Mayumi Itoh



THE MAKING OF CHINA'S PEACE WITH JAPAN

What Xi Jinping Should Learn from Zhou Enlai



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Notes on the Text

Names of people and places in Chinese are in principle shown in the modern spelling of Mandarin, based on pinyin; however, some historical names of institutions and people that are known in the old spellings are shown in Wade–Giles style, as in Sun Yat-sen and Tsinghua University. For Japanese, the Hepburn style is primarily used, with macrons; however, macrons are not used for words known in English without macrons, as in Kyoto and Tokyo. Another exception is that "n" is not converted to "m" for words where it precedes "b," "m," and "n"; for example, "nenpu" instead of "nempu" and Saionji "Kinmochi" instead of Saionji "Kimmochi" (names for Japanese newspapers, such as *Asahi Shimbun*, are given "as is" because they are their official English names).

Chinese and Japanese names are given with the surname first, except for those who use the reversed order in English. Honorific prefixes, such as Dr. and Mr., are not used in the text, except in direct quotations. Positions and titles, as well as ages, for individuals are as of the time for which the event is described in the particular passage of the text, unless specified otherwise. English translations of institutions and positions are based on the ones given at the official sites of each governmental organization, wherever available. All translations were made by the author, in the form of paraphrases (not as literal translations), in order for the translations to make sense in English, and in consultation with multiple native Chinese speakers for accuracy. Citation numbers for sources of information are normally given at the end of each paragraph, instead of at the end of each sentence, in order to enhance the smooth reading of the text and also to limit the number of citations. Regarding online sources, the dates of actual access are given unless the sources give the posting dates.

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
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CCCPC	Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
CCPIT	China Council for the Promotion of International Trade
CHINCOM	China Committee
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COCOM	Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
CPAFFC	Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign
	Countries
CPC	Communist Party of China
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress
CYCPE	Chinese Youth Communist Party in Europe
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DSP	Democratic Socialist Party
ECAFE	Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FIR	Flight Information Regions
GHQ	General Headquarters
HC	House of Councillors
HR	House of Representatives
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IJA	Imperial Japanese Army

xiv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

JAPIT	Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade
JCAET	Japan–China Association on Economy and Trade
JCG	Japan Coast Guard
JCOTLC	Japan–China Overall Trade Liaison Council
JCP	Japanese Communist Party
јстра	Japan-China Trade Promotion Association
JSP	Japan Socialist Party
KMT	Kuomintang (Nationalist Party)
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry
MOFA	•
ODA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	overseas development aid
PLA	People's Liberation Army
POW	prisoner of war
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
SCAP	Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers
SDPJ	Social Democratic Party of Japan
SOFA	US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement



Map: East Asia as Related to Zhou Enlai and Japan Source: Constructed by author from blank map of East Asia, courtesy of Daniel Dalet, d-maps.com, http://d-maps.com/lib=east_asia_maps&num_car=77&lang=en



Memorial poem stone of Zhou Enlai, 'Arashiyama in the Rain', originally written in Kyoto, Japan, April 1919.

Introduction

Two things awe me most, the starry sky above me and the moral law within me.

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)

This is the final part of a three-volume study of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (March 1898–January 1976) and Japan, in commemoration of the 100-year anniversary of Zhou's visit to Japan in 1917 in order to study at a higher school in Tokyo. It reviews and updates all of the previous studies on contemporary Sino-Japanese relations, by this author, by juxtaposing them with the newly published official biography of Zhou Enlai (Vol. 1 and Vol. 2) and the official *Chronology of Zhou Enlai*, 1949–1976 (Vol. 1, Vol. 2 and Vol. 3), as well as with the previous official *Chronology of Zhou Enlai*, 1898–1949.¹

It is no exaggeration to state that a significant aspect of Zhou's life and career was the contemplation of strategies for how to deal with Japan. Zhou grew up observing Japanese expansionism in China. He was born just after the first Sino-Japanese War and grew up in the middle of the Russo-Japanese War, in which the two countries vied for spheres of influence in Manchuria (China's northeast region). Zhou studied at an upper elementary school in Fengtian (Mukden, current Shenyang), the former capital of China's northeast. Then, he enrolled in Nankai Middle School in Tianjin, where Western imperial powers and Japan occupied concession territories in the city. Upon graduating from Nankai Middle School, Zhou went to Japan to study at a higher school in Tokyo from 1917 to 1919. Chinese intellectuals at that time

