuum created by the deprivation of serf owners'

authority led to communal associations actually increasing theirs. *Obshchestva* used exile against their members as only a last resort, after all other punitive measures were exhausted; but as the rural population exploded and competition for resources grew more intense, they more readily turned to exile to punish undesirables. They also sometimes used exile simply to rid their villages of burdensome or disagreeable neighbors.

Statistics related to administrative exile are less readily available than those concerning judicial exile. Nonetheless, we know that during the period 1867 to 1876 the state administratively deported a total of 78,686 people to Siberia. They accounted for just over half of all those forcibly removed to Siberia during this period. In 1875, the governor-general of the Main Administration of Western Siberia (GUZS) reported more than 80,000 exiles in his jurisdiction alone.[11] During 1882–1886, administrative exiles accounted for 40,056, or 53%, of all those removed to Siberia.[12]

Traditionally, it was serf owners, *obshchestva*, and *meshchanstva* who generated the vast majority of administrative exiles. The Russian government used administrative exile sparingly during the decades prior to the 1863 Polish Uprising. Those banished by St. Petersburg accounted for only 1–2% of all administrative exiles. Nearly all administrative exiles—that is, half of all persons forcibly removed to Siberia—were deported under the auspices of civilian authorities. This changed with the January Uprising, when the state began using administrative measures to deport the majority of insurrectionists, as we shall see in more detail later. Moreover, the state's application of administrative exile against the Poles soon broadened more generally throughout the empire. "[D]uring the reign of the 'iron despot' [Nicholas I] the Administrative exile was rare," wrote Kropotkin in 1887.

> But throughout the reign of Alexander II, since 1862, it has been used on so immense a scale, that you hardly will find now a hamlet, or borough, beyond the fifty-fifth degree of latitude, from the boundary of Norway to the coasts of the Sea of Okhotsk, not counting five, ten, twenty Administrative exiles.[13]

This book considers the Russian government's mass deportation of Poles within the context of its expansion of both the exile population and the exile system. It demonstrates that Alexander II not only perpetuated his father Nicholas I's police state, but significantly expanded it.

My equivocation of Alexander II's regime with a "police state" runs counter to the prevailing historiographical narrative. Western historians have generally argued that a police state emerged only during the latter half

of Alexander II's reign, and that the police state received official imprimatur through the "Ordinance on Measures for the Preservation of State Order and Public Tranquility," which Alexander III issued on August 14, 1881, more than six months after his father's assassination.[14] They portray the "Tsar-Liberator" as a benign figure who, had he lived, would have led Russia down a different and better path than the one it actually followed. Within this narrative construct it was political dissidents' increasing radicalism that brought on the police state as a response, and so they shoulder the burden for Russia's subsequent *Sonderweg*. This school of thought characterizes as "reforms" those Alexandrine policies redolent of a liberal agenda, yet ignores or characterizes as "conservative" or "reactionary" coeval reforms that do not sit comfortably alongside liberal ideals. Thus N. G. O. Pereira writes in his biography of Alexander II that "no one in the late 19th century had nearly the positive impact of this man."[15] Ben Eklof, despite acknowledging that while Alexander II was still the tsarevich he was "known to be quite as conservative as his father," insists that he later "launched a series of reforms quite remarkable for their breadth, comprehensiveness, and daring. These measures amply merit the appellation of 'Great Reforms' which history has bestowed upon them."[16] Though less enamored of Alexander II, Daniel Orlovsky, in his study of the MVD, nevertheless replicates other historians' association of "reforms" with liberal Western norms. He contrasts the "incomplete reforms that [were] passed on by the government of Alexander II to its successors" with the "conservative statist ideology" supposed to have returned only after 1881.[17] In his book on Russia's prison reforms, Bruce Adams devotes much attention to Alexander II's reign, yet largely ignores the tsar's mass deportation of Poles and his establishment of the Sakhalin penal colony.[18]

W. Bruce Lincoln once cautioned that "one cannot label as part of the Great Reforms everything progressive or innovative that transpired in Russia during the first two decades of Alexander II's reign."[19] Equally true is that one cannot edit from Alexander II's reform agenda those policies that were conservative or even reactionary simply because they do not conform to liberal Western norms.

Historians' correlation between *reform* in general and *liberal Western norms* specifically has influenced generations of students' perceptions of late imperial Russia. This correlation has led to Alexander II being imbued with an anachronistic and presentist intentionality he did not and could not have possessed. There is little evidence that the emperor wanted to model his political system on that of Western democracies. Instead, he intended

his reforms to strengthen the autocratic system that he, like his predecessors, believed to be Russia's natural form of government. In order to account for the inconsistencies and contradictions within Alexandrine policymaking, historians exclude any policy that is not liberal and instead label it reactionary. But the resulting dichotomy suggesting that Alexander II vacillated between liberal and repressive policies is misleading. His government's policies were far more coherent than generally acknowledged.

The 1918 Bolshevik coup and the ensuing Cold War help to explain the origins of this traditional historiography on Alexander II and the Great Reforms. Western historians sought to interpret Russia's development through a linear modernization paradigm that held that, had it not been for the Communists, Russia would have eventually developed along Western, i.e., "normal," lines. Both capitalism and democracy would have triumphed in Russia, as they did in the West, and all, or at least most, of the problems created by and associated with the Soviet Union would have been avoided. Despite falling out of favor in other fields of historical research by the mid-1960s, within Russian studies the modernization paradigm persisted far past its due date. Cold War imperatives and fears among academicians at being labeled a Communist sympathizer help to explain this paradigm's continued use. As a result, scholarship on Russia was retarded for decades. Studies of the imperial era were written with the 1917 Revolution looming like a Damoclean sword over whatever was being discussed; studies of the Soviet period were written with the revolution serving as a Pandora's box that released Stalinism and other horrors. Just as the Soviet-American conflict generated bi-polar characterizations of good and evil, so too did the year 1917 mark a chronological division between a land of divine possibility and a hell-on-earth. Along the way, in the view of historians Pereira, Eklof, and others, Alexander II became a figure as worthy of exaltation as Abraham Lincoln supposedly is. As with the much-lamented American president, so with the so-called "Tsar-Liberator," the focus was as much on unfulfilled possibilities as actual deeds.