© The Author(s) 2017 M. Itoh, *The Making of China's Peace with Japan*, DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-4008-5_1 had ambivalent feelings toward Japan: animosity toward Japanese militarism on the one hand and admiration for Japanese modernization on the other. The young Zhou absorbed a kaleidoscope of new thoughts and learned communism from the Japanese version of the "Hundred Flowers" movement. There were no Chinese translations of Karl Marx available in China at that time.²

While a student at Nankai University, Zhou was arrested and imprisoned for his part in a student protest. He was released after six months and shortly thereafter travelled to France, where he stayed, apart from a brief sojourn in the UK, for two years. Upon returning from Europe, Zhou climbed up the hierarchy of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and guided the nation through the civil war with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) under Chiang Kai-shek. Zhou subsequently formed the KMT-CPC United Front against Japan, fought in the Anti-Japanese Resistance War (the second Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945), and then fought another civil war with the KMT. Subsequently, with the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC, or "China" hereafter) in 1949, Zhou, as its foreign minister and premier, launched diplomatic overtures toward Japan and proactively engaged in restoring relations with Japan. From the perspective of China's world strategy, Japan was important as a counterbalance to the United States during the Cold War era, and Zhou, a "modern Sun Tzu," tried to drive a wedge between Japan and the United States.³

Zhou's foreign policy initiatives toward Japan established the foundation of post-World War II Sino-Japanese relations, and this is still relevant today. The issue of Japanese political leaders' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine is a case in point. Zhou visited the Yasukuni Shrine himself while studying in Japan in 1918 and observed its annual spring festival. No other Chinese leaders, in their youth or in their maturity, have ever done this. Little did the young Zhou know then that this shrine would later become a focal point of the controversial "history issues" between China and Japan. If Japanese parliamentarians remembered how Zhou had renounced China's (PRC's) war reparations from Japan, they would understand why the Chinese government continued to protest Japanese leaders' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. In addition, Zhou established a mutual agreement on the territorial dispute between China and Japan involving a small island group in the East China Seathe Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. However, Chinese and Japanese government officials appear to have forgotten about this.⁴

LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature in Chinese

The Chinese government has published a number of works on Zhou Enlai since his death in January 1976. One of the most important productions is the *Official Biography of Zhou Enlai*, edited by the Central Committee of the CPC (CCCPC) Party Literature Research Office. The original 1989 version covers the period from his birth to the establishment of the PRC (1898–1949). The revised 1998 version added a second volume, covering his premiership of the PRC until his death (1949–1976). However, the new volume concentrates on Zhou's involvement in Chinese domestic policy and mostly presents the officially recognized views of the CPC. It includes only scant accounts of his foreign policy towards Japan, and there is not a chapter on the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization.⁵

Another important publication is the official *Chronology of Zhou Enlai*. The original 1989 edition has only one volume, covering the period 1898–1949, whereas the new 1997 edition chronicles his life and premiership from the foundation of the PRC until his death (1949–1976) in three volumes. This three-volume chronology is the most detailed documentation of Zhou's day-to-day activities as Chinese premier and foreign minister, clarifying many facts that were unknown or unclear previously. In addition, the CCCPC Party Literature Research Office compiled the *Manuscripts of Zhou Enlai since the Nation's Foundation*, in three volumes, in 2008.⁶

Literature in English

Despite the crucial importance of Zhou Enlai's foreign policy toward Japan, which constituted an integral part of Chinese foreign policy toward the United States, biographies of Zhou Enlai in English by and large ignore his relations with Japan in the post-World War II period. In turn, a plethora of books in English on contemporary Sino-Japanese relations have been published. Some of the notable works include Quansheng Zhao, *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-Macro Linkage Approach* (1996), Yoshihide Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 1945–1978 (1998), and Ming Wan, *Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation* (2006). Nevertheless, no book offers a comprehensive and exclusive study of Zhou's foreign policy

making toward Japan from the foundation of the PRC until his death, as seen from his own perspective.⁷

In previous works, no personal views of Japan and the Japanese by Zhou Enlai loom large. As with a number of Chinese intellectuals and revolutionaries who lived in Japan in exile at the turn of the twentieth century, including Sun Yat-sen (November 1866–March 1925) and Liang Qichao (February 1873–January 1929), Zhou had high hopes and deep disappointments with the Japanese. This dichotomy in the Chinese intellectuals' perceptions of Japan reflects the complex historic relations between the two countries, and also is evident in Zhou's foreign policy toward Japan. Interestingly, Zhou in his "Diary of Travel to Japan" expressed his concerns about some of his fellow Chinese students studying in Japan who denounced as "traitors" other Chinese propaganda politics and its official party platforms toward Japan hide Zhou's personal views of Japan and the Japanese. ⁸

Literature in Japanese

Meanwhile, memoirs of Japan by China–Japan Friendship Association Deputy Secretary-General, Sun Pinghua (1917–August 1997), were published in Tokyo in 1998. Sun was born in Fengtian province (the current Liaoning province) and studied at the Tokyo Higher School of Technology (the current Tokyo Institute of Technology). After the establishment of the PRC, Sun directly assisted Zhou Enlai's operations vis-àvis Japan and also worked in Tokyo as China's chief representative for Sino-Japanese Long-Term Comprehensive Trade. Sun's memoirs, written originally for a Japanese newspaper as a series of articles in 1997 (they were then published as a book in 1998, after his death), offer candid and uncensored views of Zhou's foreign policy making toward Japan. A Chinese translation was also published.⁹

In the same year, the *Asahi Shimbun* reporter, Yoshida Makoto (b. 1931), who was its Beijing bureau head at the time of the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, published his record of reporting Sino-Japanese relations for 35 years. Then, in 1991, an anthology of recollections of Zhou Enlai by a number of Japanese who had been closely associated with him was published in Tokyo. This fine collection offers many interesting and insightful accounts of Zhou by politicians of

both ruling and opposition parties, government officials and business leaders, as well as individuals in academic, cultural and sports circles (a Chinese translation was also published). In addition, a new scholarly work on Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization came out in 2010, demonstrating continuing interest in Japan in trying to understand Zhou's foreign policy toward Japan and contemporary Sino-Japanese relations.¹⁰

SCOPE OF THIS BOOK

This book examines the existing literature on Zhou Enlai in three languages—Chinese, English, and Japanese—with special attention to the inner working of Zhou's foreign policy making toward Japan, as well as his personal perceptions of Japan and the Japanese. In so doing, building on all of the previous works on Zhou Enlai available to this author, it presents the most accurate and comprehensive study of Zhou's relations with Japan in the post-World War II period. It also sheds new light on contemporary Sino-Japanese relations from a longer historical perspective and thereby provides constructive insight into President Xi Jinping's foreign policy toward Japan. As with the first two volumes of this author's study of Zhou Enlai and Japan, this work is indebted to the herculean efforts of scholars and writers who have investigated and tried to understand this enigmatic Chinese leader. This book is, therefore, to be understood as being a synthesis of all of the previous works on Zhou Enlai.

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- 2. For details, see Mayumi Itoh, *The Origins of Contemporary Sino-Japanese Relations: Zhou Enlai and Japan*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
- 3. For details, see Mayumi Itoh, *The Making of China's War with Japan: Zhou Enlai and Zhang Xueliang*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
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6 1 INTRODUCTION

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Chinese Diplomatic Overtures toward Japan and Zhou Enlai

The Chinese won their Anti-Japanese Resistance War, with the help of the US Army, Air Force, and Navy, including the American Volunteer Group (the "Flying Tigers") led by Lieutenant General Clair Lee Chennault (September 1893–July 1958), only to resume the civil war between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1946. After three years of intense battles nationwide, the CPC army defeated the KMT army. The former won primarily because the second KMT-CPC United Front had given it much-needed respite from the earlier round of civil war (Chiang Kai-shek's relentless "Bandit Suppression Campaign") and positioned it to confront the KMT Army again. The CPC was no longer an insurgent group but a legal organization and an equal to the KMT that was running the Republic of China (ROC) government. Mao Zedong pointed out the paradox: "The CPC owed its victory in the revolutionary war to Japanese imperialism, because the Anti-Japanese Resistance War had united the Chinese and strengthened the party."