But this mythologization of Alexander II did not have to wait until the Cold War. Even after he had become an anarchist opponent of tsarism, Pëtr Kropotkin could write that, because the emperor was weak, "General [Pëtr A.] Shuváloff, the chief of the state police, and General [Dmitrii F.] Treépoff [Trepov], the chief of the St. Petersburg police, were indeed the real rulers of Russia. Alexander II was their executive, their tool."[20] Even if it were true that the emperor was a Macbeth who let himself get pushed

around by stronger personalities, this character trait should not absolve him of responsibility for the decisions made during his reign. He was, after all, the autocrat in a political system that gave him power over life and death, and, like Macbeth, he carried blood on his hands.

Why, when he had the mandate of his people, did Alexander II so quickly resort to police measures?

Richard Wortman and other historians have written about the development of a legal consciousness in imperial Russia and the struggle that emerged during the nineteenth century between proponents of a *Rechtsstaat* ("rule by law") and those of a *Polizeistaat* ("police state"). The former notion emerged in central Europe during the Enlightenment, and holds that the state should insure the attainment of the greatest happiness for all through a rational application of objective rules of law. Today, this notion of a *Rechtsstaat* has come to prevail in nearly all the countries of Europe and the Western Hemisphere as well as throughout much of the rest of the world. Without thinking about it too much, these countries' modern-day citizens accept the *Rechtsstaat* as a natural form of governance.

For these same citizens "police state" is, by contrast, a thoroughly pejorative term. The idea of a *Polizeistaat* shares with that of a *Rechtsstaat* a foundation in European rationalism, but its emergence predates the latter. The Thirty Years' War, which ended in 1648 and is considered by many historians more devastating than World War II in per capita terms, was the impetus for designing the *Polizeistaat*. Authorities' desire to avoid such a war in the future helped give birth to *Polizeiwissenschaft*, i.e., "political science," and this served as the modus operandi for the *Polizeistaat*. Initially, writes David Lindenfeld, these "sciences of state were less concerned with articulating the goals or ends of action and were more concerned with the techniques of implementation."[21] But this changed over time. Under the influence of the Enlightenment and rational utopianism, political science eventually came to be regarded as the method for achieving the mythical "common good."

Yet the Enlightenment never exerted much influence over Russian governance. And in contrast with, say, Jean Jacques Rousseau's views of the "noble savage" and other *philosophes*' conceits regarding human nature, Russian culture remained characterized by a fundamental belief in the inherent evilness of human nature. Dostoevskii's entire oeuvre is founded on this premise. Russia's foundational myth, the *Primary Chronicle*, tells that the Slav tribes needed the foreigners called "Rus" (i.e., Scandinavians) to

come and impose unity between them, because they were forever engaging in internecine warfare and could not unify on their own. And to the present day defendants sit behind bars in Russian court rooms during their trials.

The notions of *Rechtsstaat* and *Polizeistaat*, simply put, correspond to these contrasting views of human nature: the former seeks to *condition human behavior so as to bring out the good in society*; the latter seeks to *restrain bad human behavior in order to protect society*. Put another way, the former necessitates *theory*; the latter necessitates *power*.

Yet, within Russia, even the idea of a *Rechtsstaat* did not emerge unmediated by cultural peculiarities. Andrzej Walicki's close reading of nineteenth-century Russian legalists who advocated a nominal *Rechtsstaat* shows that most were in fact calling for a *Reglamentstaat*—a "rule by regulation" rather than "rule by law." Proponents of a classically liberal interpretation of law did exist, and did score some victories (e.g., juried trials, the "peace" courts). But Walicki pointedly notes that such individuals, who had almost all been educated in Europe, comprised a marginalized group. The line between a regulatory and a police state is thin indeed, and early during Alexander II's reign the *Reglamentstaat*'s more numerous proponents found allies among hardline *Polizeistaat*-supporters. Together, they maneuvered to block and limit *Rechtsstaat*-supporters. These conservative allies were also borne aloft by the growth during this time of a bureaucratic stratum so powerful that some historians have called it a new *soslovie* ("class"). Like bureaucrats everywhere, Russia's sought to *apply* the law rather than *interpret* it. The application (as opposed to the effect) of standards and regulations "according to law" (*po zakonu*) satisfied, first and foremost, the personal interests of bureaucrats themselves, since it ensured continued employment and helped replicate and empower the bureaucracy to which they belonged. The bureaucracy's importance to policy formation cannot be overstated. Mikhail T. Loris-Melikov, Alexander II's top administrator during the latter half of his reign, was more interested in empowering newly-established state institutions rather than the tsar's subjects; and bureaucratic routine was more significant than a reformist agenda in causing liberals to resist reactionaries' counter-reforms.

A supreme expression of Alexander II's reliance upon police powers rather than legality was the mass deportation of insurrectionists associated with the January Uprising. Rather than accommodate Poles' and Lithuanians' patriotic aspirations, St. Petersburg tightened its grip around these subjects and helped presage the very uprising it hoped to avoid.