When the People's Republic of China (PRC or "China" hereafter) was established in October 1949, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai worked out a successful division of labor. CPC chairman Mao dominated party politics and domestic policy as President of the Central People's Government of the PRC (term of office, September 1949–April 1954), while Zhou held the dual positions of premier and foreign minister of the government and took charge of foreign policy. This chapter examines Zhou's foreign policy toward Japan in the first decade of the PRC.

ZHOU ENLAI'S "FIVE PRINCIPLES FOR PEACE"

As the first foreign minister of the PRC, Zhou Enlai carefully selected the high echelon of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and appointed Wang Jiaxiang (August 1906-January 1974) as the PRC's first ambassador to the Soviet Union. Wang had been one of the "28 Bolsheviks"-the CPC's internationalist group controlled by the Third International (Comintern)-but he switched his position and allied with Mao Zedong and Zhou during the Long March. (Wang died during the Cultural Revolution.) Then, in February 1958, Zhou surrendered his position of foreign minister to vice premier and vice chairman of the National Defense Committee Chen Yi (August 1901-January 1972). This was a gesture of self-criticism on Zhou's part, as he had taken a cautious, neutral stance when Mao launched the Great Leap Forward, considering the campaign to be hasty "adventurism." Zhou had known Chen from his years in Europe and they had become close colleagues there. Zhou continued to oversee Chinese foreign policy as premier alongside Chen, who served in this position until his death during the Cultural Revolution.²

Zhou, meanwhile, had envisaged the fundamental framework for Chinese foreign policy and wrote the "Five Principles for Peace" in December 1953, which consist of: (1) mutual respect for others' territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence. The principles were codified for the first time in April 1954 in the agreement between China and India concerning trade and traffic between China's Tibet region and India. Subsequently, they were incorporated in the Ten Principles for Peace that were adopted at the Asian–African Conference in Bandung in April 1955, which became almost universal principles to guide relations between the non-aligned countries.³

ZHOU'S DIPLOMATIC OVERTURES TOWARD JAPAN

No sooner had the Chinese MOFA taken off than Zhou began operations vis-à-vis Japan, as an integral part of the Chinese international propaganda strategy. As the US government supported Chiang Kai-shek's ROC government on Taiwan (ROC or "Taiwan" hereafter) and embargoed China, the Chinese needed foreign economic aid to rebuild a nation that had been devastated by decades of war. Although the Soviet Union provided economic assistance to China, this was hardly sufficient, and Zhou approached Japan. (Sino-Soviet relations were not as monolithic as outside watchers had imagined, but their ideological disparities and the Sino-Soviet rift did not become evident to the outside until the early 1960s.) Nevertheless, Japan had lost its sovereignty and was under occupation by US armed forces, led by General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). The General Headquarters of SCAP (SCAP-GHQ) essentially dictated the domestic and foreign policies of Japan.⁴

Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty with the former Allied Powers in September 1951, but the treaty excluded China, Taiwan, and the Soviet Union and its allies. Although Japan regained its sovereignty when this peace treaty came into force, the US–Japan Security Treaty incorporated Japan into the US camp in the postwar Cold War system. This gave Japan little leverage to formulate an independent foreign policy that could contradict the interests of the US–Japan alliance.

The Truth about the Renunciation of War Reparations from Chiang Kai-shek

The Japanese government concluded the Japan–ROC (Taiwan) Peace Treaty in April 1952 on the day the San Francisco Peace Treaty took effect, in which the ROC government relinquished its right to war reparations from Japan. However, Chiang Kai-shek did not voluntarily relinquish this right, as it has been generally thought, when he quoted a Chinese axiom, "To repay hatred by gratitude." Contrary to this facesaving political gesture, Chiang had actually sought war reparations from Japan. In fact, his ROC government in its provisional capital, Chongqing, had planned to take over properties in Japan as war reparations. The Chongqing government sent its official representative to Japan in 1947 to investigate potential reparation properties such as the Hirohata Works of Japan Iron & Steel (currently part of Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal Corporation) in Himeji (west of Osaka) and the Kure Power Plant (east of Hiroshima), and to negotiate with SCAP-GHQ.⁵

This fact is known because the ROC government's Economic Department senior adviser, who was sent to Tokyo as ROC representative

to Japan, wrote the account in his memoirs. Surprisingly, he was a Japanese businessman, Takasaki Tatsunosuke (February 1885–February 1964). Takasaki had worked in Manchukuo (the Japanese puppet state in Manchuria) as vice president and then as president of the Manchuria Heavy Industries Development Company, at the strong request of its founder Ayukawa Yoshisuke (generally known as Ayukawa Gisuke; November 1880–February 1967). After Japan's surrender, Takasaki voluntarily chose to remain in Manchuria (though the Japanese government had secured his repatriation) and took a leading part in the postwar settlement in Manchuria, acting as an intermediary between the ROC, the Soviet Union, and the United States.⁶

In Tokyo in 1947, Takasaki visited SCAP-GHQ's Economic & Scientific Section (ESS) and met Colonel Charles W. Ryder, who was surprised to see that the ROC government's Economic Department senior adviser was a Japanese. Takasaki wrote a detailed report on his feasibility study of the ROC taking over the Hirohata Works of Japan Iron & Steel and the Kure Power Plant as war reparations. Having read the report, the Truman administration changed its mind and decided that the ROC would *not* seek war reparations from Japan. Chiang Kai-shek was obliged to follow the US decision.⁷

ZHOU'S "DIVIDE AND CONQUER" TACTICS

In turn, Zhou Enlai's primary objective in his dealings with Japan—to establish a connection with the Japanese government—had met strong resistance from the Japanese MOFA and the US administrations. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (terms of office, May 1946–May 1947 and October 1948–December 1954) had initially "fought a vigorous, rear-guard action" against the Truman administration's chief peace-treaty negotiator, John Foster Dulles (US secretary of state, January 1953–April 1959), resisting his demand to recognize the Taipei government. Dulles prevailed. Yoshida was also interested in establishing trade relations with Beijing, but the US administration objected. Yoshida thus employed double-tongued diplomacy and publicly denounced China (the PRC). However, the Truman administration and Eisenhower administration were still suspicious and closely scrutinized any Japanese contacts with China. Consequently, China and Japan became distant neighbors.⁸

Hemmed into these political confines, Zhou Enlai employed "divide and conquer" tactics, trying to drive a wedge between Japan and the United States. While publicly condemning the Yoshida cabinet that concluded the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan-ROC Peace Treaty, Zhou deftly courted Japanese, in various circles, who were interested, for different reasons, in reestablishing Sino-Japanese relations. Zhou approached not only Japanese politicians on the left in the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), but also conservative politicians in the Japan Democratic Party and the Japan Liberal Party. The two conservative parties were created by Hatoyama Ichirō, who merged them in November 1955 and formed the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP): the "Conservative Merger of 1955." The LDP has ruled the postwar Japanese politics, for the most part, until the present day. Zhou had to forge positive relations with conservative Japanese lawmakers because they ruled Japanese politics. He thus approached conservative parliamentarians in the House of Representatives (the HR, the powerful lower house) and the House of Councillors (the HC, the nominal upper house like the House of Lords in the United Kingdom).9

Meanwhile in Japan, many conservative politicians, let alone those on the left, saw the need to establish official relations with China (although Japan had established diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1952). They were not only motivated by narrow national interests (such as economic benefits) but also had a larger perspective in mind. Historically, China had been the mentor for the Japanese, and the Japanese had had relations with the Chinese for two millennia. Added to this were feelings of guilt for Japanese acts of wartime aggression in China. While recognizing ideological differences, many Japanese politicians considered it abnormal not to have diplomatic relations with their neighbor, representing as it did the great majority of the Chinese people. While acknowledging the cardinal importance of the US-Japan alliance, these politicians groped for a way to establish relations with China, and, as a first step, formed the Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians to Promote Sino-Japanese Trade. Zhou could take advantage of these "weak spots" the Japanese had for China.¹⁰

ZHOU INVITES JAPANESE CONSERVATIVE PARLIAMENTARIANS

In this context, Zhou Enlai proactively approached ruling conservative Japanese politicians. Among them were such influential figures in the Japan Democratic Party as Sakurauchi Yoshio (May 1912–July 2003),

Sonoda Sunao (December 1913–April 1984), and Nakasone Yasuhiro (b. May 1918). Nakasone's most recent memoirs tell how the three HR members visited Beijing as early as September 1954, when there were no diplomatic relations between China and Japan. They had visited Stockholm, as part of the non-partisan parliamentarians' mission, and attended the International Peace Conference there before flying to Beijing via Moscow.¹¹

All three became leading figures in the LDP and worked towards reestablishing Sino-Japanese relations. Sakurauchi, who held such positions as international trade and industry minister, foreign minister, and house speaker, promoted Sino-Japanese relations as the president of the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade (JAPIT). Sonoda became chief cabinet secretary of the Fukuda cabinet and foreign minister, and signed the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978. As for Nakasone who became Prime Minister in 1982, he is usually considered anti-communist, as exemplified by his friendship with President Ronald Reagan. However, he was actually one of the earliest promoters of Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization.¹²

ZHOU WELCOMES JAPANESE LEFTIST POLITICIANS

Simultaneously, Zhou Enlai engaged in forging strong ties with Japanese parliamentarians from opposition parties on the left. The newly published official *Chronology of Zhou Enlai* records that in February 1953 Zhou invited former HC Vice President, Matsumoto Jiichirō (June 1887–November 1966), who was a leader of the "Leftist Socialist Party of Japan" (the JSP split into leftists and rightists in 1951; they merged again in 1955). Back in Tokyo, Matsumoto was elected first president of the Japan–China Friendship Association in May 1953. Zhou invited Matsumoto again in November 1956 for the 90th anniversary celebration of the birth of Sun Yat-sen.¹³

Zhou also invited a non-partisan parliamentarians' mission in Beijing in the fall of 1954, which included Suzuki Mosaburō (February 1893–May 1970), chairman of the "Leftist Socialist Party of Japan" and his protégé, Sasaki Kōzō (May 1900–December 1985), who became JSP chairman (term of office, May 1965–August 1967). Then, in November 1955, Zhou received the first official delegation of the JSP, led by party chairman Katayama Tetsu (July 1887–May 1978), who was Prime Minister of a coalition cabinet (May 1947–March 1948).¹⁴

"PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POLITICS AND ECONOMICS"

China's potential large market offered irresistible opportunities for the recovery of a Japanese economy that had been devastated by defeat in World War II, and leaders in business circles wanted to develop trade relations with China. Nevertheless, the Yoshida cabinet could not openly sanction trade with China due to US objections. In this bind, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) devised a non-linkage policy called, "the principle of separation of politics and economics (business)," in order to accommodate Japanese economic interests in China and to facilitate unofficial trade arrangements with China.¹⁵

This measure of political expediency allowed Japanese business leaders, except for government officials, to visit China without obtaining permission from the MOFA and to engage in private trade with China. Zhou initially repudiated this non-linkage policy because it was impossible for Chinese corporations to conduct bilateral trade with any foreign countries without government involvement. However, he eventually decided to condone the measure, recognizing the political constraints on the Japanese side.¹⁶

ZHOU'S RIGHT-HAND MAN FOR OPERATIONS VIS-À-VIS JAPAN

Moreover, Zhou Enlai encountered obstacles from within. At home, even after the war, anti-Japanese sentiment ran so high among the Chinese officials in the CPC establishment that Zhou faced difficulties in launching his diplomatic overtures toward Japan. Zhou charged Liao Chengzhi (September 1908–June 1983) with the task of overseeing China's operations vis-à-vis Japan. Liao was *not* one of the Japan specialists in the party apparatus during the war years, but there was no better person than him for this job. Liao was born and grew up in Tokyo and spoke fluent Japanese. He was the son of Liao Zhongkai (April 1877–August 1925), the right-hand man of Sun Yat-sen and the financial manager of the KMT, who had been dubbed "Sun Yat-sen's wallet."¹⁷

Liao Zhongkai and Sun Yat-sen fled to Tokyo and lived there each time their revolutionary attempts failed. Liao became the KMT representative at the Whampoa Military Academy at its foundation in May 1924, and it was Liao who hired Zhou as deputy director of the Academy's political department in September 1924 upon his return home from France. Zhou had known the young Liao since 1924 because Liao's family lived in the compound of the academy, along with its commandant, Chiang Kai-shek. Liao Chengzhi grew up calling both Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek "uncle."¹⁸

During the civil war, Zhou Enlai had Liao Chengzhi engage in international propaganda work and appointed him president of the Red China News Agency in its formative years (Red China News Agency became today's Xinhua News Agency—the New China News Agency). With the foundation of the PRC, Zhou appointed Liao as deputy director of the International Liaison Department, deputy director of the United Front Work Department, and vice chairman of the Committee of Overseas Chinese Affairs at the Central Committee of the CPC (CCCPC). Liao was also appointed vice minister of the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs at the State Council and maintained expansive international networks in Hong Kong, Europe, and North America.¹⁹

The head of the Overseas Chinese Affairs bodies both in the CCCPC and in the State Council was Liao Chengzhi's mother, He Xiangniang, who was Sun Yat-sen's colleague and life-long friend of his widow, Song Qingling. Also, Liao's niece, Chen Xiangmei (b. June 1925), is the widow of the Flying Tigers leader, Clair Lee Chennault. Anna Chennault (her American name) was a significant figure in Sino-US relations and Republican Party politics from the 1950s to the 1990s, holding many leadership positions, including National Republican Asian Assembly chair.²⁰

THE FIRST POST-1949 JAPANESE DELEGATION TO BEIJING

The first mission that Zhou Enlai charged Liao Chengzhi with was to invite to Beijing in May 1952 the first unofficial Japanese delegation, made up of three parliamentarians: Kōra Tomi (July 1896–January 1993), an HC member (affiliated to a group of Independents in the HC called the Ryokufū-kai); Hoashi Kei (September 1905–February 1989), a former HC member (as an Independent) and soon to be an HR member from the JSP; and Miyakoshi Kisuke (1905–1966), an HR member from the Japan Progressive Party. Kōra was vice chair of the HC Special Committee for the Repatriation of Oversea Japanese. She had studied psychology at Columbia University and had graduated from Johns Hopkins University. She became the first Japanese woman to receive a Ph.D. degree, and then taught at Japan Women's University.²¹

Hoashi Kei was representative of the Japan–China Trade Promotion Association (JCTPA) and Miyakoshi Kisuke was director-general of the Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians to Promote Sino-Japanese Trade. The objectives of this delegation were humanitarian and economic: to initiate negotiations for the repatriation of Japanese left behind in China and to conclude a first private (unofficial) trade agreement between the two countries.²²

Repatriation of Japanese Left Behind in China

Zhou Enlai first took up the humanitarian project with Japan because there were as many as 60,000 Japanese left behind in China's northeast in 1948. They were mainly the survivors of the Japanese farmer-settlers who had settled in Manchuria as part of the Japanese government policy to create Manchukuo. When the Soviet Army invaded Manchukuo in August 1945, the Japanese Kwantung Army abandoned Japanese civilians, leaving them to be massacred and plundered by the Soviet Army. It is estimated that, out of a total of 270,000 farmer settlers, 80,000 died at the end of the war. The survivors became displaced persons. Some managed to reach cities, where Japanese local residents had already turned into refugees. Then, more Japanese died *after* the war had ended because the Japanese government ignored Japanese civilians left in Manchuria and did not repatriate them.²³

In the absence of government help, several Japanese civilian leaders who had remained in Manchuria organized self-help organizations to facilitate the repatriation of Japanese. The representative of these voluntary groups was Takasaki Tatsunosuke, who patiently negotiated with the ROC government, the Soviet Army, and other concerned authorities. As a result, collective repatriation of the Japanese took place, and by the end of 1947 approximately 1,272,000 Japanese had been repatriated. However, more than 60,000 were still left behind in China.²⁴

The Yoshida cabinet had ignored this issue, but Kōra Tomi was determined to repatriate the remaining Japanese in China and wanted to negotiate directly with the Chinese government. Hoashi Kei and Miyakoshi Kisuke were planning to conclude a first private (unofficial) trade agreement between China and Japan. However, it was almost impossible for the three Japanese politicians to visit China because the Yoshida cabinet had banned Japanese from visiting communist countries. They planned to go to Beijing after attending the International Economic Conference in Moscow, but Foreign Minister Yoshida Shigeru (he held dual positions) denied their visa applications to Moscow, invoking the Japanese Passport Law that could deny a visa if a potential visit was deemed to hold the possibility of jeopardizing Japanese national interests and security. Hoashi later sued the Japanese government for the denial of his visa application—the Hoashi Kei Incident.²⁵

Zhou Enlai then made an elaborate plan for them. The three first flew to Paris. Then they flew to Moscow and attended the International Economic Conference there. At the conference they met the chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) and the president of the People's Bank of China, Nan Hanchen (1895–January 1967), who was Zhou's former military intelligence agent, and Foreign Trade Vice Minister Lei Renmin (b. 1912). The two Chinese officials invited the three Japanese to visit Beijing. That was how the first Japanese delegation visited China in 1952.²⁶

Zhou meanwhile appointed a CCCPC staff member, Sun Pinghua (1917–August 1997), who had studied at the Tokyo Higher School of Technology (currently the Tokyo Institute of Technology) from 1939 to 1943, as a secretary to the CCPIT and assigned him the task of taking care of the first post-1949 Japanese delegation to China. From this point in time, Sun became involved in Chinese foreign policy towards Japan. If Liao Chengzhi was the right-hand man for Zhou in Chinese operations vis-à-vis Japan, Sun was the right-hand man for Liao. In 1952, Zhou sent him to Beijing airport to receive the Japanese delegation. He welcomed the delegation members in Japanese, but, as Hoashi Kei smilingly confided to Sun years later, they did not understand his Japanese at all.²⁷

FIRST SINO-JAPANESE PRIVATE TRADE AGREEMENT

In May 1952, the three Japanese parliamentarians met PRC's first health minister and first president of the Red Cross Society of China (of the PRC) Li Dequan (1896–1972). Li promised Kōra Tomi that she would investigate the matter of the Japanese left behind in China. On June 1, 1952, Hoashi Kei, as the JCTPA representative, Kōra, as the International Economic Council representative, and Miyakoshi Kisuke, as director-general of the Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians to Promote Sino-Japanese Trade, signed the first Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement with CCPIT chairman Nan Hanchen. The agreement was referred to as "private agreement" because there were no official diplomatic relations between the two

countries. However, the nature of the agreement was nothing but governmental. The format was barter trade because China did not have foreign currency to pay for imports. The first Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement provided a maximum £30 million—each way—in goods to be traded before the end of 1952.²⁸

Upon returning to Tokyo, the Yoshida cabinet reprimanded the parliamentarians for visiting Moscow and Beijing in violation of the Passport Law. Nevertheless, the cabinet not only did *not* repudiate the trade agreement signed in Beijing; in fact, it approved supplying China with essential items such as chemical fertilizer in exchange for coal. The Yoshida cabinet, however, did not sanction supplying China embargoed items banned by the China Committee (the CHINCOM) of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), of which the United States, West European countries, and Japan were members.²⁹

CHINCOM had a longer embargo item list than COCOM. In the end, only about 5 percent of the total amount in the trade agreement was traded. However, this agreement sparked Japanese business circles' interest in the Chinese market, putting the Yoshida cabinet under pressure to reexamine its trade policy towards China.³⁰

The Beijing Agreement of March 1953

In February–March 1953, Kōra Tomi visited Beijing again for negotiations on the repatriation of Japanese, leading a seven-member delegation including representatives of the Red Cross Society of Japan, the Japan– China Friendship Association, and the Japan Peace Liaison Council. Kōra did so despite the fact that Japanese Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo initially denied her a visa; she had already violated the Passport Law in 1952. In order to obstruct her visit, Okazaki falsely stated in a press conference that the other six members of the Japanese delegation were willing to go without Kōra, contrary to fact. In turn, the six delegation members unanimously protested to the MOFA, stating that they would not go without Kōra.³¹

Okazaki issued her a visa at the last minute on the day of departure. Meanwhile in Beijing, Zhou Enlai charged Liao Chengzhi with the task of receiving the Japanese delegation, as chief representative of the Red Cross Society of China. Their meeting resulted in the Agreement on the Issues Concerning Japanese Repatriation, signed by the Red Cross Society of China, the Red Cross Society of Japan, the Japan–China Friendship